

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

ENDC/SC.I/FV.28
20 September 1962

ENGLISH

SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 September 1962, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. SMITHERS

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United Kingdom:

Mr. P. SMITHERS

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Mr. I. SMART

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. A.N. SHEVCHENKO

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. T. PICKERING

Secretariat:

Mr. H. CORNIL

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the twenty-eighth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Unless any other delegation would particularly like to open the proceedings, perhaps I might myself make an opening statement and then see whether any other delegation would like to speak. Would that be agreeable?

At the last meeting of our Sub-Committee I posed three questions to the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/SC.I/PV.27, pp. 9 et seq.) and he was good enough to say that he would consider those and reply to them if he considered that they warranted such a reply at our next meeting (ibid. p.14). But he was also good enough to give an interim reply to those questions, and therefore I thought that procedurally it might be of some convenience if I said something about his interim reply. He might then take into account, in anything he says, the further points which seem to me to arise in the same context.

I have been looking carefully at the record of what the Soviet representative said, and perhaps I might take the points in order. I noticed in the first (ibid.) place that he said that all that he had heard from the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had been a repetition of what had already been said by us at previous meetings. I do think that we ought to try and clear our minds about this matter. Repetition in itself is no bad thing. It may well be true that we have been repeating ourselves to the extent that Mr. Stelle and myself were emphasizing once again at the last meeting how anxious we were to begin detailed negotiations. Representatives of the West have been saying this at almost every meeting and trying to engage in such negotiations. It is our most earnest desire to reach an agreement to halt tests, and we do not see how we can possibly do this unless the Soviet Union does meet us by negotiating. But we have certainly not been repeating -- and this is what I want to emphasize -- a previous precise position adopted by our countries. We have not been repeating, in fact, what we were saying when Mr. Tsarapkin was last present in these discussions. Since then we have come forward with new proposals, and they are proposals which constitute a very great advance from the position we were adopting at the time when Mr. Tsarapkin was previously with us. Far from being what Mr. Tsarapkin calls our "old approach to the question" (ENDC/SC.I/PV.27, p.13), they are very substantial concessions to the Soviet Union, and I really think that the whole world now knows this.

(The Chairman. United Kingdom)

We are not asking for anything approaching the same international system of supervision or for anything like the same system of international detection that we were previously asking for. Nor are we asking for anything like the same degree of international inspection. We are not in fact basing ourselves on our old approach to the question; we have moved a long way, with the purpose of making an agreement with the Soviet Union possible. Mr. Tsarapkin, I do not doubt, knows that perfectly well. I only wish that the Soviet Union would make some attempt to negotiate in the same spirit. If I repeat that once again, I do not mind being reproached for doing so, because we think it so important that our attitude be fully understood.

A little further on in his speech Mr. Tsarapkin said that attempts to begin detailed work on a draft agreement on the basis proposed by the West ran counter "to what the Soviet Union proposes and to what the non-aligned States propose." (ibid.)

All that has been offered and submitted by the Soviet Union is contained in their draft agreement of 28 November 1961. This consists of four short paragraphs. No serious person would say that this could serve as the text of a draft treaty. Moreover, it is certainly not compatible with what has been offered by the neutral States. It makes no provision for inspection or for an international commission. But the eight Powers told us when they presented their memorandum that it was not intended to be a blueprint for a treaty. They wanted the nuclear Powers to provide their own blueprint in discussions between them. We have provided a draft text and we have asked the Soviet representatives to discuss it. Mr. Tsarapkin tells us that our draft runs counter to the memorandum submitted by the neutral States; we have asked him to tell us in detail where the differences exist. We deplore flat statements that our careful and thorough work, which we have submitted for negotiation and not in any way as an ultimatum, is unacceptable without any proper explanation of the reasons why this should be so. We deplore this because we desire to reach agreement, and such an attitude seems to indicate that the Soviet Union does not. But we also deplore it because the whole world is beginning to fear that the Soviet Union wishes to avoid coming to an agreement to halt nuclear tests. When the nations begin to despair, that is a grave and dangerous situation. It is increasingly clear that the responsibility for it lies with the Soviet Union.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

In the face of this situation, I want to make it clear once again that we in Britain think the nuclear menace so grave and terrible that we are prepared to negotiate no matter what discouragements and difficulties are put in our way. When we consider the fearful alternative to halting the race in nuclear arms, our patience is inexhaustible and our determination to reach agreement to halt tests is inflexible.

I must compare this attitude of ours with that of Mr. Tsarapkin. For example, in the second paragraph of his speech at our last meeting (*ibid.*) he said that the Soviet Union was surprised that the West was continuing to maintain its old attitude of insisting on an international system of control when everybody was hoping that we might reach agreement on the basis of control with national means of detection. It is the Western Powers that are entitled to be surprised. The fact is that in our draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) we propose that the detection system should be based mainly on national stations. I can only assume that Mr. Tsarapkin has not yet read our draft treaty. But, as I have already said, our patience is inexhaustible. We will wait until he has studied the treaty, and then we shall look forward to hearing his expression of pleasure that we are in fact proposing an agreement on the basis of a system of control with national means of detection -- just that system which he said "everybody", presumably the Soviet Union included, was hoping we would agree to.

