CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.214
8 September 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 8 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. L.C.N. OBI (Nigeria)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
	Mr. E. HOSANNAH
Bulgaria:	Mr. C. LUKANOV
	Mr. G. GHELEV
	Mr. T. DAMIANOV
	Mr. I. BOEV
Burma:	U SAIN BWA
	U HTOON SHEIN
Canada:	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
	Mr. S.F. RAE
	Mr. R.M. TAIT
	Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. KLUSAK
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. A. MIKULIN
	Mr. J. CHMELA
Ethiopia:	Ato S. TEFERRA
India:	Mr. R.K. NEHRU
	Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
	Mr. K. NARENDRANATH
Italy:	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
	Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
	Mr. S. AVETTA
	Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:	Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
	Mr. M. TELLO
	Mr. J. MERCADO
Nigeria:	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
Poland:	Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Romania:	Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
	Mr. E. GLASER
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU
	Mr. I. IACOB
Sweden:	Mr. P. LIND
	Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
	Mr. B. VEGESACK
	Mr. J. PRAWITZ
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
	Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH
	Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV
	Mr. I.M. PALENYKH
United Arab Republic:	Mr. A.F. HASSAN
	Mr. A. OSMAN
	Mr. M. KASSEM
	Mr. A.A. SALAM
United Kingdom:	Sir Harold BEELEY
	Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
	Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:	Mr. W.C. FOSTER
	Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE
	Mr. D.S. MACDONALD
	Mr. R.A. MARTIN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the 214th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. KLUSAK (Czechoslovakia)(translation from Russian): Since the beginning of this year the work of our Committee in regard to problems of general and complete disarmament has been, practically speaking, entirely centred on the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- in particular, the proposal of the Soviet Union for the maintenance of a nuclear umbrella until the end of the process of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), and, recently, the proposal (ENDC/PV.188, p.17) for the establishment of a working group to discuss the technical details of the concept of the retention of minimum deterrents. We consider that this focussing of the work of the Committee has been fully justified, since it is becoming more and more evident that the question of delivery vehicles is the key-question of the solution of all the other problems of general and complete disarmament.

This view is shared by other delegations in the Committee, which have quite rightly pointed out in their statements that the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is the core of the whole problem of general and complete disarmament. If it is not settled, there will be no real prospect of making progress in the negotiations on other issues. That is why we also consider completely justified the view that it is necessary to continue to exert every effort to achieve agreement on this question.

A suitable basis for specific discussions which might lead to the achievement of agreement is the Soviet Government's proposal, submitted at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, for the maintenance of a nuclear umbrella until the end of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, while all the remaining delivery vehicles would be eliminated in the first stage. The submission of this proposal, in which the Soviet Union showed once again its willingness to meet the position of the Western Powers, provided further evidence of the constant atriving of the Soviet Government to find a practicable way towards solving the question of delivery vehicles on the basis of a reasonable compromise.

That is why this proposal has been highly valued by all who are seeking for a possibility of solving this problem. This was shown in a whole number of cases. At the General Assembly a number of delegations welcomed this proposal. At the meeting of this Committee held on 25 August the representative of Sweden reminded us of the positive attitude taken by the Swedish delegation in regard to it (ENDC/PV.210, pp. 30, 31). The delegations of India, Indonesia and other States also adopted a positive attitude.

In this connexion I should like to quote part of the statement made by the representative of New Zealand who, during the discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament in the First Committee of the General Assembly, said among other things:

> "The acceptance in principle, announced by the Soviet Union in the General Assembly on 19 September, that each of the great Powers may retain an agreed number of nuclear missiles throughout the process of disarmament until the end of its third and last stage could open the way for a fundamental appraisal of the assumptions on which the negotiations to date have been based." (A/C.I/PV.1324, p. 41)

On many other occasions the Soviet proposal was greeted with approval by the official spokesmen of the governments of a number of States, as well as in world public opinion.

Unfortunately, however, it has to be noted that this important initiative of the Soviet Government failed to meet with proper understanding on the part of the Western Powers. There is no doubt -- and this has been confirmed by the statements of many delegations at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as by the work of our Committee -- that the proposal for the maintenance of a "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the process of general and complete disarmament would open up new possibilities for a general reconsideration of the state of the negotiations and for a revision of the positions of individual States. But the negotiations that have so far taken place in the Committee have confirmed beyond all doubt that the Western Powers have not set about any such revision and that they continue stubbornly to adhere to their old position and their original unacceptable proposals and demands.

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As the statement made by the United States representative on 1 September showed, the United States is now trying to justify this position in a peculiar way. Among other things, Mr. Timberlake said:

> "We were also told that it" -- the "nuclear umbrella" plan -- "was a compromise, when in actual fact it reflects only a growth in the realism of the Soviet Union's approach to the problem." (ENDC/PV.212, p.22)

The question naturally arises: what can such an approach to negotiations lead to, when one side declares its proposal to be the embodiment of realism whereas it qualifies the other side's proposal aimed at creating a basis for finding a reasonable compromise solution as only "a growth in realism"? What, then, would the United States agree to regard as a compromise? Perhaps the acceptance by the other side of a position which the United States would consider realistic -- that is, the complete acceptance of the United States proposal.

It is obvious that such an approach to negotiations cannot lead to any results whatever. It is this approach that is the real reason why our work in the field of general and complete disarmament has so far failed to lead to any results. Moreover, the delegations of the United States and other Western countries accuse the delegations of the socialist countries of adopting an inflexible attitude in discussing the problems of delivery vehicles and the establishment of a working group. But how can the Western Powers talk about flexibility at all? After all, it is beyond dispute that, whereas the submission of the proposal to maintain a "nuclear umbrella" signified an important modification in comparison with the Soviet Union's original proposal, the United States has not made in regard to measures concerning nuclear weapon delivery vehicles even the slightest change in its so-called "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" (ENDC/30) of April 1962.

Moreover, if we compare the statements made by the delegations of the Western Powers at the beginning of 1962 with their present statements, we see that they are putting forward essentially the same artifical objections against the proposal to retain a "nuclear umbrella" as they put forward against the proposal for the complete

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elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament which was contained in the original Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2). I do not think there is any need to go again over all those objections, the groundlessness of which has already been pointed out by the delegations of the socialist countries, since they have been put forward again, for instance, in the statement made by our United Kingdom colleague at the 210th meeting. The representative of the Soviet Union replied to them very aptly and cogently on 1 September (ENDC/PV.212, pp. 31 et seq).

In substance, all those objections boil down to this: that the negative attitude of the Western Powers towards the proposal for the maintenance of a "nuclear umbrella" is determined by their unwillingness to agree to effective measures right from the beginning of the disarmament process that would eliminate the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and would deprive all States of the possibility of waging such a war. They try to justify this fundamental negative attitude by asserting, among other things, that radical measures to eliminate delivery vehicles, while an agreed minimum deterrent was retained, would lead to upsetting some sort of military balance, which in present-da conditions guarantees, they allege, the security of States. Measures of that kind, they say, would be contrary to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) of 1961

In many statements made by the delegations of the socialist countries and, most recently, in the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union on 25 August (ENDC/PV.210, pp. 20 et seq), it has been proved time and again that the concept of a so-called "military balance" not only has nothing to do with disarmament but, just the contrary, has been one of the main reasons that have led in the past to the failure of all attempts to solve this problem. Utterly groundless also are the attempts to interpret any paragraph of the Joint Statement in such a way as to make out that it requires the maintenance of the existing military balance. After all, it is a generally-accepted fact that the present-day situation, which is characterized by the stockpiling of huge quantities of the most devastating weapons in the arsenals of States, guarantees neither peace nor security to a single State.

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On the contrary, it constitutes a constant source of the danger of an outbreak of thermonuclear war. It is precisely this danger that makes the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament so urgent -- that is, the adoption of measures that would lead to a radical change in the present situation. The sooner and the more radically this situation is changed as a result of the implementation of agreed disarmament measures, the better it will be for the peace-loving peoples of the whole world. The attempts to maintain a so-called military balance as the Western Powers understand it -- even at another, lower level -- has nothing to do with the strengthening of the peace and security of the peoples.

