

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE  
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 28 August 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman

Mr. KUZNETSOV

(Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN: (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): (translation from Russian): The twenty-fourth meeting of the Sub-Committee is called to order.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Yesterday my Government and the Government of the United Kingdom presented to the Conference two important and significant nuclear test ban treaty drafts. The first (ENDC/58), covered the banning of tests in all environments and the second (ENDC/59) a partial ban limited to prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. The United States Government is prepared, as soon as it can be negotiated, to sign either draft.

Today we are meeting under the cloud of continuing tests in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union. The Press has already reported eight nuclear tests by the Soviet Union in its current series. There may have been more of a low yield unreported. Several of these tests have been of a yield of tens of megatons. These tests, I submit, are not an auspicious background against which to negotiate an effective nuclear test ban treaty. Presumably, as Chairman Khrushchev announced was the case last fall after the resumption of Soviet tests on 1 September 1961, these tests are made to increase the military security of the Soviet Union. While they go on and on, unrestrained and in large yields, we are asked to restrain ourselves and to trust to luck that our military security will not be harmed. However, the United Kingdom and the United States have proposed the comprehensive draft treaty which will stop all the tests in all environments for all time and will provide the guarantees necessary to ensure that all tests by all parties have in fact ceased.

This comprehensive draft treaty is the treaty which my Government and the United Kingdom Government would prefer to sign now. It is the treaty which will accomplish our primary objective of stopping all nuclear tests in all environments. We are ready to push on with negotiations on this comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

However, if we cannot reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban, the other treaty draft would proscribe those tests the control of which we can both agree upon now. My Government, as I have said, is also prepared to sign such a partial test ban treaty. We continue to believe that as a matter of primary importance both sides should continue earnestly to work for a treaty banning permanently all tests in all environments.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

This afternoon I want to examine in some detail the full extent of the proposals made by my Government and the United Kingdom Government in treaty form. The first of these is the comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) which bans nuclear tests in all environments.

The obligations parties would assume in this comprehensive treaty are clear, straightforward and simple. The parties would agree to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear test explosions at any place under their jurisdiction or control. That, of course, is an obligation stated in terms of the territory and of the persons over which a State has jurisdiction or control. The obligation would also go beyond that. The parties would also undertake to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions anywhere. That means that all parties not only would themselves be prohibited from testing but also would be prohibited from aiding and abetting any other State, person or group of persons in conducting nuclear weapon test explosions anywhere in the world.

The treaty makes specific provision for the establishment of an international scientific commission to verify these treaty obligations. The commission would be assisted in its operation by an international staff and a verification system. Each party would undertake an additional obligation to co-operate promptly and fully both in the establishment and organization of the commission and in the implementation by the commission of the measures of verification spelled out in the treaty.

The commission is allotted several important functions by the treaty. The most important of these is general responsibility for the collection of data on, and the reporting of all events which could be suspected of being nuclear weapon test explosions. The commission is specifically charged with attempting to make positive identification of the nature and origin of such events, wherever that is possible. In accomplishing that task the commission is given the duty of supervising all elements of the verification system, including the institution of measures to ensure the rapid, co-ordinated and reliable collection of data.

The commission may discuss the nature of any unidentified event with the appropriate parties to the treaty and issue a report on the nature and origin of

(Mr. Dean, United States)

any event. The commission is charged with the responsibility of conducting programmes of basic scientific research to improve its capability of verifying the obligations undertaken in the treaty. In addition, the commission would have responsibility for approving the total of its annual budget, choosing an executive officer who shall assist it, and arranging for conferences of all parties to the treaty.

The organization of the commission has been most carefully thought out in this draft treaty. There would be fifteen members chosen as follows: four from countries associated with the United Kingdom and the United States, four from the Soviet bloc, and seven from among parties nominated jointly by the permanent members of the commission -- the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

The commission, unless otherwise specified, would make its decisions by simple majority of the members present and voting. Provision is made for non-members of the commission to participate without vote in its meetings whenever their interests are especially affected. Before establishment of the commission its permanent members, acting by unanimous agreement, are to carry out its functions.

Thus it can readily be seen that the commission's functions are central to the successful and effective verification of the treaty. Much of the success of the treaty indeed would depend upon the efficient and rapid operation of the commission. It would be assisted in its functions by an executive officer and, under him an international staff. The staff's primary job would be to provide the personnel necessary to do the analytical and reporting tasks assigned to it by the treaty. Most of those tasks would undoubtedly be performed at the headquarters of the commission, although staff personnel would supervise elements of the verification system, man such international elements of the verification system as were set up by agreement between the commission and the parties and ensure that properly trained and adequate personnel were available for on-site inspection teams.

An executive officer, responsible to the commission and under its supervision, would be in charge of appointing the staff and of overseeing the operations of the staff. The executive officer could be removed if the commission decided, by a vote of eleven of its members, that it no longer had confidence in him. The executive officer would recruit the international staff on the basis of standards set forth in the treaty which ensure its competence, integrity and efficiency, as well as its recruitment on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

A second and extremely important portion of the control arrangements supervised by the commission is the verification system. This system would include several classes of stations.

The first class would consist of stations built at sites to be agreed upon, but maintained and manned by the States on whose territory they were located. The construction of each station, including its equipment and the training of its personnel would be paid for by the international commission. The operation of these stations would be internationally supervised by the commission.

A second class of stations would be those now in existence and operated by universities or other institutions or agencies. They would be made available to the commission but would be maintained by the parties in agreement with the commission.

