

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.216
15 September 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 15 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

(Romania)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
	Mr. E. HOSANNAH
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. C. LUKANOV
	Mr. G. GHELEV
	Mr. G. YANKOV
	Mr. I. BOEV
<u>Burma:</u>	U HTOON SHEIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
	Mr. S.F. RAE
	Mr. R.M. TAIT
	Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. KLUSAK
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. A. MIKULIN
	Mr. J. CHMELA
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Ato S. TEFERRA
<u>India:</u>	Mr. R.K. NEHRU
	Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
	Mr. K. NARENDRANATH
	Mr. S.V. PURUSHOTTAM
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
	Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
	Mr. S. AVETTA
	Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. I. IACOB

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. El FATATI

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TILBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I declare open the 216th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before I call on the first speaker, I should like to point out that a number of documents have been circulated to the members of the Conference:

(1) a communication from the delegation of Burma, dated 14 September 1964, on behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, concerning a memorandum of the eight delegations (ENDC/143);

(2) memoranda from the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, containing a brief résumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation on measures of disarmament and collateral measures discussed by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during 1964 (ENDC/144);

(3) a joint memorandum submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic (ENDC/145);

(4) a draft report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly, recommended by the co-Chairmen (ENDC/146).

Ato S. TEFERRA (Ethiopia): I have asked for the floor this morning because I have been requested by the eight non-aligned nations to draw the attention of the Committee to document ENDC/145, dated 14 September 1964, which is a joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations concerning the test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

Sir Harold BEELEY (United Kingdom): Although I myself have participated in the Conference for only two weeks, I should like, if I may, to offer some comments on the course of the Committee's work during the past three months.

It is, of course, disappointing that the Committee has been unable during this session to reach agreement on any disarmament or collateral measure. It is the more disappointing because the previous session ended on a promising note with the announcements by the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and my own country of reductions in the planned production of fissile material for weapon purposes (ENDC/131, 132). As a newcomer I was surprised to learn, for example, that the Committee had spent almost all its Tuesday meetings this session trying

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to resolve the basically-simple procedural question of setting up a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles, a question on which there was a considerable measure of agreement from the outset. It seems clear that the majority of representatives consider that the time has come to expand our traditional procedure by establishing such a group.

I regret to say that my study of the records justifies only too clearly the conclusion drawn by the leader of my delegation on 25 August (FNDC/PV.210, pp.5 et seq.) that the basic reason for the present impasse on this question lies in the attitude adopted by our Soviet colleague. The Soviet representative has been frank enough to tell the Committee that, in his view:

"... at the present time, the conditions are not yet ripe for the establishment of a working group in connexion with the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles." (ibid., p.28)

He has even rejected (FNDC/PV.212, pp.37, 38) the proposal put forward by our Swedish colleague for a preliminary working group (FNDC/PV.210, pp.33, 34).

I think it is fair to ask -- and the General Assembly will no doubt ask -- why, after an initial show of willingness, the Soviet delegation backed away from its own suggestion for a working group. We must also ask why it did so when Western and non-aligned delegations had responded promptly and favourably to this suggestion, on the understanding of course that the group would be allowed to work under conditions which are, one would have thought, reasonable and fair in themselves and which have been endorsed overwhelmingly by the majority of the Committee. I must confess that I cannot follow the reasoning behind these Soviet tactics. I am puzzled by Mr. Tsarapkin's attempts in recent meetings to exaggerate the differences between the two sides. I cannot see that any fundamental difference really exists now that the Soviet Government accepts the need for both sides to retain nuclear deterrents throughout the disarmament process, and until alternative methods of ensuring international security have been set in motion.

It seems to me that our Soviet colleague only confuses the issue by maintaining that the Soviet proposals, even in their revised form (FNDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1), are irreconcilably different from those of the United States (FNDC/30 and Corr. 1 and Add.1, 2, 3) in their treatment of the nuclear threat. Although the deceptive nature of this argument has already been exposed, I understand, at previous sessions, I feel that its revival by our Soviet colleague makes it necessary to try to clarify our thoughts on the true nature of the concept of nuclear deterrence.

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The purpose of nuclear deterrents -- or, as they have been called, the "nuclear umbrella" -- is to ensure that before and during the disarmament process, in fact until other effective mechanisms are available, peace will be maintained and the security of States safeguarded. Our Soviet colleague has told the Committee:

"It is impossible to imagine that, if a 'nuclear umbrella' existed, any State would venture to violate peace and embark on aggression."

(ENDC/PV.163, p.21)

Each side would be deterred from committing aggression by the fear that, to quote Mr. Tsarapkin's phrase, it "would have to pay a high price for such an act" (ibid.). In other words, each side would be deterred by the fear and by the threat that any major aggression would entail inescapable and unacceptable damage as a result of nuclear retaliation by the other. It follows, therefore, that if Mr. Gromyko's proposal is to serve its stated purpose of deterrence it must obviously maintain the threat of nuclear retaliation -- I stress the word "retaliation" -- throughout the disarmament process. Without the retention of such a threat there would obviously be no mutual nuclear deterrence. Thus the claim that Mr. Gromyko's proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) would have the effect of eliminating the nuclear threat in stage I is surely inconsistent with the deterrent purpose of that proposal as publicly proclaimed by Soviet representatives in this Committee. Mr. Tsarapkin cannot both eat his cake and have it.

While I am on this subject of deterrence, I think we should all try to distinguish between the threat to use nuclear weapons and their actual use; for clearly there is a profound difference between retaining nuclear weapons as a deterrent against aggression, and the actual use of the weapons comprising the deterrent. The whole purpose of maintaining a credible threat to use nuclear weapons, both now and during the disarmament process, is to ensure that those weapons are never in fact used; that aggression is always deterred. Without such deterrence, governments might be tempted to commit aggression.

It may be a sad commentary on the state of contemporary international affairs that peace between the nuclear Powers has to be maintained by what has been called a balance of terror -- or, as I should prefer to call it, a balance of prudence. But the fact remains that, until we have negotiated and carried out to its final stage

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a disarmament agreement, the best guarantee of peace and security, however precarious it may seem to be, is provided by having a balance of nuclear deterrents on both sides. These are an integral part of the balance of power as it exists now and as it will have to be maintained at progressively lower levels during disarmament until there is no national power to balance.

In his statements at the 210th, 212th and 214th meetings Mr. Tsarapkin tried to deny the desirability of maintaining such a balance during the disarmament process. In particular he alleged that:

"... the Western Powers substitute for disarmament the maintenance of the stability of the balance of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.212, p.35)

However, as my colleague Mr. Tahourdin pointed out two weeks ago (ibid., p.39), our Soviet colleague has been trying here to knock down a man of straw of his own creation. Mr. Tahourdin stressed -- and I do so again today -- that the West had never suggested that there should be a balance of power instead of disarmament. What we have said, and what we shall continue to say, is that as we all disarm, and until we are all disarmed, a stable balance of power must be maintained both before and during the process. That is absolutely essential if international peace and national security are to be maintained. Of course, as I have already said, as we all disarm the balance can be progressively reduced to lower and less costly levels at each stage of the process until international peace and national security can be preserved and guaranteed by some other method. But to argue, as our Soviet colleague has done, that the West wishes to substitute a balance of power for disarmament is, quite frankly, a complete misrepresentation of the true position.

Mr. Tsarapkin seems to be ignoring the fact that, as regards the question of balance, the Soviet Union has itself accepted, and the General Assembly has endorsed, the Fifth Agreed Principle (ENDC/5). He seems to have overlooked Mr. Zorin's reference on 30 June to "the basic principle which you and we have accepted -- the principle of balance". (ENDC/PV.194, p.33) Mr. Tsarapkin has also overlooked the fact that last year, in answering questions put by the Director of Il Giorno, Chairman Khrushchev stated that the starting-point of talks on disarmament and other outstanding issues is the balance of power which has developed in the world today.

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Those are my first impressions of the Committee's present position in relation to general and complete disarmament. In the light of those impressions I would earnestly suggest that we should try to get out of this dead-end of misrepresentation and exaggeration of differences. We are agreed that we want to prevent the calamity of a nuclear war; we are agreed that that will only be ensured, finally and definitely, by general and complete disarmament; and we are agreed that some system of mutual deterrence must be retained, though at decreasing levels, until we have devised a better way of ensuring peace and security in a disarmed world. What remains is to work out, as Mrs. Myrdal has said (ENDC/PV.202, p.6), the modalities; and for that we require a working group. I trust we shall set one up without delay at our next session.