In this connexion I should like to draw attention to one particular fact. The representatives of the socialist countries, and of several non-aligned countries as well, have pointed out -- as was done most recently by the representative of India (ENDC/PV.212, pp. 7, 8) -- that a percentage reduction is by no means a guarantee that equal security for all States would be ensured in all circumstances and that some of them would obtain a unilateral advantage to the detriment of the security of the other side. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, submitted a very concrete, workmanlike and clear analysis of this situation on 16 June (ENDC/PV.190, pp. 29 et seq). Although a considerable amount of time has gone by since then, neither the United States delegation nor any other delegation of the Western countries has had anything to say in this regard or adduced anything that could refute the arguments put forward by Mr. Zorin and prove that the position of the Western countries is justified.

Yet, in spite of that, on 1 September the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, saw fit to assert once more that "The Western plan, on the other hand, does provide a balanced, orderly approach to the elimination of the nuclear threat..." (ENDC/PV.212, p.20). We are compelled, however, to point out that, in the light of the arguments which were advanced by the delegation of the Soviet Union and the delegations of the other socialist countries and which, as I have said, have remained without any valid answer on the part of the Western delegations, that assertion sounds utterly unconvincing. That is what can be said on the question of balance of forces.

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Equally dubious is another assertion to which the delegations of the Western Powers keep returning: namely, that a prior condition for any effective disarmament measures would be the establishment of special peace-keeping machinery which, they say, should constitute the basic guarantee of the security of States during the disarmament process, and that after the completion of this process it should replace those guarantees which, they say, are now given to States by the existing military potential and, first and foremost, the nuclear potential.

How is this demand to be understood? After all, there is a consensus of opinion to the effect that the demand for general and complete disarmament, its realism and urgency in present-day conditions, are based above all on the fact that even the most tremendous accummulation of the most destructive types of weapons does not give States any guarantee of security but, on the contrary, increases the danger of mutual extermination in the event of war. General and complete disarmament should do away for ever with the threat of war and lay a solid and reliable foundation for the complete security of all States, large and small.

The demand of the Western Powers, who make the implementation of effective disarmament measures dependent upon the establishment of peace-keeping machinery as the basic guarantee of security, is bound to create the impression that, in their opinion, general and complete disarmament would not only not lead to the consolidation of international peace and security but, on the contrary, would be more likely to weaken and jeopardize it. The objections of the Western Powers in regard to peace-keeping machinery, and in particular their attempts to make acceptance of the "nuclear umbrella" concept dependent upon the solution of this question, could well become a further pretext for delaying disarmament and rejecting effective measures for its implementation.

Of course, this remark of ours does not mean that we do not take into consideration the necessity of giving States, even in the conditions of general and complete disarmament, some additional guarantees of security and leaving the international community sufficient means of crushing any possible attempts at aggression. This

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necessity is fully provided for in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1), which includes corresponding measures based on the United Nations Charter which would be carried out in the process of general and complete disarmament. We consider these measures sufficient guarantees, which supplement the basic system of peace and security established as a result of general and complete disarmament.

The delegations of the Western Powers try to justify their negative position in regard to the "nuclear umbrella" concept also by asserting that it is vague and not specific enough. But this objection is no more convincing than the other ones. The basic idea of our concept of the maintenance of a "nuclear umbrella" -- that is, a minimum deterrent or "nuclear shield" -- is perfectly clear. It is based on the premise that both sides would retain an agreed minimum quantity of delivery vehicles and that all the rest would be eliminated in the first stage of general and complete disarmament. In this regard no one should have any doubt. The fact that the substance of the proposal for the maintenance of a "nuclear umbrella" is also clear to the Western countries is shown by numerous statements of their representatives in the Committee.

Moreover, I should like to stress that at the present stage of the negotiations we are dealing precisely with this substance and not with technical details. But it appears that it is precisely with this basic idea, this substance of the concept of the maintenance of a "nuclear umbrella", that the Western Powers do not agree. It has been confirmed time and again that nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, the possibility of waging nuclear war, is the alpha and omega of all their political and military reasoning, their idol the removal of which they do not wish to accept. This was confirmed once more by our United Kingdom colleague in his statement on 25 August, when he declared:

> "It is quite unreasonable to expect States to destroy -- even if this could be done, which is doubtful -- so much of what they consider to be their main means of security in such a short period of time without first establishing a much higher degree of confidence." (ENDC/PV.210, p.9)

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That is the real reason of the disagreement over the proposal for the maintenance of a "nuclear umbrella". That is the heart of the contradictions in the discussion of the Soviet Union's proposal for the establishment of a working group which would examine the technical problems and details connected with the "nuclear umbrella" concept, and where all the questions of the Western Powers concerning particular aspects could be answered in detail.

The purpose of the proposal to establish a working group on the basis of the adoption by the Committee of the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" is to achieve progress in solving the key problem of general and complete disarmament. This, of course, relates to the substance of the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. That is why the centre of gravity of the disagreement in the matter of establishing a working group does not lie in a procedural decision, as the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, rightly pointed out in his statement on 25 August (ibid., p.15). These contradictions derive from the fact that there continue to exist two absolutely opposite concepts in regard to the necessity of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war and in regard to the implementation of effective measures which, right from the beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament, would deprive all States of the material means that would make it possible to wage such a war.

The mere establishment of a working group without agreement on this essential question of principle could not produce anything useful. The establishment of a working group should not be an end in itself. It will only make sense if it is the reflection of definite progress on basic questions of substance. Such progress would be the adoption by the Committee of the principle of the maintenance of a minimum quantity of means of deterrence. That is precisely what was proposed by the delegation of India at the meeting of the Committee held on 24 March (ENDC/PV.177, pp.28 et seq). It coincides with the basic thesis of the Soviet proposal for the establishment of a working group. The adoption of that proposal would be tantamount to a step forward, which would not be limited merely to the formal aspect of the establishment of a working group, but would at the same time create a solid basis for its activities.

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The Western Powers, however, take a different attitude. Although they express as a matter of form their agreement to the establishment of a working group, they put forward such conditions that the working group would inevitably be, from the very outset, a stillborn child, a body incapable of achieving any positive results and condemned to mark time, reiterating the sterile discussion on the problem of delivery vehicles which has already been going on for nearly two years in our plenary meetings.

The Western attitude affords no other possibility. The readiness which the delegations of the Western Powers declare to discuss in a working group the proposal for the maintenance of a minimum nuclear deterrent -- or even to recognize that this question should be given priority -- is not a sign of their flexibility, as they keep trying to prove. After all, in proclaiming this flexibility of theirs, at the same time they emphasize -- as the United Kingdom representative confirmed once again in his statement on 25 August (ENDC/PV.210, p.12) -- that the very principle of the maintenance of a minimum deterrent when all the other delivery vehicles are eliminated in the first stage is unacceptable to them.

In such circumstances, what could the discussion of this proposal in a working group lead to? Only to endless delay without any prospect of reaching agreement. If the delegations of the Western Powers declare in advance that they reject the very principle on which the proposal for the maintenance of a "nuclear umbrella" is based, what sense could there be in discussing particular technical details and aspects of it? This circumstance proves once again quite clearly that the attitude of the Western Powers merely seems to be flexible, and is flexible only in words. Actually they persist in their rigid, unyielding attitude.

Thus it is confirmed again and again that the true reason for the deadlock in our negotiations is to be found in the unwillingness of the Western countries to accept effective disarmament measures and, in the first place, to accept effective measures in regard to delivery vehicles in accordance with the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella". The Western Powers maintain this attitude of theirs despite the fact that in the world and in our Committee the opinion is being affirmed ever more clearly that that is the only way to achieve progress in the present negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

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Such a situation is bound to cause serious concern and compels all of us to think the matter over. But this cannot be a ground for abandoning the problem of delivery vehicles -- that is, the problem that continues to be the key one. It is now for the Western Powers to realize their responsibility for th lack of any results so far in the negotiations, and to adopt such a position as wo ld enable us to solve this problem and thus help to ensure that this key shall open the door to the achievement of progress in negotiations on other problems of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): At recent meetings of the Committee devoted to problems of general and complete disarmament, the delegations of the Soviet Union and other socialist States have endeavoured to lay bare the reasons why our discussions on the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- the key question of the whole problem on general and complete disarmament -- have ended in deadlock. We have shown that the failure of our negotiations on this subject is due to the fact that the Western Powers are striving to substitute for the aim of ensuring equal conditions of security for all States through the implementation of disarmament measures, as mentioned in the United Nations Charter and in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) of 1961, the fallacious and discredited concept of the "balance of armaments", which has always been used as a convenient screen for carrying out the policy of the arms race.