A third class of stations would be those to be constructed and manned by the commission on an international basis if any party and the commission deemed that to be a feasible and desirable arrangement in any particular case.

All parties would agree to co-operate in the establishment, operation, expansion, calibration and standardization of all the elements of the verification system. This obligation would include making available suitable sites for the detection stations. The parties would undertake to ensure that already existing stations would become integrated with and would operate as a part of the system within six months after the coming into force of the treaty, and that newly constructed stations would begin their work twelve months after the coming into force of the treaty. Stations would operate continuously equipment specified by the commission as set forth in the treaty, and in a manner satisfactory to the commission.

On-site inspection of unidentified events would take place in a regulated and orderly manner. The executive officer, acting for the commission, would certify as eligible for on-site inspection those seismic events which were located in accordance with the terms of the treaty and which were not eliminated as natural events in accordance with criteria spelled out in the treaty. For example, certain located events, such as those whose depth of focus was below 60 kilometres, would be eliminated from consideration. Data provided by stations on territory in which

(Mr. Dean, United States)

an event was located could not be used to render it ineligible for inspection but might be used in establishing its eligibility. The executive officer would also designate the area eligible for inspection in accordance with the terms of the treaty. Unless another area were designated by the executive officer the inspection team of the commission would not be able to go into another area. Thus, the inspection teams would not be able to wander at will but would be subject to the orders of the executive officer as to location.

In the case of events occurring on United States or United Kingdom territory, the inspection of an unidentified event certified by the commission would be carried out at the request of the Soviet Union. In the case of events which occurred on the territory of the Soviet Union, the United States or the United Kingdom would request inspection of a particular event after certification by the commission as unidentified. Each party would agree to co-operate and to make the necessary arrangements to facilitate on-site inspections. The maximum number of inspections which could be requested in any year after the certification of unidentified events would be strictly limited to a specified quota. But if, as the Soviet Union has told us, would be the case there were no unidentified events on its territory, then there would be no on-site inspections. Let me repeat that: if there were no unidentified events then there would be no on-site inspection. The quota would only determine the maximum number of inspections which could take place in any one year; if no unidentified events were certified the fact that a quota had been fixed would not mean that there would be that number of on-site inspections. The inspections would be carried out by objective and competent teams formed by the executive officer. Each party would be obliged to give teams immediate and undisputed access to the area where an inspection was to be conducted, to refrain from interfering in the inspection operation and to give such assistance as the team might require to enable it to perform its mission.

The treaty therefore clearly provides for obligatory on-site inspection of a limited number of unidentified events each year in a way which would do most to discourage actual or projected violations of the treaty and to preserve the treaty in continuing existence. The United States and the United Kingdom have not proposed any restrictions on the composition of on-site inspection teams other than that they be made up in such a way as to ensure that nationals of the inspected State

(Mr. Dean, United States)

are not themselves involved in inspecting their own territory. That provision would ensure that the team would always be composed of responsible international civil servants whose only interest in visiting the inspected State was to perform their assigned function in the inspection areas. Such a proposal should go far towards assuring individual States that their national security would not be jeopardized by the mere presence of an international commission inspection team on their territory performing its prescribed and assigned functions.

As I have said before, my delegation is open-minded about the exact details of how an inspection might be carried out in practice. We would be quite willing to consider whatever reasonable safeguards might be necessary to ensure that the inspection team of the commission did not engage in actions detrimental to the national security of any party, as long as the team was not inhibited in the performance of its assigned treaty tasks in seeking to identify unidentified events. For instance, we have said in the past that the inspection teams could travel over Soviet territory to the inspection sites in Soviet planes, flown by Soviet pilots, over geographical routes laid down by the Soviet Government and with appropriate restrictions, while en route to the inspection sites, with regard to binoculars, cameras, and so on. The inspection teams could be accompanied at all times by Soviet observers, and their movements outside the inspection area would be restricted to what was actually necessary in the performance of their treaty inspection tasks.

If that outline is not sufficient, Mr. Chairman, please tell us what it is that you want. We shall be most happy to discuss your requirements with you.

The treaty would have appended to it an annex prescribing arrangements for the conduct of any necessary explosions for peaceful purposes. They could be conducted only with the unanimous consent of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States or, alternatively, after the internal inspection of the nuclear device by the above-mentioned parties.

The treaty contains a provision for withdrawal. A party may withdraw if it makes a determination that any one of four conditions exist:



(Mr. Dean, United States)

(1) the treaty obligations have not been fulfilled;

(2) the arrangements for obligatory on-site inspection have not been fulfilled and the withdrawing party's national security has been jeopardized;

(3) nuclear explosions have been conducted by a State not a party to the treaty and the withdrawing party's national security has been jeopardized;

(4) nuclear explosions have occurred and it is not possible to determine the State conducting the explosions and the withdrawing party's national security has been jeopardized.

The party considering withdrawal would then have to request a conference and would have to explain the reasons on which its determination to withdraw were based. The withdrawing party could then, after a maximum period of sixty days after requesting the conference, give notice of withdrawal. The withdrawal itself could not take place earlier than sixty days from the date on which the notice to withdraw had been received by the government of the State acting as depositary for the treaty.

The treaty also makes provision for certain other administrative and housekeeping arrangements. The commission could enter into agreement with the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies. The Commission would be charged with a review each year of the operation of the international staff and verification system with a view to improving their operations. The scale of contribution to the annual budget of the commission would be specified in the treaty. The privileges and immunities of the staff would also be set forth in an annex to the treaty. Provision would also be made for amendments to the treaty.

