

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 20 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. HAJEK

(Czechoslovakia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. EURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. LAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. P.M. GEORGE
Mr. G.D. COMGAR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy: Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

Mexico: Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria: Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland: Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. W. WIECZLOREK

Romania: Mr. M. MALITEA
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. O. NEDA
Mr. M. PREDESCU

Sweden: Mr. R. EDBERG
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. M.S. AHMED

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the seventy-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

May I first of all welcome to this Committee the head of the Polish delegation, and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, and Mr. Edberg as head of the Swedish delegation. At the same time, I should like to bid farewell to Professor Lachs and to express the hope that we may see him again soon, if not here then elsewhere, and to thank him for his co-operation.

I have on my list of speakers for today the name of the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to speak on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. So far there are no other speakers on that item, and if that is still the case after the representative of the United Kingdom has spoken we shall be able to pass on to the question of general and complete disarmament.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by associating myself with the remarks which you have just made in the name of all of us.

Today I have a statement to make on behalf of the United Kingdom on the subject of a nuclear test ban, but before I turn to that subject I want to say that I listened with close attention to what the representative of Sweden had to say (ENDC/PV.71, pp.29-37) at our last meeting on the subject of general and complete disarmament. My delegation is studying the interesting ideas he put forward. May I also note with interest the contribution made by the representative of Brazil (ibid. pp.14-17) to the discussion of a nuclear test ban. That is the topic on which I wish to concentrate my remarks this morning.

The fact is that the situation reached in this Conference over a nuclear test ban agreement is simple. It is not complicated at all, it is simple. The difference between the two sides is not wide, it is narrow. I want once again to reaffirm the faith of my delegation that the gap is narrow and that it can be bridged.

We are all agreed, I think, that as the representative of Mexico said on 9 May, nuclear weapon testing is "the most serious form of rearmament" (ENDC/PV.34, p.18). We want to stop it for good and all. How can we do so? We believe that the bridge

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should be provided by the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28). Today I am not going to continue what Mr. Castro called the "courtroom debate" (ENDC/PV.71, p. 15) on the interpretation of the memorandum. I prefer to base myself on his words when he said:

"In my opinion, the real intention of the eight nations is to urge the nuclear Powers to negotiate with a view to concluding a mutually acceptable agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests ...

"If the nuclear Powers do, as we earnestly hope, through negotiation conducted in a spirit of compromise and mutual concessions, reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to a certain paragraph or sub-paragraph of the memorandum, I would venture to say that the eight nations would accept such an interpretation if it carried with it the cessation of all nuclear tests." (ibid.)

In finding a way across the bridge provided by the eight-nation memorandum we have a general guide in the principles (ENDC/5) which we are all agreed should govern our discussions on disarmament, and which are, so to speak, the charter of our negotiations in this Committee. And here I must say that I was struck by the intervention at our last meeting of the representative of Bulgaria (ibid., pp. 5 et seq.). The Soviet representative has lately been taking as his thesis that the United States and the United Kingdom are sticking to old positions. The representative of Bulgaria proved in his eloquent intervention, with the help of a good deal of chapter and verse, that the Western Powers are not sticking to their old positions but have changed their position from that of some years ago. Mr. Tarabanov was quite right, and I am glad to have him on my side in assuring Mr. Kuznetsov that the West is not sticking to old positions but has new positions.

But I am not in agreement with the representative of Bulgaria when he maintains, as I understood him to maintain, that a nuclear test ban is an entirely separate and distinct matter from disarmament, and that a nuclear test ban agreement need not therefore be such as to give reasonable assurance to all members that the treaty is being observed by other members. He was apparently arguing that one yardstick should be applied to a disarmament agreement and another yardstick to a nuclear test ban agreement. Since an agreement of either kind affects, and affects deeply, the national security of all signatories, such an argument is completely contrary to

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common sense. As we say in England, "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander". Indeed, that principle was, as my colleagues will remember, embodied in General Assembly resolution 1648 (XVI), of 6 November 1961, sponsored by the Government of India. In that resolution the Assembly expressed confidence

"that the States concerned will reach agreement as soon as possible on the cessation of tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, under appropriate international control",

and called upon the States concerned

"to engage themselves with urgency and speed in the necessary efforts to conclude such agreements expeditiously".

The principle was also embodied still more precisely in General Assembly resolution 1649 (XVI), in which the States negotiating at Geneva were urged

"to renew at once their efforts to conclude at the earliest possible time a treaty on the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests... in all environments under inspection and control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms".

The thought was also embodied in the sixth of our agreed principles for disarmament which reads:

"6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations."

(ENDC/5)

I admit I was particularly astonished to hear the representative of Bulgaria say that a nuclear test ban was something in a different category from the field of disarmament, a category to which these conceptions do not apply because prohibition of nuclear tests is one of the measures provided for in the Soviet draft disarmament treaty. Article 17 of the Soviet draft disarmament treaty deals with this very matter, as I need hardly remind my colleagues. I will read the article.

"The conducting of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited (if such prohibition is not implemented under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed)." (ENDC/2, p.12)

Now, if the Soviet Government does not regard the prohibition of nuclear tests as a measure in the field of disarmament, why does it include it in its draft treaty, the title of which is "Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control"? Why does it devote a special article of its treaty to this measure?

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As if that were not enough, Mr. Tarabanov was placing himself at variance also with the four principles advanced by the representative of Sweden (ENDC/PV.71, pp.30-31) at our last meeting as principles which, he said, ought to be applicable both to general and complete disarmament and to a nuclear test ban. The first of those principles was that the treaty should afford reasonable assurance to all members of its fulfilment by other parties.

My purpose is not to seek points of disagreement but of agreement. The representative of Sweden said that the treaty should afford reasonable assurance to all members of its fulfilment by other parties. I agree, and I believe that most of us around this table agree. The question then turns on what constitutes reasonable assurance of fulfilment. In this particular case there are two main elements in the problem of verification, detection posts and on-site inspection. I shall not speak today of the precise relationship between detection posts and an international scientific commission because, as Mr. Godber has already said on behalf of my delegation (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, p.16), we consider that point to be negotiable. I shall turn to the others.

The West, as far as its territories are concerned, sees no difficulty in the matter of detection posts, no difficulty in the matter of on-site inspection, no threat to its security involved in either. The Soviet Government says, on the other hand, that it does see such a threat, because it maintains that any foreigners, even neutrals, and even neutrals who would be international civil servants engaged in verification in the Soviet Union, might be guilty of espionage. What the effect would be of applying that principle to general and complete disarmament to the extreme point of saying that there should be no inspection at all I must leave Mr. Kuznetsov to tell us. However, that is the point which the Soviet Government has made in the nuclear text context -- the risk to the security of the Soviet Union of having any foreigners for verification purposes in Soviet territory. Now, how many foreigners, and doing what, would be involved? Mr. Kuznetsov said at our last meeting:

"... representatives of the Western countries, month after month and year after year, have advanced the same 'arguments' and 'reasons' on the need for the presence in the territory of the Soviet Union of many hundreds of foreign controllers and inspectors and for the organization of numerous on-site inspections for verifying compliance by the other side with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests." (ENDC/PV.71, p.38)

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What is the truth of this? The West, in 1961, had made two proposals: the first that there should be nineteen detection posts in the Soviet Union with 380 foreigners operating them. In the light of the new data we have dropped that proposal and accepted the principle that detection posts should be operated by home country nationals. So the 380 foreigners disappear from the scene. That leaves us with foreigners who might come on inspection visits. The West had thought that a maximum of about 120 foreigners would be required in a year on the basis of twenty inspections a year. We then came down to a sliding scale of between twelve and twenty. Now we are able to say that, on the basis of the new data, we can discuss fewer than that. Therefore, these "hundreds of foreign controllers and inspectors" are imaginary. They only exist in Mr. Kuznetsov's vivid imagination. Let me reassure him. These hundreds of foreign controllers and inspectors have no place in the new Western proposals.

Mr. Kuznetsov put another question. He asked:

"But is such international control over the cessation of tests which could be used as a cover for intelligence work really necessary?"

(ibid., p.38)

My answer is: of course it is not necessary. Let me reassure him once again. We are not proposing anything of the sort. First, there could in any case be no inspection in the Soviet Union or anywhere else except in a small area indicated by scientific instruments and designated by the international scientific commission. Nobody could designate that area except the instruments and the commission. Neither the Pentagon nor the Kremlin could designate such an area; only the instruments and the commission. Secondly, if the area were in the Soviet Union, the six or fewer inspectors, so far as any Western desires are concerned, could be transported in Soviet aircraft with a Soviet pilot and surrounded with as many Soviet observers as the Soviet Union might want. They would have no freedom to roam about in the Soviet Union. Their only task would be to verify in a narrowly defined area, within which the commission and no one else had located the epicentre of the event, where a nuclear explosion had taken place. After that they would go back home.

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However, if the Soviet Union can show us any means of identifying all seismic events without on-site inspection at all, there need never be any on-site inspection at all. The basic difficulty is at the worst, therefore, narrowed down to finding a solution between zero inspections and some figure of less than a scale of twelve to twenty. At best, as soon as it could be shown that there would no longer be any unidentified events there would be no on-site inspection at all and, therefore, no foreigners required even for short visits to the Soviet Union -- or anywhere else for that purpose. If there would be any problem left at that point, it escapes me what it is.

But the Soviet Government says that we have reached that point already. The Soviet Government says that it knows how to identify all seismic events. That was Mr. Kuznetsov's theme again at our last meeting. If that is true then I say to Mr. Kuznetsov that, by withholding that knowledge from us and from the other delegations at this table, the Soviet Government is deliberately withholding the key to agreement. And I would ask him further whether to give such information -- if the Soviet Government really has it -- would prejudice Soviet national security more than the continuation of the nuclear race.

For my part I find it difficult to believe that the Soviet Government is genuinely withholding the knowledge if it has it. I prefer to assume that it has not got the knowledge. If I am wrong in assuming that, Mr. Kuznetsov will no doubt correct me and produce the information. If he does not do so, I can only assume from his silence that what I am saying represents the truth and that the Soviet Union knows of no means at present of identifying all seismic events without any on-site inspection. But, I repeat, if that is the case, the problem, although still existent, is surely soluble. As I said at the beginning of my intervention, there is still a gap, but it is a narrow one. The problem then narrows down to finding a compromise between zero inspections a year and a sliding scale of twelve to twenty. I was glad to hear the representative of Romania say at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.71, p.25) that although actually there exist all the conditions for the conclusion of a treaty, one point -- one single point -- remains to be settled. Let us see whether we cannot make any progress here and now, even if modest, towards bridging the gap and settling the basic outstanding points.

