

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 13 June 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. HAJEK

(Czechoslovakia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. ASSUMPÇÃO de ARAÚJO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARAÚJO

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. H. MINCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZELLA  
Mr. E. PEPICH

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HANID  
Mr. A. HANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K. K. RAO  
Mr. G.D. COMIAR

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. F. DE COURTEN

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. K. HASZKOWSKI  
Mr. H. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. O. IEDA  
Mr. A. CORCIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSCOV  
Mr. A.A. DOSHCHIN

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT  
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. V. BAZER  
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from French): I declare open the fifty-fifth meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. HASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I should like to deal today with the problems of the third stage of disarmament, also mentioning certain factors relating to the disarmament process as a whole. Under the plan submitted by the Soviet Union, execution of the measures in the third and final stage would bring about complete elimination, by all States, of their armed forces, armaments and military establishments. After the implementation of the treaty on disarmament, States would retain only agreed contingents of militia or police for maintaining internal order.

The Soviet disarmament plan leads to an unarmed world such as I have described through disarmament measures in the first and second stages, during which nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles would be destroyed, and conventional armed forces would be substantially reduced. The final disbandment of the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, which would number a million men each at the beginning of the third stage, and the disbandment of the numerically smaller armies of the other States, could easily be completed within the period of one year provided for in the Soviet draft. Thus in four years the process of complete disarmament would be finished.

When we examine the United States proposals for the last stage of disarmament, our attention is drawn to the lack of a specific time limit for completing the disarmament process.

Mr. Dean, the United States representative, tried yesterday to minimise the importance of this point. He said there was only one difference between the Soviet and the United States plans, namely, that they prescribed different periods for each stage, but that there was no difference in their final objectives.

In reality, the position is entirely different. The United States and their allies wish to carry out the measures in the first two stages in six years, which is twice as long as the period proposed by the Soviet Union. But even at the end of those six years the world would be a long way from complete disarmament, and what is more important, the end of the process would not be definitely in sight. That is the essential difference. The American disarmament plan is based on the principle that States would continue to have a large war potential, including atomic weapons, even in the third stage of disarmament. Under the American plan this potential in the third stage would differ quantitatively from the present potential of States, but as Mr. Lall, the representative of India, pointed out in

(Mr. Maszkowski, Poland)

his statement on 1 June, the structure of the war machine would change in favour of weapons of mass destruction. Armies would be numerically smaller, but relatively more saturated with nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction.

In this context we think it is worth mentioning an article by an American expert on disarmament. I refer to an article entitled "The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament" which Professor Thomas Schelling, the author of a number of works on disarmament, published in the quarterly review "Foreign Affairs" last April. This article throws a characteristic light on the thinking of influential United States experts on disarmament, and on their opinion on the problems connected with the last stage. In particular, the author is at pains to justify the need for the States concerned to retain an adequate proportion of their deterrent potential during disarmament. According to him the retention of a nuclear deterrent potential is an indispensable factor in the process of disarmament up to its completion, for it is the only possible way to prevent an attack by the other side. What is more, the author regards the retention of a deterrent potential as a guarantee that the other side will not break off the disarmament process.

I must say that this is really a very strange guarantee. Here is a quotation from the article in question;

"There should be no divorce between deterrence and disarmament. If disarmament is to work, it has got to improve deterrence and to stabilize deterrence."

For this deterrence Professor Schelling advocates a system that would leave nuclear weapons in the hands of States and establish supra-national police forces also equipped with nuclear weapons. But that is not all; Professor Schelling considers it an essential feature of the disarmament programme that States should retain the ability to re-arm. He writes:

"The straightforward elimination of so-called "military production facilities" might, by sheer coincidence, provide the stability; but stability is more likely if there is a deliberately designed system of "stable equal readiness for rearmament"."

In this connexion, Professor Schelling suggests that the treaty on disarmament should be accompanied by a prior agreement on the method of rearmament. Referring specifically to the United States he adds:

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"In this country we would certainly want to have careful rearmament plans ..."  
It may be asked why we quote at such length the opinions of an expert who, though well known it is true, does not express the official viewpoint of the United States Government. We do so because the Professor Schelling's philosophy clearly echoes the ideas of the United States plan. For we find in this plan, first, the idea of retaining sufficient armed forces for a nuclear strike until the last stage of the disarmament process; and secondly the idea of forming international armed forces equipped with means of deterrence, not excluding nuclear weapons, which continually recurs throughout the Western plan, reaching its full expression in the provisions of stage III.

I should now like to say a few words about the system for maintaining peace advocated by the United States as part of stage III.

The problem of the international forces already been referred to, which the United States calls the United Nations Peace Force, is obviously of capital importance. Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, tried yesterday to present us with a picture -- a rather gloomy one I would say -- of a disarmed world, in which the law of the strongest and the intrigues of so-called aggressive States concealing arms etc. would continue to prevail. In our view, the reason for this is that the Western Powers wish to apply the system of the armed world under the conditions that will obtain in a disarmed world. This explains their policy of maintaining a system based on force, the only difference being that it would have another name.

It is characteristic of the United States proposals -- and we have pointed this out before -- that they do not refer to any article of the United Nations Charter, within the framework of which this force would have to act; so we are fully justified in concluding that the force would be established on principles other than those of the Charter.

The provision in the United States plan that this armed force is to reach such strength during stage III that "no State could challenge it", shows that it is intended to be a powerful, supra-national army. The report on "Economic Impacts of Disarmament", published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, quoted here on Thursday last by the representative of Romania, proposes that the international forces should consist of two elements: "police forces" and "deterrent forces".

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According to American experts, in order to maintain these international forces, it would be necessary to provide in the United States budget for expenses of the order of 5,300 million dollars; this is assumed to be one-third of the amount needed to maintain the forces, which would be contributed by the United States. Thus the cost of maintaining the proposed armed forces would be about 15,000 million dollars a year. On considering this figure and comparing it with American views on the armament of the international force, one can only conclude that the United States envisages a huge army, heavily equipped not only with conventional arms, but also with nuclear weapons.

Although the United States constantly maintains that it wishes to leave open the question of nuclear arms for this force, that cannot alter the fact that the Western Powers are willing to have the international force equipped with nuclear weapons.

There is no need to prove that such an idea is entirely contrary to the principles of general and complete disarmament. Mr. Lall, the representative of India, spoke convincingly about this on 7 June (ENDC/PV.51, p.19).

Let us now examine the military and political implications of giving effect to such an idea.

It is clear that if nuclear weapons were left in the hands of what is called the United Nations Force, it would be necessary to provide production capacity for these weapons. Furthermore, if nuclear weapons were to be retained, it would be necessary to retain delivery vehicles for them. I am sure that neither Mr. Dean nor Mr. Godber would agree to nuclear or hydrogen bombs bearing the United Nations emblem being delivered to their targets by cutters or civil aircraft. If the force is to be equipped with nuclear weapons, it will also have to have rocket launching pads, a strategic air force etc., and there will have to be production facilities for these weapons too.

Consequently, the idea of equipping the international force with nuclear weapons cannot be reconciled either with the principle of total elimination of nuclear weapons advocated by the Soviet Union, or even with the principle of prohibiting production of these weapons and the means of delivering them, to which the United States delegation nevertheless agreed in the working draft of Part I of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament.



(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

It is difficult to imagine that the United States delegation does not appreciate that in these circumstances it would be necessary to decide where the nuclear weapons were to be produced and stored, where the delivery vehicles were to be manufactured, and where the rocket launching pads and the bases for atomic submarines and the strategic air force were to be situated.

I am quite sure the United States would never agree to all these things being in the territory of the Socialist States.

It is clear from what I have said, that the originators of these ideas of a supra-national super army are secretly counting on having the decisive voice as regards the use of this army. Hence it is not by chance that the authors of these plans -- for instance Mr. Cavalletti on 7 June 1962 -- consider it a defect in the Soviet plan that it refers to the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council for the adoption of sanctions against those causing a breach of the peace, and that it provides for a tripartite command for the forces made available to the Security Council.

Mr. Godber yesterday expressed doubts that the tripartite command would be able to reach agreed decisions. I am bound to say that we do not share Mr. Godber's pessimism, but apart from that, I should like to ask our United Kingdom colleague what alternative he sees. Would he prefer the decision to be imposed by one of the parties?

Putting the United States idea into effect would have another consequence. So long as it was materially possible to use nuclear weapons under the "international" label, each State would be encouraged to provide its own means of retaliation. That would obviously mean giving up disarmament.

The nuclear weapon, as we often said, is not like other weapons; its very existence throws a shadow over international relations, is a source of tension and undermines trust between States.

An international order in an unarmed world cannot be built on principles of peaceful co-existence and good neighbourly relations if, at the same time, it is based on "nuclear terror".

The Polish delegation considers that the United States conception of a security system in an unarmed world, not only is not based on objective necessities, but conceals within itself grave dangers for disarmament in general.

(Mr. Haszkowski, Poland)

The Soviet plan proposes, after the implementation of the third stage, a real and effective system for maintaining peace, which satisfies all requirements.

Article 37 of the Soviet draft treaty provides that, during the third stage of disarmament, States shall draw on the militia or police they retain to form units which will be placed at the disposal of the Security Council, under agreements concluded with the Council, if they are required for action to maintain international peace. This is the international security system provided for in the United Nations Charter, and the only system that can give satisfaction.

The Polish delegation has more than once had occasion to emphasize the need to jettison all the cold war ballast which unfortunately still weighs down the Western Powers' approach to the question of disarmament. It is high time to understand that war can no longer be a means of settling international disputes, that disarmament is an objective necessity, and that there is no other solution to this problem but general and complete destruction of the means of waging war, beginning with the most terrible weapon of all.

It must also be finally realized that the disarmed world, which will open a new era in the development of international relations, cannot be a world living in the shadow of nuclear weapons, no matter whether they are "national" or "supra-national".

Mr. LALL (India): My statement today will be divided into parts. First, I shall attempt to clear up certain points regarding our position on nuclear weapons, and secondly, I shall state some of our views on the important subject of peace-keeping measures and machinery.

I turn first to our position on nuclear weapons. I shall deal with certain aspects of that position because we are concerned to clear up any misunderstanding that might exist.

In this connexion, we have studied again very carefully the full terms of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations. I am bound to point out that there is no sanction whatsoever for nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction being continued after disarmament is achieved. The emphasis in this document is heavily on their elimination, and I would suggest that if it had ever been suggested in the General Assembly when this document was unanimously adopted that possession of nuclear weapons should continue in any way, grave reservations would have been expressed in the Assembly and the vote of unanimity would not have been obtained. The whole concept of this document is to end weapons of mass destruction.

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I know it has been argued that the document speaks of States and nations and not of the United Nations peace force, but that is necessarily the case because the United Nations peace force does not yet exist, and the question of liquidating or eliminating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the United Nations peace force does not arise at the moment. These weapons are only possessed by certain States and therefore the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles is restricted to the elimination of these weapons from the arsenals of States and nations.

I would like to draw attention to a final point of a technical character regarding this document. It is made clear in the second of the agreed Principles that "States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force". Now, these States and nations on the support of which the United Nations peace force must depend will be States and nations without any nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction. It follows that the support which would be rendered by the States and nations of the world can be of a non-nuclear character only. We would suggest that it was completely outside the concept, the whole working-out, of this document for anyone to contemplate the possession of nuclear weapons. That is the first point I would like to make today. It has been suggested, however, that "we have to be prepared to contemplate with equanimity the possibility that one or more States might have succeeded in secreting a few, and possibly a considerable number, of these weapons after the completion of general and complete disarmament". (EHDG/PV.51, p.51) This argument was attributed to me. Of course, I did not argue that at all. What I said was that at the moment, so far as I know, there is no sure scientific or technical way of being absolutely certain that there is full destruction of nuclear weapons. There is no complacency in the attitude or position of the Government of India regarding nuclear armament in any of its aspects. We hold the view that no country and no one can be allowed such weapons, not even the United Nations peace force, and much less any individual State. There can therefore be no misunderstanding about the position of India in this regard.

While I expressed the view, which I believe is correct, that today, there is no scientific possibility of being absolutely certain that every single nuclear warhead has been located and destroyed, there are, of course, scientific, technical and political ways of going a long way, and perhaps even going all the way, to making sure that there are no such weapons concealed. At the right time we ourselves

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will make suggestions in this connexion which we hope will be found of assistance. But I would like to point out that we have advocated in this room -- and I believe no one else has so far done this -- that in order to provide the necessary assurance and deterrent against any possible future concealment, although we do not expect any of the present nuclear Powers to adopt such base and self-incriminating tactics, we have proposed that the weight of control be considerably heavier on them than on any other country. This will probably be necessary for at least some years, and must be accepted by the nuclear Powers as the price which they will have to pay in the future for their present possession of weapons of mass destruction. It is a normal law of life that this kind of thing is not possible without a price being exacted at some time or other, and therefore those Powers which have seen fit to develop nuclear weapons must accept the price which the world community will exact from them in the way of heavier safeguards. I suggest that this shows there is anything but complacency in the attitude of the delegation which has been the only one to make this suggestion so far.

However, these heavier controls on the nuclear Powers may not be regarded by all of us as meeting all cases. For example, our United States colleague, Mr. Dean, referred to an important but hypothetical case when he spoke on 7 June as follows:

"If some very small nation that is not a party to this treaty should have some exceptionally brilliant scientist or if it should develop some process, nuclear or otherwise, which could wreak great destruction on the rest of the world, it might say to some other country, 'Do what we tell you, or else'". (ENDC/PV.51, p.36)

It is true that the suggestion I have made of heavier controls on the present nuclear Powers would not meet this case which Mr. Dean has raised. Some other way must therefore be found to meet it. We have the following suggestions to make regarding that sort of eventuality.

First, we would favour its being made a United Nations Charter obligation that all States Members of the United Nations must adhere to the disarmament treaty. We are sure that such an amendment to the Charter would be readily adopted. That is to say, it would be incumbent upon all States Members of the United Nations to adhere to the disarmament treaty. If they did not do so they would lose their rights, their privileges and their whole position as Members of the United Nations.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Secondly, all those countries that apply for membership in the United Nations must show and establish that they have adhered to the treaty on disarmament.