It is the hope of the United States that progress will be realized soon not only on a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests but also on many other aspects of disarmament so that no country need fear that preparations for tests were being undertaken in secret. In the absence of such progress a country must maintain a state of readiness to test as a necessary precaution for its national security. My Government believes, therefore, that any treaty banning nuclear weapons tests should not preclude any State from conducting laboratory and other work preparatory to testing. In other words, preparations for tests would not be covered, and thus

(Mr. Dean, United States)

not prohibited, by a nuclear test ban treaty. Such preparations would merely represent the prudent precaution of a serious and concerned government.

The United States and the United Kingdom, I submit, have gone a long, long way to get a comprehensive test ban treaty. We have conducted scientific research. We have done everything possible to make the treaty effective and workable. We have listened with great care to the suggestions that have been made here at our Conference. We have done everything that we know how to get the Soviet Union to accept this treaty. The Soviet Union need now only move a very little way to agree on obligatory on-site inspections and on a small number of detection stations on its territory and to a small number of on-site inspections of events certified by the commission as unidentified events. We truly want to work out with the Soviet Union a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and we assure it that we will do our level best to meet with it in a reasonable way on these negotiations.

Yesterday I also presented, on behalf of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, another draft treaty (ENDC/59) which would ban nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. A partial treaty in those environments would constitute an important step forward in the pursuit of the larger goal of banning all nuclear weapons tests, just as an agreement banning all nuclear weapons tests should be regarded as a step toward the larger goal of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. My Government wants to make it clear that a partial step is in no way a substitute for a larger and more comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. A comprehensive test ban treaty is our objective, as it is the objective of the United Kingdom. At the same time the United States believes strongly that, in the interest of humanity, if partial steps are within our grasp they should not be postponed.

Why is that so? First, a partial treaty would provide a large measure of constraint on development of nuclear weapons by all States adhering to the treaty. It would also deny to any party to such a treaty the further accumulation of knowledge regarding the effects of nuclear weapons in the environments proscribed by the treaty. Second, a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water could take the world a long way towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. Since none of the present nuclear Powers

(Mr. Dean, United States)

conducted its first test underground, a partial ban started now would discourage other Powers from attempting to test and thereafter to produce nuclear weapons for themselves. That would be especially true if there were definite prospects of a complete ban to follow within a short period. We know that once many countries become nuclear Powers the control of these weapons of great destructive power will become immensely more difficult. We must act now before this question of control has gone beyond our control.

The third reason for signing a limited test ban treaty soon is that we must stop the further pollution of the atmosphere, outer space and under water with radioactive debris. People all over the world have noted with increasing alarm the rise in radioactive fallout in certain sections of the globe. They know at the least that this fallout has no desirable effects. To stop further increases in fallout would be a blessing for all the world, and it is within our grasp to do so.

A limited treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water would be a simple treaty. It would not require any international verification machinery. Such a limited treaty would not take long to negotiate and put into effect.

As I mentioned in my statement yesterday, the United States proposes that there be a cut-off date for testing in both treaties, as proposed by Mr. Padilla Nervo of Mexico on 9 May 1962 (ENDC/PV.34, p.16). We believe that that cut-off date should take into account the present situation regarding our respective national security concerns. The United States was prepared to stop testing any time within the past year if the Soviet Union had been prepared to do the same and join with us in an effective nuclear test ban treaty. We believe that our countries should attempt to find a date acceptable to all for the ending of all nuclear weapon tests which will be proscribed by a treaty.

The partial treaty (ENDC/59) which we submitted yesterday contains provision for withdrawal. It specifies three conditions for such withdrawal. The first condition is that a party to the treaty believes that another party has violated the treaty. The second condition is that a State not a party to the treaty has

(Mr. Dean, United States)

tested nuclear weapons and that that is deemed by the withdrawing party to jeopardize its security. Please note in this connexion that the United States-United Kingdom treaty draft does not assume that any nuclear weapon test by a State not a party to the treaty would constitute grounds for withdrawal unless that test, in the opinion of the withdrawing party, jeopardized the withdrawing party's security. The third condition posed in the treaty for withdrawal is when a nuclear weapon test has occurred which a party believes to have jeopardized its national security, but when it is not possible to identify the State responsible for that test.

The withdrawal provisions in the proposed United States-United Kingdom draft treaty do not permit immediate withdrawal. Before a party can legally withdraw it must first request the calling of a conference. Then, if a conference is held, the withdrawing party must present to that conference its reasons for withdrawal. Even then a party cannot withdraw until after it has submitted a notice of withdrawal, which it cannot do until after sixty days from its request for a conference, or until after the termination of the conference, whichever is earlier. The purpose of such procedures is to make any effort to withdraw a most serious act on the part of any State and to ensure that withdrawal can take place only after a State has explained carefully the reasons for its actions.

In the absence of a complete nuclear test ban States would not be prohibited from testing underground so long as no radioactive debris from such tests was present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions were conducted.