The statements made by the spokesmen of the delegations of a number of non-aligned States, particularly the statement made by the representative of India, Mr. Nehru at the 212th meeting, have shown that this assessment of the situation that has come about in our negotiations meets on the whole with their understanding, and that the non-aligned States, like the socialist States, see in the implementation of radical measures of nuclear disarmament in the first stage of disarmament a real means of removing the threat of a thermonuclear war.

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It is natural that the Committee should have awaited with interest the reaction of the Western Powers to our comments. At recent meetings devoted to the discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament, their representatives have made a number of statements. If we peruse and reflect on what Mr. Timberlake, Mr. Tahourdin and Mr. Cavalletti said at the 212th and 213th meetings, we can say with complete justification that the representatives of the Western Powers obviously tried to evade explaining their position on the substance of the question raised by the Soviet delegation at previous meetings. Yet the attitude of the members of the Committee in regard to this question was of great importance from the standpoint of the principle and method upon which, in the last resort, depends the possibility of finding a common constructive basis for agreeing on a programme of general and complete disarmament.

Let us begin with Mr. Timberlake, who in his last statement tried to analyze the reasons for the failure of the Committee to produce results. Mr. Timberlake told us that he sees the reason for the failure of the negotiations on the question of nuclear delivery vehicles, not in the fact that the Western Powers are unwilling to agree to their elimination in the first stage of disarmament, but in the fact that the Soviet Union has not responded "in a meaningful way to the views expressed regarding the Soviet position", and that the Soviet Union has refused "to fill in some of the more important blanks in this position". (ENDC/PV.212, p.20)

I shall first reply to Mr. Timberlake's second remark to the effect that the Soviet Union has not filled in some of the more important blanks in its position. In this connexion let us see whether there is anything unclear and indefinite in the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella".

We have pointed out on many occasions that, in putting forward our proposal to prolong the "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the third stage of disarmament, we have explained it from every angle; we have considered all its probable consequences from the point of view of solving the key questions of the problem of disarmament and the requirements for ensuring the security of States. We have thoroughly explained to the Western Powers that the purpose of the "nuclear umbrella" is, of course, to provide

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additional safeguards for the security of States, the very safeguards which the Western Powers consider it necessary to have, although the Soviet Union does not see the need for such additional safeguards.

We have stressed that the "nuclear umbrella" should be kept to a minimum in regard to quantity, so as not to provide the material possibility for the unleashing and waging of a nuclear war.

We have also explained what the "nuclear umbrella" should consist of, and we have indicated the specific categories and types of missiles. We have explained to our Western partners that the number of missiles of various types and categories to be retained should be agreed between us, and that we are prepared to start working out concrete proposals in this regard together with our Western partners as soon as we reach agreement on the principle of the matter.

We have explained in whose hands this "nuclear umbrella" is to be: namely, solely at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States, and in their territories.

We have explained when the "nuclear umbrella" will begin to exist: we have proposed that this measure should come into effect at the end of the first stage of disarmament.

We have also explained how long the Soviet Union and the United States may retain these missiles. Taking into consideration the views of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union has proposed that the "nuclear umbrella" should be retained during the second and third stages of disarmament.

We have also given explanations concerning the verification measures to be applied in regard to the "nuclear umbrella". We have proposed that the missiles to be retained should be verified at their launching pads.

Lastly, we have analyzed from all angles and in the most detailed manner the favourable effects which an agreement on the "nuclear umbrella" would have for the solution of other problems of general and complete disarmament.

Thus the Soviet delegation has done the maximum of what is necessary in order that the gist of our proposal and the principle underlying it may be understood. These explanations make it quite possible for our partners to take a decision of principle, after which we could start in earnest to reach agreement on all the concrete questions deriving from this agreement in principle and connected with the implementation of our

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proposal. All in all, as you can see, the situation is not at all "unclear" or "indefinite", as the representative of the Western Powers try to make out. In adopting such a position on this question, the representatives of the Western Powers are simply overplaying their hand.

Certain statements made by the Western representatives in the Committee show beyond all doubt that they fully understand the significance and purport of our proposal. The representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, in his statement of 11 February, correctly analyzed the substance of the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella". He noted that it provided for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles with the exception of a small quantity or, to use his own words, "some very low level on both sides by the end of stage I". Mr. Foster added: "That level would then be continued to the end of disarmament. If that is so, we appear to be rather far from agreement." (ENDC/PV.165, p.22)

It is clear from this quotation that as early as seven months ago Mr. Foster fully understood the Soviet proposal and declared that we were still far from agreement on this question. Against the background of this statement by Mr. Foster, the continuing attempts of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada to pretend that they are not in a position to evaluate the Soviet proposal because it is unclear are in contradiction with the real state of affairs.

I shall now analyze another of Mr. Timberlake's arguments. On 1 September he declared that "only if proper consideration is given to the views of both sides can progress be made." (ENDC/PV.212, p.20) As one of the reasons for the failure of the negotiations on the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, he pointed to the fact that the Soviet Union had not responded in a meaningful way to the views expressed by the representatives of the Western Powers regarding the Soviet position.

First of all, it should be pointed out that the views of the sides have nothing to do with the matter. I repeat once again: here it is not at all a question of the views of this or that side, but of the objectively-existing truth, which is that nuclear weapons are the most terrible weapons of mass destruction and that for this reason the threat of nuclear war must be eliminated at the very beginning of the process

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of disarmament. That is the aim to which any proposal relating to this subject must be subordinated. Nevertheless, both the proposals of the United States on this subject and the attitude of the Western Powers towards the Soviet proposals go in precisely the opposite direction.

The fact that Mr. Timberlake saw one of the reasons for the failure of the negotiations in the Committee on the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the fact that the point of view of the Western Powers had not been taken into account, calls for a special analysis. In this connexion we deem it appropriate to refresh the memories of members of the Committee in regard to certain statements made by United States representatives concerning the attitude of the United States towards the proposal to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, towards the question of eliminating the threat of nuclear war, and towards the problem of disarmament in general, and to see how far this attitude of the Western Powers corresponds to the aim of removing the danger of nuclear war.

Here are those statements. On 14 December 1962 the representative of the United States declared:

> "The United States firmly believes that ... combined military and political undertakings provide a substantial degree of security for the free world against the possibility of attack." (ENDC/PV.92, p.12)

What does that statement of the United States representative show? All it shows is that the United States bases its security and the security of the so-called "free world" not on disarmament but on military alliances and the deployment of their armaments.

On 20 December 1962 the representative of the United States began his statement by recognizing that --

> "The Soviet delegation has been insisting that the main objective of our efforts here should be to eliminate the danger of nuclear war at the very first stage of disarmament by the elimination of all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles."

What was the attitude of the United States representative towards this definition of our objective? Here is his attitude -- I quote from the verbatim record:

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"Whether we like it or not ... nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery are today integral parts of the military establishments on which both East and West rely for their security, or, as some perhaps would say, for their lack of security ..."

He continued:

"... the fact remains that the security of both sides rests to a major degree on such nuclear armaments. Of that there can be no question". (ENDC/PV.95, p.22)

In those statements, as you see, the representative of the United States pointed out that his country had no intention of accepting nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. In explaining his idea, he stated the following:

"... let us see what would be the result of the actual implementation of the proposal made on 21 September by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko" -- he was referring to the 'nuclear umbrella' -- "if that proposal means the retention by both sides of an equal number of missiles. It is quite clear that such an arrangement would leave the Soviet Union with its proclaimed and assumed qualitative superiority and deprive the West of its quantitative superiority. It would also eliminate completely the bombers and nuclear-armed submarines, in which the West holds a clear lead both quantitatively and qualitatively." (ibid., pp.23, 24)

From that quotation it is evident that what the United States representative is concerned about is not disarmament at all but how to ensure quantitative and qualitative military advantages for the United States. Everything is subordinated to that consideration.

