

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.222
10 August 1965
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

(Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV
Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij M. IMRU
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. T. BEKELE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. Y.M. VORONTOV

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. P.S. BRIDGES

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I call to order the two hundred and twenty-second plenary meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all I should like to thank the representatives of Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia, who were kind enough to give me the opportunity to speak first.

Yesterday, 9 August, as co-Chairman of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I received from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Stibi, a Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the resumption of work in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Mr. Stibi's covering letter contains a request to bring the aforementioned Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the notice of all the States participating in our Conference. In view of the fact that the questions raised in the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic are important and topical and have a most direct bearing on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, permit me to read out the text of this document:

"Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the Resumption of Negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament"

"The resumption of negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament induces the Government of the German Democratic Republic to express anew its determination to support to the best of its ability the endeavours to bring about disarmament and the relaxation of tension.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic has repeatedly informed the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament about its point of view on important disarmament problems (ENDC/16, 81. 124 and 133), thus confirming its readiness to join a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, to conclude a treaty on the comprehensive renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States and to agree upon an arms stop as well as upon measures to reduce the strength of armed forces and weapons in both German States.

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"The Government of the German Democratic Republic emphasized to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that it considers it possible to have disarmament in the field of nuclear arms and the conventional armed forces in both German States controlled by a commission composed of an equal number of representatives of the Warsaw Treaty States and of those of NATO.

"It further requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to examine the possibility of proposing that the United Nations General Assembly recommend that those States possessing nuclear arms withdraw them step by step from German territory in so far as they have been stockpiled there -- and pledge themselves to respect both German States as permanent nuclear-free territories against which in no case should nuclear arms be used.

"With regard to the resumption of negotiations by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Government of the German Democratic Republic again draws attention to the question of the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States. Recently the efforts of the West German Government to obtain nuclear arms have been further intensified and are drawing to a dangerous climax. Especially characteristic of this was a statement by Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the West German Federal Republic, on 3 July 1965. This statement makes it clear that the West German Government is not prepared to renounce the acquisition of nuclear arms. Herr Schroeder rather tried to give reasons for a right of the West German Federal Republic to acquire nuclear arms of its own if it does not get them via a multilateral nuclear force of NATO. He stressed the absolute priority which the realization of the plans for West German participation in the control of nuclear arms has over agreements on the non-dissemination of nuclear arms. At the same time Herr Schroeder made the fulfilment of the revanchist claims against the German Democratic Republic a further condition of any West German consent to disarmament agreements, especially to an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Thus the decision on dissemination or non-dissemination of nuclear arms becomes a means of pressure to enforce a change of the status quo in Europe and the claims to rule over other States.

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"Similar statements were subsequently made by other influential government representatives of the West German Federal Republic. They can only serve to obstruct an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear arms and to keep open for the West German Government the road to nuclear arms, be it through multilateral agreements of NATO or direct acquisition. The statements made by the West German Government, that it could renounce the acquisition of its own nuclear arms only if the West German Bundeswehr obtained control over nuclear arms through multilateral organizations of NATO, unequivocally refute the assertions that such projects as MLF and ANF were compatible with an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear arms. They rather confirm the repeated statements made by the Government of the German Democratic Republic that MLF as well as ANF are in contradiction to an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear arms. An adherence to these projects while endeavouring at the same time to conduct negotiations on the non-dissemination of nuclear arms is tantamount to misleading the peoples.

"In this connexion the Government of the German Democratic Republic draws attention to some other alarming facts:

- "The West German army is already today the strongest conventional army in Western Europe. It maintains the strongest NATO contingent and possesses numerous means for the delivery of nuclear weapons.
- "Along with the United States of America the West German Federal Republic, among the Western States, has the largest number of nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.
- "West German officers hold top command posts in NATO enabling them to have already today decisive influence in the planning of nuclear operations of NATO.

"In view of the present situation new efforts to ensure European security have become a priority problem in the peoples' struggle for disarmament and

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peace. The Government of the German Democratic Republic feels called upon to point out explicitly that the West German Government's pressing for nuclear weapons and the stepped-up armament pursued by West Germany threaten European security, extraordinarily impede all efforts towards disarmament and place ever new major obstacles in the way of rapprochement and the ultimate reunification of the two German States.

"Out of a feeling of responsibility for peace in the centre of Europe, the Government of the German Democratic Republic reaffirms its proposals submitted to the Government of the West German Federal Republic that the two German States --

- "renounce the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons as well as obtaining control of them in any form,
- "agree on an arms stop.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic is willing to take up appropriate negotiations on these proposals immediately. It is convinced that their implementation by the two German States would lead to an appreciable relaxation of tension in Europe and facilitate disarmament measures on an international scale.

"In addition the Government of the German Democratic Republic proposes that the two German States join a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

"This proposal is in accordance with the consideration and efforts of many European countries, for example the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Scandinavian States, as well as with the views of many other States which have advocated similar solutions for other parts of the world, as, for example, in the Cairo Declaration of Non-Aligned Countries of 10 October 1964.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic expresses its willingness to support to the best of its abilities the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and expresses the hope that its proposals will help to promote the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, particularly in view

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of the special importance which the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States would have for progress in solving the question of disarmament, to give all possible support to the efforts of the German Democratic Republic for the safeguarding of peace in the centre of Europe."

That is the end of the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic.

The Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic which I have just read out contains, as you see, important and serious proposals designed to reduce tension in Europe and contributing to the cause of nuclear disarmament and disarmament in general.

