CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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28 April 1966

ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 28 April 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. T. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia)

cdc.66-418

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
	Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
	Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES
Bulgaria:	Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
	Mr. D. POPOV
	Mr. T. DAMIANOV
	Mr. D. KOSTOV
Burma:	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
Canada:	Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
	Mr. S. F. RAE
	Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
	Mr. P. D. LEE
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. V. CEBIS
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ABERRA
	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
India:	Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
	Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
	Mr. K. P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
	Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
	Mr. S. AVETTA
	Mr. F. SORO
Mexico:	Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Nigeria:	Mr. G. O. IJEWERE
	Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:	Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
	Mr. B. KAJDY
Romania:	Mr. N. ECOBESCU
	Mr. C. UNGUREANU
	Mr. A. COROIANU
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
	Mr. R. BOMAN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
	Mr. V. V. SHUSTOV
	Mr. G. K. EFIMOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. M. KASSEM
	Mr. A. A. SALAM
	Mr. M. SHAKER
United Kingdom:	Sir Harold BEELEY
	Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
	Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
	Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN
United States of America:	Mr. W. C. FOSTER
	Mr. S. DePALMA
	Mr. A. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. F. MILLER
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. P. P. SPINELLI
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the two hundred and sixtieth plenary meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): As was agreed in the Committee, we are to devote four meetings to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, our statement today will be devoted to this question.

The Committee has already been discussing for three months at this session the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are bound, however, to reoognize the regrettable fact that today we are just as far from a solution as we were in January, when the Committee resumed its work after the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In this connexion we cannot help asking ourselves what is the reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs in regard to the solution of this important and urgent problem. We have already answered that question in the statements we made at the 252nd and 255th meetings of the Committee.

Today we shall confine ourselves to summing up our point of view on this subject and at the same time we shall develop a number of arguments put forward by us at previous meetings. As we have already noted, the reason for the lack of any progress in solving the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the position of the United States of America, its policy of satisfying the claims of the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to nuclear weapons. That is why the United States is trying to leave the door open for the proliferation of these weapons among its NATO partners. It is precisely to this aim that both the original (ENDC/152) and the amended United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152/Add.1) are subordinated.

In this connexion we should like first of all to touch upon the question of how the concept of "control" over nuclear weapons is dealt with in the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation. The draft treaty submitted to the Committee for consideration contains a very narrow definition of the concept of "control". The possession, handling and disposal of nuclear weapons by a State are not regarded in this draft treaty as an integral part of control over these weapons by that State. Control, you see, is merely "right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapon State." (ENDC/152/Add.1)

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

But the word "control" in English embraces a very broad concept. Incidentally, our attention was drawn to this fact by the United States representatives in the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations as far back as 1946/1947, when the question of prohibiting nuclear weapons was being discussed. In defining the concept of "control" over atomic energy and atomic weapons, the United States delegation pointed out that this concept covered the production, ownership, handling and disposal of atomic materials, atomic energy and atomic weapons. The definition of the concept of "control" in the United States draft treaty, as we see, represents an obvious deviation by the authors of the draft from that natural sense of the word "control" which would assure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and which had previously been given by the United States side when the nuclear problem was under discussion in United Nations bodies.

Why was it necessary to include in the United States draft treaty a very restricted definition of control, which is completely inappropriate to the aim of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, a definition in which there is no mention of the possession, handling and disposal of nuclear weapons and only one element of their disposal is referred to: the firing of nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State? The introduction of this restricted and truncated concept of control into the draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is due to the attempts of the United States to adapt this treaty to the aims and purposes of its policy in NATO, and in the first place to its desire to satisfy the claims of the Federal Republic of Germany to nuclear weapons.

