

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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ENGLISH

SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 October 1962, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

(United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. L. WEILER

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. A.N. SHEVCHENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. P. SMITHERS

Mr. I. SMART

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

Secretariat:

Mr. H. CORNIL

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the thirty-second meeting of the Sub-Committee. Does any representative wish to speak?

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today I should like to analyse briefly the reaction of the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, to the various solutions to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests which we have proposed. At the last meeting Mr. Stelle told us that the United States could not agree to a solution of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the Soviet Union's proposal of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11), or on the basis of the proposals contained in the joint memorandum of the non-aligned countries, (ENDC/28) or on the basis of its own proposal for the conclusion of a partial treaty (ENDC/59) with the addition of an undertaking to continue negotiations on the cessation also of underground nuclear weapon tests and an undertaking not to carry out such tests until an agreement has been concluded on the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests as well.

Let us examine the arguments which Mr. Stelle put forward in order to justify this exceptionally rigid, negative and ultimatum-like position of the United States in this Conference. Let us begin with the arguments advanced by Mr. Stelle in order to justify his unwillingness to settle the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the Soviet Union's proposal of 28 November 1961. Against this proposal of the Soviet Union, Mr. Stelle put forward three arguments, each flimsier than the previous one. First, this proposal of the Soviet Union, as Mr. Stelle put it, is unacceptable to the United States because article 3 of this proposal provides for a moratorium on underground nuclear explosions. The United States representative said:

"We have had an unfortunate experience with a voluntary moratorium on tests in the past and with the Soviet Union's observance of unilateral pledges not to test. We do not intend to expose ourselves to another Soviet denunciation of existing restraints on testing by entering again into similar arrangements."

(ENDC/SC.1/PV.31, p.4)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

But allow me to ask you, Mr. Stelle, what denunciation are you talking about? A treaty or an agreement can be denounced; but no international agreement on a moratorium ever existed. Neither you nor we, nor indeed anyone else, ever subscribed to such an agreement. Therefore it is simply impossible to denounce or violate something that has never existed at all. But if we are going to talk about the unilateral declarations previously made by the Governments of the USSR and the United States of America to the effect that they would voluntarily refrain from nuclear tests, then on that score we can remind you once again of some very well known facts.

First of all I should like to remind you of the decision of the Soviet Government in March 1958 to cease unilaterally the testing of nuclear weapons. At that time the Soviet Government addressed an appeal to the other nuclear Powers to follow the Soviet Union's example and to put an end once and for all to all nuclear weapon tests. The whole world knows, however, that the Western Powers replied to this generous initiative of the Soviet Union with a series of nuclear weapon tests of unprecedented intensity and duration.

In connexion with this question I should also like to recall the statement of the United States President, Mr. Eisenhower, of 29 December 1959, when he openly announced to the whole world that the period of validity of the voluntary moratorium accepted by the United States would expire on 31 December 1959 and that after that date the United States would consider itself free to resume nuclear weapon tests. As you see from this statement by the United States President, it is perfectly clear who renounced the obligation in respect of the moratorium and on whose initiative the moratorium was terminated. In the light of this officially declared political line of the United States, people can only be astonished at the liberties which you take in dealing with facts, Mr. Stelle.

I can also remind you that it was precisely during that period of time that France, an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom, was continuing to conduct nuclear explosions in the interests of the whole of the NATO military bloc. To this must be added the fact that the Western Powers were continuing day after day to increase the pace of the arms race and military preparations, openly engaging in sabre-rattling and threatening to unleash a nuclear war against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States. Naturally, with such a dangerous development of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

events, the Soviet Union, being anxious for its security and for the maintenance of universal peace, could not fail to take the necessary measures to strengthen the defensive capability of the Soviet State, and accordingly it was compelled to carry out a series of nuclear tests. At present we have a possibility of solving the question of a moratorium, not on the basis of unilateral declarations, but on the basis of a formal international agreement. A moratorium which depends only on a unilateral arbitrary decision could lose all meaning at any time, as happened, for instance, on 29 December 1959 after the statement of President Eisenhower, which I have just referred to. But a moratorium laid down in the text of a treaty or an agreement would represent a formal international undertaking. The difference, as you see, is a substantial one, and it is exceedingly odd that the representatives of the Western Powers should pretend not to understand that what is now proposed is to reach an agreement on a moratorium of an altogether different nature. I emphasize once more that we are now talking about an international agreement which would have international legal force, that is, the force of an international obligation, which was never the case before. And there was no "unfortunate experience", as you described it at the last meeting, Mr. Stelle, except President Eisenhower's statement of 29 December 1959.

