CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 8 June 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO
	Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
	Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Bulgaria:	Mr. M. TARABANOV
	Mr. N. MINTCHEV
	Mr. G. GUELEV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Burma:	Mr. J. BARRINGTON
	U Aye LWIN
Canada:	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
	Mr. J.E.F. HARDY
	Mr. J.F.M. BELL
	Mr. R.M. TAIT
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. J. HAJEK
	Mr. M. ZEMLA
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. V. TYLNER
Ethiopia:	Mr. M. HAMID
	Mr. A. MANDEFRO
India:	Mr. A.S. LALL
	Mr. A.S. MEHTA
	Mr. K.K. RAO
	Mr. G.D. COMMAR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:	Mr.F. CAVELLETTI
	Mr A. CAGIATI
	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
	Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mexico:	Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
	Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ
Nigeria:	Mr. A.A. ATTA
	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
Poland:	Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
	Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
	Mr. M. BIEN
	Mr. J. SLAWINSKI
Romania:	Mr. G. MACOVESCU
	Mr. C. SANDRU
	Mr. E. GLASER
	Mr. O. NEDA
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Baron C.H. von PLATEN
	Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. V.A. ZORIN
	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
	Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:	Mr. A.F. HASSAN
	Mr. M.S. AHMED
	Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID
United Kingdom:	Mr. J.B. GODBER
	Sir Michael WRIGHT
	Mr. D.N. BRINSON
United States of America:	Mr. A.H. DEAN
	Mr. C.C. STELLE
	Mr. D. MARK
	Mr. R.A. MARTIN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. O. LOUTFI
Deputy to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the fifty-second plenary meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Ever since the second plenary meeting of this Conference the seventeen delegations sitting round this table have devoted countless hours of effort to the discussion of the problems involved in arriving at an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Even more energy has been expended by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, not only in their attempts to draft an acceptable and workable nuclear test ban treaty but also in the deliberations of the Sub-Committee which the Eighteen Nation Committee has established to deal solely with this very urgent question.

It is unfortunate, indeed tragic, that, in spite of all this, we do not appear to be at all closer to the conclusion of a mutually acceptable treaty than we were on 14 March last. We are no closer to the conclusion of an agreement, despite the offer of the United Kingdom and the United States to sign their draft treaty of 18 April 1961, with the numerous amendments which they proposed in an effort to meet the requirements of the Soviet Union, and despite the submission to this Conference of the most useful joint memorandum by the eight new members. There is not one Government among those represented at this Conference which has not spoken out strongly in favour of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. Both since this Conference began and for many years preceding it, statesmen the world over and religious leaders have been recounting the irrefutable arguments in favour of ending nuclear testing in all environments.

They have decried the impetus which testing gives to the arms race in general. They have noticed the increase in world tensions caused thereby. They have spoken of the urgent need to take a first concrete step on the road to co-operation between the East and West on disarmament issues. Nevertheless, despite these enormous efforts and the enormous goodwill involved, to this very day no agreement has been reached on a nuclear test ban treaty. That is the problem we confront.

Our Soviet colleagues, Mr. Zorin and Mr. Tsarapkin, have a very simple, indeed a pat, explanation for the absence of agreement. In their view of world affairs, the origin of all the trouble is the terrible capitalists in the United States who, allegedly, are striving to keep the arms race and world tension at fever pitch lest their wealth and world power be destroyed by agreements on a test ban and general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Nothing could be further from the truth. This is a line undoubtedly calculated to impress those without access to free news media, but I submit that it is hardly likely to influence the informed public, to say nothing of our many colleagues here. I would call it pure fantasy, but it has nevertheless been raised to the level of State policy in the Soviet Union. It must seem ludicrous to anyone who knows the facts of international life, and especially to those of us here who have followed the steps taken by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to facilitate a sound nuclear test ban agreement, and who on the other side have not forgotten the decision taken by the Soviet Union during the last days of August 1961. Indeed, that decision was taken while we were negotiating on a nuclear test ban agreement in this very Palais, on the very afternoon when we had proposed that the treaty include all tests, thinking that we had thereby met all the requirements which the Soviet Union itself had described as essential for the achievement of a nuclear test ban treaty. Nevertheless, on that very night, the Soviet Union announced that it was resuming nuclear tests -- tests which, as far as we know, had not been carried out for some thirty-four months.

Merely to reject the simplistic explanations offered by the Soviet Union is not, as I am quite well aware, to provide a fruitful answer to the why's and wherefore's of the absence of a test ban treaty, and I believe we owe it to ourselves to seek to understand why we do not at present have the nuclear test ban agreement that we all want.

If I had to suggest the key factor as to why we do not have an agreement, I would use two short words -- national security. Each nuclear side has, I suppose, carefully considered the political factors involved in a nuclear test ban treaty -- certainly my Government never forgets them -- but each side has nevertheless come to believe that one or another aspect of its national or military security prevents the conclusion of a test ban treaty on terms acceptable to the other side because it has an importance which over-rides the political motivations toward a nuclear test ban treaty.

We in the West are determined to get a nuclear test ban treaty but we quite frankly acknowledge this factor of national security. We admit that the problem of national security is a very potent factor. I do not think our work will be advanced if we tend to paper it over or try to forget it. We frankly believe that neither a

(Mr. Dean, United States)

nuclear test ban treaty nor any other measure of general and complete disarmament will be possible until the concerns of each of us on this score is satisfied in a reasonable way. I think all of us would agree that it would not do us a great deal of good to work out, and indeed to sign, a nuclear test ban treaty unless each of us was honestly satisfied in his heart that that treaty made adequate and effective arrangements for control over the fulfilment of the obligations of all parties to the treaty.

One of the essential elements in the drafting and carrying out of any nuclear test ban treaty is for the parties to believe that its provisions will work, for them to have reasonable confidence that if they themselves do not test other people will not test, or else that the machinery of the treaty will pick up clandestine tests and subject the erring party to the provisions of the treaty.

Let me be very clear. My Government and the United Kingdom Government have already submitted a draft of a nuclear test ban treaty which we are prepared to sign. We also have an open mind about the provisions of that treaty. But the United States Government is also firmly convinced that the national security of not only the United States but also of the free world would be gravely endangered if it entered into any nuclear test ban treaty without satisfactory, workable and adequate assurances that if the Soviet Union -- that is, the other side -- attempted to conduct a secret nuclear test it would run a serious risk of being discovered as a violator of the treaty.

An enormous number of statements have been made about the advances in detection and identification capabilities, but the fact is -- and this is unfortunate -- that those who are familiar with this problem and who are working constantly in this field state that very little advance in scientific knowledge in this area has been made, despite the fact that my own Government has been spending enormous sums of money in an effort to advance this scientific knowledge.

In the present state of scientific knowledge, it is only through the application of appropriate and effective international controls that a party which signed the treaty and did not itself test could have the necessary assurances that any violations by the other side would immediately come to light.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

For its part the Soviet Union professes not to be worried by this side of the problem, and it is quite possible that Soviet equanimity on this score is genuine. I say this because the uncensored and free United States press, radio and television and the unfettered movement of United States citizens are powerful independent forces which monitor the activities of the United States Government and which would therefore be quite likely to find out about and to publish the news of any illegal tests, or indeed illegal preparations, that the United States might be trying to carry out.

Therefore, I submit, the Soviet preoccupation is of quite a different order. We have tried to meet that preoccupation in the proposal for progressive zonal inspection that we have included in the outline treaty on general and complete disarmament that we have submitted to this Committee. We have apparently been unsuccessful so far, because the Soviet Union believes that any international control arrangements, as distinct from national control arrangements, would open the door to Western espionage and would thereby endager the maintenance of the very high degree of secrecy on all military matters which the Soviet Government seems to regard as a great national asset.

It so happens that I do not agree entirely either with the Soviet evaluation of the possibilities of espionage in the international control system which we have proposed -- for we have done everything possible to ensure that there could be no espionage -- or with the apparent Soviet concept of just how much secrecy the Soviet Union does enjoy in this modern world. I imagine that neither of our countries is keeping very much secret from the rest of the world. Nevertheless I do recognise that this question of espionage does appear to worry the Soviet Union a great deal, and that it has proved to be a tremendous stumbling block in our negotiations. No matter how far we go or how creative we try to be on this subject of control, we are always brought back by our Soviet colleagues to this question; no matter what we propose they seem to believe that we are proposing it for purposes of espionage.

This is not the only manner in which the Soviet Government's concept of its own national security has jeopardised a nuclear test ban treaty. When we resumed negotiations in the test ban Conference here on 14 March 1961 we made an honest and sincere effort to meet all of the points which the Soviet Union had said were necessary for a nuclear test ban treaty. During the negotiations, we made still other advances to meet the Soviet position -- in particular, to make the treaty

(Mr. Dean, United States)

apply to tests in all environments and to remove the so-called threshold on underground tests. However, during the course of our negotiations in the spring and summer of 1961 it became evident that at some point during 1961 the Soviet Union had become dissatisfied with its own nuclear arsenal -- at least, in relation to the Western nuclear arsenal -- and had decided that it had to conduct further nuclear development tests, no matter what the cost and despite the real advance that we had made by that time towards an effective nuclear test ban treaty.