Regarding collateral measures, I must again confess to feeling considerable disappointment at the lack of progress after what appeared to be an encouraging beginning. My delegation has tried to make its views clear on the different proposals before the Committee during this present session. I do not wish, therefore, to repeat in detail all that we have said, but I cannot let the session close without restating briefly the views of Her Majesty's Government on the main problems in this field.

I think we would all agree that non-dissemination is one of the most important questions facing us. Mr. Thomas set out the United Kingdom position on this question in some detail at the meeting of 23 July. My colleagues may recall that at the end of his remarks he made a plea that the Committee should consider this question without polemics or emotion (ENDC/PV.201, p.27). As we all know, that appeal has not been met. Even if we concede that our East European colleagues may in fact harbour the suspicions to which they have so often given voice, their speeches on the subject do not appear to me to contain any evidence that they are seeking to make an objective appraisal of the relevance of the proposed multilateral force to the problem of non-dissemination. I can only hope that they will now give careful attention to the illuminating remarks made on this subject at our last meeting by the representative of the United States (ENDC/PV.215, pp.48, 49).

I can, of course, assure them once again that Her Majesty's Government has no intention of participating in any arrangement which involves dissemination. However, if our East European colleagues do not feel able to accept my word for that, it still seems to us that it is then in their best interests to conclude a non-dissemination agreement now. As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Butler, said during his visit to this Conference on 25 February 1964:

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"The existence of a formal agreement ... would itself constitute a safeguard against a multilateral force which involved the dissemination of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.169, p.11)

Once a formal agreement existed there could be no question of the United Kingdom's acting in a manner incompatible with such an agreement. Therefore I would appeal once again to my East European colleagues to cease treating this question as an opportunity to make propaganda, and instead to turn with us to a serious and unemotional consideration of this important question.

This leads me to the question of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1909 (XVIII) (ENDC/139), which has been so much the subject of our debates in recent weeks. I notice that the terms "idealistic" and "realistic" have been much used, and I think that may be due in part to some misunderstanding of the United Kingdom's position as it was set out on 20 August by my colleague Mr. Tahourdin (ENDC/PV.209, pp.11 et seq.) I can assure the Committee that it was never my delegation's intention to impugn idealists; I think anyone who studies the history and literature of my country will agree that we have made our contribution to a positive acceptance of idealistic considerations in the conduct of human affairs. Nevertheless we must face facts. Indeed, to do so is of especial importance in considering a question which is of such crucial significance for the future of mankind.

I have already spoken of the fact that at the present time international peace and national security largely rest on a balance of mutual deterrence. Deterrence itself rests on the knowledge that aggression could be met by a devastating retaliatory nuclear blow. It is on that that we must rely to prevent aggression. But the credibility of the deterrent on both sides would be undermined if a ban on the use of nuclear weapons led a State to believe that it could launch aggression with impunity. That is why my delegation believes that a ban on the use of nuclear weapons could in fact endanger rather than increase international security. Therefore we agree with the representative of Mexico that "this is not the right moment to convene such a conference" (ENDC/PV.213, p.20). We also share his view that this question must be considered "within the context of general and complete disarmament" (ibid.).

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The delegations of the non-aligned countries have circulated a joint memorandum (ENDC/145) concerning the need for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and referring to United Nations General Assembly resolution 1910 (XVIII) (ENDC/139). I should like to take this opportunity of re-emphasizing the importance which Her Majesty's Government attaches to the conclusion of such a treaty and of welcoming the support given to this aim in the statement of view by the non-aligned countries.

My colleague Mr. Tahourdin has already explained (ENDC/PV.209, pp.11, 12) why the need for on-site inspection to verify compliance with a ban on underground nuclear tests still exists. I do not wish to enter into technicalities today, but, briefly, it is because improved means of detection have not as yet brought certainty of identification. That is why we regret the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from its earlier readiness to accept, in principle at least, a limited amount of on-site inspection. Nor has the representative of the Soviet Union been prepared to explain what new technical advance Soviet scientists may have made as the basis of his assertion that national means of detection would be sufficient for the verification of the observance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. But if Soviet experts have in fact made some new advance in that field, then the Soviet delegation's failure to share that improved knowledge with us all casts doubt, if I may say so, on the sincerity of the Soviet Union's desire for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Here, however, there is surely work to be done, even while this Conference is in recess. As both Mr. Foster and Mr. Tahourdin have said, the United Kingdom and the United States would be very ready to hold expert talks between scientists of both sides in the hope of establishing an agreed verification basis. We therefore welcome the support given to that proposal in the joint memorandum before us. That would be a most useful first step towards reaching an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. If we could agree that such talks should be held at an early date, that would at least mean that our report to the United Nations General Assembly would not be entirely negative on that aspect.

I have already spoken at some length, and I shall refer only briefly to some of **the** other collateral measures which have been proposed.

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I regret that the United States proposals (ENDC/120) both for a freeze and for a cut-off have received such a summary dismissal from the delegations of the Soviet Union and other East-European countries. I confess that I find their argument that those are not measures of disarmament difficult to understand. In the first place, both measures would go far to meet the criteria for collateral measures set out in document ENDC/1/Add.1, which was adopted early in the life of this Conference, on 23 March 1962. In the second place, as was so vividly stated on 9 July by the United States representative, who was then Mr. Timberlake:

"A freeze undertaken now would in fact have the same effect at any given future time as the destruction of all the weapons to be produced between now and that future time." (ENDC/PV.197, p.5)

The cut-off would be a comparably valuable measure.

My delegation also continues to attach great importance to an early beginning on the actual physical destruction of some weapons. Here the United States proposal (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.) which is generally called the "bomber bonfire" would be a significant beginning from which we would hope further measures of destruction might follow. Let us not allow more ambitious but impracticable proposals to obscure the value of making a useful start.

The same consideration applies to the proposal (ENDC/120) for the establishment of observation posts. We have had a full agenda this session, which has not permitted that particular proposal to be discussed. I should therefore like to remind the Committee of the United Kingdom paper (ENDC/130) on the subject and to suggest that this is a subject which merits study during the recess in order that we may turn at our next session to detailed discussion of a proposal which has been widely recognized as having intrinsic value as a measure of lessening international tension.

I should next like to put forward some tentative suggestions about the lines along which, in the view of my delegation, we might all usefully proceed in our preparatory work on disarmament matters during the recess. Many of us will, of course, be participating in the work of the General Assembly. The debates on disarmament and related matters at the United Nations may well provide us with a new stimulus and fresh ideas which will contribute to our work in Geneva next year. At the same time the forthcoming recess will provide delegations and their governments

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with an opportunity to review the work of the Conference and reconsider their present positions. The degree to which our next session will prove fruitful will depend to a large extent on the degree to which we all profitably use the next few months in preparing for our next round of negotiations.

In the first place, I would urge the Soviet Government to reconsider its attitude towards the establishment of a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles and to ask itself what is to be gained by continuing to exaggerate the differences between the two sides on that important question. However, I would urge the Soviet Government to consider whether the remaining differences between its proposals on nuclear delivery vehicles and ours are more likely to be resolved by continuing plenary debates than by a working group.

In the second place, I suggest that we could all usefully reflect during the recess on the subject of verification. Like the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles, verification is a key issue which sooner or later we shall have to resolve. In our view the Committee has not yet devoted enough detailed attention to that question, either in the present session or in previous sessions. To some extent that may have been due to our failure hitherto to introduce sufficiently flexible methods of work to allow us to examine the problem of verification in the detail and depth required. For our part, we in the United Kingdom delegation hope that during the recess our colleagues will reconsider the suggestion made at various times in the past, particularly by our Brazilian colleagues (ENDC/PV.188, p.9), that we should set up a working group on verification in the disarmament context.

The Committee will recall that Mr. Butler, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, spoke at some length on that subject on 25 February. He said:

"We think that the problems of verification should be subjected to detailed study now by the Conference".

Speaking of the first full stage of disarmament, he suggested that we should

"acknowledge that whatever degree of disarmament we had in that stage we should have the same degree of inspection".

Since there are many possible ways of putting that into practice, he suggested that

"it might be worth while to approach the problem of verification from new angles".

