

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.373  
5 March 1968  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 5 March 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. I.F. PORTER

(United Kingdom)

GE.68-3762

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES Mr. O. MUNIZ OLIVA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. CHRISTOV Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG U KYAW MIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL Mr. J.R. MORDEN Mr. A. BERNIER
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. P. WINKLER Mr. T. LAHODA Mr. V. VAJNAR
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. A. ZELLEKE Mr. B. ASSFAW
<u>India:</u>	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN Mr. N. KRISHNAN Mr. K.P. JAIN
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. R. CARACCILO Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI Mr. E. FRANCO Mr. R. BERLENGHI
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO Mr. A. CARRANCO AVILA
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Alhaji SULE KOLO Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO  
Mr. C. GEORGESCO  
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. A. EDELSTAM  
Mr. M. STAHL  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV  
Mr. V.B. TOULINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF  
Mr. O. SIRRY  
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER  
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER  
Mr. S. DePALMA  
Mr. L.D. WEILER  
Mr. C.G. BREAM

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

1. The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the 373rd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): We are now fast approaching the end of our deliberations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the draft non-proliferation treaty, and it is rather late to make further comments. However, before it is too late, I wish to take the floor once more in order to state our views on some of the points that have been raised by other delegations since I last addressed the Committee at our 364th meeting. Naturally I will concentrate on suggestions and comments made in reference to the amendments that were submitted by my delegation in documents ENDC/215 and ENDC/216.
3. All delegations are now beginning to have a rather clear picture of the positions of other delegations in regard to the draft texts submitted by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States on 18 January (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1). That is of great importance as we are now entering the last phase of the Committee's long labours on the non-proliferation issue: the transmittal of the resulting report to the General Assembly of the United Nations in accordance with the wishes of the Assembly as expressed in resolution 2346 A (XXII) (ENDC/210).
4. We understand that the draft treaty text to accompany this report will be on the authority and under the signature of the originators of the text, our two co-Chairmen. We are, of course, eagerly looking forward to seeing the once more revised treaty language which they will recommend, hoping that it will incorporate the gist of our amendments and expressed desires. However, as several delegations have indicated before me, our final attitude to the text can, of course, only be crystallized during the forthcoming deliberations in the United Nations.
5. In the first series of amendments put forward by my delegation and introduced by me at our 363rd meeting, we suggested an additional paragraph in the preamble of the draft treaty referring to the urgency of concluding a comprehensive test ban; further, a strengthening of the wording of article VI on negotiations for further disarmament measures; and, finally, an additional sentence in paragraph 3 of article VIII explicitly providing for a possibility of periodic review conference every five years.
6. The Swedish delegation has been much gratified by the support given to those various amendments by other delegations during the past weeks. As a matter of fact

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we have heard no dissenting voice in regard to that set of amendments, contained in document ENDC/215. Therefore I suggest that it is correct to assume that they have gained wide support and that they will find their place in the treaty text as revised by the co-Chairmen, to be annexed to our report to the General Assembly.

7. Some changes in the language of our amendments both to article VI and to paragraph 3 of article VIII were suggested by the United Kingdom delegation at the 369th meeting. We have studied those changes of wording with care and wish to state that we gladly accept them. They do seem to us in both cases to be improvements to our texts.

8. We are also happy to note that the United Kingdom delegation on the same occasion formally reintroduced in document ENDC/203/Rev.1, its earlier amendment to paragraph 3 of article VIII, in which I strongly supported in my intervention at the 363rd meeting. We have noted that that amendment has gained wide support in the Committee and therefore we trust it will likewise be included in the revised draft text of the treaty. We should have nothing against accepting the version of that same paragraph submitted by Italy (ENDC/218) if it were to meet with general approval.

9. In our second series of amendments (ENDC/216) we suggested some minor changes in the seventh paragraph of the preamble as well as in article V -- both related to the subject of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. These amendments have not, it would seem, been as widely accepted as the previous set; some replies may still be forthcoming. Perhaps they have not been so well understood or judged to be as important as we are convinced they are and even more will prove to become, despite the fact that I argued their case at some length in my statement at our 364th meeting.