Careful examination of this definition in comparison with other provisions of the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation convinces us that this draft provides the possibility for the United States, irrespective of whether unified nuclear forces are created in NATO or not, to transfer nuclear weapons to other countries, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany, and for the latter to obtain these weapons, keep them, transport them as it sees fit and put them into its missiles or aircraft, which could thus carry out flights with nuclear weapons aboard. Lastly, the Federal Republic of Germany would be able to use these weapons after receiving the consent of a nuclear Power.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Further, we should like to consider the provision in the United States draft treaty article 1 paragraph 3, regarding the possibility of transforming a nuclear Power into an association of States having control over nuclear weapons. We have already expressed our views on this question at the meeting of the Committee held on 5 April (ENDC/PV.255, pp. 20, 21). We have pointed out the dual inconsistency of this provision. First, a nuclear Power and an association of nuclear States are not one and the same thing. Secondly, the very problem of such a transformation is artificial and improbable and does not arise out of any real necessity, since no nuclear Power, as far as we know, has declared its intention of renouncing nuclear weapons in favour of any association of nuclear States. The very formulation of the question of the possibility of transforming or converting a nuclear Power into an association of nuclear States is thus hypothetical, and merely testifies to the endeavour of the authors of the United States draft treaty to provide therein additional loop-holes or chinks which would enable a single nuclear Power to transform itself into an association of nuclear Powers, so that, instead of a single nuclear Power, there would emerge two, three or more such Powers.

The existence of loop-holes in the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation is confirmed by the provision it contains for the right of veto of the nuclear Powers in regard to the use of nuclear weapons by States not possessing these weapons at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. The provision for the right of veto in the United States draft treaty shows quite obviously that under this treaty non-nuclear States may possess and fire nuclear weapons with the consent of a nuclear Power. Thus, the United States draft treaty directly provides for the possibility of proliferating nuclear weapons; it lays down only one condition: namely, that the nuclear weapons placed at the disposal of a non-nuclear country should be used only with the consent of a nuclear Power. This is the only meaning of the provision for the right of veto included in the United States draft treaty.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The provision for the right of veto contained in the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is a direct indication that this draft treaty in no way prevents the spread of such weapons; it merely introduces a certain element of restriction on the use of such weapons. This restriction is the consent of a nuclear Power to their use. If the United States draft treaty provided for neither the direct nor indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons, if it contained no loop-holes for such proliferation, there would be no need to introduce the right of veto into the treaty.

In this connexion we should like to stress that in the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164) there is, of course, no provision for the right of veto, since there is no necessity for it. The Soviet draft provides for neither the direct nor the indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons. It contains no loop-holes for their proliferation.

In considering the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as a whole, together with its provision for the right of veto, its deliberately narrow definition of the concept of "control", and the possibility which it provides of transforming a nuclear Power into an association of nuclear States, can it be said that this draft treaty complies with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations which lays down that --

> "2 (a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;" (A/RES/2028(XX), p.2; ENDC/161)

To this question we reply with the utmost conviction that the United States draft treaty is directly and flagrantly contrary to this resolution of the General Assembly. The United States draft treaty permits, first, the creation of joint nuclear forces within the framework of military blocs; and, secondly, the transfer of nuclear weapons into the control of any non-nuclear State, with the proviso that the nuclear Powers retain the right of veto in regard to their use. Under the provisions of this treaty the United States would be able to transfer nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany or to any other State -- for instance, the Republic of South Africa -- if it desire to do so.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Our analysis of the United States proposal -- its draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons -- contains the answer to the question of what has brought about the obviously unsatisfactory situation in the Committee in regard to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Careful consideration of the United States position and proposals in this regard is bound to lead us to the conclusion that the United States is not prepared to come to an agreement on this question on the terms laid down by the unanimously-adopted resolution of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly -- that is, on those terms which enable this problem to be solved at all. In fact, the United States proposes to us, not a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but a treaty on the proliferation of such weapons with certain limitations, on terms which fit in with the aims and purposes of the policy of the United States. In fact, it is proposed to us that we should legalize the proliferation of nuclear weapons within a well-defined framework and under the limited control of the United States, which envisages using the right of veto in regard to the use of nuclear weapons by States which, under this treaty, would obtain access to these weapons.

We have already stated here on many occasions, and we state once again, that there can be no agreement on the basis proposed by the United States. As we have already stressed, the Soviet Union will not agree to a treaty that would provide for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the granting to the Federal Republic of Germany of access to these weapons. Undoubtedly such a treaty would fit in with the plans of the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany. These circles are well aware that the United States draft treaty does not close to them the door to access to nuclear weapons. It is therefore not surprising that they have agreed to the submission by the United States of the draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons now under consideration by the Committee, which obviously suits them completely.