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In particular, Mr. Butler suggested that it might be worth while examining what he called a "functional" rather than a regional approach. He said:

"Studies might be made of how certain key categories of armaments and certain key components of those armaments are produced and stored. Those studies might lead in turn to fresh conclusions about the type of control needed -- perhaps it would be some kind of spot or sample inspection -- to ensure that permitted production was not being exceeded. Similar checks might also give enough information about armaments already in existence, both those permitted and those which might be hidden.

"Adding the results of such studies together, we might arrive at fresh conclusions about the problem of verification as a whole. If we could at the same time achieve those conditions of increased and firmer international confidence that I have envisaged, then it might be possible to verify the first stage at least of general disarmament with a lesser degree of intrusion than we have hitherto thought necessary." (ENDC/PV.169, pp.17, 18).

To work out proposals along these lines obviously requires very detailed study. We in the United Kingdom are looking at this question, and we hope to be able to share our thoughts with the Committee at some future date. In the meantime, we hope that other governments represented here will use the recess to pursue their own studies into the question of verification, so that we can make further progress in our future work as a result of our individual and collective research.

Meanwhile, the connoisseurs of our proceedings, and in particular those who read our report to the United Nations General Assembly, can hardly be criticized for concluding that 1964, in contrast to 1963, will not go down as a vintage year in the history of disarmament negotiations. Nevertheless, I am not discouraged; I believe that our work this year may well have prepared the ground for a more distinguished harvest next year.

In conclusion, I should like to convey our thanks to Mr. Protitch, to Mr. Epstein, to the staff of the United Nations Secretariat and, in particular, to our hard-worked and long-suffering interpreters, for the excellent services with which they have once again provided the Committee.

Mr. GOLDBLAT (Poland): We have reached a point in our deliberations where it would appear necessary to take stock of the Committee's work for the past eight months. That is not just a ritual we have to go through only because the Conference is about to adjourn. It is, in our view, a good occasion for examining the reasons why no progress in our negotiation will be recorded in the progress report we have been asked by the United Nations General Assembly to submit.

I have used the word "negotiation", but I admit that I am not at all sure whether in fact our talks here meet all the necessary requirements of what is meant by "negotiation" in the contemporary political and diplomatic vocabulary. Looking for an authoritative definition, I came across an opinion of one of the most eminent American lawyers, John Bassett Moore, expressed in connexion with the "Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case" which was considered by the Permanent Court of International Justice a few years after the First World War. The definition reads as follows:

"... in the international sphere and in the sense of international law, negotiation is the legal and orderly administrative process by which governments, in the exercise of their unquestionable powers, conduct their relations one with another and discuss, adjust and settle, their differences." (Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, No. 2, 30 August 1924, pp. 62,63).

Thus to negotiate would mean to discuss, adjust and settle. Obviously the three elements are logically linked with each other, because the purpose of discussion is to facilitate adjustment, and adjustment is a condition for settling the differences between sovereign States. I hope that such an approach to what we are doing, or rather what we are supposed to do in this Committee, will not be called in question by my colleagues.

If this body is not a mere debating society, and if the work we are engaged in should lead to settlement, then, I submit, the divergent positions of the parties must be adjusted to each other -- and, may I add, adjusted by both sides. The record of the Committee, examined from this point of view, would clearly show that the socialist States have consistently followed the path of adjustment. To substantiate that statement, let me refer to the following facts.

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The Soviet Union has twice modified the original version of its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) with respect to its most important component — the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. In addition to that, desirous of taking yet another step to meet the Western position, the Soviet Union has expressed readiness (ENDC/PV.188, p.17) to consider in detail, in an appropriate working body, specific questions connected with the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella".

In the field of the reduction of military budgets, the socialist States agreed to alter their original proposal for equal 10 to 15 per cent cuts in military expenditure for all States and agreed to take into account the particular situations of some countries. Furthermore, having due regard to the difficulties certain governments might experience now in their legislative procedures, the socialist countries suggested that at present the Committee should at least express the intention of the participants in the disarmament talks to embark upon the path of reducing their military budgets, and that it should appeal to other States to follow their example. In deference to the wishes of the non-aligned members of the Committee, the socialist States were also willing to include in the Committee's declaration a proposition regarding the possibilities of devoting a portion of the resources released to rendering increased economic assistance to developing countries (ENDC/PV.193, pp.33,34).

The Soviet Union has altered its proposal for the destruction of bomber aircraft, taking into account the considerations put forward by some Committee members to the effect that the States possessing the greatest military potential should be the first to start eliminating bombers in an agreed sequence of types (ENDC/PV.199, pp.8 et seq.).

In view of the Western opposition to undertaking, at this stage, a commitment to abide by the statute of denuclearized zones, wherever and whenever they might be created, the Soviet Union has suggested that the Committee should at least issue a recommendation which would encourage the setting-up of such zones in various regions of the world, especially where the threat of a nuclear conflict is particularly great (ENDC/PV.209, p.33).

Similarly, considering that the Western Powers were not yet willing to withdraw all their troops and military bases from foreign territories, the Soviet Union proposed that as a first step the number of armed forces stationed abroad should be reduced on a basis of reciprocity (ENDC/PV.215, p.16).

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Those have been acts of adjustment of the recent past only. Have the moves by the socialist countries been reciprocated by the Western Powers? Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Elaboration of old proposals, however extensive, is not enough.

The United States apparently recognizes the need for adjustment. How can one explain otherwise the statement made by Mr. Timberlake on 1 September to the effect that the United States does not expect that any plan eventually agreed to would be unchanged from its original draft (ENDC/PV.212, p.20)? But any declaration, however commendable, remains hollow -- if I may say so -- unless supported by deeds. So let us not merely toss slogans around; they are opiates for the conscience. Adjustment implies give-and-take. Concessions made only by one side will not do. No wonder we have made no progress in widening areas of basic agreement or similarity in the approaches to the fundamental issues of general and complete disarmament; no wonder we have reached no agreement in the Committee on measures which could serve to reduce international tension and lessen the possibility of war, as recommended by the resolution of the last General Assembly (A/RES/1908(XVIII); ENDC/139).

Worse than that: new obstacles have been placed on the way to accommodation, even on those issues which seemed most ripe for solution. I have in mind the idea of accelerating the arms race through the setting up of a multilateral nuclear force within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Once carried into effect, the new force would open access to nuclear weapons for non-nuclear States and would thus increase the number of those who own and control the weapons. The representative of the United States did not deny that last Thursday. His statement (ENDC/PV.215, pp.45 et seq.), though couched in soothing terms, has failed to dispel our misgivings. If anything, it has corroborated them. We have received official confirmation that the nationals of States participating in the multilateral force would not merely man the ships of the multilateral-force fleet but would be directly concerned with maintenance and control of missiles. The tendency to obscure the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers would thus be further reinforced. It is not fortuitous, then, that the Western thesis about the alleged compatibility of the multilateral force with the principle of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and the Western Powers' patent misinterpretation of the United Nations resolution prohibiting the spread of those weapons (A/RES/1665(XVI)), have found no support in this Committee, or for that matter in any other forum.

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It is equally impossible to convince anybody that the aspirations of the West German Government to keep a finger on the atomic trigger have anything in common with a defence policy. Nobody questions the borders of the German Federal Republic, while our borders, those of Poland and of the neighbouring States, are being openly disputed by the highest State officials in West Germany. It is not Poland, or any other socialist State, which blocks peaceful initiatives aimed at relaxation of international tension; it is precisely the German Federal Republic which has been adamantly opposed to any such initiatives, irrespective of their authorship.

Federal Germany has become the most powerful State in Western Europe and is already in a position to blackmail effectively its NATO allies. The whole idea of establishing a multilateral force has been conceived with the sole purpose of appeasing the West German desire for nuclear armaments. Who can guarantee that the military and political leaders in West Germany, obsessed by a dangerous illusion of a revision of frontiers in Europe and having acquired access to nuclear weapons, may not create a situation which would involve the other Western Powers in a venture fraught with incalculable risks? Who can guarantee that the sharing of nuclear responsibility will not lead to the sharing of nuclear irresponsibility?

If our discussions here are to lead to a settlement, which is, after all, the ultimate objective of any negotiation, the participating States should, to say the least, refrain from widening the areas of disagreement and from aggravating and worsening the situation, which is already bad enough, in particular in the field of nuclear armaments. The delegations of non-aligned countries, such as the United Arab Republic, India, Mexico and Nigeria, have voiced their opposition to any changes in the existing arrangements for the control, disposal and possession of nuclear weapons and for training in their use. Will their ardent pleas remain unheeded?