10. Our objections to the present wording of article V derive from three serious considerations: first, that a future comprehensive test-ban treaty must not be hampered by any wording in this treaty; secondly, that the possibility for the conclusion of bilateral arrangements between a nuclear-weapon State and a non-nuclear-weapon State for the purpose of nuclear explosions should be eliminated, as such arrangements might give rise to suspicion; and thirdly, that potential benefits from peaceful explosions must be shared by all countries and should not accrue predominantly to nuclear-weapon countries.

11. On the first score, our basic view has met with considerable approval. All delegations that have spoken on the subject seem to agree that the contents of article V must not prejudice or prejudge the requirements of a comprehensive test-ban

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treaty. However, if my fellow representatives and, more specifically, the co-Chairmen would once again study the rules in article VIII fettering the procedures for having amendments to the present treaty approved, everyone would, I believe, be eager, in view of the very cumbersome nature of such an undertaking, to rid the present treaty text of any wording that would need reformulation when the comprehensive test-ban treaty is agreed upon. The further fact that all countries that are defined as nuclear-weapon States and might at the time of such amendment be parties to this treaty have a veto right makes it still more imperative that we be circumspect. There does exist a connexion between the formal aspect -- that of safeguarding the future test-ban treaty -- and the substance -- that is, the conflicting interests in regard to peaceful nuclear explosions -- and I shall revert to that.

12. If it had not been for that intrinsic connexion between form and substance we might have acquiesced in the interpretation of the present wording of the article given by some delegations, including those of the co-Chairmen: that the article in its present form does not create any prejudice or prejudgement of the test-ban issue. We were prima facie particularly interested in the compromise language suggested by the United Kingdom delegation. In his speech of 22 February the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Porter, suggested that the article

"... be prefaced simply by a phrase to the effect that nothing in the article would prejudice the subsequent conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty"

(ENDC/PV.369, para.33)

However, for the purpose of safeguarding true internationalization, such a caveat formula is not enough, I regret to say. Still less could we be ready to accept the wording as it now stands.

13. We come closer to the substantive issue involved when considering our second point, regarding bilateral arrangements -- or, rather, any arrangements but international ones -- where some other delegations have rallied to the support of our thesis. The representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, quoted very appropriately in his speech on 20 February a statement by the representative of the United States, Mr. dePalma, in regard to bilateral safeguards arrangements. Mr. DePalma in fact said on 6 February: "Bilateral safeguards would not suffice to eliminate suspicions that could arise among third parties..." (ENDC/PV.362, para.30). After his quotation from Mr. DePalma's statement Mr. Khallaf went on to say:

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"That is why my delegation is anxious that there should be no mention of bilateral agreements in article V. In this regard, we welcome the suggestion made by Mrs. Myrdal at our meeting of 13 February that the words 'on a bilateral basis' be deleted from article V..." (ENDC/PV.367, para.33)

14. Furthermore, the representative of Canada has once more dealt with that question. On 21 February Mr. Burns, who had earlier expressed very strong criticism of the inclusion of the reference to bilateral agreements on the utilization of nuclear explosive devices, seemed perhaps to have restricted the requirements "to appropriate international observation" (ENDC/PV.368, para.14), which is also the formula repeatedly used by the United States.

15. I regret once more to have to beg to differ: international observation would not be enough. The solution which in the long run must be sought to this problem of non-discriminatory sharing of the potential for economic exploitation of these most advanced engineering methods must be some form of internationalization, and we can conceive of no better scheme than one to require licensing by an international organ of each project using nuclear explosives. That has also been strongly vindicated, for instance, by the representative of Nigeria at our 371st meeting.

16. The news reaching us about plans for exploitation on a very different basis -- making it international big business -- is judged as disquieting, on the one hand by us who care about a test ban as an urgent disarmament measure and on the other hand by those countries which have the right to hope that their development should be promoted no less than that of rich countries if these methods turn out to be practicable. The creation of an international company, "Nobelpaso Geonuclear", as a follow-up to Project Gasbuggy, with American and French capital, together with some from Belgium and West Germany, places the future in a different light. The aim of this enterprise to sell services for the use of nuclear explosive devices "over the whole world" with the exception of the United States hardly tallies with the promises that such services will be made available on the basis of very low charges as a kind of technical assistance. The profit incentive is evidently not excluded.