Thirdly, no country should be permitted to continue as a Member of any of the United Nations agencies unless it adheres to the disarmament treaty.

It is obvious -- I need not spell it out -- that these three categories will cover all States. Certainly by the time we enter into the disarmament treaty and the world picture is largely changed by the conclusion of that treaty, these three provisions will cover the whole ground. All States will thus be obliged to adhere to the disarmament treaty.

We think this is an entirely fair proposition. There certainly should not be any loophole in the arrangements into which we will enter at this Conference that would permit States to side-track the treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control in or for a peaceful world. Otherwise how could we achieve the objective of a peaceful world, which is certainly what we are here for?

So much for the remarks I felt obliged to make regarding our attitude on nuclear weapons and their complete and absolute elimination from the arsenals of all States and of any force for peace which will be created.

I now turn to peace-keeping arrangements. I should like to begin my remarks by saying how strongly we in the delegation of India adhere to the words in the first of the Agreed Principles in (EUDC/5) and to the further elaboration, in the seventh of the Agreed Principles, of the principle of the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and the strengthening of institutions for the maintenance of peace. I should like in passing to observe that paragraph 7, which is an elaboration of the sentence in paragraph 1, is interesting in the sense that it does not spell out the strengthening of institutions so far as the settlement of disputes by peaceful means is concerned, and, as regards the arrangements which should be made and developed for the maintenance of peace, it spells out just one of these measures -- that is, the international peace force. It says that there must be:

"the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments." (EUDC/5, page 3).

It goes on to say -- and we entirely agree with this provision:

"Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations." (Ibid.).

(Mr. Lall, India)

We want to make it very clear that our adherence to those parts of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles is absolute and unqualified.

Now I come to the two plans themselves, in regard to this important matter. We are glad to see, of course, that both plans start with the premise that they base themselves on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. In stages I, II and III of the United States plan there is a considerably greater amount of detail and elaboration of the Agreed Principles than there is in the Soviet plan. We welcome the effort which has been made in the United States plan to face up to this issue of the maintenance of peace and the machinery required for it and also the machinery required for the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, I am bound to point out one thing, just to get the perspective correct. It is that in the Soviet plan there is much more stated in the pre-disarmament stages. That is to say, before the commencement of stage I of disarmament measures, there is much more stated about obligations to maintain international peace and security than is stated in the United States plan. In the United States plan, on page 3 of document ENDC/30, there is a brief paragraph, namely, paragraph 4 of part B, "Principles", which deals with this matter. On the other hand, there are two paragraphs in article 3 of the Soviet plan in document ENDC/2, page 4 and one of these paragraphs has three parts. As a result largely, I suppose, of the fact that there was a larger spelling out in one plan than in the other, we find an even greater elaboration of this matter -- or a potentially greater elaboration of this matter, because all of it has not yet been agreed -- in document ENDC/40/Rev.1, namely, "Part I -- Outline of General Treaty Obligations". I would invite attention to the fact that there is more than one page of material now in this document, on which we are still working, and which will put into the general obligations that we will all assume a considerable amount of material dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security, including obligations to settle all disputes by peaceful means, to set up an international peace force with the necessary equipment and so on.

I would draw attention to the fact because there is going to be much more in part I of our treaty than has been included in the pre-disarmament stage in either of the two plans, and much more than is included in the United States plan. I make that point not to try to say that one plan is better or has anything to favour it over the other, but because it is relevant to certain remarks that I will now come to as I look at some of the details -- not all of them -- in the two plans, regarding this important matter of the maintenance of international peace and security. I will go through some of the points, beginning with stage I in both plans.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I should like to draw attention first of all to page 17 through 19 of the United States plan (ENDC/30). Because there is to be a spelling out in part I of the disarmament plan of the general obligations which we are to assume, some of the wording contained in this phase of the United States plan may be taken as already covered. However, if it is the general wish to repeat that wording in this phase of the disarmament plan which we will finally adopt, the delegation of India would not have any objection whatsoever to that.

In paragraph 1 of section H of the United States plan (ENDC/30, page 17), we find a repetition of the obligation by which we have bound ourselves as Members of the United Nations. We have no objection to this. I take it that the United States had it in mind that not all countries which are militarily significant are Members of the United Nations, and that it felt that these obligations which United Nations Members normally subscribe to should be covered again in the plan.

Coming to the interesting question and suggestion concerning the rules of international conduct, I must confess I have been a little baffled by this part of the United States plan. I am not at all sure that it is really possible to study this matter very effectively in the abstract. I of course believe that the manners of countries in their dealings with each other should be exemplary: if that is what the United States has in mind, then obviously our intentions are entirely identical. However I do not understand very well how this matter is to be studied in the abstract. Perhaps the United States delegation has in mind the way in which countries treat their neighbours. I should like to refer -- with a little more force than was possible a few days ago -- to the question of Laos. I take it that this is the sort of case that is envisaged. An international agreement has been formulated in respect of a small country that has been having certain difficulties with its neighbours. This agreement, which will have the effect of a treaty as soon as it is signed -- and one may hope that the agreement on Laos is very near the signature stage -- sets out the kind of behaviour which neighbouring States must adopt towards the small country in question.

If that is what is in mind -- and I entirely agree that situations like this might, unhappily, develop in the future even after we have general and complete disarmament -- then would it not be wiser and more practical to deal with such cases ad hoc? I will come back to this point in a more general way later. But

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I would say to the representative of the United States in particular that, while we agree that the conduct of countries in relation to each other should be exemplary and that we must find means of seeing that any deviation from such standards of conduct is dealt with; we would have thought that that would be best dealt with ad hoc rather than by an abstract study. I should be grateful if this possibility could be borne in mind.

Concerning pages 17 and 18 of the United States plan I should like to draw attention to paragraph 3 a, which sets out the method of dealing with disputes. Again I would draw attention to the fact that this is a repetition of Charter language, of Article 33 of the Charter. We have no objection to this repetition but it does not seem strictly necessary unless the United States delegation has in mind a contingency which I am not envisaging, namely that States which are not Members of the United Nations will adhere to the treaty on general and complete disarmament. As I said earlier in another connexion, I think that there will tend to be a coincidence between membership of the United Nations and adherence to the treaty on disarmament, on a basis of universality. However, I draw attention to that repetition.

The new thought which is contained in the United States paper, on the maintenance of international peace and security, is the idea of involving the International Court of Justice much more fully in the settlement of such disputes. This is a matter which is referred to both in the first stage in paragraph 3 b. under this section, and in the second stage. In principle we are perfectly willing to see this happen. We see nothing against it. We would like to see greater use being made of the International Court of Justice. I should like to point out that India itself has taken steps recently to alter its form of adherence by filing a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2 -- which we did in a new form on 14 September 1959 -- accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. We did this after having followed our good United States friends for almost a decade in their example of restricting adherence to the Connally type of amendment, or to something on the lines of that type of amendment. But we found, by experience, that we should move on from there. We hope that our friends in the United States will also move on to a fuller adherence.

We note with satisfaction that the Government of the Soviet Union has for the first time participated this year in the oral proceedings before the International Court of Justice concerning the request for an advisory opinion relating to the expenditure for the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations.



(Mr. Lall, India)

However, we have often said that we must be realistic in our discussions. We would like to point out that so far only thirty-eight States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, and two of these thirty-eight States are not Members of the United Nations. That means that only a little over one-third of the total membership of the United Nations has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court. Although the membership of the United Nations has gone up by about 70 per cent since 1955, no State accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court in 1961 and none has so far done so in 1962. We would also note that only one contentious case has been taken to the International Court in each of the years 1960 and 1961.

Quite clearly, in these circumstances, before we assign increased responsibility to the International Court, as suggested and contemplated in the United States plan, we must give some thought to the reasons for the reluctance of States to go to the International Court. Perhaps we should see whether some of these reasons can be removed. Otherwise the position will remain the same even after disarmament has been achieved -- that is to say, most States will not have adhered to the Statute of the Court.

We would now like to draw attention to some of the difficulties regarding the International Court, which are germane because this issue has been raised in the United States plan. Owing firstly to its recent origin, to the indefinite character and scarcity of its rules, and to the constitutional difficulty of creating new rules and amending obsolete ones, international law, more than domestic systems of law, exhibits considerable gaps and difficulties. The result is that a decision in accordance with the law is frequently impossible to arrive at. In addition, as Dean Pound put it:

"The legal order must be flexible as well as stable. It must be overhauled continuously to the changes of actual life which it is to govern. We are afraid that this has not happened in relation to the evolution of international law in its application to the realities of international life."

A somewhat similar thought -- and a very important one -- was expressed in The Common Law of Mankind, by Doctor Jenks, who said:

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"It is not the primary function of international law in the latter half of the twentieth century to protect vested interests arising out of an international distribution of political and economic power which has irrevocably changed, but to adjust conflicting interests on a basis which contemporary opinion regards as sufficiently reasonable to be entitled to the organized support of a universal community."

In addition, the rectification of this rather patently unjust situation has assumed considerable importance not only from the point of view of the legitimate interests of newly independent States which have become Members of the United Nations, but also from the point of view of the atmosphere in which the rule of law, which we would all like to see established, can truly flourish in international relations. If the rule of law is to mean the maintenance of the status quo, without provision for peaceful change, the new countries of the world will obviously find it difficult to accept such a rule of law. The newly independent States -- and we feel that it is necessary in our context here to remember them -- no less than the others are anxious for growth conducive to greater international co-operation in the peaceful settlement of international disputes in accordance with valid concepts of law and justice. In fact, I would say that the new States are even more strongly adherents to this kind of arrangement than the older States, which have perhaps become a little cynical -- although I do not want to make any accusation.

What the new States want is that the law in international affairs, by which their relations would come to be governed, should take into consideration the new realities of international life and the aspirations of their peoples. This idea has been put into words in a forceful and excellent manner by Judge Alvarez of the International Court in a supporting advisory opinion, and I would like to quote some of his words:

"According to current opinion [the International Court] has to apply the principles of international law deemed to be in existence at the moment when it delivers its judgement or opinion without considering whether they have in mind any more or less sudden changes or whether they are in accord with the new conditions of international life. It pertains, we are told, to the International Law Commission, created by the United Nations to determine what modifications should be made in international law. This is a view which it is impossible to accept. As a result of the great changes in international life that have taken place since the last

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social cataclysm it is necessary that the Court should determine the present status of law in each case which is brought before it and, when needed, act constructively in this matter."

One could refer to other aspects, but as time is getting on and as I have something else to say I would like to come to some more practical considerations regarding the International Court.

I would like to refer to another reason which has led to rejection of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Frankly, this is the lack of confidence in the impartiality of its judgements which does exist. The problem of putting beyond any possible doubt the impartiality, disinterestedness and wisdom of the Court is perhaps the most important one in relation to this issue of compulsory jurisdiction which has been raised by the United States plan.

We must frankly say that there is a feeling that since 1951 the Court has been constituted more on the basis of regional allocation of seats than according to the provision of the Statute itself which says that on the Court the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world should be represented.

Without in any way criticizing any of the learned judges or in any way objecting to the Court's composition, we in our delegation feel bound to point out that the vast majority of the world in Asia and Africa is represented by only three judges. We think that a court cannot establish its reputation for impartiality and fairness and a universality of view as a basis of its judgements and opinions if the distribution of seats is not obviously much more in keeping with the realities of life. Other parts of the world are more adequately represented. For example, the American Continent has five judges. We do not resent that in the slightest. We only point out that there will have to be a change in the overall position, perhaps by increasing the number of judges -- we are not trying to take away anything that anyone has -- if the Court is to establish itself on a basis of universality.

The interesting suggestions which have been made by the delegation of the United States must be considered in the light of these realities. Otherwise, we are afraid that the idea, good though it is, of adherence to the International Court and using it more frequently for the settlement of legal disputes will remain theoretical and it will not really be of much relevance to our treaty on disarmament.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Before passing to other aspects of the United States plan I should like to go back to this idea of an international study, which the United States suggested, by a subsidiary body of the international disarmament organization regarding rules of international conduct.

Since that is largely a judicial matter, I should like to draw attention to Article 13 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states:

"1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

"c. ... encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;"

I draw attention to this because I am sure it is not the intention of the United States delegation or of anyone here to try to sidetrack the United Nations. I am not saying that rules of conduct are international law but they impinge upon international law and I think we ought to conform to United Nations procedure where it exists and to approach this matter through United Nations bodies, even if it means expanding a little the interpretation of United Nations Articles, rather than to do things which might conceivably be contradictory to the Charter.

I should like to turn to section II, paragraph 3.c. of stage I of the United States plan (EHDG/30) in which there is the idea that:

"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes ... more effective;" (EHDG/30, page 18)

We have no objection whatsoever to studies, but under the Charter of the United Nations the peaceful settlement of international disputes is dealt with in Chapter VI, a Chapter which deals with the functions of the Security Council. Therefore, if such a study should be held we would suggest that it be done under the aegis of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. Otherwise, once again there is this aspect of overlooking Charter provisions. This suggestion gains force from the fact that all the various methods of settlement of disputes which the United States has been able to spell out in its plan are those included in Chapter VI of the Charter. Not a single new method has been envisaged. I suggest therefore that if there is to be any such study it should be in conformity with the concept of the

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United Nations Charter. We must not brush aside the Charter; I am sure that that is not the intention of the United States delegation. I therefore feel I am fully warranted in pointing out this consideration.

In paragraph 4 of section II of the United States plan the suggestion is that:

"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority and operation of the United Nations". (ENDC/30, page 18)

I must say that this is a little vague. It is difficult to understand what is meant here, but if something is meant I would say the concept might be that of a study by the United Nations more or less in line with the previous study. Otherwise I am afraid we shall get into a haze of considerable depth which I am sure is not the intention of the United States delegation. I am trying to make a suggestion which would make the proposal more practical. We do not object to the basic idea contained therein.

Paragraph 5 on the same page of the United States plan deals with the United Nations peace force and I should like to draw attention to certain ambiguities therein. It states that there should be an:

"a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of the United Nations forces for keeping the peace;". (Ibid.)