A policy of accomplished facts, a policy disregarding the interests, security and legitimate fears of the other side, depreciates the value of agreements already concluded, creates an atmosphere of mistrust, and adds to the difficulties which must be removed before a settlement can be attained. Proper conditions for disarmament can be created only by a policy aimed at halting the arms race and reducing tension, particularly in those regions where the forces of the two military alliances face each other and where enormous stocks of lethal weapons have been accumulated. This policy lay at the foundation of the Polish plan for establishing a nuclear-free zone in central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1). The same policy

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

prompted us to submit a few months ago a proposal for freezing nuclear weapons in Central Europe (ENDC/PV.189, p.6). Our immediate aim is to arrest the stockpiling of nuclear charges in the most sensitive area of the world and to prevent diffusion of nuclear weapons there, by prohibiting their transfer and manufacture. We sincerely believe that the dialogue on the Gomulka plan, in which we are engaged with a number of countries, will be continued through diplomatic channels in a truly constructive spirit.

In conclusion, let me express the view that, although the Committee has found itself in an impasse, the outlook may not be altogether bleak. This does not mean that I share the opinion expressed by Voltaire when he defined optimism as a mania for declaring, when things are going badly, that all is well. But the Polish delegation hopes that the United Nations General Assembly, to which, unfortunately, we shall go empty-handed, will be able to provide an impetus to disarmament talks. However, what is needed is a reappraisal by the Western Powers of their very approach to disarmament negotiations in so far as that approach reflects a policy of untold peril. Progress will become possible if and when the Western Powers, mesmerized as they are now by a strategy of deterrence, discard the thesis that peace cannot prevail unless backed by armaments. Arms control is no substitute for disarmament. Those who consider it dangerous to dismantle the lethal mechanism should ponder whether it is safer to stand by idly listening while the mechanism ticks away inexorably.

Finally, with the Committee's permission, I should like to thank the whole of the Secretariat staff -- my former colleagues -- for the excellent services extended to us.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): All members of this Committee will remember with what high hopes we resumed our work last January. As we approach the end of our sessions in Geneva for the current year, it is impossible not to be deeply disappointed that we have been able to do so little to turn these hopes into reality. However, it is useless to dwell on past disappointments. The task before us remains as urgent as ever. Fortunately, there have been positive elements in our work this year on which we should be able to build in future negotiations. Among these is the emphasis which we have placed on collateral measures. The Conference has had explained in detail the collateral measures which were proposed last January in President Johnson's message (ENDC/120) and in the Soviet memorandum (ENDC/123). I should like now to review briefly the position Canada takes regarding a number of these measures.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We consider the first group of collateral measures of which I shall speak as being of outstanding importance because in one way or another they attack directly the crucial problem of halting the arms race in the field of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. I have in mind the proposals for (a) a comprehensive test ban; (b) measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons; (c) the freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapon vehicles; (d) the cut-off of production of fissile material for weapon purposes, accompanied by the reduction of stocks of such materials by the transfer of agreed quantities for peaceful purposes; and (e) the physical destruction of agreed types of nuclear weapon vehicles, as exemplified by the proposal of the United States for a bonfire of B-47 and TU-16 aircraft (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.). During the present session all those measures have been considered by the Committee. The Canadian delegation believes that the attention which they have received is the most positive and constructive aspect of our recent work. In past statements we have expressed our views on those proposals, and those views are on record. We have urged that the proposals be transformed into definite agreements at an early date. I have a few additional comments to offer with respect to several items.

First, as regards the question of a comprehensive test ban, the Canadian delegation finds itself in agreement with the views expressed in the memorandum of the non-aligned nations (ENDC/145) which has been distributed to us today. In particular, we favour the view that an agreement to discontinue all nuclear weapon tests could be facilitated by exchange of scientific information between the nuclear Powers.

Next, it seems to the Canadian delegation that a particularly useful examination has taken place in the Committee of an agreement for the cut-off of production of fissile material. The United States delegation has put forward in detail its proposals for the complete cessation of such production (ENDC/PV.191, pp.6 et seq.; PV.193, pp.11 et seq.), and has also explained how that goal might be reached by stages. Last week the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, cleared up (ENDC/PV.215, pp.50-52) some of the misconceptions which the Soviet delegation appeared to have about the scope and nature of the verification arrangements which would be necessary. Probably there has not been enough time at this session for

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

the Soviet delegation to consider that clarification fully. However, we trust that after the matter has been studied during the recess the Soviet Union will be able to take a more positive attitude to the measure.

We believe also that States should consider very seriously two aspects of the United States proposals for action in the field of non-dissemination. Those aspects seem to us to have been neglected somewhat in our discussions. They are, first, the application of safeguards to all transfers of fissile material and equipment for peaceful purposes; and, secondly, the proposal for the acceptance by the nuclear Powers of safeguards over their non-military atomic activities. In our view those proposals clearly deserve support as part of our over-all effort to ensure that the development of nuclear science is channelled for the benefit of mankind and not for its destruction.

Our debates on general and complete disarmament during the past session have shown only too clearly how difficult it is to reach agreement on how nuclear weapon vehicles should be reduced while the competitive race in building more and more of these armaments goes on unchecked. This Conference now has before it a concrete proposal for a collateral measure which would put a stop to this race in the field of strategic nuclear weapon vehicles. The Soviet Union and its allies have chosen to criticize this far-sighted proposal for a freeze on the familiar grounds that it would constitute control without disarmament. We urge them, however, to reconsider whether it is appropriate to apply this old formula to a measure which could have such important consequences. Implementation of the freeze proposal would bring about numerous and profound benefits. It would allay much of the tension which the arms race produces; it would save substantial resources which this race now devours; it would prevent the staggering increases in the weapons held by the two sides which would occur inevitably in the absence of a freeze agreement; and, finally and most important, it would lay a firm basis for negotiating important reductions in all types of armaments.

The Canadian delegation hopes also that the Soviet Union will reconsider its position in regard to measures which could begin the actual reduction of armaments in advance of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. As its proposal for the destruction of all bombers shows, the Soviet Union now accepts that there are areas in which the disarmament process can be begun without waiting for agreement

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

on general and complete disarmament. We welcome this, although we believe it has been demonstrated that it would not be practicable to destroy all bombers at this stage. At the meeting held on 16 July, Mr. Timberlake, speaking for the United States on the subject of the United States proposal for the destruction of equal numbers of TU-16 and B-47 bombers, indicated his Government's readiness to consider realistic Soviet counter-proposals. At that time he said:

"If the Soviet Union is not prepared to undertake destruction of any TU-16 aircraft at this time, perhaps it might suggest other types of aircraft -- or other armaments -- with which it would prefer to begin." (ENDC/PV.199, p.15)

The Canadian delegation hopes that during the recess the major Powers will give close thought to preliminary measures involving the physical destruction of important types of armaments. It seems to us that proposals of this sort hold out definite prospects for constructive negotiations if the principle of equity -- that is, that no military advantage should accrue to either side -- is preserved.

In his speech on 10 September (ENDC/PV.215, pp. 10-13), the representative of the Soviet Union repeated the charge, made frequently in the past, that the members of the NATO alliance are inspired by aggressive intentions. It is very surprising to the Canadian delegation that representatives of socialist countries should continue to talk in this way. We should think that more than enough has been said here to show that the conventional forces of the NATO alliance are hardly sufficient for defence of their national territories in Europe, if compared with Warsaw Treaty conventional forces. The idea of aggression by NATO in the conventional or non-nuclear way of war is ridiculous; and who is going to start a nuclear war in these days when the dreadful results are known to all persons who control the levers of power? It would seem sometimes that in the view of the Soviet Union the determination of the NATO alliance to defend itself is what constitutes aggressiveness. It would be better for our negotiations here if accusations of wrong moral attitudes on one side or the other were dropped.

However, we think that the Soviet Union is basically in agreement with the West that it is important to develop means whereby the two military blocs can reassure each other regarding the essentially defensive nature of their respective military postures. This common concern emphasizes the importance of adopting measures which would reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

At our meeting of 9 April my delegation spoke (ENDC/PV.182, pp.16 et seq.) of the important contribution which the establishment of a system of ground observation posts could make to the reduction of tension between the major military groupings. It would do this by providing a means by which the country on whose territory the posts were located could reassure the nation or group of nations manning the post that its actions were peaceful and defensive and that it had no aggressive intentions.

