

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 6 June 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

(Sweden)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA

Mr. C. A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Mr. L. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Mr. H. M. da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. S. F. RAE

Mr. C. J. MARSHALL

Mr. J. R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. WINKLER

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

Mr. E. FRANCO

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. F. CORREA

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO  
Mr. O. IONESCO  
Mr. C. GEORGESCO  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. A. EDELSTAM  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. V. P. SUSLOV  
Mr. I. M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. O. SIRRY  
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY  
Mr. I. F. PORTER  
Mr. R. I. T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. W. FOSTER  
Mr. G. BUNN  
Mr. C. G. BREAM  
Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the 302nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I have on my list of speakers for this morning the names of the representatives of Sweden and Poland, and in order to follow that order I shall speak first as representative of Sweden.

2. Today I want to make some comments on an issue which has lately become quite topical. I refer to the issue of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In the two existing, but now quite old, drafts of a non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152/Add.1 and ENDC/164) no reference was made to this subject. Recently, however, the introduction into the debate of this new element -- evidently with the intention of prohibiting, through the non-proliferation treaty, the manufacture or procurement in other ways by non-nuclear-weapon States of any nuclear explosive devices, for whatever purpose -- has caused some apprehension and even called forth some opposition. It would be highly desirable if, through an open debate in this Committee, we could disperse such fears and agree on a solution satisfactory to all parties.

3. I wish to take as my point of departure the indisputable fact that any nuclear explosive device might be used as a nuclear weapon. The technology is identical and the material structure of the device is very similar. The only difference of importance becomes manifest in regard to where and how the charge would be applied. The technology is the same whether nuclear energy is harnessed, as Lord Chalfont put it at the meeting of 23 February, for moving a million tons of earth to dig a canal or create an oil deposit, or for pulverizing a city of a million people. (ENDC/PV.288, para.16)

4. There could be no two views on the necessity for submitting such a dangerous object to international regulation. Mankind could not feel safe if it were left to the discretionary power of a growing number of nations to decide whether they should or should not cross the hair's breadth that divides peaceful and military uses of such objects.

5. Now my analysis turns away from those gloomy aspects to an evaluation of the positive aspects of the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. Even if today we have an incomplete knowledge of the economic value of using nuclear explosives for various engineering undertakings, this lack of knowledge will certainly not be permanent. When contemplating international agreements it is in the nature of things to prepare for the future, because if we wait until the future,

(The Chairman, Sweden)

which is uncertain today, becomes the present, it will most probably be too late to regulate the situation. This is, alas, an experience often repeated in the history of disarmament efforts.

6. Viewing the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions as one of economic and political realities, my delegation has been struck by the strength of the arguments brought forward on behalf of the countries which, for historical reasons, have remained economically less developed. We must in all fairness admit that if operations of the kind envisaged became economically advantageous and at the same time devoid of health hazards they might serve to release enormous new resources. Though it might be playing with fire, we must strive to find acceptable regulations for such undertakings which would be both safe and equitable.

7. We then face a dilemma: how to design the rules so as to prohibit the manufacture but permit the use of nuclear explosives. But -- and this is intended to be my contribution to a fair and reliable compromise -- this very distinction between regulations governing manufacture and regulations governing use may be helping us out of the dilemma.

8. When some of our colleagues, and particularly the distinguished representatives of Brazil (ENDC/PV.293) and India (ENDC/PV.298), have examined these problems they have rendered a great service to us all. Their arguments, eloquently and forcefully presented, have hinged on the value of being allowed to use such devices of potential benefit and, more specifically, of being able to benefit from their use in a non-discriminatory manner. As far as I can see nobody has argued for the necessity per se of independent manufacture of them. If assurances of these rights of equitable use -- I repeat, rights of equitable use -- could be given and codified, a prohibition in a non-proliferation treaty, or for that matter in a cut-off treaty, which said, in these or similar words, that "to manufacture nuclear devices which might be used as nuclear weapons" was forbidden ought to be acceptable to all. It would seem to be quite sufficient that the ban in this way implicitly covers all manufacture.