What does that mean? Does it mean the examination should lead to further strengthening? I would say: let the examination lead to a revelation of the facts and let the strengthening of the institutions be done by agreement. I feel that the examination should be restricted to the facts of the case, but it is not quite clear what this paragraph means.

I now come to the very important contents of paragraph 5 b, which states:

"b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;". (Ibid.)

Here I should like to draw attention to a slightly different wording in Article 18 of the Soviet plan for stage I, which says:

"all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, ... as provided for in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/2, page 13)

(Mr. Lall, India)

I do not wish to pronounce on which of these two formulations we would prefer, but I would draw attention to the fact that one is much stronger and more direct. In the United States plan paragraph 5 b. on page 18 deals with a very crucial matter, how the international peace force is to be set up. I take it that paragraph 5 c. on the same page which states "Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations peace force in stage II" is closely linked up with paragraph 5 b. -- that is, that the roots of the peace force will be found in the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. If that is so, then I would suggest that this part of our plan when it is finally adopted -- and here I am not talking of the two formulations before us -- must be direct and forthright on this matter.

As I have said previously, it is a matter of regret that Article 43 of the United Nations Charter has not been implemented and I think we must bind ourselves clearly and strongly to implement that Article and thus create the international peace force, which seems to be intended in the United States plan but which is set out in a manner which is not sufficiently strong. I hope that in the plan we finally adopt we can be much clearer on this matter.

The last idea contained in the United States plan is that stated in paragraph 6 on page 19, about the United Nations peace observation corps. I should like to say at once that the delegation of India has no objection whatsoever to the idea of a peace observation corps, but I suggest it is a matter for political judgement whether something of this kind is mentioned in the disarmament treaty. My reason for saying this is that peace observation arrangements can flow from the Charter of the United Nations. There is nothing to prevent a Member State or even a non-Member State from going to the United Nations and requesting that its frontier with another State be put under observation. This has been done before, it can be done again, and there is little point in duplicating these arrangements. I feel it is doubtful wisdom and this matter should receive consideration in the light of arrangements which are already feasible, which have been made and can be made again if and when the occasion arises.

I should like to turn to stage I of the Soviet plan. It contains two aspects, one of which I have already mentioned -- namely, the forthright way of pinning down stage II adherence to Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, which we welcome. Then, in paragraph 2 of Article 18 of the Soviet plan it states that the armed forces:

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"... shall form part of the national armed forces of the corresponding States and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength, equipped and prepared for combat." (ENDC/2, page 13)

Mr. Godber raised certain points regarding these issues and they should certainly be studied. I believe the representative of Italy also raised points in this connexion, and we think they should be studied also.

I would like to turn to the second stage of the United States plan because there are a few other ideas there on which one should comment. Indeed, I have already dealt with points relating to the International Court, the rules of conduct, and indirect aggression and subversion. I have said, with regard to indirect aggression and subversion, that this matter should rather be dealt with ad hoc, as and when cases arise, as was done for Laos. If Mr. Dean will forgive me, I feel bound to ask him to help me to understand part of the statement he made on 21 May. I think Mr. Godber quoted from this statement. I am not going to quote all of the remarks Mr. Dean made but I would like to draw attention to one important point. Mr. Dean said:

"We will still be faced with conflicting ideologies and with political struggles, and social systems will be subject to disruptive pressures from within and from without." (ENDC/PV.40, page 9)

With great respect, I would like to know what Mr. Dean had in mind when he talked about "disruptive pressures from within". I suppose that he means "within a State". I would suggest that happenings of this kind within a State are not going to be the concern of the international disarmament organization just as it is not the concern of the Charter of the United Nations. This is not a matter which we can deal with here, and I am sure that it is not the intention of the United States to do so. But these words at least create some doubt, which I hope will be cleared up. Besides, having read this whole paragraph and examined this question of international rules of conduct, I am bound to say -- and I am saying this rather lightly, trusting that it is not the case -- I hope Mr. Dean will not fall into the old isolationist pattern. It seems to me that there would be rather strong, water-tight compartments around each State and that there would be no influences permitted from outside.

I would like to remind Mr. Dean that the Prime Minister of India has publicly said on more than one occasion that we owe a good deal in our Constitution to that of the United States. I hope Mr. Dean does not regard that sort of outside influence

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as subversive. There are good breezes which blow around the world and this sort of locking up of each State and telling them to protect themselves from all outside influences could be most unfortunate.

We have, of course, in our Constitution and in the policy of our Government, which is to create a socialist India, obviously borrowed from other sources; and it will be our intention to make available things which other people can borrow -- of course adapting anything which they might borrow to their own particular needs. Obviously, when we borrow we do not borrow slavishly; we adjust ideas to our own needs and then let those ideas grow on the basis of our own requirements. There is in the United States plan some suggestion that we should all be locked up in separate rooms. I think that would be most unfortunate and I would hope that the United States would see to it that in the plan which we finally adopt there would be no suggestion of that kind. Undoubtedly the ideas of the United States Constitution were subversive when they were adopted -- very subversive. Ask the United Kingdom of those days how subversive they were. Yet we took some of those ideas into our own Constitution. Perhaps -- although I do not think so -- the United Kingdom thought it subversive that we adopted them.

We must not be so opposed to the spread of ideas, subversive or otherwise, provided a country decides for itself, unhampered by any influences from outside -- direct influences, the impingement of force: political, economic or military -- as to how it will use those ideas and what its social pattern will become. That is the right of a community, to develop and to decide. I think that if we do not admit that right the international peace force of the United Nations will be so busy that it will be decimated in the first three months of its existence. We would not like that to happen.

I turn now to paragraph 5 (ENDC/30, page 26), in which the United States has the valuable idea of national legislation in support of the treaty. We are wholly in favour of and welcome that idea. I have compared this with the Soviet plan in which I found two or three references to national legislation supporting, for example, the elimination of nuclear weapons, the cessation of military training, and so on. But we think it would be preferable on the whole to have one omnibus clause regarding national legislation as proposed in the United States plan, when we come to adopt the good disarmament plan which we will all adhere to.



(Mr. Lall, India)

Let us turn briefly to the last stage of the two plans and see what they say about this important matter. If the representative of the United States will excuse me, I must confess that I found paragraph 1 vague. It says:

"The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature." (ENDC/30, page 32)

That is a bit vague and I am not quite sure that I understand what it means. Perhaps at some future time, if the United States would like to continue this thought, it would be good enough to explain it further.

I have already talked about the rules of conduct and I will not say any more about them.

I turn to paragraph 3, which reads:

"The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no states could challenge it." (Ibid.)

I suppose the idea of the word "progressively" is that the forces in national armies will still be in the process of being reduced, but I would be in favour of omitting this word, so that it would read "the Parties to the Treaty would strengthen the United Nations Peace Force ..."

The point is this. We have envisaged the creation of that force, under agreements with the Security Council, as provided in Article 43 of the Charter, and I think that again there is a certain weakness of language which could be overcome.

I would like to make a few comments on the last part of the Soviet provisions regarding this matter. I must say that I think it is well to say that:

"the States parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness that part of the police (militia) contingents" --

I would say "peace force" --

"which is intended for joint international enforcement action."

(ENDC/2, pages 23 and 24)

I think that is put in a forthright manner.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Various parts of the Soviet article, namely, the stationing of these troops and their command, were referred to by Mr. Godber yesterday. I would say that those considerations which he had in mind should certainly be considered, and I must confess that while we are glad to see that the wording of the Soviet draft adds up to the fact that the international peace force will be a force, we are of the opinion -- tentatively, at any rate -- that the suggested method of command would be extremely difficult to implement in practice.

We would imagine that this would certainly require further thinking. Unfortunately, the very nature of an armed force is that it should be able to act expeditiously. We doubt whether that would be possible under the arrangements which are suggested, though we understand the spirit underlying them, namely, that there should be a wide basis of agreement for the use of such a force. That, of course, is an excellent idea, but when it comes to implementation of action by the force itself, then we feel that such a distribution of immediate command would not be very practical.

We take note of and welcome the idea that the areas in which these special contingents are to be stationed will be the subject of agreements to be concluded with the Security Council. That, we think, might get around one of the points which was raised by Mr. Godber. I think he said that these forces should be stationed in other countries. Provided these forces are stationed in agreement with the Security Council, the matter would be adequately covered. We think that that suggestion is well worth pursuing.

I should like to say, finally, that as we go through these articles -- and we have taken the liberty of going through them in this room today -- we find that there is not much difference between the peace-keeping machineries suggested in the two plans. The peace-keeping machinery suggested is the United Nations force. In both plans the basis of the United Nations force is Article 43 of the Charter. We welcome the fact that though the wording is different, though there has been a great deal of, if I may respectfully say so, talk about differences, there is not as much difference as we expected to find. We welcome the approach of our United States colleague yesterday, which was to find the similarities in the last stage of the plan; we thought that was a very helpful analysis.

Coming back to these matters, we think that the United Nations peace force is more or less common ground and that agreement could be reached on its manning, on its armament -- a very important matter -- on its stationing, and on its command.

(Mr. Lall, India)

So far as other matters are concerned, some studies are proposed by the United States. Our view is that these studies should be undertaken in the light of and in conformity with the corresponding United Nations Charter provisions so as to make it quite clear that we are not side-stepping the United Nations.

Regarding the matter of peaceful settlement of disputes, which is a third point in my concluding remarks, I should like to say that both plans agree that peaceful settlement should be in accordance with United Nations procedures. The United States, in addition, introduces the International Court of Justice. We have made remarks to indicate that, while we agree with the idea in principle, we find that it will not really shift the practical factors very much unless the International Court of Justice can be made much more acceptable to the world community of States.

Fourthly, there is the question of international rules. We would make the suggestion that these should be developed ad hoc, as in the case of Laos, rather than by a somewhat abstract study.

Fifthly, there is the United States suggestion about peace observation. We think that that is already provided for and can be operated under the Charter of the United Nations, and that it may not be necessary to spell this out again.

Sixthly, we welcome the idea of national legislation in support of the treaty. We would strongly support it.

I should like to say, in conclusion, that while we must be ready to safeguard international peace and security we must be even more ready to come together in the future when we have disarmed, to solve the questions that will arise. It is quite true, as has often been stressed by the representative of the United States, that general and complete disarmament will not create a Utopia. I would go further and say that general and complete disarmament together with peace-keeping machinery will not create a Utopia.

The will of man for peace, the will of man to discuss things in a sensible and in a reasonable way, will be of great importance throughout. This impinges upon the suggestion I have made for a pragmatic, ad hoc, approach to the settlement of some questions which will arise. We hope that that can be borne in mind.

(Mr. Lall, India)

There is one point which I should touch upon, and I mention it particularly to our United States colleague. When he spoke on 24 May, he expounded some of the past efforts which have been made in our century for the peaceful settlement of disputes. He pointed out that from the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 until the commencement of World War II, there had been negotiated some 300 Conventions, bilateral and multilateral, for the pacific settlement of disputes -- Conventions which, I believe, are still in force. This is a most striking fact because it most clearly emphasizes that what was lacking when we came to the mid-thirties was not the means for peaceful settlement of disputes -- there were these 300 international Conventions -- but general and complete disarmament under international control. Those 300 agreements for the settlement of disputes are still there. What we do not have -- the missing piece in our whole situation -- is general and complete disarmament under international control. That is what is missing, and that is what we must supply. On Mr. Dean's own argumentation I would submit that this is what comes strikingly and emphatically to our mind.

We hope, now that we are approaching a recess that we will come back with much greater vigour to achieve the placing of this great missing piece, the absence of which has resulted already in two world wars. But may I recall that not only these two wars but all the wars that man has had have resulted in a total explosion of only five megatons of explosive force, whereas today, if there is a war, we know very well that thousands of megatons of explosive force will result and that there will be no future for anyone.

We hope, therefore, that when we come to consider these matters we will realize that the main emphasis has rightly been placed by the General Assembly on a treaty now for general and complete disarmament under control.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): I must confess that I feel at somewhat of a disadvantage, having to speak after that brilliant learned and comprehensive statement of Mr. Lall. However, I must ask the Committee's indulgence in taking it back to my simpler approach to disarmament problems.

Now that our Committee has decided to take a recess, it may be in order to take stock of what we have achieved in the first round of our talks, to think of what we should set as our goal for the next round, and of the most promising means of approaching that task.

It was natural and logical that the first round of our talks should have been, as it indeed proved to be, one of general exposition and clarification of both parties' general approach and viewpoints, a period of delineation of the outlines and scope of each disarmament plan. As such, it was not to be expected that it should have been a round of agreement or settlement, or even one of real negotiation.

As a matter of fact, it was a necessary and inevitable stage in our deliberations, in order to acquaint and familiarize the eight new delegations, or some of them, with these plans and viewpoints. And what is more, this has taken place, and largely in a serious, workmanlike and businesslike fashion.

Apart from the aforementioned considerations, it has been possible for our Committee to score some further gains.

The many questions and requests for clarification which came from the eight new members, as well as other members, did open up many avenues and considerations, and did point to some possibilities of readjustment.

We submit that, in order to achieve progress in our second round, we should pick up the thread where we left off and should not go back to a reiteration of the same old positions and the same old arguments. A re-thinking by each party of its position, in the light of the suggestions and constructive criticisms which have been voiced in the first round, and in accordance with the other side's known and legitimate interests, may now be in order, I submit.

In the course of our study of a draft treaty for general and complete disarmament, we have come across some substantive and basic problems. As was natural and to be expected we forged ahead in the first exploratory round, with our review of both the draft treaty and the treaty outline before us. This may well have been the right procedure to adopt in the first round. The general theory and strategy of disarmament obviously differ extremely from the Soviet

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and Western viewpoints in so far as proposed steps for each stage, the order of those measures, their scope, pace, and the relative importance given to inspection, control and so forth are concerned. In the interest of the speedy conclusion of the first exploratory and general review stage of our work, our Committee reviewed and studied the two draft treaties simultaneously in one and the same session. Sometimes we would even emerge from a discussion of the first stage of one plan to plunge into a review of the second stage of a completely different plan of a dissimilar context and an almost incomparable nature; then we would shuttle back to yet another aspect of the first plan and so on. This, we submit, was not the most helpful method to contribute to the visualisation of the general context and import of either of the plans, nor to a proper appreciation or assessment of all their intentions, purpose and results. Nor does this method, even if it suited the special purpose of the first, exploratory stage, lend itself to the Committee's joint effort in the next round, aimed at filling the gaps in either plan and at slowly evolving both plans and bringing them around to the point where they can finally be brought nearer together, thus satisfying the known legitimate requirements of one and all.