At the beginning of our meetings this year we hoped -- as a result of certain statements which had been made by Mr. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union -- that this measure of assurance of peaceful intentions would be considered on its own merits. However, the Soviet Union delegation has made it clear that the Soviet position now is that the system of observation posts could be set up only in conjunction with an agreement not to station nuclear weapons in the territory of East or West Germany and a reduction of the number of troops of one ally stationed in the territory of another in Europe (ibid., pp.37 et seq.). Those measures taken by themselves would not seem to the Western side to be equitable or be in accord with the agreed principle that measures of disarmament should not confer a military advantage on any group of States.

I should like to elaborate the Canadian position with regard to nuclear-free zones, of which the proposal made by the Soviet Union and the proposals made by the representatives of Poland (ENDC/C.1/1; PV.189, p.6) are examples. In the Canadian House of Commons on 4 June 1963 the Prime Minister of Canada pointed out that any proposal for a denuclearized zone should meet at least the following three criteria. He said:

"First, it should be acceptable to all the countries of the geographical area in which the zone would be located. That seems to be obvious. Second, it should include some arrangement for verifying that the commitments undertaken would be carried out; and third, it should be consistent with the accepted principle that no disarmament measure should create a unilateral advantage for any State or group of States."

My delegation believes that, provided proposals for nuclear-free zones can be shown to meet those criteria, measures of this kind may well prove to be a useful means of reinforcing international efforts to limit the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our Committee might be able to play a useful role

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in elaborating agreed guide-lines for the creation of nuclear-free zones. However, it must be recognized that a number of proposals for the creation of nuclear-free zones, including that regarding German territories, which have been advanced by the socialist countries in this Committee clearly do not meet the criteria which I have mentioned.

Finally, I shall make some brief remarks about the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty States and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This matter was extensively discussed here in the spring of 1963, when the Soviet Union circulated a draft of the terms of such an agreement (ENDC/77). The position of Canada in this matter was stated by Mr. Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the Canadian House of Commons in May 1963, when he said:

"It should be understood that all Western countries, and indeed all Members of the United Nations, are solemnly sworn to prevent aggression and to develop friendly relations among nations. This Government considers that it could be useful, in appropriate circumstances, to give additional recognition to this fact in the form of a non-aggression pact. At the same time, we believe that this question is closely linked to difficult political problems in Europe, and between East and West generally, and that it should not be considered in isolation from them."

The Canadian delegation does not believe that it would be right to try to negotiate a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty States and the NATO States in this Committee. We are here to discuss measures of disarmament. The pact proposed by the Soviet Union is closely related to far-reaching and important political problems of a different character.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, we have, regrettably, not reached agreement on any of the numerous collateral measures placed before the Committee at the beginning of this year; but we can now judge more clearly just where the major Powers stand with respect to those proposals, where the difficulties lie, and what must be done if those difficulties are to be overcome.

Document ENDC/144, which has just been circulated, summarizes the views which the non-aligned members have expressed in the Conference during this year. It brings

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together in a useful way a number of constructive suggestions which they have made in the field of collateral measures. The Canadian delegation hopes that all members of the Committee, and particularly the nuclear Powers, will use the months of recess to review their positions on collateral measures in the light of our discussions. This period of reflection and study, and the discussions on disarmament in the General Assembly, should, if there is good will and a sincere desire to reach agreement, enable us to produce next year the positive results which have eluded us in 1964.

In conclusion, I wish to extend my delegation's thanks to the members of the Secretariat, who, as always, have served our Conference so well during this session.

Mr. NEHRU (India): Our Conference is about to take a recess, and we are going to present a report on our work to the General Assembly. The draft report has been placed before us, but we have not had time to study it carefully. We are grateful to our co-Chairmen for the trouble they have taken in preparing the report (ENDC/146).

I propose today, on behalf of my delegation, to make some brief comments on the work of our Conference. We met in January this year in conditions which were recognized as favourable for our work. The Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and other agreements, followed by the unilateral cuts in military expenditure (ENDC/PV.157, pp.10; 13,14), had helped to improve the international atmosphere. There was a further improvement as a result of the unilateral cuts in fissionable material production for weapon use (ENDC/131, 132). We were also assured by our colleagues from the United States and the Soviet Union that their approach to the various problems that we are discussing would be more flexible. Great hopes were thus aroused, and the expectation was that we should make fuller progress at the present session.

I think we must all agree that that expectation has not been fulfilled. That is a matter of disappointment for us, and the General Assembly also will be disappointed. It had asked us to carry out our work with a high sense of urgency. It also expected us to negotiate agreements, or to widen the area of agreement,

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both on collateral measures and on measures of disarmament (ENDC/139). We have discussed many such measures in the two sessions of the Conference, but we have not achieved any concrete results. It is perhaps inevitable, at a time when there are political and other uncertainties, that our work also should be affected. Progress on disarmament is in many ways closely related to other developments that are taking place in the world. Thus it is not altogether surprising that our discussions in the present year had not led to concrete results.

However, in spite of the lack of results, I think we can say that the discussions have not been fruitless. We have covered a good deal of ground; new ideas have emerged; and there is a better understanding of each other's position. This may help us in due course, to reach agreements or to widen the area of agreement on some measures.

The delegations of the non-aligned countries have also taken some new and constructive initiatives. In our view, those initiatives have some value and significance from the point of view of our work. The first initiative of the non-aligned countries was to suggest ways of breaking the deadlock which exists in the Conference. There is a deadlock on practically every issue, every measure which has been proposed by one side or the other. The non-aligned countries have made concrete proposals and suggestions for widening the area of agreement. They have presented a memorandum containing a brief résumé of their proposals and suggestions (ENDC/144). We hope that that memorandum will be appended to the report and will receive further consideration both in this Conference and in the General Assembly. The representative of Burma has made a specific request on behalf of eight delegations (ENDC/143) for the memorandum to be appended to the report of the Committee.

The second initiative of the non-aligned countries is the joint memorandum which they have presented on a comprehensive test ban (ENDC/145). We understand that in the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy which was held recently in Geneva the question of carrying out underground explosions for peaceful purposes was discussed. The results which were reported in the Conference showed that radioactive contamination could be controlled or eliminated. We are, of course, entirely in favour of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. However,

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that subject does not fall within our purview, and the memorandum which we have presented is confined to explosions for the testing of weapons.

We have welcomed the Moscow Treaty and have appealed to the nuclear Powers to put an end to underground weapon tests. Unless all such tests are discontinued, the danger arising from the nuclear arms race and the risk of contamination will not be removed. Some countries have rejected the universal demand for the ending of all nuclear weapon tests. They have refused to sign the Moscow Treaty. We regret their decision, and we hope that steps will be taken to ensure that every country signs the treaty immediately.

Among the measures which we have discussed at the present session of the Conference — and in fact since early in January — is the question of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. On that question also the non-aligned countries have made some constructive suggestions. In this connexion I made some reference at an earlier meeting (ENDC/PV.194, pp.5 et seq.) to India's policy in regard to nuclear weapons and to disarmament generally. There have been some comments on the subject from some of our colleagues, and I think it might be helpful if I were to clarify our position.

The United States representative has welcomed the decision of the Government of India not to use India's nuclear capabilities for non-peaceful purposes. He has said that our decision is an immense contribution to the efforts of all of us to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He has described the decision as an act of statesmanship, and has expressed the hope that all countries which seek peace will be inspired by India's example (ENDC/PV.213, p.65). While thanking the United States representative for his appreciation of my country's policy, I should like to point out on behalf of my delegation that not only have we taken a firm decision not to use our nuclear capabilities for non-peaceful purposes, but also that we are totally opposed to the use, manufacture or possession of nuclear weapons by any country. The United States representative recently described the possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons, or of a nuclear war. He said that in a matter of minutes hundreds of millions of people might be killed in Europe and America (ibid., pp.61,62). I think he might have added that the effects of a nuclear war would not be confined to a few countries: they would be shared by all countries, and the disaster would be widespread and universal.

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Therefore, in our view, the use -- or even contemplated use -- of nuclear weapons is nothing short of a crime against humanity. As we have pointed out in previous statements, the use of nuclear weapons is a violation of the United Nations Charter and the rules of international law (ENDC/PV.212, pp.5,6). It is not enough, in our view, to take steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. Preventive steps must, of course, be taken, since the situation would be much graver if other countries were also to acquire such weapons. However, the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries is in many ways a temptation for others also to acquire them. It is necessary, therefore, in our view, that, along with measures to prevent dissemination, effective measures should be taken to halt the nuclear arms race and bring about the reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armouries of the nuclear Powers.