Replying to our objections to the United States draft treaty and to our arguments concerning the threat to peace involved in giving the West German Bundeswehr access to nuclear weapons, the representatives of the United States and other Western Powers in the Committee repeat their assertions that the policy of West Germany is peaceful and does not pursue any revanchist aims. In this connexion we have already adduced many facts and arguments which show the contrary.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

We should also like to refer to the statement made on 10 November 1965 by Chancellor Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany in which he insisted on the re-establishment "of equity in settling the question of possession of their own nuclear weapons" by all members of NATO. This statement of the Federal Chancellor was echoed by the West German Press. Thus the Düsseldorf newspaper Industriekurier wrote on 23 October 1965 that, with the advent of the new Government --

"...the most urgent problem is the German right to participate in deciding the nuclear strategy of NATO. Here a clear-cut decision should be taken after long years of fruitless debating and plan-making".

During the discussion in Munich on 29-30 January 1966 on the nuclear defence of the West, at which many political leaders of the NATO countries were present, the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany openly declared that West Germany must be given the right to have a say in regard to the use of the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Access to nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany is also being vigorously advocated by the former Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Herr Strauss, who, speaking at the end of August 1965, threatened that a new Führer would come to power in the Federal Republic if West Germany's claim to be given access to nuclear weapons was not satisfied. That was reported in The Sunday Times of 29 August 1965.

It is necessary to bear in mind that all the statements we have quoted have been made in the circumstances of an extensive militarization of West Germany, which is facilitated by the political policy now being pursued by the United States. We have no illusions about what would happen if the Federal Republic of Germany obtained access to nuclear weapons. The course of events would drag us into a path fraught with the direst consequences for the peoples of the world. To insist, as the United States is doing, upon an agreement which would give the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons is tantamount to dragging us into that path. Have we a right to give our consent to this?

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The sacrifices borne by our country in the two world wars — more than 20 million died during the Second World War alone -- the tens of thousands of towns and villages destroyed and the huge losses suffered in these wars by many other countries, emphatically require us to make every possible effort and take all possible measures to prevent such a development of events, and forbid us to enter that path, which is exceedingly dangerous for all countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany. It was precisely in order to prevent such a development of events that the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom took at the Potsdam Conference the following decision, to which France adhered later:

> "... German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors, or the peace of the world".1/

In the light of the events that have been taking place in the post-war years, the assertions of the representatives of the United States and other Western Powers about the peaceful character of the policy of Western Germany, and that the granting of nuclear weapons to that country under the conditions provided for by the United States draft treaty would serve the cause of peace, appear to us to be unconvincing. If the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany really wished to reduce international tension and to solve the problem of eliminating the nuclear danger, they would not seek to obtain access to nuclear weapons, nor would they hinder the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the form required by the aforesaid resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.

The stubborn efforts of the Federal Republic to obtain access to nuclear weapons show that its plans and policies are in direct opposition to the aim of eliminating the vestiges of the Second World War, normalizing the situation in Europe and in the world, and strengthening international security. In the Federal Republic and the United States people must surely realize that access to nuclear weapons by the Bundeswehr would mean closing the door to the conclusion of a treaty to prevent the spread of these weapons;

1/ Britannica Book of the Year, 1946, p.121

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

it would also make international tension considerably more acute and increase the threat of a nuclear war. People in those countries must surely know also that any draft treaty on non-proliferation which provides for such access has no chance whatever of becoming the basis of an international agreement on this question.

We are told that the plans for the creation of a multilateral force or an Atlantic nuclear force have lost their immediate relevance and are a "dead letter". But then we may ask: for what purposes does the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons leave a possibility for the creation of multilateral nuclear forces, or any similar plan for "sharing nuclear responsibility", which is a dangerous form of proliferation, and why do the Western delegations not agree with the Soviet proposals which completely preclude such a possibility?

The positions of the United States and of the United Kingdom do not give us any grounds for thinking that the plans for giving West Germany access to nuclear weapons have been set aside to any extent or have lost their importance. This is shown in particular by the statement made by the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, on 3 February this year in the Joint Atomic Energy Commission of the United States Congress, in which he stressed that --

> "There is no contradiction between the policy of the United States on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possible nuclear agreements proposed for the Atlantic Alliance."[1/]

Thus, the Secretary of State of the United States admitted that the attempt of the United States to give the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons is entirely within the framework of the United States policy of so-called "non-proliferation" of nuclear weapons.