9. We might then proceed to examine how the equitable access to "use" of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes may be assured to the whole international community. At this juncture we find a very valuable point of departure in the statements made in this Committee recently by the representatives of the United States (ENDC/PV.295, paras.73-78) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.297, para.21) suggesting solutions to this problem. Both Mr. Foster and Mr. Roshchin indicated certain procedural arrangements to this effect.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

10. Mr. Foster outlined in certain detail an international regulation for having nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes made available by the nuclear Powers to non-nuclear-weapon States on economically advantageous terms. Safety precautions, studies of the feasibility of requested projects and questions of priority would be handled by an international body. In this context, we should like to put forward the additional idea that nuclear devices might be committed to a formal "pool" for allocation, by this body, to interested customers. Such an arrangement should help solve the problem of equity, to which I shall return in a while.

11. Mr. Roshchin did not amplify his suggestions to the same degree as Mr. Foster amplified his, but he clearly held out the comparable promise that

"... an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot and should not prevent non-nuclear countries from using nuclear energy for the purposes of peaceful economic development. In this connexion we bear in mind that the question of the procedure and conditions governing the carrying out of nuclear explosions is a particular question which can be settled only on the basis of a separate international agreement." (ENDC/PV.297, para.21)

12. Many might say, however, that there is still a deficiency in this approach. It can be argued that it would unbalance the future in favour of the rich and mighty nations -- a category in which the nuclear-weapon Powers anyway are already.

13. When the issue of peaceful nuclear explosives has become a politically heated one it has been, of course, on account of the news stories telling us that an economic breakthrough in this field might be approaching. If I take some quotations from United States sources only, this is a consequence of the openness of the discussions in that country; it is only to be expected that similar preparations are under way in other nuclear-weapon countries.

14. According to these news stories the development in the United States under what is known as project Plowshare, in which huge sums have already been invested, is "beginning to attract some serious American business interests." I will not enumerate all the different projects under study. I will choose only one example of special interest due to the numerous references recently made to new methods for extracting oil, a commodity of such great interest to the world market. One of the popular United States weeklies mentions, as it were in passing, that:

(The Chairman, Sweden)

"A different process for extracting oil from shale is being studied by the Colorado School of Mines with backing from six oil companies. And 25 firms, including the Oil Shale Corporation, are working on a plan to use a deep atomic blast to melt the shale and permit the oil to be pumped from conventional wells."

15. This and many similar news items obviously function as eye-openers, particularly to countries as yet tragically underprivileged economically but with oil or mineral resources that might possibly be tapped. This is why we must, by way of an international regulation, seek a solution which is both economically interesting for these countries and politically balanced and equitable. At the same time such a solution must of course serve as a guarantee against the proliferation of nuclear arms.

16. How should this be achieved? May I offer the following suggestions for constructive thinking. The first is that we seriously consider the advisability of taking the heat out of this issue in connexion with the non-proliferation treaty by simultaneously assuring its place in another set of agreements. Of course, the manufacture of explosive devices would be covered by a non-proliferation treaty. But for the wider purpose, the use of such devices, we must do two things: (a) find a formula for prohibiting nuclear explosions in the context where we think it rightly belongs, in a comprehensive test-ban, and (b) work out a separate agreement for allowing exemptions from this ban for peaceful explosions under specific rules as to international management and control.

17. We think this is a better method than trying to dispose of the whole matter in connexion with the non-proliferation treaty. A general prohibition of nuclear explosions, whether for testing or engineering purposes, would be an effective means of arms control. All nuclear explosions, except those undertaken as war measures, would thus come under international regulations. There would be a complete balance and equity if such explosions in all countries were prohibited -- as some very important ones already are by the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

18. Another reason for treating the explosions outside the non-proliferation issue is that the controls needed for surveillance of them are not of the same kind as those needed for the purpose of ensuring non-production.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

19. The main argument is, however, the one with regard to establishing a balanced disarmament system and equitable economic possibilities. This would be achieved by obtaining simultaneously the agreement on separate arrangements for international licensing of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and a comprehensive test-ban treaty debarring all parties from undertaking any nuclear explosions without proper licensing.