As I said, while we were negotiating in this very building -- indeed, in the evening of the very day when we had made several further major advances to meet the Soviet ideas -- we learned, after we had left the Palais des Nations that the Soviet Union had decided to test. Then we experienced the whole series of tests conducted by the Soviet Union last autumn.

It seems apparent from statements made by Mr. Krushchev and Mr. Gromyko that that round of tests, from September through November last year, huge as it was, was not sufficient to satisfy Soviet security requirements, as the Soviet Government sees these requirements. Of course, this may be speculation on my part. Whether or not the Soviet Union plans to have an additional round of tests, as its spokesmen have clearly stated they intend to do, I do not pretend to know. But we are still confronted by this Soviet fear of espionage, which may be very real and is undoubtedly a major factor which we must recognize, with which we must contend and which we must undoubtedly overcome in any nuclear test ban treaty and general and complete disarmament treaty that we expect the Soviet Union to accept.

I am not arguing whether this fear of espionage should exist or not; I am simply stating that it does exist and that we must take it into consideration in our negotiations.

It also seems to me axiomatic that no agreement will be possible that does not take into account the other reasonable worries and concerns of each nuclear side, in addition to this fear of espionage. The United States recognises this and in its various drafts has done its best to meet the Soviet views on this point. But we must all recognize that these Soviet preoccupations with secrecy and espionage, and the fear of foreigners setting foot on the soil of Mother Russia, were not born in 1961 but are in some ways as old as the Soviet State; of course they have been dominant elements in Soviet motivation for the last fifteen years. Thus, although we believe

(Mr. Dean, United States)

that an effective nuclear test ban treaty must contain scientifically adequate arrangements for effective control over both nuclear tests and disarmament measures, we have an open mind. As our Soviet Union colleagues know we have been quite willing to sit down with them and explore these problems, and to try to solve them by working together on a mutually satisfactory basis.

I have gone over all this because I do not think we should forget that these national security problems and worries of the United States and the Soviet Union were very much in existence in 1958 when, after correspondence between Marshal Bulganin and President Eisenhower, serious negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty began in Geneva in October of that year. The verbatim records of those negotiations show that those problems were never far from the thoughts of the Eastern and Western scientists who assembled in Geneva in July 1958 to seek agreement on a technical framework within which satisfactory political negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty could be carried on.

Everyone here is well aware of the experts' report of 20 August 1958, but I suppose there are very few sitting at this table -- other than our United Kingdom and Soviet colleagues -- who have actually read all the verbatim records of the experts' meetings. However, they are all available and a perusal of them will show that the experts' report itself was a compromise document on many matters, such as, for example, on the number of control posts which would be requiredin the global network; on the threshold levels of effective detection and identification of seismic events; on the arrangements for aircraft sampling flights; on the standardization of equipment in the control posts, and so forth.

As I have said, the experts who met in Geneva in 1958 knew all about the announcements which each nuclear side had been making for some years about tests conducted by the other side, and they were well aware of the capabilities of existing detection networks. As I said earlier this morning, I have for several years been spending a great deal of time with experts in this field, going over all the data, talking to them about these questions, trying to get their advice on these matters, asking them to make further explorations and to get in touch with scientists all over the world. It has been part of my job to try to keep myself informed of scientific advances in this field -- and, as I said earlier, there is apparently a great deal of misinformation about these matters.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Unless important new, and as yet undisclosed, scientific advances in this field have been made since 1958 there is absolutely no basis for thinking that the technical aspects of control are now any less difficult to handle than they appeared to be to the experts in 1958. If any representative wishes me to support that statement with data I shall be most happy to do so.

Moreover, it is a fact that the United Kingdom, Soviet and United States Governments all approved the conclusions of the experts on these questions in 1958; and, what is even more important, they also approved the recommendations -- that is, the compromise recommendations of the experts -- for an international control system. So it was that we obtained a basis for negotiation on a nuclear test ban and were on our way to working out a treaty.

The 1958 experts' report was not easily arrived at. It was probably not a perfect document. Like all compromises it was not entirely satisfactory to both sides. But it was a foundation for what we hoped would be sound and effective political discussions and it did represent an enormous amount of detailed work, thought and compromise. I do not wish to labour this point, but a tremendous amount of thought, work, compromise, and scientific endeavour went into the drafting of this experts' report. Therefore, I do not believe it is possible, at least for the United Kingdom and the United States Governments, to take a detached historical view, as though we were men from some other century, of the true significance of the Soviet Government's action on 28 November 1961 in ripping to shreds and officially repudiating this arduously negotiated basis for test ban negotiations, in the course of which our two Governments had made honest and sincere attempts to meet the so-called "check list", or "veto list" of the Soviet Government. We have made some fifteen or sixteen advances in very important fields in an effort to meet the Soviet point of view. It has been said here that we were negotiating from extreme positions, but I submit that that is not correct. The United Kingdom and United States Governments made many, many advances, on the basis of the statements of the Soviet Government itself that if we did so it would accept the treaty.

So one side made these advances and then the other side would not accept them. I submit that this shows that we were not negotiating from extreme positions. I do not believe we can overlook that fact. I do not believe that to say that we were

(Mr. Dean, United States)

negotiating from extreme positions will help us in our work of drafting a nuclear test ban treaty. I for one -- perhaps I am terribly naive -- still think we are going to get a nuclear test ban treaty, and I am going to continue to work for such a treaty.

I do not believe that we can content ourselves with saying that the action taken by the Soviet Government on 28 November 1961 has become a fait accompli and that we had better forget about it, and about our work of three years; and that we have to accept the fact that there is a new situation in the world and must go on from there, pick up the pieces and try again. As I have said, we are going to go on, we are not going to give up in our attempts to get a nuclear test ban treaty. I want it to be clear that my Government has an open mind and is open to conviction on this subject. But I would be less than frank if I did not say that there are some limits to the possibility of compromise. There is a point where going further in accommodation does not really advance one, because one will only get an agreement which one knows in advance will not work and from which there cannot spring that degree of national confidence which is the basis of all successful agreements.

I think our United Kingdom colleague, at one of our early meetings, asked the other representatives here to translate this Soviet step on 28 November 1961, when it repudiated our nuclear test ban treaty, into terms more familiar to our own Conference on general and complete disarmament. He asked: what would we think if either the United States or the Soviet Union suddenly announced that it repudiated the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961, which was later unanimously approved by the General Assembly? What would be the reaction -- indeed, what would be the outcry -- from our Conference here? Would we say that this was a fait accompli which we had to recognize? I do not think so. I think we would say that general and complete disarmament remained a vital and a fundamental objective and that we had to keep on trying. That, I think, would be fair enough. But what would be the state of confidence among the participating States and what would be the prospects of early success?

I must say in all frankness that it was not easy to persuade a good many of the people concerned with the drafting of this treaty in our country to permit us to go forward with these sixteen or so advances that we made. It took an enormous amount of work and effort. We had to tell these people that if we had this authority we thought we could get a treaty. When this rejection by the Soviet Union came on 28 November 1961, it was not easy to restore the situation that had existed when the authority to make all these advances had been given.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I go into these matters because I think it is essential that we appreciate now the situation which prevailed at the end of 1961 and which, unfortunately, had not changed when this Conference began here in March. The experts' report, with all its built-in compromises, has been repudiated by the Soviet Union, and the seventeen articles and the two annexes of the nuclear test ban treaty on which both sides had reached agreement in these negotiations have been thrown overboard by the Soviet Union. All the United Kingdom and United States compromises, reached at great effort in 1961, have been spurned by the Soviet Union. All of the painstaking efforts which the Western Powers had made to develop detailed treaty language to ensure that the control arrangements could never be misused for espionage in the Soviet Union -- and I urge members to read in our White Paper the numerous steps that we took to try to make it clear that the control system could not be used for espionage purposes -- were abruptly dismissed by Soviet spokesmen, who suddenly began, despite our patient negotiations, to make sweeping and unsupported charges about the danger of espionage. Then, to top it all, while we were negotiating here and when each of us had agreed that we would not test while the negotiations were going on, the Soviet Union carried out its own series of tests.