The process of the simultaneous confrontation and contrasting of the two plans in the same session or at alternate sessions naturally gave way to the temptation to indulge in due and undue criticism rather than to an effort to be constructive, to try to evolve either plan and bring it nearer to the common goal.

The Soviet and the United States plans are conceived according to a special and different theory of disarmament, the one based on conventional strategy envisaging the total elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage and the total elimination of the atomic deterrent in the second stage after thirty months; and the other based on nuclear strategy and aimed at keeping the nuclear deterrent until the very last -- not to mention other, no less fundamental, differences of approach. Naturally and logically, all other steps, measures and stages of each plan, and logically all the argumentation of one and the other party, assumed two distinct levels and were put into two dissimilar contexts. How could the Committee be expected to attempt any constructive endeavour at harmonizing these two different-level plans?

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During the recess could we not engage ourselves in thinking of a more constructive method of work in order to avoid useless, and indeed baseless, contrasts between the two plans which cannot be compared in point of each step, each stage and each detail, but only, and finally, as a general whole, only as far as effect and result are concerned?

Naturally, in the midst of our study of each plan we shall come upon certain substantive basic problems such as control; balance; practicability; different strategic concepts, nuclear and conventional; the advantages of a one-stroke elimination of delivery vehicles or of a gradual percentage-wise elimination; foreign bases and national bases; disengagement; thinning out, re-deployment, and the like.

In our humble submission it should be possible, along with our study of each plan, to set aside some meetings, either of a Committee of the Whole or of any other forum to be agreed upon, formal or informal, for the study of such substantive questions. But they should not be discussed in isolation or necessarily in contrast to other plans, but mainly in the context and within the framework of their own plan. By its very nature, this may be a more constructive approach.

I will now turn briefly to the work of the Committee of the Whole. We hope that the agreement on the priority discussion of the next two items will lead to more substantive agreement. As we all know, however, a procedural agreement to initiate study is no guarantee of the success of the study. We all agree on the usefulness of the suggested collateral measures for lessening tensions, building confidence and facilitating agreement on general and complete disarmament. Mr. Atta, the representative of Nigeria, was good enough to review the practical difficulties and hurdles standing in the way of implementing each, or almost each, of the proposed individual collateral measures. The difficulty our two co-Chairmen have encountered in agreeing on the order of discussion of the subsequent items after war propaganda points to the possibility that almost every one of the collateral measures suggested by the United States and the Soviet Union necessitates certain conditions which will probably not be attainable before agreement on general and complete disarmament, and the controls and confidence which go along with it. And yet those collateral measures were supposed to facilitate reaching general and complete disarmament.

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In order to break this vicious circle and to overcome the practical obstacles in the way of implementing individual collateral measures, could we not think, during our recess, of the possibility of discussing, with a view to implementing, some or all of the collateral measures proposed by East or by West or otherwise, as a package arrangement? The idea behind this tentative thought, which we formulate for what it may be worth, is that each individual measure may complete and sustain the others and satisfy some of the requirements for the successful implementation of the others, sometimes even balancing one another, so that the general picture may be a more stabilized and balanced one than in the case of the implementation of just one individual measure. It may be worthy of mention that such a package arrangement of collateral measures, aside from favouring the preservation of the requisite balance, may easily facilitate future agreement on disarmament and lead to such a treaty. It may also be a useful testing ground for building and verifying possible similar disarmament techniques. In other words, could this package arrangement not serve as a preliminary stage connected with or leading into the disarmament process?

The eight new member States of this Conference presented their memorandum on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests on 16 April. Since then the three nuclear Powers have held many meetings of their Sub-Committee. While it is a source of gratification to my delegation that the joint memorandum should have been accepted by all three nuclear Powers, we must hasten to admit that nothing could have been further from the thinking of the eight sponsors than to have its interpretation made the subject of polemics and controversy. To the delegation of the United Arab Republic, as one of the sponsors, the memorandum was conceived in terms of a compromise stand between the original two viewpoints. As one of its co-sponsors, we never intended it to be construed as identifiable with any of those extreme stands. Accepting the memorandum would to us, therefore, be tantamount to accepting a new spirit or a new premise, meeting the basic requirements of security of both East and West, as the eight new States saw them.

We have noted that, at least in principle, some movement away from past stands is detectable; but we hope that this movement will be carried to a more meaningful and conciliatory end. In order to help contribute to reaching that end, my delegation would venture to recall that the implementation of international agreements can be guaranteed only up to a certain point. Elements that work in



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favour of such implementation are the moral consensus and compunctions of the world, as well as the obvious interest of all parties to a treaty in compliance with it and in the prevention of incurring possible sanctions. The representative of Mexico, in his eloquent statement of 9 May 1962, voiced similar considerations. Thus, acceptance of a test ban treaty would offer the prospect of a reasonable settlement, compliance with which is motivated by the moral will of the whole world as well as by the self interest of the parties.

Under such a test ban treaty, a party which chose to defy international public opinion, thus going against its own self-interest, would also be appropriating the onus of allowing the other parties to determine their own course of action with regard to the treaty. The parties which have respected the treaty will not have suffered irreparable damage. It has been observed that the time space between the testing by one party and the new counter-series of tests undertaken by the other party has not exceeded a few months.

The United States and the United Kingdom on 3 September 1961 offered the Soviet Union the conclusion of a treaty ending tests in the atmosphere, with no additional control measures other than those embodied in the national systems, leaving the question of the disputed underground tests until such time as a new scientific break-through had made it easier to come to an understanding about this field. Obviously, and logically, the United States and the United Kingdom selected this field of atmospheric tests as the target for their treaty because they realised that it was from atmospheric tests that most of the dangers emanated, whether in the field of the arms race or of radioactive fall-out or radiation and other atmospheric disturbances. The same applies even more forcefully to tests in outer space. It was also because they realised that atmospheric tests presented no major controversy or no difficulty in relation to identification that they made this conciliatory and tempting offer.

The Soviet Union did not accept that offer then -- on the grounds that it would leave the door open for underground tests -- and it went on with its atmospheric tests. But on 28 November 1961 the Soviet Union offered the other nuclear Powers the conclusion of an agreement banning atmospheric tests -- which again represented the greatest danger -- as well as under-water and outer-space tests under a treaty obligation, offering at the same time the imposition of a voluntary suspension of underground tests. The United States and the United Kingdom

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refused that offer, and once again gave as grounds the same reason as first put forward by the Soviet Union, namely, that it would leave the door open for underground tests.

We may ask ourselves: why is it that each party came around with this apparently conciliatory and easy-to-accept offer when the other party was in no position to accept it? We may go one step further and again ask ourselves: Since less than a year ago it was possible for one party and the other to offer a test ban treaty banning atmospheric tests, with no additional international obligatory controls required, and relegating the solution of the more thorny, less important underground tests to some future date, would it not again prove possible for both parties to give a little here and a little there and arrive at a settlement which might embody the desires, and indeed the spirit, of the offers of both parties already referred to?

Again one is still tempted to ask oneself whether, since both parties have already conducted their atmospheric tests, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union could not with a little more effort synchronize their timing, so that their moments of conciliatory and tempting offers could coincide with the propitious moments of receptiveness of the others.

Much has already been said about the advantages and disadvantages of conducting atomic tests. However, one thing is certain, namely that no matter what their degree of relative success, atomic tests have failed to impart a real sense of security to the party which conducts them. This party will always be in a race against his adversary, against himself, and against science. As this race goes on and on the feeling of security grows less and less, until finally one party decides to end this intolerable insecurity by putting his atomic bombs to the real and final test. This will be the end of his tests, of his insecurity, and of the world. However, this is only one way to end tests.

What I am more concerned with tackling at this particular juncture is the spirit which should characterize the nuclear Powers' approach to the interpretations on the implementation of the joint memorandum.

I submit that there is another way to end tests -- a way based on the same spirit of conciliation and practicality which was apparent in the United States and United Kingdom offer of 3 September 1961 and in the Soviet Union offer of 28 November 1961. I should like to leave this thought with the Committee for further consideration and study during the imminent recess.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Within the next round could this not be brought about? Could not an agreement be signed, reiterating the spirit of those previous offers, carrying them one step further and harmonizing them with the spirit and content of the joint memorandum?

We have been filled with anxiety and thoroughly disturbed by reports of forthcoming Western or Eastern atomic tests at a very high altitude, that is, in outer space. Reputed scientists from all corners of the world have drawn our attention to possible disturbances and the grave ill-effects which may result from tampering with the tremendous forces of that largely unknown area, outer space.

Apart from all those possible unknown evils and expected known dangers, there is the certainty that if any party conducted tests in outer space a hitherto dormant arms race in outer space would be unleashed. Once this process began there would be no stopping it.

It will do us no good to try to lay the blame at the doorstep of this party or that party. The tragic fact will remain that in outer space, as well, the world will have unfortunately reached that point of no return. This is no fantasy or pure imagination, although it may very well be a nightmare. Therefore we should all do our utmost to prevent those evils and dangers of tests in outer space from materializing.

The conclusion of such a treaty will in all probability act as a catalyst. It will set forth a chain reaction of related beneficial side-effects, lessening other political tensions, building up much-needed confidence, imparting fresh hopes, and removing bottlenecks and hurdles on the collateral measures and the disarmament negotiating tables.

Assuredly the advent of that happy and long-awaited event, the signature of a test ban treaty, will be the right way to end the atomic arms race. We have good reason to believe that all parties concerned will honour and respect such a treaty; for it will serve their own self-interest, as well as the interests of all humanity.

There is sometimes a tendency to picture the work of our Committee as a controversy, a dispute, or a political confrontation between East and West. The fact of the matter as we conceive it -- and as we would rather the whole Committee and world public opinion saw it -- is that all of us in this disarmament Conference are members of one team. The truth is that we are all pitted against the forces of war and destruction, that we are all exerting our efforts for the triumph of reason and the preservation of peace and all that is good in our society. In this

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

we are all on the same side. If we accept this theory that we are all members of one and the same team, animated by the same desires and working for the same ends, then we are in duty bound to convey this message through our Press and other media of communication to our peoples in order to suppress the tendency to picture our work as a dispute or a quarrel between two divergent camps.

Our task will be made easier only if world public opinion comes to the realization that what is at stake here at this Conference is not the United States or the Soviet Union disarmament plan -- for the final product of our talks will probably be neither American nor Russian -- but rather the cause of world peace, and the happiness and prosperity of all our peoples. The world Press has its line of duty neatly cut out for it here.

The presence of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of our countries at the beginning of the first round has given our work a useful impetus and its initial momentum. Their deliberations and contacts have helped clarify and open up many issues. Many of their statements and proposals were thought-provoking and inspiring to the extreme. We are all desirous that our next round should bear more fruit than our first. We would like to leave the following thought with our two co-Chairmen and with the Committee: that other ways and means, liable to give our work at the next round the required impetus and renewed momentum, should be considered.

In order to keep the door open for fruitful negotiation during the second round, we would wish to join our voice with the many similar appeals made by my colleagues exhorting the big Powers to spare no effort during the recess and thereafter to improve the political atmosphere and to shun any recriminations which may further increase tension. Above all they should, patiently and without interruption, continue their endeavours, always groping for ways and means to solve outstanding political problems which have a direct bearing on our task.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened most attentively to the statements made by the representatives who have already spoken this morning; I have found them very interesting and helpful and my delegation will certainly give them the most careful consideration.

Today I should like to speak on two subjects which are of importance in connexion with all three stages of our plan: the United Nations peace force, and verification.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As I said yesterday, the difference between the United States and the Soviet Union draft treaties is not just a matter of timing in the various stages. I believe that there are differences which are conceptual.

First, let me turn to the United Nations peace force, which our United Kingdom colleague discussed in some detail yesterday. I have read his statement in the verbatim record and have very little to add to his very able presentation; I agree with it.

As the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out yesterday, in the completely disarmed world States cannot entrust the protection of their vital interests solely to negotiations, conciliation, mediation, resolutions and the like. These methods are of course very important and I do not mean in any way to cast the slightest aspersion on these key and most important diplomatic activities. However, the history of international relations shows that they have never been sufficient in themselves to deter a State determined to impose its will upon another State. Indeed, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter envisages other methods.

I would doubt that any country, and I include my own, would actually be prepared to disband its armies and to relinquish all its armaments -- something we hope we can accomplish through our efforts here for general and complete disarmament -- before it is confident, and can say so to its people, that an effective international peace force exists which could if necessary defend it against aggression and safeguard its legitimate interests.

Our Soviet colleague, Mr. Zorin, suggested in our fifty-first plenary meeting, that:

"The fact that disarmament itself will be the surest and most certain means of securing peace and the security of States is disregarded. When the means of waging war are destroyed, when States dispose of neither armies nor armaments, no one will be able to start a war and no will be able to apply force or the threat of force in international relations." (ENDC/PV.51, p.12)

I wish I could agree with my Soviet colleague, but I simply do not find this statement realistic. All of us around this table know, I am afraid, that some of the means of aggression -- indeed, I might even say some of the means of warfare -- do not require tanks, machine guns and artillery. David, I believe, killed Goliath with a sling shot. Samson is supposed to have used the jawbone of an ass as a weapon.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As I pointed out in an earlier statement, even after general and complete disarmament one State could still interfere, directly and even violently, with the sovereignty and the independence of another State. One State could send into the territory of another State trained agents capable of wreaking great destruction, by poisoning the water supply, by improvised bombs, by burning property, by sabotaging crucial facilities in a great city, and so forth.

If events of this nature should take place, it is hardly possible that the victimized State or its people would be content supinely to suffer the damage. Such a State would undoubtedly do its utmost to muster all the forces at its command to protect itself, and might even seek to re-arm itself, unless -- I repeat, unless -- there existed an effective international peace force which could be relied upon for protection.