20. The right of decision to allow explosions for peaceful purposes should be granted to an international organ. This would assure the equitable use of such explosions. Perhaps the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might be given this right, as suggested by Mr. Foster in the statement I have already cited. (ENDC/PV.295, para.75). Out of concern for the disarmament effect, i.e. to avoid any risk of proliferation of nuclear arms, the stocks of explosives will have to remain with the nuclear-weapon Powers. But for economic reasons, as well as for health reasons, no private or national discretionary power should be allowed to give the final permission for the employment of explosives. Thus, their use by the nuclear-weapon Powers also should be the object of a licensing procedure. This is the ideal situation that I would like us to strive for.

21. Such a permissive separate agreement must be coupled with a prohibitory general one, as I have said, The place to achieve this is, in our opinion, in a treaty banning underground explosions. Now the prospective usefulness of such explosions for civilian purposes will come to constitute a pressure on all of us, and not least the nuclear weapon States, to proceed without further delay towards the conclusion of an underground-test-ban agreement.

22. Such a treaty would take the form of a general undertaking to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test explosion, or, subject to a specially listed exemption, any other underground nuclear explosion. The special exemption should refer to the criteria under which peaceful explosions would be permissible and would ensure full international control.

23. What is here pictured in terms of bans, prohibitions, licensing, etc. is in reality a great challenge to creative international co-operation. It is an attempt to help reconcile disarmament interests with economic development interests, and, in a world where the young generation is not ridiculing science fiction but on the contrary very seriously talking in terms of "des futuribles", we should be farsighted enough to grasp this magnificent opportunity. In all sincerity, I believe we have no right to place unnecessary obstacles on the way to a richer future. But time is of the essence.



24. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): In my statement today I do not propose to expatiate on the need for a non-proliferation treaty. When, more than five years ago, we adopted United Nations General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI), we all recognized the importance of checking the spread of nuclear weapons. That was the starting point and the framework of our subsequent endeavours. Other United Nations resolutions on the subject have been only an elaboration of a well-established principle.

25. Our efforts here to draft a treaty are nothing more than an attempt to translate that principle into an internationally binding document. The core of the question -- namely, the strict interdependence between the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons and the obligation not to acquire them through independent manufacture or otherwise -- has remained unaffected, whatever the semantic differences between "dissemination" and "proliferation".

26. Nor do I propose to extol the advantages of bridling the arms race and preventing it from running out of control. To do so would be reminiscent of battering at an open door. Everybody around this table is, no doubt, convinced of the value a non-proliferation treaty would represent per se for making the world "a better, a safer and a saner place to live in", if I may quote the words used by Lord Chalfont at our meeting of 25 May (FNDC/PV.299, para. 5).

27. Instead, then, of discussing the illness and its pernicious effects, let us rather concentrate on providing the cure. Admittedly, much has been done towards that end during the last few months, and it is well known that the backbone of the future treaty, its main provisions, have already been agreed upon, at least between the two major alliances. Some controversial questions which remain will still have to be solved before the draft treaty can be finalized.

28. It is, however, the view of my delegation that progress is not facilitated by constant injection into our debate of new issues, either extraneous to the problem of non-proliferation or only loosely connected with it. And we feel that many of them have arisen from sheer misunderstanding.

