

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE  
ENDC/PV.51  
7 June 1962  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 7 June 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. TARABANOV

(Bulgaria)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U Tin MLUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. E. PEPICH

Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HAMID

Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K.K. RAO

Mr. G.D. COMMAR

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGLIATI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. B.P. KRASULIN  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. G. EL-ABD  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT  
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. R. STURGILL

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I declare open the fifty-first meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Before proceeding to the main theme of our statement today, the Soviet delegation would like to make two comments on the statements of the Western representatives at the meeting of 6 June (ENDC/PV.50).

In connexion with our reply to the statement of the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, concerning alleged difficulties in control over the elimination and destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and of the nuclear weapons themselves, again reverted to the question of setting up a committee of experts (*ibid.*, p. 11). Mr. Godber, if we understand his remarks rightly, does not clearly comprehend our attitude to technical experts, although we have already availed ourselves of the opportunity to put forward our views on this subject; it seems that we shall have to do so again. The real obstacle to reaching agreement, as emerges with particular clarity just now, is represented not by differences or difficulties on technical problems, but by differences on basic questions of principle regarding the very substance of disarmament.

The Soviet Union, as is well known, proposes the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage, and nuclear weapons themselves at the second stage (ENDC/2). We have explained in detail why it is necessary to proceed in this way, and adduced arguments which the Western representatives did not refute. Instead, the Western delegations proposed a percentage cut in the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, which does not, however, eliminate the risk of a nuclear attack in the first, second, or third stage, i.e. over a period of no less than ten years under the United States plan (ENDC/30). With regard to nuclear weapons themselves, the United States proposals provide no safeguard that they will be eliminated and prohibited at all.

The representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, tried in vain yesterday to make out that my statement was a form of agreement on our part with the general approach contained in the United States outline to the matter of elimination of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.50, p. 32). This is not so. And if Mr. Stelle will carefully study yesterday's record, he will see that I said nothing about common aims in the two plans, nor did I say that we accept the provisions of the United States plan concerning elimination of nuclear weapons; on the contrary, what I

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in fact said yesterday was that, right until the end, the United States plan does not, in substance, propose or ensure the elimination of nuclear weapons (ibid., p.15).

There is every reason to think that, under the proposals of the Western Powers, nuclear weapons will be preserved even after general and complete disarmament, the only difference being that they will be assigned to the international armed forces - although it is not yet clear where they will be located. Here there is a serious difference, and one which hinders agreement.

In this connexion, one must ask what assistance might be gained from the work of any group of experts if we have not reached agreement on whether nuclear weapons are to be prohibited and eliminated at all. On the contrary, one might reasonably fear that this fundamental political dispute, which has not been resolved in the Committee, would in effect be transferred to the group of experts - which will clearly not help matters. A basis for really useful and fruitful work by experts can be formed only when we have reached firm agreement here on the basic aspects of the disarmament programme which are at present at issue between the two sides. Yet yesterday's statement by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, emphasised once again the profound difference between our positions on such a key question of disarmament as the elimination of nuclear weapons.

When earlier in the discussion we pointed out that the United States proposals on the second stage of disarmament do not provide an effective reduction of nuclear weapons themselves, our conclusions were disputed. Nevertheless, as the discussion proceeds, we are more and more confirmed in the rightness of our analysis of the United States proposals. We were much helped in this by Mr. Dean himself, who confirmed that the United States proposals for a percentage cut in the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and certain categories of conventional arms do not basically affect the military potential of the United States and its capacity to carry out first, second and subsequent nuclear strikes (ENDC/PV.45, p.6). This made matters a good deal clearer.

Once again we must express our gratitude to the United States representative, in this case Mr. Stelle, who yesterday shed light on the second stage of the United States plan also, confirming our conclusion that, in effect, it does not envisage the reduction of nuclear weapons. Recalling that in the first stage the United States intends some reduction in fissionable materials, Mr. Stelle said yesterday:

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"In stage II we make further attacks on this problem with a further reduction of fissionable material stockpiles, and we begin to attack the direct question of nuclear weapons through registration of such weapons. In stage III we call for their elimination". (ENDC/PV.50, p.33)

It is now clear to the Committee that in the second stage the United States does not reduce nuclear weapons but merely studies the matter, and only in the third stage proceeds to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is the true picture hidden behind the vague wording regarding the second stage in the United States document.

These are the remarks which I felt I had to make before proceeding to the main theme of our discussion today. At today's meeting the Soviet delegation intends to deal with the third and final stage of general and complete disarmament. While explaining the provisions of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Government, we shall also deal with the relevant sections of the United States proposals.

The tasks of the third stage of disarmament are set out in article 30 of our draft (ENDC/2, p. 20). They consist of undertakings by States fully to disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of their military machines. This will comprise: the completion of the elimination of armed forces and remaining conventional armaments; the cessation of military production; the abolition of military establishments; the abolition of military conscription and military training; the prohibition of the appropriation of funds for military purposes. These measures are to be completed within a specified time-limit. The Soviet Government proposes a time-limit of one year for the third stage.

The fulfilment of the third-stage obligations under the Soviet proposals will result in a situation in which the States will no longer have the means of waging war and the danger of war will be finally eliminated. For the maintenance of order States will merely have at their disposal limited, agreed contingents of police or militia, equipped with light firearms.

Turning to the United States outline of basic provisions for a treaty, we find no clear delineation of third-stage tasks. It must be said that in general the third stage in the United States proposals is very imprecise. It is not merely that no specific time-limit is proposed for the stage, although even this fact alone robs the third stage obligations of their effectiveness; apart from this,

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the United States introduces a number of reservations which in fact rule out the possibility of achieving general and complete disarmament.

In our draft treaty a specific procedure for accomplishment of the third stage is proposed. Under Article 31, the States parties to the treaty will first disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament and completely abolish the system of military reserves. Secondly, they will destroy all armaments, military equipment and munitions remaining at their disposal, whether held by troops or in depots. All military equipment and munitions which cannot be converted to peaceful uses will be destroyed. All this will be carried out under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization, whose inspectors will exercise control over the disbanding of troops and the destruction of material resources and also control the conversion to peaceful uses of transport and other non-combat equipment, barracks, auxiliary premises and depots, training and proving grounds, and so forth. At this stage of disarmament the International Disarmament Organization will have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the treaty.

The elimination of the remaining armed forces and armaments will be simultaneously accompanied by the cessation of military production. Article 32 of the Soviet draft treaty provides for the discontinuance of military production at factories and plants, except for the manufacture of agreed types and quantities of light firearms required for arming units of the police (militia) contingents retained by States parties to the treaty for the purposes of maintaining internal order and complying with their obligations in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter. This article also provides that factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and other specialized equipment destroyed, and the premises and general-purpose machine tools converted to peaceful uses.

In addition,

"All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the production of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination, shall be destroyed.



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"All orders placed by military departments for the production of armaments, military equipment, munitions and material with national or foreign Government-owned enterprises and private firms shall be annulled". (ENDC/2, p. 21)

The United States outline does not contain similarly clear and strict provisions. It does not define the procedure and methods for eliminating armed forces and armaments and confines itself to references to non-existent annexes. At the same time, some of the expressions used in the United States document create serious doubts as to whether actual liquidation of the military machinery of States will be achieved. Thus, in Section B, paragraph 2 (b), "Armed Forces", reference is made, in addition to the retention of certain armed forces for the maintenance of internal order, to the "subsequent establishment" of additional armed forces or organizational arrangements, about which the United States does not disclose its intentions. However, it is clear that this may conceal a loophole for the build-up of new armed forces.

The phrasing of the United States document where it concerns armament production is full of reservations. With regard to the most dangerous type of weapon - nuclear weapons of mass destruction - the United States proposals in fact aim to preserve these even after the third stage - that is, to perpetuate them. The statements in the United States document on the elimination of nuclear weapons are mere empty words, since everything is made dependent on this business of study by experts of the question of control. Need one stress that, if there is no wish to put an end to nuclear weapons, the result of such a study can be easily predicted? In any event the United States' refusal to stipulate in the treaty that the international armed forces shall not possess nuclear weapons, as was clearly stated in the Committee here, speaks for itself.

In the discussion on the first and second stage the Western delegations accused the Soviet Union of concentrating too much on dismantling foreign military bases at the expense of national ones. A comparison of the proposals on the third stage in the two plans further underlines the ambiguous position of the United States and its Western allies on this question. The Soviet Union envisages completion of the dismantling of national military bases in the third stage. The United States, as appears from Section D, paragraph 1, "Military bases and facilities", intends to keep military bases and certain military facilities.

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The draft treaty proposed by us pays great attention to the dismantling of military installations. This is no accident. One cannot consider a military machine completely liquidated if war ministries and general staffs - the controlling bodies of this machine - in any way survive.

On this assumption we believe that in the last stage of disarmament all military controlling bodies should be completely eliminated in whatever form they may exist in the various States. In the past we have already encountered opposition on this matter on the part of the Western Powers, which have stubbornly refused to state unequivocally the need to accompany the liquidation of armed forces with elimination of all bodies connected with the control of those forces. In this regard such groundless arguments have been adduced as, for instance, that control of the remaining units of police militia, and the organization of their recruitment and training would require staffs, schools, and so forth. We have already given explanations on this subject.

It is well known that in the vast majority of countries at present police, gendarmerie, militia and even frontier-guard units are not controlled by war ministries and hence certainly have no connexion with general staffs with regard to the functions which they discharge. Likewise, in a future disarmed world the retention of military organs to control units of police (militia), including those seconded for duty to the United Nations, will not be necessary. This function will be successfully handled by the appropriate civilian ministries and authorities.

It is necessary to recall in this connexion that the elimination of military control bodies was fully reflected in the Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations issued jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union and approved by the General Assembly. This document provides that the programme of general and complete disarmament should contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishments of every nation, for:

".... Abolishment of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;"

(ENDC/5, p. 2)

Strictly adhering to this principle, our draft treaty sets out in detail the procedure for the abolition of military institutions. Article 33 provides that at the third stage of general and complete disarmament:

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"... War ministries, general staffs and all other military and para-military organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States parties to the Treaty shall be abolished". (ENDC/2, p. 21)

With this object in view the States parties to the treaty will demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations, abrogate all legislative acts, rules and regulations governing their structure and operation, and destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilization and the operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war. In addition we believe it to be necessary that the States party to the treaty should enact, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. All this is set out in detail in Article 34 of our draft.

In contrast to this we would point out that in the United States outline of basic provisions of a disarmament treaty the question of the elimination of military control bodies, the discontinuance of military training in any form and the closing down of all military training establishments appears in a very vague form. The United States limits itself to a general reference in section B, paragraph 1, to the liquidation of military establishments, without specifying their nature. But Articles 33 and 34 of the Soviet draft treaty leave no room for any mis-interpretation.

At this last stage of disarmament the Soviet draft treaty (article 35) provides for a complete discontinuance of the appropriation

".... of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from government bodies or private individuals and public organizations ... " (ENDC/2, p. 22). This measure, the implementation of which, as of all the others, will be ensured through effective inspection by the international disarmament organization, will remove all economic incentive to any attempt to evade the fulfilment of obligations incumbent on States parties to the disarmament treaty. The Soviet delegation has already dealt with this question in detail before, and for this reason we need not go further into the matter.

These are the third-stage disarmament measures provided in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union.