The United States representative showed with the maximum clarity and a laudable frankness that in the disarmament negotiations the United States is not seeking to ensure equal conditions of security for States through radical disarmament measures, but to maintain the existing structure of the armed forces of States until the end of the disarmament process. Here is what the United States representative stated in this regard on 20 December:

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"As I have said earlier, we firmly believe that the United States approach, providing for proportionate reductions of all major armaments by 30 per cent in the first stage, is fair. Why is it fair? Because it does not disturb the existing armaments mix of States and retains the basic interrelationship among the various components of their military might ..." (ibid., p.24)

That situation, according to the United States concept and according to its approach to disarmament, is to be maintained until the end of the disarmament process. In order not to leave any doubts in anybody's mind on this score, I venture to quote what was said by the United States representative at the meeting of 14 December 1962:

"The United States would welcome the type of changed world political order that would emerge with the realization of total disarmament in a peaceful world, with the disappearance of great military powers. However, as long as armed forces and weapons remain a crucial factor in world affairs, as unfortunately they do now, and as they" -- that is, armed forces and weapons -- "will continue to do until the final part of the disarmament process, the United States will not be prepared to accept a major qualitative -- as distinct from quantitative -- reduction which would reshuffle the existing political-military balance under the guise of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.92, p.13)

It follows from that statement that the United States adheres to the point of view that armed forces and weapons are to remain the crucial factor in international relations until the very end of the disarmament process. While I do not intend to go into the political aspect of the matter, although it deserves the closest attention and the most serious criticism from every angle, from a purely military point of view that statement of the United States representative means that exceedingly powerful and very menacing armed forces would have to remain until the very last stage of disarmament, otherwise, as everybody realizes, they would not be "a crucial factor in world affairs", as the United States representative declared at the 92nd meeting.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In order to dot the "i"s concerning the United States attitude to nuclear disarmament, the United States representative stated the following:

"The United States Government is composed of realistic and determined officials ...

"United States officials will not be impressed by exhortations, such as those from the Soviet bloc delegations here, that the highest norm or standard for disarmament negotiations must be the elimination of the risk of nuclear war in the first stage." (ibid., pp.13, 14)

As all the statements by United States representatives which I have just cited show beyond all dispute, the Western Powers do not at all set themselves the aim of eliminating the nuclear threat. At the same time, they try to persuade the world that the reason why they do not accept the Soviet proposals on disarmament, and particularly the proposal for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, is that the implementation of those at the first stage would lead to the retention by the Soviet Union of an advantage in respect of armed forces and conventional armaments (ENDC/PV.135, pp.43, 44).

In reality, however, that argument is simply a screen, a camouflage of the true aims. The point is that on 15 March 1963 the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, stated that the Soviet disarmament proposals would be unacceptable to the Western Powers -- I quote his words --

"... even if, taking the statistics of manpower and armaments of the separate NATO nations and adding them together, the sum were approximately equal to the corresponding statistics for States members of the Warsaw Pact bloc."
(ENDC/PV.132, pp. 22, 23)

That statement by Mr. Burns shows that the Western Powers are not at all avoiding agreement on the Soviet disarmament proposals on account of any mythological, or rather imaginary, fears that as a result of their implementation the Soviet Union would gain an advantage in regard to armed forces or conventional weapons, because, as is evident from the quotation taken from Mr. Burns' statement at the 132nd meeting, this Soviet proposal would be altogether unacceptable to the Western Powers even if there were an equality of armed forces and conventional armaments.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Let us go further. Previously the Western Powers objected to the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament also under the pretext that they would not ensure adequate verification, even though we explained on many occasions that we were prepared to accept the Western proposals for verification if they accepted the Soviet disarmament proposals. It has now become clear, however, that this argument of the Western Powers also is purely speculative, since, as Mr. Burns told the Committee at the 132nd meeting, the Soviet proposal for disarmament would be unacceptable to the Western Powers "even if" -- and I draw your attention to his words -- "those measures were implemented with verification considered adequate by the West ..." (ibid., p.22).

What, then, do the Western Powers want? It appears that they now reject the Soviet disarmament proposals, and particularly the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella", for the reason that to accept them would "reshuffle the existing political-military balance under the guise of disarmament" (ENDC/PV.92, p.13). That is the heart of the matter, it would seem. The most glaring defect and contradiction in the approach of the Western Powers to disarmament is their thesis that disarmament measures must not, as Mr. Burns has said, "break up the co-ordinated defensive dispositions" (ENDC/PV.132, p.22)

Hence the United States position is not really based on considerations relating to an alleged military advantage being gained by the Soviet Union or to the demand for adequate control. The truth of the matter is that the Western Powers simply do not want to accept any serious disarmament measures. This was stated quite definitely by Mr. Timberlake on 1 September when he said:

> "The Soviet approach /to disarmament/ ... would result in a massive weakening of the Western defence position, and hence would not preserve the balance upon which international security depends". (ENDC/PV.212, p.20)

But, Mr. Timberlake, the same massive weakening of armaments, of the defence position, to use your words, would apply also to the other side. It could not be otherwise. After all, disarmament means precisely the massive reduction of armaments by all parties. Only such disarmament can ensure equal conditions of security for all. How do you, the representatives of the Western Powers, envisage disarmament?

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

As regards nuclear disarmament we, the Soviet Union, propose that in the first stage all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be destroyed with the exception of an agreed number of missiles to be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of disarmament. This proposal ensures equal conditions of security for all, including, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union, against the nuclear threat. This is obvious to everyone.

Moreover, as regards armed forces we, the Soviet Union, propose that the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States be reduced in the first stage to an equal level of 1,900,000 for each. It is obvious to everybody that this proposal of the Soviet Union also ensures equal conditions of security for the United States and the Soviet Union.

Lastly, as regards conventional armaments, we have accepted the United States proposal to reduce these armaments by 30 per cent during the first stage.

The implementation of this series of measures in the first stage under appropriate control will substantially change the international situation; it will be a transition from the world of today, armed to the teeth, to a world without weapons and wars, not to mention the fact that the implementation of these measures will ensure equal security for all.

It cannot be doubted that the implementation of these measures will entail substantial changes in "the co-ordinated defensive dispositions" (ENDC/PV.132, p.22), to use the terminology of Mr. Burns, both for the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries and for the United States and its NATO allies. To declare one's readiness to disarm and at the same time to insist that in the disarmament process "the co-ordinated defensive dispositions" should not be broken up, as the representative of Canada puts it, or that the qualitative characteristics of existing armaments, as the United States representative prefers to put it, should not be touched until the very end of the disarmament process, are incompatible requirements. We have previously mentioned in this regard that one cannot, for instance, demand of a swimmer that he should dive into the water in such a way as not to splash it and not to get wet himself. If we are to set about disarming in real earnest, then we cannot put forward conditions that are incompatible with real disarmament and make it impossible.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The aforementioned quotations from statements made by the representatives of the United States and Canada reveal the philosophy of the Western Powers' approach to the solution of the problem of disarmament. They reveal what kind of "disarmament" the Western Powers have in mind. This philosophy consists, first, in the fact that the Western Powers start from the premise that the mutual relations of States should be built and rest upon military might, and that this situation should continue throughout the first stage of disarmament, throughout the second stage, and throughout the third stage -- that is, until the end of the disarmament process. It is evident from the statements made by the representatives of the Western Powers that they see the guarantee of the security of each State not in disarmament but in combined military and political alliances and the armaments race.

Secondly, it is only by their concern for accelerating preparations for war that one can explain the fact that in their position the Western Powers put so much stress on retaining the existing structure of the armed forces, the existing military and political balance, the existing co-ordinated defensive dispositions, and so on. In general, the Western Powers are striving with all their might to maintain intact the war machine which they have built up. It is precisely these considerations that the Western Powers place in the forefront, relegating considerations of disarmament to the background. To this we can only reply that priority must be given to disarmament and not to other considerations. We cannot allow the cause of disarmament to be frustrated by dabbling in concepts such as the "balance of armaments" which reflects the demands of general staffs and is incompatible with disarmament.

It is characteristic that all these considerations are put forward as if the present nature of the mutual relations of States in the conditions of the growth of militarism and the arms race were something self-sufficient, objectively existing outside our wills, outside our consciousness -- that is to say, a permanent factor. But in reality this is not so at all. In reality, this is a derivative of the political course of the States concerned. If this is so, then the political course can and must be reappraised, and the real, and not the alleged, security of States must be ensured by disarmament and not by the maintenance of the so-called "balance of armaments".