The United States draft outline describes in general terms the best means we could devise for the creation of an effective and reliable United Nations peace force. Let me describe briefly its provisions and demonstrate how we believe that our proposals would contribute to the achievement of a disarmed and peaceful world. The first part of our proposal is found on page 18 of document ENDC/30, paragraph 5 of section H.

In stage I, the parties to the treaty would undertake to develop arrangements for the establishment in stage II of a United Nations peace force. To this end, the parties would agree on a number of steps. First of all, the parties would agree to an examination of the experience of the United Nations, leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace.

The parties would also agree to examine the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. Finally, the parties would conclude an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations peace force in stage II. This agreement would include definitions of the peace force's purpose, its mission, its composition, its strength, the disposition of this force, its command and control, the training, the logistic support, the financing, the equipment and armaments.

First of all, it may be asked, why should we examine the experience of the United Nations in order to strengthen the United Nations forces for keeping the peace? The answer is that the United Nations has been in existence for some sixteen years and in this significant period -- only a few years shorter than that between the two great World Wars -- the United Nations has engaged in a substantial number of very important operations or efforts to keep the peace.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

These operations have varied in scale. There have been relatively small operations, such as the United Nations commission in Greece in 1947. Then there have been some large-scale operations, such as was involved in the organization of the forces under the Unified Command in Korea, pursuant to the resolution of 25 June 1950, which involved the contribution of many divisions of men, heavy armaments, vast supply problems, and the like; or in the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, to which I shall advert later.

On some occasions a relatively small number of countries have participated. In other cases many countries have been involved, as in the recent case of the Congo. But permit me to point out that, as I am sure you are all aware, while the United Nations forces -- not including any forces from the great Powers -- have been involved in the Congo, the ability to get those men to the Congo and in many cases to supply them with food and logistic support has depended on the existence of arms and transportation in the hands of the great Powers or other Powers which have helped the United Nations in this operation. If every country was completely and totally disarmed, these forces would not be readily available to the Secretary-General; to be given to the United Nations forces or to be utilized at his request.

It seems to me that we have a valuable opportunity, which it would be difficult to overestimate, to examine the problems and solutions which were found in the various situations. If we take advantage of this opportunity and apply the lessons of United Nations experience in the past, then we should be able to take important steps in strengthening the ability of the United Nations to keep the peace.

I have referred to the "feasibility" of concluding the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, because there is a real question whether it will prove feasible. In passing, I call attention to the fact that when the United Nations Charter was drafted in San Francisco in 1945, Article 43 was not drafted with the idea that we would be carrying out general and complete disarmament. That is a very important fact that should not be forgotten when statements are made to the effect that everything can be carried out in accordance with Article 43. The agreements envisaged in Article 43 are to be concluded between the Security Council and Members of the United Nations; thus these arrangements are subject to veto by any permanent member of the Security Council.

I think we all remember what happened in the United Nations Military Staff Committee when it sought to lay the basis for agreements under Article 43 shortly after the founding of the United Nations. It did not prove possible to map out a

(Mr. Dean, United States)

plan acceptable to all the permanent members of the Security Council, or even to agree upon the principles which should govern the organization of the forces to be made available to the Security Council under Article 43. I am sorry to say that no agreements were ever reached. We are quite prepared to try again, but I must ask, in the light of our past experience, whether it is wise to pin all our hopes on agreements pursuant to Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, as is the case in the Soviet draft treaty.

In addition to the possibility of implementing Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, the United States plan also states that the parties to the disarmament treaty would agree to conclude agreements among themselves for the establishment of a United Nations peace force in stage II.

The United Kingdom representative yesterday gave us some very valuable thoughts concerning a number of the problems which would arise in organizing the United Nations peace force. We welcome the views of our United Kingdom colleague and subscribe to the three principles which he has developed.

I am sure that everyone at this table will agree that this Conference is particularly fortunate to have sitting with us one representative who has personally served the cause of international peace-keeping in the zone of actual danger. I refer of course to the representative of Canada, General Burns, who has not only headed the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in the Near East but also commanded the United Nations Emergency Force. It seems to me that the contribution of constructive ideas by such countries as Canada, as well as other countries which have participated in United Nations peace-keeping activities, will be invaluable.

In stage I, the United States also proposes that the parties to the treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a peace observation corps (ENDC/30, page 19, paragraph 6). It appears to us that it would be significant contribution to the ability of the United Nations to maintain peace for it to have a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. In addition, elements of the peace observation corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

Experience in the United Nations demonstrates that the presence of impartial representatives of the United Nations can have a stabilizing effect in troubled areas and can even prevent the outbreak of hostilities. Again, we think we should



(Mr. Dean, United States)

examine the experience which the United Nations has had in this field and should draw on that considerable experience in establishing the peace observation corps.

We have heard a good deal from our Soviet colleague, to the effect that the United States plan seeks to bypass the United Nations. Nothing could be further from the truth; indeed, I welcome the statement made by the representative of India on that point this morning. On the contrary, the United States wishes to strengthen the United Nations by creating a United Nations peace force which can guarantee effectively the rights of States as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Zorin has stated on many occasions that Article 43 of the United Nations Charter provides the means for establishing forces which may be used by the Security Council, but this certainly does not mean that Members of the United Nations may not agree to create institutions such as the United Nations peace force which may be necessary in order to safeguard, in a world of general and complete disarmament, their fundamental rights under the United Nations Charter.

Article 43 of the United Nations Charter does not exhaust the means provided in the Charter to ensure the collective security of Members of the United Nations. As I have already mentioned, we have behind us valuable experience, some of it representing improvisation in the face of urgent requirements, some growing out of the broad recommendatory powers of the General Assembly as laid down in Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Charter and all of it entirely within the authority of the United Nations. Thus there exists ample precedent and broad authority to carry out within the framework of the Charter what we have in mind in improving the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations.

I wish to turn briefly now to the subject of verification.

As the representative of Brazil so ably pointed out yesterday, verification is essential to our efforts here; without progress towards agreement on this problem we cannot make much progress towards our goal of general and complete disarmament.

In the case of verification -- and the representative of the United Arab Republic pointed this out this morning -- the differences between the two plans are considerable in both stage I and stage II, as has become evident in our discussion here. The basic differences indeed appear to continue into stage III, even to the end of the disarmament process. In the United States plan verification of agreed reductions and of the cessation of production and other prohibited activities would proceed in stage III at declared locations much as in earlier stages.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Progressive zonal inspection or some comparable technique which would do the job effectively would be used to provide assurance, as a substantive and not merely a technical matter, that arms and armed forces which were supposed to be reduced were not in fact retained, and that prohibited activities were not being carried out at undeclared locations. This would, of course, be absolutely crucial by the time we got to stage III. None of us, I assume, would relish the thought of waking up some morning after we have, for example, in good faith eliminated all our nuclear and conventional weapons only to find that others have not done so and now threaten to take advantage of that fact. By the end of stage III, therefore, progressive zonal inspection or some adequate substitute for it would have to cover effectively all territory, because there will come a time when we will have to be sure that this process is going to work; we cannot afford to have some papering-over formula as a substitute for real destruction and verification. Only then can we have real assurance that there are not secret weapons or activities in existence.

The Soviet draft provides that the international disarmament organization shall have the right in stage III "of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty" (ENDC/2, page 24). On the face of it, this would seem to be close to what we have in mind.

However, I call attention to the fact that the purpose of this inspection is not to verify whether parties to the treaty have retained arms or continued prohibited activities secretly. According to this same article in the Soviet draft, it is "for purposes of control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments." (Ibid.) This may be intended to limit what the inspectors can look at or what they can do with the information they find. Last Thursday, in discussing this language, our Soviet colleague put the same qualification on it. He said that his delegation thought it:

"necessary that the international disarmament organization should ensure effective control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments, for which purpose it should have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the treaty."

(ENDC/PV.51, p.14)

In analyzing what this means, I call my colleagues' attention to the fact that in our negotiations on part I our Soviet colleague agreed that the treaty should ensure that "control arrangements are instituted progressively throughout the disarmament process". (ENDC/40/Rev.1, p.3)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

However, our Soviet colleague refused to add to this clause language stating that the objective of verification was "to provide assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces are not exceeded." Thus, in his view, it is not the purpose of inspection to verify that parties do not violate provisions concerning agreed levels. Moreover, he also rejected language on the veto which comes directly from the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. It provides that the treaty would "ensure that the Organization and its inspectors have unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification." (ibid.)

In rejecting this language, our Soviet colleague said that it would mean that no veto would be applicable to the inspection "to provide assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces are not exceeded." This is the language I quoted first, which he had also rejected. Thus, our Soviet colleague clearly does not want the inspectors to find out whether agreed levels are exceeded by any party, and we must therefore assume -- I would be very glad to be corrected if I am wrong -- that the stage III language of the Soviet draft would not permit such inspection. If I read and understand the Soviet draft correctly, inspectors would witness only the actual destruction of weapons or the burning of those weapons in stage III. In the case of conventional armaments and armed forces they would "exercise control over the disbanding of troops, and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment" and so forth. (ENDC/2, p.20). So far as I can tell -- and again I would like to be corrected if I am wrong -- the inspectors would never even receive a declaration from the parties of the total amount of troops and conventional armaments that each possessed at the beginning of general and complete disarmament.

The same clause provides that they would have access in stage III, not to all documents relating to these armaments and armed forces, but only to those "pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces." Thus, putting aside for the moment the question of arms production, the only information the inspectors would apparently have under the Soviet draft plan is the number of weapons that were being destroyed, which I will call "Y". The inspectors would not be able to verify the original number which existed, which I will call "X". Indeed, as I read the Soviet plan the inspectors would not even be told what the figure "X" was, and would not be able to verify the final number -- let us call it "Z". In the formula  $X-Y=Z$ , we have three unknowns, but the inspectors would be given only one of them; that is "Y", the amount being destroyed. So the inspectors would have to struggle with two unknowns.

(Mr. Peon, United States)

I submit that no one can determine that "Z" is zero or almost zero unless he either knows "X" or has the necessary information to ascertain "Z". And I think we can all agree that zero, or "Z", is the most important figure.

In this connexion, I must say that I do not fully understand the remarks made by the representative of India at our forty-seventh meeting (ENDC/PV.47, pp. 5 et seq.). The representative of India seemed to assume that the inspectors would be given the figure "X" -- that is, what one had at the beginning -- but he did not say who would give it to them or how they would know it was accurate. As you all know, one of the big stumbling blocks in the past was that no start could be made on the destruction of arms until there was complete verification. In drafting our plan we thought we had taken a very major step forward in being willing to go ahead with stage I without insisting on this complete verification at the beginning. Therefore, I am assuming that the representative of India is not proposing that "X", the original level, be completely verified before we start.

The representative of India also said -- taking my symbol "Z" or zero -- that the figure after reduction might be made up of two figures: that is, legally retained arms and clandestinely retained arms. I agree that this is true, but I do not see that this makes our problem any the less difficult. If "Z", or zero, is the figure we are to verify, it seems to me that we must look at both components which make it up. In other words, we must verify the level of legally retained arms and we must make sure that none are retained clandestinely. How else can we possibly know what the retained levels are? If, for example, the illegally retained are mixed in with the legally retained, and one cannot look at those labelled "legally retained", how does one find out what has been illegally retained? This is a highly practical matter about which, I submit, we are going to have to be clear and specific.

The representative of the Soviet Union criticized the United States draft outline because, he said, it provides no inventory of nuclear weapons until the end of stage II. (ENDC/PV.41, page 40). More recently, the representative of India repeated this criticism of the United States draft outline (ENDC/PV.51, p.21).

But as I pointed out very specifically at our forty-third meeting, a declaration would be submitted at the beginning of stage II which would provide information on the fissionable material component of all nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.43, page 17). This seems to me to be very specific. If it is not, I should like to know in what respect it is deficient. Quite frankly, I do not see in the Soviet draft outline

(Mr. Dean, United States)

any provision for an inventory of nuclear weapons, either in stage II or indeed anywhere else. If one does exist in the Soviet draft treaty, I would be very glad to have it brought to my attention.

I realize that at our forty-first meeting the representative of the Soviet Union said that:

"In proposing the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the second stage, the Soviet Union provides that States, before proceeding to implement this measure should submit the necessary information about their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.41, p.40)

Perhaps our Soviet colleague intends to add this language to the Soviet draft -- and I hope that he does. But all I find in the Soviet draft is that States must make available documents:

"... pertaining to the extraction of nuclear raw materials, to their processing and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes." (ENDC/2, p.15)

I should like to ask whether this language is intended to provide the inspectors of the international disarmament organization with a complete inventory of nuclear weapons at the beginning of stage II. If that is the intention, I welcome it; but I would suggest that the language be redrafted to say just that.

The representative of India has also indicated that he does not accept the view that verification of the complete elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles would be very difficult. He divided them into three categories: ships, aircraft and missiles. He then said:

"... I would like to point out that two of these categories" -- ships and aircraft -- "are fairly easy to control, and the third category" -- missiles -- "is not as difficult to control as one is sometimes given the impression it is by being told that these are awfully involved, complicated and extremely technical matters." (ENDC/PV.51, p.30)

In drafting the United States plan we brought together a large number of people who were recommended to us as outstanding experts who had spent a good part of their lives in the control of inventories or setting up methods by which one could control such things. These people have drawn up a large number of solutions based upon the probability of mathematics. They are similar to the principles of mathematics that occur in these sampling programmes. But I must confess that in all our work with them in trying to set up a truly verifiable and effective system, we have found this still to be a rather difficult and complicated problem.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

If we have exaggerated the difficulties involved in this problem, I would welcome a simplification. I was very happy indeed to hear the representative of India say this morning that he intends to amplify his ideas on this score and I look forward to this more detailed statement. In passing, I would like to suggest to the representative of India that he consider, as a fourth category, vehicles that run on land and, possibly as a fifth category, vehicles that may be orbited in outer space. I would also direct his attention to the fact, as he is doubtless aware, that modern technology is producing ever smaller and more efficient nuclear weapons; I use the word "efficient" in the sense of greater destructive capacity. I wish to assure my colleagues that we are not intending to magnify in any way the difficulties and complications involved in this work. In fact, we would welcome any suggestions as to how these technical problems can be reduced. However, I do think we have to address ourselves with a high degree of realism to these problems and we must be sure that anything we set up will work effectively.