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From a comparison of the provisions of the treaty submitted by the Soviet Government with those of the United States outline, it is not difficult to see which comprises effective and genuine obligations ensuring the carrying out of general and complete disarmament, and which proposes nebulous schemes devoid of any guarantee as to their implementation. In the discussion on the second stage of disarmament and the document on Part I (ENDC/40/Rev.1), the Committee obtained the first indications that the United States, although professing support for elimination of nuclear weapons, is not in fact prepared to accept this. Study of the third stage in the United States draft confirms this attitude of the United States in full measure.

I shall now offer a few remarks on measures to safeguard the security of States and to maintain international peace.

At recent meetings of the Committee a definite policy on the part of the Western delegations has been noted with regard to the matter of safeguarding the security of States during the disarmament process. An artificial forcing of this question appears to be taking place. In the statements of the Western representatives a definite distortion of view is discernible. The fact that disarmament itself will be the surest and most certain means of securing peace and the security of States is disregarded. When the means of waging war are destroyed, when States dispose of neither armies nor armaments, no one will be able to start a war and no one will be able to apply force or the threat of force in international relations. On the other hand, no measures of security have or can have any real significance if large armies are maintained together with nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery.

Incidentally this is one further reason for the lack of realism in the United States programme, which leaves States in possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery at all three stages. Under such conditions, let us consider what would be the value, from the security point of view, of the international armed forces which the United States intends to create in the second stage. Will they be able to halt a militarily powerful State? Obviously not, since they will be opposed by nuclear weapons and the only thing which could happen would be the provocation of a nuclear war. Perhaps it is for this reason that the United States wishes to equip the international armed forces with nuclear weapons. If so, the result is still nuclear war.

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Surely this is not the purpose of a disarmament programme. Surely people do not care whether they perish in a nuclear war occurring between two or three States or in one fought between some State and international armed forces armed with nuclear weapons. The solution of the problem of safeguarding peace and security should be sought not in artificial, abortive schemes but in a speedy, decisive and resolute disarmament, carried to its final conclusion, particularly with regard to basic armaments -- the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons themselves. Then additional measures will make sense, and our draft treaty supplies them.

Chapter X of our draft is devoted to these measures. Article 36 provides that:

"... the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have, after the complete abolition of armed forces, strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms." (ENDC/2, page 23)

The strength of these contingents for each State party to the Treaty will have to be agreed by us, taking into account just criteria and basing ourselves thereon. Yesterday the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, raised this question (ENDC/PV.50, p. 40). It of course requires discussion, and agreement will be needed as to what criteria will govern the strength of police (militia) contingents.

With regard to the manufacture of arms for these contingents, article 36 confines manufacture to "... strictly limited quantities of light firearms ...". Here it is provided that the list of plants producing such arms, their quotas and types for each party to the treaty shall be specified in an agreement. All these measures will be controlled by inspectors of the international disarmament organization. (ENDC/2, page 23)

The placing of units of police (militia) at the disposal of the Security Council will be carried out under the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. All States parties to the treaty must, on the request of the Security Council, not only place at its disposal such units but also provide them with assistance and facilities, including rights of passage. The States parties to the treaty must maintain in a state of immediate readiness that part of the police (militia) units which is intended for joint international enforcement action. This incidentally answers the doubts of certain Western representatives that there might be delay in bringing such armed forces into action. Such doubts are groundless. Both the size of the police (militia) units placed at the

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disposal of the Security Council, as well as the areas where they are stationed, will be specified in agreements to be concluded by the States parties to the treaty with the Security Council, as provided under the United Nations Charter.

The command of the police (militia) units placed at the disposal of the Security Council will be made up of representatives of the three principal groups of States actually existing in the world today on the basis of equal representation, which will ensure justice and impartiality in the actions of these forces in settling international conflicts.

The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament accords an important place to measures to prevent the re-establishment of armed forces in disarmed States. These control measures are set out in article 38 of our draft. On this question we have two aspects in mind. First, we propose to subject to strict control by the international disarmament organization the police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the treaty with the object of verifying compliance with the obligations in regard to the strength, armament and location of these contingents and also of revealing substantial movements of police (militia) units. Secondly, we believe it necessary that the International Disarmament Organization should ensure effective control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments, for which purpose it should have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the treaty. In addition our draft treaty -- and this is also reflected in article 38 -- accords the International Disarmament Organization the right to institute aerial control, both in the form of aerial inspection and aerial photography, over the territories of States parties to the treaty.

These are the measures on disarmament and control which are proposed for implementation under the Soviet draft treaty in the third and final stage of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I do not propose to make a speech this morning, and particularly I do not propose to follow the representative of the Soviet Union into the realms of stage III. I think we have scarcely concluded discussion on stage II, and I shall certainly want to say one or two more words at a later meeting in relation to that stage before we leave it.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I am not at all sure that it really helps us if one delegation goes ahead, without consultation with the others, to discuss another stage. I think it rather tends to confuse our discussions. However, that is what the representative of the Soviet Union has chosen to do. I do not wish to make a point of this, but that is the reason why I am not going to comment on what he said in the body of his speech this morning.

I have asked to speak primarily for this reason: I was particularly interested yesterday in the response of the representative of the Soviet Union to the speech I had made at that meeting. I put a considered question to him at the end of yesterday's debate, to which he promised to reply this morning. He has done me the courtesy of giving that reply, and I am grateful to him for that. But I am afraid I am not terribly encouraged by the reply he has given. Perhaps I could refresh my colleague's memory with the exact position.

I posed what we in the United Kingdom delegation regard as very real problems, problems which I do not think it helps to seek to ignore or belittle or, as it were, to brush under the rug, out of the way. I suggested ways in which we might try to face up to them.

When our Soviet colleague replied yesterday, he made one or two comments which I thought sounded not too unhelpful. Perhaps I could just recall two different passages of his speech. He said:

"You have merely criticized difficulties which you have seen in the solution of the problems of elimination of the means of delivery and elimination of nuclear weapons. At all events, as you see these difficulties, let us consider together how they may be overcome ..."

(ENDC/PV.50, p.16)

That seemed to be conciliatory and helpful, and I was very glad to hear it. At a later stage in his speech he said:

"Firm obligations within concrete time-limits, as set forth in our draft, provide a secure basis for the effective elimination of the possibility of carrying out nuclear strikes in the first stage and for the complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war as a result of implementation of the second stage, when nuclear weapons themselves will go to the scrapheap. If Mr. Godber has today doubts about the feasibility and controllability of this, let us consider how we can settle them." (ibid., pp. 21).

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I thought these were encouraging words. Therefore it was to clarify just what our Soviet colleague meant that at the end of the morning I asked this simple question of him:

"Is he, by saying that we should discuss these matters together, not only recognizing the problem but expressing willingness to establish such a committee of experts as I suggested, for the reasons I gave this morning? If he is, that is an important step forward and I would like to be clear that that is what Mr. Zorin envisages. If he does not, I do not really understand the meaning of those words he used." (ibid., p. 46)

What has Mr. Zorin told me this morning? He has told me that I was alleging certain difficulties and that I had said the Soviet position was not clear. Then he said that the true obstacles on the road to agreement are differences not on technical matters, but on matters of principle. And he dwelt on this fundamental difference. He said "What help can we expect from a group of experts? It would be a case of handing the political problem over to experts. This is no good."

He then went on, as it seemed to me, to confuse the issue -- I am sure not intentionally -- by talking about the Western position, and in particular the position of the United States, on the elimination of nuclear weapons. He sought to imply that the Western position on this was that we wished to see the retention of nuclear weapons after the end of the programme of general and complete disarmament. He is, of course, perfectly well aware that in the third stage of the United States plan there is a clear provision that:

"... the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal ..." (ENDC/30 page 29)

It is quite evident that there is no thought or intention on the part of the United States or anyone on the Western side that nuclear weapons should be retained by States at the end of the disarmament process. Indeed, to think of doing so would be nonsense. It merely confuses the issue to try to drag in these references.

But, to confuse it further, our Soviet colleague goes on to talk about the United States position in regard to the United Nations peace force. He claims that it is the definite view of the United States, and presumably of the Western Powers generally, that the United Nations peace force should retain and have possession of nuclear weapons. I think it has been made abundantly clear by our United States colleague -- there is scarcely any need for me to repeat it -- that in fact no



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decision of any sort has been taken, no view has been formed, on this very important matter. I doubt whether any of us really wants to see the extension of these weapons in any form after the end of the process of general and complete disarmament.

But the point which we have to face is whether some unscrupulous State would be retaining or seeking to retain some of these weapons. I posed the question yesterday very clearly to show the great difficulties in checking whether in fact it had. If there is a real danger of that happening, we have got to decide at some stage in our discussions here what the extent of that danger is and whether we, the nations round this table, feel on the whole that it would be wise, perhaps for a limited period, to retain within the ambit of the United Nations peace force some deterrent in this form. No decision by any delegation, as far as I am aware, has been taken on this. Obviously it is a matter that would require the gravest consideration from us all. But this is the point: the Soviet Union is seeking to say that the United States in particular, and the West as a whole, are taking this position at the present time.

But the whole point of my desire to set up some form of expert committee to look into this matter is the very involved nature of the problem and the tremendous complications that exist. How are we to take a political decision on a matter so vital as this until we have the facts clearly expressed before us? I do not suggest for one moment that we delegate political decisions to committees of experts. As a politician I rather like taking political decisions myself. I have no desire to delegate that authority. But I have every desire -- and I think that we should all have the desire round this table -- to be given clear and factual information on just what the problem is.

That was what I was seeking in the proposals I put forward yesterday. I was seeking to expose the difficulties of the problem, which I do not think, frankly, have been fully realized, and to find a way to overcome them. It seemed to me that some form of expert discussion could do nothing in any way to harm our discussions, and could well help us to reach at the right moment the appropriate and correct political decision.

Our Soviet colleague this morning, in seeking, as it seemed to me, to blur the issue in this way, was in fact rejecting the suggestion I had put forward. I think that is a very retrograde step. I think it is very unfortunate that he should do so. I submit that he cannot deny the existence and the complicated

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

nature of this problem. How can he deny them? If he does not deny the complicated nature of this problem, then he must agree that some way of overcoming it must be found. If all nations that have these ghastly weapons are going to divest themselves of them, they have to be assured that others are doing the same; and, for the reasons I gave yesterday, we have to face up to the difficulties which this involves.

So, as I understand it, the argument used by our Soviet colleague this morning does not stand up to examination at all. It is no good for him to say that we are seeking to hand over political decisions to experts. We are not seeking to do anything of the sort. We are seeking to get a clear exposition of the extent of the problem so that we can take the correct decisions on it. That is the Western position, and I should have thought it was a very reasonable position.

Having dealt with the technical aspect, I would come back now to the words that Mr. Zorin used. May I remind my colleagues once more that he said:

"...As you see these difficulties, let us consider together how they may be overcome." (ENDC/PV.50, p. 16)

He said later:

"If Mr. Godber has today any doubts about the feasibility and controllability of this, and about the possibility of controlling all this adequately, let us consider how we can settle them." (ibid., p. 21)

All right. He has rejected -- I think most unwisely, and I hope he will reconsider it -- the idea of expert discussion. But, if he said these words having already in his mind rejected the concept of expert discussion, what did he mean? Did he mean some special, closer, form of political discussion among us? I do not think anyone could really say that our discussions in plenary meetings round this table constitute in fact putting our minds together and really getting down to the problem. I think we are too prone to make speeches at one another. Is he therefore suggesting some new form of contacts, some informal contacts where we can make more progress and really thrash out the political issues involved here? I have indicated that I think there are primary, practical difficulties to solve first, but I am all for closer political consideration and more informal discussion.