In comparing the foreign policies of the two German States -- the German Democratic Republic on the one hand and the West German Federal Republic on the other -- one cannot fail to see the sharp contrast between them. Whereas from Bonn voices are incessantly heard demanding that West Germany should be given access to nuclear weapons and calling for further militarization of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, by proposing that both German States should renounce nuclear armament in any form, has acted once again from the standpoint of the defence of peace and the security of Europe. The peaceful proposals of the German Democratic Republic, which clear the way towards ensuring peace in the centre of Europe and facilitate progress in solving the problem of disarmament, certainly deserve all possible support on the part of our Committee and all those who are sincerely interested in improving the international situation and in preventing a nuclear missile war.

The delegation of the Soviet Union highly appreciates and fully supports this new important initiative of the Government of the German Democratic Republic. I request the Secretariat of the Committee to arrange for the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to be circulated as an official document of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,^{1/} and I venture to express the hope that this Statement will be studied and supported by the participants in the negotiations.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/151

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I call upon the representative of the United States, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First, I cannot understand why priority was asked for and given to this statement. The representative of the Soviet Union has just asked for the communication which he has read from Mr. Stibi to be circulated as a Conference document. The position of the United States delegation upon this is well known. Any communications from the so-called German Democratic Republic are, so far as we are concerned, communications from a non-governmental representative or body and as such should be treated in accordance with the procedures governing such communications.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I call upon the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) (translation from Russian): What the United States representative has just declared to the Committee represents the unilateral point of view of the United States. Two German States are in existence and the fact cannot be impugned. You can make any declarations you like, but facts remain facts. We support the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic and, as the representative of the Soviet Union, I request the Secretariat to issue it as a Conference document.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I call upon the representative of the United States, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I should like to point out that the procedures of this Conference are well known. As far as the United States delegation is concerned, the communication in question is from a non-governmental organization. That being so, if the representative of the Soviet Union wishes to submit it as such, it should of course be so treated.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I call upon the representative of Sweden.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): In my statement today I intend to follow closely resolution DC/225 (ENDC/149) of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In its mandate to this Committee it recommends that we should concentrate our attention on three problem fields where measures are urgently required. First, that of general and complete disarmament. Secondly, among the collateral measures priority is to be accorded both to the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to the consideration of an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

While all our delegations are deeply concerned with a fulfilment of that mandate, as we want to live up to that pledge of honour we have given ourselves to build a road leading to disarmament, we must nevertheless be aware that the time at our disposal during this session is probably extremely short and that it is fast running out -- for we also have a time-restricted duty laid upon the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: namely, to report "on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations" (ibid) to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the United Nations General Assembly at its forthcoming session. In view of the risk of overloading our agenda and scattering our efforts, I would at this stage of our work defer discussing substantively general and complete disarmament, without in any way belittling the need to proceed as soon as possible and as vigorously as possible with a systematic blue-printing of substantial disarmament.

If we single out for concentrated attention the two collateral measures mentioned in the resolution, this should be understood, however, as a choice made on purely practical grounds; these are by consent the very measures that stand the best chance of resulting in early agreement. I want to stress this, particularly with reference to suggestions proffered on earlier occasions by the Soviet delegation on a different list of priority items and again emphasized by its distinguished representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, at our meeting last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.220, pp.12 et seq.) If I, and others, do not propose to enter now into a substantive discussion on certain of these matters -- although they are undoubtedly closer to the political actualities of today -- it is not to be interpreted as if we wanted to minimize the importance of the

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problems they refer to. Nor, of course, do the measures listed lie outside our field of competence; the resolution itself asks us to "consider all proposals". But the Government and the people of my country have ample opportunities to pronounce themselves on the most urgent political matters, including questions about wars on foreign continents, in other contexts.

In this forum we want to narrow our attention and dedicate our efforts to those measures in the disarmament field which seem to us to be the most tractable ones in the multilateral negotiations for which the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee is the chosen instrument. According to those criteria, therefore, both non-dissemination measures and a comprehensive test ban are certainly most profitable to discuss, as on them the gap between great-Power positions has proved to be least wide. We must proceed with both of them. I am also, in this statement of mine, going to deal with them side by side, as they are more tightly intertwined than is usually explicitly acknowledged. Also, they happen to be matters on which comments by countries which are non-great, non-nuclear and non-aligned might have a certain relevance.

Both these measures are subservient to a very noble aim: namely that of reducing the threat of nuclear war and also of nuclear blackmail. My Government is wholeheartedly dedicated to that aim: it wants to contribute to international regulations which minimize the risks of what has been called "nuclear anarchy". When we met in the United Nations Disarmament Commission I quoted a passage of the Speech from the Throne at the opening of this year's session of the Swedish Parliament in support of our conviction that spread of nuclear weapons was a danger to be met by concerted international action (DC/PV.77, p.52 of the provisional text). Today, to provide a variation on the same theme, I would quote the reply which the Speaker of the Upper House gave to His Majesty the King on that occasion. He said:

"The risk of a further spreading of nuclear weapons rather has increased, and measures to counteract this tendency seem more necessary than ever."

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The imperative question now facing us here in Geneva is: what would be the shortest and surest route to this goal? The representatives of the great Powers, particularly of the West, have so far seemingly placed consideration of a non-dissemination treaty -- that is, an agreement to prevent the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons from increasing beyond the present five -- as the primordial of the two considerations indicated in our guide. Parenthically I may observe that these five nuclear countries are obviously now accepted not only as faits accomplis but as belonging in a special category. This could only be based on their being precisely those States which have the right to occupy the permanent seats in the Security Council and which thus, as "great Powers", carry a special responsibility for the maintenance of peace, and are for that reason expected to act in harmony between themselves. Otherwise there could be no specific circumstance justifying a categorical cleavage between these five and all others. Nobody could assert that they are the ones whose possession of nuclear fire-power poses the minimal danger; in other words, that all is quiet on the nuclear front as it is drawn today.