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

Here may I say that I have been studying with close attention and interest the statement made by Mr. Kuznetsov at our last meeting. Since what I am going to say may be important in the search for agreement, I want to be meticulously careful about it. He said:

"A careful study of the memorandum shows that the authors of this document approach the question of on-site inspection in a very serious manner, from a standpoint which takes into account the situation that will arise as a result of the assumption by the nuclear Powers of the obligation to cease all nuclear tests. Accordingly, it is contemplated that the question of on-site inspection may arise only after a thorough and detailed examination by the international commission of the facts 'necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event'. Therefore this examination of the facts should be the first step.

"After that, as the memorandum states:

'Should the commission find that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant event it would so inform the party on whose territory that event had occurred, and simultaneously inform it of the points on which urgent clarification seemed necessary.'

Thus the second step to be taken by the international commission would consist of notification and a request for co-operation addressed to the State on whose territory the event in question had occurred.

"What is to follow after that? After that:

'The party and the Commission should consult as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment'.

It is envisaged here that the State on whose territory the event to be investigated had occurred would 'give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment'.

"The Soviet Union subscribes to this without any reservation.

"Such is the third stage of the work: joint consultation, and the speedy and full co-operation of the State on whose territory the event had occurred." (ibid., pp.41-42)

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I have quoted those words verbatim because they are words which my delegation wholly endorses. So far Mr. Kuznetsov and I are in full agreement, and let me underline at this point that the stages spelt out by Mr. Kuznetsov fully bear out the point I made earlier, namely that in all those steps leading up to the designation and location of an event it is the instruments and the commission which have the responsibility. It is not the other side, it is not the Pentagon or the Kremlin, but the instruments and the commission.

There follow further paragraphs of Mr. Kuznetsov's speech which are of much interest, and which those who wish to follow my argument will no doubt want to read again. But there are words which I do want to quote. They are as follows:

"In the light of all these considerations, is it possible to come to the conclusion that the nuclear Powers will always refuse to invite the commission to visit their territory? Of course, it is impossible to come to such a conclusion; it would be quite unjustified. It is clear that any government will in each specific case approach the question with great care, taking all the circumstances into account.

"Therefore, it appears that the formula of on-site inspection by invitation, while not providing for such inspection on an obligatory basis, nevertheless does not preclude the possibility of on-site inspection in specific cases." (ibid., p.43)

I must repeat once again, I am looking for points of agreement. The passages I have just quoted certainly do not bridge the gap between the two sides. They do not bridge it, but do they bring us closer? I do not want to say anything prematurely which might prejudice the slightest drawing together of the two sides. But the point which strikes me is that those words seem to indicate that for the Soviet Union the possibility of on-site inspection in concrete cases would not necessarily constitute an unacceptable risk to the security of the Soviet Union. If that is the case, then perhaps we are on the trail of something. I repeat, I would not want to spoil the possibility of following up this trail. But I must point out that there are still difficulties to overcome.

In the first place, I would recall a statement made by Mr. Tsarapkin at the sixtieth meeting of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on 23 February 1959. Mr. Tsarapkin, speaking for the Soviet Union, said:

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"If any State were to take the step of violating the treaty and to start a series of nuclear explosions, such a State would of course never allow any inspection team to enter its territory." (GEN/DNT/PV.60, p.16)

That is the voice of common sense, and to maintain the opposite is obviously artificial and incorrect. Therefore, to leave to the home country the choice of events to be inspected does not offer a solution, because a State would never invite if it had violated the treaty. Secondly, any analysis of the problem inevitably leads back to the question: if a State were to decline to issue an invitation for an on-site inspection when asked to do so by the commission, would that State be giving to the commission the full co-operation which Mr. Kuznetsov has pledged that the Soviet Union would give? If it were a treaty provision that refusal to invite an on-site inspection when asked to do so would be a breach of the treaty, thereby releasing other members from their obligations under the treaty, that would be one thing. But if there were no such provision in the treaty, then if a State declined to accept on-site inspection other States would have to decide whether to denounce the treaty without a breach of the treaty having been committed. Because of this refusal and without knowing, owing to the refusal, whether an explosion had taken place or not, they, the other States, would have to take the onus of denouncing the treaty, and that would be a very serious matter; they, and not the State which had declined to accept on-site inspection, would have to take the onus.

In this negotiation we must never give up. Let me take the important point which it seems to me arises from Mr. Kuznetsov's intervention at our last meeting, namely, that on-site inspection in concrete cases would not constitute an unacceptable risk to the security of the Soviet Union. Let me say once again that the basic difference between the two sides has already been narrowed down at worst to finding a compromise between zero inspections a year and a sliding scale of twelve to twenty. We offer, and I repeat the offer now, to come down from a sliding scale of from twelve to twenty if the Soviet Union will come up from zero. In saying this I am doing publicly, in this Committee, what the representative of Brazil urged us to do at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.71, p.15), namely, to negotiate and to offer compromise. That, in the view of my delegation, is how the matter stands. It is as simple as that.

Mr. LAJL (India): It seems that we are about to conclude this most recent of perhaps too many rounds of discussion, rather than of action, on stopping nuclear tests. What is the situation in which we approach the conclusion of this reconsideration? I have been much impressed by the words used by the representative among us who is most able to tell us what the situation is in terms of the realities posed by continued testing. I refer, of course, to General Burns, who has greater professional qualifications than any of us for telling the Committee the true nature and the true effects of nuclear testing at the present time.

I want, therefore, to turn first to General Burns' statement at our meeting on 15 August. He said:

"No objective observer can assert that the security of any State" -- I repeat, "of any State" -- "can be increased by prolonging what the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, so aptly described as 'abominable rehearsals' for nuclear war." (ENDC/PV.70, p.34)

I submit to all my colleagues that this in fact is a warning, from one among us who is capable of administering such a caution, that it is untrue that the security of any State can be increased by prolonging this "abominable rehearsal" for nuclear war. That is the situation which confronts us -- that we are carrying out and witnessing an abominable rehearsal for nuclear war. The words are almost too weighty to sink into us in their full meaning, but that is what we are doing and we should remember that, as General Burns said, the continuation of testing cannot bring any increase of security to any State.

I must say, with great respect, that it is surprising to hear every now and again, "Our security is involved; we must test." That statement is negated not only by what General Burns has said but, I submit, by the statements by the President of the United States and by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union who have said clearly that in the continuing arms race, and the building up of nuclear weapons in particular, lies destruction and not security. We have been told that repeatedly so we are faced now, if I may submit this with respect, by a situation of confusion in which those States which tell us that their own security cannot be increased by further testing go and test. That is certainly confusion and not reasonableness or rationalism. We are saying this not as an accusation but to point out how dangerous is the situation in which we find ourselves; that is why I said at the very beginning that it would have been better if we had already reached a stage of action.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Nevertheless, the delegation of India believes that this round of discussions has been most useful and fruitful. I think that the same view is implied in the statement which we have just heard from the representative of the United Kingdom. He said that the gap between the two sides is narrow -- it is not wide; and that is something which has emerged in this last round of discussions which has, therefore, proved to be very useful.

I should like to say, before I enter upon the substantive part of my own remarks, that the delegation of India is grateful to those countries which had their scientists come to Geneva; and we are grateful to the scientists who tried to enlighten the not necessarily very scientific recesses of our own brains. I must say, though, that certain questions, even of a technical character, remain in our minds; but then this is an experimental field in which developments are taking place almost continuously, and the general direction of those developments is what is important. I would submit that as a result of the talks we have had with the various scientists who were here we found that the general direction is a reassuring one in terms of the agreement which we are seeking to reach and which indeed I hope we are now on the verge of reaching.

I should like also to pay tribute to the leaders of the two main delegations -- if I may use that term. Mr. Dean, particularly, has laboured very hard with us to enlighten us in somewhat the same terms as have his scientists and others. We would like him to know that we appreciate the point of view of his Government and his delegation and, particularly, their concern to obtain a workable and secure agreement as a result of negotiations. Equally, we are most grateful to Mr. Kuznetsov whose statements have, I am sure we would all agree, taken us forward in understanding the position of his Government and have also, I believe, taken us forward towards an agreement. He too has assured us in terms that make his general approach not dissimilar to that of the other side. In this connexion I should like to draw attention to a few words from his statement on 17 August. Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"I should like to emphasize that the Soviet Union is no less interested in the establishment of effective control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests than is the United States or any other country."

(ENDC/PV.71, p. 38)

Those must be words which will be welcomed all around this table.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I think it would be advisable at this stage for me to try to explain how the delegation of India approached this matter when we joined with our colleagues in elaborating the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28). I am not, of course, speaking for the eight non-aligned States or for any of the others: I am speaking for the delegation of India. Because it is a consideration that intensifies the degree of our concern and impinges upon the effectiveness of our concepts, their practicality, adequacy, and necessity (ENDC/PV.70, p.24) --- to borrow the very apt phrase used by our colleague, Mr. Hassan --- I feel it is germane to stress that in pressing for a test ban we have not been thinking only of the nuclear Powers but also of ourselves, of our freedom from fallout, and of our freedom from the threat of the extension of this dread disease of testing to other States. Therefore, we have and have had our own interests very much in view in addressing ourselves to this matter; and the eight-nation memorandum must be regarded as directly and intrinsically realistic because it concerns and takes into account our own well-being, our own need for an end to the cold war. And, indeed, in this respect our need is much more pressing than the needs of the nuclear Powers themselves.

So I stress the point that the non-aligned countries are not presenting suggestions to others which concern only those others, in a situation wherein we non-aligned countries should consider ourselves as mere spectators, or unaffected arbiters, or people standing outside the arena. That is not at all the case. Such a view of our approach would not measure more than a fraction of the amplitude of our concern. When we addressed ourselves to the search for a compromise we did so not just because we share membership of this Committee with States from the two sides. Nor did we do it merely because the General Assembly endorsed unanimously the composition of this Committee, and thereby invested all of us with a responsibility which we cannot, each one of us, but take with deep seriousness.

