CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 6 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. J. B. GODBER (United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO
	Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
	Mr. JANOS LENGYEL
Bulgaria:	Mr. M. TARABANOV
	Mr. N. MINTCHEV
	Mr. G. GUELEV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Burma:	Mr. J. BARRINGTON
	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
Canada:	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
	Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
	Mr. J.F.M. BELL
	Mr. R.M. TAIT
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. J. HAJEK
	Mr. M. ZEMLA
	Mr. J. RIHA
Ethiopia:	ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
	ATO M. HAMID
	ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH
India:	Mr. A.S. LALL
	Mr. A.S. MEHTA
	Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO
Italy:	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
	Mr. A. CAGIATI
	Mr. C. COSTA REGHINI
	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:	Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
	Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ
Nigeria:	Mr. M.T. MBU
	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
	Mr. F.B. KOSOKO
Poland:	Mr. M. LACHS
	Mr. S. ROGULSKI
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
	Mr. W. WIECZOREK
Romania:	Mr. H. FLORESCU
	Mr. E. GLASER
	Mr. N. ECOBESCU
	Mr. O. NEDA
Sweden:	Baron C.H. von PLATEN
	General P. KALLIN
	Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.A. ZORIN
	Mr. L.I. MENDELEVICH
	Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
	Mr. V.V. ALDOSHIN
United Arab Republic:	Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
	Mr. A. El-ERIAN
	Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
	Mr. M.S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:	Mr. J.B. GODBER
	Sir Michael WRIGHT
	Mr. B.T. PRICE
	Lord NORWICH
United States of America:	Mr. A.M. DEAN
	Mr. C.C. STELLE
	Mr. D.E. MARX
	Mr. R.A. MARTIN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Mr. O. LOUTFI
Deputy to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the sixty-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I know that the members of this Committee are vitally interested in the discussions in which I have participated during the past week in Washington concerning the question of a nuclear test ban treaty, and in the decisions on that subject that have been reached by my Government and announced by President Kennedy at his press conference on 1 August. I have read in the verbatim records with great interest the statements and suggestions relating to this question that have been made here in Geneva by various members of this Committee during the past week, all of which underline the need to approach agreement as soon as possible on the banning of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. My delegation will spare no effort to bring that about. The large atmospheric test yesterday by the Soviet Union underlines, I believe, the extreme urgency of our achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments.

Yesterday I had an informal and useful discussion with Mr. Zorin, and I plan to meet him again today. I believe that at the present time the best way to further our efforts to reach agreement on the nuclear test ban treaty would be to continue those informal discussions, at least for a day or so. We shall of course report to this Committee on the results of our discussions at the earliest appropriate time, which will probably be early next week, but at present I believe one can assume that there will be a meeting of the Sub-Committee on a nuclear test ban treaty before the end of this week. That is all I have to say this morning on that urgent matter, and I should now like to turn to the general subject of disarmament and to discuss further some of the provisions in our draft outline of a treaty (ENDC/30).

In keeping with my delegation's statement on 1 August (ENDC/PV.64, p.39), I should like this morning to consider the very important problem of production of armaments. The United States attaches great importance to restricting production early in a disarmament agreement. We believe that measures limiting the production of armaments are among the most important of the disarmament measures that should be agreed to by the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries. We have no doubt that the Soviet Union agrees with this contention.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The question of production covers two aspects of the arms race. First, it involves the quantity of weapons that can be added to the arsenals of a State; clearly, a treaty on general and complete disarmament must not permit a party to the agreement to increase, in stage I, the quantity of armaments possessed by it. Secondly, it involves the quality of weapons produced. My Government had pointed out that the major Powers are engaged at least as much in a qualitative as in a quantitative arms race. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other countries, are expending large resources, material and human, to increase the lethal effectiveness of the weapons produced.

Both these arms races must be stopped. My Government's proposals on production deal with stopping both the quantitative and the qualitative arms races in which we now regrettably find ourselves. The problem of production is directly related to the question of maintaining agreed levels of armaments at various steps and stages of the treaty. Another closely linked problem is the question of verification. The proposal on the production of armaments in the United States draft treaty outline is quite detailed and has not so far been sufficiently discussed in this Committee. It would be useful, therefore, as an introduction to my statement this morning to set forth in brief the essence of the United States proposal.

On page 6 of document ENDC/30, under topic 3, section A, Armaments, the United States treaty outline provides that production of all armaments listed in the ten specified categories of stage I would be limited to agreed allowances during stage I, and by the beginning of stage II all production would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments. Only limited production within each of the ten categories would be permitted in stage I, but with the proviso that any armaments produced within a category would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that category, to the end that agreed levels of armaments in each category would not be exceeded at any time.

In an effort to ensure that all parties to the treaty comply with its spirit and refrain from producing increasingly larger or more deadly weapons of mass destruction during stage I, the United States plan proposes an additional, restrictive criterion, called "destructive capability". That criterion would be applied to production of armaments during stage I. The United States plan proposes that the total destructive capability of the armaments in categories (1) and (2) (ibid., pp. 4 and 5) in stage I should not exceed through production what it would

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have been at the end of stage I if production had not taken place. That would mean, of course, that no State would be able through the production allowed it during the first stage to increase the destructive capability of its weapons while at the same time undertaking the net 30 per cent reduction provided for in the United States plan. In effect, each State would have to ensure that in the two specified categories it also reduced the total destructive capability of its armaments in proportion to the actual reduction in numbers over the steps of the first stage.

The United States outline treaty proposal therefore applies two related criteria to the limitation of the production of armaments in categories (1) and (2) during the first stage; first, the total number of armaments in each category would have to be reduced by 30 per cent, and the resulting number could not be changed by production; and, secondly, the total destructive capability of the armaments in each category would also have to be reduced by 30 per cent as a consequence of the reduction in numbers, and that reduction could not be changed through production during stage I.

On page 21 of document ENDC/30, topic 4, section A, Armaments, the United States treaty outline specifies that during stage II the parties to the treaty would halt the production of armaments in specified categories, except for production within agreed limits of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments. In addition, the parties to the treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments.

Finally, in stage III, as set forth on page 28 of document ENDC/30, topic 3, section A, Armaments, the parties to the treaty would halt all applied research, development, production and testing of armaments, and would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all facilities for such purposes. This final prohibition is subject, of course, to agreed arrangements in support of national forces necessary to maintain internal order, and to agreed arrangements in support of the United Nations peace force.

This résumé of my Government's proposal for both limiting and halting the production of armaments during the time of the treaty reflects the most considered judgment and logical assessment of existing and realistic conditions which were obtainable at the time the United States draft treaty outline was presented to this Committee in April of this year. The United States proposal, including our provision on production, is one of the most comprehensive and specific series of proposals on disarmament ever put forward.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

My Government has been, and is, engaged in a careful review of all the United States proposals and those of the other members of this Conference, in a serious endeavour to find new ways of moving our negotiations closer to agreement. This morning I wish to present some important additions and changes to the proposals the United States has already made on production. These additions and changes are not only an attempt by my Government to clarify further its own position on production but also a demonstration of the reasonableness and the flexibility with which we have tried to approach these negotiations. It is my hope that these changes will serve to bring us closer to agreement.

In order to elucidate clearly the new proposal of my Government, I intend to discuss in some detail four principal aspects of the production problem. In each case I will set forth the important changes which we are making. Also, I intend to make clear the merits my delegation sees in these changes and clarifications which could move forward the work of this Committee.

First, the United States is fully prepared to specify in our agreement that production of new types of armaments will be entirely prohibited during stage I. Various comments have been made by communist delegations that the United States was seeking to have an arms race in modern weapons while destroying obsolete weapons. Only last week, the representative of the Soviet Union stated in the plenary meeting of 1 August:

> "It is, of course, no accident that the United States proposes that, in the first stage, States should retain the right to continue the production of means of delivering nuclear weapons. This means that ever newer types of missiles, aircraft and artillery systems would continue to come off the production lines of plants, while warships and submarines adapted for the delivery of nuclear weapons would be built at shipyards. It also means that scientists would be working hard in design offices and laboratories engaged in perfecting the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. And the newly produced and more advanced means of delivery of nuclear weapons would go into the armaments, while worn out and obsolete nuclear weapon vehicles would be eliminated and destroyed as the 30 per cent reduction quota required. Though on the whole the quantity of the means of delivery would be somewhat reduced, actually, under the guise of disarmament, a renewal of armaments would take place." (ENDC/PV.64, p.28)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

This clarification which the United States is now submitting demonstrates that the above assertion of the Soviet representative is completely and totally incorrect.

My second major point is that we propose that the agreement should specify that no production of any of the agreed types of armaments would take place except on the basis of replacement for an armament of the same type. This proposal means that for every item produced by a party that party would have to destroy another item of the same type of armament over and above those items of the same type which it was destroying during the reduction process. In order to ensure that nations could not become engaged in an undesirable qualitative arms race, it is necessary that types of armaments should be clearly and narrowly defined. For example, our proposal would not permit a Minuteman missile to replace a B-52, since those are clearly different types of armaments. Also, a B-52 could not replace a B-47. A B-52 could be produced only if another B-52 were turned in for destruction, or proof furnished of its loss through accident. In such a case those B-52s turned in for destruction could not be counted as armaments destroyed in order to meet treaty commitments for the reduction of arms. Therefore the treaty limit on levels of retained arms would at all times be observed.

In stage I there would be some cases where replacement would be necessary. An aircraft might crash or become useless. Armaments might be expended in training. Some armaments of a country might so deteriorate as to become inoperative. Those would be valid reasons for replacement. As I have indicated, the destruction of armaments that would be required for any permitted production on the one-for-one replacement basis would have to be over and above the destruction of armaments required in order to reduce armaments to agreed levels for each step in stage I. Moreover, the United States wishes to emphasize that a country cannot use provisions in a treaty for replacement of armaments to produce replacements at an unlimited rate. Any production allowed for replacement in stage I would be substantially reduced from an agreed production rate which had occurred prior to the entry into force of the treaty. Certainly the amount of any replacement would be defined and strictly limited in the treaty for each type of armament that was being reduced. In that way it would be made clear that no State could use replacement of armaments for purposes in violation of the agreement.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

There are two other important parts of our proposal on production and its limitation in stage I which greatly simplify the carrying out of portions of stage I of the treaty with respect to production limitations. As I indicated earlier, the United States draft treaty at present stipulates that production during stage I would be within certain specified categories of armaments. Not only is the limitation of production to replacement by type a principle which is simple to understand and uncomplicated by the question of precise definitions of categories, but in addition it eliminates the need for insisting on application of the principle of destructive capability to categories 1 and 2 of stage I. Each type of weapon could only be replaced through production by a weapon of the same type. The net reduction in numbers should be proportionately reflected in reduction in destructive capability. The elimination of the need to define the criterion of destructive capability would also serve to move forward our work, since it would simplify the process of reaching agreement.