Only yesterday, in connexion with an article in The New York Times which had published a report that the United States had set aside its plans for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force, the Secretary of State made the following statement:

1/ Translated from Russian.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

"The United States regards the problem of nuclear sharing as a major unfinished business. The development of an arrangement to provide participation for NATO non-nuclear nations, including the Federal Republic of Germany, in the management of nuclear power is under the most serious discussion among interested governments.

"The United States Government has made no decision to foreclose a possible Atlantic nuclear force or any other collective approach to the problem". (The New York Times, 28 April 1966, International Edition, p.3).

The plans for creating an Atlantic nuclear force in NATO are still on the agenda of the United Kingdom Government. In the pre-election manifesto of the Labour Party it was stressed that the proposal of the United Kingdom for the creation of an Atlantic nuclear force "is still the best basis for a discussion between allies". This position was confirmed in the Queen's Speech on 21 April, in which she said: "The United Kingdom will endeavour to establish nuclear interaction among Western countries".

All this stresses once more that the policy of the Western Powers aims at giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons, with all the ensuing dangerous consequences for the people of all countries, including West Germany. It is precisely this fact that has led to stagnation and even to an impasse, both within and outside this Committee, in the negotiations on the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is of such great importance for the destiny of all the countries of the world.

In this Committee a paradoxical situation has come about in regard to consideration of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not one of the representatives of the Western Powers has been able to put forward any substantial arguments against the Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation. No one has been able to point to any incompatibility between the Soviet draft treaty and the task set by the General Assembly in regard to the way in which the problem of non-proliferation should be solved. Nevertheless, the representatives of the Western Powers evade serious consideration of this draft treaty and refuse to accept it as a basis for negotiations on non-proliferation

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

In contrast to the United States draft treaty, the Soviet draft treaty contains a direct and clear formulation of commitments: not to transfer such weapons in any form - directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States - to the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons and not to accord to such States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation fully ensures that no non-nuclear State would be able to fire nuclear weapons, for the simple reason that it would not possess such weapons nor have any access to them. The Soviet Union has also proposed to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory.

We should like to stress that the Soviet Union does not regard the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an end in itself. We consider that the conclusion of such a treaty would be merely a step towards the implementation of a wide range of measures leading to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. Among such measures are, in the first place, the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests; the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world, including Central Europe; the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; and, lastly, the complete prohibition of such weapons, accompanied by the destruction of all existing stocks.

For a long time now we have been considering the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but have not yet achieved any positive results. We have by no means unlimited possibilities at our disposal in regard to the time required for reaching agreement on this question. Time is pressing us. We should make every effort to solve the problem of non-proliferation without delay. If we do not solve it in the very near future, there may come about a situation in which we shall never be able to do so.

Those are our views on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which we wished to set forth by way of addition to what we have already said at previous meetings of the Committee when considering this problem.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I do not propose to reply in detail today to the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union. Every one of the charges that he has made has been answered and refuted by the United States delegation at previous meetings. It is clear, however, from his statement that the Soviet Union persists in its efforts to turn our discussion of means of halting proliferation into a campaign against NATO and against the Federal Republic of Germany.

I must say that the Soviet representative is somewhat less than candid with us when he talks -- or, rather, does not talk -- about Warsaw Pact arrangements on nuclear defence. We have asked repeatedly about these arrangements and whether they, in the Soviet view, constitute proliferation. So far we have not received a direct reply. For instance, on 31 March (ENDC/PV.253, p.14) Mr. Fisher took note of a Soviet press statement clearly implying that questions regarding the use of nuclear weapons are considered within the Warsaw Pact. But his question whether the Soviet Union considers the sharing of military decision-making on these matters as constituting proliferation is still unanswered. At the same meeting Mr. Fisher also referred to the presence in the armed forces of certain Eastern European countries of Soviet-built delivery vehicles "capable of using nuclear warheads" (ibid., p.15). I submit that this appears to be evidence that the Soviet Union also trains its allies in the use of nuclear weapons. Yet Mr. Fisher received no answer when he asked if the Soviet Union considers this practice to be proliferation.