We are quite prepared to do our best to continue these nuclear test ban negotiations. We are quite prepared to do everything that we reasonably can do to work with our Soviet colleagues and to get them to change their minds. But I submit that one cannot have all the "give" on the Western side and a demand on the Soviet side that the West should accommodate itself completely to the national security preoccupations of the Soviet Union, when they are not willing to grant even the slightest consideration to the national security concerns which the United Kingdom and the United States feel must be met by essential control measures -- not political control measures but measures approved by scientists. We have not lost in any respect our desire for a nuclear test ban treaty, or our belief that its accomplishment is overwhelmingly important. We are anxious to negotiate and sign such a treaty. We were ready last year and still are ready to hold back any further nuclear tests of our own once an effective nuclear test ban treaty had been entered into and come into force.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

At our Conference here on 16 April the eight delegations which this year joined the disarmament deliberations submitted their joint memorandum with suggestions for overcoming the apparent impasse in negotiations on a test ban treaty. We welcomed this memorandum, and we still do. The Soviet Union, for its part, purported to accept this document as the basis for further negotiations. The Western Powers announced that they were willing to accept it as one of the bases for future negotiations, and indeed we have used it a great deal. We have endeavoured to explore what possibilities for sound and reasonable agreement might lie within the ideas put forth by the eight co-sponsors. At many meetings we have done our best to use this memorandum as a basis for going forward. We would be prepared to use not only this memorandum but any other reasonable proposal as a future basis for negotiations, always within the general outlines of what I have just said about this problem of national security.

I do not wish to delay the Committee this morning by going again into all the matters that have been examined in the nuclear Sub-Committee. The verbatim records are available, and I know that all members have read them. However, I would like very briefly to summarize some of the conclusions which the United Kingdom and the United States delegations have reached on the Soviet attitude towards this very useful eight-Power memorandum.

We have taken the joint memorandum in the spirit in which we believed it was offered, that is, as a suggestion for a further compromise between the Western compromise positions of 1958, 1959, 1960 and 1961 and the new, extreme Soviet position of 28 November last. We have recognized, therefore, that the joint memorandum involves something different from prior Western proposals. The verbatim records of the Sub-Committee will show that we have spelled out these differences, which concern the use of national detection systems, reduced responsibilities for the international control organ, and restricted arrangements for obligatory on-site inspections under certain circumstances. On the other hand, the Soviet delegation, while paying some lip-service to the compromise nature of the joint memorandum, has in fact unilaterally interpreted that memorandum to the point where it has made it almost a carbon copy of the Soviet position of 28 November 1961 in all essential substantive respects.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

For example, in the Soviet view it will somehow still be a compromise if only existing national detection stations are used and if these are not in any way tied together, standardized and co-ordinated by the international scientific commission. It seems to us that it will also be a somewhat meaningless compromise if the country where a suspicious event has been recorded always has the complete option of deciding whether or not to invite an on-site inspection to take place on its territory. Not very much confidence can be engendered if the right to inspect is 100 per cent on the basis of invitation. As far as control purposes are concerned, such an arrangement by invitation would amount to no inspection at all in those instances where inspection could really be vital, namely, in those cases where a State might actually be trying to conceal a clandestine nuclear detonation conducted in violation of a treaty. It is no wonder, therefore, that the joint memorandum, by the terms of paragraphs 4 and 5, did not leave matters on any such basis of invitation but, indeed, introduced elements of obligations.

I shall not press my views on these matters further at this point. But it seems to us that the Soviet Union is apparently still so preoccupied with its concern for secrecy and with its fear of espionage that it has allowed this factor to colour its every action concerning the eight-nation plan. Their whole method of negotiation -- if one could call it "negotiation" -- in the Sub-Committee is to say that they have their own interpretation of the eight-nation memorandum and that until we adopt their interpretation there can be no further progress. In other words, the Soviet Government would now like to be rewarded for its resumption of testing last September and for its repudiation last November of all past agreements. It is asking that the Western Powers completely surrender every principle concerning a test ban treaty and international control arrangements for such a treaty which are reasonable, sensible and justified.

I have said that we are quite prepared to negotiate in a reasonable manner and on the basis of the eight-Power memorandum, but we are not prepared to have every sound principle repudiated, and then to have to go forward on that basis with the negotiations.

In the light of this record, it is hardly surprising that the Soviet delegation is anxious to divert attention as much as possible from its own record in these test ban negotiations by dragging in extraneous matters. It completely

(Mr. Dean, United States)

ignores the fact that it violated the moratorium and started tests last September. It completely overlooks the fact that it ignored the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, which was proposed by the Swedish delegation, about detonating the 50-megaton bomb, and that it actually carried out tests in all four environments; in fact, some of these tests were carried out at very high altitudes.

Naturally I recognize that, as we are one of the parties that has been trying to negotiate this test ban treaty for some three years, our reaction is probably different from that of other delegations. Each and every member of this Committee that is not a nuclear Power or is not involved in the negotiations has every right to feel a deep concern about the lack of a test ban treaty and about the continuation of nuclear testing in the world. We share these anxieties. I have put this record before the Conference in order to indicate how we feel about these negotiations. With respect to our own tests, we have examined the factors involved in every test with the greatest care and scientific objectivity and we are confident that we have done everything possible to reduce the danger to mankind. But, as I say, we should much prefer to have a treaty and to stop these tests. Getting such a treaty is the only sound answer to nuclear testing. However, I believe that in order to get on with this question we have to give proper recognition to the problems that confront us in these negotiations.

I submit that the primary requisite for success in these nuclear test ban negotiations is to obtain the co-operation of the Soviet Union. We can only hope that there will awaken in the Soviet Union a sense of responsibility in these matters which will permit us to bring our labours to some fruitful conclusion. I personally think that the obtaining of an adequate and effective nuclear test ban treaty falls within the field of disarmament; there have been many statements that it does not and I do not want to dwell on that question now. But it seems to me that the conclusion of a test ban treaty would be of great significance to the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and I think it would give the world great cause for joy. So we very much hope for a change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union on this question. For our part, we are prepared to continue to negotiate and to continue to explore this matter in every reasonable way that we know of, because it is still the desire of both the United Kingdom and the United States to obtain a nuclear test ban treaty which would effectively stop all tests in all environments for all time.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have just listened to a one-hour statement by the United States representative. I must frankly confess that it made a gloomy impression on us. Although he said at its end that the United States is prepared to continue negotiations and even to conclude an agreement, it showed as a whole quite clearly that the United States merely wishes to talk and does not want any kind of agreement. This was quite apparent from everything the United States representative said today. He touched in fact upon many questions. He referred to the course of negotiations since 1958, the many concessions made by the United States, the general problems of national security, espionage, his thoughts and speculations; but curiously enough he said practically nothing about the eight power memorandum - though he called it very useful. In his statement he pointed out that the United States had used this memorandum in the negotiations. He also said that the United States and the United Kingdom had used it as a basis for going forward; but strange as it may seem he did not speak of it as a basis put forward for overcoming the impasse in the negotiations, which is by no means merely apparent, as he stated, but real. It was only a side issue in the background of the United States representative's statement. And that was no accident. Precisely because the United States and the United Kingdom do not want an agreement, they reject that sole existing basis for an agreement, the basis put forward by the eight non-aligned States.

The whole of the United States representative's speech clearly showed that the United States adheres to the old positions and insists that an agreement shall be concluded on its own terms. And when the United States representative said today that the Soviet Union wishes to deflect attention from its sins, I immediately realized the point of his statement. I believe that its basic political motive is precisely to distract the attention of the Committee from the really urgent problems facing us today, which are connected with the new nuclear arms race which the United States has now started and already extended into outer space.

On what basis can agreement really be reached, and why has the eight-nation memorandum not become the real basis of the negotiations? One who does not desire to conclude an agreement will of course avoid answering this question. But the United States says that it wants to conclude an agreement. Why then does it evade the question which is fundamental to the present conditions? We last discussed discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests on 9 May - a month ago. May I remind you what I said at the very end of our discussion?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"But an agreement cannot be achieved without settling the main questions of principle. That is quite clear. There can be no agreement that excludes the main questions. Such a treaty is impossible. Therefore, it is necessary at the outset to reach agreement on the main questions, and there are three. In regard to these three questions there is a clear answer in the memorandum. Be so good, Western Powers, as to give us a clear and precise answer: Are you prepared to accept what is formulated and expressed in the eight-Power memorandum in regard to these three main questions, or do you want to interpret all this in your own way?" (ENDC/PV.34, p.51)

At the conclusion of my speech I said:

"I want to be frank, so that there may be no illusions, and from what I have said it is perfectly clear that the Soviet Union takes its stand on the memorandum. It accepts the principles of the memorandum as they are stated, and we want the Western Powers also to take their stand on the memorandum and accept the principles contained in this memorandum in regard to the main questions, as they are stated. If the Western Powers agree to this, we are prepared to carry on negotiations with them on the draft treaty itself. If you still try to lead us in a different direction, if you still try to give your own interpretations and demand that we agree with these interpretations, if you insist on your old positions, then we tell you that such negotiations will be useless. We shall not agree to this, and there can be no agreement on this basis.

As a result of today's discussion we should have a clear idea of the prospects for our future negotiations. The Western Powers must adopt, in regard to the main questions, the position set forth in the memorandum as it stands, and then on this basis we can speedily reach agreement on all the specific matters of detail which arise out of the solution of these main questions. This is our position." (ibid., pp.51, 52)

I said this on 9 May. Since then a month has passed. Anyone reading the verbatim records carefully will see that in fact the Western Powers continue to pull in their own direction.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

This has just been confirmed in the statement of the United States representative. This was the whole point of his statement. There will be agreement if you accept our positions which we stated on 18 April 1961; without this there will be no agreement, and we will go on exploding nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underground under water and in outer space. That is the meaning of the present United States position.

