CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 July 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Alhaji SULE KOLO (Nigeria)

GE.67-14287

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
	Mr. T. DAMIANOV
	Mr. D. KOSTOV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. P. WINKLER
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. B. ASSFAW
India:	Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
	Mr. E. FRANCO
	Mr. F. SORO
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:	Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Romania:	Mr. N. ECOBESCO
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
	Mr. A. COROIANU
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. R. BOMAN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. V.P. SUSLOV
	Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. A. OSMAN
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. M. SHAKER
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
United States of America:	Mr. W.C. FOSTER
	Mr. G. BUNN
	Mr. G. BREAM
	Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH

1. The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the three hundred and sixteenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. WINKLER (Czechoslovakia): The deliberations on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons have now reached a considerably advanced stage. The broad discussion in our Committee has contributed largely to the clarification of the positions of individual delegations and to a rapprochement of views which seems to prevail in the talks of the two co-Chairmen of our Committee. There is, I think, a prevailing hope among the members of our Committee that we will soon be in a position, on the basis of the recommendations to be submitted by the two co-Chairmen, to start drafting the text of a stable and effective non-dissemination treaty which would be adceptable to the largest possible number of States. Like the other participants in the deliberations, the Czechoslovak delegation has already explained in its previous statements (ENDC/PV.290, 298) its position on the various aspects of the non-dissemination treaty. We propose, therefore, to limit our remarks today to a few questions we have encountered at the present stage of the deliberations.

3. To start with, let me say that at this advanced stage of our deliberations we think it might be useful to recall some basic circumstances connected with the birth of the idea of non-dissemination as of a specific problem within the framework of disarmament negotiations. We believe that this retrospection might be of some significance for the clarification of certain realities which should not be overlooked in our negotiations. It is a summary of certain generally-known facts, and it is therefore not necessary to go into details. These are, after all, fully available to everybody in the relevant documents, particularly in the verbatim records of the United Nations General Assembly -- for instance in those of its sixteenth session --, as well as in the records covering the deliberations of this Committee in recent years. It is therefore sufficient to refer to these facts only in general outline.

4. We consider it important to refer particularly to the following facts. It was mainly the non-nuclear-weapon States which stood by the birth of the idea of non-dissemination and pressed for the solution of the problem as a specific problem within the framework of disarmament. This initiative was a reaction to the growing danger that nuclear weapons might be acquired by additional States, either by obtaining them from the existing nuclear-weapon Powers or by producing them themselves. The objective of that initiative was to avert this danger without waiting for an

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agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons or the agreement on general and complete disarmament. It likewise reflected the conviction that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States would not strengthen their security and, on the contrary, would aggravate the international tension and increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

5. The non-nuclear-weapon States have played a decisive part in formulating the substance and the basic aim of non-dissemination -- that is, to prevent any increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. It was on the initiative of the non-nuclear-weapon States that several resolutions calling for the conclusion of a controlled non-dissemination treaty were adopted in the United Nations. Those resolutions formulated the fundamental obligations that such a treaty should contain. On the one hand, it is the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States not to transmit nuclear weapons and information on their manufacture to the States not possessing such weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States in their turn must undertake not to manufacture nuclear weapons or to acquire them in any other way. These differing obligations reflect the actual situation in the world, where nuclear and non-nuclear States exist side by side and where there are accordingly two potential sources of dissemination of nuclear weapons. The non-dissemination treaty must unalterably and permanently cut off both those sources in view of the fact that neither of them must be overlooked or underestimated at any time.

6. The existence of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and the aim of preventing any increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers determine objectively to a certain extent the kind of unilateral character of non-dissemination. This is reflected in the different obligations on the part of the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States, which would probably affect the non-nuclear-weapon States in a greater degree. Nevertheless, the non-nuclear-weapon States considered these different obligations to be appropriate and to correspond to the given situation, and themselves proposed their adoption. They regarded them as useful from the point of view of their own interests as well as those of the nuclear-weapon Powers; and they regarded them as useful also from the point of view of international peace and the creation of more favbourable conditions for the solution of other disarmament problems.