It is no answer to say that the Soviet Union is prepared to abide by the terms of its draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/164). The question before us here is: what do those terms mean? The Soviet Union has told us in great detail how it would choose to interpret these terms as they might apply to possible NATO arrangements; but the Warsaw Pact arrangements remain completely shrouded in secrecy. The United States does not assert that the practices of the Warsaw Pact constitute proliferation. However, if the Soviet Union feels free to comment on internal NATO defence matters while refusing to inform us about practices of the Warsaw Pact which have an equal bearing on the matter being discussed here, are we not entitled to question the seriousness of the Soviet Union in seeking a non-proliferation treaty?

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I fail to see how the approach taken by the Soviet Union can lead to the conclusion of the treaty which I believe we all seriously wish to achieve. However, we shall study the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union. We reserve the right to make a detailed reply at a subsequent meeting to some points he has raised.

My real purpose in speaking this morning is to make an announcement that should be of interest to this Committee. It is an announcement that is timely as we resume discussion today of our common objective to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; and it is highly pertinent to the objective of seeking to ensure that in the nuclear field what is peaceful today remains peaceful tomorrow. By way of background, I would recall the statement I made before this Committee on 7 September 1965 (ENDC/PV.230, pp. 22, 23) describing the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system. We noted then that the system is designed to cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication plants, reactors and fuel reprocessing plants -- that is, chemical separation plants. The development of a safeguards system is, moreover, viewed by the International Atomic Energy Agency as a step-by-step matter, of which the first major step was the development of procedures for inspecting nuclear reactors. We also stated that procedures for inspecting other types of facilities will be developed as the need arises.

At the last meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors in February of this year, it was recognized that the time had come to develop detailed procedures for safeguarding nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. The Board therefore set up a committee to develop such procedures. During our session last year the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, referred to this subject on 12 August 1965 (ENDC/PV.223, pp. 19-21) and stressed the importance of safeguards on such plants. As we have often said, the United States favours the widest possible coverage of international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear facilities in all countries. We have therefore contributed extensively to the development of such safeguards. We have invited the International Atomic Energy Agency to safeguard several of our nuclear reactors, including the large power station at Rowe, Massachusetts. We have done this to demonstrate that safeguards in no way infringe national sovereignty and impose no appreciable burden on the facility or on the host State. We have done this to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in training inspectors and in developing improved inspection techniques.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Every nuclear power reactor generates as a by-product of its operation materials which could be diverted for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. For this material to be used in a weapons programme it must first undergo treatment at a reprocessing plant. Given the present and foreseeable expansion of nuclear power production in the world, with increasing quantities of plutonium by-products being generated, the need for international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities and facilities becomes more and more evident if we are to be successful in preventing the development of nuclear weapons by States not now possessing them.

As a new contribution to the development of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards procedures, I now wish to announce that the United States is offering to that Agency access to a commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing facility for development of safeguards procedures and for the training of Agency inspectors. This plant, which is located at West Valley, New York, is owned and operated by Nuclear Fuel Services Incorporated. It is the first, and so far the only, commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in the United States, and we are grateful for the co-operation we have received from this commercial corporation.

Developing safeguards procedures for fuel reprocessing plants presents technical problems which can best be dealt with in an operating plant. This offer will give the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards staff the opportunity to try out various possible safeguards techniques and to evaluate them on an experimental basis. We hope that this practical experience will contribute to the more rapid development of such techniques.

The offer by my Government to give the International Atomic Energy Agency access to a commercial nuclear reprocessing facility in the United States is further demonstration of our continued strong support for international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities and of our belief in the efficacy of the International Atomic Energy Agency system. We have urged and continue to urge other governments to co-operate in expanding the coverage of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to such peaceful nuclear activities. We agree that this is not a one-way street. Today my Government has again shown that it is prepared to do its part.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I understand that this is the last meeting of the Conference that Ambassador Correa do Lago of Brazil will be attending, and I should like to address the following remarks to him. It is always sad to have to say goodbye to good friends, and doubly so when the friend in question is the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Correa do Lago. Ambassador Correa do Lago has been with us since 1964 and had made many useful contributions to this Committee's work. I recall in particular his words of encouragement and support for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, as well as for a comprehensive test ban. He has been active and eloquent in urging positive steps towards disarmament, in particular to free resources that can best be used for economic development in many parts of the world.