The United Kingdom representative at the last meeting of the Sub-Committee on 6 June tried to make out that between the attitudes of the Soviet Union and of the Western Powers to the eight-power memorandum there was only an apparent difference. He even asserted that in the discussions since 16 April the eight-nation memorandum had been the only basis of the negotiations (ENDC/SC.1/PV.20, p.4). Mr. Dean just now stated something of the same kind. As evidence that the West adopted the eight-power memorandum, Mr. Godber said that the Western representatives had spoken on each of the three questions in the memorandum - the system of control posts, the international commission, and inspection.

According to Mr. Godber, the Western representatives had tried to fill the gaps in the memorandum. The first gap to be filled by the Western delegations related to control posts. How did they do this?

Mr. Godber referred to what he called the fully-argued statement of the United States representative at the sixteenth meeting on 22 May. He added modestly that Mr. Dean had submitted an opinion on the ideas contained in the memorandum with regard to the detection system. What opinion did Mr. Dean advance? He stated categorically that the system of control posts must be international, though paragraph 3 of the memorandum speaks of existing national networks of observation posts.

At the sixteenth meeting, to which the United Kingdom representative referred, Mr. Dean said:

> "Nothing could be clearer than that this system is to consist of some inter-relation of many national networks. In other words, we are to have a multi-national system, by agreement among several nations, and that inevitably means an international system." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.16, p.11)

He went on to say:

> " ... When the eight-nation plan speaks of an agreed system of national networks of existing observation posts, it is addressing itself to an international system ...". (ibid., p.12)

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

This is the way the gaps in the memorandum are filled, as Mr. Godber puts it. An international network appears in place of a national network; the one is substituted for the other; and this is called proof of the desire to conduct negotiations on the basis of the memorandum.

How is the gap filled with regard to the commission of scientists? At the twentieth meeting, at which what might be called a balance sheet of all the Sub-Committee's work was drawn up, Mr. Godber referred (ENDC/SC.1/PV.20, p.5) to Mr. Dean's statement at the twelfth meeting. Let us look at Mr. Dean's statement.

First of all he concluded (ibid., p.7) that the memorandum was somewhat indefinite. He then added that apparently its sponsors wished to leave the three nuclear Powers to devise the structure of the commission of scientists, which he then proceeded to do. What was the structure he devised? It was a complex structure of a commission with wide administrative functions, recruiting personnel for control posts, with a large staff and a single administrator taking decisions on obligatory inspection. He stressed that the launching of an on-site inspection, if decided by the Commission, "... must be obligatory on the parties in certain circumstances ..." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.12, p.9)

He repeated this today when he pointed out that there is no compromise if a country always has the right to decide whether or not to invite an on-site inspection (supra, p. 15). But this means that the United States delegation, and also the United Kingdom delegation, reject the proposal in the memorandum on any inspection by invitation. But this is an exact copy of what was proposed in the draft of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9).

At the twelfth meeting of the Sub-Committee, Mr. Dean concluded that this commission and all its functions resemble what was discussed earlier, as he put it, and so it really is. I venture to quote from the statement he made at the twelfth meeting:

> " ... The international commission would certainly have major duties in the co-ordination of world-wide recording facilities in different countries and in establishing standards and procedures for reporting and recording operations on a global basis.
>
> All this would entail the use of a fairly sizeable staff and would make necessary the adoption of a formal organizational scheme for the allocation of staff members to appropriate sections and divisions. Undoubtedly it

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

would also be necessary to appoint one official to represent the commission in managing the staff and in making sure that the staff capably performed its assigned functions.

It may seem to my colleagues that the description which I have given of the institutions that would have to be established under the eight-nation plan resembles in certain respects the central headquarters which was discussed during most of the meetings of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. To a certain extent this is true." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.12, p.10)

This was Mr. Dean's conclusion in his statement at the twelfth meeting. In other words, the Commission's whole scheme, work and functions are the very scheme proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom on 18 April 1961: an administrator, a large staff, appointment of foreign staff to control posts, obligator decision on inspection, no decisions by agreement, and so forth. Of the commission of scientists proposed in the eight-Power memorandum practically nothing is left. In its place appears the old international commission from the Western plan of 18 April 1961. And this is what Mr. Godber calls negotiations on the basis of the eight-Power memorandum. Actually it is a substitution of the old one-sided Western position for the compromise position of the eight Powers.

Let us see how the inspection gap has been filled. As a specimen of this work, Mr. Godber advanced Mr. Dean's statement made at the eleventh meeting on 26 April, and his own made at the fifteenth meeting on 18 May. How did Mr. Dean tackle these gaps? On 26 April he was very eloquent. Inspections by invitation he termed 'meaningless arrangements' (ENDC/SC.I/PV.11, p.6). And later he started to interpret the memorandum. According to Mr. Dean, certain facts can be obtained solely through an on-site inspection, and parties "have an obligation to permit the inspection". (ibid., p.10)

The verbatim record states:

"In these circumstances, the party would have an obligation to permit the inspection by the commission to be carried out.

The conclusion which my delegation has thus reached from reading the eight-nation memorandum is that every party to a test ban treaty would, in the last resort, be obliged to permit the carrying out of an on-site inspection on its territory..." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.11, pp. 10, 11)

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

This is the conclusion Mr. Dean says he has reached on the basis of the memorandum. Thus the gap has been filled by the re-entry on the scene of the previous United States demand for obligatory inspection. Thus Mr. Dean calls meaningless the inspection by invitation with which the memorandum deals, and insists on obligatory inspection. Mr. Godber confirmed this on 29 May, saying:

> "As far as the question of inspection is concerned, we continue to think that the parties to the treaty should be obliged to accept on-site inspection if the international commission is unable to determine the nature of a detected event without on-site inspection: in other words a 'suspicious and significant event', in the words of the memorandum." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.18, p.16).

Thus on all the basic questions, the substance of the memorandum, we see the same tactics: formal acceptance as a basis, and even discussion; but in fact verbal gymnastics to emasculate the memorandum, remove from it the proposed compromise, and insert instead the old one-sided Western demands which in fact made agreement impossible. The conclusion drawn by the Soviet delegation at the last debate on tests at the thirty-fourth meeting of the Committee held on 9 May, which I read out at the beginning (supra, p. 18), remains completely valid. To make agreement possible the Western Powers must straightforwardly and honestly accept the eight-Power memorandum and not turn it inside out to suit themselves. The Soviet Union has really accepted the eight-Power memorandum as a basis for negotiations. It has adopted the new compromise position.

First, whereas in the previous position of the Soviet Union - I mean the proposal of 28 November, to which Mr. Dean has frequently referred - there was no question of creating any international body, we have now, by accepting the proposal of the non-aligned countries, agreed to the creation of an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with the appropriate staff.

Secondly, whereas on 28 November 1961 the Soviet Union objected to any kind of on-site inspections, now by accepting the proposals of the non-aligned countries we agree that inspection is admissible under the conditions and procedure provided in the memorandum of the eight neutralist countries: that is to say, by invitation of the States parties to the agreement.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Thirdly, the Soviet Union considers, like the non-aligned countries, that the basic means of control over an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests must be national detection systems. Incidentally Mr. Dean, when he spoke today of the sins of the Soviet Union, for some reason did not even mention the declarations of Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan of 3 September 1961, in which both statesmen publicly stated to the whole world that they considered the existing national detection systems adequate for all nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. For some reason the United States now passes this over in utter silence. Experience of monitoring nuclear explosions has shown that these systems, no matter in what environment the explosions are carried out - underground, under water, in the atmosphere or in outer space - have been proved reliable and effective.

I will not repeat again the arguments supporting this conclusion. They have been expounded both at meetings of this Committee and in the Sub-Committee. Moreover, we have stated that we have no objection to the establishment of new seismic stations provided that they form part of a national detection system. With regard to technical requirements, about which the United States representative spoke at length today, I should like to refer to the authoritative statement by Professor Leet of the United States, professor of geology at Harvard University and one of the world's greatest experts in seismology, who clearly stated in the weekly "National Guardian" of 9 April that the Government - that is to say, the Government of the United States - might merely be seeking a pretext to demand inspection in Russia, but was not entitled to justify itself by seismology. This is what the leading United States seismologist, Professor Leet, said. So you had better not refer to seismology and technology, Mr. Dean. The key is not there, but in the policy of the United States Government.