In the third paragraph of his speech Mr. Tsarapkin says: "facts are facts." (*ibid.*, p.14) It is impossible to know whether we are looking at the same set of facts. I do not know precisely what Mr. Tsarapkin had in mind when he spoke of "facts", but perhaps it is fair to assume that he was referring to new scientific and technical data which enable more effective detection and identification of seismic and nuclear events than was possible in 1958. If this is what he meant, then I would ask him to make the facts, as the Russians see them, available to us. We are prepared to make the facts, as we see them, available to them. Let us exchange information. We have asked for this time and time again, and we have had no response. I do not see how we can make progress in this negotiation if only one side is prepared to put its scientific knowledge on the table. It is difficult to believe that a party to a negotiation which alleges that it holds scientific information that if disclosed would at once enable agreement to be arrived at but which refuses to disclose that information, desires the negotiation to succeed.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

I now turn to a paragraph towards the end of Mr. Tsarapkin's speech at the last meeting, when he said that the Western delegations wanted to

"transfer these national means from their own territory to the territory of the Soviet Union and send their own agents there." (ibid., p.16)

How can any justification for such a statement be read into the United States-United Kingdom draft comprehensive treaty? Would Mr. Tsarapkin refer us to the passage in that treaty which justifies his statement? We are not proposing anything of the sort. This appears to be yet another Soviet attempt to invent imaginary reasons for refusing to come to an agreement. We are proposing a minimum of internationally-manned inspections per year on Soviet territory. We are proposing that detection posts on Soviet territory should be operated exclusively by Soviet nationals. In neither of these two cases can there be any question of our attempting to control operations in the Soviet Union with our own agents. No such question could arise, unless the Soviet representative really believes that international civil servants on inspection teams drawn from many Powers, including the neutrals, would automatically operate under the instructions of the United States or the United Kingdom. Such a proposition is obviously ridiculous.

This question is connected with another that I put to Mr. Tsarapkin at our last meeting, and I do hope that he will be able to deal with it. I mean the question of espionage (ibid. p.10). If he is to convince world opinion that the Soviet Union **wants** a test ban treaty, he really must tell us just how he thinks that an international inspection commission could conduct espionage operations in the Soviet Union under the conditions which we have proposed. It seems to us absolutely impossible. But if Mr. Tsarapkin can show us a loophole we will do our best to fill it up to his satisfaction. If, however, no such explanation is forthcoming, the world must draw its own conclusions as to the reason why that is so.

I should now like to take up the point raised by Mr. Tsarapkin in his speech in connexion with the partial treaty (ENDC/59). He said that the three questions which were addressed to him by me were all based on the old position of the Western Powers "... regarding the establishment of an international system of control" (ENDC/SC.I/PV.27, p.14)

Well, to begin with, I would point out that our draft treaty is not based on an international system of control. I again invite Mr. Tsarapkin to read the treaty. This is, after all, a serious subject. The treaty includes neither a commission nor inspection of any kind or description. Of course it involves international agreement and international undertakings. So do all treaties. But there is in it no provision for international control as such.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

More important than this point, however, is the question of whether or not a partial test ban would lead to an improvement in the international atmosphere. Mr. Tsarapkin said that it would not prevent or reduce a future armaments race or avoid future proliferation of nuclear weapons. I must say I find this a truly surprising statement. I simply cannot understand why an international agreement to ban testing in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space could not be regarded as an advance towards eliminating the armaments race. But, even if the Soviet Union would not welcome such a treaty, I am quite certain that the whole of the rest of mankind would do so. If Mr. Tsarapkin denies this, he is indeed remote from the wishes and longings of mankind everywhere, including, if I may say so, ordinary people in the Soviet Union itself. Our partial treaty would not, of course, completely avoid further proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it would go some way towards that. Mankind everywhere longs to hear that we have made at least some progress to stop nuclear tests: it is becoming clear every day for all the world to see that it is not the West that prevents it.

This brings me to the third question which I put to Mr. Tsarapkin at our last meeting (ibid.p.12). I suggested to him that a partial test ban without an uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests would provide a spur to negotiation for a comprehensive test ban treaty -- which of course we should prefer -- but that a partial test ban treaty coupled with an uncontrolled moratorium would, on the other hand, surely lead to delay in negotiations for a comprehensive ban, because the incentive to early agreement would no longer exist. I would much welcome the Soviet representative's reasoned comments on this point, because the matter is of the utmost importance and, if progress is to be blocked by the Soviet Union on this ground, the world is entitled to know why.

There are a number of other passages in the statement of the Soviet representative at our last meeting to which I should have liked to draw attention, but if we could have a clear statement of the Soviet position on those I have already mentioned, which arise from our discussion at the last meeting, that would be at least a step towards a better understanding. In any case, I ask the Soviet representative to believe that I am concerned not with scoring debating points but with trying to persuade him to get down to detailed negotiation. I want to try to narrow the differences between us, not to increase them. I want to

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

understand the difficulties -- at present, I must say, incomprehensible -- which he raises, so that we may solve them. No reasonable person could expect us to be clear, at the moment, about the position of the Soviet Union. We do not see how the Soviet representatives can make the general statements they do, which rebuff every attempt on our part to meet their difficulties, if, as they profess, they really want a test ban treaty.

Any treaty needs negotiation. It needs texts, and those texts require detailed discussion. We have provided texts and we have offered them for discussion; Soviet representatives refuse to discuss them. We have made substantial concessions; the Soviet Union has treated them with scorn. We have asked for scientific co-operation; the Soviet Union has refused it. All of those attempts to find a way to arrive at a test ban agreement are rejected by the Soviet Union. The choice, then, lies with the Soviet Union. Will it now show us how we may progress towards agreement?