17. Perhaps it would be good to remind everyone of the statement by the representative of Ethiopia, who wondered about the effects of a monopolistic system on the price (ENDC/PV.364, para.45). We might even fear that vested interests, in the world of international commerce, could come to act as a pressure against the test ban.

However, our rescue in regard to the present treaty text seems to be close at hand.

In his statement on 22 February the representative of the United States, Mr. DePalma,

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made a reference on this point to the phrase in the first sentence of article V, "appropriate international procedures". He went on to say:

"These 'appropriate international procedures', once established and whatever the particular form they might take, would apply to both bilateral and multilateral projects." (ENDC/PV.369, para.44)

Here I would insert that they should, of course, apply also to unilateral ones.

Mr. DePalma continued:

"If, under a comprehensive test ban treaty, international approval were needed for the conduct of a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, such approval would constitute an 'appropriate international procedure' applicable to services conducted bilaterally or through an appropriate international body." (ibid.)

18. That important statement of principle clearly shows the way out, which is exactly the one we have suggested in our amendment. The reference to bilateral arrangements can be deleted as redundant in this context. Any substantive prescription about this whole matter might be postponed until we deal with a text for the comprehensive test-ban treaty and/or a special agreement on the conduct of permitted explosions. It is certainly extraneous in this connexion, where we are only trying to legislate about conditions influencing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, encompassing a prohibition on their producing nuclear explosive devices for any purpose. That is our main goal, from which we should not deviate.

19. Special treatment for the nuclear-weapon Powers and the possibility of special bilateral arrangements for the benefit of some non-nuclear-weapon States are clearly elements which should be erased from the text as far as is possible. I have several times made that remark in connexion with the article on control, article III, as have many others. I feel that it is just as relevant in relation to article V. Therefore I wish to express the strong expectation that the co-Chairmen will heed these views in the careful study they are now making of the wording of this whole article. Should our point of view not be taken into account by the co-Chairmen in their new draft text, I feel that we shall have to raise this matter again during the debate in the United Nations. An important question of principle is involved. I am also sure that especially representatives of economically less-developed countries regard the form of this article as of very special importance to their interests.



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20. Let me for one moment dwell on the even more general subject of international co-operation for the further applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We share the view, put forward by several delegations, that the non-proliferation treaty ought to have a stimulating effect in that regard and that the provisions in the preamble and in article IV dealing with the subject could be of genuine importance. In that connexion I wish to quote from a statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, who said on 16 February, inter alia:

"The conclusion of the treaty will also enhance the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which will not only exercise control over the activities of nuclear States in connexion with the non-proliferation treaty but will have wider links with them, which will enable it to obtain a better knowledge of their needs, interests and requirements, and also of the situation in regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a whole and of the possibilities existing in that field. All this will make it possible to take further and even more effective steps to deepen, widen and make more specific the forms of co-operation between States in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and in rendering assistance in this field to many countries, including the developing and other non-nuclear States." (ENDC/PV.366, para.23)

21. It is well known, of course, that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in accordance with its Statute, has been carrying out a wide programme of this kind for many years and that this programme is all the time extending in scope. With that fact in view, I wish -- although it is probably unnecessary --- to warn against interpretation of the new article IV in this treaty as an attempt to restrict in any way the free flow of information or the channels for co-operation in the nuclear energy field, which is part and parcel of the task of IAEA and, by and large, of our international strivings. The immense value of wide international co-operation in nuclear technology has been emphasized by many delegations, for instance, by those of India (ENDC/PV.370, para.19) and Bulgaria (ENDC/PV.371, para.46).