Presumably Mr. Zorin had some thought in his mind when he uttered these words. I am sure he was not seeking merely to fob me off with words; I am sure he would not do that. Therefore I assume he had something in mind. He has rejected the first interpretation that I had hoped he had in mind in relation to the setting up

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

of a committee of experts. I invite him now to tell me what he really did mean by those words. It might help us forward if, when he cares to intervene again, he expressed himself more clearly. If he is suggesting some closer consultation in which we can really get down to things, I shall welcome it. I am only too glad to welcome any suggestions from Mr. Zorin if it is possible for me to do so.

Mr. LALL (India): The last few days of discussion have tended to centre on the important, the crucial question of nuclear weapons and how to deal with them in the disarmament plan we are to formulate.

May I first point out that in the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) the disarmament programme is set out in paragraph 3? This disarmament programme has five points, running from (a) to (e). All these five points concern nuclear weapons. Two are specifically and entirely devoted to nuclear weapons, and of course other weapons of mass destruction, and their elimination -- that is, (b) and (c) --, while (a), (d) and (e) concern weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, other armaments, and other facilities. The point I am making here -- and we have not yet drawn attention to it in our consideration of the question of nuclear weapons -- is that all five points in the disarmament programme touch on this question of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and this is not so with regard to conventional armaments and weapons. Thus we are correct, I believe, in drawing the conclusion that when this Joint Statement was drawn up the authors -- that is, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union who are here and some of their colleagues -- attached particular importance to the elimination of nuclear weapons. That is very clear from the programme of disarmament.

Now, we approach this subject in the same spirit as does this Joint Statement. To us the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is of primary significance. That is why -- I say this frankly and I hope I shall not be misunderstood -- it has been a matter of great concern to us that there has seemed to be some hesitation regarding nuclear weapons at the end of the plan: that is to say, leaving the possibility of giving nuclear weapons to the United Nations peace force. I should like to reiterate that my delegation could not agree to that proposition in any circumstances. We could not agree to these weapons of mass destruction, which in their primitive stage wrought havoc, whose effects are still being felt at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, being ever used again.

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We should like to make this position absolutely clear. These weapons, which in a primitive stage of development caused such devastation, must not be used again, and we should not be able to agree to the possession by the United Nations force of such weapons. We think -- and I should like to state this -- that such retention would be totally contrary to the Joint Principles. How could it be possible for the programme of general and complete disarmament to be achieved in terms of paragraph 3 of the Joint Principles if nuclear weapons of all kinds and weapons of mass destruction were not totally eliminated? The Joint Statement says they are to be eliminated, so it is not possible in terms of that Statement either to leave such a possibility open.

I want to make one other point extremely clear, and I would request the representative of the United States kindly to take this into account. We have never doubted that the United States envisages in its plan the full elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of all States. I should like to refer to what Mr. Dean said on 5 June in the early part of his speech:

"... the continued possession of nuclear weapons by any nation must be incompatible with general and complete disarmament. In fact, possession of such weapons by a supposedly disarmed State would amount to a contradiction in terms." (ENDC/PV.49, p.33)

He said a little later in the same statement:

"There is a complete identity between the Soviet Union and the United States on the point that there should not be any nationally-held nuclear arms." (ibid.)

We have always known that to be the United States position; we have never doubted it; and we realize that the United States does intend that there should be full elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all States. We should like to make that quite clear, because we do not share doubts which are sometimes expressed around this table to the effect that the United States has other intentions regarding nuclear weapons. We do not share these doubts at all. We are fully satisfied that it is fully the intention of the United States to put an end to all such weapons in all national arsenals.

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Further on Mr. Dean said -- and his statement seemed to indicate some misunderstanding of my position which I should like to set right at once:

"Mr. Lall suggested on 1 June that the Western plan did not provide for a progressive squeezing down across the board of all arms components to zero, as we have claimed ..." (ibid., p. 34).

I should like to say straightaway that, as I have just pointed out, I have never doubted that the United States plan was squeezing down nuclear weapons to zero. But that was not my point. My point was that the rate at which this squeezing-down is taking place not the same for all types of armaments. I must confess that, although the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States have dwelt upon this point and tried to answer me -- and I have been predisposed to be convinced by them --, I find that I am not convinced.

The plain fact is that the United States plan does not attack the question of chemical and biological weapons until stage II. There is no question of any cut in the first stage. Therefore, from that element alone, there is an imbalance in favour of weapons of mass destruction.

The second plain fact is that in the first stage no inventory is to be taken of nuclear weapons: that will not happen until the end of the second stage. There is no plain, straightforward statement that on the basis of the inventory we will cut nuclear weapons by 30 per cent and we will cut them again in the second stage by 50 per cent of the remainder.

Therefore I am afraid that the absolutely inescapable conclusion is that the rate at which armaments are brought down is not across the board. I must, with great respect, point this out to the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. I wish I could think differently, but I do not see how I can, no matter how much I study the documents before us.

In that connexion, referring to stage II, Mr. Stelle said:

"To ensure that appropriate reduction was accomplished during stage II in all armaments, the United States treaty outline provides that all parties to the treaty would submit to the international disarmament organization a declaration of their inventories, existing at the beginning of stage II, of the types of armaments in categories additional to those declared in stage I."

(ENDC/PV.50, p. 37)

(Mr. Lall, India)

Making a different point, I admit that in the second stage the United States plan does, of course, cut down nuclear weapons to some extent and that it does make some cut in chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. But, again, I am afraid that this formulation is not entirely accurate, because a certain number of small arms remain which are not cut in stage II. Let us face that fact.

I am labouring this point because I want to make it clear beyond doubt that the United States plan does not maintain the military mix as it exists today; it does not maintain the pattern. This is perfectly clear, and it is a point of some importance. Mr. Cavalletti said on 5 June -- and it was an interesting comment -- that it was impossible in practice to have, in the course of the same disarmament stage, partial control and total control (ENDC/PV.49, p. 32). I think we should all bear that interesting point in mind. This is one of the difficulties in dealing with partial and total measures. But if one delves deeply into that thought, and if it does mean that there cannot be different rates of disarmament in one stage -- which I think is what he had in mind --, then I would submit to him that that point applies to both plans. There is not the same rate for weapons reduction all the way through either plan.

Referring again to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles: as I said, all the five points of the programme touch on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, while only three of them touch on conventional weapons. Therefore it is surely incongruous, to say the least, that the disarmament plan should proceed faster with reference to conventional weapons and slower with reference to nuclear weapons.

Speaking frankly, the present Western plan allows, at the very least, one-quarter, one-third, even one-half of the nuclear weapons to exist far into the third stage of the disarmament plan. As we are speaking very frankly here, I think we should remind ourselves that over five years ago, having given up his post as General in charge of weapons development in the United States Army, General Gavin, the present United States Ambassador to France, appeared on a Columbia Broadcasting System national television hook-up and said that, if the United States and the Soviet Union were to drop all their nuclear weapons on the North Pole -- not on any particular target --, enough radioactivity and other forms of turmoil would result to destroy the whole world. He was the person most intimately connected with weapons development in the United States, and he must have known what he was talking

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about. Records are kept of these CBS "Meet the Press" telecasts, and I am sure that General Gavin's statement is available in the CBS office in New York.

Since General Gavin said that -- over five years ago --, there has been an accelerated development of more devastating types of nuclear weapons. It seems quite clear that even towards the end of the third stage, if we were to proceed in the manner proposed in one of the plans, there would be enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world.

We cannot conceive of this as compatible with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, in which the emphasis is placed heavily on the elimination of nuclear weapons. We cannot see that this fits in with the Joint Principles, which have been accepted primarily by the two great Powers and then by all the Members of the United Nations.

Therefore it is with this sort of background that we approach the problem of nuclear weapons. I repeat that we have never been of the view that the United States plan does not take nuclear weapons down to zero for all national arsenals. We have always known that to be the case, and we have never doubted it.

Since I am now talking about the clarification of certain misunderstandings, I should like to refer to two parts of Mr. Zorin's statement of 6 June which concerned myself. Mr. Zorin said:

" ... we cannot agree with the assertion of the representative of India, Mr. Lall, that we have paid insufficient attention to control over weapons plants." (ENDC/PV.50, p. 28)

May I say, with great respect, that I am glad Mr. Zorin has tried to indicate that in the Soviet plan there is control over enterprises producing armaments? I am very glad of that. It has been our view, and it is still my view, that neither of these plans before us goes far enough in this particular matter. That is our view. We may be mistaken. We have an open mind about this, and if these plans do go far enough, so much the better. But we hope ourselves to return to this matter, because we think it is of great importance; and perhaps we shall have certain suggestions to make about it.

I should like to refer to another point in Mr. Zorin's statement. A little later on, speaking of the Security Council and the international disarmament organization, he said:

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"We agree with the remark of the representative of India that:

' ... there would be nothing in this disarmament plan which could supersede the fundamental procedures of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, we have not received powers to modify the United Nations Charter'". (ENDC/PV.50, pp.29, 30)

I would like to add that in view of that fact -- with which of course we agree -- we believe that it is not necessary to mention the United Nations Charter in detail, section by section, in the disarmament plan. That is why I had suggested, and I still suggest, that in article 40 of the Soviet plan it might not be necessary to refer to the powers of the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations.

Now may I come to some very important matters concerning nuclear disarmament? I come to them through the very helpful statement which Mr. Godber made yesterday and in which he clarified some of the technical issues involved. I find that sort of statement valuable, because we must face these issues. I entirely agree with Mr. Godber that we cannot possibly try and get round them just by thinking that they do not exist, and by giving that impression. I see that he said yesterday:

" ... I am certain that no responsible government can afford to take any risks, at least until it has thoroughly considered every aspect of the problem and has convinced itself of the wisdom of its action in doing so." (ibid., p.8)

He repeated that thought more than once, and I should like to say that I understand and appreciate the sentiment it conveys. I agree with it generally. I might not myself have formulated it quite in that way, for reasons which I will come to later. I hope those reasons will -- if I may be so presumptuous as to think so -- lead Mr. Godber himself perhaps to agree with me that another formulation might have been proposed more in keeping with the situation as I trust it may develop.

Mr. Godber referred to three types of possible concealment -- or, shall I say, possible diversion to military purposes -- which were inherent in the subject of nuclear energy.

First, he referred to concealed warheads containing fissile material. I am not an expert on the concealment of warheads containing fissile material; I have never even seen one of these weapons; but I believe it to be true that the storage of warheads containing fissile materials is not an entirely simple matter, and that in the storage of these weapons there are possibilities for detection of stocks. However, I would like to say this quite frankly. Such technical advice as I have taken in this matter -- and it is of a high order -- informs me that science at



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present knows no way of being sure that all nuclear weapons have been detected and destroyed. There is no way at present -- no way at all. I state this quite bluntly because I think we have to face that fact: that there is no way now in which we can be sure that all these nuclear weapons will have been located and destroyed. I will come later to certain countervailing factors, but I think that at present at any rate we should face that fact.