My colleagues may have noticed from this morning's newspapers that in the communique issued on Tuesday at the end of the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, sixteen Commonwealth Premiers, representing nearly 740 million people:

"noted that discussions on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests had been taking place in Geneva and expressed the hope that these efforts would be successful in bringing into being an effective treaty to eradicate this source of fear and danger to mankind."

It is to the conclusion of just such a treaty that the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have directed their attention here. If the Soviet Union continues to reject our approaches, it must accept responsibility before the world not only for the continuance of nuclear tests but also for the "fear and danger to mankind" of which the Commonwealth Prime Ministers have spoken. It is my devout hope that, in this first meeting of this Sub-Committee at which I have had the honour to preside, we may begin to make some little progress towards removing from mankind both the fear and the danger.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, speaking today as the representative of the United Kingdom you expressed surprise at the assertion by the representatives

(Mr. Tsararkin, USSR)

of the Soviet Union that the new so-called "draft comprehensive treaty" on the cessation of tests submitted to the Committee jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August (ENDC/58) provides for the establishment of an international system of control with obligatory inspection, and you stated that there was nothing of the kind in the draft treaty submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August. But in order to refute you, I shall quote some of the provisions of your own draft treaty, which will disprove this unjustified assertion of yours.

Let us take article II, headed "Establishment of the International Scientific Commission." Paragraph 1 reads.

"The carrying out of the obligations assumed in Articles I and IX of this Treaty shall be verified by an International Scientific Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission". The Commission shall include an International Staff, hereinafter referred to as the "Staff", and a Verification System, hereinafter referred to as the "System"." (ENDC/58, p.1)

Thus, the international commission has both an international staff and a system of verification. Is this not an international control organization? Certainly this provision is in complete accord with the idea in this regard, expressed perhaps in a slightly different wording, which was set forth in your original draft treaty of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9).

Further article III, paragraph 2, reads:

"The Commission shall maintain supervision of all elements of the System in order to ensure that such elements function in an integrated manner ... " (ENDC/58, p.2)

and to ensure the co-ordination of all elements of the system. This provision also confirms our assertion that in this case the intention is to establish an international system of control.

Paragraph 5 of the same article III reads:

"The Commission shall arrange for observers to be permanently stationed at, and to make periodic visits to, elements of the System in order to ensure that established procedures for the rapid, co-ordinated and reliable collection of data are being followed." (ibid.)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Here, in this paragraph, it is a question of inspectors who are to be permanently stationed at elements of the system, that is to say, foreign agents who will be stationed on the territory of another country. So here again it is a question of an international system.

Paragraph 10 states that:

"The permanent members of the Commission shall arrange for a conference of Parties to the Treaty ...". (ibid., p.3)

Such an element of the international system as a conference of parties existed also in your original draft treaty of 18 April 1961.

Article V, paragraph 2, reads:

"The Staff shall supervise the collection of data by all elements of the System and shall provide the observers who are to be stationed at and make visits to elements of the System for the purposes specified in paragraph 5 of Article III." (ibid., p.4)

What staff is meant in this paragraph? Let us look at article II, paragraph 1, which speaks of an "International Staff". This provision also provides evidence of the fact that an international system of control is intended in your new draft treaty.

Article V, paragraph 5, reads:

"The System shall, in accordance with procedures and standards prescribed by the Commission, collect and report ... " (ibid., p.5)

Thus the system works according to instructions and prescriptions, in co-ordination with and under the supervision of the Commission. As you see, here again in your new draft treaty it is a question of an international control organization in the true sense of the word.

Furthermore, your new draft treaty provides for an Executive Officer, that is the very same administrator about whom we had very lengthy disputes, the idea of such an administrator being completely unacceptable to us. Yet the very same idea has re-appeared in your new draft treaty. The very same idea of international control appears also in article VII which deals with the organization of verification, and in article VIII which deals with on-site inspection. In paragraph 2 of this article it is directly stated that States must assume the obligation to allow on-site inspection on a compulsory basis. Thus, all the elements to which we objected in your draft treaty of 18 April 1961 are also contained in this new draft. There has been no change in this respect. So your assertion, Mr. Smithers, that your new draft treaty is altogether unlike the previous one, that it contains no provisions that

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would justify the statement of the representatives of the Soviet Union that your new draft comprehensive treaty provides for an international system of control, and that there is no foundation for our statement, does not stand up to criticism. As soon as one quotes from your draft treaty of 27 August, all your arguments in rebuttal crumble to dust.

You have spoken a lot about difficulties. You also spoke about difficulties at the last meeting but, Mr. Chairman, I must state categorically that the source of the difficulties in our negotiations is that the Western Powers -- the United States of America and the United Kingdom -- evade accepting the compromise proposals of the non-aligned States. Therefore the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Smithers, at the last meeting and again today cannot fail to cause us disappointment and anxiety about the fate of the negotiations.

In both these statements he tried to make out that the source of the difficulties which the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests have been encountering all along is the position of the Soviet Union. Mr. Smithers tried to saddle the Soviet Union with the responsibility for the obstacles standing in the way to an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. Such a statement, which is contrary to the real situation, can only be explained by one out of two suppositions: either the author of the statement is completely uninformed regarding the course of the negotiations and the positions of the sides and of the non-aligned States, or it is a deliberate distortion of events, facts and positions for the purpose of evading responsibility for the lack of success and the endless dragging out of the negotiations.