Further, the Soviet Union agrees to the proposal of the non-aligned countries for the establishment of an international commission to process and analyze data received from national observation posts, the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event which may take place on the territory of parties to the agreement. The Soviet Union has moreover agreed that all States should co-operate with this international commission, furnish it with data from their observation posts, reply to its enquiries, supply it with additional information, consult with it concerning further measures of clarification to assess the nature of any particular suspicious event, and so forth.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

States parties to the agreement could invite the Commission to visit their territory or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt. All this is contained in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries, and ensures perfectly adequate control over the implementation of the agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. But in the memorandum, as everyone can see, nothing is said about obligatory inspection or the setting-up of an extensive international control system headed by a control commission possessing wide administrative powers and the right to dispatch its agents to sites in order to control and inspect the operation of national detection systems, to dispatch on-site inspection teams at its discretion, and so forth. This is all a complete fabrication of the United States and the United Kingdom, which interpret this memorandum in their own way.

This is the sum total of the discussions in the Sub-Committee. The Western Powers' position is that they do not really accept the eight-Power memorandum as a basis for negotiations and agreement. They are attempting to replace it with their old proposals of 18 April 1961. The Soviet Union has accepted the new compromise position of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States as basis for negotiations and agreement.

That is the position today. Yet the question still arises why the Western Powers only pretend to negotiate and do not start genuine negotiations on the new compromise basis of the eight-power memorandum. Mr. Dean tried to answer this question today, but did not do so. He spoke of the technical requirements of control; but, as I have just shown from a statement by the most eminent seismologist of the United States, that is irrelevant. He denied the charge that the United States has political and military problems which prevent it from concluding an agreement, yet he also declared that the essential obstacle to a treaty was "national security" and the "political factors" which, as he put it, must safeguard that national security.

This declaration is somewhat vague, yet it leads us to the crux of the matter. This "national security" is the pretext on which the United States has now, with the assistance of the United Kingdom, unleashed nuclear weapon tests in the Pacific. While the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom jockey for position in the Sub-Committee and in our Committee, trying to evade the compromise approach of the eight-Power memorandum, the rate and scope of nuclear tests are on the increase. Nuclear bombs are exploded below ground and under water; their explosions rend the air.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Now tests are being extended even further - into outer space. Many famous scientists throughout the world have been warning of the danger of such tests. At the meeting on 9 May we drew attention to the alarm of British scientists on this score, (ENDC/PV.34, page 44) but alliance commitments are more important to the United Kingdom Government than the interests of science and of all mankind. It is supporting a dangerous United States venture. In the last few days many speeches have been delivered by public figures varying in kind and consequence. Many representatives of science have spoken in various parts of the world. The Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, said at a press conference on 5 June, when asked what he thought of the United States nuclear tests at high altitudes:

"When these tests were announced, many prominent scientists from all over the world who have no personal or selfish motives strongly objected to them. Furthermore, everyone knows that outer space is not part of the territory of any country. It is the common property of all countries; and I think that these projected high-altitude tests feed a highly dangerous psychosis that is abroad today."(1)

The Italian newspaper Giustizzia, an important organ of the Western press, said: "The unsuccessful launching of a rocket into outer space raises a number of dangerous problems ... The announcements of the United States authorities have caused further alarm. The catastrophic failure of this first attempt sheds further light on the immense danger of such tests. That rocket might start a new world war."(1)

Even the American press, which on the whole frequently supports the present policy of the Kennedy administration, is now obliged to sound the alarm by the United States Government's new dangerous action. The leading article of the New York Times for 5 June reads:

"When it comes to tampering with the environment of outer space, the problem assumes for the first time a global aspect that raises the question of the right of any nation to act unilaterally in such matters. If it is true that such tests are made necessary by the demands of our national security, the question still remains whether or not our national security would not be better served by consultation with an international body of scientists in the free world, whose security it as vitally involved as is ours. Furthermore, in unilaterally carrying out such tests, we are giving the USSR an excuse for conducting similar tests on its own in outer space, thus opening a new Pandora's Box of potential evils that all humanity may have cause to regret for ever after."

(1) Translated from Russian.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I think that these comments of a serious American paper ought to warn the United States Government against these dangerous experiments. But none of these actions of the United States Government is accidental. They result from the policy recently adopted by that Government.

These actions constitute an act of agression against all peoples by the United States Government, which has assumed a heavy responsibility by taking the initiative in extending the nuclear arms race into outer space. This policy of the United States of continuing nuclear weapon tests and intensifying the nuclear arms race is fully shared by two other NATO nuclear Powers - the United Kingdom and France. Quite recently the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, confirmed in Parliament the intention of the United Kingdom Government to continue nuclear tests. A similar statement was made on behalf of the French Government by General de Gaulle at the beginning of last month after the latest French test in the Sahara.

In the light of these facts there must be very few people simple-minded enough to believe that the Western Powers, having adopted the policy of increasing their nuclear arsenal and intensifying the nuclear arms race, are really interested in discontinuing nuclear tests and are honestly and in good faith negotiating on this question here in Geneva. It must now be clear to everyone that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom nor France has any use for an agreement that would tie the hands of the militarist circles of NATO, who are deliberately sharpening international rivalry in the development and improvement of nuclear weapons. This fact is indisputable and cannot be camouflaged by any speeches of Western politicians or diplomats. It explains in particular, why we have not yet been able to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, or even to make any progress at all towards one. It explains why we could not take the chance of concluding an agreement which we were offered about two months ago when the eight non-aligned States introduced their memorandum. The non-aligned countries proposed a basis for agreement. The Western Powers by their actions are really undermining this basis and making agreement altogether impossible. Why? There can only be one answer: they wish to have a free hand to intensify the nuclear arms race still further, in order to keep the world under the threat of nuclear war. This also explains why the United States, as Mr. Dean confirmed yesterday, is not prepared to put in writing that it favours the prohibition of nuclear weapons even under general and complete disarmament.

But this policy is a serious threat to peace. All States interested in maintaining peace must warn the United States and their allies of this danger and of their

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

heavy responsibility for aggravating the international situation and undermining an agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests. Such an agreement is possible on the basis of the eight-Power memorandum, but is obviously not wanted by the United States or the United Kingdom, let alone by France. The Soviet Union is prepared to conclude such an agreement on the basis of the eight-Power memorandum, and the next move is with the United States and the United Kingdom alone.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Of the seventeen nations taking part in this Conference, the fourteen which are not nuclear Powers would certainly today want to voice their deep disappointment that the report on the twenty meetings of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests ends on such a melancholy note, not even holding out a hope that the three negotiating Powers are nearing an agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. We would need to voice that concern not only on our own account but also on behalf of that overwhelmingly great majority of mankind who are concerned, albeit concerned in the passive and restless way of those who know that they are going to be the victims in a nuclear war, and also the victims of the tests themselves. In particular we of the eight non-aligned countries who have been called to participate in this Conference now -- and thus to take a certain share in the responsibility for its work -- would be failing in our duties to our nations and to the world at large if we did not, and, if need be, did not repeatedly, express the deep concern of a tormented mankind which is witnessing this spiralling series of nuclear tests, where one from the East has been followed by one from the West, to be followed by one from the East, and so on in seemingly endless perpetuity. It is this race -- to perfect the means of world destruction -- which we have the right to demand should be halted first, as the most immediate of the disarmament measures.

I have, however, not asked for the floor today for mere lamentation, justified as it would be. For when we read carefully the records of the Sub-Committee, we cannot help registering some hopeful signs -- more hopeful, I think, than the participating delegations explicitly acknowledge. This may sound astonishing, particularly after the speeches we have listened to today from the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. But perhaps it is inherent in the nature of being a great Power that it is difficult to give any semblance of beginning to agree, even when that is the reality. The delegations who are the authors of the joint memorandum

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

have a different kind of perceptiveness. I, for one, dare to conclude that a considerable closing of the gap between the positions, extreme as they were at the beginning of this Conference, has occurred. At least it has occurred on two of the three main points; that is, it has not occurred -- or hardly -- in regard to the issue of inspection, but has occurred in regard to the international collaboration between the detecting stations and in regard to the proposed international commission of scientists. The two sides have had both to give and to take, and they have done so to a certain extent. On the one point -- that of the observation posts -- more has been given by the West; on the other point -- that of the international commission -- more has been given by the East

I do not intend to go into details. I do not wish to hold any of the negotiating delegations to what they have said, since positions have changed during the series of twenty meetings. However, I hope that the members of the Sub-Committee will take it as an objective verdict from a detached observer -- as detached as anybody can be on this matter -- that some progress has been made in the Sub-Committee.

The question then arises: Where does the Sub-Committee go from here? The sponsors of the joint memorandum have taken the position that it should stand on its own merits and that what has been left to be filled in should be done by negotiation between the three nuclear Powers. Therefore, I am not going to suggest anything today in regard to substance. Nevertheless, with due respect, perhaps I might allude to one or two recommendations which suggest themselves to us in regard to practical problems concerning the Sub-Committee's work after the summer recess. It seems to our delegation that timing is becoming a more and more crucial question and therefore we, and I hope also the negotiating Powers, welcome the suggestion made by the representative of Mexico, in a very eloquent statement on 9 May, that a decision should first be taken on the date when a test ban treaty would come into force and, as he said, "a definite end /will be put/ to the senseless nuclear competition". (ENDC/PV.34, page 17).