The second kind of problem which Mr. Godber talked about was the diversion to illegal uses of fissile material produced in authorized plants, in breeder reactors and so on. He pointed out that in a chemical separation plant there was a margin of error in accuracy of control of, I believe, about one per cent in the chemical separation of plutonium coming in a mixed state from a breeder reactor. He said that the United Kingdom itself had programmes which could make it possible -- theoretically of course, because he was not advocating such a thing in the United Kingdom -- to divert enough plutonium to make weapons. He is quite right; that is so; but I shall come to certain facts about this which lead me, I must say, to the view that this is not a significant or practical danger. I will come to the reason why.

Incidentally, in connexion with plutonium Mr. Godber said, categorically, that plutonium can never be rendered unfit for use in weapons. I must differ from him in that matter. I know that his technical advice is of a high order, but I also have taken advice of a very high order, and I am satisfied that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, though I hesitate to quote this here, Professor Oppenheimer said quite recently that it should be possible to mix something with plutonium to render it unfit for use in weapons. So I am afraid that what Mr. Godber said in this connexion is not necessarily so. But I am not depending only upon Professor Oppenheimer's statement. I am basing this on other scientific advice of an equally high order, according to which scientists at the very top believe that plutonium could be made useless for weapon manufacture.

I now come to the third type of diversion of which Mr. Godber spoke -- that is, the use of stocks of fissile material which are held for legitimate purposes but could be seized by an aggressor. Again he was giving us a theoretical example of how the Dounreay fast reactor's stocks of fuel, which is highly-enriched uranium, could be used. I say "a theoretical example", because I am sure Mr. Godber was not advocating such a course in the United Kingdom at all. Of course, what Mr. Godber said is so. But here there are various countervailing factors. I will come to the

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general one which leads me to the view that this again is not a substantial difficulty, not a significant difficulty at all. But I would like to point out again that, though this would require control measures -- I am now talking in general terms of control measures for ensuring that nuclear materials, including fissile materials, remain in the circuit of peaceful utilization -- it is, let me say, plausible scientifically that fast reactors should be operated on enriched uranium which is below weapon strength.

I know that the Dounreay reactors work on highly-enriched uranium which is of weapon strength; but that does not mean that it is not plausible for such reactors to work on enriched uranium below weapon strength -- and again I have taken advice of a high order before making this statement. Of course, this would mean that some redesigning would be required, but the general point I am making is that fast reactors do not have to operate on fissile material which is above 20 per cent enriched, the minimum required for weapon strength. Normally one needs much richer uranium than that for modern weaponry.

However, that is a small point. I might say here that not only the Dounreay fast reactors but also a good many research reactors -- although the fissile material used for them is generally in smaller quantity -- also use enriched uranium as their basic fuel. The fact is, however, that it is not necessary for them to do so.

I myself proposed in the International Atomic Energy Agency once that it should be a policy of that Agency never to give out fissile material which was enriched by more than 20 per cent. This would require a certain restraint, and an acceptance of certain standard designs for research reactors using enriched uranium. These changes are possible scientifically, however. Thus, purely from a technical point of view, the difficulties involved exist but are not insurmountable. However, my main point is that I do not believe these difficulties are significant, as I will show later.

To end my comments on this technical aspect I would say this: Mr. Godber spoke in his statement of hydrogen-3, and of a lithium compound used for hydrogen weapons which he said came under the definition of nuclear material but not of fissile material. Of course he was quite right. However, in spite of the fact that one hears rumours that there have been recent developments that take this matter a stage further in the development of armaments -- which I personally greatly regret --, it should be made clear that, so far as I am aware at present, no hydrogen weapon goes off without a fission trigger. Therefore no hydrogen weapon is any good without that. As I have

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said, here again change is possible -- and in a way which in my view would lead to deterioration. But because a fission trigger is needed, some fissile material is needed for all nuclear weapons at the present stage of development. I believe that to be true; but the secrets of military development are not very well known to me.

That has dealt with the technical aspects. I feel that the main point about these nuclear diversion possibilities is that, as long as we consider in isolation the possibility of the diversion of nuclear materials, including fissile materials, diversion is always a danger. The Government of India took this view very strongly in considering the safeguards in the International Atomic Energy Agency. We pointed out that there was no safety at all in the safeguards which have been adopted and voted for by the delegations -- including, among others, the delegation of the United Kingdom. Those safeguards are full of holes; they are not safeguards, they are laborious exercises in red tape in the atomic sphere. If fissile material is given to very poor countries with these heavy safeguards, and safeguards are not put on the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other countries which might or could soon manufacture weapons, it is just meaningless. This arises because the safeguard system has been too narrowly conceived and is not universal. Just as no law can be any good unless it is universal, no safeguard system can be any good unless it is universal. That is a basic proposition which is violated by the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that is why these safeguards are practically useless.

In Mr. Godber's interesting statement, I would submit there is a tendency to consider this matter in isolation. For example, Mr. Godber has said that from the Dounreay stocks of fissile material it is theoretically possible to make several weapons. That is true, of course, and it would be true if all we were doing was to try to safeguard the stocks of fissile material there. But what we are trying to do is to arrive at the total destruction of the armament industry in the United Kingdom. All its bomb-making capacity will be destroyed or converted. Then how will it be possible to make that fissile material into bombs?

That is the point about general and complete disarmament, and that is why it is now essential.

Mr. Godber referred to a 1955 proposal by the Soviet Union which I looked up; his reference (DC/71, Annex 15; DC/SC.1/26/Rev.2) was absolutely accurate, but there was no proposal at that time for general and complete disarmament. To some

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extent it is possible to take the risk of this one per cent inaccuracy in following the figures in a chemical separation plant or in a gaseous diffusion plant which has to be used to convert fissile materials into enriched uranium or pure plutonium, either of which is required in weapons manufacture. That small risk can be taken, but not in isolation, because, if it were, this stuff could be put into an armaments industry. But when the armaments industry is destroyed or converted, and when there is control in the whole country over all industry which could possibly become an armaments industry, then this risk does not arise.

That is the point which is overlooked in the statement of the United Kingdom representative. That refers to both his second and third categories -- that is to say, legitimate stocks, and use of plutonium and so on which come out of chemical separation plants. Once gaseous diffusion plants to enrich uranium, and chemical separation plants to purify plutonium, have been put under effective control, and once the whole of the armaments industry has been progressively converted or destroyed, there is no significant risk.

That is why we do not think that either of the plans tackles the question of production sufficiently fully. I said that we should come back to this matter, as indeed we shall. Once the armaments industry is put under proper control and reconverted, then this risk is not a great risk. Here I would add that this risk will exist only in certain countries -- at least, for a long time to come --: in countries where the industrial base is theoretically able to support an armament industry for nuclear weapons. That is not easy; very few countries in the world are at that stage of development, fortunately; and if we could only have the test ban which many of the countries at this Committee keep imploring the nuclear Powers to accept, then it would not really pay a new country which had never manufactured weapons, even if there were some leakage in its chemical separation plants, to try to manufacture these weapons. It would not have the armaments industry -- that would have been converted to peaceful purposes or destroyed --, and it would not have the industrial base on which to manufacture such weapons, apart from the fact that it would first have to convert that industrial base into an armaments industry and then manufacture the weapons.

I think analysis would show that only the first category -- namely, concealed warheads -- could conceivably be used. As Mr. Zorin said, the representative of the United Kingdom did not mention trucks any longer: he mentioned the TU 114 and

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the TU 104 and other possible aeroplanes (ENDC/PV.50, p. 6). I accept that that is a problem and we should have to look into the question of these aeroplanes. I assume the Boeing 707 is in the same category. The Boeing Company is the third largest defence contractor in the United States; it took orders of over a billion dollars last year. The bomber fleet of the United States is based largely on prototypes which later enter into civilian use; the Boeing 707 is based on a military bomber. This problem exists in several countries and would have to be faced. However, I am perfectly convinced that effective controls can be devised to cover this question.

I did not intend to talk about this question of controls today, but I will say a few words about controls over delivery systems for nuclear weapons. I am not trying to defend any plan. As I have said before, I doubt very much if this Conference is going to accept plan "A" or plan "B" -- that is, either of the two plans before us. Through a process of give-and-take, negotiation and realistic efforts at arriving at a compromise, we shall have to come to an agreed plan. I hope we are determined on that, and that we are going to come to an agreed plan. So I am not trying to defend one plan or the other. However, I would like to point out that on the question of delivery systems for nuclear weapons there are three types involved. There are sea-based delivery systems -- that is to say, warships and submarines; there are land-based, but air-borne, delivery systems -- that is to say, various types of aircraft; and there are ground-based systems -- that is to say, launching pads, missiles and so on.

Now it is quite clear to all of us that so far as sea-based vessels are concerned -- submarines and warships -- control is perfectly feasible. Even nuclear submarines operated on big nuclear charges have to surface, have to return to their bases, and so on. Once you control all the submarine bases in a country, the slipways where warships are manufactured, and their harbours, you can bring under control all sea-going methods of delivery of nuclear weapons.

The next category I will take is aircraft. By control of all factories for manufacture -- these are not small units -- and by control of all airfields of certain sizes you can effectively control all potential delivery systems through aircraft.

There remains the question of launching sites. These are not very small: they are large. I would freely admit that their control is an operation which requires a very considerable degree of inspection in a country. Theoretically, the right to

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inspect the whole country must be granted for such methods of delivery, but that is not an impossible task.

I have broken it down into three categories because I would like to point out that two of these categories are fairly easy to control, and the third category -- which, I submit, is large launching sites and so on -- is not as difficult to control as one is sometimes given the impression it is by being told that these are awfully involved, complicated and extremely technical matters. With great respect, I do not accept that view.

Let us now come back to nuclear disarmament, which is, as I say, the primary task in terms of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. This is a matter on which major emphasis has been placed by the delegations which drafted the Joint Principles. So we cannot, I would submit, get around the issue of thorough nuclear disarmament as rapidly as possible.

The question of a nuclear study has been raised. I think Mr. Godber was the first to suggest that a nuclear study should be started in advance of the signature of the treaty on disarmament -- perhaps almost at once, during the negotiations. This proposal has been supported repeatedly by the representative of the United States and, so far as I know, has not been objected to by the representative of the Soviet Union -- although I will come very soon to certain remarks that Mr. Zorin made today in this connexion.

I would like Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber to consider the point to which I am going to allude. They have both proposed that such a study should be undertaken now before we sign the treaty and should be concluded before we sign the treaty. This study would be on the kind of problems which Mr. Godber raised and which, in my view, are not as complicated as he indicated yesterday. I believe his complications arose out of considering the controls for nuclear weapons in isolation, that is to say, apart from the control for the whole armament industry which we will have to undertake as part of this plan. If this study is to be completed, as Mr. Godber himself has proposed, before we sign the treaty -- and this has been supported by the United States -- then I would ask a very simple question. Why is it necessary to delay nuclear disarmament as long as is proposed in the United States plan?

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I would now quote from what Mr. Dean said on 5 June:

"We propose to face this frankly and at an early stage of the disarmament effort. Indeed, it would be our preference to clarify the verification situation even before our negotiations on a treaty have been completed, so that the requisite provisions can be spelt out in the treaty itself."