Before passing on to the next major point I should like to repeat once again that the United States would welcome an early indication on the part of the Soviet Union of its intent to enumerate in detail what types of armaments it proposes to reduce during stage I of a treaty. Because our two positions do appear to have moved closer in this regard, some indication of Soviet intent should have a helpful effect on efforts to reach agreement on those specific armaments to be reduced during the first stage.

The third point I should like to deal with concerns research and development of new prototypes. As I have said, we propose that no armaments would be produced except on the basis of a one-for-one replacement of the same existing type. Thus the treaty would ban the production and the testing of new prototypes. States would be allowed routine testing of existing armaments to test their continuing serviceability but in the case of missiles this would be limited by agreed annual quotas.

The fourth and final point I wish to make this morning regarding my delegation's proposal deals with the limitations that should be placed on the modernization and expansion of production facilities declared upon entry into a treaty. It is the position of my Government that all parties to a treaty should make declarations about their existing armaments production facilities upon entry into force of a treaty, and that agreement should be reached that production facilities for armaments could not be expanded or modernized during the course of the treaty. In placing strict limitations on the allowed production facilities early in a treaty

(Mr. Dean, United States)

parties should also be prohibited from building stand-by facilities which could be used to the great disadvantage of other parties if the intent at some point in time was to abrogate the treaty.

I should mention also that agreed arrangements will have to be negotiated concerning the production of spare parts to replace a part of an armament that may become no longer useful or serviceable. The objective should be to assure that the qualitative race in armaments should not be continued under the cover of ostensible replacement of worn out parts. My Government is prepared to discuss that problem further in our deliberations here as we reach the point of detailed treaty drafting.

I think it should be amply clear to representatives that the proposals which I have put forth today do indeed make an important and significant amplification and modification to the present United States outline proposal. Furthermore, I am confident that nothing in our proposals would in any way upset the principle of balance nor erode the assurance that no nation would gain any military advantage from their implementation.

Following is the text of a paper which my delegation is submitting today containing modifications of ENDC/30, which our new position calls for:

"Stage I, Section A, Armaments

"1. In the second sentence of sub-paragraph 1a, delete the phrase 'except as adjustments for production would be permitted in Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below.'

"2. Replace the present text of paragraph 3, Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities, by the following:

"'a. Production of all armaments listed in sub-paragraph b of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

"'b. The allowances would permit limited production of each type of armament listed in sub-paragraph b of paragraph 1 above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments, any armament produced within a type would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that type to the end that the ten per cent reduction in numbers in each type in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"'c. The testing and production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

"'d. The expansion of facilities for the production of existing types of armaments and the construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

"'e. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

"'f. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.'"

I would ask the Secretariat to circulate as a Committee document(1) the amended language of document ENDC/30 which I have just read.

My remarks this morning would not be complete without a brief discussion of the proposals in the Soviet draft treaty relating to halting and limiting production of armaments during the three stages. I believe this to be necessary and instructive in order to bring more clearly into focus the similarities and differences between the two plans. It would appear that the proposals of the Soviet Union and the United States have identical objectives in mind but put forth different means and timing to reach that goal.

On page 5 of ENDC/2, chapter I, section A, article 5, the Soviet draft treaty proposes that the production of all rockets and pilotless aircraft capable of delivering a nuclear weapon of any calibre and range and of the materials and instruments for their equipping, launching and guidance shall be completely discontinued.

Article 6 of the same chapter and section, on page 6, provides that the production of all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be completely discontinued. Further, article 7, on page 7, requires that the building of warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and all submarines, shall be completely discontinued. In addition, article 8 of the same chapter and section stipulates that the production of all artillery systems

(1) ENDC/30/Add.1

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capable of serving as a means of delivery for nuclear weapons shall be completely discontinued. And finally, under article 12 on page 10, the Soviet draft provides that, proportionately to the reduction of armed forces, the production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under articles 5-8 dealing with nuclear delivery means shall be reduced.

During stage II of the Soviet treaty, under chapter VI, article 25, page 17, it is proposed that, proportionate to the reduction of armed forces, the production of conventional armaments and munitions shall be reduced. And finally, during stage III of the Soviet draft treaty, chapter IX, article 32, on page 21, states that military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for the maintenance of internal order and to ensure compliance with the obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

Permit me now to discuss briefly those portions of the Soviet treaty draft which, to my delegation, are vague and in need of further clarification. It is true that the Soviet plan calls for the complete elimination of production during stage I of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, and for some limitation of the production of conventional armaments. We assume production of the latter group of armaments will be related to the 30 per cent reduction in these armaments which the Soviet Union recently accepted as an amendment to its plan (ENDC/2/Add.1).

However, the Soviet proposals with regard to either nuclear delivery vehicles or conventional armaments are totally unclear about when it is proposed to begin the cessation or limitation of production during stage I. Indeed, it appears that under the Soviet proposal it might not be necessary to halt or limit the production of major armaments until very late in, or even the end of, stage I.

My delegation submits that the Soviet Union should clarify its position on this matter, particularly in the light of its continued insistence that the United States proposal would permit a significant upgrading of its military capability during stage I. We know, of course, that that is not the intent of the United States Government, and now there should be no doubt of it in the light of the very clear position on stage I production which I have presented today as an amendment to our proposed treaty.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

With respect to the Soviet proposal for the limitation of production of conventional armaments in stage I, my delegation hopes that the procedures the Soviet Union intends to recommend for the reductions in production will be spelled out in detail for this Conference. The additions and modifications which the Soviet Union submitted to this Conference on 16 July (ENDC/2/Add.1) did not -- I repeat, did not -- clarify its position on production.

A significant point of difference between the propsals of my Government and those of the Soviet Union is the provision for continued production of conventional armaments during stage II of this draft treaty, and even possibly until some time late during stage III of the Soviet proposal, since it is not clear at what point production limitations will be introduced in the Soviet draft treaty and when the process will be completed. It is well known that the United States draft outline proposal has consistently called for the cessation of the production of all armaments in stage II, with the proviso that spare parts production alone be permitted for the maintenance and repair of retained armaments. The new proposal put forth by the United States would limit the production of major armaments from the beginning of stage I and would prohibit any increase in their numbers and destructive capability. My delegation will look forward to an early explantion by the representative of the Soviet Union in order that this Committee may fully understand the Soviet proposals and their rationale.

The question of verification of production is also most significant, and I intend to discuss that subject with this Committee during forthcoming meetings.

I hope that this very important amendment to the United States plan will put us much further forward in our deliberations on this subject of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation wishes first of all to say that it welcomes the statement just made by the representative of the United States setting forth the modification of the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty (ENDC/30) in relation to production of armaments, as we feel it to be a very useful step forward taken in response to suggestions and criticisms made in the earlier part of our proceedings here in Geneva.

During the last several meetings the Committee has been examining the provisions contained in the United States and the Soviet Union draft treaties regarding the reduction and eventual elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation hopes that that examination will continue long enough and will be sufficiently thoroughgoing and detailed to enable the Committee to understand the realities of the problems involved and the measures which are proposed. The statements which were made by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom at our sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth meetings, as well as the statements by the representatives of Poland, Romania and Italy at the latter meeting, have shown us some of the real difficulties which have to be solved in this crucial area if we are to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. I should like to say that my delegation found the statements which were made at those meetings by the representatives of Sweden, Ethiopia and Burma very impressive, and we shall probably wish to revert to them on another occasion. But I shall not be referring to them today because they either dealt in particular with the problem of stopping nuclear tests or, in more general terms, with the whole of general and complete disarmament, and not with the specific question of what measures for the reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles should be applied in the first stage of disarmament, which is my subject today.

The representative of the Soviet Union, in his introductory statement at our sixty-fourth meeting, gave us little beyond a repetition of the virtues which are claimed for the Soviet measures concerning nuclear weapons vehicles. The Canadian delegation had hoped that he would have set out in concrete and clear terms how those measures would be carried out and how they would be verified. But he has not done that as yet. His remarks at our sixty-fifth meeting were mostly answers to Western questions and criticisms, and I am sorry to say it seemed to us that those answers in the main either were perfunctory or consisted in the repetition of the claim that he had previously "proved" that the criticisms were invalid.

During our meetings from March to June, Western representatives have presented our arguments that the measures contained in the first stage of the Soviet draft treaty, and in particular those relating to the total elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, are unacceptable and impracticable because they offend against the principle of balance and present insuperable difficulties of verification. I intend this morning to repeat some of the arguments I have advanced previously because they have not been properly answered.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

But I propose also to offer a few general comments on the assertions, or assumptions, which are made in favour of the Soviet position on eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles. It seems that these fall into three main groups: the first, that the Soviet proposal was originally advanced by France, the second, that the Soviet proposal will provide a complete assurance against the threat of a nuclear war after the first stage; and the third, that there is a difference in essence between the Soviet and the United States proposals for eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles. I should like to deal with each of these assertions or assumptions in turn.

At our sixty-fifth meeting we had a certain amount of discussion about whether the Soviet Union proposal for the abolition in the first stage of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons corresponded to the original French conception. It would seem that the Soviet Union is endeavouring to make it appear that it has support for its idea from a Western Power which is now developing a nuclear force. We heard the representative of Italy tell us (ENDC/PV.65, p.27) what Mr. Moch thought about that; and towards the end of the meeting we also had further remarks by Mr. Moch quoted by Mr. Stelle (ibid., pp.48-49). However, in order that the record may be absolutely clear, the Canadian delegation would like to read into the record some additional remarks of Mr. Moch in this respect which have not previously been quoted.

At the thirty-ninth meeting of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee on 15 June 1960, Mr. Moch said, inter alia,

> "To sum up, we believe that elimination of the vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons is still controllable, but that, to be acceptable to all, it must be carried out in a realistic manner -- that is to say, gradually and methodically.
>
> "We are convinced that a methodical progression of the kind I have just outlined for demonstration purposes would lead us to our goal faster than the adoption of a vague measure which had not been previously studied in detail." (ENDC/PV.39, p.10)

At the forty-seventh meeting Mr. Moch once more forcibly rejected in the following terms the suggestion that the Soviet proposal reflected a French thesis:

> "... among the questions put to me by Mr. Zorin on Friday was one, the principle of which he repeated today, namely, that the Soviet Government has adopted the French thesis concerning vehicles for nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

> That is completely incorrect and I wish this denial to appear in the record. In the answer I had prepared to the questions put by Mr. Zorin I recalled my statements on 22 October 1959 in the United Nations General Assembly, on 1 April 1960 here, and on 15 June 1960 here, in which I emphasized that it was necessary to proceed methodically and gradually, by successive stages, and that elimination of vehicles on those lines would lead to substantial results for peace, whereas to proclaim that all such devices would be destroyed in twelve to eighteen months -- as Mr. Zorin said -- without having studied the necessary means of inspection and verification, was a propaganda weapon and not a serious proposal." (ENDC/PV.47, p.22)

I should like to repeat those last words of Mr. Moch's: "... was a propaganda weapon and not a serious proposal."