Why does the United States reject the concept of a moratorium on underground testing pending the completion of a treaty banning tests in all environments? As I have said, the United Kingdom and the United States have proposed a comprehensive treaty banning all tests in all environments under appropriate international supervision, including obligatory on-site inspections. We do not reject a moratorium because we want to go on testing underground, as our Soviet colleagues have charged. We reject it because a moratorium -- or a voluntary restraint, or whatever else a moratorium may be called -- on underground testing is no different from a treaty on underground tests which contains no effective

(Mr. Dean, United States)

means for verification, as we found to our sorrow. Where was the moral obloquy of the world when the Soviet Union broke its solemn word and resumed testing in September 1961? I should like to have this moral obloquy of the world specifically pointed out to me. Neither a moratorium nor a voluntary restraint would give us the assurance that both the Soviet Union and the United States are pledged to give each other in principle 6 of the joint statement of agreed principles of September 1961 (ENDC/5).

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have pledged in principle 6 that any disarmament measures should be "implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations". We ask no more than what our Governments have already pledged. A moratorium on underground testing or a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests without the type of control proposed in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty (ENDC/58) would not provide the necessary assurance that all parties were abiding by their obligations. Without that assurance the needed confidence we all recognize must increase will not be forthcoming. Indeed, the opposite could result. There would be suspicions with no means of verification.

It might be argued that acceptance of an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium would pose little risk, since underground tests conducted in violation of the moratorium could not be very significant. I regret to say that that argument is contrary to scientific fact. We cannot accept it for the reasons that I gave in my statement on 17 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.71, pp.21-22). Without going into details again, let me just reiterate that we believe that important tests can be carried out underground. Moreover, underground tests need not necessarily be restricted to very small yields, particularly if testing were carried out in alluvium, a so-called unconsolidated type of gravel or soil, a medium in which quite large yield explosions might produce very weak, and hence undetectable signals. Even if such signals were detected there could be no means of identifying them by seismic means alone.

It might also be argued that risks of an uninspected moratorium on underground tests are small because, in a short time, detection and identification capability will have improved so much that the on-site inspection problem will disappear.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Again we say that there is absolutely no scientific evidence for this belief. If anyone has this proof, let him bring it forward. We have every confidence that our technology will improve, but our scientists -- and there is no disagreement on this -- cannot now foresee seismic or other remote detection techniques which will make possible unequivocal identification of all unidentified seismic events without effective, adequate and sure on-site inspection.

Since we feel that underground tests can be important, and since we cannot see any way other than through provision of obligatory on-site inspections of ensuring that such tests are not occurring, we cannot accept an uninspected moratorium on underground testing by whatever name anyone chooses to call it.

My Government has said on many occasions that it will not test nuclear weapons without just cause. It was clear to the world that the United States exercised enormous reserve and restraint before it resumed testing last spring as a result of the test series begun by the Soviet Union in September 1961. As President Kennedy said in his speech of 2 March 1962,

"We were determined not to rush into imitating their" -- that is, the Soviet Union's -- "tests. And we were equally determined to do only what our security required us to do."

President Kennedy repeated that policy at his news conference of 23 July 1962. He said:

"We are very reluctant to test. We will not test again unless we are forced to because our security is threatened."

Our policy is and always has been a policy of restraint. But we must, of course, evaluate the current series of Soviet tests in the atmosphere when and if they are concluded.

In conclusion the United States is seriously determined to explore every reasonable way to end nuclear weapons tests in all environments for all time.

The United Kingdom and we have presented the Soviet Union with two concrete proposals for negotiation. One is for a comprehensive test ban treaty, (ENDC/58) completely revised from our past joint treaty (ENDC/30 and Add.1 and 2) of 18 April 1961. The provisions of our new comprehensive test ban treaty stem primarily from the results of lengthy research on the detection, location and

(Mr. Dean, United States)

identification of underground nuclear tests about which there is no apparent, or at least no adduced, disagreement among scientists. They reflect also the positive proposals put forward by members of this Conference, including those put forward by the eight new members of the Conference.

The second area for negotiation with the Soviet Union which the United Kingdom and the United States have put forward is for a partial treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/59). This is a treaty that could be negotiated within a short time, given the determined will on the part of our Governments to take an important step forward in curbing the arms race. The United Kingdom and the United States have demonstrated that will; we now call upon the Soviet Union to match its will to ours.

Of course, a partial treaty is no substitute for a total ban, but we must try to find a place to start. A partial ban, we submit, is such a place, and we ask the Soviet Union to give our joint proposals its earnest and open-minded examination. Again let me say that we would prefer to sign a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and if the Soviet Union would only come a short distance to meet us and to agree to the obligatory on-site inspection necessary to verify such a ban it would find us more than reasonable on the question of detection stations and the number of on-site inspections, and such an agreement could be reached within a short period of time. But a voluntary restraint or an uninspected moratorium on nuclear testing underground only plays into the hands of him who wishes for no agreement.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I should like to say only a few words at this moment, and then perhaps I might be able to comment further later on.

At the moment all I wish to say is that yesterday the representative of the United States and I jointly submitted to the Conference the texts of two new draft treaties. Today, the representative of the United States has spelled out some of the points in those treaties. What I want to ask is that your Government, Mr. Chairman, should give very, very careful attention to the proposals which we have put forward and that you should see if you cannot now agree to one or the other of our drafts. We made it quite clear, on behalf of both our countries, which we prefer. We prefer the comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58). But we realize,

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

although we do not agree with, the fact that you have put forward certain arguments in regard to on-site inspection, and it is because of that and because we are determined to try to get agreement that we have put forward this alternative. I do beg of you to give it very serious consideration indeed.

What, after all, is dividing the two sides now? In relation to a comprehensive treaty all that is dividing us is a very small number -- a double handful at most -- of on-site inspections a year in the territory of the Soviet Union. We raise no difficulties ourselves with regard to that. That, on the one hand, is all that is preventing agreement on a comprehensive treaty at the present time.