We realize, of course, that the reduction and elimination cannot take place through the adoption of a resolution or the making of a declaration. It can take place only on the basis of an agreement, unless one side or the other is prepared to give them up unilaterally. Therefore we welcome any step or any proposal which might have the effect of bringing an agreement on this question nearer. At the start of our negotiations there was a wide gap between the positions of the two sides on this question. That gap has been gradually narrowed, largely because of some changes in the Soviet position.

The latest change is represented by the Gromyko proposal for a so-called "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). The Soviet representative has in many of his statements expressed his appreciation of what he has described as an Indian proposal. The proposal he has in mind was made at one of the Committee's earlier meetings (ENDC/PV.177, pp.27 et seq.). At later meetings we have clarified and amplified the proposal and given it more concrete shape. The Indian proposal for the reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles is contained in the statement I made on 1 September (ENDC/PV.212, pp.7 et seq.)

I should like to explain briefly the Indian proposal, since we are anxious to promote some agreement on this question. That is the purpose for which the non-aligned countries were invited to participate in this Conference. We have

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welcomed the Gromyko proposal, not because we consider the retention of some nuclear delivery vehicles, even for a limited period, as a meritorious act in itself: we have welcomed it, first, because it narrows the gap between the two sides and is a possible step on the road to an agreement; and, secondly, because it provides for a substantial reduction of dangerous weapons at an early stage of disarmament. Our approach to the disarmament problem is that, while disarmament must take place on the basis of the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) -- which means, in effect, that balance, verification and peace-keeping must be ensured -- the first stage of disarmament, or the earliest possible stage, must be one which provides for a substantial and striking reduction of armaments.

The Gromyko proposal would, in our view, bring about such a reduction and would reduce nuclear delivery vehicles to the level of what has been described as a "nuclear umbrella". The term "nuclear umbrella" -- or "nuclear shield", or "minimum deterrent" -- is not a happy one. It seems to imply that the limited stocks which might be retained could be used in some given circumstances. As far as India is concerned, we are totally opposed to the use, manufacture or possession of nuclear weapons. We should prefer for that reason to use the more factual term "lowest agreed levels" in place of that of a "nuclear umbrella" or "deterrent".

I should like to summarize the suggestions that we have made. We agree that it is necessary to set up a working group to study this question. The working group should have a clear directive and clear terms of reference. Its hands should not be tied, and it should be open to the group to consider all proposals for reduction or elimination. As far as India is concerned, we do not think that small percentage cuts spread out over a number of years are an adequate response to the nuclear menace. Uniform percentage cuts, where one side is weaker than the other, might also create a dangerous imbalance. However, those are matters of detail which the working group would have to study. As regards the purpose or aim of the study, we think that it should be possible to reach an agreement on the terms of reference.

What is the essence of the Gromyko proposal? "Umbrella" is a picturesque word and, in the nuclear context, a dangerous word; but, if we have understood correctly the Soviet position, the Gromyko proposal aims at the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the lowest level at the earliest possible stage.

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All other details of the proposal must, of course, be the subject of technical study and negotiations. The lowest level will have to be an agreed level, which means, in effect, that what we should aim at is the reduction of existing stocks to the lowest agreed level at any early stage of the disarmament process, leading to the total elimination and destruction of all stocks.

Naturally, the reduction and elimination must take place on the basis of the Agreed Principles. That means that other steps may have to be taken to ensure that balance and security are maintained in all the stages. In fact, the establishment of one working group might lead to the establishment of another for the study of related measures.

The United States position, if we have understood it correctly, is that the working group should consider all proposals for the reduction of existing stocks to agreed levels in each stage. The agreed levels in a process of reduction must necessarily be defined as the lowest agreed levels. Surely it is not the intention of the nuclear Powers to maintain stocks at the highest levels possible while asking other countries to give up their nuclear ambitions. If stocks were reduced to the lowest agreed levels in the first stage or at an early stage of disarmament, no one could object to a further reduction in later stages as part of the continuing process of disarmament leading to the total elimination of all stocks.

In conclusion, I should like to say that the tentative formula we have suggested for the terms of reference of the working group (ENDC/PV.212, p.10) seems to us to be capable of bridging the differences between the two sides. Similar suggestions have been made by other non-aligned delegations. Those delegations have also offered to help and co-operate with our co-Chairmen in the efforts they are making to formulate the terms of reference. My delegation is convinced that an agreement on that question is possible on the basis of the suggestions of the non-aligned delegations.

As I may be speaking for the last time during the present session of the Conference, I would take this opportunity to thank all our colleagues for their courtesy and friendly co-operation, and our co-Chairmen in particular for their wise and considerate leadership of the Conference. I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to thank all the members of the Secretariat -- those who sit with us at this table and those who do not -- for their devoted work and the assistance they have extended to all of us in the two sessions of the Conference this year.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The Committee has this morning heard several statements, to which all the delegations have certainly listened with attention. For my part, I was particularly interested in the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Sir Harold Beeley, who was speaking for the first time in this Committee and who has made a valuable initial contribution to our work. Many points deserve to be emphasized in his comprehensive and well-documented statement, but I shall only mention one -- the invitation which he made to us and which was subsequently repeated by Mr. Burns, to continue to reflect and work on our problems during the recess. Sir Harold and Mr. Burns are quite right, and I hope that their advice will be followed.

As regards the statement made by Mr. Goldblat, the representative of Poland, I do not intend to reply to it, for which I hope he will forgive me. I do not want to add my repetitions to his. I have already examined the problem which he raised this morning in my statement of 3 September (ENDC/PV.213, pp.30 et seq.) which summed up my delegation's attitude on that subject.

But apart from the statements which it has heard this morning, the Committee has today received several important documents, on which I should like to make a few remarks.

First, document ENDC/144, submitted by the delegations of the eight non-aligned countries, contains a very useful summary of the proposals made by the delegations of all the non-aligned countries. It concerns an activity to which my delegation has always attached the utmost importance, and in my opinion, it is only right and proper that this activity should be suitably brought to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly at its next session. Fresh proof of the importance of the contribution of the delegations of the non-aligned countries has been furnished this morning by the statement of the representative of India, Mr. Nehru.

Second, another document submitted by the delegations of the eight non-aligned countries on the banning of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/145) also makes a very useful contribution to our work, and particularly to the solution of the problem of underground tests. The Committee is aware of the importance that my delegation attaches to this question -- we have referred to it on several occasions -- and I can only regret that the

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Committee has not gone sufficiently deeply into the problem. The document submitted by the eight delegations contains an encouragement and an appeal and it puts forward very constructive ideas on the solution of the problem of underground tests which are largely shared by my delegation. This morning Sir Harold Beeley expressed the satisfaction with which he welcomed this document of the eight delegations. I share his sentiments, and trust that the nuclear Powers will take it as a useful basis for their subsequent efforts to reach an agreement.

Last, the Committee has before it its draft report to the General Assembly (ENDC/146), our final document. This document was circulated yesterday and I have not yet been able to study it in detail. I shall submit a few preliminary observations today, and will revert to this question if necessary at our next meeting.

I understand that this draft report is the result of long and arduous work by the co-Chairmen, and it would perhaps be rather out of place to insist on its amendment. Nevertheless, my delegation wishes to make some remarks which, if they cannot be embodied in the form of amendments, can at least appear in the verbatim records.

In the first place, my delegation would have preferred our report this year to be slightly different from those of previous years, precisely because it was unable to record any agreement. In my opinion, the report should have stressed the real efforts which we have all made here and the few rapprochements -- by no means negligible -- which have been achieved. In short, it should have emphasized our intensive work over the past six months.

But the report is extremely brief, not to say curt. In substance, it confines itself to listing the documents submitted to the Conference, some of which are not even working documents but statements made to the Press by the Soviet Government. That gives the impression that only a few governments and delegations made an active contribution to the disarmament negotiations, whereas in reality, all the governments here represented have done their best, within the limits of their abilities, to participate constructively in our debates. All these contributions, modest perhaps, but sincere and inspired by the need for peace, are glossed over in the report.

Furthermore, the report contains nothing to relieve the impression of pessimism which may be gained by the reader. In my opinion, however, such pessimism is entirely unjustified. In this connexion, I would mention that Chapter II of the draft report concludes with a statement as negative as it is useless:

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"The Committee has not reached any specific agreement either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension" (ENDC/146, p.4).