29. Take the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is an incontrovertible fact of history that large-scale atomic research was motivated by military considerations. Consequently, those countries which were the first to engage in the manufacture of nuclear bombs were also the first to use nuclear energy for other, not warlike, purposes. They have thus acquired an advantage over all the other States which entered the atomic stage later.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

30. There are few countries which could afford the simultaneous use of the atom for military and peaceful aims — and here I have in mind, of course, a serious and intensive development in both fields, not just a token display of dubious capabilities. Except for some of the existing nuclear Powers, there is probably no country which could afford that.

31. Let us now consider the possible effects of the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons on the economy of a country in the intermediate stage of scientific and economic development. Generalizations are, of course, hazardous because developments in the economic and scientific fields do not always go hand in hand. But we can, for the sake of our argument, examine the case of a country which has attained marked progress in basic research in nuclear physics, chemistry and radiobiology and which has some significant achievements in the production of nuclear installations, in reactor and fuel techniques, and in the manifold applications of nuclear technology.

32. We can, I suppose, reasonably assume that a nuclear armaments programme which such a country would embark upon would be relatively modest by modern standards and would also be carried out without grants or substantial assistance from abroad. That may amount to a programme of some fifteen to twenty atom bombs carried by bombers in the first five-year stage, some twenty to thirty hydrogen bombs and warheads, a few dozen intermediate-range rockets and perhaps one or two submarine nuclear missile carriers in the second five-year stage — all this at a total cost of some \$5,000 million-\$6,000 million. The cost in terms of money, spread over a period of say ten years, may not seem to be prohibitive. But that is only one of the factors, and not by far the most important one. For in real terms a nuclear arms programme would involve a redistribution of the national income and productive resources with far-reaching short-term and long-term effects which only a very rich country could sustain without serious damage.

33. Peaceful nuclear technology would naturally fall the first victim since almost the entire scientific, engineering and technical personnel, and almost all nuclear installations and plants producing nuclear apparatus would have to be assigned to the nuclear armament effort. A good number of scientific and research institutions — as well as industrial enterprises in the chemical, metallurgical, electronic and other fields — would have to be converted for the exclusive purpose of nuclear procurement, with a consequent drain on the most qualified and highly skilled human resources.

(Mr. Blusztain, Poland)

34. It is very likely that such a programme would influence profoundly the imports of the country concerned. It might therefore affect current production and investment. It is doubtful whether it could be achieved without a drop in consumption and employment levels. As I have said before, I realize that the consequences of a nuclear weapon programme may vary from country to country, depending on the level of economic and scientific development. But I venture to contend that nowhere would those consequences prove harmless to the economy as a whole and, in particular, nowhere would they prove beneficial to the peaceful uses of the atom.

35. That is why we cannot accept the assertion that the countries which have forsworn nuclear weaponry are handicapped in developing peaceful nuclear technology, or even that the balance in that field would for ever remain tipped in favour of the nuclear-weapon Powers. Actually, as was stated here a few days ago by you Madam Chairman — and as was proved by the experience of your own country and of Canada, India and Czechoslovakia, not to speak of others — research, development and production in reactor technology and in similar fields have not been hampered by lack of knowledge obtained through the manufacture of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.200, para. 9).

36. If anything, the treaty on non-proliferation would promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy even further by opening up new vistas for world-wide co-operation and making available the scientific and technical achievements of some to all. We shall certainly insist on including in the text of a future treaty on non-proliferation a provision to that effect. For once the treaty is concluded the present mistrust and uncertainty over the use some countries may make of the technical information, material and equipment received will be dispelled, at least in relation to those who have signed or adhered to it. It will, of course, be a matter for the sovereign decision of each State whether to enjoy or forgo those larger benefits of international co-operation in the field of the peaceful utilization of the atom.

37. Yet another question related to the uses of nuclear energy — that of the so-called peaceful explosions — calls for some comment. May I say here how much impressed I was, Madam Chairman, by your statement at this meeting. Although my views on some technical or economic aspects of the problem are not identical with yours, I can assure you that we shall study your statement very carefully because it contains a wealth of very constructive suggestions. We may come back to the problem at one of our subsequent meetings.