It follows from the position of principle I have just indicated that the Swedish delegation would welcome progress in relation to non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. As soon as a draft for such an international agreement is forthcoming we shall be able to find out whether what have hitherto been regarded as political hurdles in the way of a joining of stands between the nuclear Powers are about to be overcome, and thus be able to judge how bright the prospects are of their clinching the issue in the near future. We shall then be able also to scrutinize the terms of an eventual treaty in realistic detail and judge its clauses on the merits they will carry for the international community as a whole and also for our individual countries. However, before we know exactly on what we are supposed to negotiate our comments can only be tentative.

The very first point I wish to make in these circumstances -- that is, in the absence of a great-Power concord -- is to recall once more the close relationship between the two collateral measures mentioned in our mandatory resolution, as both aim at curtailing nuclear capabilities. There is nevertheless a difference -- to our mind an important one -- namely that a non-dissemination treaty would in reality curtail only the freedom of action of the hitherto non-nuclear nations, as

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the nuclear Powers already, in intelligent self-interest, evidently observe the rules to which a treaty would commit them. A comprehensive test ban, on the other hand, would have an impeding effect not only on the nuclear have-nots but also on the nuclear haves.

As for the efficiency of the measures envisaged to prevent nations presently non-nuclear from "going nuclear", the value of a comprehensive test ban seems to be at a fair par with a non-proliferation treaty, at least as far as non-aligned countries are concerned. It may be surmised that a first primitive nuclear device that an aspiring nuclear State could fabricate might probably work. But the great sophistication of delivery and defence systems utilized today will make it almost impossible, without a series of several tests, to set up military forces equipped with usable nuclear warheads of specified effects. This, of course, presupposes that the nuclear Powers continue to keep secret their knowledge in nuclear weapons technology.

I will not conceal that, as the positions now stand in regard to these two collateral measures, my delegation definitely prefers an early agreement on a comprehensive ban against nuclear test explosions. We do that for the reason which we have repeatedly stated, and which we know is entertained by most non-nuclear nations: namely, that a test ban would entail some sharing of sacrifices of nuclear potentials. In the debates of the United Nations Disarmament Commission a mighty choir of delegations voiced this concern. I could quote them in a long row, all expressing the same basic philosophy, although differing on the emphasis employed and on the specific proposals of how to link non-dissemination measures with some definitive nuclear disarmament measures.

Thus, besides ourselves, spoke India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, the United Arab Republic, Syria, Japan, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Philippines, Brazil, Chile, Australia and New Zealand, while Italy expressed the "legitimate hope" that restrictions accepted by the non-nuclear countries would lead to the nuclear Powers embarking "on a gradual and concrete process of general nuclear disarmament".

(DC/PV.88, p.12 of the provisional text) Here I will restrict myself to quoting a carefully-balanced statement of the need to harmonize national interests of nuclear and non-nuclear countries: namely, one by our colleague from Canada, Mr. Burns, who said that --

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"... nations which are at present not nuclear Powers but have the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons should not be expected to agree to abstain forever from becoming nuclear Powers unless the existing nuclear Powers within a reasonable period of time take some concrete steps towards divesting themselves of this most dangerous weapon." (DC/PV.76, p.61 of the provisional text).

And further, the Canadian representative said there should be in any treaty on non-dissemination -

"... a reaffirmation of the intention of the nuclear Powers to reduce and eventually eliminate the stocks of these weapons and the means for their delivery ..." (ibid.).

Within parentheses I might recall that the practical conclusion of the Canadian delegation was that of a time-limit for the commitment of the non-nuclear Powers, a suggestion reiterated in New York, and most distinctly here by His Excellency the Italian Foreign Minister (ENDC/PV.219, pp.18, 19). This idea of a voluntary moratorium may become a minimum programme in the non-dissemination field, since to accomplish it we do not need to wait for concurrence by the nuclear Powers.

Also, during our present negotiations the basic philosophy of a double-sided surrender of nuclear growth possibilities seems to have been at least indirectly acknowledged. Thus on the first day of our session the leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Foster, said, although addressing himself to a specific aspect of our problem, that as a part of the non-proliferation effort all governments should -

"... undertake to accept IAEA or similar international safeguards in all their peaceful nuclear activities. This is an undertaking which should be assumed both by those countries which have developed nuclear weapons and by those which have kept their nuclear activities confined to the peaceful field."

(ENDC/PV.218, p.12)

I am not quite clear if that was intended as a proposal that a submission to Agency control be made part of the non-dissemination agreement. The point I want to register today is that Mr. Foster recognized this need for a symmetric acceptance of restrictions on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear nations alike. I am confining myself here to

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statements which have been made as part of our negotiations, although I could have culled more far-reaching expressions from, for instance, Mr. Foster's recent and very interesting article in Foreign Affairs (July 1965, Vol.43, No.4, p.587).

For my country the belief in the necessity to reduce already-existing nuclear capabilities, or at least to stifle their growth in strength, amounts to a fundamental principle in all our efforts to promote disarmament. That is the reason we have so often repeated it. We are bound to continue to plead consistently for it. In the context of our present negotiations on the issue of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons our main concern remains that of demanding some corresponding sacrifices on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike. This requirement of some kind of "compensation" does not amount, however, to any claim to obtain an "inducement" for our adhering to a treaty in the form of any guarantees, any promises, of protection by the nuclear Powers against nuclear attacks or even against "nuclear blackmail". Sweden is willing in principle to play its part, when a non-dissemination agreement is reached, without raising demands for any such guarantees -- being, as a matter of fact, doubtful as to their desirability.

These statements of mine are intended to strike not a note of negativism, or even of pessimism, but just one of caution. My delegation stands prepared to welcome news that the difficulties besetting a non-dissemination treaty have been surmounted. But even in the absence of such news we continue to be dedicated to straining our own efforts in search of a positive approach to the supreme aim of reducing nuclear potentialities.