I assume that in this case such a statement was made by Mr. Smithers owing to his being inadequately informed, and not with any malicious intention. If that is so, then I shall very willingly make a brief excursion into the past in order to infuse the necessary clarity into the idea which Mr. Smithers has formed regarding the state of affairs in the negotiations. I have all the more reason for doing this since Mr. Smithers, speaking as the representative of the United Kingdom, has said today that repetition in itself is no bad thing (*supra.*, p.3).

The point is that the Geneva negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, since 1959, have been at a complete standstill owing to insuperable differences of opinion on the question of an international system of control over an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. It was a question first and foremost of an international network of control posts and on-site inspection. Fruitless negotiations

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dragged on over a number of years. Last year it finally became apparent that no agreement could be reached on the basis of international control and inspection for the reasons which we have repeatedly pointed out to you. I also made a brief reference to these reasons on 14 September (ENDC/SC.I/PV.26, pp.20 et seq.).

In order to get the negotiations out of the deadlock and to achieve agreement on this important question, on 28 November 1961 the Soviet Government proposed the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water without international control, that is without an international network of control posts and without inspection (ENDC/11). It was proposed to use national means of detecting nuclear explosions for the purpose of control over the fulfilment of an agreement. In submitting such a proposal, the Soviet Government took into account a similar idea put forward by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in their message of 3 September 1961 to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Khrushchev.

In regard to underground nuclear explosions the Soviet Government also proposed that such explosions should be discontinued until the methods of control over them had been worked out within the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In submitting this proposal, the Soviet Government gave our partners in the negotiations an opportunity to get round the unsurmountable difficulties which had arisen in regard to international control and which prevented the conclusion of an agreement, and thus get the negotiations out of the deadlock, out of the state of stagnation.

We consider that on this basis it would be possible to reach agreement quickly at any time, given good will on the part of the Western Powers. Unfortunately, it is still lacking.

The Western Powers showed no interest in this proposal of the Soviet Union, thereby demonstrating that they were unwilling to seek for new ways and means or a new approach, which would make it possible in the existing circumstances to achieve agreement on the question of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

The Western Powers continued to insist on their old positions, demanding the establishment of an international system of control together with obligatory inspection.

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When the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests passed to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament for consideration, eight non-aligned countries, members of the Committee, became convinced that at the present time the question of stopping nuclear weapon tests could not be solved on the basis of the position adopted by the Western Powers.

Faced with the fact of the refusal of the Western Powers to come to an agreement on the basis of the Soviet Union's proposal of 28 November 1961 and being anxious to get the negotiations out of the deadlock and lead them towards an agreement, the eight non-aligned nations put forward a joint memorandum on 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28). That memorandum contained compromise proposals which included something taken from the position of the Western Powers, something from the Soviet proposal and something suggested by the eight nations themselves. All this was put together by them as a genuine compromise proposal. Let us see what this compromise suggested by the eight non-aligned countries consists in essentially.

Mr. Godber, the predecessor of Mr. Smithers, used to say that a compromise would be where there were two extreme positions, that is between **two extreme positions**. That is precisely the situation in the case in question. We have before us two extreme positions. One position is that on which the Western Powers insist and which is set forth in their so-called draft comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests of 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58). The other position is that on which the Soviet Union insists and which is set forth in its draft agreement of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11).

1. The United States and the United Kingdom demand that a definite quota of inspections annually should be laid down in the treaty, whereas in the Soviet proposal of 28 November 1961 no inspection is envisaged. There you have two extreme positions, which are quite obvious.

In their memorandum the eight non-aligned countries allow for visiting the territory of a State where a suspicious and significant event has been recorded, or for the carrying out of on-site inspection. And for this purpose the parties to the treaty could invite the international commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the suspicious event. This proposal of the non-aligned countries is, of course, a new one and is a compromise between the aforementioned extreme positions: that of the Western Powers, on the one hand, and that of the Soviet Union, on the other.

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The Soviet Union has accepted this compromise proposal of the neutrals. If this, one of the most important compromise proposals put forward by the non-aligned States, were to be accepted by the Western Powers, the way to an agreement would be open.

2. The question of an international organ. The aforesaid draft treaty of the Western Powers does in fact provide for the establishment of an international control organization. I have just read out to you some articles and paragraphs of your draft treaty of 27 August, which confirm this statement. A network of international and national control posts would be under the authority of an international scientific commission. It would be entitled to take decisions regarding the despatch of inspection teams. Under the Soviet draft, no international organ is provided for, since control over the fulfilment of obligations would have to be carried out through the use by each of the parties of its own national system of detecting nuclear and thermonuclear explosions and not through an international body. There you have two extreme positions.

In their memorandum the eight non-aligned countries suggest the establishment of an international commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with the appropriate staff. The tasks of this commission would include the processing of all data received from existing national observation posts, consultation with the States parties to the treaty regarding measures for clarifying the nature of a suspicious event and the assessment of such an event. That is all. As you see, this proposal of the non-aligned countries is also a compromise between the position of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the position of the Western Powers, on the other.

