

1521st meeting

Monday, 9 December 1974, at 3.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Milan ŠAHOVIĆ (Yugoslavia).

A/C.6/SR.1521 and Corr.1 and 2

AGENDA ITEM 95

Need to consider suggestions regarding the review of the Charter of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General (*concluded*) (A/9739, A/C.6/L.1001, L.1002, L.1008, L.1010, L.1011)

1. Mr. CHAVES (Grenada) said that his delegation had decided to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 because it believed that that text represented a reasonable way of meeting a very real need of the international community and that it would facilitate progress in the constitutional development of the United Nations as a world organization. As a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, his country fully appreciated the importance of constitutional continuity, but even the British constitution, which was one of the oldest in the world, had shown itself to be amenable to change. The Charter, which could be regarded as the constitution of the United Nations, should have the same flexibility.

2. Mr. JEANNEL (France) said that his delegation would support draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011, which seemed to be the only draft capable of bridging the radically divergent views represented by the draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001 and A/C.6/L.1002. A procedure for amending the Charter already existed. It had been used in the past and would no doubt be used again if circumstances warranted. His delegation could not agree to the establishment of the proposed *ad hoc* committee. It would be dangerous to entrust a small committee of limited membership with a review of fundamental questions of concern to all States. It was doubtful that any proposal put forward by such a committee would be supported by the vast majority of States. As the representative of Iraq had pointed out (1518th meeting), the proposed committee would not have as its objective a review of specific provisions of the Charter which might need to be changed; rather, as presently envisaged, it would most likely attempt a systematic revision of the Charter. The Saudi Arabian proposal would have the merit of forestalling any possible polarization in

the Committee and avoiding a hasty decision on the item by carrying it over until the following year. If obliged to choose between draft resolutions A/C.6/L.1001 and A/C.6/L.1002, his delegation would vote in favour of the former, but it would prefer not to be faced with such a choice. Accordingly, the best procedure would be to put draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011 to the vote first. In that connexion, it should be emphasized that the Saudi Arabian request for priority was the only such request which had been put to the Committee as a formal motion. In asking for priority for his draft at the 1512th meeting, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines could only have been referring to priority over draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001.

3. Mrs. ULYANOVA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) appealed to the members of the Sixth Committee to reflect carefully on the draft resolutions on the item under consideration and to approach the question of reviewing the Charter with a high sense of responsibility. Her delegation was of the view that the fairest and most reasonable proposal was draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001, of which it was a sponsor. Despite the efforts of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 to convince others that the purpose of that draft was merely to set up a committee with limited terms of reference, it was clear that their real aim was to revise the Charter. The establishment of the committee would thus represent an illegal attempt to circumvent the provisions of the Charter relating to the procedure for amendment. As was clear from the debate and government observations communicated to the Secretary-General in compliance with General Assembly resolutions 2697 (XXV) and 2968 (XXVII), most Member States were not convinced of the need for review of the Charter. The prevailing opinion in the Sixth Committee seemed to be that the United Nations had by no means exhausted all of the possibilities of the Charter itself. In the introduction to the report on the work of the Organization (A/9601/Add.1) the Secretary-General had stressed the need for strict observance of the provisions of the Charter and had made the point that the future effectiveness of the United Nations would depend on making full use of all the possibilities offered by the Charter. The establishment of the proposed *ad hoc* committee would stand in the way of making maximum use of the possibilities the Secretary-General had referred to.

4. Mr. SAM (Ghana) observed that many delegations had stressed the fact that only 38 Member States had sent observations to the Secretary-General on the review of the Charter and that, of that number, only some 12 had definitely been in favour of such a review. At the preceding meeting the representatives of Tunisia, Algeria and Cyprus had responded to that point, referring to the fact that a great many States had expressed their views concerning the need to review the Charter at previous sessions of the General Assembly. The amendment to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 submitted by Guyana (A/C.6/L.1014), which had been withdrawn, made it clear that the views expressed during the consideration of the item at various sessions of the General Assembly, including the twenty-seventh and twenty-ninth sessions, should be taken into account.

5. Mr. KOLESNIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation continued to believe that the most

reasonable solution would be to adopt draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001, which represented the interests of all States regardless of their size or level of economic development. His delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 because it could not accept the proposal to set up a committee to study ways and means of amending the Charter. Such a committee could serve no useful purpose and might indeed produce negative results. The serious problems confronting the world at the present time, such as the explosive situation in the Middle East, the arms race and armed conflict in various areas, could not be solved by revision of the Charter. That view was shared by an overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations, including a majority of the developing countries as was clear from the statement adopted by the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries to the effect that if the United Nations had not been very successful in some of its endeavours, that was not only because of any inherent defect in the Charter but also because of the unwillingness of some Member States to observe the principles of the Charter.

6. Those who advocated revision of the Charter, among them several States which would like to become permanent members of the Security Council, were prepared to throw out logic and the rules of procedure. It was not logical to entrust a body of limited membership with questions which were of vital concern to all Member States. The legal procedure for amending the Charter was clearly laid down in Chapter XVIII of that instrument. There was no justification in the Charter for the General Assembly to establish an *ad hoc* committee for the purpose of amending the Charter. The revision of the Charter was not a legitimate function of the General Assembly. The course of action proposed by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 was dangerous and unlawful. The Soviet Union did not take a conservative position on the question of revising the Charter. It had supported the amendments to increase the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council so that non-aligned countries could participate more fully in the work of those organs. Any amendments, however, should be made in accordance with the legal requirements of the Charter and not in the roundabout and unlawful manner advocated by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002. For all those reasons, his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002.

7. Mr. SOGLO (Dahomey) said that the Charter was not without defects, as its founders had realized when they had provided machinery for its amendment. The Charter could not be blamed for the failure of States to live up to all of its provisions, but it was not true, as some had alleged, that strict observance of the Charter would solve the world's problems. Not all the provisions of the Charter were satisfactory, and it was legitimate to ask for revision of outmoded procedures. A majority of the present membership of the United Nations had not attended the San Francisco Conference, and it was high time that they should be given an opportunity to express their views. The world was divided not only between capitalism and communism but also between the rich and the poor, and the lines of division were not always parallel. Many countries were advocating a new world economic order and

were not satisfied with the provisions of an instrument which reflected the *status quo* of 30 years ago. Those who opposed review of the Charter or wished to defer it were not taking a progressive attitude. For all those reasons, his delegation would support draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 in preference to the texts in documents A/C.6/L.1001 or A/C.6/L.1011.