I turn again, therefore, to the other collateral measures given priority on our agenda, and as a matter of fact preceding in order of presentation that of non-proliferation: namely, the conclusion of an agreement to stop nuclear test explosions completely. As I have said already, as far as the non-nuclear Powers are concerned this would achieve the same result de facto as a non-dissemination treaty. A comprehensive test ban is a non-proliferation measure, and an effective one. This was acknowledged, by the way, by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, when he said that the extension of the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to underground tests would "deal forcefully with the problem of nuclear proliferation". (ENDC/PV.218, p.14).

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As for the nuclear Powers, a complete test ban might only deprive them of some prospects of further perfecting their nuclear weapons — that is, make more static a situation which is at present dangerously dynamic and which would continue to be dynamic ever under a non-proliferation treaty. To use the words of the Secretary-General:

"Those who have already embarked upon nuclear weapons development continue to perfect and increase their stockpile of nuclear weapons."

(ibid., p.6)

It is this dynamic aspect of the present gap that weighs heavily with the non-nuclear Powers.

At this juncture in our negotiations we are presented with some especially cogent reasons for devoting immediate constructive attention to measures for completing the Committee's work on banning nuclear tests. Advantage number one is that the test-ban issue is probably the most tractable politically both as between the different nuclear Powers and as between them and the non-nuclear ones. Advantage number two is that such an agreement, thanks to our earlier efforts in the Committee and within our national institutions, has reached such an advanced stage of studied preparedness that only a couple of points, minor in comparison with the situation a few years ago, relating to control are still outstanding, while the control issue as regards a non-dissemination treaty has not yet even been prised open for negotiation.

I do not intend today to proceed to discuss the substance of the knotty residual problems which have to be resolved before our protracted test-ban negotiations can be crowned by a settlement. They are all per se of a technical nature, although some — such as the question of control — have come so far into the political limelight that it would be difficult to settle them by recourse to reason alone. However, we are all now so blissfully aware of the fact that considerable scientific progress has recently been made, more specifically in seismological techniques of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions, that these can now be quoted in support of proposals to simplify the verification process. The moot point still seems to be that of inspection although, to quote the good news carried by Lord Chalfont in the message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, "We are not tied to a particular figure" (ENDC/PV.219, p.10). Lord Chalfont also intimated that British scientists "still believe that some on-site inspection is necessary, but they are ready to be convinced that it is not." (ibid.)

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As was recognised already at the time of signing the partial test-ban Treaty, 100 per-cent certainty can never be achieved that every shot violating the treaty could be discovered. And now we must continue to reason in the same terms of probabilities and risks. There now only remain (a) the question whether inspections — and if so what kind of inspections — are really the best way to narrow the margin of uncertainty, and (b) the question as to what margin of uncertainty is tolerable when weighed against the gain of obtaining an agreement.

In this connexion I would only take the liberty of reminding us all that just prior to the signing of the Moscow partial test ban, some interesting suggestions had been offered by various non-aligned members of the Committee with a view to facilitating a comprehensive treaty. These might now be revived for discussion, placed in the context of new knowledge, and elaborated further to meet the needs of a workable compromise. An important suggestion might be the participation of non-nuclear Powers in the process of detection and identification.

Another suggestion was tendered in case on-site inspections should still be wanted — and I do not pronounce any view on the need for these, but just assume for the sake of argument that they would figure as an element of a verification system. It was suggested that a much better formula than an annual quota for them would be one referring to longer periods, possibly made to overlap each other. The purpose would be to get effective deterrence with a lower inspection rate by decreasing the boundary effects and making the selection process more efficient. By way of example — and this is a theoretical example only — six inspections over three years might have as much worth as three a year; this because I believe nobody expects the quota ever to be fully utilized.

There is a particular reason prompting us today to re-examine the need for verification and to search for more flexible procedures for any such verification. For when we discuss this problem in the context of stopping the further spread of nuclear capabilities, it becomes glaringly evident that it is no longer one that can be dealt with in terms of adversaries, as they have been called, implying the Soviet Union on one side and the United Kingdom/United States on the other. Any contemplated system, be it with or without inspections, must be built up so as to cover all the countries which are to comply with the obligations.

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The zest for achieving a true reduction of military might through all the steps taken has guided my Government to ask for combined, package, measures. We did so in relation to the so-called Undén Plan several years ago (A/RES/1664 (XVI); DC/201) when we presented some considerations for our adhering to a nuclear-free zone. In the United Nations last winter our Foreign Minister proposed (A/PV.1319, p.27) a three-fold package -- non-dissemination plus comprehensive test ban plus cut-off of production of fissionable material -- believing that this represented a fair measure of balance and counter-balance. I do not now want to load our agenda with consideration of the cut-off of production of fissionable material as an additional item, especially as it is not among the measures explicitly enumerated by the Disarmament Commission for priority consideration at this stage in our work. But of course -- and I must stress this -- any progress on any disarmament measure, any offer of reduction of the nuclear strength of the present nuclear Powers, would serve as an inducement to the non-nuclear ones to forgo temptations to enter the nuclear race.

What I have been saying today has been motivated by a desire to help us to focus our agenda at this session so as to maximize the chance to obtain some positive decision. We in the Committee enjoy a capital of confidence from all the United Nations Members and from world public opinion in general. We must be aware that this capital may be eroded -- yes, forfeited -- if once more we just turn up our empty hands for the world to see.