Consequently, your first argument does not stand up to criticism and is utterly unsubstantiated.

I now pass on to Mr. Stelle's second argument. His second argument against the Soviet Union's proposal of 28 November 1961 is that the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests without the establishment of international control, as provided for in paragraph 3, would be contrary to paragraph 6 of the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations. In that paragraph, as we know, it is stated that disarmament measures - I draw attention to these words - disarmament measures should be implemented under international control. But, in the first place, the cessation of tests is not a disarmament measure and, consequently, this principle, speaking strictly juridically, is not applicable here. In speaking of a gross violation of this principle, Mr. Stelle is stretching a point too far. Secondly, the moratorium we propose would be of a temporary nature. And, thirdly, the technical means available today for detecting nuclear explosions make it possible to carry out national control also over compliance with an agreement on a moratorium.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Thus your second argument, Mr. Stelle, is likewise unsubstantiated. That argument cannot convince anyone that underground nuclear weapon tests should continue after a treaty has been concluded.

I now pass on to Mr. Stelle's third argument. He stated that a moratorium on underground nuclear weapon tests could well serve to inhibit a further formal agreement on an effective underground nuclear test ban, rather than to promote it, because the Soviet Union would have no incentive to abandon the moratorium arrangement.

Frankly speaking, we are simply astounded by this sort of logic, if indeed we can call it logic, of the representatives of the Western Powers, who try to assert with a straight face that a partial treaty without a moratorium on underground tests, that is a treaty under which underground nuclear weapon tests would continue, would be a "great spur" to the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of all tests, whereas such a treaty, but with a moratorium on underground nuclear tests, would hamper the solution of the question of a definitive ban on underground nuclear weapon tests. But what sort of logic is that, gentlemen? According to you, it turns out that the continuation of nuclear weapon tests, in other words the further improvement of nuclear weapons and the further continuation of the nuclear arms race, would facilitate the achievement of an agreement to ban underground tests. If one carried on this sort of reasoning somewhat further, one could say that war itself would be the best spur for a struggle against war; therefore let us have a war in order to facilitate the emergency and development of a spur to the prohibition of war, the development of a spur to general disarmament. But such arguments are simply absurd and are a striking illustration of how the Western Powers go against common sense in their reasoning, merely in order to keep their hands free for the continuation of nuclear weapon tests.

Anyone not devoid of common sense will understand that it is precisely when there are no nuclear weapon tests at all anywhere, and in those conditions alone, that it will be possible to ensure the speediest possible agreement in regard to extending the treaty to cover underground nuclear explosions as well.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

As for Mr. Stelle's statement that the Soviet Union proposes an indefinite "uncontrolled moratorium", here again the United States representative is indulging in an obvious distortion. What grounds have you for drawing such a conclusion? No such conclusion follows from our proposal.

The Soviet Government proposes that the moratorium on underground nuclear tests should remain in force while negotiations are being conducted and until agreement is reached on the definitive banning of underground nuclear weapon tests as well.

Consequently, all the arguments of the Western representatives against a moratorium on underground tests, as my analysis has shown, are unconvincing, and only the complete unwillingness of the Western Powers to come to an agreement can explain the fact that they stubbornly continue to cling to these flimsy arguments.

I shall now deal with the explanations to which the Western Powers have recourse in order to justify their refusal to solve the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the proposals of the non-aligned States. Everyone can see that in this regard the Western Powers are in a very embarrassing situation. At first they were up in arms against the neutrals' memorandum and rejected it outright, and then they suddenly had second thoughts, because they saw that such a bluntly negative attitude to the proposals of the neutral States met with condemnation throughout the world, and the Western Powers had recourse to new, more subtle tactics while completely retaining their negative attitude to the substance of the neutrals' proposals. Now the Western Powers say that they and the Soviet Union interpret the neutrals' proposals in different ways; there are differences in regard to the interpretation of the memorandum by the Western Powers, on the one hand, and by the Soviet Union, on the other. These differences, so the Western Powers declare, concern the nature of inspection and the organization of an international system of control. In short, the Western Powers continue to adhere to their old positions, insisting on obligatory inspection and the establishment of an international system of control, and they cover this up by groundless and unsubstantiated references to alleged differences in interpreting the neutrals' memorandum. The weakness and groundlessness of the position of the Western Powers on this question has been revealed very clearly.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Finally, I have something to say about the position of the Western Powers in regard to a partial treaty. On this question the Western Powers and ourselves appear to be closer to one another. There is, however, a difference and a very substantial one. It consists in the fact that we propose to reach agreement and conclude such a partial treaty as would leave no loop-hole for the continuation of underground nuclear tests. But that is precisely what the Western Powers are unwilling to agree to.