We have also accepted this compromise proposal of the non-aligned countries, whereas the United States and the United Kingdom have remained essentially on their old position. There, Mr. Smithers, you have the real reason for the difficulties with which our negotiations are faced, and who is causing them. At the last meeting the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Smithers, displayed an exceedingly high degree of readiness. The propaganda purpose of the following part of his statement is so obvious that I am going to quote it in full.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"We are ready to meet the wishes of the Soviet Union as to the manner in which this should be done. We are ready to take the points of difference between us one by one and to see if there is any way of eliminating them. We are ready to take the points of agreement between us and to incorporate them in the text of a treaty. We are ready to negotiate on the basis of the draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) that we submitted to the Disarmament Committee on 27 August; or we are ready, if the Soviet Union cannot accept the idea of a comprehensive treaty involving a minimum measure of on-site inspection, to negotiate on the basis of the partial draft treaty (ENDC/59) that we submitted on the same day. We are ready to do any of these things. But we do beg the Soviet Union to enter into negotiations with us and to get down to details and to texts." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.27, pp.8-9)

Really, you display truly fabulous generosity in what does not cost you anything, in what cannot lead our negotiations to anything positive. You are ready to meet the Soviet Union halfway as regards how to deal with the difficulties which you have yourself created by refusing to accept the proposal of the non-aligned countries that national means of detecting nuclear explosions be used for control over a treaty and that inspection be carried out only by invitation. You are ready to take one by one the points of difference which have arisen between us as a result of your refusal to accept these proposals of the non-aligned countries. You are ready to incorporate in the text of a treaty the points of agreement between us, which in fact do not exist. You are ready to negotiate on the basis of your draft comprehensive treaty of 27 August, knowing that it is unacceptable to the Soviet Union, as we have already stated officially quite a number of times, because this draft treaty is based on an international system of control and obligatory inspection. You are ready to negotiate on the basis of the United States-United Kingdom partial treaty, which would make it possible to continue nuclear weapon tests and, consequently, would lead to intensifying and extending the nuclear arms race. You are ready to do any of these things, which would not oblige you to change your position on the question of control and inspection.

Is there not too much readiness on your part? You are ready to meet the Soviet Union halfway in everything, only not in following its example and accepting

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the proposals of the non-aligned States regarding the use of national means of detecting nuclear explosions and inspection by invitation for the purposes of control over the fulfilment of a treaty. Yet there is one simple and, at the same time, very effective way to put an end to the difficulties and move the negotiations forward. Neither the recognition by the United Kingdom of the existence of real difficulties nor its readiness to deal with them by studying them in detail is likely to do away with the existing difficulties and move our negotiations forward. The nature and character of these difficulties are well known to all of us and there is no need to make a study of them. It would only lead to sterile discussions and to dragging out the negotiations still further. At present everything turns on the position of the Western Powers. Accept the compromise proposal of the non-aligned States for control over the fulfilment of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests through the use of national means of detecting nuclear explosions, accept the neutrals' proposal for inspection only by invitation on the part of a State and the way to an agreement will be open.

Mr. Chairman, at the last meeting, speaking in your capacity as representative of the United Kingdom, you put to us several questions concerning the position of the Soviet Union in regard to control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet delegation has carefully studied the verbatim record and, frankly speaking, it does not think that the United Kingdom representative really does not have a clear idea of the position of the Soviet Union on these questions. Since, however, these questions have been posed, I shall try to answer them in order to do away with any lack of clarity about which Mr. Smithers spoke.

Referring to my statement at the twenty-sixth meeting of the Sub-Committee, in which I set forth the Soviet Union's fundamental point of view on the question of international control over disarmament and the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, Mr. Smithers asked (ENDC/SC.I/PV.27, p.9) whether this meant that the Soviet Union rejected any control over the fulfilment of an agreement banning nuclear weapon tests, unless there was an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Moreover, Mr. Smithers tried to find even some sort of inconsistency between what we had said at the previous meeting of the Sub-Committee and what the representatives of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin and Mr. Kuznetsov, had said in this regard in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. Actually there are no inconsistencies in the

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statements made by the Soviet representatives and do not try to seek for them, Mr. Smithers, because no such inconsistencies exist.

The position of the Soviet Union is perfectly clear. We have stated it more than once and if anything is still unclear to Mr. Smithers or if he still has any misunderstanding, we are prepared to state our position once again. In this connexion I should like to refer to the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, to the Session of the Supreme Council of the USSR on 24 April 1962. Here is what the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR said -- and I quote:

"The discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is justifiably regarded as part of the problem of general and complete disarmament, since it is only under the conditions of the implementation of general and complete disarmament that all the incentives spurring States to produce ever new forms of nuclear weapons will finally disappear. But actually this question has been isolated as an independent one, and many States, including the Soviet Union, are in favour of putting an end to all nuclear weapon tests immediately, without waiting for the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government is prepared straight away to sign an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, as was proposed by us on 28 November 1961, and the Western Powers know quite well that the Soviet Union would carry it out honestly."

(ENDC/34, p.17)

The Soviet Government also expressed itself in favour of taking as the basis for negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States submitted to the Disarmament Committee on 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28). What is unclear in that, Mr. Smithers? The Soviet Government is in favour of the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and does not make it dependent on whether agreement is reached on general and complete disarmament. By accepting the eight-nation memorandum as the basis for negotiations, the Soviet Union thereby expressed its readiness to agree to the implementation of those control measures of an international nature which are contained in that document, namely to the establishment of an international commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, and to international inspection in the event that a State, party to the treaty, should wish to invite the commission to visit its territory.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

As regards the demand of the Western Powers for the establishment of an international system of control over the cessation of tests, the Soviet Government and the Soviet delegation in the Disarmament Committee and in the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Tests have repeatedly pointed out that at the present time there is no need for such a system. The fulfilment of obligations under an agreement on the cessation of tests can be verified successfully and with adequate assurance by already existing national means of detecting nuclear explosions at the disposal of States. This is fully confirmed by the practical experience of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and other countries in recording such explosions.