All those reasons are there, but do not convey adequately the truth --- that we felt ourselves directly involved in this matter because of the indubitable and unhappy fact that those who test are not able to confine to themselves the pollution resulting from their own actions. Our countries suffer, and will suffer, from it. Nor as yet is the fact covered that the example of the nuclear Powers of infringement of the right of peoples to keep clean the air which they breathe and infringement of international rights on the high seas and elsewhere must regrettably encourage other States to do likewise.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Even more basically there is the consideration that results if certain States insist that their security demands that they test nuclear weapons, though we ourselves believe that that is not the case, and if they feel that they will be unfair to their peoples and to their friends if they do not develop and perfect -- what a sad use of a good word -- weapons capable of annihilating scores of millions of human beings. In short, if certain governments assert the validity of that argument can they not see that they are encouraging other countries to follow the path in favour of which they so strenuously develop their justifications? Surely what some countries assert to be necessary for their own security must be equally good for the security of other countries.

What is more, this activity of testing cannot but rouse ambition in other States. The Foreign Minister of an important country said recently in this very country of Switzerland that his country's scientists were developing nuclear energy so that they should soon have nuclear weapons; and he said that if his country did not do that it would be regarded as contemptible by other countries.

It is in the awareness of all these complex and ever-growing, ever-threatening factors, which are of direct concern to all of us, that the eight nations drew up their suggestions. In short, we drew up suggestions not to condone but to end -- and to assure the end of -- nuclear tests. Let this be very clear. We cannot think in terms of, nor therefore can we suggest, an agreement which could not deal with this matter effectively. So I would submit that the eight-nation memorandum was drawn up with a view to finding a realistic solution to the question and putting down the terms of adequate control and verification. In doing that we interposed a high level international scientific commission between the tensions of the two sides and endowed it with an important role involving a series of international determinations in connexion with a suspicious and significant event, culminating at one stage in consultations which would extend to the question of on-site verification, and then again going back to the commission's own task, as an international body, of reporting on all the circumstances of each case and making known its assessment of the event concerned.

It has sometimes been suggested that the memorandum of the eight nations was unclear and needed interpretation. The delegation of India is glad to note that the view that the memorandum might be unclear -- a view to which, incidentally, we

(Mr. Lall, India)

have never subscribed, and one which is not supported by the authoritative statement on behalf of the eight countries to the effect that, of course, the picture had to be filled in by detailed negotiations -- has lost ground. We feel this because during the last week, in the course of our most recent reconsideration of the situation, strong support for the memorandum has been advanced from all sides of this Committee. When delegations support the memorandum they can only do so being clear in their own minds about what they are supporting. We can all substantiate for ourselves this statement of wide support, and I therefore will not cite all the relevant remarks which have been made by our colleagues here. But, lest my statement should lose force, I will, without I hope giving the impression of being invidious, draw attention to a few of the views which have been expressed by delegations round this table.

First I would turn to the statement of the representative of Brazil. He has twice in the course of this last week made statements, and on both occasions has touched on the eight-nation memorandum. He said, quoting from a note issued by his Government:

"The Government of Brazil hopes that mutual concessions on the part of the nuclear Powers will permit them to reach an agreement on the modality of control envisaged in the eight-nation joint memorandum of 16 April 1962, of which Brazil is one of the co-sponsors."

(ENDC/PV.71, p.14)

I should like to draw attention also to a remark made by the representative of Poland. Mr. Lachs said:

"We ought to thank the members of the eight delegations for their unceasing efforts and for their really painstaking work. We should tell them how much we have appreciated and how highly we value their constructive contribution in this field, for the document which they have produced is indeed an excellent outline for an agreement."

(ENDC/PV.70, p.5)

Then I should like to refer to the statement at the same meeting by our colleague, the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, which also brings in certain views of the representative of the United States. Mr. Hassan said:

(Mr. Lall, India)

"We have taken note of Mr. Dean's remarks at the Sub-Committee meeting, and of the remarks he made yesterday to the effect that the United States endeavour has produced a number of technical conclusions which bear 'on the efforts of the United States to respond to the eight-nation initiative to achieve a workable comprehensive test ban treaty ...'. We sincerely hope that the nuclear Powers will find their way to such an agreement on the basis of the joint memorandum." (ibid., p.21)

I wish to come to another statement to which the delegation of India attaches very great significance, and that is the statement by our colleague, the representative of Canada, which was also made on 15 August. General Burns was talking of the view of his Government and he was referring to the position set out by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada on behalf of the Canadian Government, and this is what he said:

"Mr. Green pointed out that the proposal in the eight-Power memorandum for an improved system of national detection stations combined with the establishment of an international centre to collect and analyse the data received from those stations should provide an adequate technical basis for an agreement acceptable to both sides." (ibid., p.35)

In that statement, Mr. Burns summarized the view expressed here on 24 July by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada. He went on to say:

"The Canadian delegation finds it encouraging that, in broad terms, the results of the intensive research which two of the nuclear Powers have been carrying out in the field of detection and identification of nuclear explosions appears to bear out that assessment." (ibid.)

Here he is referring to the assessment of the Canadian Government regarding the eight-nation memorandum. That is what is borne out by the research which one side has just been conducting.

Those are very important statements from all around this Committee, indicating how clear and how widespread is the support for the eight-nation memorandum. Indeed,

(Mr. Lall, India)

today in his statement the representative of the United Kingdom based his remarks, I believe, mainly on the eight-nation memorandum. We are still discussing just that one memorandum.

I do not wish to refer here to the statements of the representatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union on the memorandum, because they are well known to us, but I should like to remind this Committee that the only common basis which those two delegations -- and, indeed, the other nuclear Powers --- have at present for an agreement on this pressing issue is the eight-nation memorandum and none other.

What follows from this widespread and universal support for the memorandum? What follows is the inevitability of progress towards a solution -- indeed, of a solution itself. Is this statement borne out by the facts? I submit that that is precisely the case; that the elements of a solution now exist has been admitted. Is that not clear from what, again, Mr. Hassan said? I am choosing a composite part of his statement because in that way we get the views of two delegations. This is what he said:

"... it is the opinion of the Government of the United Arab Republic that there is no lack of bases for an honourable and secure settlement. My delegation cannot but agree with the words of the representative of the United Kingdom when he said yesterday:

'... the elements of an agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty do now exist if there is the will on both sides to achieve it. I affirm my faith that those principles, those possibilities, those elements do exist, and I should like to try to generate hope in this Committee ...' (ibid., p.27)"

I should like to draw attention also to Mr. Cavalletti's statement made on the same day, in which he said:

"Our side has therefore kept its word and has worked on the basis of the memorandum to give practical effect to this in letter and spirit. We are ready to continue this work with others, flexibly and sympathetically, contributing our experts' help and our findings."
(ibid., p.19)

(Mr. Lall, India)

But I would submit that there is even more concrete evidence of progress than what is contained in these valuable general statements. Permit me to sift the relevant positions of the two sides in order to show how this is the case. When our colleague, Mr. Dean, opened the present round of discussions on 14 August, he closed his helpful statement by summarizing and then re-stating the two basic differences: "... the two basic differences which today prevent the signing of an agreement to end all our nuclear weapons tests in all environments for all time." (ENDC/PV.69, p.20)

Before I come to analyse the question of the two basic differences, I should like to make one submission to Mr. Dean -- and to all members of this Committee, if I may say so -- for our general consideration. Mr. Dean, in the last words of the statement which I have read out, closed with the words "for all time." That is, he is in search of a test ban treaty agreement which would be valid for all time. We welcome the spirit behind that kind of search, but we would submit that that is not what is required at this juncture. We are carrying out our work here in the context of trying to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. As soon as that agreement comes into being we shall have inspection in all countries on an increasing basis and various other arrangements will exist which will supersede, in a large measure, any test ban arrangements which we now arrive at. Therefore, at least to begin with, for the present, it will be adequate -- Mr. Hassan talked about what was adequate and necessary -- if we look at this problem in the terms of the next few years. By then, we must reach agreement, I would submit, on general and complete disarmament. If we do not, that will be an appalling situation and we shall of course have to look at the whole problem again.

Our problem is not to find a system which has the qualities of eternal endurance; we are not thinking in terms of eternity, we should confine ourselves to the practical issue of setting up arrangements which we can accept for the next few years. That is the important matter. It is a very important practical consideration, and therefore I stress it.

I shall return now to the two basic differences which prevent agreement at this juncture. What is the first of these two basic differences? Let us look at the verbatim record of the meeting on 14 August and see how Mr. Dean himself stated the first of those two basic differences. He said:

(Mr. Lall, India)

"To summarize: it is our view that any system will be able to identify some events as earthquakes; there will be others that it will not be able to identify either as earthquakes or as nuclear explosions."

(ENDC/PV.69, p.16)

Then he went on in the next paragraph:

"The present position of the Soviet Union appears to be that distant seismic stations can in all cases both detect and identify the nature of a seismic event." (ibid.)

There we have the difference stated. The United States says, "No, not all cases." The Soviet Union, according to Mr. Dean's statement, says that in all cases it thinks detection is possible.

Now let us see where our discussions of the past week have led us in this matter and whether they have contributed to moving nearer on this point. I would submit that the relevant statement to which we should now turn is to be found on page 77 of the English provisional verbatim record (ENDC/PV.71)* in the statement by Mr. Kuznetsov. He said:

"This conclusion is confirmed by a wealth of material coming from national stations, which shows that the existing national systems have fulfilled successfully the task of detecting practically all nuclear weapon tests which have so far been carried out by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France."

He said, not "all", but "practically all", nuclear weapon tests. Later Mr. Kuznetsov referred to certain other statements. He said that the statements which were made by Mr. Krishna Menon and Mrs. Myrdal:

"confirm our conclusion that the existing national detection means satisfy all practical requirements for the verification of compliance" (ibid., p.78-80)*.

He said, "all practical requirements". He did not say "all requirements".

I wish to draw attention to those statements, for do they not clearly establish at least a basis for fruitful negotiations to bridge the positions of the two sides? Does Mr. Dean's first basic difference subsist? I do not have to answer. I have quoted from the statements of both sides. I would submit that we have reached a point where at least this particular issue is negotiable and that this is no longer a basic difference.

*See final version p. 39, of ENDC/PV.71.