At the last meeting the United States representative made a statement from which it follows quite clearly that the United States does not wish to take into account either the position of the Soviet Union or the position of the non-aligned States, or again the demands of the peoples of the world, and insists that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should be reached only on those terms which would suit the interests of the United States and its allies in military blocs, that is to say, on terms providing for the continuation of nuclear weapon tests. The United States does not even want to hear about an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis, that is on the basis that no nuclear tests would be carried out - either underground or above ground. It was not by chance that at the last meeting of the Sub-Committee Mr. Stelle attacked the idea that after concluding a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, States should give an undertaking to refrain from underground nuclear weapon tests as well, while negotiations were being conducted for the definitive banning of underground tests.

Thus the United States is categorically opposed to the idea of a moratorium on underground nuclear weapon tests, that is against the idea which has become urgent and which in the present circumstances opens up a possibility of getting out of the deadlock in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The United States is opposed to this idea which meets with the widest support throughout the world. It is opposed to the idea which has been repeatedly put forward in one form or another by the representatives of the non-aligned States in the Disarmament Committee and which has several times been expressed in resolutions of the most representative international forum - the United Nations General Assembly.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Soviet Government and the Soviet delegation in the Disarmament Committee and in the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests have already pointed out that the Soviet Union, being anxious that the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should be real and not illusory, cannot leave open the question of underground nuclear weapon tests, nor can it agree to the conclusion of an agreement which would allow for the possibility of continuing nuclear tests in any environment whatsoever.

Is it not clear that if an agreement were concluded which would not impose any restrictions on the carrying out of underground nuclear explosions, such an agreement could only create a false impression in the minds of the peoples of the world and cause them to have the illusion that an end had been put to competition in the business of improving nuclear weapons and creating new types, whereas nothing of the sort had been done? The United States and the United Kingdom insist that the treaty should allow underground nuclear weapon tests to be continued. But such a treaty would mean the continuation of the arms race and the replenishment of the arsenals of States with ever new types of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

We have already pointed out on many occasions that in the matter of putting an end to tests there must be no half measures; there must be no chinks, cracks or weak spots. An agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is intended to play the role of a sort of dam which would block the way to the further improvement of nuclear weapons and the creation of new types; which would bar the way to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and slacken the arms race.

If, however, as a result of the negotiations we were to conclude an agreement which would still make it possible in the future to conduct nuclear weapon tests, the question of which environment they would be carried out in would have no significance of principle, and it goes without saying that those States which are sufficiently advanced from the scientific, technical and economic standpoint to organize the production of their own nuclear weapons would get from such an agreement an incentive to take the course of carrying out their own nuclear tests. If an agreement on the cessation of tests were to allow any exceptions whatsoever, if there were to remain in it any loop-holes for the continuation of nuclear tests, then other States would intensify still further their efforts to create their own nuclear weapons, and it would hardly be possible for anyone to blame them for acting in such a way.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is obvious that the question of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests must be solved in one way or another - either by way of a comprehensive treaty or by way of a partial treaty with a moratorium. If the Western Powers were to adopt a reasonable and realistic position, we could quickly achieve an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests for ever.

Unfortunately, the unwillingness of the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom to agree to the cessation of underground nuclear tests deprives us of the possibility of making headway. At the present time it is only the position of the United States and the United Kingdom that is holding up the solution of the problem of the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests.

As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev stated in a talk with a delegation of the Gandhi Foundation for World Peace on 1 October 1962, the Soviet Union will continue to strive for a solution to the question of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

The Head of the Soviet Government emphasized that if the Western Powers are not ready to come to an agreement at the present time to ban all nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Union is willing to sign a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and to continue negotiations for the cessation of underground tests as well; and during such negotiations, until agreement is reached, all the nuclear Powers should refrain from conducting such tests. Mr. Khrushchev also pointed out that the Soviet Government was prepared to take as a basis for the solution of the question of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests the proposals which India and other neutral States had submitted to the Disarmament Committee for consideration.