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella", together with the proposal for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, will ensure at the first stage equal conditions of security for all and will make pointless all discussions about the "maintenance of the balance of forces" or the "balance of armaments". These proposals constitute a good basis for reaching agreement on the problem of disarmament.

In engaging in polemics with us, the representative of the United States put forward yet another assertion. At the meeting of 1 September Mr. Timberlake tried to switch the discussion from the serious political question put by us regarding the basis of principle of the disarmament programme to an artifically-devised question to the effect that the Soviet delegation had in some way changed its position in regard to the establishment of a working group on the "nuclear umbrella", and had thus created difficulties in the negotiations. Mr. Timberlake even interpreted our statement of 25 August, when we put the aforesaid question of principle (ENDC/PV.210, pp. 15 et seq), as showing "discouraging intransigence" and as one step further back in the position of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.212, p.22)

I think that the participants in our negotiations understand quite well that such methods, whereby one side, instead of making a serious contribution to the discussion, begins quite unjustifiably to reproach the other side with changing its position, certainly cannot help us to make progress in the negotiations. But since the representative of the United States has had recourse -- and not for the first time -- to such methods and has alleged that the Soviet delegation has changed its position in regard to the establishment of a working group, we deem it necessary to state the following.

With a full sense of responsibility, we declare that the allegation by Mr. Timberlake to the effect that the Soviet delegation has taken some steps backwards in regard to the proposal to establish a working group, is an invention and does not in any way correspond to the truth. Everything that was said by the Soviet delegation in the Committee at the beginning of the present session on the question of a working group remains completely valid at the present time. The Soviet delegation

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supported and continues to support the proposal put forward by the representative of India at the meeting of the Committee held on 24 March to the effect that, after approving in principle the "nuclear umbrella" proposal, the Committee should establish a working group, with the participation of experts, to examine all practical questions deriving from this proposal (ENDC/PV.177, p.28). We have said, and we repeat, that in determining the terms of reference of the working group we should be prepared to use also the relevant material in this regard submitted to the Committee by the delegations of the non-aligned countries, which, as we have already pointed out, corresponds to the aspect of principle of the matter.

Mr. Timberlake alleged that his delegation and certain other delegations --

> "... have devoted considerable effort to the attempt to find a formulation [of terms of reference] which would be acceptable to both sides. We have done so because we were encouraged by Mr. Zorin's original proposal for the creation of such a group. Yet, despite our hopes for progress, no progress has yet been made." (ENDC/PV.212, p.19)

You are right, Mr. Timberlake: we have made no progress in regard to establishing a working group and determining its terms of reference, but the responsibility for this rests not at all with the Soviet Union but with the Western Powers. At the first meeting of the current session of our Committee, on 9 June, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, declared on behalf of the Soviet Government:

> "At present we are taking yet another step forward to meet the Western Powers. They have repeatedly expressed a desire to proceed to a detailed consideration of specific questions connected with our proposal for a 'nuclear umbrella'. Bearing that desire in mind, we are prepared to participate immediately in the consideration of such specific questions in an appropriate working body, if the Committee aproves, as proposed by the delegation of India before the recess, the proposal for a 'nuclear umbrella' as a basis for the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles." (ENDC/PV.188, p.17)

Mr. Timberlake has told us that the Western delegations were encouraged by Mr. Zorin's original proposal. But if that is so, why have the delegations of the Western Powers not accepted that proposal? Why have they so far refused to

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accept the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" as a basis for solving the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles? The Western Powers have only to accept it, and then the suggestion made by India regarding the establishment of a working group -- which is supported by the majority of members of the Committee, including the Soviet Union -- will be carried out. As regards the establishment of such a working group, as was mentioned by Mr. Zorin at the 188th meeting and by the Soviet delegation at many subsequent meetings, we are prepared to agree to this immediately.

I should like now to say a few words regarding the statement made by the United Kingdom representative on 1 September. In that statement Mr. Tahourdin thought it best to adopt a position of complete negation. He declared that the criticisms of the Soviet delegation have been

> "... misdirected against a thesis which has never been advanced by the West: that there should be a balance of armaments instead of disarmament. We have not suggested that". (ENDC/PV.212, p.38)

O sancta simplicitas -- O holy simplicity! But, Mr. Tahourdin, think of the statements made by the Western representatives which I have quoted today, and you will, I am sure, be convinced of the complete correctness of our analysis.

In conclusion, I should like to make a few comments in connexion with the statement made by a third Western speaker -- the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti -- on 3 September. Like Mr. Tahourdin, he did not attempt to say anything on the substance of our considerations of principle, but he declared with greater frankness than his United States and United Kingdom colleagues that he disagreed with the basic principle which alone can ensure the preparation of a constructive programme of general and complete disarmament: namely, the principle of equal conditions of security for States as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures that would eliminate the threa of war and military aggression. Mr. Cavalletti said that he could not agree with the point of view according to which --

> "... the principle of balance would in practice entail the immediate reduction of the nuclear weapons of both sides to equal minimum levels ..." (ENDC/PV.213, p.23)

That is the picture that emerges. One after another, the representatives of the various countries members of the Committee -- countries of Europe and Asia, Africa and Latin America -- have put forward at meetings of the Committee the idea that the securit of States requires the elimination, at the earliest, the first stage of disarmament,

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, with the retention of a strictly limited, agreed number of missiles forming the "nuclear umbrella". This is the starting point adopted by the socialist countries; this idea is supported by the non-aligned States. But Mr. Cavalletti declares that he does not agree with this point of view; he is not in favour of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage but in favour of retaining them till the very end of disarmament. Mr. Cavalletti sees balance, not in the equality of conditions of security as a result of disarmament, but in the retention by both sides of equal possibilities of unleashing a nuclear war and making nuclear strikes at each other,

Mr. Cavalletti himself probably realized all the falsity of this position, but, since he had adopted it, he had to go on with it to the end. And so he tried to persuade the Committee that we should not worry about the existence in the world of huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Why should we not wor about them? Because, Mr. Cavalletti explained to us --

> "We in the West know with absolute certainty that the Western Powers, who are joined together in a defensive alliance, will never be guilty of unleashing a nuclear war. Those Powers proved it by indisputable facts..." (ENDC/PV.213, p.26)

It must be admitted that here Mr. Cavalletti hit the nail on the head: in the Bay of Tonkin, in the Congo, in the Caribbean Sea and in Cyprus, member States of the NATO bloc have recently given the world particularly convincing proofs of the depth of their peaceful intentions. They are convincing the world even more by accelerating the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, within the framework of which it is proposed to give access to weapons of mass destruction to those who have twice in the last half-century unleashed world wars.

The plain and indisputable fact is that the international tension which still exists, the threat of war which still hangs over the nations, have their origin precisely in the aggressive policy of certain Powers united in the NATO military bloc -- a policy aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of independent States, at flagrantly infringing their sovereignty, at unleashing so-called "local wars", in order to establish the domination of the NATO Powers in various parts of the world. The representative of Italy cannot but be aware of this.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Thus, Mr. Cavalletti, no good for the position of the Western Powers has come from your attempt to explain why these Powers reject the only reasonable principle -- the principle of equal conditions of security through the implementation of radical disarmament measures -- and continue to adhere to the long-discredited doctrine of the "balance of nuclear terror". You, Mr. Cavalletti, have merely made still more conspicuous the unsoundness and dangerous nature of that doctrine.

Today's meeting of the Committee is the last of the series devoted to questions of general and complete disarmament. There remain two concluding meetings of the present session which are set aside for summarizing our work. It is now no longer possible to expect that we shall be able, before the end of the session, to break the deadlock in the discussion on general and complete disarmament, which in any case has not led to any tangible, useful results during the three years' work of the Committee.