At the meeting of the Disarmament Committee on 17 August 1962, the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, pointed out:

"And if we are to talk about why the four-year negotiations in Geneva on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests have been unsuccessful, it must be recognized that their failure to achieve results is due precisely to the desire of the Western Powers to make the solution of the problem of a nuclear test ban treaty dependent upon agreement by the Soviet Union to open its territory for legalized intelligence work under the guise of international control and inspection." (ENDC/PV.71, p.38)

And later on he emphasized:

"At the same time the Soviet Union declared that its security would never be an object of bargaining in the negotiations on the cessation of tests and that any attempt to make this cessation dependent on the opening up of our territory to foreign intelligence could not serve as a basis for an agreement." (ibid., p.40)

It is precisely to this aspect of the matter that we have drawn attention in our statements at previous meetings of the Sub-Committee, and we cannot help being amazed at the fact that Mr. Smithers has discovered or, rather, discerned some inconsistencies in the statements of the representatives of the Soviet Union. We can only account for this by the fact Mr. Smithers is a newcomer to the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and perhaps he has not had an opportunity to study all the documents of the Conference thoroughly and to ponder on them carefully.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Now I should like to infuse some clarity also into the question of on-site inspection. Mr. Smithers tried to create the impression that the Soviet Union had changed its attitude towards the relevant propositions of the eight-nation memorandum. But here again there has been no change in the position of the Soviet Union. In dealing with this question, the representatives of the Soviet Union in the Disarmament Committee have pointed out that we admit that in specific cases scientists, members of the international commission, may be invited to investigate on the site the nature of an event in regard to which there is some doubt. Thus, for instance, the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, stated at the seventy-first meeting:

"...it appears that the formula of on-site inspection by invitation, while not providing for such inspection on an obligatory basis, nevertheless does not preclude the possibility of on-site inspection in specific cases."

(ibid., p.43)

That is our position on this question. If the Western Powers agree with this approach to the solution of the question of control and inspection, the way to an agreement is open. But the whole trouble is that the Western Powers reject the proposals of the non-aligned States in this regard; they reject such a solution of the question and try to impose upon the Soviet Union their old unacceptable proposals providing for the establishment of a system of international control, that is, in other words, a legalized system of intelligence and espionage under the guise of such control.

Mr. Smithers pretends that he is unable to understand the logic behind the argument of the Soviet Government about espionage, and in that connexion he puts before us a whole number of questions. Well, here again we are ready to give you the necessary clarifications, Mr. Smithers.

We have carefully perused the verbatim record of the last meeting and kept track of the logic behind your arguments and this is what we found. At first you asserted that if the Soviet Union were to accept the proposals of the Western Powers, there would not be any danger of espionage. You tried to substantiate this thesis by saying that the new proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom provide for a reduction in the number of inspections and a reduction in the number of international inspectors to be sent into the territory of the Soviet Union. But the real situation

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

is such that Mr. Smithers himself has been obliged in the end to admit that the changes made by the Western Powers in their position would merely reduce any possibilities of espionage and, as you yourselves say, reduce them to negligible proportions. This statement by Mr. Smithers shows that the Western Powers themselves realize that no changes in their proposals on the question of control do away with the possibility of such control being used for espionage purposes. They talk about quantitative changes in the results of espionage activities, but even they themselves do not venture to say that there would be no possibilities of using inspection teams for intelligence purposes.

Mr. Smithers has told us that he and his family travelled for over 2,500 miles through the Soviet Union last summer and that he was never at any point accused of espionage (ENDC/SC.I/PV.27, p.10). He also referred to the fact that many British tourists visit the Soviet Union every year. And in this connexion Mr. Smithers raises the question why the Soviet Union is willing to admit foreign tourists to its territory and at the same time objects to obligatory visits of international inspectors to Soviet territory. Yes, Mr. Smithers, we believe that you really went to the Soviet Union as a harmless tourist for the purpose of getting to know what Soviet people are like at home and, as you stated, you brought back the pleasantest recollections of that visit. As is well known, the Soviet Union is visited by many thousands of tourists from various countries of the world, and they do so with good intentions. Unfortunately, however, the intelligence services of the NATO countries miss no opportunity to send spies and intelligence agents into our country in the guise of tourists. There have been a good number of cases where the Soviet security agencies have unmasked such bogus tourists. They have been reported in the Soviet press and I think that you, as well as Mr. Stelle and Mr. Mark, know all about it. I think that Mr. Smithers will be satisfied by the replies I have given to the questions which he posed at our last meeting, and that now there will be nothing left that is not clear to him on that score.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I would only just like to thank Mr. Tsarapkin for the immense amount of trouble that he has gone to in replying to the points that I put and, if I may step outside the immediate controversy for a moment, to say what a pleasure it is to have a patient and courteous colleague.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

I should merely like to draw his attention to the first part of his intervention in which he responded, or intended to respond, to some remarks of mine today. I think he will find, if he will be so good as to read the verbatim record carefully, that he completely misunderstood what I was trying to say at two points of my speech. I will not elaborate on that, except to apologize for any unclearness on my part, perhaps, in expressing what is, after all, quite a complicated matter; though I dare say that part of the difference between us which arose from the earlier part of his reply today is not really a difference of substance. On further examination, perhaps he will see that he misapprehended what I intended to say.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): My delegation will of course want to read with care what our Soviet colleague has had to say today and may, on some points he made, reply in greater detail at a further meeting; but it does seem to me that there was one very striking distortion of the situation in what Mr. Tsarapkin said, particularly in regard to the eight-nation memorandum.