Such is the position of the Soviet Union. We are waiting for the Western Powers to show at last good will and the desire to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests as quickly as possible by concluding an agreement in this respect on a realistic, mutually acceptable basis. You have a number of alternatives, you have a number of possibilities; it is for you to decide.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Does any other representative wish to speak? The representative of the United Kingdom.

Mr. SMITHERS (United Kingdom): I am sure that the representative of the Soviet Union, with his great knowledge and experience of these negotiations, would be the first to recognize that there is nothing new in the summary of Soviet arguments which he has given us this afternoon and that there was nothing new in the suggestion thrown out by Chairman Khrushchev to a visiting Indian delegation in Moscow, to which he referred. That suggestion appeared to be a statement of the now well-known attitude of the Soviet Government, in which it has not varied in essence since last November. In the circumstances I thought that today I would try to present a short summary of some of the questions which seem to me to be outstanding in these negotiations and to which I should have thought it would not be difficult for answers to be provided.

At the twenty-sixth meeting of this Sub-Committee I tried to set out what the United Kingdom delegation was trying to achieve. We would continue our efforts to remove the difficulties which have so far stood in the way of agreement on a nuclear test ban. I said:

"... we have been indefatigable in our search to find ways of meeting the Soviet demands, unreasonable though those demands may be, so that the Soviet Union may be willing to reach agreement." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.26, p.19)

I suggested that we should begin:

"... not by declaring all the matters upon which we disagree, but, first of all, by emphasizing those on which we are agreed. Surely thus far the Soviet Government should be able to go." (ibid. p.18)

Unfortunately, from their attitude towards the draft proposals which we have put forward, it does not appear that the Soviet Union is willing to go that far. Therefore, in subsequent meetings I have been trying to take the remaining matters upon which we are disagreed and, as I said at our twenty-sixth meeting:

"... one by one, examine them in detail to see whether there is any way of narrowing the differences between us." (ibid. p.18)

The response of the Soviet representative to all the efforts of my United States colleague and myself to enter into any real negotiations has been to make the totally unsubstantiated claim that we are merely standing on our old position, which could not serve as a basis for negotiation. This he keeps repeating although the

(Mr. Snithers, United Kingdom)

substantial concessions made by the West to the Soviet Union are now generally recognized. We fully recognize the existence of difficulties and differences between us but so far from ignoring those and presenting our draft treaties on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, we expressed the hope, as I put it at our twenty-seventh meeting:

"... that the Soviet Union will be willing to discuss the difficulties with us to see whether, by detailed examination ... and by negotiation, we could find the means to remove these difficulties and to reach agreement."

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.27, p.8)

My main purpose, therefore, has been to try to find out what is at the root of these difficulties from the point of view of the Soviet Union -- to try to grasp and understand them in order to see whether some way around them can be found. It is a pity that Mr. Tsarapkin has not been more co-operative. His response has merely been once again today to say that the way to remove the difficulties is for the West to swallow the Soviet Union's propositions hook, line and sinker. It is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union will not help us to appreciate its own problems. The Soviet representative seems reluctant even to clarify the position of his own Government. We must take it, as he put it again today, without explanation. It seems to us that before we can reach agreement we must really be able to understand that position.

In my efforts in this direction I asked three questions at our twenty-seventh meeting. The first was whether the Soviet representative, in saying that any international inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union was impossible short of an agreement on disarmament, was going back on statements made by Mr. Zorin and Mr. Kuznetsov that international inspection under a nuclear test treaty would in certain circumstances be acceptable. Although we are now in our thirty-second meeting, we still await an answer to that important question.

My second question, following on from this, was how espionage would really be feasible

"under any scheme even remotely resembling the proposals which we have put forward." (ibid. p.10)

(Mr. Smithers, United Kingdom)

How is it that the Soviet Union does not regard tourists, inspection by invitation or inspection under an agreement on general and complete disarmament as posing an unacceptable espionage risk, but regards inspection under our proposals as making this risk too great to bear? Why is it that such inspection should be more dangerous, or more conducive to espionage? If we knew the answer to that question, we might be able to find a solution. We have asked our Soviet colleague to tell us. He still has not done so.