(ENDC/PV.49, p.38)

What follows? What follows is that, if the study is completed before we get to the signing of the treaty, then all the argumentation which has been put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom that the United States plan is better because it gives us more time to face these issues of control falls to the ground. For his own proposal has been accepted by the United States - namely that this study should be completed before we even sign the treaty. I am sure that the representative of the United Kingdom, who is always logical and fair-minded, will agree that his whole argumentation falls to the ground and that there should be a much faster plan for nuclear disarmament. I submit that that is the only type of plan for nuclear disarmament which is consistent with the Joint Principles, where the emphasis is heavily on nuclear disarmament and less so on conventional disarmament. So how can anyone, in the light of the Joint Principles, accept such a slow plan for nuclear disarmament? As I have also said, it is inconsistent with the Joint Principles for a United Nations force to be left with nuclear weapons. I cannot see how we can reconcile the Joint Principles and such a thought. So I feel that this study must be undertaken quickly.

Mr. Godber quoted something which Mr. Zorin said yesterday, but I am afraid I must quote it again because I am arguing this point. Mr. Zorin said:

"At all events, as you see these difficulties, let us consider together how they may be overcome..." (ENDC/PV.50, p.16)

Now I am sure that Mr. Zorin meant this -- and, if he will forgive me for saying so, we are going to hold him to it. This is an important point. There are potential difficulties here -- although I think they are not as large as the representative of the United Kingdom feels they are. Let us study them.

Now what do we mean by study? I think that is a very important issue. We all have access to technical and scientific information and advice. One way of studying these issues is in informal meetings here, in our own forum.

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I would not rule that out because I feel that the wider the participation in these matters the better, and I do think that one cannot divorce the political from the technical at any stage in these considerations. I am bound to say that I think that we should base ourselves on the view that there must be no nuclear weapons in the world at all. Let us base ourselves on that view, and let us study the technicalities involved. Only that view is consistent with the Joint Principles. We could study it in this forum; we could meet informally to do so.

I would request the representative of the Soviet Union to make constructive proposals regarding the study to which he referred yesterday. I think he should tell us what kind of studies he would be willing to undertake. I myself have thrown out a possibility: maybe we can arrange to discuss it informally in our own meetings, with scientific advisers present. In any case, let us study this point. Some important delegations involved attach great importance to this study. The Soviet representative himself has said that we should study these matters together. So let us now agree on the method of study.

That is important. We would support this approach to the matter. We think that it is incumbent upon us all to make suggestions which would enable such a study to take place. I would presume -- though it is not for me to say this -- that our colleague from the United Kingdom will show flexibility regarding the forum of such a study. I am sure he will not insist on a particular type of working party, or whatever he had in mind. In other words, we must reach agreement together on what kind of study we should give to this matter. If we do, then it should be possible to iron out some of these points.

As I have said, with great respect, I do not think anyone can produce scientific evidence at the moment to assure Mr. Godber, in isolation, that all the nuclear warheads can be detected and destroyed. I am afraid on that he will not get complete satisfaction. But I would submit that that matter, too, has to be looked at in the context and in the framework of the total control measures and the total disarmament measures in the country. It may be that these countries which are nuclear Powers today -- I am not making any proposal, I am merely thinking aloud -- will rightly have to submit to a higher degree of inspection at the end of the plan, or at any given stage of the plan, than other countries. This is possible. After all -- if our colleague from Burma will not mind my mentioning his name -- why should you inspect countries like



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Mr. Barrington's country, Burma, for nuclear weapons? It would be a tremendous waste of money and of manpower. But the United Kingdom, yes: we would have to inspect the United Kingdom pretty thoroughly for nuclear weapons, especially since Mr. Godber thought up such excellent means of getting around controls.

The impact of control will have to fall more heavily on the nuclear Powers, I would suggest. This is inherent in the situation. I would suggest that in the context of these heavy controls, in the context of the disarmament industry being turned off thoroughly, under control, in the context of vigilance at all airfields, launching-sites, and so on, then Mr. Godber's fears regarding someone popping out one of these concealed warheads will be brought into manageable proportions. At least, that is what I think. Maybe Mr. Godber does not; maybe he is by nature much more cautious than I am. Of course we must create a system which will cover every reasonable man's instinct of caution and self-preservation. I have never doubted Mr. Godber's great reasonableness, and I am sure we all feel very glad that we have him as our colleague at these discussions.

I have made these observations on nuclear disarmament. There are a few other points which I wanted to speak about, particularly peace-keeping arrangements; but that is a separate issue and I shall defer those remarks to another date.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I propose to speak primarily this morning on the subject of peace-keeping arrangements, but first I should like to mention just a few points that some of the speakers this morning have raised.

I participated with Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin in the drafting of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5). I do not claim any particular authority in interpreting this document, but some of the statements made this morning by the representative of India are not, in my view, in conformity with the actual text of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles.

Paragraph 2 of the Agreed Principles reads:

"The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order..." (ENDC/5, p. 1)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I call attention to these words: "that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments...".

Paragraph 3 reads:

"To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, ..." (ibid., p.2)

Sub-paragraph 3(a) relates to the disbanding of armed forces and the cessation of the production of armaments -- all kinds of armaments, not merely nuclear armaments.

Sub-paragraph 3(b) relates to the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and the cessation of their production.

Sub-paragraph 3(c) relates to the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

Paragraph 4 states that:

"The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed ..." (ibid.)

Paragraph 5 states:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ibid.)

We must not overlook this principle of balance. In drafting our plan we paid a great deal of attention to this question of balance. If we made any error, I will be happy to have it pointed out to us. But we strove very conscientiously in the drafting of our plan not to put any Power at a military disadvantage while disarmament was being carried out.

In carrying out general and complete disarmament we cannot overlook geography. We cannot overlook the tremendous land mass of the members of the Warsaw Pact, the European part of the Soviet Union, the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union, and its ally communist China. If one looks at a map of the United Kingdom and the United States, one sees that we are separated on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the west by the Pacific Ocean, and on the north by the Arctic Ocean, and in order to carry out our commitments to our allies we have got to use ships, aircraft or missiles.

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We just cannot ignore this problem of balance. If we do, we shall founder on this problem of carrying out disarmament. I think this is a fundamental problem that we have to recognize. We do want to carry out general and complete disarmament. In drafting our plan, we did not try to put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage; but I submit that the Soviet plan, in its emphasis on the destruction of all nuclear delivery vehicles and all foreign bases in stage I, and of all nuclear weapons in stage II, definitely does place the United States and the United Kingdom at a disadvantage and ignores paragraph 5 of the Agreed Principles.

Now let me very briefly turn to the question of whether or not the United Nations peace force should have nuclear arms. This is a subject on which the United States is quite open to persuasion. Paragraph 7 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles --- and this language was very carefully drafted --- says:

"Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of interational disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments." (ibid., p.3)

Why did we use in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles the words "agreed types of armaments"? Both in the Soviet plan and in our plan there is provision for accession in due course by all militarily-significant States. In order to make progress, we thought that stage I could proceed even before all militarily-significant States had come in; but they would have to come in at stage II. Then in our plan --- and I believe there is a similar provision in the Soviet plan --- there is provision for all other States to come in and to accede to it. We have not yet worked out the text of the treaty, but I would assume that if all the militarily-significant States come in, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries would be willing to go forward even if each and every State did not come in.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As the representative of India has said here many times -- and he is quite correct in saying it -- there is no one nation that has any particular monopoly of scientific ability, brains or research. It has always been of tremendous interest to scientists that, just when they think they have done some extraordinary things in well-equipped laboratories, some scientist in a rather poorly equipped laboratory will come up with some very new and startling innovation; he has attended some scientific congress or has read some article which has led him to a discovery. No matter how much we know about nuclear weapons today and the manner in which they are manufactured, we cannot completely exclude the possibility that somebody, somewhere, at some time, in a very small nation, might be able to invent something that would put all the rest of us at a very real disadvantage: the Soviet Union, the United States and everyone else.

This is all I am saying, and I want to be clear about this. If some very small nation that is not a party to this treaty should have some exceptionally brilliant scientist, or if it should develop some process, nuclear or otherwise, which could wreak great destruction on the rest of the world, it might say to some other country, "Do what we tell you, or else". If we then called upon the United Nations peace force to put that country down, the United Nations peace force might then say to us, "We are sorry, but you yourselves are responsible for the fact that we cannot make that country obey, because you were the ones that wrote into the treaty that we could not have nuclear weapons." All I am saying is that in the course of our discussions here we ought to decide whether it is going to be absolutely impossible under any circumstances for this United Nations peace force to be armed with the appropriate weapons, whatever they are, to put down any threats to the peace of the world that may occur at any particular time.

All we are saying is: "Do not be too negative so far in advance. Wait until you have examined the whole problem." That is all we are saying on this question of agreed types of weapons. That is what we had in mind when, with Mr. Zorin, we agreed to paragraph 7 of the Joint Statement of Principles.

However, I would call attention to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Despite all the declarations against the use of war, Article 51 says that there is nothing in the Charter that can prevent anybody, either singly or collectively, from exercising self-defence. If we write in the treaty that this United Nations peace force cannot under any circumstances be armed with nuclear weapons, and if

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a small country comes along with this new weapon and we call upon the United Nations Peace Force and it tells us that it cannot because of the terms of our treaty, then we must expect others to resort to self-defence.

That brings me to my main subject this morning. Even with the very best intentions, general and complete disarmament is not going to solve all the problems of the world. If my reading of the first chapter of Genesis in the Old Testament is correct, even Adam and Eve had some problems, although they were unarmed.

I must say that I found that what my colleagues from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and India said this morning was exceptionally interesting, and I should like to reply to them at a later date at somewhat greater length.

My primary purpose today is to continue my exposition of the provisions of the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a peaceful world presented by the United States (ENDC/30). My remarks today are directed to the proposals which the United States has made for stage II on measures to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace.

The first of these proposals appears under the heading "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes", section G, paragraph I c:

"In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature." (ENDC/30, p.25)

This constitutes an extension of our proposal for stage I, Section H, paragraph 3 c, that the parties to the treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations on measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective (ibid., p.18).

On 24 May I explained why we considered this study to be important and what we thought it might accomplish. In stage II we should be in a position to build upon the results of the studies projected for stage I. For example, if recommendations for new procedures and arrangements emerged from the studies, under our proposal these could appropriately be implemented in stage II (ENDC/PV.41, p.17).

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Our outline includes a second proposal concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes during stage II, which involves strengthening the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. This proposal is found in paragraph 1(b), which reads:

"The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes." (ENDC/3C, p.25)

We think it entirely appropriate that at the beginning of stage II the parties to the treaty should accept without reservation the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide international legal disputes. I should like to point out that our proposal refers to legal disputes, and that therefore the Court would do no more than settle disputes which are entirely appropriate for a court to consider.

A fair number of States represented at this Conference have already accepted a comparable obligation. In fact, four of the countries represented at this Conference have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice without significant reservations. My own country, as well as one or two of the other countries represented here, has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in future legal disputes but with certain limitations or reservations. Our reservations are more commonly known as the "Connally Amendment". More than half of the countries at this Conference, however, have not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide any future legal disputes which might arise.

So far as the countries in this latter group are concerned, as well as the countries which have accepted compulsory jurisdiction with limitations or reservations, including the United States, we would say the following. In stage II of the disarmament process we will have crossed the halfway point towards general and complete disarmament. At the end of stage II we will be entering the final phase.