I trust that the two extracts which I have just quoted from Mr. Moch's interventions in the Ten Nation Committee will set the record quite straight on the exact relationship between the original French concept and the Soviet proposals now before us on the subject of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

The second assertion which always accompanies exposition of the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of delivery vehicles in stage I is that such a measure will rid the world of the threat of a nuclear war. In theory, perhaps it could be conceived as doing that -- but provided two conditions could be satisfied previously. The first condition would be that the other provisions in the treaty on general and complete disarmament would have to be so drawn up as to maintain the strategic and military balance between the West and the East which the adoption of the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of delivery vehicles in stage I would seriously upset.

The present Soviet plan, as Western representatives have been pointing out since we began discussing this matter, does create a serious imbalance in favour of the Soviet Union and its allies as against the NATO countries in the first stage. At our sixty-third meeting I advanced certain arguments to show why that is so (ENDC/PV.63, pp.14 et seq.). Towards the end of the meeting the representative of the Soviet Union tried to show (ibid. pp.42 et seq.) that I had not succeeded in proving that there would be such an imbalance; and at that time I said I would leave the matter to the judgment of the Committee. However, I think that this matter is of such central importance among the measures to be taken in the first stage that some further discussion is needed.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In his remarks at the sixty-third meeting Mr. Zorin objected to my calculations on the effective armed force which the NATO Powers on the one hand, and the Warsaw Pact Powers on the other, could deploy on the decisive front -- that is to say, on the line of demarcation from the Baltic to Austria. He objected to my excluding Turkey and Greece from the total of the NATO forces which could exercise any effect on that front. But Mr. Zorin's military advisers know perfectly well that Greek and Turkish troops would have to be first moved by sea, and then make a long road or rail journey: and long before they had even got part of the way to the front the decisive battle would have been fought and over.

Mr. Zorin also made the point that some forces of the Warsaw Pact Powers would have to face those of Greece and Turkey on the Macedonian front, and some to face Turkish troops in the Caucasus. That is doubtless so, but even if we allow that 200,000 Soviet troops would have to be stationed on those fronts and others, and that some of the Bulgarian and Romanian forces would also have to face Turkish and Greek troops, yet my basic argument is untouched; and that is that the Warsaw Pact Powers, operating on interior lines, would have the classical strategic advantage that such geographical relations confer. And they would have the further advantage which I mentioned, and which Mr. Zorin did not contest, that more than half of the Warsaw Pact Powers' forces would be homogeneous -- the very heavily armed and effective front line troops of the Soviet Union.

On 3 August the representative of Romania said, regarding the Western contention that the balance would be upset:

> "As regards the level of armed forces, it is impossible; the levels of manpower possessed by the Soviet Union and by the United States will be equal" (ENDC/PV.65, p.23)

But, astonishingly, he ignores the fact that, because of the provisions in the first stage of the Soviet Union draft calling for the elimination of all foreign bases and the withdrawal of all troops from foreign territory, the forces of the United States would be confined to North America. And since the United States would have lost its means of operating at a distance -- that is, aircraft and naval forces -- it could not intervene on the European continent.

The representative of Romania said also:

> "Will there be an imbalance from the point of view of armaments? That is impossible, since -- as we have proved on other occasions -- it is always possible to establish a certain proportion of man to weapon to satisfy both parties." (ibid.)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I should like to know when that has been proved by the spokesmen of the socialist States. There is no such provision in the Soviet Union draft treaty and, with its recent modification, it would run that the 30 per cent reduction is to be applied in stage I to conventional armaments on both sides, and, as the Soviet Union is admittedly much more heavily armed in conventional weapons now, the advantage that it has will remain.

Finally, at the same meeting, the representative of Romania said:

"It has been proved convincingly that imbalance with regard to the distance to be covered to the presumed theatre of operations could not exist, ..." (ibid.)

I should like to ask Mr. Macovescu when and by whom such a proof has been offered. It certainly was not given in the very brief and incomplete statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia at our sixty-third meeting (ENDC/PV.63, p.28).

To sum up, I think it is fair to say that it does not require military expertise or second sight in order to see that the whole effect of the provisions in stage I of the Soviet Union draft treaty would be to make it impossible for the NATO Powers to operate as a defensive alliance, while leaving the Soviet Union with its great conventional armaments able to operate decisively in Western Europe.

The second condition which would have to be met before we could accept the Soviet 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles in stage I as feasible is that it should be fully verifiable. The Soviet delegation has yet to prove that it is. In his statement at a recent meeting Mr. Zorin once again gave us only half of the answer when he said:

"... As regards verification of the 100 per cent elimination of the means of delivery, the Soviet Union is prepared to accept 100 per cent verification of the implementation of this measure throughout its territory. All such means of delivery will be eliminated before the eyes of the international inspectors, who will make sure that what is being destroyed is not something else, but precisely the means of delivering nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.64, p.24)

This first half of the answer, so far as it goes, is satisfactory; but Mr. Zorin has so far failed to provide us with the other and more important half, namely, what verification is the Soviet Union ready to accept to provide adequate assurance that all -- and I repeat, all -- nuclear weapon vehicles have in fact been destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes?

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That is the problem that we are concerned with? It is the problem of verifying that 100 per cent of nuclear weapon vehicles have been destroyed in the first stage of disarmament, and I should like the Committee to take note that this is a different problem of a different order from that of verifying the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapons through three stages. Gradual, three-stage elimination, the Western delegations think, can be verified without encountering the insuperable difficulties of verifying which the Soviet Union 100 per cent first-stage proposal would meet; and we will be prepared to explain and discuss the United States proposals, including their verification provisions, in as much detail as is necessary.

Now, with regard to the Soviet proposal. Let us suppose that the specialized means of delivery of nuclear weapons have been identified as long-range bombing aircraft, shorter-range aircraft specially adopted for the purpose, and rockets and artillery of all kinds down to certain minimum sizes and calibres. The Soviet Union proposes that those nuclear weapon vehicles should be assembled at various places and destroyed, and that international disarmament organization inspectors should watch that being done. But the representative of the Soviet Union knows very well that the West is not going to destroy all its nuclear weapon vehicles until it has been made perfectly certain that the means of delivering nuclear weapons are eliminated from Soviet Union territory and the territory of its allies and friends. That could mean that before destruction could take place teams of inspectors must go everywhere in those territories where they think that any of those vehicles might be concealed, and make sure that none are hidden away and that all those declared in the inventory and located for destruction are, in fact, the only nuclear weapon vehicles existing.

What would that mean? It would mean that the exact location of all the nuclear weapon vehicles belonging to the Soviet Union would be known to the international disarmament organization, and hence to the Western Powers -- and, of course, also to those circles the Soviet Union is so fond of telling us about which are itching to begin a preventive war. Those villains, the Soviet Union tells us, are just waiting for that precise information in order to deliver an unprovoked, aggressive nuclear strike.

I would ask Mr. Zorin how he proposes to escape from this dilemma. The West is not going to destroy all its nuclear weapon vehicles until it knows what items the Soviet Union proposes to destroy, where they are, and that there are no others anywhere else. I have put this question before, and I have received no answer.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

What Mr. Zorin said, in effect, was "Well, that is a matter of detail; we can settle all those details after we have accepted the principle that we are going to destroy all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage."

I submit that that is not a good answer; it is not a sufficient answer; and unless a real answer is forthcoming the Canadian delegation will have to conclude that the proposal of the Soviet Union to destroy all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage is not a serious proposal, and that it has never been intended to be executed. We hope that we shall receive a proper answer from Mr. Zorin and that he will not brush this question aside as a matter of little consequence and tell us again that what must be decided are matters of principle, that we must take political decisions. The Canadian delegation cannot accept that what is vital to the whole process of disarmament -- that is, verification that the measures agreed upon are carried out -- is to be treated as a matter of detail of secondary importance.

Mr. Stelle, of the United States delegation, on 1 August brought out the practical difficulties of differentiating between different types of armament -- of determining, at this point in our discussions, whether certain vehicles now classified as conventional might or might not be used for delivering nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.64, pp.34 et seq.), Mr. Cavalletti made that point with particular relation to artillery, and we know that Chairman Khrushchev, in his speech on 10 July to the World Conference on Peace and Disarmament, dealt with the question of substitute means of delivery to a limited extent; and to the extent that he dealt with it it seems to me that he has gone quite far towards dispelling the myth that the Soviet Union plan, by abolishing nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I, has abolished the threat of nuclear war.

Mr. Khrushchev stated, and Mr. Zorin repeated on 1 August, that

> "nuclear weapons can also be carried in TU-114s, Boeing 707s, and other civil aircraft." (ENDC/47, p.10)

Mr. Khrushchev conceded that, as a remedy:

> "... the various countries may for a while keep their means of defence -- anti-aircraft artillery, and air defence rockets and fighters. Modern means of warfare make it possible to shoot down any aircraft flying at any altitude." (ibid., p.10-11)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

By saying this Mr. Khrushchev admits that after the Soviet Union's proposed stage I provision for the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles was carried out there would still be a risk of nuclear bombing. Otherwise, why retain anti-aircraft artillery and so forth?

I should remark in passing that anti-aircraft systems, in spite of great improvements, cannot guarantee that "the bomber will not get through", and the bomber that Mr. Khrushchev was talking about in his speech was the converted high-performance transport aircraft, or military aircraft originally intended for other purposes. Furthermore, Mr. Khrushchev said nothing more about the subject we discussed on 3 August (ENDC/PV.65): the dangerous potentialities of the rockets which are being retained and manufactured during and after disarmament for the harmless -- if rather expensive -- feat of bombarding the moon. They could be readily equipped with nuclear warheads and used for threatening people on this earth. The representative of the Soviet Union told us that it would be impossible for that to be done, as there would be inspectors in the various places where those "peaceful" rockets would be kept.

I reget to say -- and I have pointed this out before -- that the inspectors of the international disarmament organization would not be an infallible guarantee that the peace would not be threatened or broken. I have mentioned that in my own experience United Nations military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine were forcibly removed from places where they were supposed to be supervising compliance with the terms of the armistice agreement in accordance with the directions of the Security Council, which in that matter has been unanimous. That was done when it suited the purposes of one of the parties to have observers out of the way so that they should not see actions which would contravene the agreement.