That is a conclusion which any reader, informed or uninformed, could easily reach for himself, without the additional emphasis. By stressing our failure, without a word of regret or any expression of confidence in the future, we seem to imply that our work has been completely fruitless, and that the Committee has served no useful purpose. As we all know, that is not the case, as was again proved by the statements we heard this morning, even that of the representative of Poland. If the sentence I have just quoted is retained, I think its negative aspect ought to be modified by at least drawing attention to the relaxed and co-operative atmosphere which prevailed during our discussions this year. That atmosphere has a political as well as a psychological value. Mainly thanks to it, the picture presented by the Conference is not one of unrelieved gloom, despite the absence of any concrete agreement.

Last, the report contains no indication whatsoever of our determination to continue our work with a view to achieving at some future date the tasks which have been entrusted to us. There is only an indirect reference to this point in the statement that we shall resume our work at a date not yet decided upon.

It is true that the annexes to the report contain all the verbatim records of our meetings, giving details concerning the above points which do not emerge from the report itself. However, annexes often pass unnoticed. I think, therefore, that all the delegations which have participated in this Committee's work should make a collective effort in New York to demonstrate in an appropriate way what has been accomplished in our last two sessions. That common task should have a special character this year, in view of the international atmosphere in which our discussions have taken place. Moreover, our collective responsibility towards the United Nations must not be forgotten, and I hope that this year, when our work at Geneva comes before the General Assembly, it will be reflected in a definite feeling of solidarity among us. In my view, every member of the Committee should eschew, in his statements to the United Nations, any remark savouring of harmful propaganda, and endeavour to present in as objective a manner as possible the real difficulties we have encountered. We must demonstrate that, although it was not possible to reach any agreement, that was due to really serious obstacles, but that nevertheless useful work was done and that there is every reason to hope that such agreements will be reached in the future.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I believe that it is by such participation in United Nations discussions -- that is, in a spirit of objectivity and solidarity, devoid of any tinge of propaganda -- that we shall succeed in bringing to the Assembly's attention the factor which escapes the reader of our report: the new constructive atmosphere, the new spirit which has pervaded our Conference during the past two sessions. Indeed, it is thanks to this positive factor that our Conference is steadily acquiring the character of an essential and irreplaceable organ for the relaxation of international tension. We ourselves are already aware of this, but it must be made clear to the United Nations as well.

Furthermore, a serious and objective contribution to the discussions in New York is necessary on the part of us all, if we wish the United Nations to give us a constructive impetus for the continuation of our work. If our statements before the General Assembly were confined to sterile polemics and mutual recriminations, and if we failed to give an objective indication of the difficulties we have encountered, it would be very difficult for the General Assembly to obtain a clear idea of the situation and give us effective encouragement. We all have a very important role to play in the General Assembly vis-à-vis the other delegations, and we must perform it adequately, with a due sense of our responsibilities.

Despite the absence of any new concrete agreements, the Committee is adjourning in an atmosphere of serenity, due to the confidence we all have that our work is not being interrupted but merely suspended, to be resumed at a later date with renewed vigour under the impetus of the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): First, I should like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's most sincere appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and to Mr. Epstein, as well as to the various interpreters and verbatim reporters who have done so much to assist us -- it is perhaps a pity that I must now inflict an extemporaneous speech on them.

I should also like to thank my colleagues for their co-operation, and to express the hope that during the recess their governments will apply their minds to the problems before us and that on resuming our work we may be able to elaborate further areas of agreement.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

I shall now proceed to discuss very briefly the draft report (ENDC/146) which we have before us. I will begin by thanking our hard-working co-Chairmen for producing this report. It is a pity that the report came to us rather late in the day yesterday, and there is need, I believe, to discuss it today so that the views of the various delegations may be taken into account. In thanking them, however, I trust it may not be ungracious to make a few comments which, on the face of it, might appear to be over-critical -- though I think this is inescapable in the present context of our work. As Mr. Cavalletti has rightly pointed out, the time has come when the Committee should send to the United Nations a report which should not be restricted by the formal character of previous reports. In fact, if I may say so, the report which we now have before us denotes a step backwards even from the previous reports we have submitted in the past.

The report could be briefly summarized as follows: the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament met for two sessions; it held discussions on general and complete disarmament, discussed collateral measures, received a number of documents, and so on -- and one hard fact, that no agreement was reached.

In view of the fact that my delegation attaches the greatest importance to the discussions at the United Nations and we feel that the basis of those discussions should be our report, and also in view of the fact that we are convinced and continue to believe that the United Nations could give clear directives and could be helpful to our work here, we are very anxious that any report we send to it should at least reflect, as accurately as possible, both the atmosphere of our work here and the various proposals and suggestions made by all sides. As the report stands, one obtains the impression -- though I am sure this is not the intention of the Co-Chairmen -- that the two great Powers have done their very utmost to reach agreement but that perhaps the others -- the non-aligned Powers and the others in military groupings -- have done virtually nothing. As I have said, I am sure this is not the intention.

I would take, for instance, the report on general and complete disarmament. This is an area in which efforts have been concentrated at this session, and yet the report

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

as it stands does not reflect either the interest which has been aroused in this Committee on this subject or the efforts made by all delegations, including those of the non-aligned countries and those of many countries of the two military groupings, to achieve a rapprochement. In particular I would mention in passing that my delegation contributed its quota to this -- we submitted a working document, among other things (ENDC/144, p.16) -- but neither our views nor the views of our other colleagues seem to have received any mention. In fact, there is no indication that the Committee has concentrated on setting up a working group. We do trust the co-Chairmen will mention this fact, even though we did not set up the working group, and also the fact that we have not given up hope that this will materialize.

With regard to the section relating to collateral measures, the same comments apply with even greater force. We have a battery of asterisks here referring to documents submitted by the various delegations, in particular by two delegations. With all due respect to our co-Chairmen, I am not sure I understand the criteria for the separation of sheep and goats. Perhaps we could change the method of using asterisks to classify certain documents presented to the Committee as being included in annex I while others are lumped with the verbatim records and other documents; either we should do away with this classification or efforts should be made to ensure that the views expressed by various delegations are equally reflected.

It is true that the responsibility for reaching agreement here lies primarily with the co-Chairmen, and that is a fact we have accepted; but it is also a fact that we in this Committee have specific responsibilities to help the co-Chairmen in the first place, and the other governments as well, to reach an agreement to which we ourselves, though we may have little to contribute, can be parties. In this sense we think it would be very helpful if the various views expressed in this Committee were adequately reflected in the report sent to the United Nations.

Secondly, in the fourth paragraph on page 4 we are told:

"On 29 July 1964, a List of General Assembly Resolutions Referring to Tasks of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament ... was circulated (ENDC/139). These resolutions were discussed at several plenary meetings." (ENDC/146, p.4)

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

In theory, or perhaps rather in essence, that is a true statement of facts, in the sense that these resolutions include discussions on general and complete disarmament, nuclear testing and so on. But it does not reflect accurately the intention of the General Assembly, for we had specifically referred to us at the last session two particular resolutions in addition to those on general and complete disarmament, which had been dealt with earlier. I refer to the resolutions which asked us to study the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and the question of the suspension of underground tests. (A/RES/1909, 1910 (XVIII); ENDC/139). Those two resolutions were actually discussed at two meetings. In view of the fact that we have already dealt with general and complete disarmament earlier, it does seem somewhat misleading -- although I am sure this was not the intention of our co-Chairmen -- to state that the General Assembly resolutions were discussed at several meetings. Perhaps we might become a little clearer on that point.

Those are the few comments I wished to make at this stage. I make them very sincerely and trust they will not be misinterpreted. We acknowledge the efforts of our co-Chairmen and the work which went into producing the draft report. We recognize that there are difficulties in obtaining a common denominator; but at the same time we recognize, especially as we have not attained an agreement at this session, that it is absolutely necessary that our report should be factual and should reflect the negotiations as they are, that it should not in any way over-emphasize pessimism, that it should reflect the good atmosphere in which we have negotiated, and that it should also reflect the positive contributions made by various delegations to assist the two co-Chairmen to come to agreement. I trust that these comments will be taken into account before we have the final report before us.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico): (translation from Spanish): In connexion with the draft report which has been submitted to us, my delegation has unfortunately arrived at the same conclusion as the United Kingdom representative: namely, that this year will go down in history as one of the most negative in the long negotiations on disarmament, notwithstanding the cordial atmosphere which has prevailed throughout our discussions.