Even if a major result at this session is not in the offing, we should at least be able to take a few strides forward. One such minimum programme has been offered to us in the field of non-dissemination. I refer to the proposal made by the Italian Foreign Minister that the non-nuclear Powers take the initiative by accepting a moratorium -- its duration obviously will have to be discussed -- during which period they would "agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons" (ENDC/PV.219, p.18). During that period further negotiations would proceed with and between the nuclear Powers. To quote Mr. Fanfani, "In that way ... a factor of pressure and persuasion would be created which could be brought to bear on the nuclear countries" (ibid, p.19). But, of course, it would also serve to relieve this whole issue of the sharp sense of urgency.

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It is possible that this proposal may prove valuable. I imagine that the time-limit for the proposed moratorium on the part of the non-nuclear States would have to be relatively short. Moreover, a decision on such a moratorium ought to be accompanied by pledges on the part of the nuclear nations that they would do everything in their power to negotiate so as to achieve definitive results in relation to a comprehensive test ban and a non-proliferation treaty.

Even under these conditions, however, a decision to participate in a moratorium such as that envisaged might be difficult to take for many non-nuclear countries. As far as my own country is concerned, I can say that if such a decision seemed to rally support on the part of non-nuclear nations, we would be ready to give it positive consideration. The atomic energy programme on which Sweden is working is in any case a purely civilian one. Press reports which make assertions to the contrary are consequently entirely misleading.

To return to those steps forward which can be taken in this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament: we might also have to conceive a minimum programme relating to a comprehensive test ban. In this field there is perhaps nothing decisive that the non-nuclear, non-aligned countries can institute of their own accord. I have already alluded to the contributions which may be forthcoming in regard to the seismological detection of underground tests. This was also obviously in the mind of the Italian Foreign Minister when he said on 29 July:

"In this regard it must not be forgotten that we can count upon the co-operation of the non-aligned countries, which are ready to offer their territories and the help of their own personnel to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement, and they are willing to do so." (ibid., p.17)

Some preliminary and private exploration has also been going on as to a voluntary co-operation on a scientific basis between seismological stations in different countries, creating a so-called "detection club". It would of course be preferable if such co-operation at the outset were not restricted to the non-nuclear countries but were worldwide. The demand that there must be a scientific, open, international co-operation in the seismic field as a basis for confidence in a test ban which is also to cover underground nuclear explosions, has been and remains the praeterea censeo of the Swedish delegation. Why should not some planning for this co-operation

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

be initiated now? And why could it not continue even if the major work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament entered into a period of recess during the time of the United Nations General Assembly?

I am fully aware of the misgiving of several delegations as soon as the question of some more technical exploration is as much as hinted at. But I assure representatives that the Swedish delegation is as concerned as anybody could be to reserve the discussion of principles and politics for this body. To ensure that no inroads are made on the political issues, I would suggest that technical talks between our delegations should not even deal with verification problems but merely with one or two items, narrowly circumscribed, belonging to sheer "mechanics". We should select items in areas where we already have agreement in principle, as is the case in regard to the basic reliance to be placed on national observation posts for the gathering of data. Some of our experts might ponder, for instance, by what means an international flow of such seismological data can be arranged, what channels of rapid communication can be utilized -- whether through the co-operation of the World Meteorological Organization or by some other network.

Similarly, as there is already in existence a fairly extensive international exchange of seismological data, the question remains how to widen its scope to include smaller earthquakes and how to encourage the development of scientific programmes and co-operation between them. An increase in the relevant data should facilitate the endeavours of those who are trying to find a basis for a lower inspection rate. We in Sweden would be prepared -- in the event such a step would facilitate the reaching of general agreement on a complete test-ban treaty -- to consider seriously establishing and operating an advanced seismic station on our soil; and we would be ready to have its data made available to the international data flow.

On the other hand, all problems to which a political element has been imputed should decidedly be left to be tackled by us at the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during the winter session. In the meantime, it would have to constitute our "homework". If certain tasks were explicitly stated as duties for us, even if we had not reached any major decisions in the weeks still before us, that would at least serve as a sign to the world outside this Geneva

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

enclave that we do take our dedication to disarmament seriously. It goes without saying that it would be so much the better if we were to have some more triumphant news to announce.

There are also challenges to be met beyond the confines of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament if the foundations for disarmament are to be secured. The most crucial one of these is to enlist China and France in a constructive dialogue with the rest of the world. As the Swedish Government has persistently urged throughout the years that China should be represented in the United Nations, we cannot pass over this matter in silence but must express regret that propitious opportunities have hitherto been lost. There is now a new chance given us by this problem's having been coupled with that of a world disarmament conference which was recommended in the United Nations Disarmament Commission resolution (DC/224; ENDC/149). Sweden voted for this as a matter of principle, but we also realize that such a conference would be of insignificant value if China were not to participate.

Surely we have to carry a heavy load of responsibility for what we do or do not do in the coming weeks and months, in order to set in motion a noble race towards disarmament. Let us now begin in earnest to discuss concrete next steps.

Mr. LOBODYCZ (Poland): The Polish delegation listened with the greatest attention to the most interesting statement made by the representative of Sweden today. We shall study that statement carefully in the verbatim record and indicate at a later stage our position on the ideas so eloquently put forward by Mrs. Myrdal. Now may I proceed to my prepared statement?

Our Committee has resumed its work, in accordance with resolution DC/225 adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965 (ENDC/149) in order to continue the negotiations. We are confronted with various problems. Thus, in the first instance, as the above-mentioned resolution has stressed, the Committee is called upon --

"... to resume as a matter of urgency its efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to consider all proposals for measures to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race".

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

Before turning to the subjects envisaged by this resolution, we deem it necessary to stress the fact that our Committee does not exist and act in a political vacuum. Taking into account the experiences of this Committee during the more than three years of its work, we cannot but mention that it has been a sensitive instrument of international negotiations, which reflects with almost seismographical precision all tensions and détentes in the international situation. It is obvious that positive as well as negative events in the international arena exert influence on our debates. They either favour negotiations or, unfortunately, render them more difficult.