Inspectors of the international disarmament organization, according to the Soviet Union plan, would have no means to oblige a host country to let them stay and do their duty. They would have no force to protect them. We know that inspectors in municipal or national employment can only report on what they see or otherwise learn. When they see something which is being done contrary to the law it is not they -- the inspectors -- who enforce the law but the judges and the police. And where would be the police to enforce international law at the end of the first stage of disarmament? Perhaps one may argue too long on this point; but while alternative or substitute means of delivering nuclear weapons exist we cannot be sure that at some time, somehow, in some crisis, those means may not be brought into play.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That brings me to the third Soviet assertion, or assumption: that there is a difference in essence between the United States and the Soviet proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The representative of Poland, Mr. Lachs, has recently treated us to an interesting discourse on this highly philosophical theme. He said on 27 July:

> "What we need in this field, I believe, is a decisive qualitative decision, a change which could be arrived at and achieved only by a 100 per cent quantitative measure, because the very nature of atomic weapons is such that only a 100 per cent reduction in quantity creates new quality, creates more decisive security for the world, ..." (ENDC/PV.62, p.23)

I must confess that I do not understand what that means -- what is meant by a "qualitative decision". Nor can I agree that the Soviet Union proposal is a qualitative one, whereas the United States proposal is a quantitative one. The argument that while 90 per cent is quantitative 100 per cent is qualitative is incomprehensible to me, at any rate. It seems to me that the only differences in quality between the two plans are the time in which they will be carried out and the thoroughness with which they will be verified. That is the difference in quality, or the qualitative difference. It seems to me that we are merely confusing the issue in talking of a qualitative difference, when in fact the difference is one of timing.

I note that the representative of the Soviet Union, in his last statement on 3 August did not make use of the expression "qualitative difference"; but he said:

> "First, in our statement at the plenary meeting of the Committee on 1 August ... we showed that the difference between our proposals for the elimination of all delivery vehicles in the first stage and the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of them in the first stage is a profound difference of principle. Our proposals on means of delivery prescribed the implementation in stage I of radical measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear attack, and are consequently aimed at real disarmament and the strengthening of peace." (ENDC/PV.65, p.39)

Then Mr. Zorin characterized the United States proposals, and again I quote from his statement:

> "... the proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I, though disguised as a disarmament measure, may in fact become an instrument for the military policies of certain aggressive circles. Precisely therein lies the difference of principle between the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States ..." (ibid.)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Now I should like to quote something which was said by the representative of Romania at the same meeting:

"The socialist side enjoys an undisputed superiority with regard to the most powerful nuclear vehicles -- intercontinental missiles and global rockets; it is, however, ready to give up that advantage. The Western Powers consider themselves -- and I shall not discuss here whether they are right or wrong -- to be ahead as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, but they will not renounce that superiority. That is a fact and I would ask the members of this Committee to interpret that fact; it is an indisputable reality." (ENDC/PV.65, p.23)

Mr. Macovescu calls our attention to the powerful forces possessed by each side, upon which both now rely for their national protection. Mr. Khrushchev has recently pointed out that it is those intercontinental ballistic missiles which are the principal means of defence of the Soviet Union. If each side is convinced it is superior, should an impartial observer not conclude that they are probably about equal? Then why should either side not be ready to reduce these weapons gradually, if the reduction is to be the same for both sides?

The only answer given is that, if there were such gradual or percentage reduction, the West would be able to get information about the location of Soviet rockets, which would be detrimental to the security of the Soviet Union. But, of course, the Soviet Union would be able to get the same kind of information about the Western rockets. So we are then reduced to the argument that the Soviet Union would never think of committing an aggressive act, whereas obviously the Western Powers are capable of such acts. Such an imputation of superior virtue does not seem to be well adapted to move our disarmament negotiations forward.

In this connexion we have the direct allegation by Mr. Zorin which I have quoted that the proposals put forward in the United States basic outline are really designed as a means of waging war. To the Canadian delegation that seems to be rather unhelpful talk. Finally, Mr. Zorin said:

"The future attitude of the Western Powers to the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I will be, as it were, the acid test which will show whether the Western Powers really do or do not desire to reach agreement on the main disarmament problems." (ibid, p.39)

That statement sounds to me very much as if it is of the "take it or leave it" order. Either we take the Soviet proposals as they are, or else no agreement is possible. I wonder whether that is the real attitude of the Soviet Union. Certainly

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

the Canadian delegation hopes it is not; for, because of the reasons which I hope I have once again set forth in this statement, the Soviet Union proposals as they stand cannot be accepted by the Western nations here, and we think they cannot be accepted by anyone who wishes to make a fair and reasonable agreement to carry out general and complete disarmament.

However, to look at a more hopeful aspect of our negotiations, in agreeing only a few days ago (ENDC/PV.65, p.41) to extend the time limit for stage I from twenty-one to twenty-four months Mr. Zorin has -- perhaps unwittingly -- recognized that the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States proposals for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are not of essence, or "qualitative", but differences of timing. What, in effect, Mr. Zorin has told us is that the Soviet Union is now prepared to accept an $87\frac{1}{2}$ per cent reduction in twenty-one months and a 100 per cent reduction in twenty-four months.

The Canadian delegation of course welcomes this small concession on timing by the Soviet Union delegation. We hope that further consideration of the problems involved, which should be illuminated more fully in our discussions of this vital topic during the next meetings of this Conference, will persuade the Soviet Union that the one-stage, "one-shot" proposal does not correspond to the realities of the nuclear armaments in the world today and the fears and suspicions, which are also real and which prevent drastic solutions.

If the Soviet Union is persuaded, as a result of the discussions of this subject in our March-June meetings and the present meetings, that a lengthening of the time during which the process of elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles will be carried out and a more precise definition of the means of verification are reasonable and necessary, then there should be a possibility of eventually reaching agreement on this subject, which is properly described as crucial to general and complete disarmament. The Canadian delegation hopes that will come about.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): At its last few meetings the Eighteen Nation Committee has been studying the central question in the first stage of general and complete disarmament: the disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including their production and the appropriate control measures, according to the recommendations of the co-Chairmen for the procedure of work on the first stage (ENDC/52, p.2).

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It has been unanimously agreed at our discussions that one of the chief aims of general and complete disarmament is the rapid elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, which has weighed on all mankind since the first discovery of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. In response to the desire of the peoples of the whole world to see the danger of nuclear war disappear and to save humanity from its horrors, the Soviet Union proposed long ago the prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons at the outset of disarmament. On different pretexts, however, the Western Powers have rejected these proposals.

In 1960, at the Ten Nation Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, the French Government and its representatives put forward and defended the idea that, once the vehicles for delivering nuclear arms had been destroyed and banished from national arsenals, the stocks of nuclear weapons would lose all value and effect. That is why the French delegation suggested allaying anxiety and mistrust by beginning the disarmament effort with elimination of the most important factors in a war of total destruction -- nuclear weapons vehicles.

At our last meeting, and again this morning, certain Western representatives, in particular today the Canadian representative, have tried to show that the French proposal was not relevant. Mr. Burns quoted Mr. Moch's proposals of 15 June 1960 and certain of his statements at the forty-seventh meeting of the Ten Nation Committee (supra, pp.16-17).

To establish what the French idea really was, let me dwell a little on this question and quote from a document of the French Foreign Ministry. On 22 October 1959 -- that is to say, right at the beginning -- Mr. Moch made a speech in the Political Committee of the United Nations in which he said:

> "... We suggest allaying anxiety and mistrust by beginning the disarmament effort by eliminating the most dangerous vehicles for delivering means of universal destruction".[1/]

What is now the means of universal destruction? Obviously nuclear weapons. We all know that; that is what we are discussing. In this document there is no talk of reduction. I will read from it again:

> "... by beginning the disarmament effort by eliminating the most dangerous vehicles for delivering means of universal destruction."

1/ Extract from the Suggestions of the French delegation, 27 October 1959, Documents on Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 17. Translated from French.

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So, according to Mr. Moch, we should begin, not continue or conclude, our effort in this way.

Secondly, at the meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament held on 15 March 1960, that is to say, almost at the beginning, Mr. Moch said:

"When the vehicles have been banned and destroyed, the military stocks" — obviously nuclear stocks — "will appear worthless." (ENDC/PV.1, p.16)

I believe one representative said during a recent discussion that what we had to do here was to establish paternity (ENDC/PV.65, p.51), I should say that perhaps in the meantime paternity has been contested, for after the Soviet Union had introduced in 1960 its proposal for the abolition of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, it took Mr. Moch more than a week (he spoke on 15 June after the Canadian representative, whereas the Soviet proposal was distributed on 2 June and presented on 7 June) to remember that he had not made an original proposal of that kind, or to explain that his original proposal had not been properly understood. But during that week how many private discussions were held within NATO? How many difficulties had to be overcome so that NATO could present a common front at the Committee? On that occasion Mr. Moch was putting forward, not the original French proposal, but the NATO proposal arising out of those private discussions.

I see that the relevant newspaper cutting has not been handed to me, but I remember that this very year, I think about a month ago, General de Gaulle made an important speech in which he again declared that nuclear weapons must be eliminated. He did not say "totally"; he simply said "eliminated". But elimination means total abolition at the beginning of disarmament. Perhaps that is an attempt to re-establish the paternity of a proposal which is certainly the source of the French proposal.

So much for this question, which has been discussed so often in our Committee. The importance of nuclear weapon carriers in removal of the threat of nuclear war has been stressed many times by many representatives in the Eighteen Nation Committee. I do not wish to refer again to what all the various representatives have said, particularly the representative of the United States, who in his speech of 24 April was very explicit on this point (ENDC/PV.26, pp.8 et seq.)

In view of the present importance of nuclear weapon carriers in war, of the unanimous wish of the peoples of the whole world to see the nuclear threat disappear for ever, and of the Western Powers' refusal to consent to the abolition of nuclear weapons in the first stage, the Soviet Union modified its proposals. It postponed the abolition of nuclear weapons, but advanced to the first rank the abolition of

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nuclear weapon carriers. The leading idea has always been to find practical means of eliminating the danger of nuclear war as early as possible. To abolish nuclear weapon carriers in the first stage, as proposed in the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament, would not only remove the nuclear threat in fact, but also seems, in the present stage of nuclear weapon development, to be the best method of doing so.

Nevertheless, despite the decisive military and universally-recognized importance nowadays of nuclear weapon carriers for the almost total removal of the nuclear threat hanging over us all, the Western representatives object to their complete abolition during the first stage of general and complete disarmament. This is contrary to all reason and even to their own arguments at recent meetings and during the general discussion.

A close study of the Western representatives' arguments against the abolition of nuclear weapons carriers during the first stage of general and complete disarmament must leave any impartial observer with the impression that the Western Powers are in fact opposed to the abolition of nuclear weapons -- I repeat, opposed to the abolition of nuclear weapons -- and trying by devious ways and arguments to prove the necessity of retaining nuclear weapons in the world today. In face of the imminent danger of a nuclear catastrophe which might under present conditions overwhelm mankind by pure chance -- by miscalculation, negligence or misunderstanding of signals --, what is the value of these "arguments" endlessly repeated by the Western delegations, and authoritatively refuted by the representatives of the socialist countries, to show that the abolition of nuclear weapons would produce imbalance between the forces of the two military groups concerned, the Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact?