(Mr. Lall, India)

What is the second basic difference? -- for there is only one other basic difference which Mr. Dean says is keeping us from agreement. There again we must turn to his comprehensive statement of 14 August. As shown in the verbatim record, this is how Mr. Dean summarized the second difference:

"Secondly, we have a difference about accepting the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection if one is called for under the treaty."

(ENDC/PV.69, p.21)

There are three thoughts in that brief sentence. Therefore it is a complex and important sentence. Mr. Dean, in talking about this difference, mentions the obligation, which is a very important factor. Then he mentions "to facilitate", which is an active concept -- that is, to take certain action arising out of the obligation. Thirdly, he speaks of the result of this action: namely, on-site inspection itself. I propose that we examine all three of those concepts and see to what extent there is a basic major difference.

Now I should like to make a few comments on the question of obligation in terms of the eight-nation memorandum. In this kind of issue, which is an international issue and not a municipal one, would it not be agreed that one cannot create obligations so much by legal phrases as by creating a situation in which there exists and increasingly emerges an active sense of mutual international duty? The concept of duty is fundamental to the whole meaning of "obligation", and in this sort of arrangement what we must do, I submit, is create an active sense of mutual international duty. That is what an agreement must do -- not by finding a few legal phrases. I do not want to run down legal phrases. There are many legal phrases in the world which are very valuable; and, heaven knows, if we can put in here legal phrases which every side will accept, of course we should put them in. In any case, Mr. Dean is a distinguished lawyer, and I do not want to cause him any pain by any remarks about legal phrases. I have much respect for his own phrases, many of which are legal, when he talks to us in this Committee. But, in all seriousness, in this sort of situation, are we not looking for the creation of a sense of mutual international duty? Is that not the kind of obligation we have in mind?

In the frequent analyses which have been made of our memorandum there has naturally been a tendency to focus on each separate concept or suggestion contained in it. However, in that way inevitably the balance of the document as a whole has too often been overlooked, and somewhat incorrect conclusions have been drawn. In particular, it has not been seen clearly enough that the high level

(Mr. Lall, India)

scientific international commission which we suggest be created will develop elements of confidence and trust between the two sides and will take it upon itself to act as a catalyst to promote the spirit of mutual obligation and mutual international duty.

I was glad indeed to see Mr. Kuznetsov's words as reported in the verbatim record of the meeting on 17 August, beginning with: "the memorandum proposes a substantial measure of an international nature..." (ENDC/PV.71, p.41). To save time I shall refrain from reading the rest of that **passage**, but I think that he did see, in a measure at least, the role of this important international body which is suggested in the eight nation memorandum. As this commission which we propose functions and gains the confidence of the two sides it will stimulate their sense of mutual duty, or obligation. It will be responsible, in particular, for making clear to any country concerned what the consequences may be of refusal to give the commission the maximum co-operation in arriving at its assessment of the nature of a significant event, a co-operation that is meticulously enjoined upon each party to the treaty by the terms of our memorandum.

I suggest that the carefully built up balance of the memorandum must be viewed as a whole and that if that is done there will be seen in high relief the built-in obligations which it contains and which, in the practical working out of a scheme based on the memorandum, must succeed in providing the assurance that all of us require -- the assurance that the ban on tests will be fully observed.

That leads me to an interrelated question which was not mentioned directly by Mr. Dean when he spoke of the two basic differences but which I feel I can say that he perhaps had in mind, and that is the question of deterrence which has been stressed by the United States delegation and by other Western delegations at various times. I believe that I am correct in thinking that in their view the main factor of deterrence would be that a potential violator would not know which event would be picked up for inspection. I believe that to be the basic position of the Western side. Let us see if that can be borne out. This is what Mr. Dean said:

(Mr. Lall, India)

"... the major deterrent to a series of tests" -- and may I parenthetically draw Mr. Dean's attention to the phrase "series of tests"; I think he will know I do this because he has argued at length that a series of tests would not be necessary --

"the major deterrent to a series of tests comes from the fact that a potential violator does not know which one might be certified by the commission as eligible for an on-site inspection." (ENDC/PV.71, p.22) So that indeed is a point that the United States delegation has in mind, and we appreciate that point; it is a substantial point, an important point.

But is that same element of surprise in deterrence not present in the memorandum? Let us see. First, who would decide when an event was suspicious and significant? Would the parties to the treaty decide? No, the international commission would decide -- none other than the international commission. Secondly, who would decide which of the suspicious events called for further clarification? Would any of the countries concerned decide? No; again, the international commission would decide. Thirdly, who would virtually decide whether there should be consultations between the country concerned and the commission? Again, the international commission would decide. Fourthly, who would make it clear that in a particular case the nature of the event could not be clarified without a visit by the commission? Would the country concerned do that? No; again, the international commission would, and then the country would have to make its decision whether or not it would co-operate.

So the element of international determination plays a major role in the memorandum and it acts as a surprise each time to the country concerned -- each time; not once, as has been suggested by Mr. Dean, but each time. There is a series of surprises -- surprises not of any sinister character but arising out of the dispassionate, high-level, respected work of an international commission of scientists. I would submit that the scheme of the memorandum provides for plenty of deterrence, and of the kind of which we have heard. So although that point was not mentioned by Mr. Dean in his two basic differences I believe it too is covered by the memorandum.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I should like now to turn briefly to the two remaining concepts in Mr. Dean's description of the second basic difference between the two sides. I have dealt with one concept, that of obligation, and I have dealt also with the deterrence which arises from it. I now come to the concept of facilitating. In that connexion it is relevant that we should look at a very important statement which was made by our colleague Mr. Lachs of Poland. Mr. Lachs quoted what Mr. Zorin had said on 9 May to the effect that in certain cases it would be possible for the Soviet Union to invite the international commission; then Mr. Lachs said:

"The Soviet Union, then, is prepared to invite inspection. Thus the suggestion made in the eight Power memorandum has been accepted. What more could the Soviet Union have done? The memorandum speaks of invitation. The Soviet Union says, 'We shall invite'." (ENDC/PV.70, p.13)

Now I say to you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to the delegation of the United States and all those delegations associated with it, if that is not facilitating -- the concept which is contained in the second basic difference -- what is facilitating? What could be more facilitating than that? What could be more a facility afforded by the Soviet Union than that in the context of the memorandum, in its totality, including the international commission, in the series of determinations which the international commission would make, and which the Soviet Union would not make, the United States would not make? Surely, then, no difference regarding facilitating exists in any substantial measure.

Now we come to the last of the three concepts in the second basic difference which Mr. Dean had in mind, and that is the effect, the result, of on-site inspections. In that connexion I should like to draw attention to the Soviet representative's statement of 17 August and particularly that part of it which appears on page 42 of the verbatim record and which I believe our United Kingdom colleague also mentioned. I must read out certain parts of that statement. Mr. Kuznetsov said that when the State concerned was considering what it should do in a given case which had been brought to its notice and which it was discussing with the international commission, which felt it should visit the site:

(Mr. Lall, India)

"It would have to take into account the fact that, if it did not invite the commission, then, as is stipulated in the memorandum of the non-aligned States, 'the international commission would inform the parties to the treaty of all the circumstances of the case'."

(ENDC/PV.71, p. 42)

I will stop the quotation there and, if I may say so, I think we can all agree that Mr. Kuznetsov put his finger precisely on the point -- that all the circumstances of the case would, in that event, be stated by the international commission.

Mr. Kuznetsov went on:

"In other words, the nuclear Power concerned would know that highly qualified scientists, members of the international commission, would inform all States and the public of the whole world that the nuclear Power in whose territory had occurred some unexplained event, had refused to invite the commission to make clear the nature of the event." (ibid.)

That is the end of that quotation, but Mr. Kuznetsov went on to say a little later:

"... the nuclear Power concerned would have to weigh up what other States would think and how world public opinion would react to the specific case -- whether the world at large would understand its refusal to invite the commission in that particular instance." (ibid.)

Mr. Kuznetsov then concluded:

"In the light of all these considerations, is it possible to come to the conclusion that the nuclear Powers will always refuse to invite the commission to visit their territory? Of course, it is impossible to come to such a conclusion." (ibid., p. 43)

That is what Mr. Kuznetsov said -- that we cannot conclude that a State would always adopt a negative attitude. And he went on to say: "it would be quite unjustified." Does that not mean that there would be on-site visits? It means nothing else; it means that there would be on-site visits, provided of course that the international commission put its case and said it could not clear an event unless there were an on-site visit. That is what it means.

So I submit that, on all the three factors contributing to the second basic difference, there is not really a basic difference at all between the two sides. Mr. Dean has put to us two basic differences. He said that just those two basic differences and no others prevent the signature of an agreement. Now, members of the Committee have all heard this summary -- it is nothing more, I am not being

(Mr. Lall, India)

original -- of the views of the two sides. Do those basic differences remain? One can only conclude, therefore as I was saying a little earlier, that there has been much more progress than just general progress towards our reaching a solution. If those basic differences do not remain, then I would submit to the United States representative that the reasons for not signing an agreement do not exist. That is the position, and I do not see how one can get around those facts. They are not inventions, they are facts on the record for all to see. Of course, one can say that the language used is different. That is true. Some of the thoughts used are also different. But in substance the two sides are now very close together. I submit that both sides, the United States representative, Mr. Dean, and the Soviet representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, have said here -- I will not quote again in order to save time -- that they wish to move this matter along, that they wish to negotiate and to find agreement. Mr. Dean has said that the United States position is not a fixed position, that it has movement in it. Mr. Kuznetsov has said that the Soviet Union wants to find agreement on any mutually acceptable basis. Surely, then, we are on the verge of agreement.

Of course, many practical details remain to be worked out and a few planks remain to be found to build the bridges which will give us an agreement, but again I should like to refer to the remark of our United Kingdom colleague that the gap between the two sides is narrow. Therefore, the planks to be found are very few. Perhaps one plank would do, as I have shown. The two basic differences which Mr. Dean pointed out do not exist, I submit, in any basic form; they may exist in some tenuous form. They may exist to the extent of four fingers or one hand. If one is measuring horses, four and a half inches, I believe, is one hand. Well, it is that sort of difference that exists; just about that.