The military aggression of the United States of America in Vietnam casts a sombre shadow upon the international situation. What is more, Vietnam is not the only place in this world of ours where the United States has resorted to military force in order to impose its will upon other countries. It goes without saying that the work of this Committee is affected by this dangerous situation. The concern for a satisfactory course of deliberations of the Committee requires, I submit, a clear determination of our position with regard to acts of aggression and military violence. Needless to say, the aggression launched by the United States of America threatens international peace, thus undermining the very idea of disarmament. This idea -- as is well known -- is closely associated with the problem of peace. That fact is indisputable. Allow me to quote, for example, the words of the former United States negotiator on disarmament, John McCloy, who referred to "disarmament as a concomitant of peace" in Foreign Affairs for April 1962 (No.3, p.340).

It is difficult not to express our astonishment at the fact that some representatives in this room try to discover something allegedly improper when, during the discussion of disarmament subjects, one speaks about the United States violations of peace in Vietnam and other parts of the world. We would not serve the purpose for which this Committee has been established if we closed our eyes to the military activities of the United States of America in Vietnam to their systematic escalation, to the new kinds of military forces and arms being brought into action. If we wish for real progress in the field of disarmament, we must always keep in mind the realities of the world and be aware of all the factors that prevent such progress.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

The situation caused by the United States in Vietnam cannot be reconciled with the basic purpose of these negotiations: namely "disarmament instead of wars". The concept of "disarmament alongside of wars", which some Western representatives seem to suggest to us, is contrary to the very idea of disarmament. Disarmament is feasible in a peaceful world. The world full of sounds of military aggression does not favour disarmament.

This point of view, I submit, has found its reflection in the Soviet-American "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations". Point 1(a) of that Statement declares, amongst other things, that one of the purposes of disarmament negotiations -

"... is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that

(a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems ..."

The Statement affirms, further, the necessity -

"... to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world ...",

and urges all countries to -

"... refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means ..." (ENDC/5)

While we see a contradiction between the situation that has arisen and the purpose of disarmament negotiations, we are convinced that putting an end to the United States aggression in Vietnam would favourably influence the work of this Committee and disarmament talks as a whole, as well as the international situation in general. The United States declarations of its readiness to continue military activities and, even more so, its declarations as to its freedom in determining the scope of those activities, sound very strange in this room. It is necessary to end the United States aggression in Vietnam in order to restore international confidence and bring about an atmosphere conducive to the success of our negotiations. The present international situation presses for decisive actions in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

So far, unfortunately, the statements by Western delegations prove that they underestimate this truth. In the positions of those delegations we see various elements which in our view are detrimental to the progress of our negotiations. One of those elements is the obvious reluctance of the Western delegations to pay appropriate attention to the problem of general and complete disarmament. That, I submit, is contrary to the main purpose of our Committee. All the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the activities of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, as well as the last resolution (DC/225; ENDC/149) of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations of 15 June last, put forward as a main and urgent goal the development of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. They envisage the collateral measures as means for facilitating the achievement of this goal. These proportions should be maintained, and while pressing the need for collateral measures we cannot forget our main objective. We cannot lose sight of the target aimed at by all measures under discussion.

Another negative element is, in our view, the reluctance of the Western delegations to take radical steps in the field of disarmament which might bring about the reduction of the stock of armaments and of armed forces. As a matter of fact, the Western Powers try to perpetuate for an unlimited period of time the existing structure of their armaments, to say nothing about their continued efforts to increase their military potential.

The essential condition for success in the Committee's efforts should be, I submit, concentration upon the problems which in the present international situation call for an urgent and effective solution. That is why the Polish delegation fully supports the position of the Soviet Union on the need for the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The existence of foreign bases and the stationing of foreign troops is the main source of international tension. It is a potential element of aggression which, as the events of last month have shown, may easily become an active element of aggression. Therefore the maintenance of bases and troops on foreign territories is contrary to the requirements of peace and international security.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

The Polish delegation attaches special attention to the problem of nuclear disarmament. As in the past, we support the postulate of liquidation of nuclear armament in the earliest possible stage of general and complete disarmament. We also support concepts for a solution of this problem on a partial basis. The Government of Poland has put forward the proposal for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), and the proposal for a freeze of nuclear weapons in this region (ENDC/PV.189, p.6). We consider both proposals as still valid. The dialogues that the Polish Government has had, so far, with the governments of some European countries on the problem of the freeze of nuclear weapons, as well as the response of public opinion to the Gomulka plan (ibid.), prove the vitality of the ideas contained in this proposal.

May I submit that another Polish proposal for the convening of a conference on the problem of collective security in Europe would also, if put into effect, serve the cause of European security? Such a conference of the European States with United States participation might constitute a favourable platform for discussion of the whole complex of problems affecting security, disarmament and peaceful coexistence of States in Europe.

The Polish delegation attaches great importance to the problem of the conclusion of a treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Western delegations have made a number of declarations as to the advisability of the conclusion of such a treaty. Unfortunately in practice the position of these delegations does not correspond with their general declarations as, at the same time, they continue to pursue the concept of a collective nuclear force within the Western military grouping. It seems that the policy of the Western Powers on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is subordinated to this concept.

The representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, in his statement on 29 July presented the concept of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which does not exclude indirect transfer of these weapons. It is worth while to point out the contradiction in his statement. On the one hand he affirmed that the United Kingdom believed -

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

"...that even now the order and stability of the world could be assured with nuclear weapons reduced to lower, safer and less costly levels without destroying or upsetting the present overall military balance". (ENDC/PV.219, pp.7, 8)

On the other hand, however, Lord Chalfont persisted in advocating the plan of setting up the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ibid., p.14), which obviously cannot be reconciled with the idea of the reduction of nuclear armaments.