I believe that if the Soviet Union could accept once again, as it did up till a year ago, this system of on-site inspection then we could rapidly come to a comprehensive agreement, and the basis of it lies in this new document which we have presented. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, feels unable to go along with it then we have put forward our second document (ENDC/59) which is intended to give to the world the opportunity of getting rid of nuclear tests in that environment which worries all people all over the world most of all, namely, in the atmosphere. In addition, of course, we have included under water and outer space. But if we could do that then we could still continue in our efforts to get agreement on the fourth environment. Surely that is something in which no country would be making a sacrifice but in which a very real step forward would be made in promoting peace and better understanding throughout the world.

That it seems to me is the point which we have got to bring home. The differences between us are so small -- on the one hand, this small number of on-site inspections, or, if that cannot be contemplated, on the other hand an agreement in three environments while we continue to work out between us a position in relation to the fourth. I think it should be recognized that the West has gone as far as it possibly could in seeking to get agreement at the present time, and it really would be very sad indeed if the Soviet Union were to turn this down out of hand.

In your immediate reactions yesterday, Mr. Chairman, you made criticisms in regard to both the plans. I hope those criticisms were just an initial reaction



(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

and that when you have had time to consider it you will have second thoughts, but at yesterday's plenary meeting, you said:

"The first document", that is the comprehensive treaty, "in so far as I have been able to peruse it during to-day's meeting - gives grounds for thinking that the proposals of the non-aligned countries are completely rejected in this document." (ENDC/PV.75, p.34)

I am sorry you said that because earlier at the same meeting I had spent a considerable time pointing out that in fact it did not do that at all. I hope you were listening when I was making that point. Perhaps you did not fully appreciate what I was saying, and, if so, I suggest that you do read again pages 23-24 of ENDC/PV.75, where I pointed out just how closely this draft treaty came to the eight Power proposals. I will not read it all again now because it is there in the verbatim record as recently as yesterday, and I do think it deserves your consideration. Therefore I say that your criticism in that respect is one which I find difficult to accept.

In your second criticism, which appears further down (ENDC/PV.75, p.35), you say that, on a quick perusal, we would appear to be seeking to legalize the nuclear weapon. You talked about making underground tests permissible. That is an argument which I always find very strange indeed. I really do not understand the basis of it. One is not making it permissible in any sense. At the present moment we have four environments in which States can make tests if they so wish, and in some of those environments, as we all know, your own country is at present engaged in making tests. There are four environments. If we prevent by an agreement the making of tests in three of those environments we are making a step forward, but we are not changing the position in relation to the fourth environment. We are not making it any more legal than it is today. We are in no sense changing it. So it seems to me that that argument is a very strange one.

May I try to draw an analogy here on the position as I see it? I apologize for the analogy that comes to my mind, but if we have a case of four unmarried mothers and in the case of three of them we have been able to locate the fathers of the children and to arrange marriages which will legitimize those children, while in the fourth case we have been unable to locate the father, are we in fact

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

doing any harm to the fourth if we agree to the marriages of the three going ahead? Are we not helping in the three cases and not hindering in the fourth, while we are still seeking to find the father of the fourth child; and that is a very important point -- still seeking to find the father of the fourth child. Is it not a good thing if we have at any rate tidied up the arrangements for three of the liaisons and are still seeking to find the solution for the fourth? That it seems to me is the analogy to what we are offering in this partial ban. In three of the environments we seek to tidy up the arrangements while in the fourth we are still seeking the means to do so.

I do say, Mr. Chairman, in all seriousness, that that is the way in which it should be looked at; not using, perhaps, the actual analogy which I have given, but that is the principle -- that we are not in fact changing the position in the fourth environment by making arrangements in relation to the three. And if that, in fact, is the only argument that you have against this partial ban, then I do hope very much that on careful consideration you and your Government will feel ready to go along with us in this partial agreement and so help us forward towards solving the problem of this other environment where I believe, as I have said before, not very much divides us and, particularly with your help and scientific appreciation of the problem, we can yet find a basis on which we can agree.

So I do make this urgent appeal to you, Mr. Chairman. As I say, I do not propose here to go through the treaty text; my United States colleague has done it so well today that there is no need for me to enlarge on it. But I do make this very genuine appeal to you because I believe that the West has gone very far to meet you: now all we ask is that you come some way to meet us.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have studied the proposals submitted yesterday by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom delegations.

The first proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom deals with the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments. Is it in any way a new proposal as regards the substance? To this we must reply in the negative. This proposal is in essence merely a re-statement in the outwardly more detailed form

(The Chairman, USSR)

of a treaty of the so-called "new" proposals about which Mr. Dean informed us after his return from Washington at the beginning of August. The corner-stone of the draft treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments is, as before, the demand for obligatory international on-site inspection. No agreement to put an end to nuclear weapon tests without acceptance of obligatory international inspection - that is what the representatives of the Western Powers have said once again in this document.

We have already stated repeatedly that by putting forward the completely unjustified demand for obligatory international on-site inspection, the Western Powers are prompted by considerations of a military-political nature which have nothing to do with control over the cessation of nuclear tests.