22. No measures to restrict such benefits to the various countries in accordance with whether and when they ratify this particular treaty should be imputed to article IV of the text; and I do not believe that the continuation of the statement by Mr. Roshchin which I have just quoted should be interpreted in a negative way. Any regulation of the right to benefit from the developments in the nuclear energy field

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should, on grounds of logical and practical consistency, be related to the agreement to submit one's nuclear energy programme to IAEA safeguards, as is also stated in article III, paragraph 2. Article IV, on the other hand, should be read in a positive vein, indicating as it does that the treaty would serve as an inspiration and guidance for an ever-increasing participation in the vast current of international co-operation in regard to nuclear technology, taking place as hitherto through IAEA and in other forms, not least through open communication channels within the international republic of scientists.

23. Finally, I must voice a certain disquietude I have felt, when studying the statements so far made within the Committee, that there still seems to prevail an uncertainty about the inherent connexion between articles VIII and X -- that is, between the reviewing of the implementation of the provisions of the treaty and the purposes of its preamble, on the one hand, and the right to withdrawal on the other. Any definite interpretation concerning what constitutes legitimate grounds for withdrawal is still lacking. I may mention in parenthesis that the case of the partial test-ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) is clear-cut to quite a different degree. The delegation of Brazil has offered an amendment with some interesting language to article X (ENDC/201/Rev.2). I am not in a position today to judge what formula would be both unambiguous and acceptable to prospective signatories. However, we certainly need to be more enlightened concerning what is the politically and procedurally correct basis for interpretation of the expression of misgiving, so frequently voiced, that "the treaty may not last" if there is no definite turn of the tide in regard to the nuclear armament race.

24. Those were the remarks I wanted to make today. I am sure all delegations are now awaiting eagerly, as mine is, the next revision of the draft text which is being prepared for us by the co-Chairmen. On the real purport of that text will depend the final action which the delegations around this table will take, together with the other Member countries of the United Nations, in a few weeks' time. We sincerely want to regard the treaty as an arrow pointing to a safer future, a future when nuclear disarmament will become a fact.

25. Mr. WINKLER (Czechoslovakia): In its statement at the 358th meeting my delegation has already supported without reservation the identical drafts of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the delegations of the USSR and the United States (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1), which have become the basis of the work of our Committee at its present session. In view of the fact that, pursuant to resolution 2346A (XXII) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/210), we have to prepare and submit by 15 March a full report on our negotiations related to the non-proliferation treaty, I should like today to explain my delegation's views on some partial problems which have been the subject of our current discussions and in relation to which some delegations have submitted amendments.

26. The drafts before us are, in our opinion, a suitable basis for the final wording of the treaty and correspond in substance to our ideas of how a realistic and effective treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should look. In this view of ours we are guided by the principle that the main goal of the treaty is to prevent the States which do not yet own nuclear weapons from acquiring them. This approach is in full harmony with the spirit and letter of the resolutions on the non-proliferation issue adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in recent years. This approach corresponds also to the intentions pursued by non-nuclear-weapon States when they raised this question within the framework of the deliberations on disarmament as a separate, urgent problem calling for an immediate solution.

27. The efforts aimed at the adoption of effective measures against a further spread of nuclear weapons have been from the very beginning based upon the knowledge of the serious consequences for world peace which would result from the acquiring of such weapons by other States. It would mean a serious worsening of international tension and consequently a substantially-increased danger of nuclear war. It would considerably complicate also the completion of the tasks which are on the agenda of the disarmament negotiations, especially in the field of nuclear weapons.

28. The initiators of the deliberations on non-proliferation are well aware of the fact that, unless adequate measures are adopted in time, we might be witnesses to a chain reaction in the sphere of nuclear armaments which, haphazardly, might extend to all parts of the world, thus endangering the interests of nations. Further States, whether they wish it or not, would become involved in the ever-increasing arms race, with all its negative aspects as regards their political, military and economic development. As far as security is concerned, the acquiring of nuclear weapons by

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further States not only would have an extremely unfavourable impact on the general situation in the world; but it would not even increase the security of States embarking on nuclear armament. On the contrary, we consider fully justified the conclusion that the security of individual States and regions to which nuclear armaments were extended would be considerably weakened.