Mr. Tsarapkin quoted Mr. Godber (*supra*, p. 13) -- quite correctly, as I recall -- as saying that the eight nations had sought to find a compromise, or had sought to urge the two sides to reach a compromise, between the respective extreme positions. Mr. Tsarapkin said that the extreme Soviet position was that put forward by the Soviet Union on 28 November 1961, and he is certainly quite accurate in that statement because this was a position which called for no international control or inspection whatsoever. So that I think we would all agree -- and all the other delegations to this Conference would agree -- that the Soviet position of 28 November 1961 is an extreme position.

But then Mr. Tsarapkin went on to what he characterized as the extreme position of the West. As we know, Mr. Tsarapkin was not here, but Mr. Godber described very accurately what he meant by "the extreme position of the West", and that was the original Western position on inspections which called for automatic obligatory inspection of every unidentified event. There were other what might be called extreme Western positions, and they included having all the staff of detection stations and inspection teams in the Soviet Union composed of United States and United Kingdom nationals.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We all know that the Western delegations made continuing and successive efforts to modify their positions and to change them in the directions for which at that time the Soviet delegation was asking. We all know that in March 1961, in proposals that were later registered in our draft treaty of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9), we made important moves away from previous Western positions towards positions which at that time we sincerely thought would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. We all know that at that time we were rebuffed by the introduction of the troika which would have called for a Soviet veto on every item in the day-to-day operation of the control system. We all know that we went further that summer and tried to move, even then, towards the Soviet position. Furthermore, even after the Soviet proposal of 28 November, which of course came some time after the Soviet resumption of tests, the West again made attempts to move towards the Soviet position.

Mr. Tsarapkin will recall that at the very opening of the Eighteen Nation Conference we called on him informally and then formally proposed a position which we thought was acceptable. This involved the dropping of the threshold and having a comprehensive across-the-board ban on all tests of all kinds in all environments.

Well after the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) was submitted, the United States and the United Kingdom, taking into account that memorandum, submitted their draft comprehensive treaty of 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58), which made further important moves in the directions suggested by the eight nations and which we thought, and still think, would be acceptable to the Soviet Union if they meant what they said -- that is to say, that they accepted the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiation.

Yet today Mr. Tsarapkin tried to characterize the proposals of 27 August 1962 put forward by the Western delegations as an extreme position. Moreover, he indulged in the absurdity of saying that the eight nations thought of their memorandum as a compromise between the extreme position of the Soviet Union of 28 November 1961 and the proposals of the Western delegations of 27 August 1962, which proposals were not in existence at the time the eight-nation memorandum was submitted.

Further, it seems to me that, in spite of the length and the obvious careful preparation of what our Soviet colleague had to say today, he has not given you a clear answer to the first of the questions posed to him by you, Mr. Chairman. This question, as I recall it, asked whether the Soviet delegation was now against the

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

very idea of international control or international inspection, when we had been given to believe, both by Soviet acceptance of the eight-nation memorandum and by statements made by Mr. Zorin and Mr. Kuznetsov, that they had accepted in some guise international inspection and control. I shall want to read carefully what Mr. Tsarapkin had to say today, but it seems to me that he has not yet successfully cleared away the statement he made on 18 September, when he said:

"We have always declared" -- "we" meaning the Soviet Union -- "and it remains our point of view, that the Soviet Union will not agree to any control without disarmament." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.27, p.15)

He went on a little later to say:

"Control over disarmament measures is what we have always insisted upon and will continue to insist upon. We are in favour of such control. But the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is not a disarmament measure. When you try to establish international control over such a measure, disagreements between us are bound to arise." (ibid.)

I submit that that statement, unless it is withdrawn, seems clearly to lead to the interpretation that the Soviet delegation is now repudiating its acceptance of the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiations, for it is clear that the eight-nation memorandum does call for international control and international inspection. I think one sentence will be sufficient on this point, and that is the first sentence of paragraph 3 which reads:

"They believe that possibilities exist of establishing by agreement" -- "by agreement" obviously means an international agreement -- "a system" -- obviously an international system -- "for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis." (ENDC/28)

I do not see how the statements I have quoted from the Soviet representative square with that sentence from the eight-nation joint memorandum.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, I cannot understand the remark you made after my statement, Mr. Chairman, that I had misunderstood you. I listened carefully to the interpreter and wrote down word for word what he said, and that was the text I followed in my reply.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Now I will deal with what has been said by the representative of the United States. He stated that what the Soviet representative said today was a striking distortion of the eight-nation memorandum. Where did he see this distortion of the eight-nation memorandum? He saw it in the fact that in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations the question of inspection is resolved in the sense that inspection may take place by invitation on the part of a State. That is how it is laid down in the memorandum and we accept it. You, Mr. Stelle, go on to ask how our acceptance of the memorandum can be compatible with our statements that we are against allowing international control without disarmament. Yes, we are against it; we always have been and always shall be. What is contained in your draft treaty of 18 April (ENDC/9) and in your draft treaty of 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58), which differ very little from one another, shows that you really want to install an international system of control, but without disarmament. But we do not accept it, we reject it. Remember that once and for ever, and I would advise you never to revert to that theme; it would be wasted labour to try to sell us your consent to the banning of nuclear weapon tests in exchange for which the Soviet Union would throw its doors wide open to your intelligence services. That will not happen; we shall not agree to that. And you must start out from that premise. No matter how often you repeat your demand for obligatory inspection and an international system, nothing will come of it.