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7. Since the beginning it has been clearly stated that non-dissemination is not by a long way the maximum programme and the final objective. It does not answer the main problems of disarmament; it does not do away with the principal evil, which is the existence of nuclear weapons; its aim is only to prevent the spread of that evil. However, this is an important and urgent objective in the present world situation.

8. In view of its limited and partial nature, non-dissemination constitutes only one of the steps to be taken on the road towards general and complete disarmament and particularly nuclear disarmament. Non-dissemination replaces neither general and complete disarmament nor individual collateral measures, and cannot envisage objectives which might be achieved only through general and complete disarmament or possibly through such collateral measures. The very nature of the problem of non-dissemination makes possible its solution as an independent question, and its urgency requires that it should not be linked to other measures the solution of which, as past experience has shown, would necessitate more time. The separate solution of the problem of non-dissemination does not mean approval of the permanent preservation of nuclear weapons in the hands of nuclear-weapon Powers; but it is one of the significant steps towards the solution of that problem through the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

9. Those are some of the principal conclusions which might be drawn from the material connected with the birth of the idea of non-dissemination. The Czechoslovak delegation believes that, despite the developments which have taken place in the world since their formulation several years ago, those conclusions are still generally valid and should be borne in mind at the present stage of our deliberations also. They should serve as orientation points to help the Committee in working out a viable treaty effectively preventing any spread of nuclear weapons and acceptable to the largest possible number of States. On the other hand, respect of these realities will enable us to avoid any such over-burdening of the non-dissemination treaty as would inevitably occur if we wished to solve by it problems which reach beyond the framework of non-dissemination.

10. In other words, we regard these aspects as suitable criteria for what may realistically be demanded from a non-dissemination treaty and for what requirements such a treaty must meet if it is to be really effective and sufficiently stable.

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This applies both to the extent and nature of the obligations to be undertaken by individual States and to the relationship of non-dissemination to other problems and primarily to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Last but not least, it applies also to measures that would provide the States parties to the treaty with an appropriate guarantee that the other signatory States would meet fully the obligations they had undertaken.

11. Our delegation regards the requirement for such a guarantee in the non-dissemination treaty as fully justified. It is an important question, the solution of which would undoubtedly strengthen the effectiveness and stability of the treaty and also contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of greater confidence in the relations among States. Our position with regard to the basic principles which should be observed in the efforts to find a solution to the question of guarantees has been elaborated in previous statements of the Czechoslovak delegation. Accordingly, I shall make only a few remarks on this subject now.

12. The guarantees in the non-dissemination treaty should have a clearly-defined mission: namely that of providing the contracting States with the required certainty that the other States parties to the treaty honour their obligations undertaken under the treaty. The guarantees must correspond to that criterion both in their extent and in the methods to be applied in their implementation. We think that it should be no problem for any contracting State to agree to the adoption of a single system of guarantees which would be in harmony with this criterion -- that is, a system which would provide the guarantees that all signatory States fully honoured the obligations undertaken by them.

13. At the same time it is necessary to bear in mind the following: the non-dissemination treaty is based on the fact that there are two groups of States which have different positions and which, accordingly, should undertake different obligations. We believe that this fact should also be taken into consideration in the solution of the question of guarantees in relation to the two groups of States.

14. Finally, I should like to point to one other significant circumstance. It would not be in accordance with the role of guarantees if they were also to have other functions going in any direction beyond the framework of the non-dissemination treaty; or if they were to be applied to a different extent and in different ways to individual States which had assumed equal obligations under the treaty. In that case it would hardly be possible, we think, to reach agreement on this question.

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15. In conclusion, may I make a few remarks on the question of the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to which a number of speakers have recently paid considerable attention?

16. First of all, I should like to point out again that the Czechoslovak delegation regards it as necessary that the question of the manufacture of nuclear explosives for such purposes should be covered by the non-dissemination treaty fully and without reservation. A number of delegations have already adduced indisputable facts testifying to the necessity of such a solution. The crux of the problem lies in the fact that from the technological point of view any State manufacturing nuclear explosives at the same time manufactures nuclear weapons, whether wittingly or not.