I would like to conclude by saying that I agree with what our Brazilian colleague said at our meeting yesterday -- namely:

"... if the United States draft involves measures which may resemble espionage, then this espionage would also be carried out on American territory with consequences similar to those feared by the Soviet Union."

(ENDC/PV.54, p.28)

I would like to assure this Committee that we have not at any time or under any circumstances had the idea of using the features of our general and complete disarmament plan as a means of espionage. If there is any other way that we can carry this out which would satisfy our Soviet colleagues' feelings on the question of espionage, or if there is any method better than progressive zonal inspection, on which we spent a lot of time and which we thought was a unique contribution in the field of general and complete disarmament, we would be only too happy to hear about it.

We do not approach these methods of verification, or even progressive zonal inspection, with a closed mind. Merely because we have already spent a great deal of time on zonal inspection and recommend it in the absence of some better method, does not mean that we are frozen to it. We have done everything we can to try to get around this question of espionage while disarmament is going on, but I do agree with my Brazilian colleague that if verification is onerous its burdens will fall equally on the United States and the Soviet Union. We do believe, as I know all of us here believe, that we have to push forward on this question of general and complete disarmament. And, speaking only on behalf of the United States, we are quite prepared

(Mr. Dean, United States)

to pay whatever price we have to pay in having inspectors from the international disarmament organization roaming around our country and making inspections in order to accomplish general and complete disarmament. But we would be happy to co-operate in an effort to reduce this burden.

That completes my remarks, but, with the approval of my co-Chairman, I would like to make a suggestion. I note that there are a number of other representatives who wish to speak on this question. We have agreed to meet informally this afternoon, but I wonder whether it would be agreeable to my co-Chairman and to the Conference if we were to devote part of the afternoon to a further plenary meeting so that those whose names are already inscribed on the list could have the opportunity of making their statements.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from French): I am very glad the representative of the United States has made this suggestion, because I was concerned about the same problem. There are still three representatives who wish to speak today and five on the list for tomorrow morning. I think we can hardly ask all today's speakers to postpone their statements until tomorrow morning, and I welcome the suggestion made by the United States representative. What does the representative of the Soviet Union think?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Actually I intended to make the same kind of proposal as that put forward by the United States representative. As we shall be having our last meeting tomorrow, we should of course today complete consideration of these matters and hear those speakers who are down to speak at today's meeting. I am therefore in entire agreement with the United States representative's proposal that we should continue today's meeting after lunch, resuming at 3 p.m. instead of 3.30 p.m., hear those speakers still on the list for today, and then hold an informal meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from French): The representative of Bulgaria is willing not to speak until tomorrow morning; so at this afternoon's plenary meeting we shall hear the representatives of the Soviet Union and Sweden.

Since there is agreement on this proposal, we shall meet in plenary at 3 p.m. to hear the representatives of the Soviet Union and Sweden, after which we shall hold an informal meeting.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 1.10 p.m. and resumed at 3.20 p.m.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

At our morning meeting today we heard a number of important statements by the representatives of Poland, India, the United Arab Republic and the United States. It is not my intention to examine these statements now. I merely wish to say that the ideas put forward by the representatives of India and the United Arab Republic are worthy of the most serious attention from our point of view and should, in my opinion, be considered in connexion with the plans that we shall discuss after the recess.

Before proceeding to develop certain points in our reactions to the statements made yesterday, I should like to say a few words on some of the views expressed today by the United States representative. I shall not touch on everything that he said, but wish to draw attention to two of the points that he made today.

When speaking on control, he dealt with two aspects of the question. On the one hand he spoke of verification of the levels of armaments, and in this regard he referred to the unagreed points of article 2 of the working draft of the treaty, (ENDC/40/Rev.1), in connexion with the two paragraphs proposed by the United States.

The representative of the United States wished to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is opposed to verification of levels and is moreover establishing the right of veto on verification by the international control organization. I must state that the views expressed by the United States representative merely confirm that, in essence, the United States is maintaining its old attitude on control. Although there were moments during our meetings when it appeared that the United States had retreated somewhat from its position of overall verification of all armaments, it is clear from today's statement by the United States representative that it has, in essence, returned to this position.

Mr. Dean, in fact, referred to the insistence by the United States on the need to verify the level of armaments existing before the commencement of disarmament, before the commencement of a reduction in armed forces and armaments and also to verify the retained armaments. I must say that these remarks by the representative of the United States lead to sad reflections. During the first part of our work here the United States was apparently trying to prove that it had renounced this principle or, at least, had renounced the principle of verifying all armaments and armed forces



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before the commencement of disarmament. Now, however, this principle is the one that it is in fact adopting.

The same applies to retained armaments. During the whole course of our discussions hitherto, the United States has been telling us that it does not insist on overall verification of retained armaments but that what it has in mind is zonal inspection, which, in its opinion, simplifies the problem of verification. Today's statement, however, indicates that the United States is, in fact, adopting its former attitude and insisting on overall verification of retained armaments. This is what we call control of armaments and it is, of course, a position that is not only unacceptable to us but also impracticable and inexpedient, as has been shown throughout our discussions.

The fact that the United States has now returned to this position only shows that all its talk of having adopted a more flexible attitude on this question was without foundation. In this connexion, I should also like to explain (as, incidentally, was done during the discussion of the working draft of article 2) that we pointed out that our opposition to the clause in article 2 mentioning control without veto is motivated by the United States insistence on verification of levels, i.e. of all armaments and armed forces, whatever the strength of the armaments and armed forces subject to reduction.

For precisely the same reason we feel that it is impossible to tolerate a situation in which all armaments and armed forces, even those not subject to reduction, would be controlled and in which there would be complete freedom of movement in any district of the country being inspected. We are, of course, opposed to this. Our negative attitude to this second paragraph on the veto is therefore connected with our negative attitude to the very principle of verifying existing armaments without their being subjected to reduction and without verification of these armaments in process of reduction.

The second remark that I should like to make in this connexion is a clarification of the question raised by the representative of the United States, when he dealt with control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces. He read our text of article 38 and, in so doing, offered an explanation. Paragraph 2 of the article states:

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"For purposes of control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments, abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty." (ENDC/2, p.24).

Mr. Dean has cast doubt upon this "right of access at any time to any point", and in doing so referred to our negative attitude to the analogous paragraph in article 2 on control (ENDC/40/Rev.1, p.3), in which it is stated that the inspectors can visit any locality without veto. I must say that there is no foundation whatsoever for these doubts since the reference here is to the last stage of disarmament, when there will no longer be armaments and armed forces and when all that remains will be a defined category of militia and police, the strength of which has been agreed and the stationing of which has also been agreed. Paragraph 2 states that under these conditions we are entirely willing to afford the "right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty." Here we do not envisage any restrictions. I wish to clarify this so that there should not be any misunderstanding on this score.

My final remark concerns nuclear weapons. The representative of the United States asked us where we mention the inventory of nuclear weapons to be destroyed and where we refer to the lists and data to be submitted before the destruction of nuclear weapons. I must say that if the United States delegation had studied our draft treaty attentively they would probably have noticed that we do not in general make separate mention of an inventory, of lists or of data at each individual stage, but that there is one general paragraph that defines our attitude to this question at all stages of disarmament. This is paragraph 5 of article 2, "Control Obligations", which reads:

"The States party to the Treaty shall in good time submit to the International Disarmament Organization such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as are necessary to carry out the measures of the corresponding stage." (ENDC/2, p.4).

These are the general provisions and general obligations which we deem it essential to accept ourselves and which we recommend any State to accept. In conformity with this principle and this obligation, it is our intention that the information

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necessary for the execution of a given stage will be made available at that stage. If 100 per cent reduction or destruction of a given type of armament is proposed at this particular stage, information will be submitted on all 100 per cent of this type of armament. This is a general principle that applies to conventional armaments, to means of delivery and to nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, no foundation for the doubts here expressed by the representative of the United States. We envisage supplying the information essential to the stage at which nuclear weapons are destroyed.

These are the remarks that I deemed it essential to make in connexion with Mr. Dean's statement this morning.

I should now like to make a few observations arising from statements at yesterday's meeting of the Committee. First, I should like to consider the statement by Mr. Dean.

In setting out the United States proposals for stage III disarmament, Mr. Dean emphasized strongly that they had the same objective as the Soviet proposals. Moreover, he assured us that with a slight exception these proposals were practically identical. He even counselled us not to create difficulties where they did not exist (ENDC/PV.54, pp. 41,42).

We should, of course, be very glad if the United States position were identical to our own and if it pursued the end to which our government is striving - general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately this is not the case. Whereas the Soviet Union proposes the clear aim of total liquidation of the military machine, leaving only police (or militia) at the disposal of States, the United States has in mind that even after general and complete disarmament there should remain in being forces that, albeit reduced, are nevertheless armed forces similar in structure and command to those at present in existence. This was once again confirmed in Mr. Dean's statement yesterday. The retention of armed forces with their present structure means the retention of a nucleus for the re-establishment of powerful armed forces with all the ensuing consequences. We are of the opinion that the carrying out of general and complete disarmament should radically affect the tasks and functions of the forces remaining at the disposal of States. These functions should no longer be military but should be functions normally carried out by militia or police. Here we are at variance with you, Mr. Dean, and this is a major and, I would say, fundamental difference which is in no way indicative of unity of purpose.

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Whereas the Soviet Union proposes firm obligations regarding the elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons, the United States does not in reality intend such action. Mr. Dean attempted to lay particular emphasis on his statement that, like the Soviet Union, the United States envisages the destruction of nuclear weapons. But Mr. Dean, it is not long since we discussed the first Part of the draft treaty in this very room. The Soviet Union wanted a paragraph on the banning of nuclear weapons included in this Part, insisting that this was an essential condition if destruction of nuclear weapons was not to remain an idle dream but was to become a reality. The United States delegation categorically rejected this proposal. This means that the United States at least envisages the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons even after the advent of what is referred to as general and complete disarmament. Everyone knows who would suffer the greatest loss if nuclear weapons were used. It is not by accident that nuclear weapons are called weapons of mass destruction, their use would give rise to thousands, hundreds of thousands and millions of casualties not merely among those on whose heads the bomb fell, but also among those exposed to radioactive fallout.

The Soviet Union is striving to eliminate for ever the possibility that nuclear weapons may be used and to free our planet of this means of mass slaughter. If the matter is carefully considered, it is apparent that the United States is not merely preserving nuclear weapons but also wishing to justify their use by international agreement. After all this they still speak of some unity of purpose.

Mr. Dean is at pains to find justification for his position. Yesterday he referred to a statement by Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in an interview with the correspondent of the "New York Times", Mr. Sulzberger (ENDC/PV.54, p. 42). However, Mr. Khrushchev's remark referred to conditions in which there is no agreement on general and complete disarmament. The question of banning nuclear weapons is posed on an entirely different plane, under conditions of general and complete disarmament. We do not think that Mr. Dean failed to note the provision in our draft treaty obliging States to adopt legislation banning nuclear weapons, and providing for severe punishment of persons who dared to make such weapons (ENDC/2, p.14). Our draft treaty contains such a provision. There is nothing of a similar nature in the United States document. On the contrary, the United States document is full of reservations, the object of which is both to

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equip the so-called international armed forces with nuclear weapons and to leave these weapons in the hands of individual States.

We shall not dwell on Mr. Dean's quarrel with our conclusion that the United States proposals would leave certain military bases at the disposal of States even after general and complete disarmament. If there was anything new in the arguments put forward yesterday by Mr. Dean and also by Mr. Godber on this count, it was a recognition of the possible retention of military bases abroad after general disarmament. This new point shows the gulf between the Western proposals and a real programme of general and complete disarmament.

A considerable part of Mr. Dean's statement yesterday was a justification of the United States' desire to create powerful international forces, capable of suppressing any State, and to equip them with nuclear weapons.

Today also Mr. Dean repeated some of these points and developed them slightly, but the main defence of the Western Powers' position on this question was undertaken by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber. It may be said that his statement of yesterday is the credo of the Western Powers on the system for safeguarding security during the course of disarmament. Since Mr. Dean fully associated himself with Mr. Godber today, it can be taken that this is the general Western position.

Mr. Godber formulated three basic principles that, in the opinion of the Western Powers, justify the establishment of powerful international forces to preserve peace. Before proceeding to an examination of these principles we feel that it is necessary to touch on Mr. Godber's general attitude to the question, the attitude that may be said to underlie his principles. He let drop the remark:

"It is no good our seeking to create a world safe for bandits."

(ENDC/PV.54, p.11)

This is a very remarkable utterance, and one that reflects the attitude of the Western Powers to the honour, dignity and prestige of States. A treaty on disarmament is, after all, not the same thing as internal legislation applied to the private citizens of a State but is the expression of relations between States. Here modern States are being treated as potential criminals. The conduct of States and the conduct of the individual are quite different things that, I would have said, could not be compared. The same criteria cannot be applied to the conduct of a State as to the conduct of an individual. To do so would represent a purely mechanical and incorrect approach.

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Mr. Godber expressed disagreement with our conclusion that the proposals of the Western Powers for keeping peace and security by-pass the United Nations Charter. Mr. Godber emphasized that each of the many organizations to be set up under the United States proposal would bear the stamp of the United Nations and expressed the wish that he would hear no more conclusions of this kind from the Soviet delegation. We, however, are forced to draw such conclusions if, while paying lip service to the United Nations, measures are proposed that clearly infringe the provisions of its Charter. We base our conclusions on facts and not on words.

The representative of India has today drawn our attention to the existence of Section H, "Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace", in the United States outline. Paragraph 2.a. of this Section reads:

"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament." (ENDC/30, page 17)

He pointed out that Article 13 of the Charter states:

"The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

(a) "promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification; ..."

The question that therefore arises is why the United States wishes to entrust the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct to some subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization when, under the United Nations Charter, this function belongs to the General Assembly of the United Nations and to bodies set up by the Assembly? You will say here that you deem it necessary to strengthen the United Nations. But is the organization strengthened if, in place of a body set up by the General Assembly under the terms of the Charter, you want to establish a new body that will replace the other, since it will carry out the same functions and deal with the same questions of codification and progressive development of rules of international behaviour, that is, rules of law?