In view of these circumstances, at this juncture I am going to make a formal proposal on behalf of the delegation of India. My proposal is that the next step should be that we in this Committee make use of the new institution which we have set up, the purpose of which was by no means restricted to procedural matters but was conceived as the innermost circle of serious and hopefully fruitful negotiations. I speak of the institution of the two co-Chairmen. I now suggest that we request our co-Chairmen to get together immediately and to take fully into account this last round of discussions in our Committee, to look closely at this matter again in the light of the eight-nation memorandum and the further thinking of all around the table with regard to the way in which that memorandum can be

(Mr. Lall, India)

implemented. We would request the co-Chairmen to work out between themselves the practical steps which should now be taken. We freely admit that they are practical steps to be taken and we should get down to practical steps, as the United Kingdom representative said today. Let us get down to these practical steps. Let us not at the moment ask for another meeting of the Sub-Committee, useful as its meetings have been. Let the innermost circle of our Committee, namely, the two co-Chairmen, get together and take these discussions into account. The bridge is now visible; they will find the remaining planks. Let them go into details in depth, as the United States representative said in another context. Let him look into this in depth with his colleague, the representative of the Soviet Union who, I submit, has made very constructive statements here in the recent past. My proposal is that the two co-Chairmen get together and make a report to this Committee on the practical steps where required and suggest where we go from now. I hope they will do that urgently and we trust that the report will be one which will bring us to our goal of the ending of all nuclear weapon tests.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to associate myself with the words you have addressed today to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, who has returned to our Committee in order to lead the Polish delegation. I also wish to associate myself with the words you have addressed to Professor Lachs, who is preparing to leave us, as well as with what you have said to Mr. Edberg, who has arrived to lead the Swedish delegation.

The Soviet delegation has listened with great interest to the statement by Mr. Lall, the representative of India. We shall study his statement most carefully with the firm intention of doing everything possible on our part in order to reach agreement on the earliest possible cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

And now I should like to say a few words in connexion with the fact that we are coming to the end of our debate.

The extensive debate in our Committee on the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests has enabled the Committee members to obtain a clearer idea of the respective positions of the sides and to understand better the true causes preventing the solution of this crucial problem.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

The Committee has before it the proposals of the Soviet Union, those of the United States, and those of the eight non-aligned States.

Now that we have had a detailed exchange of views on the proposals that have been submitted, it is the duty of the members of the Committee to try to select from this wealth of material that which could really serve as a basis for an agreement to put an end for all time to every kind of experimental nuclear weapon test.

All the peoples of the world expect an immediate solution to this urgent problem. They will be disappointed if the Committee fails to get things moving and to break the deadlock in the negotiations.

To what extent are the proposals before the Committee conducive to the fulfilment of its task?

As I do not intend to repeat what has been said by my delegation regarding the United States proposals in the course of previous discussions, I should like to state briefly that these proposals cannot serve as a basis for agreement for the reasons which the Soviet delegation and some other delegations have set forth in detail in the course of our debate on the question of ending nuclear weapon tests.

I should also like to stress that the Soviet proposals of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) were prompted by a sincere desire to solve the problem of the cessation of tests, taking into account the achievements of science and technology in the detection of nuclear explosions and the actual situation existing in the world. They are aimed at ensuring reliable control over an agreement through the use of national means of detection, so that no State should find itself in a privileged position. At the same time, they offer safeguards against the use of control for purposes which have nothing to do with control over the cessation of tests. These proposals answer to the fullest extent the purpose set before the Committee and the Soviet Government would prefer to come to an agreement with the Western Powers on this basis.

Unfortunately, however, the Western Powers are stubbornly refusing to reach an agreement on the basis of these proposals.

Where is the way out from this situation? The Soviet Government considers that in the existing circumstances the way to break the deadlock can now be found

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

on the basis of the compromise proposals submitted by the eight non-aligned States in their joint memorandum of 16 April.

The representatives of the eight non-aligned States have done a good deal of work in preparing this memorandum and we should be grateful to them. In our opinion, the proposals contained in the memorandum are based on recognition of the principle that no system of control should prejudice the security of anyone, nor should it give rise to any suspicion on the part of the States concerned that control may be used for other purposes. Although the recommendations of the memorandum do not fully coincide with the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union, nevertheless, being guided by a sincere desire to put an end to nuclear weapon tests as quickly as possible, the Soviet Union has deemed it possible to agree to conduct negotiations on the basis of these proposals.

The solution of the problem of prohibiting nuclear tests brooks no further delay. We have already wasted a lot of time on fruitless controversies and bickerings. We must make fresh efforts in order to achieve positive results in the short time that is left to us before the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Committee would be failing in its duty if it missed any opportunity to reach agreement to put an end for all time to all types of nuclear tests. In our opinion, we have such an opportunity. It is the proposals of the eight States members of the Committee as set forth in their memorandum of 16 April 1962.

I wish to state once again that the Soviet Union is prepared here and now, without wasting another day, to set about drafting a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests on the basis of this memorandum, provided, of course, that the other side is also prepared to do so. We appeal to the United States delegation to accept as the basis for agreement the proposals of the eight non-aligned States.

In that case we could speedily achieve the solution of the problem of the cessation of all types of nuclear weapon tests. It is now up to the United States.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I wish to thank our United Kingdom colleague for finding it possible to express his satisfaction with my intervention of 17 August (ENDC/PV.71, pp.5-13), and to admit that the Bulgarian delegation had noted certain changes in the United Kingdom position. In his statements, however, he tried to show that the United Kingdom position resembled the common Western position, so as to escape from his difficulty and argue at the same time that the Western position had changed. I do not, of course, wish to speak for long on this point -- especially after the speech of the Indian representative, who called on the co-Chairmen to get together to find the way of smoothing out our difficulties and reaching an agreement -- but I should like to clear this matter up.

In our recent speech (*ibid.*, p. 12) we expressed our astonishment that the United Kingdom representative should now present a nuclear test ban as a disarmament measure simply because this suited his case. Should we conclude that what the United Kingdom representative said in 1957 did not express the opinion of the United Kingdom Government? Or has their opinion so far changed that the United Kingdom Government can now regard a nuclear test ban as a disarmament measure? Are the views put forward by the United Kingdom representative at the United Nations General Assembly in 1957 no longer valid for the United Kingdom representative at the present Conference?

In 1957 the United Kingdom representative said:

"I believe that all States are now agreed that in fact the suspension of tests is not itself a measure of disarmament... it is a fact that we have been pointing out for many months past. The suspension of tests cannot halt a race in nuclear armaments." (A/C.1/PV.869, p.16)

Later in his speech on nuclear tests he said:

"It does not by any means follow, to my mind, that the execution of this measure unconnected with disarmament -- a measure which could well have an adverse" -- he did indeed say "adverse" -- "effect on world security -- would be likely to promote agreement on real disarmament.

In any case, my Government is not prepared to gamble on this."

(ibid., p.18)

Above all, I was emphasizing that the United Kingdom has changed its position in now regarding cessation of nuclear tests as a disarmament measure. In 1957 the United Kingdom delegation would not have agreed with a statement like that of the present United Kingdom representative.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

I should like to say also that in all the discussions that have taken place the delegations have not in general regarded cessation of tests as a disarmament measure. It is a measure connected with disarmament; it is related to disarmament; it could, I must again stress, facilitate disarmament. But it is not in itself a disarmament measure. Why has the United Kingdom representative changed his attitude and said that cessation of nuclear tests is a disarmament measure? The United Kingdom has changed its position, I am sorry to say, so that it may continue to demand international control for this measure, as it did from 1958 to 1961.

That was what I pointed out in my speech of a few days ago, when I said that not only the United States Press and certain United States circles, but Mr. Dean too, believe that the United States and the Western Powers have not changed their position. I said:

"Moreover, the position presented here by the United States representative speaks for itself. More is needed than words to change this position into a new one. The mere words of Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber are not enough to make their old position, their former inflexible position, -- that is to say, their position of 1960 -- a new position of compromise. That is the reality about the "new" United States proposals, which turn out to be just the old United States position ..." (ENDC/PV.71, p.8)

I repeat that I am sorry to see that the United Kingdom has changed its position on one point only, so as not to have to change its general position and so as to obstruct an agreement on a test ban.

I am very pleased with Sir Michael Wright's speech today and with his conclusion that there is not much difference between the positions of the two sides -- the Soviet Union and the United States. My delegation and I would be as glad as anyone if there were really no difference at all, or if what there is, could be eliminated in the talks that are to take place. I am also very glad that it has now been suggested that this task should be entrusted to the two co-Chairmen, and that the suggestion should have come from the representative of India, a country which has always worked for disarmament. I simply wished to make this clarification so that there should be no misunderstanding. Otherwise, I repeat, I am as pleased as it is possible to be with the comments made a few days ago, because the Western delegations are very rarely satisfied with what we say.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): On behalf of my delegation I wish to thank the representative of India for his brilliant and interesting statement. We are particularly grateful for the kind references he made to the intervention of our delegation of 15 August. I wish to associate myself with Mr. Lall in his appeal to the two co-Chairmen to meet together as soon as possible and to try to work out the practical and adequate measures to which Mr. Lall referred which will serve to provide the few missing links in the structure of the test ban treaty.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): As it seems that no other representative wishes to speak, may I ask the representative of India if I have understood his proposal correctly: that is, that the two co-Chairmen should meet as soon as possible to discuss and reconsider the different suggestions that have been made on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum and, taking into account all those proposals, search for practical steps to achieve an agreement and report to the plenary session.

Mr. LALL (India): That you, Mr. Chairman, that is correct. My remarks will appear in the verbatim record and they have also been supported by my colleague of the United Arab Republic, so actually the proposal now stands in two names; it is now put forward in the names of the delegations of the United Arab Republic and India.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): It is a joint formal proposal of both delegations. May we now ask the co-Chairmen whether they accept that proposal?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened this morning with the most profound attention to the statements made by the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of India and I shall study what they have said with the greatest of care. I was greatly interested, of course, by the remarks of our colleague from India. I have spent most of the last twelve years of my life in diplomacy. When I am in diplomacy I am considered a lawyer, and when I return to the law I find that my fellow lawyers regard me as having spent so much time in diplomacy as to be no longer capable as a lawyer. So in whichever field I happen to find myself at any time I am always regarded as belonging to the other.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I shall, of course, be delighted to confer at any time with my co-Chairman, and we shall discuss this matter at great length. I must say, however, if I may turn for a moment to philosophy, that I think that we shall have to study all these proposals in the light of their actual context; we shall have to study what they really do rather than what they say. We shall have to work this out on the basis that when the commission certifies something there will be the certainty that there are going to be a number of on-site inspections. The events are still labelled "unidentified", but there has to be certainty with regard to the on-site inspection. Otherwise the whole philosophical context of the plan changes, and we shall not have the concept of somebody who would be deterred from a possible attempt to violate the treaty by the fact that it was the commission which had the power to certify the unidentified event and the power to make the inspection, while the potential violator would never know which event the commission was going to certify or when the on-site inspection was going to take place.