8. Mr. BOOH-BOOH (United Republic of Cameroon) said the world had undergone profound changes since the adoption of the Charter in San Francisco and the General Assembly was in duty bound to identify and carefully analyse the impact of those changes. The problems which affected the functioning of such an important institution as the United Nations could not be solved on a day-to-day basis. The Charter was not sacrosanct and proposals to review it were not heretical. The drafters of the Charter at San Francisco had been wise enough to provide, in Chapter XVIII, for a mechanism for amending and reviewing it. That mechanism had not fallen into disuse. Those who were asking for review of the Charter were not questioning its purposes and principles.

9. Those who opposed the idea of reviewing the Charter claimed that the matter had already been considered and that very few States had expressed interest in it. How could they be sure of that when no formal vote had been taken? To say that only 38 States had sent observations to the Secretary-General was a formalistic view. In actual fact, there was hardly a Member State that had not at one time or another expressed its views on the functioning of the Organization. At the twenty-fifth anniversary session, many Heads of State and Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs had spoken on the question. It was unfair for some Members to try to prevent the Committee from discussing the question by threatening to resort to the veto. They should remember that, during the current session, many countries had shown that they would not be intimidated by that threat. The abuse of certain prerogatives inherent in the veto in order to sustain racist and colonialistic régimes or for other motives that had nothing to do with the cause of peace would be resisted in one way or another by the forces of peace and justice in the Organization. The United Nations would certainly not be strengthened by such confrontation, but, quite frankly, he could not see any alternative under the circumstances. All Members had the duty to seek appropriate solutions to existing problems.

10. However, although that was its position in principle, his Government was not an enthusiastic advocate of Charter review. It had not sponsored any of the draft resolutions that were before the Committee nor did it plan to do so during the course of the debate on the question. In the view of his delegation, the Charter was not only a legal instrument; it was the expression of a philosophy of how States should live together. Any attempt to review the Charter should be approached with caution and should have a broad base of support among Member States. To be effective, any legal improvements in the Charter should be backed by the political will of Member States to comply with all their obligations as such. That position had been clearly stated by the President of the United Republic of Cameroon during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly (1845th plenary meeting).

11. His delegation would discuss the substance of the problem of Charter review at a later stage if the Assembly adopted a resolution to that effect. For the time being, he would say only that the proposals contained in draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 seemed worthy of consideration because they were aimed at establishing the necessary dialogue without prejudging its outcome. His delegation would therefore support that draft resolution. Its position on that draft resolution should not, however, be understood to prejudge its future position on the substance of the question.

12. Mr. ESCOBAR (Colombia) said that, in order to avoid pointless discussions and clear up any possible misunderstanding, he formally had requested at the 1512th meeting priority in the vote for the draft resolution in document A/C.6/L.1002. Under rule 131 of the rules of procedure, the Committee should decide whether it wished to vote first on that draft resolution.

13. Mr. DE BREUCKER (Belgium) said that the Saudi Arabian draft resolution (A/C.6/L.1011) seemed the most sensible one. It invited Governments to bring up to date their observations on the question and proposed the inclusion of the item in the provisional agenda of the thirtieth session, further recommending that the item should be given sufficient time for full consideration. Thus, it gave delegations time to study the matter and avoid undue haste. In his view, the Saudi Arabian draft resolution should be given priority in the vote.

14. Mr. STEEL (United Kingdom) said that the issue before the Committee was the question of priority, which was very clearly dealt with in rule 131 of the rules of procedure. The Committee had before it three proposals. In the order in which they had been submitted they were draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001, draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 and the draft resolution which, in its modified form, appeared in document A/C.6/L.1011. That was the *prima facie* order in which they should be put to the vote. But rule 131 contemplated that the Committee might decide to adopt a different order and there had in fact been separate and apparently conflicting requests to that effect. At a time when there had in fact been only two draft resolutions before the Committee, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, in introducing the second one at the 1512th meeting, had asked that it should be given priority over the resolution contained in document A/C.6/L.1001 and over all other draft resolutions which might be presented on the item. Subsequently the representative of Saudi Arabia, having introduced draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011, had requested priority for it over both of the other draft resolutions. Later on, the representative of Saudi Arabia had made a formal motion to the same effect, expressly citing rule 131. At the current meeting, following the example set by the representative of Saudi Arabia, the representative of Colombia had made a motion in similar terms.

15. While procedural proposals were often made as informal requests or suggestions, and were not usually objected to on that ground, the rules of procedure clearly contemplated that they should be made by motion. And while it was not usually necessary or desirable for the Committee to take decisions in those matters on the basis

of technicalities or questions of form, in a complicated procedural situation the strict application of the rules of procedure might be useful. It might therefore be appropriate to accord priority to the request which had first been made in the proper form: in that case, the motion of the representative of Saudi Arabia. He did not wish to suggest, however, that the Committee should be guided by technicalities only. It should also look at the substance of the problem.

16. It seemed to him that the Philippine request for priority for draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 over all other draft resolutions which might subsequently be tabled was meaningless. If other draft resolutions were subsequently tabled, then the Philippine one would automatically have priority over them under rule 131, unless the Committee decided otherwise on the basis of a request made by someone else. In any event, it seemed to him that it was impossible to ask for priority at large and in the abstract. After the Philippine request, the Saudi Arabian representative had expressly asked for priority for his draft resolution (A/C.6/L.1011) over both the previous ones. That request had been meaningful and unambiguous. The Philippines had asked for what was, in the event, a limited priority. Saudi Arabia had asked for what was, in the event, an absolute priority.

17. That interpretation also corresponded to the reality of the situation facing the Committee. Judging from the statements that had been made during the debate, it was evident that the majority of those delegations which would prefer draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001 would also be prepared to support, if only as a compromise, draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011. Accordingly, no purpose would be served by deciding first on the priority to be accorded as between draft resolutions A/C.6/L.1001 and A/C.6/L.1002. Whichever of those draft resolutions won the race would still have to pit its strength against draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011. The correct procedure was to put to the vote first the request for priority for draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011. He therefore asked for a ruling that the first vote on priority to be taken should be on the motion that draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011 should be voted on first.

18. He also wished to explain briefly why he considered that the Saudi Arabian draft resolution should in fact be given priority. It was a compromise proposal which was more capable than either of the other two of attracting the support of a large majority of the Committee. As well as being a compromise draft resolution, it was one which enabled Governments to take another look at the problem and to decide, after further reflection and consultation, exactly what they wanted.