We shall miss the wise counsel of Ambassador Correa do Lago, as well as the charm and the grace which he has brought to our midst. I say this both as a co-Chairman of this Committee and as the head of the United States delegation. I should like to convey to Ambassador Correa do Lago our very best wishes for his future work in which, I am sure, he will be as successful as he has been in his many distinguished posts in the past.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): As no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I shall make a statement now in my capacity as the representative of Czechoslovakia. I should like to make a few brief comments on the question of non-dissemination and on some other questions related to the discussions that we have had so far.

In the course of our debates on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, numerous delegations have compared the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164) with the amended draft submitted by the United States (ENDC/152 and Add.1). The delegations of the socialist countries have made a detailed, matter-of-fact analysis and have pointed to the shortcomings of the United States concept of non-dissemination and to the advantages of the USSR draft treaty. They have emphasized particularly that the USSR draft fully covers all aspects of the problem involved in the spread of nuclear weapons. That draft does not allow for any artificial limitation of the measures in question, nor for any narrow interpretation that would enable anyone to circumvent in any way the obligations which States would undertake under the envisaged treaty.

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

The draft stipulates that States not possessing nuclear weapons would unconditionally renounce the manufacture of such weapons and undertake not to acquire them in any way. It provides for the prohibition of both the physical transfer of nuclear weapons and the transfer of control of those weapons. It excludes the possibility that non-nuclear weapon States might get such weapons into their possession or under their control, or might use them in any form or way. It does not permit such States to have a share in the ownership, disposal or use of nuclear weapons in any form. It makes it impossible for non-nuclear weapon States to gain access to nuclear weapons through units of their own armed forces or military personnel, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance. The Soviet draft envisages that appropriate obligations would be undertaken by both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States.

In other words, it can be said that the Soviet draft does not have any loop-holes that would make it possible for nuclear weapon or non-nuclear weapon States to disseminate nuclear weapons in any form, directly or indirectly. Accordingly it fully meets the requirements rightly demanded for a non-dissemination treaty by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161).

On the other hand, the United States draft suffers from many serious shortcomings which have not been eliminated even by the amendments submitted in the course of the present session of the Committee. The United States draft is based on a limited concept of non-dissemination. It narrows the obligations which individual States should undertake under the treaty to the mere prevention of the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of non-nuclear weapon States or associations of such States. It completely evades the question of the indirect spread of nuclear weapons, particularly within the framework of military alignments in which nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States are associated. On the contrary, taken objectively it would lead to legalizing different forms of such dissemination.

This feature of the United States draft has been aptly described in the United States Press also. A commentary published in the New York Herald-Tribune on 26 April said, inter alia, that the main reason for the present deadlock in our discussions on non-dissemination was the question "whether West Germany is ever going to get part ownership and a share in the physical possession of nuclear weapons." In this connexion the author of the article states that "The United States is insisting on treaty language which keeps the possibility open."

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

A treaty worked out according to the United States draft would not stand in the way of the physical transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon States. On the contrary, the references to the right of veto of the existing nuclear Powers made in the statements of the Western delegations testify to the fact that their concept presupposes the physical transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon States. The United States draft completely evades the question of shared participation in the ownership of nuclear weapons, control of such weapons and decisions on their use. It leaves open the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons to joint armed forces formed within the framework of military alignments, including armed forces of both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States. In this way -- that is, within such joint armed forces -- the personnel and the armed forces of non-nuclear weapon States would have access to nuclear weapons. These are serious shortcomings, serious loopholes, which would leave room for many forms of indirect spread of nuclear weapons within the framework of Western military alignments.

The interventions of the Western delegations indicate that the Western Powers not only do not exclude such a dangerous development within the framework of alignments associating both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States, but even presuppose such a development and defend it. The United States draft confirms, just as the statements of the Western delegations have repeatedly confirmed, that the Western approach is aimed at subordinating the non-dissemination treaty to their own interests, adjusting it to their political and strategic designs in NATO. One of the factors substantially influencing their approach is the desire to satisfy the claims made in the field of nuclear armaments by some countries members of NATO and mainly by the Federal Republic of Germany.