My third question at the twenty-seventh meeting was to seek elucidation as to how the acceptance of the Western partial treaty would deter rather than encourage efforts towards a comprehensive treaty. We have had many words in reply to this; we have had more today, but really no explanation which a rational person could accept. I have had to press these questions time and again, because the Soviet representative seems unwilling to give a really clear and unequivocal answer to them. It is hard to believe that he does not want us to understand the Soviet position. Yet when we have asked him to substantiate his claim that our draft comprehensive treaty runs counter to the eight-nation memorandum he has declined to discuss with us in detail where the differences exist and has instead responded with an attempt to make the memorandum mean the same thing as the Soviet proposals of last November.

I am afraid I must return for a moment to the question of espionage, for it has not yet been explained by the Soviet representative why, as I said at the twenty-ninth meeting (ENDC/SC.I/PV.29, p.17), the Soviet Union is prepared to run the alleged risk of permitting thousands of tourists to visit the country every year when many of them, he says, may be spies from the NATO countries, while, on the other hand, it is not prepared to allow a relatively insignificant number of impartial inspectors from an international commission to visit the Soviet Union. The Soviet representative thinks that NATO spies are sent to the Soviet Union in the guise of tourists. But how could this risk arise under our comprehensive treaty when neither the Pentagon nor NATO generals could designate the small inspection area indicated by scientific instruments as the location of the unidentified event, when neither the Pentagon nor NATO generals need visit the area so designated, when even the impartial inspection team would be allowed to visit only a small, strictly defined area in the Soviet Union, and when the Soviet Union could prescribe the route and accompany the inspectors? We still await an answer to this question. How could espionage possibly take place under such circumstances?

(Mr. Smithers, United Kingdom)

In fact, logically, the Soviet Union should be far more ready to accept the inspection proposals under our draft comprehensive treaty -- which is of course the one we would like best -- than to accept foreign tourists or to accept inspection under an agreement on general and complete disarmament; for, if it is true, as the Soviet Union claims, that national networks are adequate to identify all underground events, then under our proposals there need be no inspection at all. The representative of the Soviet Union has not explained the paradoxical attitude of his Government on this matter.

Alternatively, we have asked, why does the Soviet Union not remove this obstacle, which only it recognizes as an obstacle to signing an effective test ban treaty, by bringing its scientists here to prove to us that there is no need for on-site inspection? This important question, often repeated, also remains unanswered. At our last meeting, for example, Mr. Tsarapkin again spoke of Soviet advances in seismology (ENDC/SC.I/PV.31, p.19). I therefore suggested to him that Soviet scientists should come to Geneva to tell us about them (ibid), but the Soviet representative did not say why this cannot be done. I agreed at our last meeting that there was indeed a universal demand that all nuclear weapon testing should cease. I then asked whether our Soviet colleague did not agree that, under our partial treaty, advanced industrial Powers would be more likely to join in this universal demand and less likely to begin testing themselves (ibid. p.12). I listened to what the Soviet representative had to say today, but I still cannot understand why he thinks that under the Western draft partial treaty industrial Powers would suddenly begin testing because an international agreement had banned tests in three environments, although they are not doing so today when in fact they are perfectly free to do so. Again the question remains unanswered, except for a line of reasoning which is intended to answer it but which really seems to have no relevance to the conclusion.

What amounts to a flat unsubstantiated statement is the only basis for the Soviet rejection of a treaty which would free the world from tests in three environments. A principal object of our draft partial treaty, as Lord Home put it in the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September:

"... is to save the world from fall-out. The Assembly will want to know why, with the objection of espionage removed -- because there is to be no inspection and no condition -- the Russians, along with their friends, are refusing to allow the fall-out to end."

(Mr. Smithers, United Kingdom)

I notice that in the last sentence of a statement made by the Soviet Government on 28 August 1959 it was said that the Council of Ministers of the USSR had resolved that the Soviet Union would

"continue the struggle for the complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests, regarding this as an important step towards stopping the nuclear arms race and averting the threat to the lives and health of millions of people."

That statement speaks of the "nuclear arms race" and of a "complete cessation". But, so far as the threat to the lives and health of millions of people is concerned, the Soviet Union need not struggle very hard to have that cease. All it has to do is to agree to our partial treaty. I should think that not only the United Nations General Assembly would want to know why the Soviet Union cannot do this and would want to have a valid explanation; we in this Sub-Committee would like to know, and indeed the whole world is waiting for that convincing explanation.