19. The case for draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 was largely misconceived. It was not true that the choice lay between the establishment of the *ad hoc* committee and a situation of complete stagnation. The proposal and adoption of specific amendments, designed to meet a specific, defined need, was one thing. Though if such a proposal could not be adopted on its merits, because the support for it that was necessary under Article 108 of the Charter was not forthcoming, then it was not going to be adopted any more easily merely because it had been first suggested in some *ad hoc* committee. It was quite another thing to embark on a

process of deliberate, systematic, wide-ranging revision of the Charter—and that was certain to be both the purpose and the effect of the establishment of the *ad hoc* committee proposed in draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002. The establishment of such a body, for such a purpose, and having such an effect, would be unnecessary, divisive, dangerous and, in the end, futile.

20. It was for those reasons that, leaving aside priority, his delegation would prefer to vote for draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001. But it felt the need to avoid a distressing cleavage in the Committee and to give all Members time to think again and to take their decision in full consciousness of the possible implications. His delegation would therefore abandon its real preference and vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011. And, in order to keep options open before delegations were forced to commit themselves to one or other of the two extremes, he supported the request to give priority to the vote on draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011.

21. In those circumstances, he repeated his request to the Chairman to give a ruling on the matter. The ruling that he submitted the Chairman should give was that the Saudi Arabian request for priority should itself be put to the vote first. If, in the light of the Chairman's ruling, that was how the Committee proceeded, his delegation would vote in favour of priority for the Saudi Arabian draft resolution.

22. Mr. SAM (Ghana) said the United Kingdom representative had explained the procedural situation quite clearly. Under rule 131 of the rules of procedure, priority should be given to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002, since the Philippine request for priority had been made first.

23. He could not agree with those who wished to postpone a decision on the review of the Charter; the matter would be put off year after year and "next year" would never come. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 had taken into account the views of those who, at the previous session, had objected to the use of the term "special committee" by replacing it with the term "*ad hoc* committee". Opponents of the draft resolution also claimed that there was no support for the idea of review because only 38 Governments had submitted their written comments. However, as the representative of Cyprus had already pointed out, there was no need to go back to Governments for their written views when most of them had stated their positions clearly in the Committee.

24. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 were not proposing that the *ad hoc* committee should rewrite the Charter. The developing countries had great respect for the Charter, for without it they would have had no say in world affairs. It was not right to say that the *ad hoc* committee would wreck the Charter and the Organization itself. The developing countries wished to strengthen the Charter. The Charter itself had envisaged the convocation of a General Conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter after it had been in force for 10 years. That review had not taken place. Why should Members evade that responsibility now? The Organization should look ahead; the United Nations, like any body serving human needs, must change with the times. He therefore supported the Philippine proposal that draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002

should have priority in the voting over all other draft resolutions submitted. He agreed with the United Kingdom representative that a ruling from the Chair was needed on that point. His delegation was unable to support draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001 but respected the stand taken by the USSR delegation, which had at least been consistent in its position.

25. Mr. AL-HADDAD (Yemen) said that his delegation could not support any proposal to review or revise the Charter. Firstly, any revision would mean a weakening of the principles that formed the basis of the Charter and would strike at the foundation of that instrument, even threatening the very existence of the United Nations and its role in maintaining international peace and security. Secondly, the call for a systematic revision of the Charter was contrary to his country's solemn commitment to the principles of the Charter. Thirdly, under Article 108 of the Charter, any alteration of the Charter required a two-thirds vote of the Members of the United Nations and the support of all the permanent members of the Security Council. Since the Charter itself provided for amendments of specific provisions, a systematic review was necessary. His delegation would entertain sympathetically any suggestions for concrete amendments. Accordingly, he could not support draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 or any motion to give it priority in the voting. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011, which proposed the appropriate course to be followed at the current session of the General Assembly.

26. Mr. ESCOBAR (Colombia), speaking on a point of order, moved the closure of the debate on the item under discussion, under rule 117 of the rules of procedure. Time was very short, and the Committee must take a decision.

27. Mr. KOLESNIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking on a point of order, said that although it was true that the Committee should vote on the draft resolutions before it as soon as possible, it had to decide first the order of priority. His delegation shared the view expressed by the United Kingdom representative in his impartial legal analysis of the rules of procedure. However, in order to facilitate the work of the Committee and expedite it as the Colombian representative wished, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001 had decided not to insist that it be put to the vote. They had also decided to support the motion that priority be given in the voting to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011. With the withdrawal of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001, the request that priority be given to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 clearly no longer had any purpose. The only procedural question remaining to be decided was whether priority in the voting was to be accorded to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011. He requested the Chairman to rule on that point and to put that draft resolution to the vote. Draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011 represented a desirable compromise, in contrast to the two opposing viewpoints set forth in draft resolutions A/C.6/L.1001 and A/C.6/L.1002. The purpose of the Saudi Arabian proposal was to continue the dialogue on the question of the need to review the Charter at the next session of the General Assembly, and his delegation had no wish to prevent such a dialogue.

28. Mr. ESCOBAR (Colombia) congratulated the USSR representative on his skill at parliamentary manoeuvres. He

was not, however, surprised. The Committee had the prerogative of deciding on the order of priority to be given to draft resolutions. His delegation insisted that draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 be voted on first. As a point of order, he insisted that the Committee should decide formally upon that point.

29. Mr. ROSENSTOCK (United States of America) said that, although the simplest course would be to vote first on the Saudi Arabian motion to give priority in the voting to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011, it would be wiser, since contrary views had been expressed, to have a clear ruling from the Chair on that point. Under rule 113 of the rules of procedure, he requested the Chairman to give a ruling on the point.

30. The CHAIRMAN said that, in accordance with rule 131 of the rules of procedure, he inferred that, since draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001 had been withdrawn, draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 had priority, since it had been submitted before draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011. However, since its priority had been challenged, he invited the Committee to vote on the Saudi Arabian request to give priority in the voting to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011. If that motion was rejected, draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 would have priority in the voting.

At the request of the representative of Colombia, the vote was taken by roll-call.

Iraq, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yemen, Afghanistan, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran.

Against: Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Honduras, Indonesia.

Abstaining: Laos, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Yugoslavia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Guyana.

The Saudi Arabian motion to give priority in the voting to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011 was rejected by 60 votes to 50, with 17 abstentions.

31. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia), explaining his vote before the vote, said that the question of priority in the voting on any draft resolution was immaterial. It was the substance which would count. He had, of course, voted in favour of his own motion. However, from his experience of nearly 29 years in the General Assembly, he wished to warn the Committee that on questions of substance, numerical victories were void, even in the case of States wielding world power, because the other side could nevertheless still resist.

32. It would be very revealing to see whether or not draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011 was even put to the vote. If not, it would mean that the house was divided. Tampering with the Charter of the United Nations was no laughing matter. He had attempted to bridge the division in the Committee with a compromise. Once again, he warned the Committee that, if it insisted on taking decisions by groups, the votes might just as well be sent in by mail. Solidarity was not necessarily based on justice; more often, it was based on emotions or even fanaticism. He belonged to the so-called "third world", but he belonged first and foremost to the United Nations. Unless care was taken, solidarity would bring about the fall of the United Nations as it had done in the case of the League of Nations. Member States should take heed that the United Nations would become a shadow of what it should be if solidarity remained the primary slogan, because the third world was not, in fact, a world Power. Two States which did wield world power were not eager to proceed to a review of the Charter and had agreed to postpone the question until the next session of the General Assembly, in order that an intensive exchange of views could take place informally at the United Nations and in the capitals of Member States.

33. Any fault lay not in the Charter but in the way in which it was applied by Member States. Draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002, sponsored by Latin American, African and Asian countries, called for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee with a membership of 32. However, many States did not wish to participate and would, undoubtedly, fail to attend. The *ad hoc* committee would be able to do little but adopt resolutions to which 35 or even 50 per cent of the membership would be opposed.

34. In addition to the fact that the *ad hoc* committee proposed in draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 would thus be incomplete, and its work likewise, he objected strongly to operative paragraph 3 of that document, wherein the Secretary-General was invited to submit to the proposed *ad hoc* committee his views on the experience acquired in the application of the provisions of the Charter with regard to the Secretariat. The Secretariat, which was composed of the international servants of Member States, should never be drawn into the deliberations of Member States in the General Assembly. He would warn the Secretary-General not to interfere in matters which came solely within the competence of sovereign States. If the Secretary-General heeded such demands, he would make many enemies for himself and for the Secretariat. The Secretariat should never be involved in quarrels between sovereign States.

35. He appealed to delegations to reflect seriously before rushing into an alley which might lead to an abyss. He suggested that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 would be wise not to precipitate a vote which might lead to an empty victory on paper. Not only two major world Powers were opposed to the course proposed in draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002, but also other States that still wielded considerable power, although less than formerly.

36. Solidarity or group voting was a disastrous practice. He himself followed what was right and just. He reminded the countries of Africa and Asia that he had spent seven years participating in the elaboration of a formulation of the principle of self-determination, which was set forth in article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Latin American countries should, moreover, recall that it was to their glory that they had insisted that it be set forth clearly that economic rights formed an essential part of the right to self-determination. Where now was the spirit in which all had rallied together to uphold lofty principles?

37. He suggested that all draft resolutions on the item under consideration should be left pending if not until the following year then at least until the last day of the current session of the General Assembly, in order to give delegations time for thought and to avoid precipitous action which might later be regretted. The house was evenly divided, and a decision to review the Charter should not be taken unless there was a large majority in favour.

38. Mr. SILVEIRA (Venezuela) said that his delegation was in favour of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002, which proposed a constructive course for the United Nations to follow.

39. Mr. KEBRETH (Ethiopia) said that change was a necessary condition of life and human institutions must be open to a continuing process of readjustment. It therefore followed that there must be a possibility of reviewing the Charter.

40. Although the framers of the Charter had foreseen a Charter review every 10 years, no review had yet been carried out in the 29 years of the United Nations existence. Nevertheless, the Charter had undergone significant changes both in interpretation and in implementation during that period. It had been enriched also by many declarations and resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, and a few formal amendments that had given it a new lease of life. The question now was whether the changes that had been made had gone far enough to meet the requirements of the international community, or whether a formalized review was necessary to achieve such ends. That was a pragmatic question and the answer to it should also be pragmatic. The questions Member States should ask themselves were what type of change should be introduced and to achieve what purposes? If there was agreement on the objectives, it mattered little whether the changes were brought about by formal review or through the acceptance of pragmatic changes. His delegation had no preference *a priori* as to how the desired changes should be brought about, but it shared the views expressed by many previous speakers that there was a felt need to consider suggestions for Charter review;

the Committee should ascertain the extent of that need and the direction such a review should take. Although his delegation felt that the need for a Charter review should be ascertained, it was mindful also of the need for caution so as to preclude the possibility of unrealistic demands. That was why he had stressed the pragmatic approach and the need for specific suggestions regarding the Charter review, rather than vague generalizations. A lack of caution would lead to an erosion of the Organization's stability; if that happened, those who stood to lose the most were those who most needed the United Nations.

41. He welcomed the fact that draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 reaffirmed the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter, for the consensus on those purposes and principles was the basis for world peace and security. For the reasons he had given, his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002.

42. Mr. CHAVES (Grenada) said that he appreciated the comments made by the representative of Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the effect of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 would not be fatal or even necessarily harmful. The draft resolution called for study and analysis with a view to making the United Nations a more effective Organization. He was surprised that there had been opposition to the proposal merely on the grounds that there would be difficulties. Problems could be solved only by a study of the issues involved and a search for solutions. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002.

43. Mr. MAI'GA (Mali) said that the Charter of the United Nations was of immense historical significance because of the circumstances that had led to its adoption. At that time the hopes of mankind had been directed to building a new world on the ashes of the Second World War. Since then, major changes had taken place in the world; as a result the international community must consider a new approach to ways to give full effect to the United Nations ideals of maintaining peace and international co-operation. The working methods of the past were no longer applicable. The purpose of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 was to make the United Nations more effective. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of it, but its vote did not prejudice his Government's position on the substance of the matter.

At the request of the representative of the United Kingdom, a vote was taken by roll-call on draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002.

Madagascar, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana,

Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Liberia.

Against: Mongolia, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary.

Abstaining: Malawi, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Yemen, Afghanistan, Austria, Bangladesh, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg.

The draft resolution was adopted by 77 votes to 20, with 32 abstentions.

44. Mr. JUMEAN (Qatar) said that he had voted against the draft resolution, not because he was averse to change or wished to procrastinate, but because he felt that the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee was premature. At the present time, there was an atmosphere of uncertainty among delegations about a review of the Charter, and they felt that the need for radical change was not obvious or clear-cut. It would be wrong to impose such a solution, since the vote showed that nearly half the Committee had voted against the draft resolution or abstained on it. In any event, a decision on such an important question should have been reached by consensus.