In the course of the discussions on the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the Eighteen Nation Committee and in the Three-Power Sub-Committee, numerous data have been brought forward which show that in practice all nuclear explosions can be detected by national posts and observation stations. It is a fact that all nuclear tests, including underground nuclear explosions, which have been conducted so far, whether by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom or France, have been recorded by the national detection stations in various countries - no other means have so far existed, or exist at present. Moreover, the fact has already been noted that from the end of 1958 until September 1961, the period during which neither the United States, the Soviet Union, nor the United Kingdom conducted nuclear explosions, neither side declared any suspicions that the other side was secretly carrying out nuclear explosions, although, again, during this period, each side had at its disposal only national means of detection.

It was precisely because of the possibility of detecting nuclear explosions at great distances and in view of the need for early solution of the problem of putting an end to tests, that the Soviet Union submitted on 28 November 1961 a draft agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests, providing for the use of national means of detection for the purposes of control over compliance with such an agreement. (ENDC/11)

(The Chairman, USSR)

However, as consideration of this proposal in the Three-Power Sub-Committee has shown, the Western Powers are not disposed to take the path of putting an immediate stop to all nuclear weapon tests. They have continued to insist rigidly on their demand for obligatory international on-site inspection as a sine qua non for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear explosions. As a result of that attitude of the Western side the negotiations on that question in the Three-Power Committee have again reached a deadlock.

We cannot fail to note with satisfaction that the eight non-aligned States, Members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, showing legitimate concern at the course of our negotiations, have made a very useful contribution to the work of the Committee. These eight States submitted, on 16 April 1962, their well known compromise proposals, (ENDC/28) which are a constructive step along the road to a solution of the whole problem of stopping nuclear tests, and the adoption of these proposals would undoubtedly help us to reach agreement more quickly on the cessation of all nuclear tests. They proposed that an International Commission should be set up, consisting of a number of scientists with extensive rights and powers, and that such a procedure should be established in the case of suspicious and significant events as would ensure that the complete elucidation of the true nature and character of such events.

The Soviet Union, for the sake of an early agreement on the cessation of all types of tests, agreed to take the eight-Power joint memorandum as the basis for agreement on this question.

It can only be regretted that this important proposal of the non-aligned States, which was supported by the majority of members of the Committee, has still not become the basis for agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, owing to the opposition of the United States, the United Kingdom, and their Western partners.

In this connexion, I should like to say, Mr. Godber, that the statement you made yesterday has not in the least shaken my conviction that your draft is not based on the eight-Power draft memorandum. On the contrary, my conviction that your draft does not take into account the principles of the memorandum even to a slight extent has been still further strengthened after a study of the draft you have submitted.

(The Chairman, USSR)

In refusing to take the eight-Power joint memorandum as the basis for such an agreement and in trying to deflect our attention from it, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament on 27 August a draft treaty (ENDC/59) on the "partial" cessation of nuclear weapon tests, providing for the banning of such tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater, but leaving intact the unlimited right of States to continue nuclear explosions underground.

What can we say about this draft treaty? The Soviet Union is firmly of the opinion that all nuclear weapon tests must cease -- in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water, and underground, and that nuclear weapon tests in any environment should be prohibited. The prohibition of all nuclear explosions in any environment is important in order to put an end to the perfecting of nuclear weapons, to halt their spread, and thereby to stop or at least to put a brake on the extremely dangerous nuclear arms race.

The question arises whether adoption of the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water while leaving underground nuclear tests would lead to a lessening of the dangers now hanging over humanity, as a result of the nuclear weapon tests which are continuing and increasing, and of the ever growing scale of the nuclear arms race. One can only answer this question in the negative.

The retention of underground nuclear tests does not eliminate the danger connected with the continuance of practically unlimited experimentation with destructive atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons and their improvement. On the contrary, the legalization of underground tests will lead to still greater competition in the nuclear armaments race, to a still greater stockpiling of these destructive weapons and to an intensification of the threat of a thermonuclear war.

That in particular has been mentioned by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean. In his statement at the seventy-first meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee, Mr. Dean, speaking about underground nuclear explosions, said - I will take the liberty of quoting a few of his remarks:

"Therefore, I think one can go further than that, and point out that truly scientific progress in weapons development can be and has been achieved through underground tests ... In other words, big results militarily could come from very small ... tests. (ENDC/PV.71 p. 19).

(The Chairman, USSR)

In stressing the great importance of underground nuclear explosions Mr. Dean gave some specific illustrations of the developments that can be made with even small underground nuclear tests. He pointed out that by conducting such tests the following can be achieved:

- "1. development and testing of tactical weapons;
2. development and improvement of the small initiating portion of larger weapons;
3. tests of weapons effects, namely, of the damage caused by shock, blast, X-rays and neutrons;
4. development of basically new weapons as, for example, the pure fusion weapon about which so much has been written and said.

This fusion weapon may be developed from very small underground nuclear explosions." (ENDC/PV.71, p.20)

Mr. Dean pointed out that substantial results can be achieved with even small underground tests. It is easy to imagine the results to which a continuation of large-scale underground explosions would lead.

There can be no doubt that in trying to legalize underground tests the United States and the United Kingdom are striving to retain for themselves a loophole for the purpose of continuing the nuclear weapon race and at the same time they want to pinion the arms of the Soviet Union in regard to ensuring its own defensive capacity, although they attempt to hide this fact and, of course, deny it. In such circumstances the Soviet Union would be compelled to conduct nuclear tests likewise in order to improve its weapons and create new types.