We have proposed in treaty form an agreement which would ban those tests causing fall-out, which we ask the Soviet Government to accept if it will not accept our proposal to ban all tests in all environments. We have drafted and submitted treaties because, as I said at our last meeting, "... we think it is the only way of making progress." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.31, p.10) Indeed, I see from the records that the Soviet Union was of the same opinion, as to the method, in the context of general and complete disarmament, when the Eighteen Nation Committee began its deliberations. The Soviet Union then submitted a disarmament plan in treaty form and criticized the Western delegations for not doing the same. Therefore at our meeting last Tuesday I asked:

"... if our method of progress is not acceptable, what more practical method is there?" (ibid. p.11)

We are still waiting for an answer as to a practical method of translating intentions into agreement and agreement into action.

I hope that the Soviet representative will also give me a reply to the second question I posed at last Tuesday's meeting, namely:

"... why the Soviet Government assumes that international civil servants would be liable to conduct espionage on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies..." (ibid., p.12)

(Mr. Snithers, United Kingdom)

Are we to take it that the Soviet Government expects such conduct of international civil servants as a matter of course? If so, I must say that it is a serious reflection upon international civil servants in the United Nations and other organizations and, in my experience, an entirely unwarranted one.

By posing a series of questions I have not been asking the Soviet representative to compromise himself. We are not asking him to give anything away. We are not asking the Soviet Union to accept a breach in its security. We are only asking our Soviet colleague to do as much as we have done: that is, to explain his position and his difficulties fully and frankly so that we may try to meet them. I repeat what I said at our last meeting:

"We have said that we are prepared to negotiate. We will do our best to devise means to meet the Soviet Union's fears, if the real basis for those fears is explained to us. That surely is not too much to ask." (ibid. p.13)

Let me put it in another way. Any party to a negotiation who desires the negotiation to succeed seeks to present a case which is logical and convincing. If obscurities and contradictions in that case are pointed out, it is the natural desire of any party wishing to arrive at agreement to explain them to the satisfaction of the other parties concerned. One would, therefore, imagine that the Soviet Union would seize upon the opportunity presented by our questions to restore some credibility to a negotiating position which by now must seem to any impartial observer to be absolutely untenable. If the Soviet Union showed even the smallest desire to put its own case in better posture, we should be greatly encouraged. It would be an indication that it wanted these negotiations to succeed.

I, therefore, content myself at this meeting by drawing the attention of our Soviet colleague to the long list of questions posed to him, to which he has as yet given no answer. All are questions which any party wishing to come to an agreement would be willing and, indeed, eager to answer. All are questions which need to be answered if agreement is to be reached. Our Soviet colleague has an encyclopaedic grasp of these matters, born of long experience. If there are convincing answers to any of these questions, no man is better able to give them to us than he, provided that his instructions allow him to do so. Nobody, I am sure, appreciates better than he does that a determined refusal to provide the answers can only be interpreted

(Mr. Smithers, United Kingdom)

by the world at large in one way. Such a refusal to elucidate the contradictions, the illogicalities and, if I may say so, the absurdities of the Soviet position, which are now patent for all the world to see, can only lead us to one general and comprehensive question. Is the representative of the Soviet Union content to let the world arrive at the only and inevitable conclusion which follows from his attitude: namely, that the Soviet Government is determined to avoid coming to an agreement to halt nuclear tests? It is because the Government and people of the United Kingdom most earnestly desire such an agreement, and consider it urgently necessary for all mankind, that I put these questions to the Soviet representative and thus give him once again the opportunity to demonstrate that his Government shares our desires.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, I should like to speak in my capacity as representative of the United States. My delegation, of course, will await with very great interest the reply of the Soviet representative to the questions which have been reviewed today as having been posed to him before by the United Kingdom representative. In particular, of course, we shall await with very great interest the Soviet representative's reply to the last general question addressed to him by the representative of the United Kingdom.

This afternoon I should like to comment briefly on the statement made here by the Soviet representative. Mr. Tsarapkin did me the courtesy of referring frequently to the statement that my delegation made at our last meeting. He spent a good deal of time in attempting to counter the reasons we had given as to why the proposal of the Soviet Union of 28 November 1961, for a cessation of all weapon tests without any international control, was and is unacceptable to the United States. The Soviet representative claimed that the United States had no reason to find it a deplorable experience when the Soviet Union resumed testing in the autumn of 1961. He referred, and quite accurately, to the statement of the President of the United States on 29 December 1959 that the United States considered itself, after 31 December 1959, free from any moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. It is quite true that President Eisenhower did make that statement. However, the Soviet representative did not refer to the address by Premier Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960, some two weeks after President Eisenhower's statement.