45. Mr. LEE (Canada) said that the sponsors had done a good job and the debate had been at a very high level. He wished the new *ad hoc* committee every success and looked forward to the results it would produce. Nevertheless, he had abstained in the voting on the draft resolution because he had felt that the establishment of the committee should be preceded by an intensive discussion of the question of Charter revision in the Sixth Committee, a discussion that would be possible at the next session of the General Assembly, when the Sixth Committee did not have a heavy agenda. In any event, the question of Charter revision was so important that any recommendations the *ad hoc* committee might make would have to be considered by the Sixth Committee before its submission to the General Assembly.

46. Mr. SENSOY (Turkey) said that, since there had been no change in his Government's position on Charter review, he had refrained from speaking in the debate so as not to waste the Committee's time. His Government was however keeping the question under close study. The position of his Government, as stated at the previous session, was to be found in the summary record of the 1379th meeting. His abstention on the draft resolution was to be construed in the light of that statement of the Turkish Government's position.

47. Mr. LEKAUKAU (Botswana) said that, although he did not rule out all possibility of amending the Charter, he

had abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 because he did not think it was necessary to establish an *ad hoc* committee before the views of Governments requested in General Assembly resolutions 2697 (XXV) and 2968 (XXVII) had been received. If the replies showed that there was a majority in favour of Charter revision, the procedure laid down for amendment in Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter could be applied. Furthermore, it would have saved money for the United Nations not to establish an *ad hoc* committee at the present time. He had voted in favour of giving priority in the voting to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011, and had abstained on draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002, for the reasons he had given. His delegation had a reservation with regard to operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011. Botswana, as a sovereign State, judged issues in the United Nations and elsewhere according to its own profound convictions and without any external influences; its guiding consideration was the national interest. If that paragraph had been put to a separate vote, he would have voted against it. If draft resolution A/C.6/L.1001 had been put to the vote, he would have voted against it also.

48. Mr. WEHRY (Netherlands) said that he had voted in favour of giving priority to draft resolution A/C.6/L.1011 and had abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 when it had been given priority. His vote indicated that his delegation was in favour of caution and thorough preparation for a discussion of such a question as a possible revision of the Charter, although it was aware that the majority wished the machinery for review to be set up promptly. He did not feel that the opinion of enough Governments had been ascertained or that the ground had been sufficiently prepared, but he was willing to bow to the will of the majority. His delegation had confidence in the common sense, wisdom and far-sightedness of those delegations that had been in favour of setting up the *ad hoc* committee. With regard to operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002, he trusted that it would not be interpreted so as to exclude the possibility of discussing the principle of rotation in the consultations with the President of the General Assembly.

49. Mrs. HO Li-liang (China) said that her delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002. The debate on the question of Charter review in the Committee had been heated. Many third world countries had been in favour of such a review, feeling that it would adapt the United Nations to contemporary trends, rid the Organization of the control of the super-Powers and implement the principle that all countries, big and small, were equal. However, the super-Powers had frantically opposed the review of the Charter so as to continue their power politics in the United Nations and preserve their privileged positions. It was obvious that justice was on the side of the small and medium-sized countries.

50. Her delegation had been happy to note that those countries had been able to resist the enormous pressure and the threat of the super-Powers, which, united with each other, had persisted in their struggle and obtained some initial results. The representatives of several countries had forcefully refuted the fallacies and slanders put forward by the representative of one of the super-Powers, who had exposed his country's selfish motive, which was to preserve

its hegemony in the world; but justice had been upheld by the smaller countries.

51. No one would expect any of the super-Powers to accept defeat on the question of the review of the Charter. They would continue their obstruction and sabotage, but they were weak because they were in the wrong and their position was unjust. As long as the numerous small and medium-sized countries maintained their unity and continued the struggle, they would gradually achieve their just aspiration, that of adapting the United Nations to the trends of the modern world.

52. Mr. MANIANG (Sudan) said that he had voted for draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002 because it aimed only at ascertaining the views of Governments on the question of reviewing the Charter. In his understanding, the new *ad hoc* committee would have very limited terms of reference: to give thorough examination to any suggestions that were put forward. His positive vote must not be taken to prejudice his delegation's position on the whole question of Charter review.

53. Mr. ESCOBAR (Colombia), speaking as a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.6/L.1002, welcomed the fact that the draft resolution had been adopted. All the sponsors had felt that it was appropriate to reaffirm loyalty to the purposes and principles of the Charter and support for the common goal of maintaining international peace and security. He was glad that the United Kingdom, the United States and Cyprus, among others, had stated in the debate that they believed that specific provisions of the Charter should be reviewed. The draft resolution was based on a desire to help, and it was encouraging that only 20 votes had been cast against it. The *ad hoc* committee would therefore be in a good position to participate in the dialogue that was needed before any review of the Charter could be undertaken. There was no danger of either a majority or a minority imposing its views. There would be consultations with Member States on the nature of the new committee, which would be legal and technical in nature. He himself had sponsored and voted for the draft resolution because the cause was just and because it opened many possibilities for fruitful developments in the future.

AGENDA ITEM 91

Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism (A/9028)*

54. The CHAIRMAN said that in course of the unofficial consultations that he had been holding with delegations, it had become apparent that there was general agreement on the advisability of postponing the present item to the next session of the General Assembly. He therefore suggested

* Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 28.

that the item might be placed on the agenda of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly.

55. Mr. ROSENNE (Israel) said that although there might be some measure of agreement about the postponement of the item, his delegation was strongly opposed to it. Such an adjournment would be all the less creditable since the Sixth Committee had recently spent considerable time discussing parking problems in the city of New York, hardly of international significance, and this had been followed by another debate characterized by the virulence of some of the statements towards any delegations which might have held favourable views on the possibility of reviewing the Charter. During the session, acts of international terrorism, most but not all connected with the Middle East, had been frequent occurrences. When arrested terrorists were handed over by State authorities to another terrorist gang for "disciplining" it was now widely hailed as progress. The Sixth Committee had deliberately wasted time on leisurely and academic debates so as to ensure that there would be no time to discuss the really serious question of international action to prevent terrorism. His delegation wished to protest most strongly against the way in which the Sixth Committee was failing to live up to its responsibilities. He deplored the dilatoriness with which the Sixth Committee had dealt with the items on its agenda, which had now resulted in there being no time to discuss one of the most important items. His delegation wished to record its dismay at the repeated verbal assaults on non-problems to which the Sixth Committee had been subjected by certain delegations. It protested at the grotesque waste of time and money that that had entailed. It must insist that his present statement should be fully reflected, not only in the summary record of the meeting but also in the Sixth Committee's report on the item to the General Assembly.