It matters less to the world whether the time chosen is now, next Christmas or even next Easter. New Year's Day in 1963 might be a date of great symbolic significance at which to aim. If such a procedure could be followed, two important things would be gained. Firstly, the negotiations would be lifted out of the present particularly storm-laden political climate, because more work on details could be undertaken if negotiations were to proceed under the hypothetical premise that the treaty was to be signed by a certain date. Secondly, there is the very gain in time for the preparations.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

My second suggestion is closely related to the question of how to utilize the time-span for the negotiations if such a date were hypothetically accepted. I am not going to enter into any details, particularly on the controversial issue of who should participate in the preparatory work: whether scientists, neutrals or anybody else. I would just make the plea that after the recess problems should be viewed more from the practical side. To take one example, should we not decide that there has been sufficient abstract debate as to whether the network of co-operating stations should be defined as international or not? Would it not be preferable to begin making an inventory of existing resources in the different fields of geophysics, cataloguing them and perhaps working on a blueprint of how they might be brought into more effective co-operation? The extent to which these detection resources would be found sufficient is a question for the different negotiating powers to judge, but any argument in that respect will carry much more weight after such a survey has been made.

Without proceeding further along that line of thought, I hope I have illustrated the value of a more practical approach to the work of the Sub-Committee. We must realize that the preparations for the functioning of an agreement will be time-consuming. In passing, let me say that I have always wondered how much time the setting up of 180 stations would have taken and what would have happened to the test ban in the meantime. With such a more practical procedure, the three nuclear Powers negotiating in the Sub-Committee could appeal for ad hoc co-operation as the situation demands, because the promotion of scientific collaboration between geophysics institutes in the world concerns us all more or less, and we are all ready to help.

In conclusion, may I say that we continue to hope that the next report of the Sub-Committee -- and it ought to come in good time before the next General Assembly session -- will be less disappointing than the present one.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): The Romanian delegation, having followed with great attention the proceedings of the nuclear Sub-Committee and having studied with interest the verbatim records of its meetings, now wishes to express its point of view.

I am sorry to have to say that the conclusions we have reached are most unsatisfactory. We all know that nuclear weapon tests must be banned once and for all because they worsen the international political climate, endanger the health of present and future generations and are a most potent factor of the arms race. The peoples of the world ask that an end be put to this dangerous arms race. Nevertheless,

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

the United States Government, in the middle of the debates of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and the negotiations on the conclusion of a test ban treaty, considered it necessary to conduct a new series of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, such tests being of still greater scope by reason both of their number and of their power of detonation. Even more, while negotiations are being conducted here in Geneva, on the instructions of the United Nations, with a view to using outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, the United States Government has decided to conduct nuclear weapon tests in outer space as well. The peoples will never forget that the United States was the first to start a nuclear arms drive on our planet, or that the United States is also the country which is at present extending this arms race to outer space.

We know what the stands of the three nuclear Powers were before 16 April with regard to the ending of tests. These stands proved to be completely divergent and no agreement whatever could be reached on this basis. Therefore a new basis was necessary and this was submitted to us on 16 April in the form of a memorandum sponsored by the eight non-aligned States represented in our Committee.

The representative of India said at the meeting of 5 June;

"... the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States at this Conference is a firm and sufficient basis for an accord ..."

(ENDC/PV.49, page 28-30)

What happened after the memorandum was submitted to us? The Soviet Government, animated by the sincere desire that an agreement be reached banning nuclear weapon tests once and for all, unequivocally declared on 19 April that it accepted the proposals included in the eight-nation memorandum as "basis for negotiations". During the debates which followed, the Soviet delegation adhered to that new stand of the Soviet Government.

The Soviet delegation accepted the proposal expressed in the memorandum with regard to the creation of a system of observation based on the national systems of observation posts and institutions. It stated its agreement to the proposal that an international commission be set up, composed of a limited number of highly qualified scientists and of the corresponding personnel. The Soviet delegation agreed with the proposal of the eight States that inspection should be carried out by an international commission of scientists at the invitation of the State on whose territory the suspicious phenomenon takes place.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

These are facts which cannot be denied; the verbatim records of the three-Power Sub-Committee are there to testify to them.

How, what has been and continues to be the stand of the Western Powers? To this day, the Governments of those countries have not given an official and categorical answer to the memorandum. The United States and United Kingdom delegations, being unable openly to reject this document, declared after many hesitations that they were willing to accept it as a basis of negotiations; but in fact they did not give up their old, unrealistic stand which can lead to no agreement.

The eight-nation memorandum proposes control by national means. The United States and the United Kingdom insist on giving the observation system an international character, with a working status established by the international commission, with an apparatus and a network of observation posts located on the territory of the State under discussion -- posts which would be under the control of the international commission.

The memorandum recommends the setting up of an international commission made up of a limited number of scientists. The United States and the United Kingdom aim at creating a body having vast functions, including numerous personnel and headed by a single director. I do not think it is difficult for us to understand the aim of the two Governments when no agreement has been reached as to the fundamental problem of general and complete disarmament.

The memorandum envisages that on-site inspection can be carried out only at the invitation of the State on whose territory suspicious phenomena take place. The United States and United Kingdom delegations are adhering to their old stand, insisting upon the compulsory character of inspection. From this point of view, this statement of the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, is as clear as clear can be:

"We just cannot agree, from examining it, that the joint memorandum excludes obligatory on-site inspections in certain circumstances ..."
(ENDC/SC.I/PV.16, page 9)

Today the representative of the United States fully confirmed this view, leaving no doubt as to the real stand of the United States Government. Is this not in fact a rejection of the joint memorandum and of the ideas on which it is based?

An objective analysis of the negotiations within the Sub-Committee for a nuclear test ban makes us realize with regret that an impasse has been reached. This impasse is exclusively due to the rigid stand of the Western Powers, which reject the realistic

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

proposals, thoroughly studied and pondered over with a sense of responsibility, by the eight non-aligned States. This proves that the United States and the United Kingdom are not willing to put an end to nuclear weapon tests, just as they are not willing to eliminate the deadly nuclear weapons which threaten human civilisation. World public opinion is following these negotiations with the utmost interest, protesting ever more strongly against the attitude adopted by the Western delegations, which bear the entire responsibility for the impasse reached in these negotiations.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The Italian delegation again expresses its regret that the work of the Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of nuclear tests should have proved completely sterile, despite the appeals, encouragement and suggestions the Sub-Committee has received from the Conference on several occasions.

In this connexion, I should like to refer to the statement made by Mr. Padilla Nervo, the Mexican representative, at the meeting on 9 May. In my opinion that statement was of fundamental importance for two reasons. First, because with his characteristic tact and diplomatic skill Mr. Padilla Nervo practically proposed an agenda for the Sub-Committee. I have the impression that owing to the negative attitude of the Soviet delegation, the useful agenda thus proposed could not be taken up by the Sub-Committee. I hope that on resuming its deliberations, the Sub-Committee will at least examine the concrete proposals concerning the order of work made by Mr. Padilla Nervo, which, after the eight-nation memorandum, are in my opinion, the most useful contribution of the Conference towards advancing the work of the Sub-Committee and the practical application of the Joint Memorandum.

Secondly, Mr. Padilla Nervo, again in his statement of 9 May, made another proposal which, in my opinion, is not only constructive, but constitutes the only practical way out of the deadlock we have reached. The Swedish representative has just referred to it, so I do not think I need quote it in detail; but, as Mr. Padilla Nervo said: "The plans of both parties for carrying out explosions must have an end, and this end should be fixed now in a treaty ..." (ENDC/PV.34, page 16).

My delegation, too, endeavoured to contribute to the Sub-Committee's work by proposing, on 25 April, that a group of experts from the nuclear Powers and from the eight nations which submitted the memorandum, should be appointed to make a technical study of that document. Mr. Zorin first said he would like to hear the views of

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

the eight delegations on the proposal before giving his own opinion on it. But later, he rather hastily rejected it. Indeed, he said:

> "The Soviet delegation considers that, so far from being conducive to the success of our negotiations, the adoption of such a proposal [the Italian proposal] would, on the contrary, mean that they would become bogged down in endless technical and detailed discussions which would undoubtedly lead to their breakdown." (ENDC/PV.32, page 32).

This position seems to me to be somewhat at variance with the statements Mr. Zorin made this morning, according to which he attaches great importance to the eight-nation memorandum. If that is the opinion of the Soviet delegation, why does it refuse a more thorough study of the document?

My proposal was clear. Its object was to recognize the importance of the memorandum as that document deserves -- the importance we ascribed to it from the very beginning. Why, then, does the Soviet delegation reject my proposal if it also affirms that the memorandum is so important? And why did the Soviet delegation also reject the proposal made some time ago by the United Kingdom delegation, that the eight delegations which submitted the Joint Memorandum should take part in the Sub-Committee's work? What was the reason for rejecting that collaboration, which could have been valuable if the Soviet delegation attaches such importance to the memorandum?