But the nuclear age in which we are living, and the whole development of world events, imperatively demand the earliest possible solution of the problem of disarmament. We, the Soviet people, are firmly convinced that it can and must be solved. At present the solution of this problem is being blocked by the desire of the Western Powers to retain at their disposal the enormous stockpiles, the enormous arsenal, of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. But as soon as the Western Powers cease to cling to the doctrine of the "balance of armaments", which has brought the nations so many wars, so much bloodshed and suffering, a wide path andpossibilities for an agreement will immediately open up. The Soviet Union is always prepared, and will always be prepared, to reach agreement with the Western Powers on a realistic programme of general and complete disarmament, which alone can be the source of genuine, and not alleged, security for all States.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The last words spoken by the representative of the Soviet Union, as I noted them down, were that the Soviet Union was always ready to agree on a realistic programme of general and complete disarmament which would safeguard the security of all States in the world. We would be prepared to welcome such encouraging words if it had not been for the totality of Mr. Tsarapkin's speech, over approximately the past hour, which has shown that the Soviet Union is ready to agree on a programme of general and complete disarmament provided that it is the Soviet Union' programme and no other.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation has studied with great care the statement of the Soviet representative made on 1 September. It seems to us that there are some points in it to which a reply ought to be given, in particular those points which relate to the position taken by Mr. Thomas, the United Kingdom representative, in his statement at the 210th meeting, held on 25 August. Mr. Tsarapkin said:

> "Mr. Thomas put forward arguments about a so-called 'upsetting of the strategic balance', the 'numerical superiority' of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the command structure of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in comparison with those of NATO, and so on. All these arguments have been put forward many times in the past here in the Committee ...
>
> "Thus two years ago, at the 63rd and 74th meetings of the Committee, we exposed the version excogitated by the Western Powers to the effect that the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the first stage of general and complete disarmament would place the Western Powers in a strategically disadvantageous position in comparison with the socialist countries which, they alleged, would have a numerical superiority in respect of armed forces." (ENDC/PV.212, pp.33, 34).

We have read over the arguments of the Soviet representative at the meetings to which Mr. Tsarapkin referred -- that is, the meetings held on 30 July and 24 August 1962 respectively (ENDC/PV.63, pp.42 et seq.; PV.74, pp. 21 et seq.) -- and I must say that we have not found them any more convincing after the lapse of two years than we did at the time. Those arguments were based on figures of manpower in the armed forces of the various nations of the NATO alliance and of the Warsaw Pact. At the 63rd meeting Mr. Zorin, with his well-known debating skill, tried to refute the Canadian delegation's exposition of the disadvantage, in terms of conventional armaments and armed forces, with which the implementation of the first stage of the Soviet disarmament plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1) would leave the NATO alliance in Europe. Mr. Zorin did so by denying the influence on the assessment of a strategical situation of geography, of the factors of time and space, of the problems of logistics, and of the character of military organization; but his eloquence did not persuade any of the Western delegations, at any rate, that those factors did not exist and were not important; and neither did Mr. Kuznetzov's arguments at the 74th meeting.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

However, I do not propose to renew the controversy of 1962 on the same lines today -- and that for the reason that the offensive strength of modern armed forces depends much more on the armaments they possess than on the crude manpower at their disposal. It has been pointed out here, and not denied, that even if all nuclear armaments were wiped out, or neutralized under the so-called "nuclear umbrella" scheme, the conventional armaments left would be of the kinds with which the Nazi forces were equipped when they overran most of Europe, including a large portion of the territory of the Soviet Union. Those armaments which supported the Blitzkrieg were mainly tanks, attack or tactical aircraft, heavy artillery and mortars.

The Committee is aware that under the terms of the Soviet draft treaty, in stage I all such armaments would be reduced by 30 per cent -- and, as Mr. Tsarapkin has reminded us today, that is the same percentage as that proposed under the United States plan (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3) for the reduction of all armaments, nuclear and non-nuclear. Incidentally, the Soviet Union's original plan provided for a reduction in conventional armaments proportional to the reduction in manpower of the forces. As that plan would have lowered the manpower of the Soviet Union's armed forces from about 3.6 million to 1.7 million, that would have been a percentage reduction of 53 per cent. The Soviet Union changed that to a reduction of 30 per cent, and took credit for accommodating its plan in this respect to the United States plan. Of course that "accommodation" was to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

Taking the data given in the publication of the Institute for Strategic Studies entitled "The Military Balance, 1963-64" -- which have been accepted here, for purposes of argument, previously (ENDC/PV.181, pp. 16, 40 et seq.) -- we find that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies at present dispose of some 40,850 tanks, while the members of the NATO Alliance -- excluding the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, whose forces would have been withdrawn from Europe under the first stage of the Soviet plan -- have at present only 5,800. Reducing those numbers by 30 per cent, we find that at the end of the first stage the European NATO nations would have about 4,100 tanks, while the Warsaw Pact countries would have 28,500 -- a superiority of about 7 to 1.

As far as tactical aircraft are concerned, the Warsaw Pact countries would appear to have about 12,800 and the European NATO Powers 2,477. Reducing those numbers by 30 per cent would leave some 9,000 Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft against 1,730 NATO aircraft -- a ratio of about 5.5 to 1.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Figures for field and heavy artillery are lacking in the document of the Institute for Strategic Studies, and so it is impossible to make a comparison in that important class of conventional weapons; but the order of superiority for the Warsaw Pact Powers would probably be of somewhat the same order as for tanks and tactical aircraft.

There are other important factors which would contribute to the imbalance of forces, to the giving of a military advantage to the Warsaw Pact Powers, if the first stage of the Soviet plan were put into effect. I shall refrain from going into these strategical considerations any further, as in any case they were set out in the statements of the Canadian delegation at the 63rd and 66th meetings. I expect that, in saying as much as I have, I shall be laying myself open to the same kind of criticism as that which Mr. Tsarapkin directed against Mr. Thomas when he said:

> "It is impossible not to see that, even regardless of the unsoundness of the arguments advanced by Mr. Thomas against our proposals, the very nature of his arguments reveals the fallacious approach of the representatives of the Western Powers to the problem of disarmament. In speaking of disarmament they, like Mr. Thomas, use and are guided by exclusively military and strategic considerations and calculations. Listening to Mr. Thomas, one might have thought that we were at a session of the NATO Council, not in a Committee conducting negotiations on disarmament." (ENDC/PV.212, p.35)

Of course, we are not primarily discussing strategic questions here, but we cannot ignore them. I do not think that Mr. Tsarapkin will tell us that the Soviet military authorities were kept in ignorance of what was proposed in the Soviet draft treaty until they read about it in Pravda. If military considerations are of the small importance which Mr. Tsarapkin seemed to imply when he said what I have just quoted, why has Colonel-General Gryzlov been sitting patiently listening to what goes on here all these months and years? Most other delegations have military advisers here also, for good reasons.

I might remark in passing that, if I were an officer on the Soviet General Staff, I doubt whether I could think of any provision to be included in the first stage of the Soviet draft treaty which would further improve the security of the Soviet Union if it were implemented. Of course, those measures would have a very different effect on the security of the European States of NATO.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Mr. Tsarapkin quoted from several statements I made at the 132nd meeting which, he alleged, demonstrated the inconsistency of the Western delegations' objections to the Soviet plan for disarmament in the first stage. I have examined the verbatim record of that meeting, and I can find no inconsistency between what I said then and what I have said before or since. Indeed, in the quotations which Mr. Tsarapkin made from my statement I did not quite recognize the arguments that I had put forward at that meeting. That may be due to some differences between the Russian translation and the original text. Therefore I would invite anyone interested to read again what I said at the 132nd meeting and see whether it justifies the criticisms that Mr. Tsarapkin has advanced against it.

I doubt that what I have said at this meeting will convince the Soviet Union and its allies that the implementation of the first stage of the plan which they support would leave the European members of NATO in a position of dangerous military inferiority. In fact, we shall probably be told, as we have been told in the past, that Warsaw Pact spokesmen have "proved" that that is not so. If we ever get a working group on the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles, perhaps we should set up a parallel working group dealing in specifics of characters and quantities of conventional armaments, and how they should be reduced in relation to reductions of nuclear weapon vehicles so as to maintain equal security for all parties to a disarmament treaty.