29. Moreover, the price to be paid by the States which decided to acquire nuclear weapons would be very high. A very instructive illustration of the burden to be borne by such States is given in the well-known report of the United Nations Secretary-General of last year (A/6858) on the consequences of nuclear armament. In our opinion, it clearly results from the aforementioned facts of a political and economic nature that nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices can hardly be regarded as suitable means of protection for the political or economic interests of any State, regardless of the level of its economic development.

30. The danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons has in no way diminished since resolution 1665 (XVI), known as the Irish resolution, was adopted. On the contrary, owing to rapid developments in the sphere of nuclear energy in a number of States, that danger has increased and will continue to grow in the future. That fact should be constantly borne in mind also in our deliberations. In our opinion there can be no doubt, therefore, that the speediest possible preparation and adoption of the non-proliferation treaty is primarily in the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States. My country is among those States.

31. If we take into account all these facts, it is evident that it is not correct to regard the commitment of the non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire nuclear weapons as any sacrifice on their side. It is not a detriment to their political or economic interests which should in some way be compensated. The non-nuclear-weapon States do not surrender any benefits by signing the non-proliferation treaty and thus voluntarily giving up the possibility of nuclear armament. On the contrary, they would achieve what they have tried to attain from the very beginning by demanding and supporting the prohibition of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Therefore we do not see any reasons for the criticism raised in this connexion by some non-nuclear-weapon States represented here against the drafts of the treaty under discussion.

32. However, it does not depend only on the non-nuclear-weapon States whether we succeed in preventing a further spread of nuclear weapons. It is evident that, in principle, there are two possible ways for their proliferation: first, the production of nuclear weapons by States which do not yet own them; and secondly, the transfer of

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these weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States by nuclear-weapon Powers. The non-proliferation treaty must close both those ways. Non-proliferation, therefore, does not concern only the non-nuclear-weapon States. We regard as fully justified the demand that the non-proliferation treaty now being prepared should provide for an adequate balance of commitments and responsibilities for all parties to the treaty, both non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States.

33. The commitment of the non-nuclear-weapon States not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons must be balanced by the commitment of the nuclear Powers parties to the treaty not to transfer such weapons to anyone and not to give any information or assistance for their production or acquirement. That is how we see the required balance of mutual commitments and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States under the non-proliferation treaty. In our opinion, articles I and II of the draft treaty stipulating the commitments of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States fully meet that requirement.

34. The core of the non-proliferation treaty and, at the same time, a clear definition of its scope are to be found in the key provisions of those articles. They determine its character as a partial measure aimed at a goal which, albeit limited, is nevertheless at present extremely important both for the general situation throughout the world and for the creation of conditions favourable to the implementation of further disarmament measures. The mission of the non-proliferation treaty thus defined determines in itself what can be included in the treaty. That has to be taken into account and complied with by us.

35. It is not realistic to require from the non-proliferation treaty anything more than it can fulfil, anything which goes beyond its purpose. Demands that the treaty should also include other measures -- such as measures relating to nuclear disarmament -- exceed the framework of the treaty. They would result in an accumulation of problems which, as we have been taught by the long experience gained in the course of disarmament negotiations, cannot be solved comprehensively in the near future.

36. Therefore the Czechoslovak delegation cannot agree to amendments and suggestions demanding that the non-proliferation treaty should also include further important measures in the sphere of nuclear armaments such as those raised in our deliberations so far, in particular by the delegations of the Romanian People's Republic, Brazil and certain other countries. Such proposals are based on the concept that the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is identical with that of "nuclear disarmament" in the broadest sense of the word. However, such a broad interpretation of the idea of non-proliferation does not correspond to the real meaning of the treaty or to the mission ascribed to it in a number of documents adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

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37. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, by supporting a speedy conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty with such a precisely-defined scope, does not of course in the least cease to keep its eye on the necessity of undertaking as soon as possible further effective steps towards nuclear disarmament. In that connexion I should like to emphasize once more that we regard the non-proliferation treaty not as the final goal but, on the contrary, as the first step on the way towards the implementation of further important measures within the context of nuclear disarmament.