However, what Mr. Zorin said yesterday about technical studies in general may perhaps give us reason to hope that the Soviet delegation will not always be entirely opposed to this kind of technical study in principle. He said yesterday:

> "... if you feel that in order to settle the matter [i.e. of nuclear weapons], we need an exchange of views on certain aspects, including technical ones, by all means let us have one here." (ENDC/PV.51, page 58).

If the Soviet delegation is unable to agree -- for reasons I confess I do not understand -- to the appointment of a small technical committee of eleven countries -- the three nuclear Powers and the eight countries which submitted the joint memorandum -- we could also consider having the studies in question carried out by the seventeen delegations present here, with the assistance of the technical experts and scientists of the seventeen countries.

Yesterday, Mr. Zorin told us that, generally speaking, a technical study was not acceptable to his delegation so long as no political decision had been taken. I think

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

this is a very debatable point of view, for often enough a political decision can only be taken on the basis of the results of technical studies. But in any case, where the eight-nation memorandum is concerned, we already have a political decision. The memorandum has been accepted by the Conference as one of the bases of a possible agreement. Hence the studies in question would not be made in vacuo, but on a document which everyone has recognized as a fundamental and constructive contribution to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

The difficulties arise from the fact that this document needs to be amplified and developed technically, and that the Soviet delegation insists on interpreting it dogmatically in its own way, as reproducing the Soviet view 100 per cent. Let us therefore leave it to the scientists. Let them tell us quite objectively what is feasible and what is not. And if the Soviet delegation is, as it seems, opposed to a small committee, then let us carry out the studies in the Eighteen-Nation Committee itself, giving the floor to the scientists of the seventeen countries sitting beside us.

We can no longer delay taking steps to break the deadlock. It is absolutely essential to reach agreement quickly on the discontinuance of tests. This terrible spiral of tests must be stopped. In opposing the technical amplification of the memorandum, the Soviet delegation is assuming a grave responsibility. All avenues should be explored, particularly those provided by technical studies. It is not enough to tell us a priori that such studies would be useless. That is not an answer which can satisfy us and remove the responsibilities of those who oppose these technical studies. It would be an opposition on principle, which could have no justification in the eyes of the delegations present here or, I will even say, in the eyes of the peoples of the world.

The only point which gives us some comfort today is the statement made by the United States delegation and also, I think, by the Soviet delegation, that they are willing once again to continue the current negotiations with goodwill. I have no doubt that the United Kingdom delegation, which is to speak later, will share the view that it is necessary to pursue these negotiations and endeavours actively.

I hope that on the resumption of our work the comments I have ventured to make today will be taken into consideration.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The Conference of the eighteen nations has again seen fit, before suspending its work, to discuss the question of discontinuing nuclear tests. The atmosphere in which the discussion is taking place is hardly encouraging, however. Not only has the previous international tension continued, but it has increased in various parts of the world; not only are the nuclear tests planned by the United States being carried out in the Pacific area, but tests in outer space are being undertaken or contemplated. The incalculable and, above all, the unforeseeable consequences of these nuclear tests in space have been pointed out by the Soviet Government in its statement of 3 June, by many scientists of international reputation, and by the governments of other countries interested in co-operation for the peaceful use of space.

What is also characteristic is that this new series of nuclear tests in outer space is being conducted by the United States at a time when that country is trying, by every form of propoganda at its disposal, to make the whole world believe that it is in favour of using outer space for peaceful purposes.

The fact of undertaking nuclear tests in space which will have really harmful consequences for the future of human activities there, places in their true light the United States proposals whose object -- they claim -- is to reserve outer space for peaceful purposes only. We must accordingly note with the greatest regret that we are resuming the discussion on the discontinuance of nuclear tests in our Committee in an unfortunate atmosphere, owing to the actions of the Western Powers.

In order to define the present positions of the parties to the discussion on the discontinuance of nuclear tests more clearly, it is, of course, helpful to recall the positions they took when the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations was first submitted. In passing I should like to mention -- and the Soviet representative has already pointed this out -- that in his long statement today Mr. Dean devoted only a few minutes to the eight-nation memorandum. He referred to it, if I may say so by way of explanation -- after a long series of recriminations about why the United States is not prepared to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. As will be remembered, the eight-nation memorandum was submitted in order to serve as a basis for compromise between the positions previously taken by the Soviet Union on the one hand and by the United States and the United Kingdom on the other hand. Only three days after the eight-nation memorandum had been submitted to our Committee, the Soviet Government

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

solemnly declared that it accepted that memorandum as a useful basis for reaching agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. That position of the Soviet Government has been maintained throughout the discussion and it is quite clear from the verbatim records of the Sub-Committee that the Soviet Union was willing, from the outset, to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned nations.

What has been the attitude of the Western countries when faced with this firm acceptance of the eight-nation memorandum by the Soviet Union as a basis for negotiations to reach agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests?

Speaking on the United Kingdom position at the meeting of 20 April, Mr. Godber, the representative of that country, reported to us the statement made by his Prime Minister in the House of Commons. When the Prime Minister was asked to clarify the exact content of the non-aligned countries' proposal, he replied in the following terms:

> "As I understand it, the proposals would not make verification compulsory; it would be only permissive. But if it is to be only permissive we are really back where we stood before. The question is: is it to be compulsory or permissive? If the point were granted by the Russians -- and we have made this point over and over again -- the whole situation would be changed. It is that point which once more we have thought it our duty to put forward. Failing to do that, I do not think that a fruitful negotiation can now be embarked on." (ENDC/PV.25, page 9).

That was the position of the Western countries at the opening of our discussion on disarmament, a position that was negative in substance and in form, and we think it was put very clearly and explicitly by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. We do not think that there is any disagreement between the Western countries on this particular point -- I am thinking now of the United Kingdom and the United States. But if anyone has doubts on the matter, we have before us the words of Mr. Dean himself who, in reply to a question put to him by the Soviet representative, said on 20 April:

> "We are still not very clear about this -- perhaps it is due to the simultaneous interpretation -- because after he had said that it was not to be the exclusive basis for negotiation, he still posed the question whether we accepted it as the basis for negotiations." (ENDC/PV.25, page 21).

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The reply is negative. Without any doubt, the position of the Western countries with regard to the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations has been negative from the beginning - even from the moment that document was submitted to the Conference.

Has the attitude of the Western Powers now changed? Since the long discussion which took place in the Committee, and since the Soviet Union's acceptance of the eight-nation memorandum as the basis for an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests -- and its acceptance by world opinion -- the Western Powers have changed their tactics with regard to the memorandum, but not their attitude or their position.

In fact, for some time now the Western Powers have been saying that they accept the memorandum as one of the bases for discussion of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, but not as the sole basis. These statements have since been accompanied by efforts on the part of the Western delegations to introduce, and to gain acceptance for, their previous ideas as a basis for negotiation on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. They have even gone further. In their latest statements they have attempted to show that in fact the eight-nation memorandum represented only the adoption of their former position and ideas on the compulsory nature of on-site inspection, the international character of the control system and on the other points on which they have been insisting since the beginning of the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, that is to say that the eight-nation memorandum is merely the true reflection of their previous position.

This situation was explained in detail today by the Soviet representative when he described how the Western Powers wish to fill in the gaps in the eight-nation memorandum.

We do not intend to revert to all the really tortuous statements made in this Committee by the representatives of the Western Powers on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests. What we wish to demonstrate once again is that the attitude of the Western Powers towards the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries is still negative.

I should like to illustrate the position of the Western countries once more, by referring to what Mr. Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, said in the House of Commons on 5 June -- and here I quote the French paper Le Monde reproducing an AFP report, which is the only text that I have:

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

"The Western Powers will only consent to sign an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests if it includes a clause on the verification of suspicious events on the spot, or at least provides for a method of detecting underground explosions."*

So that is the position of the Western countries with regard to the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries, and it is a negative.

This is corroborated, moreover, by the position taken by the United States representative in the discussion on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. For on 6 June 1962, referring to the impossibility of the idea that a country in which a suspicious event had taken place would issue an invitation to carry out on-site inspection, Mr. Stelle said:

"... but it is certain that such invitations would be useless as a control measure, because no country would ever call in foreign inspectors if it were trying to hide a clandestine nuclear test undertaken in violation of a treaty. In other words, if the joint memorandum were really relying solely on invitational inspections, it would amount to a compromise of, let us say, 95 per cent in favour of the old position of the Soviet Union." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.20, pages 14-15)

Without dwelling any longer on the position of the Western Powers, we must therefore conclude that, with regard to the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations, it is now just as negative as it was when that document was first submitted and discussed. Moreover, it is with the greatest regret that we reach this conclusion, for we consider that, as we have come to realize in the past, there is no possibility of arriving at an understanding or an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests on the basis of the old positions of the Western Powers. Now world opinion and the whole of mankind is impatiently awaiting the conclusion of an agreement on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum. This hope has been expressed not only by statesmen of various countries which are particularly interested in the suspension of nuclear tests, not only by representatives of organizations and different trends of opinion in the world, but also on many occasions in this very room by several representatives, among others the representative of India who said on 5 June:

"I say again in all frankness that the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States at this Conference is a firm and sufficient basis for an accord, and we hope it can be reached." (ENDC/PV.49, page 15)

The Bulgarian delegation also considers that the eight-nation memorandum is a firm and sufficient basis, and we said so in our first statement on this memorandum.