56. Mr. FERNANDEZ BALLESTEROS (Uruguay) strongly supported the Israeli representative and opposed the postponement of the item to the thirtieth session.

57. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no further objection, he would take it that his suggestion of postponing the item to the thirtieth session was acceptable to the Committee.

It was so decided.

58. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) said that his delegation had fully supported the Chairman's suggestion to postpone consideration of item 91, and noted that only two delegations had been against that proposal. He stressed that the reason for postponing consideration of the matter was not that the Committee was afraid of discussing the question of international terrorism. His delegation was anxious to discuss the terrorism to which the Arab peoples, especially Palestinian women and children in refugee camps, were being subjected by the Israeli authorities.

59. Mr. FUENTES IBANEZ (Bolivia) said that his delegation was very disappointed that it had been necessary to postpone consideration of item 91, as international terrorism was a very serious matter which claimed many innocent victims and affected human life everywhere. The item had originally been included in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the initiative of

the Secretary-General, who had not hesitated to call for broad discussion of the matter. Although the item had been referred to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism, the report produced by that Committee had not shed any new light on the matter. He hoped that the matter would be considered in the following year, as the Sixth Committee's second postponement of discussion of international terrorism would greatly disappoint world public opinion and would adversely affect the prestige of the United Nations.

60. Mr. ROSENSTOCK (United States of America) said that his delegation was very disappointed that circumstances had not permitted a useful discussion of the item, particularly in the light of rule 99 of the rules of procedure and of the fact that the item had been originally put forward for discussion by the Secretary-General. He also did not agree that nothing had happened which made it necessary to discuss the problem of international terrorism.

61. Mr. BRACKLO (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the Committee had had no choice but to postpone consideration of item 91, but it was unfortunate that the Committee had not been able to make some progress on the matter, for there was a compelling need for international measures to prevent international terrorism wherever it occurred. His delegation hoped that at a later session the General Assembly would achieve substantial results; it considered that the United Nations was the appropriate forum to deal with the issue, which concerned all mankind and involved respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It was deeply concerned at all acts of terrorism; some of the worst acts of terrorism in recent times had either taken place in his country or involved his countrymen. While efforts to prevent terrorism should not hinder the peoples in attaining self-determination and independence, nobody should have the right to use violence and to endanger innocent lives.

Statements in exercise of the right of reply

62. Mr. ARNELLO (Chile), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation had to respond to the slander uttered at the 1519th meeting by the Soviet representative in his attack on Chile, although all representatives were familiar with Soviet communism and knew that it lied systematically, whenever it needed to. It now had the insolence and brazen cynicism to use the question of respect for the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations¹ as a means of attacking Chile, as it did on every possible occasion. No nation was less qualified to speak of respect for the Vienna Convention than the Soviet Union; no nation had ever violated the norms of the Convention in such a cynical way as a means of furthering its neo-imperialist and neo-colonialist policies.

63. All the Soviet representative's allegations concerning actions by Chile were false. The Chilean armed forces had never attacked the Soviet Embassy and had never inspired or condoned any attack on it. Chile had strictly fulfilled all its legal, national and international obligations, and in the case in question had granted police protection to the

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 500, No. 7310, p. 95.

Embassy, which was under the control of the Embassy of India. After the suspension of diplomatic relations, the Soviet Ambassador and all the diplomatic personnel, administrative officials and technicians had been able to leave the country unhindered. They had left in such a hurry that the representatives of Aeroflot had forgotten to pay a debt of over \$500,000 to Lan-Chile Airlines, and that debt had still not been paid.

64. The assertions about alleged Chilean actions against the Embassy of Cuba were also false and a distortion of reality. Cuban interests in Chile were handled by Sweden, and neither Sweden nor Chile had said anything about the matter. It would serve no useful purpose to recognize Soviet neo-imperialism and he refused to comment on alleged offences which affected other States.

65. Chile had always fulfilled its obligations under the Vienna Convention in an exemplary manner. There had been no damage or victims where any country accredited to Chile was concerned; over 8,000 persons had been able to find asylum in their embassies and to obtain safe conduct and leave the country; and over 4,000 refugees had been afforded ample facilities and co-operation by the Chilean Government, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees himself had recognized on his recent visit.

66. How different the conduct of the Soviet Union was! Perhaps representatives did not remember the fate of Imre Nagy, who, having found asylum in an embassy in Budapest, had been removed from it, imprisoned and finally executed by the Soviet authorities. When had the Soviet Union ever recognized territorial or diplomatic asylum? Everyone knew what kind of pressure the Soviet Union exerted on Governments to hand over those who did not wish to return, and what Soviet persecution against those who had escaped from the paradise of the USSR was like. The effrontery with which the Soviet representatives claimed to be champions of a respect which they did not recognize and did not practise was unbelievable. The Soviet Union did not respect the Vienna Convention either as a sending country or as a receiving country. For example, the Soviet Union abused articles 10 *et seq.* of the Vienna Convention to inundate other countries with all kinds of agents and officials who carried out activities that were contrary to the respect due the receiving State. The number of diplomats and officials from the Soviet Union and from the satellite countries in Chile had increased enormously since 1970. In addition, a large number of Soviet agents representing Soviet transnational enterprises had been spying on Chile's technological and economic activities and a wide range of intelligence agents, political commissars, and more had been introduced into the country.

67. Furthermore, in violation of article 41 of the Vienna Convention, the Soviet Union had been seriously interfering in Chile's internal affairs, not only by means of ideological propaganda, active participation in Chilean politics, and the supplying of funds to its Latin American subsidiaries but also by means of overtly criminal acts which were prejudicial to the internal and external security of Chile and by supplying tons of weapons which were handed over to organized political groups. Those weapons had reached Chile by every possible means, including fishing boats and the diplomatic baggage of satellite countries. The Soviet

Union had interfered in Chile's internal affairs both within the country and abroad, as representatives could hardly have failed to observe during the past year. It was well known that the Soviet Union had interfered in the national security of most countries of the world; small wonder that in the years since the United Nations had been established 57 nations had had to expel over 500 Soviet agents from their territories.