As a direct result of the creation of the MLF or ANF, new, non-nuclear States of one military grouping, that is NATO, would have the right of co-disposal and co-decision in the use of nuclear weapons. This would substantially increase their influence over the nuclear strategy in general. Such a development would strengthen qualitatively the military position of the respective countries of NATO, and in particular that of the Federal Republic of Germany. As a result of all this a new stage in the arms race would be inescapable. Therefore, the setting up of the MLF or ANF would be, I submit, contrary to the basic purpose of this Committee - that is, halting and reversing the arms race.

The attempt to reconcile the MLF or ANF with the idea of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons leads to a paradoxical conclusion: namely, that it is possible to envisage such a non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would stimulate the increase of the arms race. Furthermore, the setting up of the Multilateral or Atlantic Nuclear Force with the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany would grant a premium to the most aggressive political forces in West Germany for their unyielding position and pressure for access to nuclear weapons. Such a move would encourage these forces and would be a starting-point for their continued claims in the nuclear field. The road to satisfying the ambitions of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of nuclear armaments would be considerably shortened. In the interest of security in Europe and of progress on the path to the conclusion of a non-dissemination agreement as well as to disarmament in general, everything should be done to avert the dangerous consequences that might arise out of the creation of the MLF or ANF.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

It is for these reasons that we consider the proposal (ENDC/151) of the German Democratic Republic on a comprehensive renunciation of nuclear arms by the two German States, and on other measures to be undertaken by both these States in the field of disarmament, as a valuable contribution to the fulfilment of the tasks of this Committee. The statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic just read to this Committee substantiates these proposals, which the Polish delegation fully supports. Because of the constructive character of that statement the Polish delegation is of the view that our Committee should pay it due attention.

The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, claimed at our last meeting, on 5 August, that the critical evaluation of the policy of the West German Government is the result of "emotions still aroused by the events of twenty years ago" (ENDC/PV.221, p.19). With all due respect, it is difficult not to express our astonishment at such an opinion. In order to judge on its merits the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany it is not necessary to look at the past. It suffices to take into consideration the facts which illustrate that policy.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany does not hide its objectives. It openly proclaims revisionist territorial claims and the desire to change the situation created in Europe as a result of the Second World War. With those objectives in mind it strives to strengthen its political and military position. The pressure for the participation of the German Federal Republic in MLF is an integral part of this policy. All this is not only directed against the security of Poland and of other socialist States but is also contrary to the requirements of peace and security in Europe.

The concept of the setting up of MLF or ANF is a stumbling-block on the road to the conclusion of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The contradiction between the concept of a multilateral nuclear force and a non-proliferation agreement cannot be overcome merely by devising a treaty formula. In his recent article in the July issue of Foreign Affairs (p.596), Mr. Foster suggested "a withdrawal clause similar to that found in the limited test-ban treaty". With all due respect, we are unable to agree with him on such an approach to the problem; because the withdrawal clause, which has been a useful formula, for instance, in the case of the Moscow test-ban treaty, would in the case of a non-dissemination agreement be trans-

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

formed merely into means of preserving the possibility to create the MLF or ANF. Thus the idea of a withdrawal clause in a non-dissemination agreement would imply that one party to it, namely the Western Powers, might presuppose that it would be allowed to take certain steps which are considered by the other party as contrary to the very spirit of this agreement. Such an approach cannot be reconciled with the principle of good faith among parties to an agreement. Moreover, in legal terminology this would be a clear case of the so-called reservatio mentalis.

What purpose would be served by concluding a non-dissemination agreement with the withdrawal clause implicitly referring to the MLF or ANF? It is well known that withdrawal from a treaty is not a popular move. After the creation of the MLF or ANF, a politically and psychologically difficult act of withdrawal from a non-dissemination agreement would become a hard necessity, not for the Western States but for the socialist States. Is that the real purpose of the Western delegations?

Taking into account the importance for international security of halting the spread of nuclear weapons, the Polish delegation calls for the cutting-off expressly of all direct and indirect means of access to these weapons within both national and allied frameworks. No other solution would be able to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Western delegations present the problem of a comprehensive nuclear test ban as if the socialist delegations had obstructed such a ban. May I submit that this is not the case? It is not the socialist delegations which advance postulates complicating the matter. The Western Powers demand that those postulates should be satisfied in order to bring about the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. There is no doubt that the key obstacle standing in the way of such a treaty is the lack of the political decision on the part of the United States.

As far as concerns other proposals tabled before this Committee, may I stress the vital importance of the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons? The implementation of that proposal would be simple and easy. The conclusion of a treaty in this field would contribute to the increase of mutual confidence in international relations and create more favourable conditions for broader disarmament measures. The attainment of that goal would be facilitated also by a declaration by the nuclear Powers, as proposed by the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.220, p.18) that none of them will be the first to use nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

The Polish delegation considers that it would be most advantageous to convene a world conference on disarmament, as provided for in resolution DC/224 adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (ENDC/149). Such a conference could become a turning-point on the path to the solution of disarmament problems.

More than three years have elapsed since the beginning of the work of this Committee. During that period no agreement has been achieved within the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that would mark significant progress on disarmament. In spite of this we are, as before, of the opinion that an agreement is possible in various fields. With this in mind we have presented our considered views on the sources of the difficulties in our negotiations and the steps that ought to be taken to promote progress in the solution of disarmament problems.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): First of all I should like to thank the Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, who was Chairman at the 218th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which inaugurated this session of the Committee, for his kind words of welcome.