We think that an achievement of such magnitude, involving international co-operation of the most far-reaching scope, would permit States to entrust to this great Court full power to decide legal disputes. We submit that the alleged limitation or partial relinquishment of national sovereignty inherent in so

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entrusting the Court is certainly not disproportionate to the agreed limitations on the exercise of national sovereignty inherent in the relinquishment, by stage II, of roughly one-half to two-thirds of a country's armed forces and armaments. As States take large, bold strides to eliminate their armaments, we believe that they must not hesitate to take comparable bold strides towards the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Before passing to our next proposal I feel it would be desirable to give a few of the technical reasons why we have included in our stage II proposal regarding the International Court of Justice a reference to Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the Court. At first glance it might appear that reference to paragraph 2 would have been more appropriate. Under Article 36, paragraph 2, States may submit declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in future legal disputes. However, as we all know, these declarations may vary in their terms: they may be submitted for specific periods of time; or, once submitted, they may be withdrawn. Article 36, paragraph 1 states that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises, inter alia, "all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force".

Our disarmament treaty, which would be a "treaty in force", would specially provide, as set out in our proposal, that the International Court of Justice should have jurisdiction to decide international legal disputes. In this way there would be uniformity and clarity with respect to the obligation of all the parties to the treaty and with respect to the disputes which could be decided by the International Court of Justice. We could not be certain that this would be the case if the jurisdiction of the Court depended upon individual declarations made by the parties.

I should now like to say a few words about the proposal set out in paragraph 2(a), "Rules of international conduct". This proposal reads:

"The parties to the treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the international disarmament organization initiated in stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The parties to the treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the control council would be circulated to all parties to the treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the parties

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to the treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the parties to the treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the international disarmament organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the parties to the treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin stage III."

(ibid., pp. 25,26)

In a previous speech I explained the desirability of establishing rules of international conduct as disarmament proceeds. What is obviously new in this paragraph is the procedure by which the rules of international conduct may come into force. Let me emphasize that under this paragraph of our proposal no State is required to accept any rule of international conduct which it does not wish to accept. If a rule of conduct becomes effective because a majority of the parties do not signify their disapproval, it is still possible for any party which wishes to do so to notify the international disarmament organization that it does not consider itself bound by the rule, and in that event that State will not be bound. Well, if this is true, it may be asked, "Why then have you made this proposal?" The answer is that we have tried to devise the simplest and the easiest procedural means by which desirable new rules of international conduct may come into force, preserving, at the same time, the right of a State not to become bound if it does not wish to.

Also in connexion with rules of international conduct, we have made a further proposal for stage II concerning indirect aggression and subversion. This is our paragraph 2(b) under section G, and I will read the precise language of the proposal:

"In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure States against indirect aggression and subversion."

(ibid., p.26)

In my earlier statement concerning our specific proposals for Part I, I explained at some length why the United States considers it to be of great importance that the parties to the disarmament treaty refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. I also described what might be involved in a study of methods designed to ensure States against indirect aggression or subversion. Here, too, as in the case of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes, the United States assumes that the stage I studies will produce concrete proposals which may be implemented in stage II.



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I would like next to say a few words about our proposal entitled "National Legislation". It reads:

"These Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for non-compliance." (ibid.)

I point out that this particular proposal has no parallel in stage I. The United States believes that the parties to the treaty need not be required to enact the kind of legislation described here prior to stage II, although there may of course be parties to the disarmament treaty which will have taken certain action in this respect. That is why we refer to parties "which had not already done so".

The basic reason behind this proposal is, I believe, easy to perceive. It is immensely important not only that governments give their full support to the treaty and to the international disarmament organization, but also that individuals be subject to appropriate national laws, thereby making less likely any obstruction of the treaty.

To an unprecedented degree in the history of international relations, States will be entrusting to an international organization and its employees duties of verification within the national boundaries of sovereign States. The responsibilities of these international officials will be complex, difficult and, at the same time, of great significance to the States parties to the treaty, which must have confidence that these international civil servants can do their job effectively. We believe that appropriate national laws could play an important role in helping to assure the success of the international disarmament organization.

Naturally, we cannot say exactly how the obligation called for in our proposal would be carried out in all the different States which may become parties to the disarmament treaty. It will certainly be necessary to go into these problems in greater detail at a later time. We may find, for instance, that the results of our detailed work in drafting the treaty will enable us to pinpoint specific areas in which implementing domestic legislation will be indispensable. Even before we reach this point, however, we believe that the principle stated in our proposal is an important one which must be included in the treaty.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Michael Wright, likened disarmament to a three-legged stool, one leg being disarmament, the second verification, the third strengthened the peace-keeping machinery (ENDC/PV.43, p.12). As one who spent a considerable time as a boy milking cows, I believe I am qualified as an expert on the vagaries of a stool, especially a four-legged stool. Anyone who has ever milked a cow will know that a three-legged stool has far greater stability than a four-legged stool. As we enter stage II, and proceed to stage III, the weight which this stool will have to support will inevitably increase. It is vital, therefore, that the three legs of our stool, each and every one of them be well balanced and that they be sturdy legs so that the structure will not collapse, crashing to the ground and destroying the faith of millions of people who will have put their hopes in reaching the goal of general and complete disarmament.

The representative of the Soviet Union told us on 31 May that the Soviet plan is not on three legs only, but on four legs (ENDC/PV.46, p.36). However, no matter how hard I look at the Soviet plan in connexion with measures to strengthen the maintenance of peace -- and I have looked very hard -- I cannot see any leg at all. Even if we assumed that the Soviet proposals on verification could be described as a "leg", then it would follow that there would be at most two legs to the Soviet disarmament plan and, as we all know, a two-legged stool is exceedingly dangerous. The period of stage II which I have been discussing today is not a period of tentative trial or experimentation; it is the stage during which more than half of the armaments of the world will be eliminated and destroyed. It is the stage during which States will come to rely more upon international organizations -- the United Nations, the United Nations peace force and the international disarmament organization -- for the safeguarding of their most vital security interests. It is the stage in which boldness, imagination and courage are required.

In the United States plan, stage II, section A, paragraph 4 is entitled "Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities", and sub-paragraph (a) reads:

"The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments."

(ENDC/30, p.21)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Paragraph 5(a) states:

"In the light of their examination during stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake ...

"(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty per cent below those existing at the beginning of Stage II." (ibid., p.22)

Section C is entitled "Nuclear Weapons", and, as the representative of the United Kingdom said this morning, paragraph 1 b reads:

"The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages." (ibid., p.23)

Paragraph 1 c states:

"The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons." (ibid., p.24)

Therefore I must disagree with my Soviet colleague when he says that there are no provisions in the United States draft treaty for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of stage III. Turning to stage III, under section A, paragraph 1 reads:

"Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of Stage II." (ibid., p.28)

The following paragraph, 2 b, reads:

"... the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed agreed levels." (ibid.)

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In paragraph 3 a we read:

"Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces ... the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied research, development, production, and testing of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all other facilities for such purposes." (ibid.)

Further on, under section C, "Nuclear Weapons", one finds:

" ... the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal," (ibid., p.29)

One may say that three or four times, but I should have thought that saying it once was enough. Perhaps the language could be clarified further, but I submit that the substance cannot be made any clearer.

In conclusion, I do hope we can continue on our basic work of drafting this treaty on general and complete disarmament. We ought to pay considerable attention to the problems which will face the world when we have eliminated all arms and armaments. If our efforts were to bog down somewhere along the road it would be a real catastrophe. It is because we wish to avoid such a possibility that we have suggested these comprehensive and far-reaching proposals for the strengthening of the measures to maintain the peace, in addition to the measures for accomplishing general and complete disarmament.

We submit that these proposals which I have outlined constitute a very sturdy third leg to support disarmament, and that it is on our solid three-legged structure that reliance should be placed that general and complete disarmament can be achieved.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): Today's proceedings mark our entry into a new phase of negotiations. The speech given by the representative of the Soviet Union opened discussions on the third stage of the process of general and complete disarmament.

The Romanian delegation wishes to make a few preliminary comments on the provisions for stage III in the two drafts. We consider that it would be useful before the recess to get a clear idea of the main characteristics of the three stages. We reserve the right to return to the details of the problems in due course.

What is the main task of stage III -- namely, the final stage of the process of general and complete disarmament? It seems to me that this task could be defined as follows: to complete the measures of disarmament started during the

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preceding stages; to end the process of general and complete disarmament. At the end of stage III we should be living in a world without weapons, in a world in which wars among States would be things of the past.

One cannot help agreeing with the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, when he said in this connexion at our meeting on 21 May:

"It would be my delegation's hope that between them these stages" -- that is, stage I and stage II -- "could contain all the major elements of disarmament such as the elimination of all nuclear weapons and their carriers, reduction of armed forces and armaments and liquidation of all potentially offensive military bases, and that stage III would be devoted mainly to providing for the smooth transition of States to a disarmed world." (ENDC/PV.40, p.35)

The criterion of comparison between the proposals for stage III as put forward by the two plans must be, consequently, the degree and extent to which they correspond to this essential task. From this point of view one cannot help noticing fundamental differences between the Soviet draft treaty and the United States plan. I shall not insist on matters upon which we have already dwelt at some length, such as the non-existence in the United States plan of a time-limit for stage III and, consequently, for the entire process of disarmament, as well as the uncertainty created by the United States plan as to a date for the beginning of stage III; and, what is more as to the very transition towards this stage. I shall not refer, either, to the fact stressed by previous speakers that when, according to the United States proposals, stage III of disarmament is only at the beginning, according to the Soviet draft treaty general and complete disarmament will already have been completed for two years. These things are well known.

Today I shall concentrate on another problem, namely that of the content of the two proposals on disarmament measures during stage III. What is the content of the disarmament measures envisaged by the Soviet draft for stage III? In this regard, article 30 of the Soviet draft treaty reads:

"The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, to fully disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military machinery of States." (ENDC/2, p.20)

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Articles 31 to 35 of the Soviet draft include detailed provisions to this end. After the speech made today by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, there is no need for me to go into details. It is enough for me simply to enumerate the measures provided for. They include the complete elimination of armed forces and conventional armaments; the discontinuance of military production, with the sole exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms necessary to the police or militia contingents; the abolition of all military and para-military organizations and institutions; the abrogation of all legislation concerning the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations; the abolition of military conscription, of military recruiting, as well as of military courses for reserves; the prohibition of the appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from government bodies or private individuals, and public organizations.

At the end of stage III States will have at their disposal only strictly limited contingents of police or militia equipped with light firearms necessary to the maintenance of internal order and to the fulfilment of obligations regarding the maintenance of peace. So here is a clear perspective which permits us to answer the question I raised at the beginning. The Soviet draft meets the requirements of the content of stage III. At the end of stage III, the war machinery of States will be completely liquidated and thus the danger of war will disappear once and for all. The age-old dream of the peoples to ensure a lasting peace on our planet will become a reality.

The United States plan offers us an entirely different picture. In the first place, according to the system proposed by the United States, the national armed forces which are maintained during stage III would be equipped with nuclear weapons -- which implies the danger of nuclear war. Moreover, the United States delegation does not exclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Its opposition to a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction leaves no doubt on this point. As to the importance of the banning of weapons of mass destruction for general and complete disarmament, I really need not add anything after the statement made this morning by the representative of India, Mr. Lall.

The United States plan does not provide for the elimination of all armed forces and armaments. This appears most clearly from the actual wording of the United States document. Indeed, this document speaks of the reduction of armaments: but

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the task is to liquidate, not to reduce them. It speaks about the reduction of armed forces: but the task is to disband and not to reduce them. According to the provisions of chapter B of the United States plan, at the end of stage III States will still have armed forces at their disposal.