(The Chairman, United States)

In his statement to the Supreme Soviet, Premier Khrushchev referred to the negotiations in Geneva among the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom on the discontinuance of what he described as "experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons". Premier Khrushchev referred specifically to the statement of President Eisenhower and deplored that statement. Premier Khrushchev referred to a resolution of the United Nations which called upon the participants in the Geneva negotiations to make even greater efforts to accelerate the conclusion of an agreement and not to resume nuclear arms tests, and noted that the delegations at the United Nations of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom had voted for this appeal. He then went on to say:

"In this connexion I would like to re-emphasize that the Soviet Government, with a view to safeguarding the most favourable conditions for the working out in the very near future of an agreement on the discontinuation of tests, will continue to abide by its pledge not to renew experimental nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union, if the Western Powers do not start testing atomic and hydrogen weapons."

There was, therefore, a clear statement on the highest level of the Soviet Government that the Soviet Union would not be the first to test. The essence of that statement was repeated several times subsequently by authorized representatives of the Soviet Union, including the present representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, and yet in the fall of 1961 the Soviet Union did test first. This the United States found a deplorable experience.

The Soviet representative went on to argue that that portion of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles -- to which both his Government and my Government have subscribed and which has indeed been adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly -- which says

"6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations." (ENDC/5, p.2)

did not apply to a test ban because -- and here again he used the somewhat threadbare Soviet argument -- a test ban would not be disarmament.

It is very clear that a test ban would be what we might call preventive, or anticipatory, disarmament. If we had agreed on an effective test ban treaty before any of our three countries had tested a hydrogen weapon, I think none of us would deny that the disarmament problems of the present day would be very much less severe; today,

(The Chairman, United States)

in all probability, there would not be the explosions of weapons of vast megaton power which are now occurring with such frequency in the Soviet Arctic. In any case, any measure which slows down the arms race is, in the broadest sense of the term, disarmament. The Soviet representative merely uses this claim that a test ban would not be disarmament so as consciously to avoid the requirement of strict and effective international control which is called for in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles.

The Soviet representative went on again to repeat that there was no technical necessity for on-site inspection to identify unidentified events. That is a claim which has frequently been made. It is one which has not been proved by the submission of scientific evidence, and it is one which we believe we have disproved by the submission of scientific evidence.

Then the Soviet representative went on to question sharply my statement that if there were an agreement on a partial treaty and an agreement on a moratorium for underground tests the incentive would be removed for the Soviet Union to reach agreement on a comprehensive treaty with adequate controls for underground tests. I do not understand his question, for what the Soviet Union proposed on 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) was just that; and if this proposal for an uncontrolled, unpoliced moratorium on underground tests were accepted it is certainly difficult to see why the Soviet Union, which makes such strenuous objections to any kind of effective inspection, should go on to agree to a comprehensive treaty which would include adequate provisions for inspection and control.

In his statement today the Soviet representative did not question what was the main thesis of my statement at our last meeting, namely, that the so-called three choices which the Soviet Union was presenting to us presumably to choose from were in fact, each and every one of them, the same thing, and were in essence the Soviet proposal of 28 November 1961 -- for the Soviet Union's interpretation of the eight-nation Memorandum (ENDC/28) would call for national detection systems without co-ordination by an international system, and would call for no inspections except at the whim of the State on whose territory an unidentified event had taken place.

(The Chairman, United States)

That is clearly the Soviet Union's interpretation of the eight-nation Memorandum, essentially the same as the proposal of 28 November 1961 for a cessation of tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space and an uncontrolled, uninspected moratorium on underground tests. The offer by the Soviet delegation to accept the proposals made on 27 August 1962 by the United Kingdom and the United States (ENDC/59) for a partial treaty, with, however, the addition of a moratorium on underground tests, is of course clearly the same as the position of 28 November 1961 and is, as our United Kingdom colleague has pointed out, precisely what Chairman Karushchev referred to recently. So the Soviet representative did not deny that the Soviet Union's proposal of 28 November 1961, the Soviet Union's interpretation of the eight-nation memorandum and the Soviet Union's acceptance of the Western partial treaty with the addition of a moratorium on underground shots were all the same thing; and I do not think he can deny it. We are waiting for movement on the part of the Soviet delegation.