In this connexion I should like to deal with Mr. Godber's remark that he found "very strange" the argument that the Western Powers' proposal set forth in their so-called "partial" treaty is aimed in reality at legalizing underground nuclear weapon tests. The analogy which you drew, Mr. Godber, would perhaps prove useful to you for other purposes. But in the present case we are concerned with more serious matters and your analogy is out of place here. What in fact are we concerned with? The whole of mankind is insistently demanding that we ban all nuclear weapon tests, that we make nuclear weapons illegal and that anyone who attempted to use them should be outlawed. The proposal for the conclusion of a

(The Chairman, USSR)

treaty to put an end to all testing of nuclear weapons is aimed precisely at outlawing those weapons. It would emphasize that mankind considers those weapons to be contrary to humanitarian principles and the standards of human ethics. From this point of view, then, what would happen if the proposal for a so-called partial prohibition of tests were adopted? While prohibiting three types of nuclear tests, such a partial treaty would legalize a fourth type - underground tests. Nowhere will you find at present a single official statement to the effect that nuclear weapon tests or nuclear weapons themselves are legal. On the contrary, all who have stated that they are against nuclear weapon tests consider them to be illegal. Yet you propose that we should declare three types of nuclear tests prohibited, that is to say, outlawed, while the fourth type - underground tests - would not be prohibited and would be recognised as legal. In such a situation those States which are striving to continue the nuclear arms race would be able to conduct tests without fearing condemnation on the part of world public opinion.

I think that it is precisely in that direction that we should consider the question whether the Western Powers' proposal leads to the legalization of nuclear weapon tests.

As you see, the adoption of the United States and United Kingdom proposal not only would not put an end to nuclear tests and to the nuclear arms race but, on the contrary, would lead to an intensification of the atomic fever. Besides, such a "solution" of the problem might give rise to false illusions that important steps have been taken to lessen the threat of a thermonuclear war.

We cannot approve a proposal which is not aimed at putting an end to the ever growing threat caused by the improvement and spread of nuclear weapons and which leaves the way open to a continuation of nuclear explosions. Basing itself on this, the Soviet Union deems it impossible to conclude an agreement that would permit States to conduct any underground nuclear explosions; it will not agree to treaties which are essentially aimed at legalizing explosions and intensifying the nuclear arms race.

In distorting the picture as to who is responsible for the continuation of nuclear testing, the United States representative tried today, as he did yesterday and several times previously, to place on the Soviet Union the responsibility for

(The Chairman, USSR)

the fact the United States still refuses to give an undertaking not to conduct any tests. The Soviet delegation has repeatedly described earlier the true situation in that regard. Therefore I shall not retrace now the history of that question. I merely wish to stress once again that the entire responsibility for starting nuclear weapon tests and for their continuation rests with the United States. The United States cannot get away from this responsibility however hard its representatives try to prove the contrary. The Soviet Union carried out and is carrying out its tests only in reply to corresponding tests by the United States, the United Kingdom and the other NATO ally of the United States and the United Kingdom, namely France. It is compelled to do this in order to ensure its security.

Is there a way out of the present situation? Is there a possibility of solving the question of the discontinuance of all tests? Undoubtedly, a way out can be found, and for that purpose there is no need for the Committee to turn off into the misleading and dangerous path into which we are being pushed by the draft treaties (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59) submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August. Those draft treaties are a fresh attempt to divert the Committee's attention from the constructive proposals of the non-aligned States which are set forth in their memorandua of 16 April. (ENDC/28).

The Soviet Government has declared its willingness to accept that memorandum as the basis for agreement. We again confirm that.

Attention should also be given to the proposal put forward by some representatives of the non-aligned countries in the course of the discussion in the Committee for the setting of a definite date after which the nuclear Powers would be committed not to carry out any nuclear tests.

The date mentioned in this connexion is the beginning of 1963. The Committee also has before it the proposals of the Soviet Union of 28 November 1961, (ENDC/11) aimed at facilitating the reaching of agreement on the discontinuance of all types of tests.

The discussions in the Committee and abundant material published in the press show convincingly that at the present time the necessary conditions exist for concluding an agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests without the establishment of an international control system which would be used for purposes



(The Chairman, USSR)

which would have nothing to do with observation over the fulfilment of an agreement. Such an agreement would not place a single State in a position of advantage, nor would it lead to any infringement of the interests of any of the parties. Mankind would be saved from all nuclear explosions, from explosions polluting the atmosphere, and an important step would be taken to stop the nuclear arms race.

In conclusion I should like to stress that the Soviet Government is prepared to reach agreement immediately on the basis of the aforementioned proposals for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to pursue this at length, for I hope very much that you will still take time to consider the new proposals we have put forward. It would seem to me that neither you nor your Government will have yet had reasonable time in which to consider the full implications of them. Therefore I will be very moderate in what I say now.

However, I must admit that I was disappointed at what I have just listened to. You appeared to be implying that neither of the propositions we have put forward is acceptable. I hope that that is not going to be your final answer. I cannot bring myself to accept "no" at this stage. The matters are so important, the issues are so great; and the advance that the West has made to meet you is also so great that it deserves very full consideration. Therefore I say that I hope that when we meet again you will have instructions which will enable you to be more forthcoming in what you say to us.

With regard to what you have said, apart from those particular points, I would only say that I find that the reasons you have put forward for rejection of the comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) do not seem to match up to the problem. We have tried to show, and I think we have succeeded in showing, that in fact what divides us is not very great at all, but it nevertheless is there and is real. What divides us is that we have no scientific knowledge to justify any statement that in fact one can not only detect but identify all underground explosions.