Despite what the Canadian representative has said today, it has been shown that any imbalance resulting from the abolition of nuclear weapon carriers would favour the Western Powers and hamper the socialist countries. The person who said this was not a representative or an expert from a socialist country, nor someone ignorant of the armaments and armed forces of the Western Powers. The United States Secretary of Defense himself, Mr. McNamara, stated this most pertinently in a speech he made on 16 June at the University of Michigan. He said:

"In manpower alone NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites."

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Later he said that the United States had increased its military budget for 1962-63 by $ 10,000 million over the earlier estimates. It is all too well known that Mr. McNamara is no layman in his knowledge of armed forces and armaments, and of other matters directly connected with war preparations of which I will speak a little later on.

Certain Western delegations have tried to sidetrack the Committee into discussions of technical detail, to introduce technical problems into debate on the solution of the political problem of disarmament. This would merely prolong indefinitely a discussion which has already lasted too long. It would merely confuse the disarmament problem with technical arguments and details, whereas the solution only calls for clear-cut political decisions.

In his speech of 1 August, the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, made a long statement (ENDC/PV.64, p.34) on the difficulty of distinguishing nuclear from conventional weapons. He claimed that the armaments spectrum presented a twilight zone in which it is difficult to tell which weapons could be used in a conventional war and which could be used as nuclear weapon carriers.

This contention by the United States delegation, with its aim of introducing technical details into discussion of the main problems of general and complete disarmament, has been supported by the presentation on 1 August by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, of two documents (ENDC/53, 54) on the supposed difficulty of the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles and its procedure. The Soviet, Romanian and Polish representatives have disposed of this attempt to divert the discussion from its proper course into technical channels. Other arguments have been put forward just as artificial as those which the socialist delegations have dealt with and refuted.

All these Western arguments have the same purpose: to show that it is unnecessary to abolish, and that no attempt should be made to abolish nuclear weapon carriers either in the first stage or at all, and therefore that no attempt should be made to remove the nuclear threat hanging over the peoples of the whole world.

We do not wish to spend time in refuting all over again these arguments which members of the Committee have seen to be valueless and which deserve our attention only as evidence of the Western Powers' reluctance to consider abolition of the nuclear threat in the first stage of disarmament. What we wish to stress, however,

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is that they all show that the Western countries, despite their statements to the contrary, neither wish nor intend to give up nuclear weapons. On the contrary, these countries are doing all they can to show that nuclear weapons should not be abolished but should stay in the military arsenals of the Great Powers indefinitely. Since the discovery of nuclear weapons the Western Powers have always shown a truly inexplicable love -- on a humane view we may even say a morbid love -- for these weapons of mass destruction. Even now the Western representatives repeat in their speeches the reasons why the Western Powers could not do without nuclear weapons. Further, as the United States draft provides, the Western Powers are trying not only to prolong the process of disarmament almost indefinitely but also to arrange to keep nuclear weapons for ever.

The assertions of the Western Powers' representatives in this Committee and elsewhere that they are just as anxious as any other country to abolish nuclear weapons, flagrantly contradict the arguments which they use here to obstruct an agreement on the earliest possible abolition of nuclear weapon carriers and to prevent nuclear weapon carriers and nuclear weapons themselves from being abolished at all. It is therefore not by chance that in the United States draft the Western Powers, instead of proposing the abolition of nuclear weapon carriers, propose that these dangerous weapons, which in Mr. Dean's own words constitute an extremely grave threat to our civilization, should be reduced only in the same proportion as conventional weapons: by 30 per cent of their present level. Our discussions, however, have shown that these nuclear weapon carriers, which have radically changed the whole conception of national power -- Mr. Dean's expression -- and of war in general, are the most dangerous of all.

The Western Powers put forward a disarmament plan which would change none of the capacity of the principal nuclear Powers to launch a nuclear war at any moment. But the peoples of the whole world ask and indeed demand the opposite; and the socialist countries are endeavouring to make this real tomorrow by proposing the abolition of nuclear weapon carriers in the first stage; they demand that the Powers should be rendered incapable of starting a nuclear war. That is the essence of the profound differences which exist between us -- the socialist countries -- and the Western countries. While maintaining intact the means by which the main nuclear Powers could start and wage a nuclear war at any moment, the Western Powers demand the establishment of complete control over armaments in order -- they say -- to create confidence between the nations.

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Only a few days ago the United Kingdom representative Lord Home, the Foreign Secretary, expressed his astonishment that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries were not ready to accept such control. He said:

"... I find it almost impossible to understand the Soviet view that inspection is too high a price to pay for disarmament. We are ready to pay that price. We will open our country to any inspection that is necessary to give confidence, but I think that that is true of every country in the world except the Soviet Union and the communist countries. Every country in the world, I believe, is willing to be open to inspection ..." (ENDC/PV.60, p.20)

I have dwelt on this statement of the United Kingdom representative because the Western Powers are again seeking to introduce through such statements control over all armaments without disarmament, and especially without the abolition of nuclear weapon carriers, which in our view would open the way to the organization of a more effective control and create an atmosphere of confidence. How could effective control be established while a potential aggressor could launch a nuclear attack with its remaining 70 per cent of nuclear weapon carriers -- a proportion which, given the present headlong development of nuclear arms technique, could mean at the end of the first stage an increase in the nuclear striking power of States?

I pause here to say that the proposals presented today by the United States delegation would do nothing to change the increase in the striking power of States, since nuclear weapons are continually being developed and can be transported by the same capacity of nuclear weapon carriers. A smaller volume of nuclear arms of greater power could be transported much more easily with the nuclear-vehicle capacity which the different States possess now and would possess at the end of the first stage. In these circumstances control would be immediately transformed into espionage, permitting an aggressor to obtain the information he needed to enable him to fulfil his aggressive plans.

Moreover, how can there be any hope of creating confidence in face of the incitements uttered in the Western countries to prepare war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries? It is true that only a few days ago Mr. Dean tried to reassure us by saying that the United States had no aggressive intentions and was opposed to any preventive attack. I have no need to quote him. Despite these statements, however, Mr. Dean has not succeeded in refuting the evidence

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adduced by the Soviet representative that the United States doctrine of "mass reprisals" propounded in 1954 by Mr. John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State, represents the United States present policy.

In his speech of 25 July Mr. Dean himself said that Mr. Salinger, the White House spokesman, had stated that the American journalist Alsop's articles must be read in their context. According to Mr. Dean, Mr. Salinger said:

"'The President's statement represents no change in American policy.'"

(ENDC/PV.61, p.15)

Since in the past the traditional American policy has been one of massive reprisals, of preparation for a preventive war, it quite obviously does not in any way promote among the nations, an atmosphere of confidence and mutual understanding conducive to disarmament and in particular to abolition of the most dangerous weapons of modern war, nuclear weapon carriers, in the manner laid down in the United States plan, to say nothing of the organization of control.

Moreover, the most highly qualified representatives of the United States and the spokesmen of United States military circles say quite the contrary to Mr. Dean. Since, if American official statements are to be believed, United States policy is nothing but the traditional policy followed in the past, let us see how this policy is interpreted by the organizers of United States military power and consequently of its nuclear striking force.

In his book "The Military Doctrine of the United States", General Smith wrote that there is one indisputable fact: when the very existence of a nation is at stake in a total war, that nation will survive which is the first to use the most destructive weapon to strike a blow at the heart of the adversary. General Curtis LeMay, in an interview given to the Daily Express on 10 April 1959, said that the fundamental strategy of the United States is a surprise blow with all available means and forces, and the United States must be the first to strike such a blow. We know that "such a blow" would also be a nuclear blow.

Mr. Dean may tell me that, like Professor Teller, the persons I have just quoted do not make United States official policy. But it should not be forgotten that General LeMay was the head of the United States armed forces. At that time, moreover, there was another general who made the official policy of the United States: General Eisenhower. On 11 March 1951 General Eisenhower stated on this very question before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Forces that in

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his opinion the atomic bomb would be used on the following basis: would it or would it not represent an advantage in time of war? If he considered the advantage to be on his side, he would use it immediately. It is true that at that time Mr. Eisenhower was not yet head of the United States Government. But, though it is easy to change one's clothes, and though the transformation of a military man into a statesman is possible and even frequent, I do not think it is quite so easy to change one's ideas and opinions.

Moreover, it is no secret that the policy enunciated by General, later President, Eisenhower underlay all United States military thought during his administration. Has this thought changed under the Kennedy administration? No, for Mr. Kennedy has himself spoken of the "traditional position" of the United States Government. This policy of a preventive nuclear attack on the enemy in a war started by conventional means has also been stated recently by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, in his speech at the University of Michigan which we have already mentioned. He said that the administration would continue to maintain powerful nuclear forces for the alliance as a whole. Later he said that the President of the United States had declared that it was only with such a force that the United States could be sure of deterring a nuclear attack or an attack with superior conventional armaments against its forces and those of its allies.

What is most disturbing, however, is not so much the statements as the acts done and the preparations made in the United States to carry out this policy of "massive reprisals" and preventive war which is the "traditional policy" of the United States. We should note that, despite denials, there is a great gulf between the position adopted by the United States representative in this Committee and the positions and statements of the most eminent representatives of United States policy and of the military chiefs.

In his speech at the University of Michigan Mr. McNamara, the person best placed in the United States to know what nuclear war preparations are being carried out by its armed forces, made some truly disturbing statements on this subject. He explained, in fact, that the United States had created military forces able and ready to destroy the military bases and forces of the enemy. The United States Defense Secretary stated that in case of nuclear war resulting from a powerful attack against the alliance, the principal military objective should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces and not of his civil population. Later, speaking of the worthlessness of an independent national striking force in a country smaller than the United

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States -- such as France --, Mr. McNamara again said that in case of war the use of such a force against the towns of a great nuclear Power would amount to suicide, while its use against important military objectives would have an insignificant effect on the outcome of the conflict.

What can we deduce from these statements? That the United States is preparing its military forces, and especially its nuclear forces, to destroy the military power and strong points of the enemy in case of a war waged with conventional arms involving the United States' allies in Europe. We all know that the re-militarization of Western Germany has been undertaken and directed by Nazi generals -- those same generals who have become specialists in the staging of "aggressions" to enable them to carry out a real aggression against their neighbours on whom they have territorial claims resulting from the second World War. We should not forget that these same generals now commanding the Bundeswehr were those who in 1939 faked the "aggression" of Poland against Nazi Germany so that they could start the second World War.