38. Coming back to my prepared statement, I should like to say the following. It is hard to believe that an issue which is at present of more theoretical than practical value, and which may remain so for many years to come, would in any way obstruct or even delay the signing of a non-proliferation agreement by any country. True, one cannot predict all the potentialities of the atom. But one would have to stretch one's imagination very far indeed to consider nuclear explosions as an industrial device or a daily occurrence. It is the opinion of people who are well acquainted with the subject that if we finally succeeded in some distant future in harnessing atomic energy for peaceful explosions -- which is not at all sure, given the requirements of safety -- such explosions would be very uncommon events, and that even then they would be impracticable in most of the inhabited lands.

39. Is it really worth while for a non-nuclear country to engage in an expensive, if not economically ruinous, proposition which may eventually prove purposeless, especially if the nuclear Powers solemnly pledge to provide their appropriate services at low cost when called upon, possibly without making any charge for research?

40. Now let us consider the international aspects of the matter which are of interest to us all. The technology of producing nuclear explosives for peaceful uses is analogous to that for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Nobody here, or elsewhere, has provided evidence to the contrary. Hence such explosives would have to be covered by an international ban on proliferation. We agree that the use people make of their skill and, for that matter, of the explosives that they invent is a matter of will. But, within the context of disarmament, objective capability counts for more than subjective will. All States would readily declare, I am sure, that the weapons they possess are not intended for aggressive aims. Would that be a satisfactory substitute for destroying those weapons?

41. The development of nuclear explosives -- although they were labelled "for peaceful purposes" -- by one State could not fail to generate mistrust and alarm among others. It would provoke contagious regional imitation by rivals reluctant to be outclassed or by foes fearful of being outstripped.

42. In considering both the technical and international political aspects of the problem, let us then adopt a realistic attitude and rather see to it that the treaty does not contain any loopholes which might defeat its very purpose.

43. Another question which has been raised during the debate is that of security. Security is obviously of universal concern. No one can feel safe in our age, when the possibility of the automatic launching of missiles with nuclear warheads has made every

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

corner of our globe vulnerable, and when a war of mass annihilation may break out not only by design, but even as a result of miscalculation, error or other accidental circumstance. A global threat should be coped with by a global effort, preferably through the United Nations, which was set up primarily for that purpose.

44. Having said that, I concede that non-nuclear-weapon States not belonging to military alliances may have preoccupations of their own, and we are far from disregarding them. But I honestly fail to see how those preoccupations could be met, at this juncture, to the entire satisfaction of all. Certainly, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States would not be the proper answer. Conversely, the renunciation of those arms by the present non-nuclear-weapon States and their refusal to let those arms be stationed on their territories might be a rational policy of self-defence, for it would reduce to a minimum the threat of nuclear arms being used against them. Consequently we would favour the inclusion of a separate clause on nuclear-free zones in the treaty on non-proliferation, as suggested by Mexico (ENDC/PV.295, para. 16).

45. Furthermore, may I remind my colleagues that the Polish plan for a denuclearized and limited armaments zone in Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), under the chapter "Guarantee", contained an obligation to be undertaken by the nuclear Powers: first, to refrain from any steps which might violate directly or indirectly the status of the zone; and, secondly, not to use nuclear weapons against the territory of the zone. A similar provision has been included in the Treaty of Tlatelolco on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (ENDC/186). Now the Government of the Soviet Union has proposed a guarantee of the non-use of nuclear weapons even against individual denuclearized States (ENDC/PV.297, para. 14).

46. Some may consider such steps as inadequate. But who would deny that, barring a general atomic weapons race which may engulf us all, those are the only realistic solutions at a time when speedy general and complete disarmament is still beyond our reach and the renunciation of non-alignment is considered by the countries concerned to be undesirable?