68. As a receiving State, the Soviet Union was violating the Vienna Convention in an equally flagrant way. All diplomats who had been accredited to the Soviet Union knew that, contrary to articles 22 and 30 and to other articles of the Convention, diplomatic inviolability was a myth and microphones had been found hidden in their missions and residences in Moscow. In violation of article 26 of the Convention, the Soviet Union severely limited the freedom of movement of diplomats.

69. The conduct of the Soviet Union in proclaiming the need to respect the Vienna Convention while showing no respect for its provisions itself was a typical manifestation of Soviet cynicism. With equal cynicism, it had buried in silence and oblivion the 35 million dead left in the wake of the bloody experiment. The Soviet Union could not be allowed to continue to deceive the peoples of the world and export its system of oppression and hatred, destroying social peace, domestic order and the freedom of men and nations.

70. Mr. ALFONSO (Cuba), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it seemed that the Chilean fascists needed to be continually reminded that they were international delinquents. The international community must be unceasingly aware of the Chilean junta's constant violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms and the most elementary tenets of international law.

71. The representative of the Chilean junta had referred to lies and slander; those words had already been applied to Chile itself, and there could be no greater hypocrisy than Chile's indignation uttered against the background of the continuing crimes of the fascist junta and the increasing number of victims resulting from the brutality of the Chilean soldiers. Delegations at the previous session had been able to see the Cuban Ambassador to the legitimate Government of Chile attending meetings still wearing a bandage over his machine-gun wound. He had been shot at by soldiers while he was in the Cuban Embassy; the Cuban Embassy had been besieged and an attempt had been made to put pressure on the Cuban diplomats. The situation had been so serious that a complaint had been made by his Government to the Security Council, and it was still on the Council's agenda.

72. He asked the Chilean representative, who had refused to reply to the accusations made, whether it was true that in September a political refugee in the Argentinian diplomatic mission in Santiago had been assassinated and in October another; whether it was true that Mr. Calderón, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the legitimate Government of Chile, had been seriously wounded while in the mission of a country accredited to Chile; and whether it was true that a few days previously the corpse of an Italian girl had been thrown over the wall of the Italian mission. The

Chilean Government's violation of diplomatic rights and, indeed, of elementary human rights was of grave concern to the international community as a whole. Representatives of the Chilean junta cynically denied matters which were public knowledge.

73. Mr. ARNELLO (Chile) said that the Committee had seen that in his statement he had attacked not Cuba, but the Soviet Union; however, the blow dealt to the Soviet Union had also affected its puppets. The assertions made by the Cuban representatives, like those of all the representatives in the Communist camp, contained a few grains of truth and much that was totally distorted. It was true that Mr. Calderón had been wounded in the Cuban Embassy, which was in the hands of the Swedish Government, but it was not true that he had been wounded from outside the building. A quarrel among people in the building had led to the incident, in which a shot had been fired at Mr. Calderón, but he had now recovered. The representative of the Italian Government had never said that the body found in the Italian Embassy had been thrown over the Embassy wall, which was more than three metres high. On the contrary, the girl had been killed inside as a result of a struggle between members of the MIR, a political group to which she belonged. The Cuban Ambassador to the Allende administration had put back his bandage specially for his visit to the United Nations. Furthermore, all types of weapons, including machine-guns, had been found in the Cuban Embassy in Santiago after the Cubans had left; the diplomatic representatives of Cuba were even armed at the meetings of the United Nations, and that had been particularly in evidence in the previous year. Perhaps that could account for the wound of the Cuban Ambassador.

74. With regard to the violence in the Cuban Embassy in Santiago in 1973, the Cuban representation had not been a diplomatic entity but a military group, and its political interference had reached such extremes that it had involved not only Cuban agents but even Fidel Castro himself, who had visited Chile amid public demonstrations. Salvador Allende had been supported by the Cuban Government, and arms had been brought into the country by Cuban diplomats. A letter sent by Fidel Castro to Salvador Allende on 29 July 1973 was clear proof of Cuba's interference in Chile's internal affairs. The Cubans had also interfered in trade unions and had organized guerrilla groups. On 11 September 1973, some civilians near the Cuban Embassy at Santiago had come under fire from within the Embassy, an event which had resulted in an exchange of fire between them and the Cubans and the extremist refugees in the Embassy. Order had been restored, and the next day all the Cuban officials had been able to leave Chile. The brazen distortion of facts by the Cuban representatives at the Committee was all that could be expected from them. Although it was true that the Security Council had taken up the complaint of the Cuban delegation, the subject had been shelved in September 1973 because there had been no sound basis for further discussion of the matter, and world peace and security had not been endangered, as the Cubans had claimed.

75. Mr. FEDOROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, much to his regret, he was obliged to speak because of the lies that had been uttered about the Soviet Government and its foreign policy. It was, of course,

difficult to reply to a statement couched in foul language with very few rational conclusions.

76. He wondered why the representative of Chile was so offended. The Soviet delegation had simply stated the fact that Chile was guilty of gross violations of the Vienna Convention and had cited the attack on Soviet property. In reply, the Committee had heard the representative of Chile repeat the same anti-Soviet falsehoods that had been uttered in the plenary Assembly and in other committees. Those gross insinuations had been considered in various bodies and the appropriate decisions had been taken. It was despicable of the representative of Chile to come to the Sixth Committee and try to show that black was white. Everybody knew about the tragic results of the military coup in Chile. During its first year in power, the military junta had terrorized, tortured or killed tens of thousands of Chilean patriots, including women, and had left thousands of orphans. He defied the representative of Chile to deny that. The shameful situation in Chile would not be forgiven by the international community. It was hypocritical for Chile to claim that it observed the Vienna Convention. His delegation totally rejected Chile's insinuations and suggested that the representative of Chile should read the United Nations decisions very carefully.

77. Mr. MAI'GA (Mali) appealed to the members of the Committee to restrict discussions to legal matters and to leave political matters to the appropriate bodies.

78. Mr. ALFONSO (Cuba) said that he understood the concern expressed by the representative of Mali. Nevertheless, representatives had their duties; there were some statements that could not go unanswered.

79. It was very difficult to make the Chilean fascist representative understand who was the puppet. That representative appeared to be unaware of the way in which CIA funds had been used to destabilize the situation in Chile. It was clear that Chile and Cuba had very different ideas about the meaning of democracy. As to Cuba's alleged interference in Chile's internal affairs, he said that the action of the Cuban revolutionary Government, its diplomats and technicians was a source of pride for Cuba. The letter from the head of State of Cuba to the head of State of Chile showed the co-operation that existed between the countries. It had been published in the Cuban press. He observed that the representative of Chile had avoided any reference to the murder of a diplomatic representative and had tried to play down the importance of the injury suffered by the head of a diplomatic mission. What was important was that the injury had occurred and that it had occurred at the hands of the military.