If we change that whole concept from a certainty to a mere theoretical possibility which can be debated at some length by the country on whose territory the unidentified event occurs -- it could debate whether the evidence was sufficient, whether the commission had acted properly, whether there was a proper exercise of authority, and so forth -- then, I submit, the whole philosophical context changes and we shall not be able to solve the problem merely by semantic changes.

I do not think that this is a problem that can be solved by my Soviet colleague and I getting out Roget's Thesaurus and looking for a series of words, or by turning to the dictionary and looking for some means of expressing something which I still believe is a fundamental difference between us. But let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I will be delighted to study with the greatest attention what the representative of India has said, and I will always at any time be available to my co-Chairman to discuss this matter.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have already stated the attitude in principle of the Soviet delegation to the proposal that the co-Chairmen should avail themselves of all their opportunities and take further steps to work out practical procedural measures for the solution of the problem before us.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

I must say once again that the Soviet delegation is prepared to meet together with the United States delegation at any time and to make every effort in order to contribute to the preparation of a draft treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the proposals submitted by the eight non-aligned countries.

I should like to stress that, in our opinion, it is precisely the proposals of the eight countries which have received the greatest support in the Committee, and therefore success will be assured if the other side also starts from the premise that the proposals submitted by the eight non-aligned States should be the basis of our negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): The Committee thanks the two co-Chairmen for the expression of their willingness to reconvene and discuss the proposal submitted by the delegations of India and the United Arab Republic.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I do not wish just now to speak on nuclear tests, but simply to comment on the suggestion that the Indian representative has just put forward: that the two co-Chairmen should get together, as they have on each difficult occasion in the past, to try to work out an agreement. This obviously falls within the purposes for which the co-Chairmen meet.

I think, however, that this suggestion and its approval by the two co-Chairmen is inclusive and not exclusive. By this I mean that on various occasions the representatives who sit in the Committee have many times proposed that other members, even all the members, of the Eighteen Nation Committee, should be admitted to the Sub-Committee's debates. I think, therefore, that this suggestion does not preclude the right of any member present here to put forward suggestions or to intervene on this question, which in the view of the Mexican delegation is the most important of all and indispensable for any progress in drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I said that this suggestion does not in any way derogate from the right of the members here to participate in the discussion. Nor does it imply that the United Kingdom delegation, which forms part of the Sub-Committee of the three nuclear Powers, should be left out of the discussion of this question of a nuclear test ban treaty.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

That is what I wished to say. I think that the suggestion of the Indian representative includes these others and does not exclude them; it does not mean that from now on the other members of this Committee cannot make pertinent suggestions nor does it mean that the Sub-Committee of the three nuclear Powers has disappeared or that the United Kingdom no longer belongs to the Sub-Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I think we all understand that this suggestion of the delegations of India and the United Arab Republic in no way excludes other members of the Committee from submitting suggestions or proposals; nor does this suggestion, accepted by the co-Chairmen, eliminate the Sub-Committee which was created by our Committee. I think we all agree with that definition, so I feel it is not necessary to have a discussion on it now.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I asked for the floor a little while ago in order to put forward the same ideas as those just submitted to the Committee by Mr. Padilla Nervo. Accordingly, I should like to associate myself with his statement and in particular to express the hope that the forthcoming meeting of the co-Chairmen may lead to the earliest possible resumption of the proceedings of the Sub-Committee of three nuclear Powers to which the United Kingdom delegation makes such an important and valuable contribution.

Mr. LALL (India): I did, of course, acknowledge the valuable work done in the Sub-Committee, and there was no intention to suppress the Sub-Committee at all. All I did was to draw attention to the fact that we ourselves in this Committee -- which set up the Sub-Committee to negotiate this problem -- also set up the institution of the co-Chairmen, and that that institution does represent, as it were, an intensification of the processes of close negotiation and consideration which we all know should play a very important role in discussion on the various aspects of disarmament.

Certainly the Sub-Committee will and should convene whenever the members of the Sub-Committee so desire. But surely members of the Sub-Committee would be the first to agree that this does not rule out the application to this problem at a given

(Mr. Lall, India)

moment of whatever institutional facilities are available to this Committee in the light of its previous decisions. I merely pointed out that the co-Chairmen are such an institution and that this juncture -- which is a pressing, urgent juncture -- is just the sort of juncture at which we should request the co-Chairmen to exercise a function in terms of the whole concept which we have of our work towards reaching agreement.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): Does the clarification just given make it possible for us to consider this discussion on the cessation of nuclear tests closed for the moment?

Mr. CASTRO (Brazil): I should like to say a very brief word, and I do not want to re-open the discussion for I think we have a consensus on the matter. I wish only to say that I am in full agreement with the considerations that have been put forward by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo. My understanding of the situation is that, along the lines of the suggestion made by Mr. Lall, the representative of India -- which has been endorsed by the representative of the United Arab Republic, and with which most of us are in agreement -- the two co-Chairmen should meet and make a joint reappraisal of the situation.

It is my view that one of the things the two co-Chairmen might consider is whether it would be convenient to have an early meeting of the Sub-Committee on nuclear weapon tests. We feel that the meeting of the co-Chairmen could be a preliminary to that, and that the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests might have the opportunity to consider some of the positions, suggestions and ideas that were set forth in our recent debates on this item.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): Are there any other comments on how the various delegations understand the position? I think now we all agree in our understanding of the proposal which has now been accepted by our two co-Chairmen. Since I hear no objection I take it that the Committee has concluded the discussion of the first part of its agenda for today dealing with the question of nuclear tests.

Before we proceed to the second part of our agenda, the discussion of general and complete disarmament, may I draw the attention of the members of the Committee to a draft announcement agreed upon by the two co-Chairmen for submission to the Conference. It reads:

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

"The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament will recess beginning 1 September and will resume in Geneva on Monday, 12 November, 1962. The co-Chairmen are empowered by the Committee to set a different date for reconvening at Geneva if circumstances so warrant in their judgement, taking into account both the expected termination date of the consideration of disarmament at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and the desirability of reconvening the Committee at Geneva at as early a date as possible."

Are there any comments on that proposal?

Mr. BURNS (Canada): It is the view of the Canadian delegation that this is a recommendation of the co-Chairmen to the Committee concerning a recess. Presumably the decision whether or not to have a recess will be for the Committee to take, and I feel that in those circumstances I am obliged to say that the Canadian delegation would have to oppose the suggestion because we are under instructions at present not to agree to a recess. The reasons for that were set out, as representatives will remember, by the Secretary of State for Canada at our meeting on 24 July. We feel that those reasons might be repeated, and I therefore quote from what was said at that time. The Secretary of State quoted (ENDC/PV.60, p.25) from the joint statement of agreed principles agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union and accepted unanimously by the General Assembly, and the last of those principles was:

"8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved ..." (ENDC/5)

What is now proposed is an interruption of our proceedings here for two and a half months. The Canadian delegation has not in its conversations with other delegations on this matter been given any reason of necessity for interrupting the proceedings of this Committee because of what is to take place at the General Assembly. We had laid before us in document ENDC/52 recommendations of the co-Chairmen concerning the subjects which would be discussed here. There were twelve such subjects, from (a) to (l), and so far we have not concluded discussion of the second

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

subject. If we adjourn on 1 September I fear very greatly that we will be reporting to the General Assembly little in the way of progress since we reassembled here. It is the view of the Canadian delegation that our discussions in this forum should continue without interruption until we have at least considered the matters which were laid before us by the co-Chairmen in the conference document which I have mentioned.

The Canadian delegation is aware that some heads of delegations here have special reasons why they would be obliged to be present for part or all of the time the General Assembly is in session. Nevertheless, it should be possible for delegations here representing the nations which were specially selected to form part of this Eighteen Nation Committee to carry on in accordance with the principle quoted by the Secretary of State of my country, which is to the effect that the United Nations expected efforts to reach agreement here to be continued without interruption and gave this Disarmament Conference a specific injunction to persevere, which was not the case with predecessors. When the Conference was set up all Members of the United Nations knew of the difficulties we would face, and for that reason the Conference was instructed to continue efforts without interruption. I shall be obliged, in face of this recommendation, to seek further instructions from my Government on the matter.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I have listened with much sympathy to Mr. Burns' remarks. Indeed, the task entrusted to us is so urgent and important that my delegation would be most anxious that our Committee's work should continue without interruption until the conclusion of our agreement. The suspension of the Committee's work is hardly avoidable during the time when the United Nations General Assembly will be discussing the disarmament problem. Hence, the Italian delegation has no objection to interrupting our discussions on 1 September, although a later date would have suited us better.

Moreover, my delegation attaches the highest importance to the fact that a specific date -- 12 November -- has been fixed for the resumption of our debate at Geneva.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The draft communique circulated to us indicates that the two co-Chairmen are empowered to fix a different date, in **the** light of certain circumstances. This language does not worry me because I am sure that the two co-Chairmen are as eager as we are that this interruption of the Conference's work should be as short as possible, and I sincerely hope that they will see their way to recall us before 12 November. I understand further that only a prolongation of the General Assembly debates beyond 12 November could cause the co-Chairmen to postpone recalling us at a later date. I hope, too, that the two co-Chairmen, with their usual kindness, will make sure of informing all the governments represented here in good time if we are to be recalled after 12 November, and that they will give us the reasons for the delay. They could make their communication either through the diplomatic channel and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or through the permanent delegations in New York.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Of course, any recommendation of the two co-Chairmen is something for the Committee as a whole to pass. In document ENDC/1 which has been adopted by the Committee, it is written:

"The Permanent Co-Chairmen of the Committee will be the Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. The Chairman of the incoming meeting will normally consult with the Co-Chairmen of the Committee regarding the next day's business. The Co-Chairmen will consult with each other and other delegations as desirable with the aim of facilitating both the formal and informal work of the Conference." (ENDC/1, p.2)

I think it is clear --- and I am sure my co-Chairman agrees with me --- that we have only the authority to recommend to the whole Committee. The considerations on which we have based ourselves in this connexion have been, briefly, as follows.