17. At the same time we wish to stress that we do not regard such a solution as an obstacle to a potential use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by the non-nuclear-weapon States. Various delegations have already submitted serious constructive ideas for a solution of this problem which would be in harmony both with the political and economic interests of non-nuclear weapon States and with the non-proliferation treaty.

18. A point of departure for an acceptable solution, which might take the form of a special international arrangement, should be the fact that a possible use of nuclear explosions for the purposes of peaceful economic development of the non-nuclear-weapon States is not conditional upon the manufacture of nuclear explosives by those States. Under an appropriate procedure these explosives might be provided by the nuclear-weapon Powers. It seems indisputable that attempts at autarchy in the field of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes would be of no advantage to the non-nuclear-weapon States from the economic point of view. Moreover, as a consequence, the country in question would lag behind in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

19. For economic reasons that are not difficult to conceive, economic autarchy is not practically advisable in any economic field. It would certainly be absurd if a country wishing to build up and develop a certain industrial branch strove on its own to secure the development and manufacture of all the necessary machines and equipment. Similarly, a country which intends to undertake large-scale ground works usually finds it economically more advantageous to import the necessary machinery than to start its own research and manufacture. Such an approach is not in any case regarded as discrimination. Neither the equality nor the independent position of

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the State concerned is affected in any way. The fact that that State is guided exclusively by economic considerations, and is not bound by any international commitments which would deprive it of the right to change such policies at any time, is certainly important. In our view, however, this fact cannot be applied as an appropriate analogy in respect of the question of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. Economic aspects naturally play a considerable role in this sphere as well.

20. These irrefutable economic factors are, however, coupled with a serious political aspect which from the point of view of the non-dissemination treaty should be decisive. The development and manufacture of nuclear explosives by the non-nuclear-weapon States would inevitably have political effects identical with the political effects of a spread of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the subjective intentions of the States in question. This is the fundamental fact which cannot be refuted by any arguments or by any considerations. Therefore it is our position that the non-dissemination treaty must cover the manufacture of all nuclear explosives, irrespective of the mission they are supposed to serve.

21. Mr. TRIVEDI (India): I wish to congratulate the representative of Czechoslovakia for bringing out one of the most salient considerations in our examination of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, namely that we -- particularly an expert body like ours -- must look at it in the historical perspective also. As the representative of Czechoslovakia pointed out, the history of these negotiations is available in the documents of the United Nations and its various commissions and committees; and I thought I might elaborate on the historical perspective given by him.

22. Mr. Winkler started with 1961, and I dare say he did that because he wanted to bring in several considerations. I am sure it was for want of time that he did not go further back; but the history of the endeavours of the international community to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons -- to prevent additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons -- and to eliminate nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the world started as early as 1946. We had the Baruch Plan and the Gromyko Plan in 1946 based precisely on this proposition. At that time there was only one nucleear-weapon Power, but there were soon to be two. The endeavours of both the United States and the Soviet Union were directed towards determining, first, how to prevent a further increase, and secondly how to stop the nuclear menace entirely. I do not want to go into the history of those ill-fated attempts, but the endeavours continued.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

23. Then, in the early 1950's when the question of a nuclear test ban was paramount in the minds of peoples and nations, the then Indian Prime Minister made appeals to the international community, to the Disarmament Commission and to the United Nations. A test ban was a non-proliferation measure; and in their various suggestions Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and India linked up the question of other measures to be taken as an urgent first step. One of them was the cessation of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes. That was included specifically in the memorandum[1/] we submitted to the Disarmament Commission and its Disarmament Sub-Committee -- even though India was not a member of the Disarmament Sub-Committee then -- because we believed it was important in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

24. In the second half of the 1950's the Disarmament Sub-Committee discussed the matter in exhaustive detail. On various occasions I have quoted what Mr. Jules Moch said, what Mr. Anthony Nutting said and what the Anglo-French Memorandum said (DC/SC.1/10 and Corr.1). The approach all throughout has been that you cannot prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries unless you stop the production of fissile material for weapon purposes in all countries.