Mr. Chairman, at yesterday's plenary meeting you quoted Chairman Khrushchev and then you went on to say:

"I think that the members of the Committee are acquainted with the abundant material and facts which have been published on this subject..."

(ENDC/PV.75. p. 36)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

There certainly is no wealth of factual material which has been published of which we are aware that in fact says that you not only can detect but can identify all those explosions. We should be very glad if you would let us have a list of all the statements that you say have been published dealing with this question of identification of all those events taking place underground. Indeed, you could supply a list -- not only of Western statements but also of statements that have been published in your own country in this connexion -- it would be very interesting to us, just as, if you really believe that science has advanced to this stage, it would be helpful if you would bring your scientists here and let them thrash out those points with us, as I have asked you to do so many times. It seems to me that unless and until you can satisfy us -- and not only us but the world as a whole -- on those points we are entitled to say to you: "We have gone to the limit that our scientific information allows us to; surely it is only reasonable, if you are not willing and able to provide us with the further scientific information, that you should agree to that small element of on-site inspection, which is all that stands between us and a comprehensive treaty."

When you said just now, Mr. Chairman, that your proposals of 28 November 1961 were aimed at facilitating agreement, I must say that I found that a very difficult statement indeed to accept; for what in fact did they do? They marked a very big step backward on your part. When you are seeking to agree with somebody, you do not usually run away from him -- at least that is my interpretation -- you come forward to meet him. But your proposals of 28 November last year were a very big move backward, because you were going back on what you had previously undertaken, namely, to have a degree of compulsory on-site inspection. So I ask you please not to say to us that those proposals were aimed at facilitating agreement, for that statement is something which I just cannot accept.

The partial treaty (ENDC/59) which we have proposed is, as both the United States and ourselves have said, a second best for us. Nevertheless it is one we seriously put forward as something which, if you cannot accept the comprehensive treaty, we should like to see agreed to. With regard to that partial treaty, again I tried very hard to follow your argument, Mr. Chairman, in relation to how it would change the status of underground explosions to the extent that they would become legal. If I heard the interpretation correctly, you said that the fourth

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

environment would be implicitly made legal, whereas at the present time none of the four is legal. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but, with the greatest respect, I do not follow your argument. I do not see how it changes the status of the fourth environment. If the three environments were banned I should have thought that that increased the degree of world odium on those who used the remaining environment. At the present time there is the same degree of odium in relation to whatever environment is used. If we ban the three, I should have thought, it makes even more striking the fact that the fourth environment continues to be used. Certainly I do not see how your argument is made good. If that is all that does divide us in that respect is that -- if you will excuse my saying so -- somewhat pedantic argument sufficient to justify a refusal to come along and meet us? I do beg that you look at all this again. As I say, I am not seeking an answer today. I do not wish to press you unduly; I quite understand that in important issues of this kind it is right that your Government should take time to consider fully. That is all I ask, and these are merely passing comments in relation to points which I felt did deserve an immediate reply. My position is still the same -- that I would be very happy to give you a few more days in which to consider this matter, in the earnest hope that when you come back again you will have better news for us.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): It seems to me that the basic reason for putting forward an agreement for a limited ban on nuclear testing is that so far at least -- and I for one have not given up hope -- we do not seem to have been able to reach agreement on the precise control necessary to ensure that all underground testing has in fact ceased. The Soviet representative's statement would appear to make a partial ban itself subject to agreement on some uncontrolled arrangement for underground tests. The Soviet representative also stated that underground tests were in fact important, and he cited my statement to that effect on 17 August (ENDC/PV;71, p.20) . I still adhere to what I said then and that is precisely why in our comprehensive proposal (ENDC/58) we insist on on-site inspection, and why we cannot accept an uncontrolled moratorium on underground testing in a limited treaty. My delegation believes that an uncontrolled arrangement for underground tests would go contrary to the very spirit in which other

(Mr. Dean, United States)

delegations to our Conference have made a proposal for an atmospheric test ban in an attempt to reach the widest area of agreement possible -- or at least apparently possible -- at the present time. That is why my Government and the United Kingdom Government have put forward such a limited proposal, and we are willing to press forward as a matter of urgency with negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty. However, I submit that in doing that we could not at the same time concede the very principle about which those comprehensive test ban negotiations would be continuing -- that is, the need for obligatory on-site inspection of unidentified events certified by the commission.

That is all I want to say. I should like to join my United Kingdom colleague in saying that we do hope that our Soviet colleague will give our two treaty proposals very careful study, and that we do not wish to press him at all with regard to his answers on those matters. We want to give him whatever reasonable time he would like in which to study the two proposals, which in fact were only submitted to him yesterday, for it is quite reasonable that he should have an appropriate amount of time in which to study them.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I do not think that the further remarks made by Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber have added anything new to what they had already said. Therefore I shall not make any comments now. I can only confirm what I said earlier.

If no one else wishes to speak, I should like to consult with my colleagues as to how we are to arrange for the next meeting of the Sub-Committee. Are there any suggestions in this regard?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): When would you like the next meeting of the Sub-Committee to be, Sir? I think you ought to have whatever reasonable time you would like to go over this draft treaty. I was wondering if you had any suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If there are no objections, we might agree that we will fix the date of the next meeting later, in the course of our consultations either tomorrow or the day after. If you have any other suggestions, I am prepared to listen to them.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I should be very happy with such an arrangement. I presume we would leave it to the incoming Chairman to consult with his colleagues about when the next meeting would take place.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Then I understand that we are agreed on that procedure.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.