There is just one point I should like to mention. As all representatives are aware, the eight non-aligned countries have today submitted two documents, namely the joint memorandum on the problem of banning underground tests of nuclear weapons (ENDC/145), and the résumé of suggestions and proposals submitted to the Conference by the non-aligned countries in connexion with the different items under discussion (ENDC/144). My delegation believes that, in addition to annexing these documents to our report with a view to bringing them to the attention of the United Nations, it would be useful to make special reference to them in the body of the report itself. I trust that this suggestion will meet with the approval of our co-Chairmen and all the other members of this Committee.

Lastly, I should like to take this opportunity of thanking my colleagues for the reception they have given to the suggestions which I have put forward on behalf of my country at the various meetings. I should also like to thank the Secretariat and our competent interpreters for the co-operation they have given us at all times.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I should like in my turn, as head of the Romanian delegation to make a few brief remarks concerning the draft report (ENDC/146) and the eight Power memorandum (ENDC/144) which has been submitted to us today.

First of all, a few words concerning the session in general.

Once again, we are about to disperse without being able to record any concrete result likely to further our negotiations. That is certainly no reason for self-congratulation, nor will the General Assembly have any reason to be too well satisfied with the report submitted to it. But there is no point in disguising the facts.

Could anyone be satisfied with the position we have reached today after seven months of negotiation? I do not think so. In our opinion, the lack of all progress towards a solution of the many problems confronting us is not to the advantage of any of the parties. Quite the reverse. Efforts have no doubt been made by a number of delegations to find mutually-acceptable solutions both for the key problem of general disarmament -- the elimination of the nuclear threat -- and for the adoption of collateral measures calculated to promote an atmosphere of mutual confidence. I should like to recall very briefly the Romanian delegation's attitude to the problems confronting us.

(The Chairman, Romania)

Setting out from the equal right of all countries to international peace and security, and the need to ensure security by general and complete disarmament, my delegation, in common with the delegations of the other socialist countries, declares itself in favour of the earliest possible elimination of the principal danger -- that of a devastating nuclear war -- by removing at the earliest opportunity the very possibility of unleashing and waging such a war. It is in favour of banning the production, testing and use of nuclear weapons, of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations, which we consider as a transitional measure leading to the abolition of all military groupings, of the setting-up of denuclearized zones in which the production, testing, possession and stocking of nuclear weapons would be prohibited.

That is why Romania proposed and still proposes the setting-up of such a zone in the Balkans, why it supported and continues to support similar proposals for the creation of such zones in different parts of the world, primarily in Europe, and why it persists in its efforts to secure the adoption at the regional level of measures to improve good-neighbourly relations between European countries belonging to different social and political systems, a proposal which appears on the agenda of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In accordance with instructions from its Government, my delegation has sought to contribute towards the promotion of a working climate favourable to fruitful negotiations. We are pleased to note that such an atmosphere has again prevailed at the present session.

The Romanian delegation has supported and will continue to support any suggestion or initiative likely to promote progress towards the realization of one of man's boldest and noblest endeavours -- the transformation of a world dominated by force, in which wars are inevitable, into a world without weapons and free from wars.

We have noted with special interest the two initiatives taken by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, the first (ENDC/144) in the form of a brief summary of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation during 1964 on measures of disarmament and collateral measures discussed in our Committee with the request that it be annexed to our report as a Conference document; and the second (ENDC/145) containing an appeal to the nuclear Powers to take immediate steps towards an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests and to discontinue such tests. In our view, the suggestions and proposals put forward this year in our Committee by these eight delegations constitute a valuable contribution to our Conference.

(The Chairman, Romania)

Thus we have one more proof that possibilities still exist of finding solutions to the problems before us -- which are undoubtedly very difficult -- and of bridging the gap between the different positions, which is undoubtedly wide in many respects.

This is all the more necessary since the armaments race has continued, inflammable materials have multiplied, and one of the camps is openly preparing to increase the number of countries which, in one form or another, under one flag or another, can obtain access to nuclear weapons. That increases the danger of an accident, a miscalculation or a local conflict, setting off a nuclear conflagration that would devastate scores of countries and wipe out hundreds of millions of human lives, inflicting untold loss and suffering on humanity. That is the environment in which we live, and those are the conditions in which we must act and make progress.

The negotiations have, it is true, revealed wide differences of method and practical means of implementing disarmament. In short, they have crystallized existing divergencies still further. In a certain sense that too is of some utility, but of course that is not what we are here for. That is not what the General Assembly of the United Nations and the countries of the world in general expect from our Committee. We are convinced that, despite the wide differences which separate us, we all have a common interest to ensure peace and security, which are the sacred right of all countries. We are bound to recognize, however, that this practical, axiomatic truth continues to be disregarded. What other interpretation can be placed on the insistence of our Western partners on the adoption of measures aimed at ensuring unilateral advantages? How else can we explain the refusal to discuss seriously with a view to a rapprochement, a number of other proposals the adoption of which would have an undeniably favourable influence on the international situation?

An example is provided by the proposal concerning the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the signatories to the Warsaw Treaty. Can anyone really affirm, for instance, that an agreement reducing military budgets would in any way affect the "relative balance", the maintenance of which seems to be a matter of such concern to our Western partners? With your permission, I will give yet another example, that of denuclearized zones. In what way could a guarantee by our Western partners -- like that which the Soviet Government has declared its willingness to assume -- to respect those zones aggravate the present international situation? There can be no doubt that we have lost precious time. In our view, the conclusion which must be drawn is that if in future we renounce any attempt to inflict a defeat on our negotiating partner, the task assigned to the Committee can be fulfilled.

(The Chairman, Romania)

The report to be submitted by our Committee to the General Assembly will, we hope, give all the Members of the United Nations an idea of the efforts we have made here during more than seven months of negotiations. We are sure that, as in the past, we shall have the benefit of suggestions and indications which the General Assembly may deem it necessary to transmit to our Committee. Meanwhile, it is absolutely essential that all countries -- and here special responsibility devolves upon the great Powers -- should refrain from any action likely to complicate still further, if not compromise, the solution of the disarmament problem. In the first place it is necessary, in our opinion, to renounce for ever any attempt to find a military solution to international problems which -- the facts are there to prove it -- can only be resolved through negotiation, taking into account the sovereign equality of all countries.

I should not like to close without expressing my delegation's thanks to our co-Chairmen and to all our colleagues, to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Protitch, and his Deputy Mr. Epstein, to the staff of the Secretariat of the Conference, the interpreters, typists, conference-room officers -- in short, to all who by their devoted and efficient work have created favourable conditions for the performance of our tasks.

If no one else wishes to speak, I shall read the following communication from our co-Chairmen:

"The two co-Chairmen ask the Chairman to announce that they will meet before the next meeting of the Committee in order to consider the comments which have been made on the report today by different delegations."

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): I am glad that the co-Chairmen intend to meet in order to consider our views. We expect that the revised report will reflect the ideas expressed by the representatives who have spoken this morning.

We do not, of course, have to rush away. Our decision to adjourn on Thursday, 17 September, is not irrevocable. If the co-Chairmen can produce before Thursday a revised draft report which will meet the requirements of the various delegations, so much the better. We wish to see the text and study it carefully before deciding whether our delegation can subscribe to it.

As the co-Chairmen point out in the last paragraph of the report:

"This report is submitted by the co-Chairmen [to the United Nations] on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament."

(ENDC/146, p.5)

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

Members of the Committee who feel strongly about certain points or have observations to make must either subscribe to the report or make reservations about it; in the latter case, the reservations should be included in the report itself.

I submit those views only to facilitate the work of the co-Chairmen. Perhaps the Committee could meet before Thursday. If it cannot, my delegation would be perfectly agreeable to an extension of this session to an indefinite date until we have a satisfactory report.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I think that the co-Chairmen have taken note of the objection of the representative of Nigeria.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 216th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador V. Dumitrescu, representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Ethiopia, the United Kingdom, Poland, Canada, India, Italy, Nigeria, Mexico and Romania.

"The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic submitted memoranda containing a summary of suggestions and proposals submitted by them during 1964 on disarmament measures and collateral measures discussed^{1/}, as well as a joint memorandum^{2/} on the question of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 17 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

1/ ENDC/144

2/ ENDC/145