25. Then came the early 1960's, whence Mr. Winkler has brought the story more or less up to date. There was the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665(XVI)), to which some delegations made important reservations. There was the Undén plan (A/RES/1664 (XVI)), which stipulated that countries should consider the circumstances under which they would not acquire nuclear weapons. Unfortunately that particular idea was not followed. Then there was the Cairo Conference formulation, where the question of the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons was a part of the effort by the big Powers to eliminate their stockpiles (A/5763).

26. Then comes recent history -- what we might call the post-Chinese-explosion history. We all know the Disarmament Commission resolution DC/225 (ENDC/149) and the historic, momentous resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161). Hence I fully agree with the representative of Czechoslovakia that when we wish to consider this issue we must consider it in the historical perspective so that we may have the right answers to the problem.

1/ See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for April, May and June 1954, document DC/44 and Corr.1.

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27. I thought I might also make one more comment. The question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been associated in peoples' minds with the question of security. I do not wish to go into the details of this particular point at this morning's meeting; but I should like to speak on it at some length at a later meeting. This is an important consideration not only in the minds of nations but in the minds of the peoples of all nations.

28. The history of nations tells us that, just as war has become total since the days of Napoleon, Clausewitz, the First World War, the Second World War, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so disarmament also has become total in the sense that the people at large have been engaged in the quest for disarmament. Just as war no longer remains a pursuit to be followed by just a few elite soldiers, so disarmament is equally not a pursuit just for certain categories of statesmen and diplomats. The peoples of all nations have been intimately concerned in this quest for disarmament; and they will have the final answer to any propositions put forward for signature or for consideration. The parliaments and the peoples will be greatly concerned and will look at all propositions that are put before them.

29. And the first question the people will ask is: "How is the security aspect being taken into account in this particular proposition?" One argument which the peoples of many nations will never accept is: "Let us face facts; let us be realistic; allow some countries to develop nuclear weapons, but you do not do it". That is a proposition which the people will never accept, a proposition which, in the confused argument for accepting a fait accompli, runs like this: "Some countries, your neighbours -- aggressive, militaristic, however they may be -- have developed nulcear weapons. Let them develop them. You were more advanced than they were, but you have been good. Never mind. Let them develop them." That, I repeat, is an argument which the people will never accept.

30. If it is to be acceptable to the people, therefore, any proposition will have to have other elements which will also take into account countries possessing and developing nuclear weapons. It will have to be in accord -- not in the letter but in the spirit -- with the historical perspective that I have put forward, with the propositions put forward in 1946, with the propositions put foward by us in the early fifties, with those put forward by countries in the later fifties and in the Undén plan, at the Cairo Conference, in the Disarmament Commission resolution and in resolution 2028 (XX).

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

31. As I said at the beginning, I intervened to agree with Mr. Winkler; and I agree with him once more, in saying that we must not load a non-proliferation treaty with too many things which are not directly germane to it. It was in recognition of this that resolution 2028 (XX) laid down two separate principles, (b) and (c). Principle (c) only talked of the treaty being a step towards general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. It did not say that a treaty on non-proliferation should include general and complete disarmament, or nuclear disarmament. We accept that; but there was a separate principle, a distinct principle. Indeed there were five principles, not just one.

32. There was principle (b), which said that the treaty should embody -- should include in its articles -- an acceptable balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon Powers. A non-proliferation treaty should therefore have mutual obligations and responsibilities; and in parenthesis I might add that this is also spelt out in principle (a) -- this provision that the treaty should embody mutual obligations and responsibilities for nuclear and non-nuclear Powers -- where it is said that neither of them should proliferate, that proliferation should be denied to both of them.

33. From that follows Mr. Winkler's principle that control should apply to the obligations assumed by the two sides. The contracting parties having assumed responsibilities and obligations not to proliferate, the control should therefore be on that particular aspect of the treaty.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 316th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Alhaji Sule Kolo, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 27 July 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.