What would happen if a similar self-aggression were faked by the Nazi generals now at the head of the Bundeswehr? The nuclear forces of the United States, ready to strike at the strong points of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, would act at once, if one is to believe the statements of Mr. McNamara. Their object would then be to destroy the strongholds and nuclear vehicle bases of the Soviet Union. The siting of these strongholds and bases in the Soviet Union would, if the United States disarmament plan were accepted and applied, be perfectly well known in the first stage of the plan to the general staffs of all the countries participating in the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

It is only too well known that, with the 70 per cent of nuclear weapon carriers remaining in national arsenals three years after the beginning of the disarmament process, it would be perfectly possible and even very easy to launch a regular nuclear attack against a possible enemy. What in the opinion of the United States military specialists, would be the role assigned to the civil population by the general staffs if they launched a preventive nuclear attack against a possible enemy's military bases and concentration points for nuclear weapon carriers?

We get the explanation from another United States military specialist -- a great specialist, it seems -- Dr. Kissinger. This man, if I am not mistaken, is now one of President Kennedy's military advisers. The civilian population of the country suffering aggression would, according to him, be an instrument of very heavy pressure

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

and blackmail on their government and statesmen. In an article in the quarterly review Foreign Affairs for July 1960, he put this idea -- which he has developed in his book Necessity for Choice -- very clearly. The first objective of a surprise attack must he says, be to destroy the enemy's power of retaliation. He assumes that the enemy will retaliate; so it is necessary first to eliminate the enemy's power to do so.

He goes on to point out that even the most foolish aggressor must know that an attack against cities which did not succeed in destroying the defender's power of retaliation would only lead to a devastating counter-attack. What is more, once the enemy's power of retaliation had been destroyed, the aggressor could have a real interest in sparing the civilian population. For purposes of blackmail the civilian population of an enemy country would be more useful alive than dead.

It is therefore all too easy to understand that, in view of the capacity to strike destructive blows like those planned by the military circles of certain countries, in particular -- as we have just seen -- the United States, and of the role to be assigned to the civilian population in that case, there is no question of creating confidence between peoples and nations. This is even less conceivable when we remember that, with the 70 per cent of nuclear weapon carriers which according to the American plan the States would retain at the end of the first stage, it would be not only possible but indeed comparatively easy to strike destructive blows against an enemy, especially when the distribution of his forces and military bases was known.

We have all been convinced by the discussions in this Committee that it is not technical difficulties concerning different definitions and tasks which prevent an agreement on general and complete disarmament. What prevents us from reaching an agreement, and especially an agreement on the abolition of nuclear weapon carriers -- which, according to the United States representative, is the common aim of the two plans submitted to us -- is the lack of a political decision by the Western Powers. And it is not by chance that the Western Powers refuse to assume the political responsibility of deciding to abolish nuclear weapons carriers; it is because in these countries there are circles which wish to remain able to wage a nuclear war not only till the end of the first stage but also during the second and third stages and even afterwards; whereas the socialist countries would like to end all possibility of launching a nuclear war even before the end of the first stage.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

These are the underlying reasons for the opposing views on the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles expressed before this Committee. While the socialist countries, which possess nuclear weapon carriers, and the neutral countries, which do not possess them, are in favour of eliminating the nuclear threat, the Western countries do all in their power to prolong indefinitely the existence of nuclear vehicles and thus the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. It is therefore only by completely reviewing their attitude towards nuclear weapon vehicles that the Western Powers can genuinely contribute to an agreement on this question and on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): My own name is the next on the list of speakers. I am very conscious that there are five more names after mine, and that they include those of the representatives of three of the uncommitted nations. It seems to me that my duty as Chairman is to ensure the greatest expression of opinion from different sides in any particular day's debate, and as the speech I intended to make is a fairly substantial one lasting about forty minutes on the question of this article 5 (b) which we are discussing I have decided to defer it until Wednesday to give greater opportunity for others of my colleagues to speak this morning.

But I would just make one comment before calling on the next speaker, namely, that in the light of the speech to which we have just listened, which contained a large number of quotations, I feel bound to give just one quotation from what appeared in the Press over the weekend in a report from Moscow dated 3 August. It refers to a speech which Mr. Khrushchev made, and it reads as follows -- I only have the Press text, but I should be happy to have the authentic text if our Soviet colleague would like to circulate it to us:

"Mr. Khrushchev told farmers at his native village of Kalinovka 28 July what the Soviet Union finds indispensable: good food, warm and tasteful clothing, comfortable and spacious apartments, schools and kindergartens."

It goes on:

"'Yes, and to that you have to add something else -- rockets and thermonuclear bombs,' he said, 'then we could really live well.'"

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

I emphasize those words because they do not seem to echo precisely what we have heard from the representative of the Soviet Union in this Conference. I shall be happy to know that in fact what he tells us is correct and not this report of what his leader says. In fact, I see that the Press comment I have goes on to say:

> "The Communist party newspaper Pravda which printed his speech on its front page today, said that at that point the audience broke out in applause and 'cheerful animation'."

I do not detect any "cheerful animation" when such thoughts are expressed here, and certainly if quotations are to be given from leaders of countries I think it is only right that this very recent one -- a very disturbing one, I think -- should be given too.

I have no further comments in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom, because, as I say, I wish to get in as many other speakers as possible.

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): Before I make the few remarks which I intended to make this morning, allow me to welcome back most heartily our colleague Mr. Dean from his trip to the United States. My delegation particularly welcomes his brief but encouraging statement on the prospects for a nuclear test ban treaty. There can be no contradiction whatsoever that if the Dean-Zorin "villa chats" are able to find a solution to the problem of the immediate banning of nuclear tests, the two names Dean and Zorin will be inscribed in gold letters in the annals of nuclear test history. It is the sincere hope of my delegation that our co-Chairmen will live up tc expectations.

Allow me also to reciprocate the expressions of affection and warm welcome extended to me by many distinguished colleagues since I joined this Committee as leader of my delegation. Indeed, I find myself bereft of words to express adequately the friendly atmosphere which characterizes the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee. A friendly atmoshphere at our meetings is indispensable if the Committee is to achieve any material result.

Disarmament conferences, in so far as recorded European history goes, raise about the most intriguing and, seemingly, intractable problems which have always confronted the cleverest of craftsmen in the arena of world politics. Because of the difficult issues of a global nature involved in disarmament our exercises here may be termed an "adventure into the unknown". Granted that, because our adventure is into the unknown, we can afford to be evasive when tackling general

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

and complete disarmament issues, what can we adduce as justifying our evasion in failing to agree on a nuclear test ban treaty?

The Chinese -- and here I make no distinction whether they are from Peking or Formosa -- have a wise saying: "The journey of a thousand miles begins with one step". That saying, though hackneyed by time, is apposite to our problem as it is as true today as when it was first used by the Chinese. Let us take a lead from that saying by first of all agreeing here and now to ban nuclear tests, and thus clear the way for serious discussion of the co-Chairmen's agreed programme (ENDC/52).

I cannot help feeling that no real progress can be achieved in our work unless and until a ban on nuclear tests is secured. Heaven knows, we have enough fish to fry already in trying to secure a ban on nuclear tests. I may sound pessimistic. If so, I beg the Committee's pardon. It is my contention, however, that without a test ban agreement safely in our pockets no progress can be made on the first three stages of our agreed programme. Whatever the distrusts -- and they reign supreme -- that exist between the East and the West, let us, on the question of a test ban, encourage a little bit of philandering between the two. Who knows if such philandering might not result in marriage -- call it a marriage of convenience if you like.

The truth is, however, that such a marriage of convenience is not barred from producing children. The children of the marriage may turn out to be among the world's best species. My reasoning may be described as quaint, but it is logical. The children of the marriage are in fact stages I, II and III of our programme of general and complete disarmament. Let us therefore sink our differences for the moment and agree to enter into a test ban treaty, thereby encouraging my metaphorical marriage of convenience, and hope that the issue of the marriage will be stages I, II and III of our programme. If they are, it becomes criminal folly for the parents to deny the right of existence to their children. The stage is set for reaching an agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. We cannot afford any more equivocation on this most important issue.

Mr. Lachs, the representative of Poland, quoted on Friday what Harold Urey had said in 1945:

> "'Atomic bombs do not land in the next block, leaving survivors to thank their lucky stars and to hope that the next bomb will also miss them.'" (ENDC/PV.65, p.34)

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

It is now or never that all nuclear tests should be banned. Thus we must remind ourselves of the celebrated Latin maxim Dum vivimus vivamus -- whilst we are still alive, let us live.

It was reported yesterday that the Russians had fired a twenty- or forty-megaton atomic device. It may be that their excuse for the resumption of nuclear tests is to catch up with the United States. I remain convinced that neither side can catch up in this perilous game in which they are engaged. There can be only one meeting place, and that is universal death. The indignation of the world is mounting daily, yet the two great Powers remain obdurate in mass producing weapons of the most diabolical nature which could, whenever unleashed, bring about the end of human civilization. What can anybody hope to gain from such universal catastrophe? The answer is nothing, except that by becoming too clever -- perhaps too clever by half -- man will have brought about the end of mankind. Let us once again jointly urge the two Powers that the time has come when the arrow must leave the bow or the cord, too far stretched, will break.

When I made my intervention in this Committee on 27 July I emphasized that my Government was uncompromisingly opposed to all nuclear weapon tests and had taken exceptional measures with regard to the French tests in the Sahara. I added,

> "No Power whatsoever has the right to jeopardize the lives of present and future generations. My Government is very much concerned about the reason given by the various nuclear Powers for conducting these tests -- namely, the alleged military gains by the opposing nuclear Power from its test series. That has always given rise to more testing. As it appears that from military calculations -- which have not proved to be too reliable -- some form of gain would inevitably be supposed to accrue to the testing Power, and that the "right" or the tendency to test would then be asserted by its opponents, that means that this spiralling of tests, this mad rush to destruction and this wanton disregard of common humanity would continue ad infinitum". (ENDC/PV.62, pp.7, 8)

It would therefore be the joy of my Government and the people of Nigeria -- nay, the people of the world -- to see an agreement concluded by the big Powers banning all nuclear tests. The world still believes in the wisdom of the leaders of the two most powerful Powers, and calls upon them to use their unrivalled wisdom and sense of justiceto save mankind from total destruction by banning nuclear tests now.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

With the achievement of a nuclear test ban treaty -- for which my delegation believes a suitable basis for negotiation has been provided by the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28), and to the salient features of which it is my hope that the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests will now seriously address itself -- the Committee can then continue with its main task of elaborating a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have asked for the floor in order to reply briefly to certain remarks made today by the representatives of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The United States representative today informed the Committee that he had had an informal discussion with me yesterday, and he pointed out that during that meeting, which he described as positive, he informed us of the talks he had had in Washington with his Government and with President Kennedy on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. That meeting did in fact take place, and yesterday we ascertained in a preliminary way some of the views put forward by Mr. Dean in connexion with the consultations which he had had in Washington with his Government. Today a brief communiqué of the State Department has been published which also speaks of new United States proposals on the question of the cessation of tests and they are described as new and very promising proposals of the United States.