This is one example of the way in which you claim that you wish to strengthen the international organization already in existence, i.e. the United Nations, but in

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fact want to set up a new organization and by-pass the United Nations Charter by entrusting matters to this new organization that, under the Charter, are the responsibility of the General Assembly.

Let us take another example, in connexion with the implementation of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, which refers to the setting up of international armed forces. In the same section H of the United States proposal it is merely suggested that there should be examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreement envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. In the very next paragraph it is proposed, with complete disregard of this Article, i.e. by-passing the United Nations Charter, to set up an international force by a new procedure not provided in the United Nations Charter.

Paragraph 5.c. proposes conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force including definition of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments. Here is a second striking example. The Charter contains a definite principle and definite provisions, embodied in Article 43, on the procedure governing organization of international armed forces. You are putting this aside and proposing to conclude an agreement on a new basis now to be formulated, and not in accordance with the United Nations Charter. What is the reason for this?

Mr. Dean has explained the reason today. He emphasized that no agreement has yet been reached on the basis of Article 43 and alleged that this article does not exhaust all the possibilities of strengthening collective security. He stated that there are now experience, certain traditions and recent precedents available. Here he referred to the setting up of armed forces in the cases of Greece, Korea, the Congo and so on. First, however, all this is experience that violated the United Nations Charter. In all these cases the armed forces set up were not established in accordance with the United Nations Charter but in violation of it. Secondly, what is your intention? You said today that it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on the setting up of armed forces under Article 43 because of lack of agreement among the Permanent Members of the Security Council on the principles governing the organization of these armed forces. Right, that is a fact, but then what follows from it? Is it now your intention to set up United Nations armed

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forces without the agreement of the Permanent Members of the Security Council? Is this how you see things? If you think that international armed forces can be established without the agreement of all the Permanent Members of the Security Council, this means that you will establish them against the opposition of any one of the Members of the Security Council. Is this what you want? It is quite clear that we shall never agree to this.

So there are two alternatives: either you will set up a United Nations force against our opposition or, if you wish to set it up with our agreement, what difference will there be? If we give our agreement to the setting up of an international force, why should our agreement to the creation of this force not be based on Article 43? What difference would there be? In either case the agreement of all the Permanent Members of the Security Council is necessary. If you obtain our agreement to the setting up of an armed force in a certain form this agreement will be in accordance with Article 43 also. We are represented on the Military Staff Committee as well as at this meeting. So the Military Staff Committee will set up the armed force with our agreement in accordance with Article 43. If you wish to do this without our agreement, you will be acting in opposition to us. But can you conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament against our opposition? It is quite clear that this is unrealistic.

The question which then arises is why you act in this way. There can be only one answer: you do not desire a treaty on general and complete disarmament, because if you do desire such a treaty it can only be achieved with our agreement and with your agreement. We are well aware of this. The reason why we are holding these discussions with you is because we want to reach an agreement. If you want our agreement, why do you try to set up armed forces in circumvention of the United Nations Charter? Do you imagine that we shall agree to violate the United Nations Charter? We declare to you openly that we shall not do so. We wish to set up an armed force in conformity with Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. If you have the same wish we shall not have any disagreement. In such case, why do you set Article 43 aside and proceed without it? You can see from this analysis that your position here is quite incomprehensible.

We shall now turn to the principles formulated by Mr. Godber. His first principle is that the international force, as he stated yesterday,



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"must be strong enough in numbers and equipment to be able to deal rapidly and decisively with any force or opposition with which it may be confronted."

(ENDC/PV.54, p.14)

What justification did Mr. Godber advance for this principle? His main argument was that there is no confidence between states and that friction and suspicion exist. In particular he stressed:

"The essential thing, therefore, seems to be that in the early stages of our work, while there are so many unknown quantities, so many imponderable factors to be taken into consideration, we should aim at establishing peace-keeping machinery which will be strong, impartial and unquestionably effective. Later on, if all goes well, perhaps we shall be able to allow it to run down to some extent as the need diminishes. One day, if confidence between nations develops, as we hope it will, it may be possible -- indeed it should be possible -- to bring the United Nations peace force down to a mere token force." (ibid., p. 15)

Anyone who considers the argumentation on which, in effect, Mr. Godber bases his first principle will see that it is without foundation. We recall that, in his first statements in defence of the American plan, Mr. Godber laid particular stress on the plan's alleged advantage of leading to the establishment of confidence. It would appear from the assurances of the Western Powers that, when implementation of the plan is drawing to a close, confidence will begin to reign between States.

If one were to follow the logic of this reasoning it would, in the view of the Western Powers, be essential to set up a large international force at this very time, capable, as Mr. Godber said, of suppressing any opposition, since it is precisely at present that tension exists between States and this tension will only begin to subside as disarmament is carried out.

Further, according to Mr. Godber's statement, the international force should be reduced even, in his words, to a "mere token force", as confidence is strengthened. But what are the provisions of the United States plan for the creation of an international force? The sequence is completely reversed. The international force will be set up during stage II and will continuously increase to the end of general and complete disarmament, even receiving nuclear weapons. The conclusion is

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inescapable that this procedure for the development of the international force does not pursue the aim of maintaining peace but clearly has some other aim. Should not these aims be sought in the proposals of the United States for what are referred to as rules of international conduct, various coercive measures for their enforcement, and other similar provisions, which in ordinary language means the setting up of what is in essence an international bludgeon to repress national liberation movements and impose one's will on peoples by force? This is the only way in which one can understand principles for the organization of an international force that grows larger and larger towards the end of disarmament.

Mr. Godber devoted special efforts to defining the need to equip the international force with nuclear weapons. On the one hand he asserted that we were wrong in accusing the Western Powers of desiring to place these weapons in the hands of an international force; on the other hand, his whole argument pointed to the absolute necessity of equipping the international force with nuclear weapons. It seems to us that, after Mr. Godber's statement, even those who still had any doubts as to the actual position of the Western Powers on this question must have had those doubts dispelled.

Mr. Godber's second principle is to be found in the clear relationship between, as he put it,

"the adequacy of peace-keeping machinery in general, and the peace force in particular, and the effectiveness of verification machinery". (ibid., p. 14)

However hard we tried, we were unable to find in Mr. Godber's subsequent remarks any arguments in support of this second principle. In particular he alleged that the Soviet proposals failed to ensure sufficiently effective verification. One asks oneself what relationship the Soviet proposals have to Mr. Godber's principles. The sense of these principles was, after all, to justify the United States proposals for setting up an international force. The United States delegation assures us, with the active support of Mr. Godber, that these proposals ensure effective verification throughout the process of disarmament, and we are once again faced with the question: where does a large force come in? What inner compulsion makes it so large and, furthermore, equips it with nuclear weapons? The artificiality of the principle formulated by Mr. Godber emerges clearly from this.

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I should remind members of the Committee that in the past the Western delegates have made great play with the question of control in order to slow down a solution of the disarmament problem. Control was turned into a matter of prime importance and decisive significance attached to it. It is evident that these possibilities are now exhausted or becoming exhausted. A more suitable lever is needed to slow down agreement and it is at this point that the intimate correlation between control and security measures appears on the scene.

The line of argument with which Mr. Godber supported his principle of the correlation between control and security measures is very interesting. He declared:

"We must create a system where the rule of law applies equally to all nations"

(ibid., p. 15)

He also asked:

"And in how many recent crises have the Communist bloc, the Western Powers and the non-aligned countries all found themselves in agreement?" (ibid.)

He did not give a direct answer, but the inference was that this was a comparatively rare occurrence.

Mr. Godber thus recognized that there are and can be differences between the three groups of States in their understanding of various problems and in their assessment of how they should be solved. He states that he wishes to ensure a rule of law applying equally to all. But how can this be done other than by agreement, even in such a matter as the command of the international force? Do you want to give the command to a single individual, who would inevitably be a representative of the Socialist countries, or the Western Powers, or the non-aligned States? It is of course clear to everyone that in such a case the armed forces could be used against the interests of any of the groups of three States and to the detriment of their security. What has happened, Mr. Godber, to your desire to secure the same law for all? It has disappeared. You speak of high principles, but in fact you are practising the same old Western policy which you have hitherto succeeded in practising in the United Nations -- a policy of encroaching on the interests of other States. This is the heart of the matter, and it is for this that you need your second principle.

Mr. Godber's third principle is that the international force must be as far as possible removed from the influence of individual states. How does the United Kingdom representative propose to implement this principle? He states that these

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troops should constitute a single body. The contingents supplied by given States should not be stationed on their territory. The international force should not be connected with any concrete provisions of the disarmament treaty. To sum up, it can be said that Mr. Godber would like to see the international force as some sort of army of mercenaries at the disposal of some entity or other.

Mr. Godber did not mention what entity he had in mind, and confined himself to general intimations that it would be under the aegis of the United Nations. Nevertheless, his objection to establishing the command of the international force on a just basis, on the basis of representation of the three groups of States, shows clearly the way things are trending. The Western Powers do not desire to afford the Socialist countries and the non-aligned States equal possibilities of influencing the use of the international force. What remains? The Western Powers remain. As far as we know, there are at present no other States in the world. This is how Mr. Godber's principle for the setting up of an international force outside the influence of individual States looks in practice.

I should now like to say a few words in connexion with the statement of the Brazilian representative, Mr. de Mello-Franco, a number of whose observations merit our attention. When examining the relationship between the political and technical aspects of control he noted:

"if we lose ourselves in the complexities of technical discussions on control, we shall hold up the progress of the political negotiations without which no treaty on general and complete disarmament can be concluded." (ENDC/PV.54, p.23)

This is what Mr. de Mello-Franco said, and it merits great attention, all the more so because he had some experience of disarmament negotiations in the League of Nations, which also got lost in a maze of expert committees of various types. In the light of this statement I find that, despite my profound respect for the representative of Brazil, his support for a technical study of the whole question of control at the present time is strange and unconvincing.

The position of the Soviet Union, of which we have spoken repeatedly, is simple and clear. For the study of technical questions to be possible and fruitful it is above all necessary to have a clear conception of what will be studied, to have a basis for study, i.e. a political decision on definite disarmament measures. Only when we have a unanimous view on the scope of disarmament measures

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and on the sequence in which they should be carried out will examination of the technical problems of control be placed on a real foundation and not degenerate into sterile talk which can only hold up the drafting of an agreement on disarmament. That is our position. Although we do not, as you see, agree with the representative of Brazil on this question, we shall nevertheless study seriously all his remarks on this and the other matters on which he spoke yesterday.

At yesterday's meeting the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Atta, made a statement (ibid., pp. 32 et seq.) in which he analysed the Soviet and United States proposals and raised a number of questions to which we should like to offer replies and explanations. For quite understandable reasons Mr. Atta laid prime stress on eliminating the possibility of a nuclear war and on destroying nuclear weapons. Here we are fully in accord with him, and this is in fact the common demand of all peoples. It is in accordance with this demand that the Soviet Union proposes that all means for the delivery of nuclear weapons should be destroyed in the first stage, thus excluding the possibility of a nuclear attack. Although Mr. Atta did not agree with us on this question he failed to show why he considers our proposals inadequate. Mr. Atta asked us why we, i.e. the Soviet Union, do not propose 100 per cent destruction of nuclear bombs during the first stage. The Soviet delegation has pointed out several times that this was due primarily to the position of the Western Powers, which were not prepared to call for the elimination and banning of nuclear weapons from the outset of disarmament. The present discussion in the Committee has demonstrated this quite distinctly.

Mr. Atta's second remark was concerned with reduction in conventional armaments. We must say frankly that we find it difficult to follow Mr. Atta's reasoning. On the one hand he concluded that:

".... a formula for an across-the-board cut can be found, provided that the reduction in armaments will correspond to the reduction in the force levels" (ibid., 35).

This can be understood in the sense that Mr. Atta considers this to be the path that is most correct and most in the interests of disarmament. This is, of course, precisely what we envisage in our plan. Mr. Atta himself noted, inter alia:

"In the Soviet Union plan, the reduction of armaments will correspond to the reduction in the force level" (ibid., p. 34).

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Why then is the representative of Nigeria dissatisfied? We can, however, understand him when he correctly notes that the United States proposal divorces reduction in force strength from reduction in armaments. In fact the United States proposal leaves in existence the possibility of retaining considerable quantities of armaments that can be used to redevelop armed forces.

At the same time we are unable to agree with Mr. Atta when he alleges that the Soviet proposals provide some possibility of retaining more advanced types of armament. On the contrary, as far as the most advanced types of armament are concerned -- and at present these are the means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- it is precisely these that we shall eliminate in the first stage. Moreover, our proposed sequence for the reduction of armed forces -- mainly by disbanding under international control entire military units, first and foremost those servicing means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- excludes any possibility of replacing less advanced by more advanced weapons.

Mr. Atta, as already mentioned above, is extremely disturbed at the possibility of a nuclear war. His remark that a nuclear war is impossible in two stages of the United States plan is therefore a matter for surprise. This is what Mr. Atta said, but the United States representatives themselves cannot summon up the courage to make this assertion, since it is not in fact correct. Mr. Atta here draws a further parallel with the Soviet proposal. He asks what it is that makes a nuclear war possible. Undoubtedly, two factors: the existence of nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery. We propose to eliminate one of these factors -- the means of delivery -- in the first stage and thus remove the danger of a nuclear attack, since nuclear weapons are immobilized without the means for their delivery and cannot be used in war. The United States retains both these factors throughout and even after the entire process of disarmament. Under the United States proposal, therefore, the possibility and probability of nuclear war will continually hang over the world. There is thus a radical difference between the Soviet and United States proposals.

The representative of Nigeria then paid considerable attention in his statement to aspects of control. His vivid remark that the West was insisting "on looking into the ears and hair .... for hidden weapons" (ibid., p.37) is an apt description of the position of the Western Powers. In fact, in insisting on control where it

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is completely unnecessary, the Western Powers resemble those who want to undertake this type of inspection. Their proposals for zonal inspection do not alter this desire of theirs and is merely a sort of screen. Permit us to recall that at one meeting Mr. Dean presented us with the picture of establishment of control over the atomic industry of States even before disarmament commenced. With such an approach by the Western Powers, zonal inspection is nothing more than yet another addition to the system of unjustifiably wide control.