47. I have, naturally, not exhausted all the topics which have arisen during our debate on a non-proliferation treaty, and I shall intervene again if necessary. But in conclusion I should like to make one remark of a general nature. Concern has been voiced about the state of our negotiations. The Polish delegation shares that concern. We think that everything possible should be done to speed up our work, but we do not attach any particular importance to the length of the list of speakers or the length

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

of our meetings. These meetings, together with the everyday unofficial bilateral and multilateral contacts and the discussions our co-Chairmen are conducting, to our mind constitute a single negotiating process which has had its ups and downs, but which -- contrary to the ominous augury of some -- is not at an impasse. I hope that we shall all persevere towards the attainment of a common goal, remembering, however, that time is not on our side.

48. We have been reminded often by some that the solution of the question of non-proliferation should be considered from the point of view of the contribution it would make to the cause of security and peace in the world as a whole, and that, in the order of priorities, it should transcend the more narrow interests of closed military groupings. We subscribe to that. But we cannot help noting that the very same Powers which have been proclaiming those indisputable truths are acting at variance with their own declarations. For it is precisely because of that very definite tendency to accord privileges to a group of nations, for no other reason than to appease the one which is more than reluctant to accept the very concept of non-proliferation, that we have encountered difficulties in our negotiations. The divide between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers is a fact of life. But to create still another division among the non-nuclear States by allowing some of them to be specially treated under a non-proliferation agreement -- be it in the field of control, or any other -- would be unjustified and thus hardly tolerable.

49. These considerations will have to be taken into account if a treaty is to be achieved.

50. Mr. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil): I should like to express my appreciation of the speech we have heard you make today, Madam Chairman. My delegation will study it with great care. Of course, we Brazilians believe, in the framework of a serious and constructive position in favour of a lasting non-proliferation treaty, that we should be free to carry out peaceful explosions with our national means -- if we feel that that better serves our national interest and that of any nation, especially the developing countries -- under appropriate international control. I should like to say that we agree with the principle that to close loop-holes in the treaty to be approved by us, the treaty should deal with controls in a more extensive way than by merely having them represented in it by the simplified idea of prohibiting peaceful -- and I insist peaceful -- nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

51. There is another matter which I wish to mention today, and I shall be very brief. Lately in this Committee we have heard with increasing frequency the argument that the non-nuclear countries would be much better off if they renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons -- weapons that they do not possess and do not intend to possess. According to that argument the human and material resources they would save in that way and would hence be able to apply to peaceful nuclear exploits would increase their capability in that promising field. That is a very tempting prospect, but the truth is that the non-nuclear countries, and among them especially the developing nations of the world, have unfortunately not yet devised a way of creating out of nothing, or at least out of very little, the resources they need. In other words, if they renounce something they do not have and do not wish to have such as a nuclear arsenal -- and the balance of obligation is what we are interested in -- the simple act of renunciation is not likely to produce by itself the great amounts of capital and skill needed to develop more rapidly their potentialities in the field of the peaceful application of the atom.

52. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): Before reading the communiqué, I have a special function to perform. I have been requested by our co-Chairmen to read the following statement to the Committee on their behalf:

"The co-Chairmen of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament discussed the priority to be given to the question of non-proliferation and to the other subjects which delegations to the Committee may wish to discuss. They noted that the General Assembly has called upon the Committee to give 'urgent consideration' to the question of non-proliferation as a matter of 'highest priority' [A/RES/2028 (XX) and A/RES/2153 (XXI)]. They also noted that the General Assembly has urged all States to take 'all necessary steps' to achieve a non-proliferation treaty 'at the earliest possible time' [A/RES/2149 (XXI)].

"The co-Chairmen were of the opinion that it would be unwise to schedule a series of meetings to be devoted to specific subjects other than non-proliferation at this time because this might delay consideration of statements on non-proliferation which delegations might wish to make. They noted on the other hand the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject in any plenary meeting of the Committee."

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 302nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mrs. A. Myrdal, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Poland and Brazil.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 8 June 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.