What Mr. Dean told us yesterday gave us a first impression that these new proposals of the United States[1/] are by no means very promising, because they do not change the fundamental approach and whole position of the United States on the question of the cessation of tests and of control over their cessation. That is what we frankly told Mr. Dean yesterday.

These proposals are based, not on the suggestions of the eight non-aligned States, which, as you know, we described as a possible basis for agreement (ENDC/28), but on the old United States proposals. Of course, we have not yet had time to study these proposals in detail, because they were merely described to us in general outline, and Mr. Dean assured us that we would have an opportunity to acquaint ourselves with them in greater detail within the next few days. We shall certainly do so and acquaint ourselves more closely with everything that may be proposed by the United States, and afterwards we shall, of course, discuss this question in a meeting of the three-Power Sub-Committee and then in the plenary Committee.

1/ ENDC/SC.1/PV.23, pp.3 et seq.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

It is precisely because we are in favour of the complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests that we are prepared to consider any proposals on this question, if they are aimed at the cessation of all tests and provide a basis for agreement in this regard. I am bound to say, however, that what we have learned so far about these proposals does not inspire us with any hope of actual agreement, since the United States continues to insist essentially on its old positions of principle, which, as is well known, are not only unacceptable to us but, I think, also to other countries which have submitted their compromise proposals.

At present I will confine myself to these remarks, since the question is not at present the subject of our discussions. I thought it necessary, however, to make this preliminary comment, because Mr. Dean touched upon this question and informed the Committee of our meeting of yesterday.

As regards the question of our tests, to which Mr. Dean also referred, I must say that the United States knew in advance what it was risking by carrying out its new series of tests, including tests in outer space. Our position on this question was explained in detail in the statement of the Soviet Government which has been circulated as a Conference document and with which the members of the Committee are acquainted (ENDC/51). Therefore I do not think it necessary to go further into this question now. I merely deem it necessary to draw the attention of the United States delegation and of the delegations of all members of the Committee to this statement of our Government which fully explains our position in this matter. In this statement the Soviet Government reiterates that it is in favour of the immediate conclusion of an agreement to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests and it reaffirms that the proposals of the eight non-aligned States of 16 April 1962 could serve as the basis for such an agreement.

My second remark concerns certain new proposals, or rather clarifications, which have been put forward today by Mr. Dean on cessation of production of armaments.[1/] I must say, however, that these new proposals and amendments are perhaps of some importance for solution of the problem of production of conventional armaments, since both under the United States plan and under the Soviet plan, as we all know, the production of these armaments in stage I is not to cease but to be reduced. In this connexion we shall, of course, study the amendments proposed by Mr. Dean.

1/ ENDC/30/Add.1

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

All these amendments, however, do not change the main point, namely the refusal of the United States to cease altogether the production of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and to eliminate existing means of delivery. In this regard the amendments do not change anything and we can only regret that this is so. The amendments proposed today by Mr. Dean merely define more precisely how the production of the means of delivery will continue, whereas in our opinion it is necessary both to cease this production and to eliminate the delivery vehicles themselves in the first stage of disarmament.

I should like to make a third remark in connexion with the rather detailed statement made by Mr. Burns. I shall not deal with all the questions he touched on. I shall deal only with what he said concerning an imbalance as between the forces of the two blocs (supra, pp.17 et seq.), about which we have already had some talk here in the past and in regard to which Mr. Burns put forward some detailed arguments at one of our previous meetings, to which we gave a detailed reply.

As regards the statement made by Mr. Burns today, I can describe it -- if he will allow me to do so, since he is a general -- in purely military terms, as a rearguard action by General Burns on the question of imbalance. Not all the arguments put forward by General Burns in the past were not repeated today; he merely put forward a few arguments in reply to our detailed remarks concerning a number of facts which he had adduced as proof that there would be an imbalance in favour of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. This morning Mr. Burns touched on that aspect of the problem which relates to the armed forces of Turkey and Greece. Incidentally, I am bound to point out that he made no mention at all today of the United Kingdom forces. That is remarkable since after our reply General Burns apparently had no rearguard comments to make on this question.

As for the armed forces of Greece and Turkey, I must say that the remarks we have heard do not add any weight at all to the arguments put forward earlier by Mr. Burns and to which we have already replied. Mr. Burns said this morning that in order to be included in the common front of the Western Powers the armed forces of Greece and Turkey would have to be moved by sea or by air. But he immediately observed that it was true that the Turkish forces in the Caucasus and the Greek forces in Macedonia were a real fact which must be taken into account. Nevertheless, for some reason, he discounted them and said that this had no bearing on the question of the transport of troops.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Well, if it has a bearing on the difficulty of transporting Western troops, it also has a bearing on the question of transporting Soviet troops: that is, neither will it be possible to transport to the western front the Soviet troops on the southern sector, so to speak, of our front. How in that case can you discount the Turkish troops? You should then discount that part of the troops of the Soviet Union which will remain facing these Turkish forces. There is no other way of looking at the matter. Or do you want us to transfer our forces from the Caucasus and denude the whole sector of the southern front while Turkish forces continue to face these southern sectors of our front? After all, they are not a mere trifle; they number 500,000 men and against these 500,000 men we must have at least some sort of shield.

Mr. Burns then went on to refer to the extra 200,000 so-called Soviet troops which, according to the calculations of the British Institute of Strategic Studies, the Soviet bloc would have as compared to the troops of the Western bloc. I am bound to say that this too is a very strange calculation. Why do you count only 200,000 men facing 500,000 Turkish troops? Is it likely that we would keep only 200,000 men facing 500,000 troops of Turkey, a member of NATO? There is something not quite clear in your calculation. Even elementary calculations show that a greater number of troops would obviously be required. Considering that Turkey is a member of NATO, I am bound to say that we cannot at all regard it as the guardian angel of our southern boundaries; I am sorry, but we simply cannot regard it as such. Therefore your calculations do not help us at all.

You also said that in Macedonia the Greek forces and also some of the Turkish forces, since Turkey has a common border with Bulgaria, can have no significance for the Soviet forces. But may I ask why you refer only to Soviet forces? After all, we were calculating the general balance of forces. Bulgaria is an ally of the Soviet Union and a member of the Warsaw Pact. Greece and Turkey are members of the opposite NATO bloc. If you keep troops facing Bulgaria, it means that Bulgaria cannot participate in other operations of the Warsaw Pact countries. It must keep its troops facing these forces. That is true, is it not? If one speaks of the general balance of forces should these be taken into account or not? I completely fail to understand your arguments. They in no way support the analysis which you have given in the past, an analysis which, as we have proved, I think quite convincingly, lacks validity.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

At any rate, in the calculation of forces which you have made so far the balance is not in our favour. The fact that today you omitted the United Kingdom from your analysis is, I may say, praiseworthy. Apparently you have reached the sensible conclusion that this argument can no longer be put forward.

My second remark in connexion with the statement made by Mr. Burns concerns his comments on control. I must point out that there even emerged some new aspects which do not seem to have been put forward before by Mr. Burns, as far as I can recall, although other representatives of the Western Powers have done so. I shall now read out from the text which Mr. Burns so kindly circulated among us on the question of control, in particular on the control of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the following statement:

> "But the representative of the Soviet Union knows very well that the West is not going to destroy all its nuclear weapon vehicles until it has been made perfectly certain that the means of delivering nuclear weapons are eliminated from Soviet Union territory and the territory of its allies and friends." (Supra, p. 20)

What does that mean? It means that first you will wait for us to eliminate completely all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and only then will you begin to eliminate your delivery vehicles. Well, you know, with an approach like that, we shall be unable to begin any disarmament at all. Just whom do you take us for? Do you think that we shall be so blind, so carried away by the idea of general and complete disarmament, that we shall go so far as to eliminate all delivery vehicles simply to assure you that we have destroyed everything, after which you will deign merely to begin eliminating your own delivery vehicles?

Is such an approach possible? Is it a reasonable approach? I think it is an unreasonable approach. Nobody would accept any such proposition, and I think that all sensible persons who are present here will understand that no country will agree to such conditions of yours. Further, you said today, and I quote from the text which you circulated:

> "That could mean that before destruction could take place, teams of inspectors must go everywhere in those territories where they think that any of these vehicles might be concealed, and make sure that none are hidden away, and that all those declared in the inventory and located for destruction are, in fact, the only nuclear weapons vehicles existing." (ibid.)

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

What does that mean? You want to send international inspectors who would have access to any place in our territory, even before the destruction of armaments takes place. What does that mean? It implies control before disarmament. Is that not quite obvious? You want first to acquaint yourselves with all the places where delivery vehicles are located and then you might decide that it was not worthwhile destroying them. You would simply depart and your allies would stike a nuclear blow at these delivery vehicles. That is all. But can control questions be approached in this way? It is perfectly clear that this is control before disarmament.

Therefore, Mr. Burns, if you are going to take that path, then it will mean in the first place that you are demanding the destruction of all our delivery vehicles before you start eliminating yours, and, secondly, even before destruction takes place, you want to send inspectors everywhere to check whether any delivery vehicles are hidden away in any place. But in that case we have no possible basis for any agreement whatsoever on questions of control. That is quite clear. If that is your attitude and the attitude of all the Western Powers, then we are talking in vain. Can any agreement be reached on such a basis? I think that, with all their goodwill, sensible people would find it impossible to reach agreement on such a basis.

Therefore, since you asked me today how I proposed to answer your arguments, I am giving you my answer -- this approach is utterly unreasonable; it is an approach which has already been condemned by all who have spoken, even in this Committee. There must be no control before disarmament. You cannot demand that one side destroy its weapons before the opposite side has even started to eliminate its own. How can we conduct reasonable negotiations with such an approach? We have always regarded your statements as the statements of a man who takes a sober view of all events and measures, but today you adopted a position which is obviously at variance with the most elementary common-sense approach. Of course my answer is therefore negative to both these questions. We cannot approach the problem in such a way. I am sure we are not alone in this; no country about to start disarmament could approach the question in the way you suggest.

Now I have a few words to say about Mr. Godber's reference (Supra, pp.36-37) to Mr. Khrushchev's statement. The part quoted by Mr. Godber is merely one of the sentences in the statement, but Mr. Khrushchev dealt more fully with the whole

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

question of co-existence with the capitalist states and reaffirmed that we stand for the principle of co-existence in deeds and that we have no intention of changing the position as between the two systems by any military means (ENDC/47, p.16). This was confirmed by Mr. Khrushchev and proves once more our fundamental peace-loving attitude in this matter. I do not wish to go into the statement as a whole, because as a matter of fact it dealt with entirely different questions.