According to the provisions of stage III, chapter B, 3, "Other Limitations":

"The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military establishments or military service inconsistent with the foregoing measures."

(ENDC/30, p.29)

This provision is particularly significant in this connexion. What is the meaning of the words "inconsistent with the foregoing measures"? Translated into simple language they mean "military conscription, national military establishments and military service required by armed forces which will have remained at the disposal of States, will be permitted."

Military institutions and organizations, according to the United States plan, are divided into two categories: those compatible with and those incompatible with general and complete disarmament. But the very notion of general and complete disarmament excludes all military institutions whatsoever. The verbal precautions taken by the United States Government when drafting its outline cannot, however, hide the fact that the measures provided for in stage III -- the last stage -- are not of a nature to ensure general and complete disarmament, to lead society to a new world, a world without weapons.

What is still more disquieting is the fact that the United States plan does not envisage, even in stage III, the unconditional elimination of nuclear weapons. Under stage III, chapter C, paragraph 1 the outline clearly states:

"In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, ...". (ibid.)

I have already had the opportunity to point out what kind of steps these are -- and I refer here to the steps involved in stage I and stage II. Therefore I do not think it necessary to insist upon them now. The aforementioned provisions point to the decision of the United States Government not to give up, at any cost, either armed forces or armaments -- including nuclear armaments -- or military institutions and organizations.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

I should like to say a few words about military bases. It is inherent in every system of general and complete disarmament that at the end of the disarmament process there should not and could not be any military bases left. But the United States draft provides for the maintenance of military bases even at the end of stage III. I want to call your attention to section D, "Military Bases and Facilities," which in paragraph 1, states:

"The parties to the treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the parties to the treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens." (ibid., p.30)

I do not want to insist further on the elements of the United States plan. In support of the views expressed by me and particularly in support of the opinion that behind the wording of the United States plan there lies a conception which is alien to that of general and complete disarmament, allow me to refer to a United States document -- other than the Outline -- which is of particular significance in my opinion. I am referring to the study entitled "Economic Impacts of Disarmament," published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in January 1962. This study, which has a preface by Mr. William C. Foster, member of the United States delegation and Director of the aforementioned Agency, was worked out by a group of experts at the request of Mr. John J. McCloy, Adviser to the President on disarmament.

Of course, one might object that this is not an official document and that therefore, as Mr. William Foster himself states in the aforementioned preface, "It does not represent the views of the United States Government." I had this objection in mind when I decided to read out the data recorded in this document. But I could not free myself of the thought that the authors of this study may well have been also the authors of the United States Outline submitted to this Committee. On page 5 the authors assure us that -

"The disarmament assumptions we used in making our projections are intended to be generally consistent with the major United States disarmament objectives and policies as set forth in the proposals presented by the President to the United Nations."



(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The index, on page 27 of the document I am referring to, points to what the military expenditure of the United States would be under conditions of general and complete disarmament. Disarmament would have to start in 1968 and be completed in 1977. The United States envisages military expenditures in a disarmed world rising to \$10.2 billion. In order for you to realise what this sum represents, let me only remind you that in 1939 -- that is, the year when World War II broke out -- United States military expenditure amounted to \$265 million sterling; I am quoting from page 45 of "The Arms Race" by Philip Noel-Baker. It is difficult to establish now the dollar equivalent of this sum. In the meantime both the dollar and the pound have been devalued. According to the present rate of exchange, which is \$2.81 to the pound, in 1939 the United States Government spent about \$750 million for military purposes. What a strange conception about disarmament exists among certain United States experts if they propose, for a completely disarmed world, military expenditures ten times larger than that recorded on the eve of World War II!

One may find it interesting to examine how this sum of \$10 billion is distributed: personnel: \$4.7 billion; operation and maintenance: \$2.1 billion; procurement, including research and development: \$1.5 billion; aircraft: \$500 million; rockets: \$100 million; civil defence: \$1.7 billion, and so on. In other words, for personnel alone a sum is earmarked four times larger than the United States military expenditure of 1939; while for military research and development a sum is earmarked equivalent to the United States expenditure for the same chapter during the financial year 1954-55, when, according to Philip Noel-Baker, that represented \$1.55 billion.

Do not all these data throw the clearest light possible upon the way the United States imagines the military forces for the maintenance of internal order under conditions of general and complete disarmament?

On the other hand, who could ever believe that military planes and rockets are necessary for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of American citizens? Is it not clear that the maintenance of military planes and rockets envisages other aims than those of keeping internal order and protecting the personal security of citizens? In the light of all these considerations, it becomes still clearer why the United States plan says not a word about the disbanding during stage III of war ministries, general staffs, and so on.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

An analysis of the provisions envisaged for stage III demonstrates that there are fundamental differences between the two plans. According to the Soviet proposals, we shall have at the end of stage III, a world without weapons. According to the United States plan, after the completion of stage III we shall have a world where weapons, armed forces and military institutions capable of organizing the military efforts of States will continue to exist.

The Romanian delegation requests the United States delegation to approach this problem in a realistic way, taking into consideration the fact that mankind is striving and struggling for general and complete disarmament, a reality nobody can ignore. This is a request that the Romanian delegation has made to the United States delegation several times before, on similar occasions.

The provisions of the Soviet draft offer powerful guarantees that no advantages would be created for any party. Does the United States delegation not consider -- leaving aside fears, prejudices and, especially, outmoded and dangerous conceptions as regards relations among States and the way of settling international disputes -- that the time has come to answer mankind that general and complete disarmament can be achieved?

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I should like to inform the Committee that there are still three speakers on my list. I believe two of them, the representatives of Italy and the United Kingdom, wish to speak in order to exercise their right of reply or give explanations. The third speaker is the representative of Czechoslovakia, who wishes to make an ordinary statement. That is the position. I think I could give the floor to the two speakers who wish to exercise their right to reply or give explanations, and then the Committee can decide what to do next.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I apologize for speaking at such a late hour. I had intended to make a few remarks in reply to Mr. Zorin's statement of yesterday and also to refer to the statement he made this morning. But as it is really very late, I will confine myself to a single, very brief comment, which will only detain the Committee for a minute.

What Mr. Zorin told us today when explaining chapter X of the Soviet plan, concerning measures to safeguard the security of States and to maintain international peace, is unfortunately not very encouraging. I really do not see how the United

(Mr. Cavaletti, Italy)

Nations forces could operate effectively, or even how they could operate at all, under the Soviet plan. For the use of those forces would be subject to a double veto: first, there is, of course, the veto of the Security Council; then, according to article 37, paragraph 2 of the Soviet plan, there is the veto of any one of the three representatives forming the "troika" which commands the international troops. It is clear from that article that without the unanimous agreement of the three commanders of the international force, even a unanimous decision of the Security Council could never be carried out. We are not military experts, but I think anyone can understand that a military force which cannot act unless a double veto is overcome -- and in particular a veto of three commanders -- has obviously no chance of exerting the slightest influence for the maintenance of peace.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I apologize to my colleagues for taking the floor now, and particularly to the representative of Czechoslovakia, over whom I shall be taking precedence -- I assure him that was not my intention. However, before we parted this morning I wanted to make one or two very brief comments in regard to the speech of the representative of India, who did me the great courtesy of studying most carefully the speech I made yesterday; he has made some very important comments in relation to it. As the hour is late, it would be unfair to seek to delay the Committee this morning by dealing sufficiently with all the points he raised. So, if he will forgive me, I will come back to some of them on a later occasion. However, there are two or three points which I think it important to deal with at once.

One of the first points he raised, I think, was the question of whether or not the United Nations peace force should have nuclear weapons. On this whole question of the retention of nuclear weapons, I tried to follow his argument. I want to study precisely what he said, and I would only say at the present moment that I fail completely to follow the logic of his argument. He claims that it is unthinkable for the United Nations peace force to have these weapons under any circumstances -- I am not arguing here whether they should or not, I am seeking to follow his argument -- and yet he says, as I followed his argument, that we have to be prepared to contemplate with equanimity the possibility that one or more States might have

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

succeeded in secreting a few, and possibly a considerable number, of these weapons after the completion of general and complete disarmament.

That was how I understood his argument. As I say, I shall study it further, but it seemed to me a completely illogical position to take up. Mr. Lall seems to indicate that that is not his argument. If that is so, I hope he will forgive me, but it sounded very much like it to me.

Mr. LALL (India): Not at all.

Mr. GODBER: (United Kingdom): We will study the verbatim records and see.

Then there was the question of balance in the United States plan. I quite understand that my colleague from India is very anxious to get away from this question of balance and he is seeking to show -- and it is very right and proper that he should, if this is his belief -- that the United States plan does not maintain this balance between the stages. I understand that this is the argument that he is pursuing.

Mr. LALL (India): No, not at all.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): It seems that there must have been something wrong with the translation. Translation from Indian into English is always difficult. Anyhow we shall have to settle this later. But I understood him to say -- and I think I have this right -- on this question of balance, that the United States plan did not maintain the balance. I hope he agrees with me there.

Mr. LALL (India): No, I am afraid not.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): This is getting even more difficult.

Mr. LALL (India): Point of order. I never once mentioned the word "balance" -- not once. I was talking and I talked repeatedly -- and even a translation into Swahili would have got it right -- only of the military pattern, or military mix. I never mentioned "balance". Indeed the balance, under the Joint Principles, is an entirely different issue. What I am saying is that the United States contends that it does not alter the military mix, or the military pattern, as it proceeds down the road to disarmament. I was concerned to point out that in my

(Mr. Lall, India)

opinion that is not the case, because the United States plan in the first stage chops 30 per cent off most conventional weapons but does not make a chop off chemical biological and radiological weapons, or clearly and specifically off nuclear weapons, and so on. I never mentioned the word "balance". Therefore I had to interrupt, because the argument is not proceeding on a basis which I mentioned.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I am most grateful for that interpretation --

Mr. LALL (India): It is not an interpretation. I never mentioned the word "balance".

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): Anyhow, the point we are getting at is the same point, however it is described. Perhaps I used the word "balance" wrongly. Anyhow, on "mix" I think the representative agrees with me. But his whole point was that he was discounting once again the importance that the nuclear delivery vehicle has in this particular context. This is what he was doing and what he has done before. I would beg him to consider again the arguments which our United States colleague and I have used before: that in fact, in so far as nuclear disarmament is progressing, as long as orthodox nuclear delivery vehicles remain they determine the degree of nuclear disarmament. That is a fundamental fact which I ask him to accept.

I come to the third point. Mr. Lall went into the scientific side of the matters which I raised yesterday. I do not claim to be an expert scientist: I do not think that the representative of India, who is a modest man, claims that either. Therefore we are both arguing from facts which we have gleaned from others.

The scientific advice which I have received indicates that a good deal of what he said this morning was unrealistic in the extreme. I have to tell him that in a considered way. I would take one aspect to make my point. My colleagues will recall that Mr. Lall advanced certain views concerning fast-reactor fuel cycles. Yesterday I referred to the Dounreay fast reactor. He picked me up on this subject and developed the theme. I think he said that the fast-reactor fuel cycle would use highly enriched uranium; he suggested that we should sacrifice our desire for technical perfection by using 20 per cent enriched uranium-235, not highly enriched uranium-235. Unfortunately, so far as that argument is concerned, the fast reactor fuel cycle which the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union are all

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

aiming at is not based at all on uranium-235: it will be based on the natural uranium-plutonium fuel cycle, or, if we are fortunate or clever enough, it will be based on the thorium-uranium 233 cycle. I am advised that the uranium-235 fuel cycle, even with highly-enriched uranium-235, would be uneconomic; in fact, the reactor would not breed. With 20 per cent uranium-235 it is not at all certain that the reactor would even go critical.