There will be approximately 110 States Members of the United Nations at the opening of the General Assembly on 17 September in New York. Most of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States will be there and will wish to participate in the general debate. Then the item on disarmament will be discussed in the First Committee. It was hoped that we could deal with that item and come back here on 29 October.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Some of the representatives -- especially those from the smaller countries -- have told the two co-Chairmen of their difficulties in maintaining delegations both here and in New York while following the disarmament debate at the United Nations; they are also somewhat troubled by the question of expense. It also happens that our colleagues from the Soviet Union have two national holidays on 7 November and 8 November, and if we set the resumption date earlier we would be coming back here and then adjourning for two days in order to permit them to honour those two holidays.

Therefore, in the light of those considerations, we hoped that we could definitely come back here on 12 November, but we agreed that if, for any reason, it seemed to be the consensus of the Committee -- because of the debate continuing in the United Nations -- that that date should be deferred, the two co-Chairmen would again consider the matter and refer their recommendations to individual members of the Committee for their approval.

I fully understand what has been said by Mr. Burns, but I am sure I speak for my Soviet colleague when I say that we thought we were merely expressing what was the general desire of the Committee in submitting this suggestion; however, the proposal is subject to the approval of the Committee.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): My delegation is concerned with the point that if we are to have a recess -- and we understand very well the strong reasons which exist for having a recess in the circumstances -- it should none the less be on conditions which would enable us to have a thorough and a fruitful autumn session of this Conference. We all know that there will almost certainly be a desire to have a recess for Christmas when the time comes -- a recess which, no doubt, delegations would wish to be fixed to begin not later than 18 December or 20 December. Therefore, we are very much concerned to have a sufficient number of weeks which will enable us to have a good session although we suppose, inevitably, it will be interrupted by at least a short recess on 18 December or 20 December. For that reason, we should have preferred and should still prefer a date for reconvening earlier than 12 November. We should have preferred 29 October. Of course, we appreciate that there may be difficulties about that but, taking one thing with another, my delegation would not be happy with the idea that the two co-Chairmen are empowered by the Committee to set a different date for reconvening at Geneva if that date were to be later than 12 November. If the decision read:

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

"The co-Chairmen are empowered by the Committee to set an earlier date for reconvening at Geneva", we should be happy to agree to that; but we feel that if a date is to be set later than 12 November the decision should not rest entirely at the discretion of the co-Chairmen, who should not feel empowered to set a later date but should, in that event, consult all the members of the Committee.

Therefore, if agreement is reached on words of that kind, I would suggest that they be amended at least to read: "The co-Chairmen are empowered by the Committee to set an earlier date for reconvening at Geneva ...". That would leave us with the fixed date of 12 November, but the Chairmen would be empowered to set an earlier date if circumstances permitted. To set a later date would then require consultation with all members of the Committee.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The recommendation submitted by the two co-Chairmen for approval by the Committee is the result of preliminary consultations with a number of delegations. Obviously, it is up to the Committee to accept this recommendation or to amend it in one way or another.

It seems to me, as well as to the United States representative, that the proposal which has been submitted is in accordance with the requirements of our work and corresponds to the many wishes which have been expressed in this connexion.

In addition to what was said by the United States co-Chairman, I should like to point out one or two considerations.

It would hardly be right to approach the solution of this problem without taking into account the fact that the seventeenth session of the General Assembly is shortly to be held. It would be wrong and abnormal to proceed, as some representatives are doing, in particular the representative of Canada, from the premise that the Committee can work whether or not there is a session of the General Assembly.

It seems to us that it would be very important and useful for the members of the Committee to know how the disarmament problem is dealt with in the General Assembly and, in particular, in the First Committee. We know that the General Assembly approved the composition of the Eighteen Nation Committee, as well as the principles of general and complete disarmament which are the basis of the work of

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

our Committee. I do not think that the representative of Canada would hold the view that the Committee can act without taking into account at all the opinion of the General Assembly, the opinion of what is for us the most authoritative organization, which will consider the disarmament questions included, as we know, in its agenda.

It also seems that consideration of the problem of disarmament in the General Assembly and in the First Committee may, we trust and hope, speed up and make more brisk the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee itself. It is obvious that positive considerations and proposals may be put forward in the General Assembly which the Committee could subsequently take into consideration in its work.

With regard to the date of the resumption of the Eighteen Nation Committee, the co-Chairman from the United States and myself discussed several dates by which the Committee might resume its work. But after carefully assessing the prospects, we reached the conclusion that the proposed date -- 12 November -- was the most appropriate from the practical point of view.

I certainly cannot agree with the view of the United Kingdom representative that it should also be stated in this announcement that the co-Chairmen are empowered to settle the question of shifting the proposed date only if it appears to be appropriate to shift it to an earlier one. This question was discussed by the co-Chairmen and we considered that the text proposed by us gives the two co-Chairmen an opportunity of discussing such an alternative, if there appears to be a possibility of reconvening the Eighteen Nation Committee even earlier than 12 November. What we have in mind is that if the work of the General Assembly is accomplished in such a way that a possibility emerges of reconvening the Committee before 12 November, then the co-Chairmen will undoubtedly take this possibility into consideration, especially as the concluding part of the joint proposal states that the co-Chairmen will take into account two circumstances: first, the expected termination date of the consideration of disarmament at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly; and secondly, the desirability of reconvening the Committee at Geneva at as early a date as possible.

Therefore it seems to me inappropriate to add to the proposed text an amendment to the effect that the co-Chairmen are empowered to set only an earlier date. However, it is a matter for the Committee to decide. If for practical purposes it

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

is considered desirable that the question of the date of the reconvening of the Committee should be the subject of consultations among all the members of the Committee, we shall have no objection to the whole Committee taking on this work, instead of its being dealt with by the two co-Chairmen.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): So it would be agreed that in the event of a delay in the resumption of this Conference, the two co-Chairmen would consult the interested governments represented here?

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): There was no objection.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I am sure I speak for my Soviet colleague when I say that the two co-Chairmen have no wish to usurp any power from this Committee. We would of course consult with each of the members and try to take into consideration the wishes of each one of them. It is just a question of whether or not the co-Chairmen, an institution set up by the Committee, should try to agree on a date and then consult with each of the members of the Committee. Otherwise it might be necessary to try to reach all the members of the Committee and to assemble them. However, I am sure I speak for the other co-Chairman when I say that we would naturally expect to consult each and every member of the Committee at all times on all matters and not attempt to usurp any authority for ourselves.

I should like to say just one more word. As you know, this Committee has a long history. I will not bore you with its long history, but it goes back for a number of years to when we had the Ten Nation Committee, with five representatives of countries associated or affiliated with the Soviet Union and five from the West. When Ambassador Stevenson and myself were negotiating with Mr. Zorin last summer we held extensive conversations about the additions to the Committee. Both of us were agreed that it would be very helpful if we could add some new and non-aligned nations to the Committee. General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 states:

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"Noting with satisfaction the report submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America following their exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body,

1. Welcomes the joint statement of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations included in that report,

2. Recommends that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based upon those principles;"

It goes on to state:

"Recognizing that all States have a deep interest in disarmament negotiations,

1. Endorses the agreement that has been reached" --- that is, the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union --- "on the composition of a Disarmament Committee, whose membership will be: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America;

2. Recommends that the Committee, as a matter of the utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations ..."

I do not wish to go into the long history of this Committee. However, although this Committee was endorsed by the United Nations, I do not think that it is actually a committee of the United Nations.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): While agreeing with the arrangement proposed by the co-Chairmen for reconvening the Committee on 12 November, I should like to say that the co-Chairmen ought not to be asked to do anything that might result in the discussion in the United Nations General Assembly being hastened or curtailed, for that discussion will certainly be very valuable for the resumption of our Committee's work.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The Canadian representative quoted the last sentence of the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5). I cite the text.

"Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme."

In referring to this sentence one should not infer that a recess in the Committee's proceedings is an interruption of the efforts towards disarmament. On the contrary, the periodic recesses might actually be said to form an integral part of our proceedings and we should all understand that certain breaks promote the solution of the problem of disarmament because, at such times, the governments are compelled to reconsider their positions.

When the delegations resume their debate after an important event like the session of the United Nations General Assembly or after a break during which they have been doing their "homework", as they say, public opinion and we ourselves expect some progress in our efforts. That is why I think it is a very good thing to await the discussion that will take place at the United Nations and to follow with interest what will be said by all the representatives who speak on the disarmament problem. We shall then come back here with new ideas suggested to us on certain points and with the latest ideas of the great Powers which have to reconsider the questions so that we can reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. I repeat that our work goes on and this is simply a matter of a normal recess in our proceedings.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): My delegation is prepared to accept what is proposed in the first sentence of the paper we have before us -- namely, a recess beginning on 1 September and a resumption in Geneva on Monday, 12 November 1962. We would accept that reluctantly because we would have preferred, and would still prefer, an earlier resumption date. But we are prepared to accept that, and we are also prepared to agree that the co-Chairmen should be empowered -- that is to say, should have the power -- to set an earlier date for reconvening in Geneva in the light of the circumstances

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

described later in the statement. But my delegation has no authority to agree that the two co-Chairmen should be empowered to fix a date later than 12 November without consulting other delegations, and I must reserve my position on that point. The view I would urge is that if a date for resumption later than 12 November were to be fixed it should require the consent of all the members of the Committee.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I understood the representative of the United Kingdom to say that he does not object to the first sentence, in which it is stated that the recess will last from 1 September to 12 November. Nor does he object to the idea that the two co-Chairmen might fix a date for reconvening earlier than 12 November. However, he objects to the co-Chairmen setting a later date, and, if I understood him correctly, he expressed a wish or a proposal that in that event the co-Chairmen should consult the States members of the Committee. I should like to emphasize that it is, of course, hardly necessary to mention it again -- the co-Chairmen would in either case consult the States members of the Committee. If, therefore, there is no objection to that part of the text which says that the co-Chairmen are empowered to set a date before 12 November, it seems to me there is also no real reason to object to our agreeing that the co-Chairmen are also empowered to consult about a later date, if the circumstances so require.

It is hardly necessary to go at present into all the details of the working procedure of the co-Chairmen on this question. In practice the two co-Chairmen will obviously have opportunities in New York to consult the representatives of all the States members of this Committee. I do not quite understand the position of the United Kingdom representative, even after hearing his explanation.