Mr. Atta also dealt with the question of the international force. In this connexion he asked our delegation:

"If a militarily significant State should insist on the possession of a nuclear weapon, do we or do we not carry on with our work on general and complete disarmament?" (ibid. p.30)

It seems to us that the answer to this question is quite clear. How can there be negotiations on general and complete disarmament if one of the nuclear Powers refuses to accept the obligation to eliminate such weapons? It is, however, appropriate to recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations, i.e. all the countries of the world, approved the Agreed Principles for Disarmament (ENDC/5), which definitely envisage the elimination of nuclear weapons. As far as we know, no one objects, at least not openly, to these principles except perhaps certain circles in the Federal Republic of Germany that are demanding the supply of nuclear weapons to the Bundeswehr.

We shall not hide the fact that we were somewhat struck at the strange similarity between the statements of Mr. Atta and Mr. Godber on the equipment of the international forces with nuclear weapons, although, judging by Mr. Atta's statement on nuclear weapons in general, his position is apparently greatly different from that of the supporters of the nuclear deterrent. We imagine that Mr. Atta will, of course, be aware of the danger that will arise, especially for small countries, if the international force is supplied with nuclear weapons. It is quite apparent that this is against the interests of all peoples, including the peoples of those African countries which have quite recently broken out of colonial slavery and of those which are still continuing the struggle for national liberation.

I assume that during our recess we shall all make a careful study of each other's remarks and draw the necessary conclusions for our further work so as to

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draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament which will correspond to the interests of the various countries and of the peace and security of all peoples.

These are the remarks which the Soviet delegation has considered it necessary to make in connexion with yesterday's statements in the Committee.

Mrs. MIRDAL (Sweden): What I have to say today is not half as important as the statements we heard before and after the luncheon break. Therefore, quite fittingly, I shall make my remarks correspondingly shorter. However, I think a few words are timely on one subject before we recess, because, during our deliberations so far, the special problems facing the smaller Powers during the disarmament process have only very recently and briefly been broached -- by Mr. Burns in his statement of 6 June (ENDC/PV.50, pp. 40 et seq.) and by the representative of Nigeria yesterday (ENDC/PV.54, pp. 32 et seq.)

The preoccupation with the problems of the great Powers or Power blocs should not be criticized as it is inherent in the world situation of today, and it was particularly natural so long as the discussion revolved around stage I of the plan for general and complete disarmament. However, when the Conference has embarked upon a first reading of the proposals for stages II and III, a few reflections about the position of the smaller Powers would seem to be in order, because I submit that there are some rather specific considerations called for in relation to stage II, when the prospective treaty, according to both plans, would perforce encompass all militarily significant Powers, even those which might have been exempt from obligatory implementation in stage I.

To a considerable extent this interest of the smaller Powers is connected with the approach to conventional war as they are all non-nuclear Powers and are thus not actively concerned in the question of limitation and elimination of nuclear weapons. The fact that we are passively concerned as potential victims of nuclear war, as well as nuclear tests, needs no re-emphasis. However, conventional war remains a threatening reality from the point of view of the smaller Powers.

If we take the situation as it exists today, and even if we project it beyond the first stage of disarmament, we can visualize a fair number of cases where one or more small Powers could be involved in a war of a conventional type where nuclear weapons would not be used. We must all beware of the conflicts, sometimes



(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

latent and sometimes more imminently menacing, in several regions of the world. In fact even if a nuclear Power were an opponent in a military encounter, nuclear weapons would not necessarily be used. Therefore, for many countries, an armed conflict would more likely than not mean conventional war. This does not mean that it would be a war without horrors. Nowadays, when the consequences of nuclear war are so often spelled out, we tend to forget the unspeakable sufferings and losses to the peoples, the material damage, and the immeasurable effect on the human mind and human relations caused by the old-fashioned type of war. Although my country has been spared the scourges of the two world wars, we are well aware of the sufferings which other countries represented here, particularly perhaps in Eastern Europe, had to endure.

This leads me to the conclusion that it is no less incumbent on this Conference to study how to prevent conventional war than it is to study how to prevent nuclear war. As our colleague from Brazil so rightly said at an earlier meeting, our task is to wage war against war -- and, I may add, against nuclear and non-nuclear war alike. In one word, what we now call conventional war must remain as condemnable as it used to be before 1945, and we must take steps that make us more secure against it as soon as ever possible.

My delegation has studied the two draft plans with such thoughts in mind, and we have come to a few preliminary conclusions, or perhaps rather questions, to be borne in mind in our later deliberations.

The first one leads us to place a new and big question mark as to the interpretation of the concept of balance. With the term as used hitherto in our discussions here, we are wont to envisage a level of armaments retaining balance between the two Power blocs. But the Agreed Principles, which have been accepted by all of us in the United Nations, do not have this interpretation. Particularly, the well-known paragraph 5 does not justify a restriction to that one major pair of forces that should be balanced. Instead, it speaks quite clearly of balance in such a way

"that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, p.2)

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

I am afraid, however, that this formula for a universal balancing of disarmament measures does not bear a more penetrating critical scrutiny. This is so already on theoretical grounds, because how could an equation with so many variables ever be soluble? Or, to put it in the form of a concrete illustration, how could, for instance, a supposedly perfect balance be obtained between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between the NATO Powers and the Warsaw Powers -- and we know already how difficult it would be to obtain balance there -- and how could it also be taken to mean a perfect balance between, let us say, the United States and Switzerland, the military mix being so different from the beginning in these two States? Therefore, any change in it is apt to be one of unequal weight. The same must be true, mutatis mutandis, when a large number of States with highly different compositions in their military establishments are to be compared within one and the same frame.

Mr. Burns alluded to this in regard to the size of the standing forces. A comparison between a great Power's and a small Power's forces and any reduction in them cannot be made on a straight quantitative basis. There exist what the statisticians call "points of discontinuity", meaning that a given quantity, reduced below a certain threshold, loses its very substance. This argument by Canada can also be pursued in regard to the quality or the very definition of weapon systems. For what represents in reality the "armed forces" which should be submitted to reduction? We have read in the drafts and heard from the respective delegations that they regard the measures of reduction in force levels contained in their plans, both for stage I and stage II, as an indication that the conventional forces will be reduced considerably and rapidly during these periods.

Now I would like to refer my colleagues to the intervention of my delegation on 11 May, when we tried to draw attention to the influence of different patterns of military organization on this problem? (ENDC/PV.35, pp. 34,35) On the one hand, there are countries such as ours which entrust their security mainly to forces which would be called up in an emergency, using a mobilization system capable of raising a considerable number of units in a few days. On the other hand, there are countries which have a number of standing units with little or no immediate reserves. A third type of country could both have standing units and large immediate reserves.

When studying the two plans, my delegation seems to find that both aim at reducing, above all, the standing units with their men actually on duty, and at

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

reducing the armaments pertaining to those units. This would leave the immediate reserves retained, but these could well be an important factor in the military posture of different countries and thus in the general balance. Therefore, a comparison of force strength is not complete if only the number of men on duty at a given time are compared. A reduction formula, for instance, like the one in the plan of the Soviet Union could leave my country with fairly unreduced forces and capable of raising a considerable number of divisions in a short time. I hope, of course, that this fact will not cause undue uneasiness in this Committee. But the problem of the feasibility of comparisons, and thereby of balance, is a very important one.

This line of thought brings me to the conclusion that the question of armed force levels is quite complicated and technical. In view of this and of the importance of conventional forces, it would seem worth while to have this problem also included in the list -- which is becoming longer and longer -- of those matters that we would need to have explored by the study method.

In this same context of conventional war and small Power interest, my delegation would like to mention the importance of certain weapons which have not been mentioned in either of the two plans. Judging from the experience of World War II, what seems to be particularly dangerous to most countries is the possibility of being rapidly overrun by armoured forces invading across a land frontier or crossing the waters by amphibious landings supported by airborne forces. Warfare by such means would be the most menacing aspect of conventional armaments retained.

In the United States draft (ENDC/30, p.5) we find that during stage I, section A, a reduction will begin of tanks, armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers, which are of great importance for rapid invasion. However, we have found no provision for reduction of such equally important armaments as landing craft for amphibious operations and transport aircraft equipped for carrying airborne troops. Nor can we see them clearly provided for in stage II, unless they are included in the types of unarmed military aircraft and non-combatant naval vessels. It would be of interest to know if these weapons are included in the non-specified categories. They do have special characteristics as they could be of great importance in a war which might be a minor one for a big Power but a fight for life for a small country.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

In the Soviet draft we find that the only provisions of the required kind for stage I are made in article 11, paragraph 2, which states that the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments shall be related primarily to the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories (ENDC/2, p.10). This seems to indicate that most of the present-day conventional forces stationed within national borders will remain and their armaments, with their offensive capabilities, will be retained.

In the provisions for stage II we find in article 24 that the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments will be carried out chiefly by complete disbandment of units and ships' crews (ibid., p.16). We have not been able to find out which type of units have been in the minds of the authors. Therefore it has not been possible to assess how much this reduction would influence the likelihood and the nature of a conventional war -- whether it be between a large Power and a small Power or between two small Powers. I wonder if the Soviet delegation could give us -- now or later -- some elaboration of its views on this subject and, in particular, if it could indicate more definitely when nationally based mechanised units, airborne troops with their carriers, and amphibious landing craft would begin to disappear according to the Soviet plan.

In this intervention I have tried to take the view mainly of a small Power, just to remind us of the need to think of some of the specific problems involved, but also to show that we take disarmament quite seriously and we want to regard it from the point of view of realistic policy. It is in this sense that the small Powers must keep pondering on what impact the provisions proposed will have on their own defence organizations. Let it be clearly understood, however, that we are not proposing that the question of balance should wait until it can be solved in such a perfectionist manner that it implies balance in all constellations. Perfection in this respect is as impracticable and impossible to achieve as is perfection in control.

A more helpful attitude is to approach both these problems with optimism and generosity, realizing that the most crucial thing is to build up at an early stage such a fund of confidence that the suspicion which is now the main premise underlying all proposals and deliberations on disarmament can be overcome.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

Allied to such an approach, it should be recognized that the smaller Powers might need some time to think and some opportunity of gaining confidence in the dedication of the great Powers to the goal of disarmament. According to the United States plan, only specified parties to the treaty would have to carry out these kinds of reductions which I have discussed pertaining to stage I. There appears to be some leeway also in the Soviet Union plan in article 11 dealing with the reduction of armed forces and armaments in stage I, where we find a dotted line where States other than the United States and the Soviet Union are to be invited to make special agreements on reductions. It will not be lost upon a number of small States, anxiously prudent as they often are on matters of security, that they have thus been offered a chance to see a fair amount of disarmament carried out, or at least begun, before they themselves are actually required to join in the disarmament race. Their confidence would be further strengthened if they were to see an actual reduction of the armament categories which seem particularly important to them before they start to cut down the same categories, or the weapon systems built up as defence measures against them.

I am confident that we shall have an opportunity to come back to such considerations. I should like to admit also, more than willingly, that these matters are not of first-rank importance and they should not be allowed to hamper or delay progress in disarmament between the great Power blocs, which we realize would benefit all of us.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from French): I call on the representative of the United States to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I shall be very brief. I am afraid that my Soviet colleague either misunderstood the remarks I made this morning or has misstated them. At that time I stated specifically that the United States did not seek -- I repeat, did not seek -- to verify the level existing at the beginning of disarmament. I thought that in that way we had overcome one of the previous obstacles to disarmament. I said specifically that the United States seeks effective verification only after the first steps of disarmament have taken place -- and I said that even then we do not seek access to the entire territory of States.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

We do say that it is essential to have a clear idea whether the declared initial levels or the subsequent levels are accurate, as well as to verify the actual arms that are being destroyed. However, I said specifically that the United States does not ask for this assurance by means of actual inspection of either the initial level or all the retained arms and forces. We shall be satisfied by the assurance that will arise from a partial check, on some effective mathematical sampling basis, either by this progressive zonal inspection system we have put forward or by any other equally adequate scheme if the progressive zonal scheme is not satisfactory.

Under the progressive zonal plan the amount of inspection would be related to the amount of actual disarmament. That is why we studied this system and put it forward. Under that system only a small part of the territory would be inspected after the first step reduction in the first stage.

The United States has not changed its stand at all on this matter. It seems to me to be important for all the representatives at this Conference to know at this stage in our work that there has been no change in the attitude of the United States in this respect.

It is a source of constant regret to my delegation that the Soviet representative appears constantly to raise and, in our view, to distort the position of the Federal Republic of Germany on nuclear arms. I read very carefully the statement made some three years ago by the Defence Minister, Mr. Strauss, of the Federal Republic of Germany and the statements of Chancellor Adenauer on this matter. It is important for all of us to seek to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into the problems of keeping the peace in Europe and elsewhere, and to work with it in a manner which will permit it to co-operate with us towards general and complete disarmament. I can say authoritatively that the sincere and continuing efforts of my Government to bring about general and complete disarmament will continue to meet both with the approval and with the continued co-operation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from French): Does any other representative wish to speak?

Mr. LALL (India): I may wish to exercise my right of reply tomorrow, after I have read the verbatim record.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from French): I would remind you that Mr. Tarabanov, the representative of Bulgaria, has agreed to postpone until tomorrow the statement he intended to make today. He will therefore be first on the list of speakers for our next meeting.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its fifty-fifth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. J. Hajek, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, India, the United Arab Republic, the United States, the Soviet Union and Sweden.

"In accordance with the agreement on procedural arrangements adopted by the Conference on 14 March 1962 (ENDC/1, paragraphs 3 and 4), all documents and final verbatim records of the Conference distributed as of 31 May will be made available to all Members of the United Nations and for public use on 18 June 1962.

"Further final verbatim records issued during the recess will be made available regularly at Geneva in the normal way to the delegations to the Conference. They will also be made available from time to time during the recess to all Members of the United Nations and for public use, through the United Nations Secretariat at Geneva and New York.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 14 June 1962, at 10.00 a.m."

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.