It has rightly been pointed out here previously that in their approach to non-dissemination the Western Powers try to weld two contradictory, antagonistic lines. They would like to see us adopt a treaty which, on the one hand, would legalize the spread of nuclear weapons within the framework of Western military alignments and, on the other hand, would ban dissemination outside such alignments. The Western Powers try to justify their inconsistent position by basing themselves on the existence of military alignments and referring to specific relations allegedly existing among their members. At the same time they wish to create the impression that their proposals -- which in fact aim at excluding Western military alignments from the scope of the non-dissemination treaty and ensuring for their members, or at least some of them, a

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privileged position -- do not contradict the measures to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons, that they do not represent any danger. They assert that in fact it is only a question of normal consultations, which are quite usual and even indispensable within military groupings.

However, the attempts to cover up the serious loop-holes in the United States draft treaty by references to the right to consultations do not hold water either when compared to the text of the draft or in the light of numerous statements made by the representatives of the Western delegations in this Committee. What is decisive in the question of non-dissemination is not what we call a certain phenomenon but what is its essence, what would be its effects. The indirect spread of nuclear weapons, which the Western Powers try to legalize within the framework of their military alignments, will not cease to be dissemination merely because it is labelled "consultations".

References to the necessity for such consultations cannot refute the objective, matter-of-fact arguments convincingly adduced against the United States draft not only by the delegations of the socialist countries but also by some non-aligned States. The assertions of the Western delegations that they are concerned only with ensuring the necessary and usual consultations throw a strange light on their own declarations to the effect that the Western concept of alliances is based on the sharing of costs, responsibilities, weapons and forces and that they think it reasonable that the collective forces of NATO should include nuclear weapons.

In view of the fact that on the question of non-dissemination the primary objective of the countries members of NATO represented on this Committee is to satisfy the demands of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of nuclear armament, it might be useful to compare the position of their delegations with declarations on this subject by official representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany. At a press conference in Bonn on 25 February, Chancellor Erhard said, inter alia:

> "Therefore we continue to be ready to take part in the joint nuclear force. The discussions in the NATO Defence Ministers' Nuclear Committee concern another aspect of co-operation of nuclear weapon States; however, they are not a substitute for a nuclear solution to be achieved jointly within NATO."

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The position of the Federal Republic of Germany was even more clearly formulated in the statement of Defence Minister von Hassel on 6 March when, referring to co-operation in the field of nuclear armament, he said:

> "McNamara's Committee as such is not sufficient for such co-operation within the alliance. It should be coupled with physical joint ownership of nuclear weapons. By the term 'physical joint ownership' we understand the establishment within NATO of a common system of weapons which will be jointly financed, will take joint responsibilities and will be jointly owned by NATO, and whose common course will be jointly agreed upon."

These facts only further underline the justifiable reservations raised in this Committee against the United States draft. They prove again that the serious loop-holes in the draft which aim at legalizing the indirect spread of nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO cannot be covered up by the many references to so-called consultations among the States members of that alignment.

In this connexion I would like to point out that it is not our intention to deal with the practice of consultation and co-operation among the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and that we do not question their activities in this respect; but we must firmly reject the above-mentioned attempts to use the so-called consultations to cover up certain forms of dissemination of nuclear weapons to other States and to legalize such a procedure by the kind of limited non-dissemination treaty proposed by the United States.

In earlier statements during our discussion on collateral measures the Czechoslovak delegation referred to the proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact between the States members of the Warsaw Treaty and those of NATO (ENDC/77). At our meeting of 21 April a representative of the Western delegations raised some objections to this proposal and its consideration in our Committee (ENDC/PV.258, pp.15, 16) -- objections which in our view are devoid of any justification. The representative of the Polish People's Republic, Ambassador Blusztajn, refuted these in an exhaustive manner at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.259, pp. 10, 11). Identifying itself fully with the arguments adduced by Mr. Blusztajn, the Czechoslovak delegation does not think it necessary to revert to the matter.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I have asked to speak in order to express, on behalf of my delegation and of the Latin-American fraternity, the sorrow we feel at the departure of our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Correa do Lago, whose great intelligence, love of peace and spirit of co-operation we have had occasion to admire so many times, and who has made a remarkable contribution to our work, as the United States representative so rightly pointed out. We wish him all success in the important post to which his Government has appointed him, and we are sure that he will remain with us in spirit and will continue to be associated with the noble work entrusted to our Committee by the United Nations.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Since Ambassador Correa do Lago, the representative of Brazil in the Committee, is leaving us to take up an important post in his own country, the Soviet delegation would like to note that Ambassador Correa do Lago has made a very useful and positive contribution to the work of the Committee in the discussion of disarmament questions. Both within the Committee and outside Ambassador Correa do Lago has made no small efforts to bring about a favourable atmosphere for the consideration and discussion of the questions under examination in the Committee and for an exchange of views on them.