That is just one of the points. There are a number of other points which I would certainly advance if I had sufficient time. However, I am saying this to indicate the complications which exist so far as these matters are concerned, and to point out that I think Mr. Lall has made by case for me. Indeed I understood him to be supporting me to the extent of the need for special studies of these matters.

I asked the representative of the Soviet Union what he meant about special discussions to thrash these matters out. I understood our Indian colleague to suggest in this context that we might perhaps have mixed meetings of political and scientific delegates. I am willing to consider any suggested ways in which we could achieve serious discussion of these very complicated matters. I would have thought that the benefit would lay in the course which I suggested, because these matters are so complicated; but if it is felt that the meeting should be a mixed one I am perfectly prepared, as I say, to look at any suggestion in order to ascertain whether it is feasible. I am certain that the need for such a study exists, and it has been made even more clear by the discussion between the representative of India and myself this morning, because of its very complicated nature.

With regard to the ability to make nuclear weapons from the illicit diversion of fissile material, the representative of India rather dismissed this point as not being so serious as some of the other matters. He said that we must consider things as a whole and not in isolation, that of course we should have to disperse the massive United Kingdom armaments industry and that this would be part of that. I understood this to be his argument.

I would remind him of the dangers which exist if these sorts of materials, even in primitive forms, could be illicitly taken and used. If he doubts me, I would remind him that he said "But the trouble which neighbours could cause to each other with even primitive nuclear weapons would be something frightful." (ENDC/PV.47, p.14)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I am using his own words as evidence in support of this particular difficulty. I trust he will agree with me that what he said at that time was right and that this danger does exist.

Nevertheless, I am grateful to him, as I say, for the careful consideration he has given to the points which I have raised. If in my opening remarks I misrepresented what he said in any way, I apologize. I shall certainly look most carefully at the verbatim record of his speech. I still think, however, that the points I have made are quite valid.

There are a number of other points I should like to return to at a later stage, but I do think, in connexion with this particularly important, critical, aspect of the scientific questions, that we must thrash them out in some way or other. I do hope that, with the support of the representative of India, we can persuade our other colleagues to agree to the setting-up of some body in which this matter can be effectively thrashed out.

Mr. LALL (India): I regret to say that I do not agree with the presentation of the facts put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom.

If the Dounreay reactor is a thorium-cycle fast reactor, how does he explain his statement that:

"The Dounreay fast reactor in North Scotland is an experimental civil power plant using metallic fuel, and has a stock of many hundreds of kilogrammes of highly-enriched uranium-235?" (ENDC/PV.50, p.10)

I was speaking of the misuse of uranium-235, because the representative of the United Kingdom himself talks throughout that paragraph about its misuse. I was making the point that uranium-235 will not be of much use if the whole industrial complex of the United Kingdom is under control.

It is true -- indeed I said this myself -- that changes in design would be necessary if fast reactors used 20 per cent enriched uranium instead of highly-enriched uranium, but I have been scientifically advised that this would be feasible. I am not necessarily saying that it would be such a good economic proposition. I only said that scientifically speaking you could solve that problem. I simply meant that the problem is one which can be contained and solved scientifically. It does not follow that in terms of economics the reactor would be as good. However, when we are considering disarmament, economics is not the only consideration involved.

(Mr. Lall, India)

My point simply was that the situation could be scientifically altered by means of using 20 per cent enriched uranium. It is true that, as at present designed, the reactor would not be able to go critical. However it does not follow that that drawback would apply to all reactor designs. I base my remarks on the advice of the highest scientific authorities in this field; they are not based on technical advice.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I still have the representative of Czechoslovakia on my list of speakers, but perhaps he would agree to postpone his statement until the next meeting. Do any other representatives wish to speak?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I intended to put off until tomorrow, when we shall be discussing the question of general and complete disarmament, my statement replying to various comments and questions by speakers today, but since the United Kingdom and then the Italian representative again raised the same questions, I should like to take literally just a few minutes to reply to certain questions now. If this is agreeable to the Committee, I would request a maximum of ten minutes in which to reply in some measure to various questions.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria): There appear to be no objections.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I am grateful to the members of the Committee for this courtesy.

First of all, I should like to deal with a question which was raised by the United Kingdom representative today, although I had in effect given an answer to this before. But since the representative of India also posed the question and Mr. Godber just now tried to deepen and broaden it, I should like to state forthwith what I had in mind at the last meeting when I expounded our views on making a study of certain difficulties and problems which arise in connexion with the plan for general and complete disarmament and, in particular, with the matter of control over the elimination of the means of delivery and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Since my statement made yesterday has been quoted, I would recall what I did in fact say:



(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"You have merely criticized difficulties which you have seen in the solution of the problems of elimination of the means of delivery and elimination of nuclear weapons. At all events, as you see these difficulties, let us consider together how they may be overcome . . . ." (ENDC/PV.50, p. 16)

That is what I said yesterday. This is the verbatim record, which is available to everyone. That it meant was this: we have a problem, so let us consider together how to overcome the difficulties. But Mr. Godber immediately turns this into some kind of complicated further procedure. Already today he spoke of joint meetings of scientists and our representatives here. He spoke of the creation of some kind of body, and so on and so forth.

Why do you complicate all this? My point of view was expressed perfectly clearly. Let us here and now discuss these questions and the difficulties which have arisen for you. If you wish to discuss this, as it were, in a more informal fashion -- by all means let us do so. Here I am in complete agreement with the representative of India: if this question needs to be discussed at any informal meeting, we are prepared to do so. If the representatives of the United Kingdom wish to discuss these questions with the Soviet delegation, we are agreeable. If the representative of the United States wishes to discuss them with us, we are likewise agreeable. Does this mean that we are opposed to discussion? We are prepared to discuss all questions. What is the point of creating a permanent body of some kind? What is the point of these joint meetings between technicians and politicians, etc., etc.? What is the point of all this? It is not necessary at the present stage of our work.

Today I stressed once again, and I think I made it quite clear, that at present we are at the stage of political decisions. We are at present engaged in discussing the basic programme of disarmament at all three stages. At this point we think it useless and entirely unnecessary to go into the technical details of each separate question, whether connected with the disarmament programme itself or with the technique of control, and so forth. This will yield nothing. What shall we discuss? The technical methods of detecting warheads or something like that, as was mentioned today, while we have not decided whether we are going to prohibit warheads in general? Why should we discuss the technical aspects of detecting these warheads when you have not yet agreed that they should be destroyed at all.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

For that reason I said today that we think it is useless to have any kind of technical discussion without having reached agreement on the main questions of the disarmament programme. But if you feel that, in order to settle the matter, we need an exchange of views on certain aspects, including technical ones, by all means let us have one here. That is what we are here for. With seventeen members the Committee is not so very large; but if you think this is too many, let us reduce the number and have informal meetings. Let us by all means discuss this. If you want something very small -- a meeting just between you and ourselves, let us meet and discuss the matter on that basis. But to set up at this stage technical bodies or committees of some kind -- this we regard as useless; what will they discuss, if it is not decided or even agreed in principle which measures of disarmament we are ready to accept?

That is my reply to this question. Thus we are prepared to discuss any questions which may arise, and we are prepared to discuss them in this Committee. We are prepared to discuss them formally or informally. We are prepared to discuss them with individual delegations, or with one, two, three, or any number of delegations. This we are prepared to do. But to set up special bodies for the purpose we regard as useless, since it will contribute nothing and will only create the impression that some discussion of technical problems on which the settlement of the question depends is in progress. Nothing of the kind. The settlement of the question does not depend on this. The settlement of the question depends on the will of your Governments. This is the crux of the matter: Are you in favour of eliminating nuclear weapons within a definite time-limit, or are you not? The degree of settlement of the question depends on this.

In this connexion I should like to draw attention to the question which was posed by the representative of India at the meeting on 5 June and to which the Soviet delegation immediately replied. I said then:

"the representative of India has put forward the definite compromise proposal that in article 1, sub-paragraph 2(b), which concerns nuclear weapons, all the brackets should be deleted, both from the phrase proposed by the Soviet Union :  
"((Prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons for mass  
destruction;))", and from the phrase expressing the United States point of  
view : "cessation of the production (and prohibition of the manufacture) ..." --  
in other words, that we should accept both the Soviet Union proposal and the  
United States proposal.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"I can state that the Soviet delegation agrees to this proposal and is willing both to drop its own brackets and to accept the bracketed United States words. If the United States is really in favour of prohibiting nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, it should have no objection to this proposal of the Indian representative. If it does object, then it should explain its position -- why it objects to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction in general."

(ENDC/PV.49, pp. 39, 40)

I said this on 5 June, and today is 7 June. So far there has been no reply to this question from the United States delegation. A reply to this question does not require any technical studies; what it requires is a definite political stand. We await the answer from the United States on this matter. However, if the United States, as was stated today by its representative, believes that this question is difficult to solve in connexion with the question of international armed forces -- and the representatives of Italy and the United Kingdom appeared to allude to this -- then I must say that in my view there is no connexion with the latter question.

In any case, to decide whether or not you are in favour of the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons means taking up a political stand. We have taken up such a political stand: we are in favour of the elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons. We should like some clarification on the following question too: does the United States adopt the same political stand or not?

Since the United States representative spoke in great detail today on the threat which might arise from a small country suddenly obtaining an atomic bomb, and asked what a disarmed world could do in such a case, I should like to remind him of a very interesting film entitled "The Mouse That Roared". This was an English film. I do not know whether the United Kingdom Government had anything to do with it -- I rather imagine that it did not. In this film, which I myself have seen, a small duchy, which appears to resemble Liechtenstein and specializes in the manufacture of brandy for the United States, suddenly gets hold of an atomic bomb. In the United States everyone takes fright and preparations are made to send combined forces against the duchy. Then all is ready, it turns out that a mouse has got into the bomb and made it useless.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Well, this is a film comedy. It is very well produced as such, but it is also very relevant today in view of what has been said with regard to a small country suddenly gaining possession of a nuclear bomb. There is no need to invent fears and create comic situations. We are engaged in a serious task and I believe that, in seeking a political decision whether nuclear weapons should be prohibited or not, we should not immerse ourselves in such marginal aspects of the question. We await a clear political answer to this question from the United States.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I submit that the complete draft treaty outline that the United States has submitted is the clear answer to the representative of the Soviet Union.

Further, I suggest that Mr. Zorin has made the best possible statement as to why we should not try to outline cryptic language in Part I before we come to the actual drafting of the substantive part of the treaty.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Before reading the communiqué, I have a message for the Committee from the co-Chairmen. The co-Chairmen have agreed to recommend the Committee to devote the meeting to be held tomorrow, Friday, at 10 a.m., to the work of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

If there are no objections to this recommendation by the co-Chairmen, I shall take it as adopted.

It was so agreed.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its fifty-first meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Torabanov, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Bulgaria.

"The representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, India, the United States, Romania and Italy made statements.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 8 June 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.