38. If we agreed to the demands that the non-proliferation treaty should deal with the whole range of problems of nuclear armaments, we could neither solve the burning question of non-proliferation nor attain the implementation of further measures aimed at the reduction of nuclear armaments. The whole of our difficult and responsible work carried out so far with regard to the preparation of the non-proliferation treaty, which now has promising prospects of attaining early positive results, would then be lost. For that reason we do not consider it useful to specify in the non-proliferation treaty the further disarmament measures which should be taken, as requested by some delegations in their amendments or observations. In that respect we identify ourselves with the views expressed by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, when on 8 February she said: "To enumerate some specific measures might be counterproductive, as agreements on certain other scores may come to present opportunities for earlier implementation." (ENDC/PV.363, para. 11).

39. As, for reasons I have tried to explain, we cannot agree to proposals aimed at the extension of the scope of the non-proliferation treaty by measures going outside its framework, similarly we cannot accept demands going in the opposite direction. Here I have in mind in particular the amendments submitted by the delegation of Brazil (ENDC/201/Rev.2) asking that the non-proliferation treaty should permit the non-nuclear-weapon States to produce nuclear explosive devices for carrying out explosions for peaceful purposes. That would limit the scope of the treaty and reduce its effectiveness in such a way that the treaty would actually be deprived of any real meaning and purpose. During our discussions sufficient persuasive arguments have already been adduced by many delegations to prove that fact.

40. The decisive fact is that, from the technological point of view, it is not possible to distinguish the production of nuclear weapons from the production of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Therefore it is indispensable that the non-proliferation treaty should also prohibit the production of such devices by the non-nuclear-weapon States. In view of the fact that that question has recently been elucidated

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repeatedly and in detail in the enlightening statements of the representatives of the USSR, the United States and Bulgaria, I do not consider it necessary to deal with the question any further.

41. The prohibition of the production of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes which the treaty imposes on non-nuclear-weapon States does not, however, mean that it deprives them of the right to share fully in the possible benefits resulting from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Article V of the draft treaty explicitly stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon States will, through appropriate international procedures, have the possibility of obtaining from the existing nuclear-weapon Powers the benefits from applications of nuclear explosive devices for such purposes on a non-discriminatory basis and under advantageous economic conditions. The appropriate international procedures mentioned in the article can of course take various forms, as has been amply shown already by some delegations and as follows also from the notable statement made today by Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden.

42. In our deliberations so far considerable attention has been rightly concentrated by a number of delegations upon article III, on safeguards. Being aware of the difficulties which the solution of this question encountered in the previous negotiations, we consider the formulation of article III in the drafts of 18 January to be a most essential contribution. This article corresponds in principle to our views concerning the purposes and tasks of safeguards within the framework of the non-proliferation treaty. The proposed range and object of the safeguards measures are in harmony with the task which the international control under the non-proliferation treaty has to fulfil: that is to say, to ensure the observance of the commitments undertaken by the contracting parties under the treaty. In harmony with the commitments undertaken on the one hand by non-nuclear-weapon States and on the other by nuclear-weapon States, and in particular with the contents of those respective commitments, we consider acceptable the concept upon which article III is based, according to which the commitment to apply the relevant safeguards to the activities in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy does not relate to nuclear-weapon States.

43. Furthermore, the method of application of the safeguards, as stipulated in article III, is in harmony with the views stated earlier by my delegation in this Committee. Article III is based on the principle that the responsibility for providing assurance that fissionable material is not diverted to the production of nuclear weapons rests with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That, we are glad to note, was again explicitly stated by the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, at the meeting of 18 January, when he presented the revised draft

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(ENDC/PV.357, para. 55). That fact is reflected in the provision of the first paragraph of article III, where it is stipulated that the agreements on safeguards to be negotiated and concluded by the contracting parties with IAEA must be in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system.

44. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as a member of IAEA, is, together with an overwhelming majority of the Agency's member States, in favour of the safeguards system adopted at the Ninth General Conference of IAEA in Tokyo. In our opinion this system is in accordance in principle with the present level of research in, the peaceful uses of, nuclear energy throughout the world. It is therefore a suitable basis for the fulfilment of the tasks of the Agency. That fact is confirmed by the experience gained so far from the application of the Agency's safeguards system. That led the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to announce at the Tenth General Conference in 1966 its willingness to accept, under certain conditions, the Agency's safeguards. We consider that the fact that the agreements on safeguards to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the treaty must be in harmony with the Statute of the Agency and its safeguards system is an adequate guarantee that these safeguards will be, on the one hand, sufficiently effective and, on the other, equal for all contracting parties.