I should like now to say just a few words in reply to Mr. Dean's remark about the rights and duties of the Eighteen Nation Committee. That question does not arise; it has not been raised by any delegation. Therefore I do not understand why the United States representative found it necessary to go into the legal aspect as to whether our Committee is or is not an organ of the United Nations. One thing is obvious, namely that the United Nations and all its Member States are vitally concerned that the disarmament problem should be solved and moreover as quickly as possible. Therefore, attempts to oppose the Committee on Disarmament, which is dealing with the disarmament problem, to the United Nations itself serve no useful purpose.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

I may say by the way that all the proposals submitted in the United Nations usually emanate from some particular delegation or delegations. There is no need at present to conduct any discussion of a legal nature on the status of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): Does the representative of the United Kingdom agree with the interpretation that has now been given?

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I regret that I do not agree. Perhaps the representative of the Soviet Union has not understood my point. Great as is the respect of my delegation for our two co-Chairmen, the position of my delegation at this moment is that we are not prepared to give the two co-Chairmen the power to fix a date later than 12 November, and we are not prepared to adopt the form of words which says that they are empowered to do that.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): Do you propose any wording to replace that in the recommendation?

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): The wishes of my delegation would be met by changing the words "a different date" to read "an earlier date". But in saying that I do not at all wish to rule out the possibility of consultation by the two co-Chairmen with members of the Committee and, with the agreement of all members of the Committee, fixing a date later than 12 November. I do not intend to rule that out, but what I do wish to rule out is the possibility that the two co-Chairmen, after consulting the views of other delegations, but perhaps disregarding some of them, may feel entitled, by something we pass here, to fix a date later than 12 November over the objections of members of the Committee.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): So if the date should be later than 12 November, the co-Chairmen agree that they will consult with each other and with the other Governments taking part in this Conference. If this point is agreed, as it seems to be, it should not be difficult to add a sentence in that sense to our communique and to inform the Press about it straight away.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I have said that we do not agree to a recess at all, and therefore it may seem rather curious that I should argue on the point which has been discussed by representatives of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Italy. What happens if the co-Chairmen proceed to consult the members of the Committee and the proposal is made that there shall be, for example, a later date and the members of the Committee do not all agree? Perhaps there would only be a minority of one, Canada, which would not agree, or perhaps we might not be in such a minority as we are at the present time. In any case, if all representatives did not agree to meet on 12 November there would not be any meeting. I would ask any of my colleagues here who have been present at these discussions on disarmament in the past few years in the United Nations who can possibly think that they will be terminated on some definite date set in advance. We do not know. What we know pretty well is that if we agree to this recess set up in these terms we will not come back here this year. That is the view of the Canadian delegation.

Mr. CASTRO (Brazil): Although we agree with much of what has been said on the question of the necessity of continuity of our efforts in Geneva, my delegation does not wish to advance any objections to what has been agreed to by our co-Chairmen in formulating their joint recommendation. They share the main responsibility for the normal conduct of our proceedings and they are thus in a position to make an assessment on the best time for our negotiations. We rely on their resolving the matter, and for our part we would be prepared to accept their recommendation. On the other hand, we would have no difficulty in accepting the suggestion made by the United Kingdom delegation were it to reflect the general consensus of this Committee. We feel that negotiations on disarmament should proceed on as continuous a basis as practicable until we reach agreement on the fundamental issues of general and complete disarmament and a nuclear test ban. Of course, the next General Assembly should provide us with an excellent opportunity for wider conversations on disarmament, and specifically on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests, if no positive results are achieved in Geneva. We feel that the Disarmament Conference should reconvene in Geneva as early as is feasible and practicable and that its proceedings should continue until our objectives are met. On the other hand, it is our feeling that before the Committee recesses the nuclear Sub-Committee might meet in order to have an opportunity to re-assess the situation of nuclear tests and to consider it in the light of our recent debates. Anyhow, it is evident that some further consultation is needed on this question of a recess and that we have not yet reached a consensus on it.

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

As a practical suggestion I venture to say that we should postpone a decision until one of our next meetings, and I wonder in this connexion if the most practical way would not be for the co-Chairmen to have a consultation with the members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament at an informal meeting where a free exchange of views on the matter might be very useful.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I did not intend to speak on this question, but the last remark of the Canadian representative, expressing his fear that if this recess takes place we shall not meet again this year, troubles me a little, and I should like to state the attitude of the Mexican Government on this matter. We have always thought that these negotiations should be continuous and we have often said that our delegation, whatever might be its composition, was ready to stay here until the year 2000, at least.

This attitude of the Mexican Government is of long standing and I should like only to quote one passage from my speech at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 2 November 1960. I then said that:

"the negotiating body on disarmament should be set up on a permanent basis. The negotiations had been broken off several times, and it had been necessary to wait for the next session of the General Assembly, and sometimes longer, to put the negotiating machinery into operation again. Almost every year there was a new discussion on the composition and terms of reference of the negotiating body. The solution of the problem was too urgent to allow such vacillation to continue."^{1/}

Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India, once said that time had become of the essence of the problem.

I also stated that there should be no more interruptions other than the recesses inherent in the nature and complexity of this type of negotiation, and that the importance and urgency of the problem demanded that disarmament be thought of and regarded as a full-time job.

Accordingly I take the view that the negotiations should continue until they are successful. Our main task is, firstly, to prevent occasional deadlocks from killing the Eighteen Nation Committee as a negotiating body; secondly, it is our duty to see that contacts between the Powers are maintained until negotiations produce concrete results; and thirdly, my Government thinks it important that a date for resumption should be fixed because this would have the effect of making

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, First Committee, 1099th Meeting, para.24.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

it clear to public opinion that there is no deadlock, but a need for a recess for reasons which have already been given and that we have the will and the intention -- which we shall carry out -- of resuming negotiations on the agreed date.

I wish further to stress that the co-Chairmen's agreement and their decision to take part in the negotiations when these are continued are indispensable to our work, because if one of them were absent there could be no meeting even if all the other members were present, since it is obvious that no agreement could be reached in the absence of one of the Powers. I think nevertheless that it is important that the co-Chairmen should consult the other members of the Committee, because what we desire is that present disagreements should not prevent the carrying on of the negotiations or result in their indefinite postponement, with all the dangers that that would involve as Mr. Burns has just pointed out. For us, therefore, it is important that a date should be fixed.

We should also take into account the possibility that the date might be altered, after consultation with the other members, because it is certain that the General Assembly, through the First Committee, will not only discuss our report but will also be informed of our intention to continue the negotiations. And it is possible that a fresh recommendation to the great Powers to resume negotiations at an earlier date, if by then the work of the First Committee is held to have been concluded, will be made by the General Assembly independently of the nations represented in this Committee. Such a recommendation would undoubtedly have great influence on the decision of the delegations represented here by the two co-Chairmen.

For these reasons, my delegation is ready to accept the text jointly submitted by the two co-Chairmen and if they wish to accept the remarks made in this connexion by the United Kingdom and Italian representatives, my delegation would agree to that too.

Mr. LALL (India): We have no objection to this paper submitted by the co-Chairmen on the question of recess, but it seems that there is not complete unanimity on it, and I think that the best way of dealing with the matter would be to postpone a decision, as proposed by the representative of Brazil.

There is one thing, however, that I think we should be clear about. The representative of Mexico has pointed out how much sense of urgency has gone into the decision of the General Assembly relating to disarmament. I think that a

(Mr. Lall, India)

practical case has been made out for the date of 12 November, and also there is language in this paper for modifying that date. All that is reasonable; but no case has been made out for the date of 1 September. I realize that certain representatives -- particularly two of them -- have to leave us early in September. That is true, but at the same time I think that in a committee of eighteen, important though it is that two representatives have to leave early, they can at least leave other representatives behind, and I do not think that we have made out the case for closing as early as 1 September. I do not see how we could justify to the General Assembly the setting of that date, taking into account the sense of urgency expressed by the Assembly. In fact, I think that it would cause a misunderstanding. I do not think that that date is justifiable; it is a possible date and we would not object to it in extreme circumstances, but I do not think it is justifiable. It does not fit in with the sense of urgency which has been expressed and, in this connexion, the representative of Mexico reminded me of the words of the Prime Minister of India.

I think that we should go on until possibly 20 September and then close. After all, the general debate of the Assembly will only begin on about 20 September. We should certainly leave our date of reconvening here flexible so as to be judged in the light of the work in the Assembly.

In short, our main consideration here is how the work of the General Assembly will progress, and our other consideration is that the Assembly regards the work of disarmament as urgent. Neither of those two considerations bears on the date of 1 September and I do not think that there is unanimity about it.

So far as the suggestion of the United Kingdom representative is concerned -- that the language should be changed so as to meet his point regarding the date of reconvening -- I think that his view is most reasonable; in other words we should fix 12 November, or earlier than that if the co-Chairmen feel that an earlier date will be satisfactory, but if the date is to be later, there should be consultation with all members of the Committee. That is perfectly reasonable and I am sure that the co-Chairmen can agree on it.

I do think that, taking into account the spirit of the United Nations and the date which the Assembly itself has fixed for its work bearing on disarmament, this question needs a little further consideration. I think that the co-Chairmen should consider it further, possibly taking advantage of the suggestion of the representative of Brazil to have an informal chat about it, in this room or some other, or at the residences of the co-Chairmen, or anywhere else where they might allow us to talk to them informally about the matter.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): Many heterogeneous opinions have been expressed on this matter and, in view of the lateness of the hour I feel that we are not in a position to reach a decision on the recommendation of the two co-Chairmen. A formal proposal has been made by the representative of Brazil, supported by the representative of India, that we should postpone our decision on this issue. Therefore, I think that we should ask our co-Chairmen to continue discussion on this point, taking into consideration the different opinions that have been expressed by members of the Committee. Is there any objection to this proposal?

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I agree with your suggestion, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I also agree with your suggestion, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): So there are no objections. In that case I think we could adjourn the discussion on general and complete disarmament until our next meeting and proceed to the communique.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its seventy-second plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Hajek, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, India, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, the United Arab Republic, the United States, Mexico, Italy, Brazil and Canada.

"On a joint proposal by India and the United Arab Republic the Conference requested the co-Chairmen, who accepted, to consider practical and adequate ways for a test ban treaty.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 22 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.