80. Mr. BOJILOV (Bulgaria), speaking on a point of order, said that he wished to support the appeal made by the representative of Mali. He wished to make a formal motion for closure of the debate.

81. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that there was no debate in progress. Representatives were speaking in exercise of the right of reply. Nevertheless, he appealed to representatives to bear in mind the General Assembly's suggestion about rights of reply and the fact that the Sixth

Committee had to conclude its work at the current meeting.

82. Mr. ARNELLO (Chile) welcomed the appeal of the representative of Mali. It was not his delegation that had raised political questions in the Committee; it was simply exercising the right of reply to respond to political attacks. He read out article 41 of the Vienna Convention, which prohibited diplomats from interfering in the internal affairs of another State, and said that what he had maintained and other delegations had recognized during the debate was perfectly clear.

83. With reference to the suppositions of the Soviet representative, the Chilean delegation had referred to specific acts on which the USSR had made no response and which could be confirmed by 57 countries; as to reading United Nations decisions, his delegation had read out in plenary meeting of the current General Assembly the resolutions adopted in 1956 concerning the occupation of Hungary, which were indeed very interesting.

84. Mr. GÜNEY (Turkey) said the representative of the Greek Cypriot community had made an inappropriate reference to Cyprus. It appeared that the Greek administration had not been satisfied with the discussion in the General Assembly.

85. Mr. JUMEAN (Qatar) said he rejected Israel's ill-disguised allegations that the discussion on the subject of terrorism had been deferred as the result of an international conspiracy. His delegation wished to get at the reasons for acts of terrorism. Israel, which was afraid to face the truth, tried to dismiss the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as nothing more than a terrorist organization. But the PLO was a reaction to terrorism and to Israel's denial of the rights of the Palestinian people. The expulsion of people at gun-point was in itself terrorism. Israel was a terrorist country and he certainly wished to hear all views on the subject.

86. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus), speaking on a point of order, said that the representative of Turkey was out of order when he referred to the delegation of Cyprus as anything but the delegation of Cyprus.

87. Mr. GÜNEY (Turkey) said he agreed with the representative of the Greek administration of Cyprus that it was important to respect and fully apply the provisions of the Charter. But that representative had failed to mention the importance of existing valid international agreements that were in accordance with the Charter. The Greek administration in Cyprus had been violating those agreements for more than 10 years and should not try to give advice on the way in which the provisions of the Charter and other United Nations resolutions should be applied.

88. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that he had made his statement with reference to the review of the Charter. The United Nations Charter was not being implemented because of the failure to implement Security Council decisions. As an example, he had referred to the failure of the Security Council to prevent aggression. If the Security Council was unable to apply the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, there was a need to revise the Charter. His

reference to events did not constitute interference with Turkey. Turkey had attacked Cyprus in violation of the provisions of a treaty guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Cyprus. That was an act in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, Article 103 of which stated that in the event of a conflict, obligations under the Charter prevailed. One had to go back to the time of Attila to find a similar situation. He noted in passing that the Turks had named their campaign "operation Attila".

89. Mr. GÜNEY (Turkey) said that the representative of Cyprus had been hypocritical in referring to Turkey without naming it. The Greek community in Cyprus had violated its international obligations and had demolished constitutional order. It had never recognized equal rights for the Turkish community, although those rights were guaranteed under the Constitution. The Greek community had put itself in danger by its own acts. The time had come to look at reality in an effort to find peaceful and realistic solutions. Nobody seriously believed that the Cypriot communities were truly independent.

90. Mr. HASAN (Palestine Liberation Organization), speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, concurred in the view expressed by Israel that it was a pity that there had been no time for a full discussion of the item on terrorism, since that would have provided an opportunity to unmask Israel. Israel was guilty of terrorism against the people and the land of Palestine and was directly responsible for perpetuating the state of turmoil which currently existed. It was not the people of Palestine that had originated terrorism; they had been living and working in the normal way when the Zionist invaders had fallen upon them, occupied their country and driven them from their homeland. The refugees in camps lived in terror because of the Israeli raids, which were carried out with sophisticated United States weapons. Thousands of Palestinians had been evicted from their homes, and over the past six years thousands had been imprisoned. The Palestine people were well acquainted with terrorism, which they had learnt to live with. They had always resisted it by armed struggle and would continue to do so, as long as Israel occupied their homeland, denied their human rights and imposed a policy of racism and chauvinism. They would be victorious in the end. He regretted the deaths of innocent civilians which sometimes occurred when military installations were attacked. That was a very different matter from attacking civilian targets, which Israel constantly did. He regretted that the Israeli representative was not present to hear the statement he had just made.

91. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that the Turkish representative had referred to the sufferings of the Turkish Cypriots under the present Cyprus Government. The Turkish delegation had made the same allegations in the Security Council. The answer was to be found in the reports of the Secretary-General from 1964 to 1974, which contained nothing to support such allegations. Turks in Cyprus had freedom of movement while the Greek community had not. If the Turks were suffering, it was from the dictatorship of their own leaders, who wished to precipitate a partition of the island. The facts could be found in the records of the Security Council meeting held in August 1974. The question had also been discussed in the Special Political Committee. In neither case had the

Turkish delegation been able to answer the accusations against his country. It had now chosen to raise the same question in the Sixth Committee, although it was well aware that it was not in any position to answer the delegation of Cyprus.

92. It was time to be realistic. The Charter had been violated by the assault by armed force on a small and unarmed country. The Turkish representative maintained that the present state of affairs must be accepted as a reality. Nothing could be more cynical.

93. Mr. ESCOBAR (Colombia), speaking on a point of order, said that the exercise of the right of reply must not be allowed to degenerate into a vituperative dialogue. He endorsed the view expressed by the representative of Mali and proposed that the Committee should move forthwith to conclude its work for the session.

94. Mr. GÜNEY (Turkey) welcomed the Colombian proposal. Out of deference to the Committee, he would not

reply to the last statement made by the representative of Cyprus. However, he wished to state that it was improper for Cyprus to be represented by someone who spoke only for one small group of its inhabitants.

95. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, as the Colombian representative had proposed, the Committee should proceed to complete its work.

It was so decided.

Completion of the Committee's work

96. After an exchange of courtesies, the CHAIRMAN declared that the Sixth Committee had completed its work for the twenty-ninth session.

The meeting rose at 8.55 p.m.