45. In the discussions so far questions have also been raised concerning how the non-proliferation treaty would be affected by future changes in the IAEA safeguards system. The Czechoslovak delegation considers it only natural that the IAEA safeguards system will develop further in accordance with the further development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with the development of technology in the sphere of control, and with the experience gained in the application of safeguards. That is how we interpret also the relevant provision in the preamble to the draft treaty. In our opinion this expected development in the sphere of safeguards should not cause any problems or doubts. It is our conviction that changes in the safeguards system will result only in its improvement.

46. In the deliberations so far a number of delegations have rightly paid much attention to the question of ensuring the security of the individual States in the conditions arising after the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. The Czechoslovak delegation holds the opinion that the conclusion of the treaty in itself will contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of confidence in relations among States, on both world-wide and regional scales. Thus the non-proliferation treaty, in our opinion, will contribute to the improvement of the situation in the world and consequently to the strengthening of security among all States.



(Mr. Winkler, Czechoslovakia)

47. Nevertheless, we consider fully justified the demand that the non-nuclear-weapon States which assume commitments under the non-proliferation treaty should be provided with certain guarantees of security. Therefore at the opening of this session of the Committee we welcomed the information that the co-Chairmen were continuing to deal with this question in an intensive way; and today we should like to express the hope that they will soon be able to submit their recommendations on that subject to the Committee.

48. Those were the remarks which I wanted to make today on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation.

49. U MAUNG MAUNG (Burma): My intervention today will be very brief. As the Committee is aware, my delegation has not made any statement since the resumption of our work earlier this year. I should like to assure my colleagues that our silence does not in any sense mean a lack of interest on our part in the important and urgent task which the Committee has in hand; nor does it mean a lack of desire to co-operate with other delegations in accomplishing that task as speedily as possible. The sole reason for it is that my Government, deeply conscious of its responsibility in this Committee, as indeed all members are of theirs, and sharing mankind's aspirations for peace, has been giving and continues to give the revised draft text of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1) the serious consideration it deserves.

50. Many constructive and important suggestions and proposals have been made, both in the Committee and elsewhere, with a view to achieving an equitable, effective and viable non-proliferation treaty. My delegation also set forth its views on the fundamental issues involved in the elaboration of such a treaty in its statement at the 337th meeting.

51. The delegation of the United States and the USSR have since laid before the Committee identical revised texts of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It has been noted that this text contains certain improvements over the original draft treaty text submitted on 24 August (ENDC/192, 193). As a concomitant to that, the draft introduces a number of new and concrete formulations in the form of treaty articles relative to some of the fundamental issues, such as the control of peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon countries; the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international scientific and technological co-operation to promote such uses; internationally-acceptable procedures for sharing the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions; obligations regarding nuclear disarmament in relation to the non-proliferation treaty; amendments procedure; duration of the treaty and the modalities for its renewal; and so on.

(U Maung Maung, Burma)

52. All those important and far-reaching draft provisions require an intensive study in depth -- a fact amply borne out by the illuminating discussion that has taken place in the Committee since 13 January, in the course of which clarifications and elaborations of some of the draft's provisions have been made by its co-authors, and suggestions and proposals have been put forward to improve it further.

53. My Government is continuing to make a very careful study of the revised draft. Our desire to offer comments positively and constructively in the Committee is equalled only by our wish to respect and comply with the terms of General Assembly resolution 2346A (XXII) (ENDC/210) requiring the Committee to submit a full report to it not later than 15 March. As that deadline is fast approaching, we have concluded that on balance it would be more helpful for us to state our views on the existing draft treaty text, or on the further modified text that may emerge from the Committee's present negotiations, at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 373rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador I.F. Porter, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Burma.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 6 March 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.