The eight-nation memorandum is a compromise. You say that Tsarapkin is mistaken in comparing the eight-nation memorandum with the present proposals of 27 August, which, you say, were not in existence at the time the eight-nation memorandum was submitted. Well, what of that? It is a purely formal point. From the standpoint of formal logic, you may be right, but not as regards the substance, because your draft treaty of 27 August 1962 and your draft treaty of 18 April 1961 are twins. In the last draft of 27 August 1962 there is some change in the wording, some change of a quantitative nature, but none whatever as regards the substance. There are no qualitative differences between these two draft treaties. I have today given you some quotations from this draft treaty. You did not seem to hear me, Mr. Stelle, when I was quoting to you from your own draft treaty, giving passages, articles and paragraphs which show quite clearly that you have in mind an international system of control, that you repeat the same provisions as are contained in the draft treaty of 18 April 1961. In that treaty there was an international commission to which a wide

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network of international control posts was to be subordinated. In the new draft treaty you make a slight change, you subordinate to an international commission a national network of international observation posts. That is the new element which has appeared in your "new" draft treaty.

Then you have the question of the administrator. This figures in the "new" draft treaty just as it did in the old one. The question of obligatory inspection also figured there just as it figures in the "new" draft. Consequently it is not a question of the wording, not a question of your wording now having been slightly changed. It is a question of the substance of the matter, and the substance of the matter remains as it was before, that is the old position remains. Therefore when I compare your draft treaty, I mean the draft comprehensive treaty of 27 August 1962 and I say that it is your extreme position; your position is reflected in it.

The proposals of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) are our position, while the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States is a sort of middle line between these two positions -- the position of the Western Powers and the position of the Soviet Union. It is in this sense that I say that the proposal of the eight non-aligned States is a compromise, and you cannot refute this, Mr. Stelle, because it really is so. I repeat once more, how do the non-aligned States approach the question of inspection?

Whereas we completely reject any inspection in our proposal of 28 November 1961, you insist on obligatory inspection and propose laying down a certain quota, while the neutrals propose neither the one nor the other. They do not insist on obligatory inspection, but they nevertheless admit inspection by invitation. Obviously there is a sort of middle line between these two positions. We have accepted it. Why do you not wish to accept it? After all, that is the only thing that hampers agreement between us. It is just the same in regard to the question of an international system.

Now you have an eclectic mixture: both national stations subordinated to an international commission and the establishment of international control stations. That is not at all what the neutrals suggested. The neutrals suggested building the whole system of control on the basis of existing national means of observation. We accept that too. Accept it likewise as it is written and do not try to interpret it in your own way, because that will lead us into an impasse, into the maze of our old disagreements. You are trying to drag us over to your position which is absolutely unacceptable. I repeat once again: we are against the obligatory inspection which

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you envisage, and we will not accept this proposal. But what the neutrals propose, namely that inspection may take place if and when a State wishes to invite members of the commission to visit its territory or to have an inspection team sent to the site, is something that we accept. Be so good as not to distort facts, but show them as they really are. But if you want us to accept the international system of control which you propose in your treaty, if you want us to accept what you propose in your draft treaty in regard to obligatory inspection, we shall certainly not agree to that, because it is precisely control without disarmament.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): We have always realized that there were three basic elements in the eight-nation memorandum: one of them had to do with the detection system, one had to do with the international scientific commission and one of them had to do with inspections. Certainly I think we will all agree that one of the most important elements in the eight-nation memorandum and one which did call for a compromise was the suggestion that an international detection system might be based mainly upon national networks. It would presumably be nationally manned and nationally operated. This, of course, is one of the very important moves that the West has made in its proposal of 27 August: a move away from and internationally-manned and internationally-operated detection system to an international system of nationally-manned and nationally-operated detection posts under some international supervision. I think I heard Mr. Tsarapkin, in his last remarks today, admit that this was a new element in our proposals, and I am glad he recognizes it as that.

Regarding inspections, there is still a difference of interpretation between us on the eight-nation memorandum, and a very important one.

Regarding the international scientific commission, I cannot believe that the articles on that which Mr. Tsarapkin quoted today from our proposals are all, or are indeed to any real degree, unacceptable to the Soviet Union. I want to study what has been said today, but may I say that I am glad to see that our Soviet colleague gives evidence of having paid careful attention to the proposals that were made by our two Governments on 27 August.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, as Chairman, it falls upon me to thank you for your attendance and to ask you to fix the date of the next meeting. Are there any suggestions as to when we should meet again?

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): If no other representative has any suggestion, I might suggest Tuesday, 25 September.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Would that be acceptable to the Soviet Union?

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In my opinion, there is a very large gap between our meetings, but if you have nothing to say, if there is no change in your position, then there is nothing else to do but agree to hold meetings alternately on Tuesday and Friday.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): My delegation would be more than delighted to meet at any time the Soviet delegation believes it has something new and useful to say in these negotiations. If Mr. Tsarapkin would like to suggest an earlier date for that purpose, we would be delighted.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): How cleverly and promptly Mr. Stelle has turned everything round. What I meant was a change in your position, because we have accepted the neutrals' proposals and it is now your turn to do so. As soon as you are prepared to accept them, we are prepared to prolong our meeting even today and listen to the pleasant news that you accept the neutrals' proposals regarding inspection by invitation and regarding a national system of control. It was in that sense that I made my remark.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): My delegation will be happy to fall in with any suggestions, but unless there is any alternative suggestion to next Tuesday -- and so far I have not received any -- I propose that we meet next Tuesday, 25 September, at 3 p.m.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.