But whether one military alliance or another would be the stronger in certain circumstances is not a proposition that will admit of positive proof as a mathematical proposition or a case in law can be proved. Arguments can be adduced, calculations can be made, but the proof can come only if the strength of the two sides is put to the test in war; and, of course, what we are trying to do here is ensure that war will not take place -- and I would say not only nuclear war, but any kind of war. The Western contention is that, even if we should concede for the sake of argument that the danger of nuclear war might be greatly reduced if the Soviet proposals for the first stage were put into effect, it would leave the Warsaw Pact in a position of great military superiority over the remnants of NATO. That would not be a condition which would be conducive to stability in Europe; indeed, it could make more likely the outbreak of what might be intended at the beginning as a limited, conventional war, but would almost inevitably escalate into a nuclear war.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Soviet delegation and other delegations of the Warsaw Pact countries have asserted many times that our primary task here is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. While it is true that that aspect of our negotiations is crucial and vital, we have no warrant to disregard all other aspects of security in the quest for nuclear disarmament. Let us see what the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) has to say.

Paragraph 3(b) calls for -

"Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons".

The next sub-paragraph calls for: "Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction".

Paragraph 4 states:

"The disarmament programme should be implemented in agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits ..."

Those paragraphs, taken together, should mean that the elimination of means of delivery weapons of mass destruction should be carried out in agreed sequence, by stages -- not all in one stage.

The Soviet proposals for eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles, combined with the so-called "nuclear umbrella" proposition, mean that 90 to 95 per cent of nuclear weapon vehicles would be destroyed in the first stage. However, only 30 per cent of conventional armaments would be destroyed, which would result, as I have tried to show, in leaving the nations of the Warsaw Pact in a position of military advantage. Thus those proposals are far from conforming to the principle of ensuring equal security for the nations on both sides.

We recall the response of the Soviet representatives to criticisms that their proposals did not call for any reduction of nuclear weapons -- as distinct from nuclear weapon vehicles -- in the first stage. That response was an offer to abolish all nuclear weapons in the first stage, as well as all nuclear weapon vehicles. I do not suppose the Soviet representatives will propose to correct the imbalance I have indicated by suggesting that conventional armaments should be reduced by 90 per cent in the first stage also. That may sound rather frivolous, but it is not; its purpose is to call the

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Committee's attention to the requirement that disarmament -- not armaments, as the Soviet Union and other Eastern European delegations interpret the Western position -- must be balanced and carried out by stages, as agreed in the Joint Statement. Those are principles that cannot be ignored or obscured by a smokescreen of wishful-thinking slogans about eliminating the danger of nuclear war in the first stage of disarmament.

For two and a half years we have been trying to find a way to agree on how to proceed towards general and complete disarmament. We have been balked because of the Soviet refusal to consider the simplest, and what would to our minds seem the fairest, way to reduce and finally eliminate nuclear weapon vehicles -- that is, proportionate reductions of the nuclear weapon carriers of both sides by stages. The Soviet Union has rejected that way of reduction because, their representatives say, it could not be done without imperilling the security of the Soviet Union -- that is, in the course of the verification of reductions by the methods outlined by the United States, Soviet military dispositions, particularly the locations of their intercontinental ballistic missiles, would be disclosed.

Representatives of the Soviet Union have made no attempt to suggest means of verification of a proportionate, stage reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles which would not prejudice the security of the Soviet Union by what they call "legalized espionage". They have instead proposed the 90 or 95 per cent reduction of all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, without any explanation of how that can be carried out while preserving balance or security during the process, or how it can be verified; and they are not willing to give those explanations in the working group which they have suggested unless the West agrees beforehand that the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles will be carried out in the precise way they propose. That method, as Western representatives have pointed out many times, is prima facie not acceptable, for several reasons besides the creation of the imbalance in national security which I have discussed today.

It is discouraging that we find ourselves in a deadlock in this most important sector of the disarmament process. The Canadian delegation can only hope that, in the study of and reflection on disarmament positions which delegations should undertake during our recess, new thoughts will emerge and new ideas come to light, and that we may find a new approach to how to reduce the danger of nuclear war, how to stop the arms race, how

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

to cut down the financial burden of armaments on all nations, and how to arrive in the end at general and complete disarmament, which is our goal. At present the Canadian delegation thinks that a new approach will be most likely to be found by developing the ideas which we have now before us, in the form of partial or collateral measures.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First I should like to welcome back to our midst Mr. Lind of Sweden, and to express the hope that his stay with us will contribute to the success of our deliberations.

Today I should like to talk about the rough balance between the two sides which now helps to keep the peace, and the way in which that balance would be preserved by the United States plan. In so doing I shall be responding to a number of the comments made by the representative of the Soviet Union this morning. Then I will suggest reasons why we should not forget conventional arms as we focus on the nuclear threat. Finally, I will indicate the need for all of us to help strengthen the United Nations peace-keeping forces if we are to proceed very far towards disarmament.

Today and at our last two Tuesday meetings the representative of the Soviet Union seemed to be saying: "Do not try to maintain balance during disarmament; simply lay down your arms, and there will be peace." We say to him in reply: "We, the United States, did substantially that after the Second World War, and it did not produce peace." We assumed that other States would live up to their wartime and post-war obligations, including the newly-signed United Nations Charter. We demobilized our conventional forces almost immediately and offered to give up our nuclear monopoly to international control. Although our nuclear offer was not accepted, a conventional imbalance to our disadvantage was evident by 1946. That was followed by crises in Iran in 1946, in Berlin and Eastern Europe in 1947 and 1948, and in Korea in 1950. The imbalance created by our demobilization may well have invited aggression and the threat of aggression.

During much of that same period there was a nuclear imbalance in favour of the United States. The Soviet Union, however, did not accept Mr. Tsarapkin's repeated advice that an imbalance should be of no concern. It vigorously sought a nuclear capability. It tested its first atomic bomb in 1949.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

An unbalanced world is not necessarily a safe world, and the Soviet Union appears to have accepted that fact when the imbalance was not in its favour. In spite of Mr. Tsarapkin's eloquent statement this morning, which seems to me to be erroneous, both sides seem to recognize, nevertheless, that a rough balance now exists between the two sides. The consequences of an all-out nuclear exchange would be devastating to both sides. While asserting United States superiority in numbers of long-range nuclear delivery vehicles, United States Secretary of Defense McNamara testified before our Congress in 1963 that -

"... the fatalities in Western Europe would approach 90 million, the fatalities in the United States would approach 100 million, and the fatalities in the Soviet Union would approach 100 million."

We must bend every effort to prevent such a holocaust from occurring. But these figures give us some idea of the magnitude of the devastation to each side if we fail. They also show the nature of the rough balance which maintains deterrence and thereby helps to keep the peace between the two sides. Balance and disarmament are not contradictory, although Mr. Tsarapkin seems to suggest that they are. In fact, general disarmament, when observed by all, should produce ultimate balance. But it cannot be achieved overnight. While we are seeking it, let us not create an imbalance and invite another war between great Powers.

When it accepted the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), the Soviet Union recognized the need to maintain balance during the disarmament process in order to protect the security of all States; but it has not yet suggested a way in which that balance could be maintained while the drastic cuts envisaged by the Soviet plan were being made. I must say that the representative of the Soviet Union has not further enlightened us on this point here today.

The existing rough balance and resultant stability could be upset in two ways. The first way is by an uncontrolled, spiralling arms race. To avoid that result, my country has put forth proposal after proposal to curb the arms race and open the door to reductions in arms. Two recent proposals of this kind are the freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles and the cut-off of production of fissionable material (ENDC/120). In both cases these proposals could be accompanied by actual reductions.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The second way in which the existing balance and stability might be upset is by a faulty disarmament plan which, during the process of reduction, radically changed the mix of armaments upon which one side has come to rely. Such a change could leave that side vulnerable to attack when it had not been so before. This could occur because the plan provided for such a reduction or because its verification system failed to prevent clandestine retention or production of major armaments by one side while the other adhered to the agreement. In either case the imbalance would be an invitation to aggression.

To avoid such a result, the disarmament process must ensure that today's imperfect stability improves throughout all stages. We know of no better way to improve this stability than by halting increases and reducing armaments in a balanced and verified fashion -- through step-by-step percentage reductions in major categories of armaments. The nation with the largest forces in one category would reduce those forces to a greater extent. A nation with larger forces in another category would take a larger reduction there. The over-all balance would be maintained throughout the process. Each nation would maintain the same proportionate distribution of allowed military resources among the different categories of armaments as it had at the beginning. No nation could say that its security had been degraded. We believe this to be the simplest, the fairest and the best way to reduce armaments. However, unlike the Soviet Union, we continue to be prepared to consider other plans.