On behalf of the Soviet delegation, and also in my capacity as co-Chairman of the Committee, I should like to wish Ambassador Correa do Lago every success in his new work, and to express the hope that in his new post he will not lose interest in our work and the problem of disarmament, which is the most important international problem of the present time. We hope that we shall meet and co-operate with Ambassador Correa do Lago again in the future at conferences, at the sessions of the General Assembly, or in other forums devoted to the strengthening of peace and security and to consideration of the disarmament problem. Therefore we say "au revoir" to Ambassador Correa do Lago and ask him to convey our very best wishes also to his wife.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): On behalf of the Indian delegation and the non-aligned members of the Committee, I should like to join the co-Chairman and other representatives in expressing our deep sense of loss at the fact that, for some time at least, we shall not be having the benefit of the wise counsel and the great

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contribution of Ambassador Correa do Lago. Other members of the Committee have already expressed their deep appreciation of his great qualities and of his tremendous contribution to the work of the Committee.

At the moment I should like to confine myself to the great contribution which Ambassador Correa do Lago has made in the counsels of the eight non-aligned delegations. We do not normally refer in plenary meetings to these group meetings, but I am sure that the members of the Committee will forgive me if I do interject this particular note and say how deeply appreciative all eight members of the non-aligned group are of the great contribution that Ambassador Correa do Lago has made. We all are familiar, for example, with the two memoranda (ENDC/158, 159) which were presented on the last day of last year's session; but it is not very widely known that it was due to the great contribution of Ambassador Correa do Lago to the finalizing of those memoranda that we were able to present them at that time.

We are glad, of course, that our dear colleague, Ambassador Correa do Lago, is taking a very important post. In fact that post is particularly important from the point of view of disarmament as he will interest young officers of the foreign services in this great task facing humanity today.

We wish Ambassador Correa do Lago Godspeed and all luck.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): As Chairman of this meeting I am sure I express the feelings of all the delegations when I say that Ambassador Correa do Lago has been a strong supporter of our disarmament efforts and a warm friend of all of us. I hope he will not forget us as he leaves to deal with other urgent problems. On behalf of the Committee I extend to him all best wishes in his next assignment.

Mr. CORREA do LAGO (Brazil): I have heard with great emotion the very kind words that have been addressed to me, and I wish to extend my very warm thanks to Ambassador Foster, Ambassador Roshchin, Ambassador Gomez Robledo and Ambassador Trivedi, and to you, Mr. Chairman, and to say that your words will serve as a constant incentive for my future work.

I should like to say a few words on this occasion when I am taking leave of the Committee. First, I wish to express to you, Mr. Chairman, and to every member of the Conference, my deep gratitude for the courtesy and understanding that I have unfailingly received from everyone. The nature of our work and the atmosphere in

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which it is carried out permit the creation of personal links between all the members of our Committee. This is not only a source of pleasure but, in my view, also helps to build up the confidence which is so necessary for our discussions and negotiations.

Having participated in the meetings of our Committee for almost two years, I am strengthened in my conviction that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is an adequate diplomatic instrument providing the indispensable mechanism for negotiations on disarmament. In this period of discussions I have been able to observe real progress in the identification and characterization of the fundamental issues involved. I leave my work here more confident and more hopeful, and persuaded that our task must be performed, in spite of all difficulties and shortcomings. In my new assignment I shall be dealing with the professional formation and training of new generations of Brazilian diplomats. I shall not fail to impart to them the deep impression that the skill, the patience and the dedication of all members of this Committee have left on my spirit.

Again I say: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, my dear colleagues and friends.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I am sure that I speak for all delegations at the Committee when I thank Ambassador Correa do Lago for his words of farewell and for all that he has done to bring us nearer our objectives.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 260th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mr. Tomas Lahoda, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, India and Brazil.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 3 May 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.