But what Mr. Godber quoted from newspapers is a natural reaction to the stubborn unwillingness of the Western Powers to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. If the West does not follow the path of disarmament but threatens us with a preventive war, we must, of course, have not only the means to feed and house our population but also, unfortunately, powerful weapons. We are compelled to have them. Without them we cannot ensure the peaceful development of our everyday life and the building up of communism, which the Soviet Union has set about and for which the programme has been laid down in detail in the resolutions of the Twenty-second Congress of our Party. We are compelled to take into account with whom we are co-existing and what our opposite numbers are preparing for us if we are disarmed. We are compelled to take this into account, and we are compelled to have powerful armaments.

I think that that is a perfectly legitimate requirement for any government concerned with the interests of its people and the building up of its society. There is nothing odious in that, it seems to me. Therefore I think that Mr. Godber's remarks provide no cause for any alarm such as he tried to create in connexion with the single sentence which he quoted from Mr. Khrushchev's statement. On the contrary, we stress that although we have these powerful armaments -- rockets and nuclear bombs -- we nevertheless propose to the West that these powerful weapons should be eliminated in the very first stage of disarmament. We genuinely propose this. This is not just words; this is our document which is now being discussed in the Committee. Accept this proposal and we shall begin to destroy these powerful weapons at the same time as you do. Only not in such a way that we would start destroying them and you would take a look, as Mr. Burns suggests. No, let us together and simultaneously destroy all means of delivery of nuclear weapons. We are prepared to do this, although we now have these powerful weapons and have superiority in them.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

We suggest destroying them; but it is you who do not want that. Why then are you trying to frighten the peoples by pointing out that Mr. Khrushchev said he had nuclear weapons and powerful rockets? Certainly he has them. But we suggest destroying them in the first stage and you do not want to do that. You want to introduce gradually, over the course of a decade, what you call a progressive reduction, and moreover you leave completely vague the end of this process of reduction -- complete elimination. This is an indisputable fact: you do not want to include in a draft treaty the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and you leave obscure the question of what armaments will be at the disposal of troops or international armed forces.

In your proposals no definite time limit is laid down for the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons or of the nuclear weapons themselves. This too is an incontrovertible fact against which you can find nothing to say. It emerges clearly from your documents. We, however, suggest the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the very first stage, that is to say, precisely what Mr. Khrushchev mentioned in his statement at Kalinovka. We have these powerful nuclear weapons, but we suggest eliminating their means of delivery within the space of two years.

I now come to my last comment, which is in connexion with France's paternity, so to speak, of the proposal to eliminate all means of delivering nuclear weapons. This matter was dealt with at length during our last meeting, and various statements by Mr. Moch were quoted. Again today Mr. Burns put forward some quotations from Mr. Moch's statements (supra, pp.16-17), and he was quoting from documents which are not really a legitimate part of the records, because they concern a meeting of only five countries out of the ten -- that is half the Ten Nation Committee on 27 June 1960.

As we were informed some time ago by the Secretariat of the United Nations, this portion of the record is not regarded as a legitimate part of the proceedings, but a day or two after the Committee of Ten had finished their work it was published on the initiative, so to speak, of the Western Powers who were present at that meeting and insisted that the record should be published. I do not know in what form this and other records finally appeared in New York -- we ought by the way to ask the Secretariat about that -- but we were informed at the time that no final records would be published. I cannot venture to say whether it was actually published in New York or not. Anyway, the quotation put forward by Mr. Burns is

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

not from the records of an official meeting of the Ten-Nation Committee; it was a statement made by Mr. Moch after the end of the official session of the Ten-Nation Committee. However, that is of secondary importance, because Mr. Moch could have said that anywhere: he could have said it at his Press conference or anywhere else.

I want to draw your attention, however, to two points. First, what Mr. Tarabanov quoted in his statement today (supra, pp.26-27) confirms that Mr. Moch, too, at one time held the view that the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons was necessary.

Secondly, why should we quote Mr. Moch? Mr. Moch does not now represent the Government of France. Let us rather concern ourselves with the real head of the French Government, General de Gaulle. He is the President of France and is responsible for the whole policy of France; he expresses the intentions of France. Let us then read what General de Gaulle wrote to Mr. Khrushchev in answer to his message of 10 February 1962 -- that is, this year, just before the convening of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. General de Gaulle wrote as follows:

> "France has unceasingly advocated that the destruction, the banning and the control should first be applied to the means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- launching pads, planes, submarines, etc."

He therefore said that we should start with that. It seems to me that this is quite unambiguous for anyone who is not illiterate and can read the text. And after that General de Gaulle wrote:

> "Indeed it still appears possible today to detect these means; furthermore to abolish" -- not to cut down, but to abolish -- "these means would undoubtedly mean eliminating almost completely the nuclear danger itself".[1/]

Who, then, is the father of the proposal to destroy nuclear delivery vehicles? I think that any court that had to decide the question of paternity would say General de Gaulle. He is the father of this proposal. We do not claim to be the father; that is why we said we accepted the proposal made by General de Gaulle to Mr. Khrushchev during the latter's stay in France in 1960. We have given that proposal concrete form in our proposals, in our draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. You will say that France is not we who are meeting here. That is a different matter. France is absent, its seat is empty. But the paternity of this proposal is perfectly obvious, as may be seen from General de Gaulle's statement.

1/ Le Monde, 21 February 1962, p.6, col.6.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

General de Gaulle advocated and was still advocating in February 1962 that a start should be made with the destruction, prohibition and control of the means of launching nuclear weapons -- that is where a start should be made. If you have not got the document concerning this, I can give you a copy of his letter and you can examine it carefully. The fact is that France advocated and still advocates the destruction, prohibition and control of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and suggests that that should be the beginning, but other Western Powers which are present here are against it.

Those are my answers to the questions that have been raised today.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): May I just say one word in reply to what the Soviet representative has said with regard to my previous comments? A famous Englishman once said that a political leader needs an able man to write his speeches for him, and a still abler man to explain them away.

Reverting to my position as Chairman, there are still three more names on my list of speakers, and I would hope we might get in at least one more speech. I ask the representative of Brazil if he would now like to address us.

Mr. CASTRO (Brazil): My intervention will be very brief. My delegation wishes to address an earnest appeal to the representative of the nuclear Powers for renewed and strenuous efforts to come to an agreement on a test ban. They should approach that task in a spirit of compromise, mutual concessions and constructive realism. We view this problem as by far the most urgent on our agenda and, as we have said, we are prepared to give it first and absolute priority.

The announcement of the first explosion in the new Soviet nuclear test series, which we deeply regret and deplore, makes it all the more urgent for us to make progress in this matter. We agree one hundred per cent with the points of view expressed by the representative of Burma at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.65, p.14) and the representative of Nigeria today (supra, pp.37 et seq.) to the effect that we will not be able to make progress in the general field of disarmament until we agree on a test ban. This shooting cannot go on for ever. Let us agree on a cease fire. That is what it really amounts to -- a cease fire -- for how can we build peace on the moving sands of tests, amid all this actual shooting going on on both sides?

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

It is not our intention to pin down or single out responsibilities. If the three Powers do not come to an agreement at the earliest, all of them will be guilty -- or, rather, all of us, for all eighteen of us have some responsibility in this matter.

We thus express the hope that, in spite of the present difficulties, the informal negotiations now taking place, among the nuclear Powers -- negotiations which were referred to by Mr. Dean (Supra, p. 5) and Mr. Zorin (Supra, p.40) -- will move us closer to the cease fire, for I do not think it possible for world public opinion to take our efforts on the drafting of articles of an eventual treaty for general and complete disarmament seriously if we cannot even agree on the more direct, clear-cut and extremely urgent issue of a cease fire.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I have still two more speakers on my list. The next is the representative of India. May I ask him if he would like to address the Conference now?

Mr. LALL (India): I will defer most of my statement to another day, but I should like to have your permission, Mr. Chairman, to say two or three words simply on the matter of tests.

I should like to endorse all that has been said today by the representatives of Nigeria and Brazil. We are deeply concerned about the situation that exists, and is developing, in the matter of nuclear tests. We do not wish to attach blame, as the representative of Brazil has said, but we feel it our duty to say that it seems to us that unless the nuclear Powers can reach agreement on stopping tests now the armaments race will reach a new pitch of acceleration. We have recently read of activities connected with germ warfare; we have recently read of activities relating to the launching of other vessels on the high seas carrying new types of missiles and rockets; and it is obvious that if we cannot secure the cessation of nuclear tests today the acceleration of the armaments race is going to assume proportions which will defeat all human calculation, and that will be a situation which will make a change to a peaceful world extremely difficult -- in fact, perhaps, illusory.

It is a matter of such deep concern that words are not able to match this concern which we feel. We also are responsible, as the representative of Brazil has said, and we also are potential sufferers, potential victims, unless this race is brought to an end. We must appeal fervently, urgently and earnestly to Mr. Zorin

(Mr. Lall, India)

and Mr. Dean to reach agreement. It will not help them or us, or the world, if after their talks they are reduced to telling us the reasons why they could not agree. Agreement is essential, and it should be clear to them -- and they are both far-sighted, reasonable men -- that the absence of an agreement now will lead to a situation which will augment enormously the difficulties that we face in this Committee in achieving our goal of a peaceful world.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I still have on my list the representative of Czechoslovakia. Does he wish to add anything at this stage?

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): In view of the late hour I would ask to be put on the list for our next meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I am sure we are all grateful for that decision. I have a request from the representative of the United States to be allowed to make a very short intervention in exercise of the right to reply. I therefore call on the representative of the United States.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with the greatest of interest to the statements made this morning by the representatives of Nigeria, Brazil and India. When Mr. Zorin was speaking about our talks of yesterday afternoon he said -- this was probably a question of the interpretation -- that I had said that they were positive. What I actually said was that they were helpful. I did not mean to indicate that we had agreed upon anything. I wish we had, but I did not mean to indicate that. Mr. Zorin was most kind to see me on a Sunday afternoon, for which I am very grateful. We did have what to me at least was a most useful talk, and we plan to see each other again today. I want to assure all representatives here that we are deeply conscious of the responsibilities that lie upon us, and that we will do everything within our power to bring about agreement.

As I have said before, we find the eight nation memorandum (ENDC/28) a most useful and constructive document. We have found it most helpful in our work. But I am very sure that what the members of the Conference want is to have Mr. Zorin

(Mr. Dean, United States)

and myself reach an agreement that will be constructive and useful, and I am sure that none of our colleagues will be too critical of us if we do not reach agreement within the precise details of the eight nation memorandum. We shall do our level best, however, to reach an agreement and we shall keep the Committee fully advised of our conversations.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its sixty-sixth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Godber, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Canada, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Nigeria, the Soviet Union, Brazil and India.

"The United States delegation tabled amendments[1/] to the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, relating to the production of armaments in stage I.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 8 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

1/ ENDC/30/Add.1