But we shall reject any plan which, like the Soviet one, would disrupt balance during the disarmament process. The Soviet plan would eliminate in the first stage virtually all nuclear vehicles. For example, it would require destruction of all missile-firing submarines. These constitute a category of invulnerable weapons upon which the United States relies much more heavily for deterrence and defence than does the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union also proposes that the United States and its allies eliminate all ships and aircraft of types which we classify as conventional weapons but which the Soviet Union classifies as nuclear delivery vehicles. Our military requirements for many of these types are much greater than are those of the Soviet Union. Yet under the Soviet plan they would be eliminated without any corresponding change in the relative strengths of the two sides in those categories of conventional armaments of which the Soviet Union has traditionally had a greater number.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

These are but two examples of particular imbalances which the reduction requirements of the Soviet plan would create. On top of this, its verification provisions would create further imbalance, because they fail to guard against clandestine retention or production of armaments at undeclared locations. Imbalance created in either manner is dangerous. Unbalanced disarmament, like unilateral disarmament, is an invitation to aggression. Both are unacceptable to the United States; and we believe that, were the tables turned, the Soviet Union too would reject both.

Mr. Tsarapkin has said that the United States intends to rely on its military machinery during the disarmament process and that this indicates United States unwillingness to proceed with disarmament. Our question is: what does the Soviet Union intend to rely on for its security during that process? If the Soviet Union is not concerned about military factors during the disarmament process, then why has it been advancing its views on the allegedly disadvantageous effect of the United States proposal on its security? Our task here is not to question each other's sincerity in seeking disarmament, but rather to seek to resolve our differences over the means by which to achieve our common objectives.

I should like to turn now to the problem of conventional warfare. It is estimated that conventional weapons killed over eight million in the First World War and twenty-two million in the Second World War. Hundreds of thousands have been killed in conventional warfare all over the world since the end of the Second World War. Disregarding completely the question of what is and who are responsible, let me name just a few places where there has been armed conflict in the past several years: on the African continent -- in the Congo and on the borders between Morocco and Algeria and between Somalia and two of her neighbours; in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East -- most recently on the island of Cyprus and in Yemen; in Asia -- on the India-China border, in Malaysia, in Laos and in Viet-Nam.

In some of these instances the great Powers have been involved, but in many they have not. In fact, the smaller Powers may have an even greater stake in dealing with the problem of conventional war, because the rough balance between East and West may have little effect on local conventional conflicts. In any event we should not ignore conventional warfare by focussing exclusively on the nuclear threat. The United States disarmament plan would reduce major conventional armaments in each stage in the same balanced, step-by-step way as in the case of the major categories of nuclear delivery vehicles; and, unlike the position under the Soviet plan, they would be reduced by the same percentage as nuclear vehicles are.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

While we are attempting to achieve a general disarmament agreement at this Conference, the United States hopes that small and medium Powers will explore every avenue leading towards verified agreements providing for regional control of conventional armaments. These could protect their security better than regional arms races, and such agreements could help to open the door to general disarmament. It is not only the nuclear Powers which must be prepared to reduce their armaments, if we are to move ahead. Simultaneously the small and medium Powers should begin to cope with their own arms races.

This leads me to a discussion of the need for strengthening existing international peace-keeping forces. This is important for the present, but essential for the future if disarmament is to succeed. Such forces have had some success in a number of instances in restraining conventional war, and in most cases the great Powers have not participated in the fighting. These forces must clearly be much stronger before they can become an effective substitute for the weapons upon which nations now rely for their security. I read with great interest the statement on this subject by Mr. Burns at our 212th meeting. My delegation agrees with his remarks on the relationship between peace-keeping and disarmament and on the need to begin now, with what we have now, to build more effective peace forces.

In the nineteen years of its existence the United Nations has eleven times established military forces or sent military observers into critical areas. More than fifty countries have voluntarily supplied personnel for those operations. During the United Nations operation in the Congo twenty-one or more Members of the United Nations contributed troops or other assistance. Of the nations represented here in this Conference, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and the United States participated in some fashion. Troops from Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom, among others, are now stationed in Cyprus at the behest of the United Nations Security Council.

I emphasize the extent of recent United Nations experience in carrying out peace-keeping operations, because this is the experience we must build upon. There is much to be done if we are to achieve a disarmed world -- a world in which States are not subject to the depredations of their neighbours, where law and justice prevail, and where international institutions can effectively keep the peace between States.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

There are many things which we can do now to help move towards this goal. For example, Mrs. Myrdal on 28 July (ENDC/PV.202, pp.13, 14) and Mr. Burns on 1 September (ENDC/PV.212, pp. 30, 31) mentioned the initiatives taken by a number of States, including their own, to set up stand-by contingents for service with the United Nations. I understand that not only Sweden and Canada but also Denmark, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands and Iran have already begun to earmark units, or plan to do so shortly. This worthy effort deserves the support of all of us.

Of equal importance to the supply of troops is the provision of funds to pay for them. To this end, each State must pay its allotted share of the United Nations peace-keeping bills. The General Assembly has accepted an advisory judicial opinion that the Congo and Middle East peace-keeping assessments are binding upon the Members. More than twenty-five countries which had previously paid nothing on their assessments have now made payments of approximately $7 million. But not all have paid. It is my delegation's hope that those of us who profess support for disarmament will show that support by paying their peace-keeping assessments.

We believe that only by maintaining the fiscal and constitutional integrity of the United Nations can we ensure its continued effectiveness as a peace-keeping agency. Only by observance of the Charter's provisions at the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly can we provide for continuance and growth of United Nations peace-keeping forces. Only through such development can we provide the peace-keeping institutions ultimately necessary for disarmament.

As our Conference draws to a close this year, each of us should consider what his country can contribute to improvement of the chances for our success next year. The goal of peace is common to us all; but the methods of achieving that goal do not always seem to be. My delegation believes that unilateral or unbalanced disarmament can be an invitation to aggression. On the other hand, arms reductions which preserve balance and are accompanied by adequate peace-keeping machinery can be successful in achieving a safer tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): The representative of Italy wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The remarks that have just been made by the representatives of Canada and the United States constitute an indirect reply to Mr. Tsarapkin's criticisms of the statement which I made at the 213th meeting. However, I should like to add one very brief comment.

Mr. Tsarapkin, it would appear, read my statement with certain preconceived ideas and found in it assertions which in fact I never made. It seems to me that the Soviet delegation, hard pressed for arguments to defend the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), is now seeking to attribute to the Western delegations certain views which they do not hold and which at times are even contrary to their aspirations and desires. But what is perhaps even more serious is that the Soviet delegation, realizing the weakness of the Gromyko proposal from the point of view of balance, is now seeking to destroy or, at any rate, restrict the scope and value of that very principle.

Mr. Tsarapkin repeated this morning -- as if it were a reproach, a very severe criticism of the Western delegations -- that security should be based on disarmament and not on armaments. What exactly does that mean? Are we not all sitting round this table precisely in order to transform the present defective and dangerous world situation into one which is satisfactory, perfect and devoid of danger? Do we not all agree that that is the aim of our work? How can Mr. Tsarapkin object to that?

But, to begin that process, we must take the world as it is; we must take the present situation as our starting-point. What is the present situation? It is characterized by the existence of military and defence organizations on both sides, and those organizations are now in a state of equilibrium which ensures, though imperfectly, mutual security. Can we close our eyes to that reality?

Nevertheless, our work, which aims at transforming the present situation into the situation that we hope for, would become very difficult and even impossible if we were to call in question the basic principles of disarmament on which we have agreed in the United Nations. Surely the best way to prepare the ground for a discussion on disarmament in the General Assembly is not to call in question, as the Soviet delegation seems to want to do, the basic principles of disarmament which were elaborated and approved by that Assembly.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Those are the considerations which I wanted to submit to the Committee in reply to Mr. Tsarapkin's comments on my previous statement.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): Before reading the communiqué, I should like to extend a somewhat belated, though none the less hearty, welcome to Mr. Lind of Sweden, who has once more joined us.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 214th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. L. C. N. Obi, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 10 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.