*Translation from French; Le Monde, Paris, 7 June, 1962.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

If we wish to reach agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, this memorandum will have to be accepted as the basis, the sole basis, for discussion and agreement on the solution of this urgent problem. The Soviet Union has accepted this memorandum as the basis for discussion and agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. It is now for the Western Powers to tell us whether they are willing to negotiate and reach such an agreement on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum.

I should now like to dwell for a few minutes on another question which has been raised several times by the Western Powers, and once again this morning by the representative of Italy. I refer to the attempts made to draw certain non-aligned countries -- or all the non-aligned countries -- into a technical discussion on the memorandum. Mr. Godber, in the innumerable statements he has made on that document, both in this Conference and in the three-Power Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, reverted to this point several times. It has also been raised by the United States representative.

Speaking in the Sub-Committee, Mr. Godber referred in particular to a passage in the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia at our twenty-fourth meeting. His words were as follows:

> "In referring to this offer by the neutrals I had in mind a statement by the representative of Ethiopia on 19 April when, speaking on behalf of all the sponsors of the eight-Power memorandum, he said" (ENDC/SC.1/PV.19, page 14) --

and since I have the French text of the part of the statement by the representative of Ethiopia which Mr. Godber then went on to quote, I shall now read it, since it is to be found in the record of the twenty-fourth meeting --

> "It may be that it would now be the wish of the nuclear Powers to ask us to co-operate with them in some or all aspects of new negotiations. We shall willingly and gladly be of any service that we can in this regard. We should also be prepared to make scientific collaboration available to the best of our ability." (ENDC/PV.24, page 5)

That is the end of the quotation made by Mr. Godber.

On the basis of this quotation Mr. Godber urged that the eight non-nuclear countries be invited to participate in the Sub-Committee's work. The question then arises: to participate in what? New negotiations? But are any negotiations really taking place in the Sub-Committee of the nuclear Powers?

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In reality, there are no negotiations, for there is no basis for negotiations. The Western Powers do not accept the very basis for negotiations, which is the eight-nation memorandum.

It will be remembered that there have been many discussions on disarmament, but that before we had the basis provided by the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations drawn up by the Soviet Union and the United States and adopted by the United Nations in a resolution, it was hardly possible to conduct a discussion -- and it remains to be seen whether we can make any progress in the situation we have now reached. Nevertheless, we have still accomplished something.

To revert to Mr. Godber's quotation I must say that here again he committed a sin for which the Soviet representative has reproached him on several occasions, that is to say, he made his quotation rather too short -- he did not carry it far enough. For if he had quoted the Ethiopian representative further, he would have seen what the opinion of the non-aligned nations is, because after the words he quoted, Mr. Sahlou added:

> "At this juncture, before we have any clear indication from the three countries concerned regarding their willingness to start anew on the basis of the joint memorandum, we believe that the memorandum has to be interpreted not by us but by you, the three nuclear Powers. This, we feel, is the most useful approach for all parties concerned." (ENDC/PV.24, page 6)

That is how the non-aligned countries expressed their point of view here.

Now the Western Powers are seeking to involve them in sterile negotiations. Why? In order to make them believe that their memorandum cannot be used as a basis for negotiations, to lead them on, by experts' discussions and meetings of people who might go on talking for ever, to smother the disarmament problem, so to speak, and above all to smother the problem of the discontinuance of tests in endless discussions.

Such a procedure, with such discussions could, of course, be very useful to the Western Powers -- to those who do not want any agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. But such a technical discussion with the non-aligned countries whose proposals they reject (for the Western Powers have not yet got a basis for discussion; they have several bases for discussion; they would like to change the basis for discussion) would be of no use. That is why I think no useful purpose can be served by making such proposals until the Western Powers have accepted the memorandum as the basis for discussion and negotiation for the conclusion of an agreement.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Consequently, Mr. Chairman, I think the only useful reply the Western Powers can make now, in order to facilitate our work, is to accept the eight-nation memorandum as the basis for discussion. When they do, but only when they do, the participation of the non-aligned nations in drawing up the agreement will certainly be very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I still have four speakers on my list -- the representatives of the United Kingdom, Poland, India and Czechoslovakia; there may be other representatives who wish to speak. I myself had hoped to make a brief statement, as representative of Burma, at the end of the discussion. In view of the time, I think that the Committee should decide now whether we should continue this discussion now, to defer it to the next meeting or, perhaps, to a later hour today. I am not suggesting anything, I am just putting forward possibilities. But in considering this I think we are bound to take into account our overall position.

This brings me to certain recommendations which have been made by our co-Chairmen. The first is that, Monday being a holiday, the next meeting of the Conference should be held on Tuesday, 12 June 1962. The second is that, as suggested by certain delegations, there should be no meeting of the Conference on Friday, 15 June, since the Conference has already decided to go into recess from that date. That leaves only Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of next week available for meetings, and our co-Chairmen have recommended that the meetings on those days should be devoted to plenary discussions on general and complete disarmament. That is the position.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): As I was the next speaker on the list, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, it would be opportune if I reacted first to the position you have expounded to us. Quite clearly, from what you have said, our time before the recess is going to be very limited. Moreover, I would suggest, it would be unfortunate if this particular discussion were left over for so long a period as from now until next Tuesday. For example, the speech I intend to make is in some sense complementary to that which our United States colleague made this morning. For certain reasons, certain aspects were left out of his speech and it would be wrong if the complete picture were not given.

Therefore, I would hope that we might be able to reconvene this afternoon, if that were not too inconvenient, and try to conclude this discussion today. That would leave next week free for the very important discussions on general and complete disarmament to which we ought to be directing our minds.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I am informed by the secretariat that there will be no great difficulty in arranging a meeting for this afternoon.

Before we adjourn I would like to go back to the recommendations made by our co-Chairman which I have already read out. Are there any objections to those recommendations?

Mr. LALL (India): We had thought that before we recessed it might be a good plan to have one informal meeting at which we could exchange frank views on where we stood, and perhaps say a few words on what we felt might be done when we reassembled after the recess. I had first thought that it would be best to have such a meeting on Friday of next week. I do not know why it has been decided not to have a meeting on that day. I had thought the proposal was that we should recess for four weeks, beginning on the weekend after 15 June.

If it is still possible to have an informal meeting on Friday, I think it would be the best plan. We could have a brief stocktaking, and if we did that at an informal meeting I would suggest that all representatives should be assured of an opportunity to speak. I would suggest that the Chairman for that day might allow a restricted amount of time to each representative, and perhaps the co-Chairmen would agree to speak after the other fifteen representatives when they would have had the advantage of having listened to the views of their colleagues. I make these suggestions. If it is not possible to have the informal meeting on Friday, I hope it will be possible to have it on another day. But I do think that it would be consistent with our general idea regarding this recess to have such a meeting on Friday next.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I support the suggestions which have been made by the representative of India. I think it would be very useful for us all if we could have an informal meeting before the end of the present part of this session of the Disarmament Conference. Perhaps we could now decide whether there will be a meeting next Friday. No meeting is to be held on Friday, perhaps we could agree that the informal meeting suggested by the representative of India should be held on Wednesday.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The proposal just made by the representative of India seems to me to deserve attention. I think it will be useful to have an informal exchange of views at the conclusion of

(Mr. Zorrin, USSR)

our work. The only question is when to hold it. Friday will be difficult because a number of delegations, knowing that 15 June was not going to be a working day, have already prepared to leave, and have made a number of administrative arrangements which would make it difficult to meet on Friday. It might be possible, however, to hold the unofficial discussion on Thursday afternoon after the meeting, when the formal work will be over, or on Wednesday, as the representative of Canada suggested. Either proposal would suit us. We can meet either on Thursday or on Wednesday, whichever is the more convenient for the members of the Committee.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): We were quite prepared to schedule a meeting for next Friday, but the two co-Chairmen believed that that was not the general consensus of the Conference. As Mr. Zorin, has just said, several of the delegations have probably made travel plans.

We are prepared to accept the recommendation of the representative of India that there be an informal meeting before the recess. Time is short: we have only three days left for meetings. The United States delegation had hoped to be able to make statements in plenary meetings on each of those three days to complete our first-reading statements, as it were, on stage II and stage III of the two documents that are before the Committee.

If there is to be an informal meeting, and if there is not to be a meeting next Friday, we would prefer that we have plenary meetings on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday and that we have an informal meeting either Wednesday afternoon or Thursday afternoon.

Mr. LALL (India): In the circumstances stated, we would be perfectly happy if the informal meeting were held on Thursday afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): Are there any other comments? If there are none, I shall take it that the informal meeting will be held on Thursday afternoon, 14 June.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.