There is, however, one thing I should add. The Soviet representative's statement of today tried to make out that the United States was rejecting the eight-nation Memorandum. The United States has taken the eight-nation Memorandum into account in the draft comprehensive treaty which it submitted jointly with the United Kingdom delegation. We do not reject it; we have used it; we have accepted many of its central ideas. What we reject is the Soviet Union's interpretation of the eight-nation Memorandum, which would re-shape it into a re-statement of the Soviet Union's extreme position of 28 November 1961; and, as I say, we await movement by the Soviet Union from that position.

Mr. TSARUKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a few brief remarks in connexion with the statement made today by the United Kingdom representative and the statement you made in your capacity as representative of the United States. The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Smithers, has said that he sees nothing new in the summary of Soviet arguments and that he sees nothing new in the Soviet proposals. Just what are you expecting from us in the way of something new, Mr. Smithers? The question

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is not one that can be given a new look or replaced by some other problem. No, on this question we cannot change our position, and we shall go on insisting on an agreement to stop all nuclear weapon tests without any loop-holes whatsoever. So do not wait for anything new in our position and do not expect any changes.

The question is whether all nuclear weapon tests will cease or whether tests will continue. The Soviet Union insists that we should reach agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, and thereupon the United Kingdom representative says that there is nothing new in the statement of the Soviet representative. Today the United Kingdom representative has again broken into lamentations over the fact that he keeps on trying but completely fails to understand what it is we differ on, what the differences between us consist in and how they are to be overcome. Well, Mr. Smithers, what we differ on is that you insist on obligatory inspection and the establishment of an international system of control, whereas we propose that this question should be solved through the use of national systems of control, for one thing, and without obligatory inspection, for another. That is what the neutral countries also call upon you to accept. By insisting on your old position, you are in opposition not only to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, but to all the neutral countries as well. In short, on this question the Western Powers are in opposition to all the rest of the world.

The United Kingdom representative said: "The Soviet representative seems reluctant even to clarify the position of his own Government." Well, I make allowance for the various rhetorical devices and sophistries which you use in abundance in your speeches, but in saying that the Soviet representative is reluctant even to clarify the position of the Soviet Union, you have gone a bit too far, Mr. Smithers, you have gone a bit too far. Please read the verbatim records and you will find in them the answers to all your questions. In particular, I can remind you of the verbatim record of the twenty-eighth meeting, during which I spoke at considerable length in connexion with your questions, and I have no intention of reverting to the matter.

(Mr. Tserapkin, USSR)

In connexion with the questions raised by the United Kingdom representative, I must say that the main point is that all the questions of the kind he referred to are intended to obscure the fact that our negotiations are making no headway not because you are not clear about certain details, most of which, we must say quite frankly, have no bearing on our negotiations, but because the Western Powers continue to adhere to their old positions, to their old approach to the solution of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests by insisting on obligatory inspection and the establishment of an international system of control, and because of their refusal to come to an agreement on the basis of a national form of control over the observance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. As soon as the Western Powers are willing to come to an agreement on a realistic, mutually acceptable basis; as soon as they agree that control over the observance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should be carried out by national systems; as soon as they abandon their demand for obligatory inspection, then, I assure you, you will take back all your questions, because, I emphasize once again, all your questions are intended to obscure the main reason for our failure to make any headway. That reason, I repeat, is that you continue to insist on your old demands which are unacceptable and on the basis of which there is no possibility of reaching agreement.

The questions you raised have no bearing whatsoever on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, as, for instance, your request that we should explain how an international control system could be used for intelligence and espionage purposes. I really cannot give you such explanations. Then there is your persistent attempt, Mr. Smithers, to drag the question of tourists into our discussions. I cannot see any reason why we should be concerned with tourists. It is completely beyond me. Then again, for instance, there is your persistent attempt to involve our negotiations in a maze of fruitless, never-ending technical controversies. That attempt was manifested in your proposal to convene another conference of scientists and experts. We know what that would lead to, Mr. Smithers. We know. You may not know, but I know from experience that a technical conference would merely lead to endless controversies, discussions and a deadlock. I admit that perhaps that is not exactly what you want, but we have no intention of being a partner to you or cooperating with you in that respect.

(Mr. Tsaraphin, USSR)

I must say that all such questions are just a way of bringing the negotiations to a standstill, blocking them. All of them are trivial and artificial. They side-track the issue. And, of course, all of them - I emphasize this once again - will disappear as soon as you stop insisting on your old position and show a willingness to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable basis.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, perhaps we could set the time for our next meeting. If there are no other suggestions, should we meet on Tuesday, 9 October, at 3 p.m.?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.