Almost eleven months have passed since the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament adjourned last September. The report which the Committee submitted to the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly upon the conclusion of its work (ENDC/148) noted that the Committee's negotiations had not yielded any positive results. The lack of results from the work of the Committee caused several delegations to express justified criticism and concern. The representatives of most of the States members of the Committee pointed out that advantage should be taken of the favourable situation and the stimulus resulting from the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments (ENDC/100/Rev.1) in order to adopt further measures towards relaxing international tension and halting the arms race, and that the negotiations should not be allowed to come once again to a standstill. However, those appeals met with no response. Despite all the efforts of the delegations of the socialist and non-aligned countries, the work of the Committee was brought once more to a standstill.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

Subsequent developments have fully confirmed that those appeals were right and well-grounded. During the past eleven months the international situation has worsened considerably and the favourable conditions brought about by the Moscow Treaty and by certain other measures have been reduced to naught by the increasingly aggressive foreign policies of certain Western Powers. These unfavourable developments already made themselves felt at the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was not able to discuss effectively a single one of the important and urgent problems of our time, including the problem of disarmament. Since the beginning of this year this undesirable process has continued and even worsened. Its most significant manifestation has been the increased aggression by the United States in Vietnam, armed intervention in the Dominican Republic, and also events in other parts of the world.

Other representatives of the socialist countries who have spoken before us in the general debate have rightly drawn attention to these facts and have stressed that, if our Committee is to fulfil its purpose, it must concentrate its activities on adopting such measures as will change this dangerous course. However, in the negotiations the delegations of the Western countries have so far carefully avoided these issues, and have even attempted to deny the socialist countries their right to examine them in this Committee, as we saw for ourselves, for instance, at the last meeting, when the representative of Italy spoke (ENDC/PV.221, pp. 21, 22). But we cannot at all agree with that. Besides, there seems to be a profound contradiction in the position of the Western delegations on this question. This can be seen, for instance, from the statement made by the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, at the same meeting in which he attempted to define the tasks of the Committee and stated that -

"Our duty here, according to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is to discuss ways in which the violence which is unfortunately endemic in the world today can be made less dangerous, less liable to erupt into a nuclear war."
(ibid, p.18)

We can agree with that point. But at the same time the Canadian representative reproaches the delegations of the socialist countries for condemning in their statements the aggressive policy of the United States. On that point we cannot at all agree with Mr. Burns. According to him we should discuss the possibility of eliminating the threat of war but we should not discuss the very thing which, precisely at the present time, is increasing this danger more than anything else.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

We are asked to pass over in silence the fact that the United States is waging in Vietnam an aggressive war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and against the struggle of the people of South Vietnam for their national liberation, a war which is daily growing more extensive and which may have the most serious consequences for peace throughout the world.

We must conduct negotiations on disarmament, but we must not talk about the fact that in recent weeks the United States has been increasing its armaments; that the United States Government has just requested a further allocation of 1,700 million dollars for armaments and for the war in Vietnam, and at the beginning of next year, according to the American Press, it will request a further allocation of 3-4,000 million dollars for the same purpose; that the American armed forces are to be increased by 350,000 men, bringing the total to almost 3 million; that it is intended to send another 50,000 troops to Vietnam in the very near future, so that the number of United States armed forces there will exceed 125,000 men. Moreover, according to American Press reports, this figure is far from being final.

United States troops are participating on an ever-increasing scale in direct military operations against the patriots of South Vietnam and are using methods which are arousing indignation and revulsion throughout the world. Only a few days ago the United States Press reported the destruction of a South Vietnamese village near the United States base at Da Nang; the village was burned to the ground. In the New York Times report of 3 August 1965 on this barbarous crime committed by the armed forces of the United States, we read:

"United States Marines using cigarette lighters, matches and flame throwers razed the village of Camne today, four miles from the Da Nang air base, after receiving sniper fire.

"About 150 straw and bamboo houses were burned. Other houses and shacks were bulldozed down by Marine amphibious tractors".

This report shows the incredible terrorism by means of which the United States armed forces are trying to intimidate the people of South Vietnam and break their will for freedom. To all those who lived through the horrors of the Second World War, and particularly to the Czechoslovak people, this report recalls the barbarous destruction of the Czech village of Lidice by the fascist occupying forces in 1942. The purpose of that punitive measure was to intimidate the Czechoslovak people and

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break their will to resist the invader. But it had exactly the opposite effect: the hatred of the Czechoslovak people for the invader increased still further, and a wave of indignation and of solidarity with our people in their struggle for freedom spread throughout the world.

We have no doubt that the people of Vietnam and world public opinion will react in the same way to this barbarous destruction of a completely innocent South Vietnamese village by the United States armed forces. We are also convinced that, like the struggle of the Czechoslovak people during the Second World War, the heroic struggle of South Vietnamese patriots will lead in the end to the independence and unification of the country, for which they have endured such terrible sacrifices throughout the many years of their struggle.

The fate of that Vietnamese village of Camne, so barbarously destroyed, is merely one example of how important and urgently necessary it is to take effective measures to put an end to the war of aggression in Vietnam. If our negotiations are indeed to contribute towards preventing the violence now taking place in many parts of the world -- the most dangerous expression of which is the United States aggression in Vietnam -- from degenerating into a nuclear war, if we wish to prevent this, we must concentrate our attention precisely on these questions, on the adoption of such measures as will help to bring about a change in this highly dangerous development.

It follows from all this that since September of last year, and especially during the past few months, as a result of the policy of the Western Powers a number of grave events have taken place in the world which are in complete contradiction with the aims and tasks of this Committee.

In these circumstances the question logically arises: what point is there in continuing the work of this Committee when certain member States are pursuing a policy which gives rise to another arms race, heightens international tension and directly threatens international security? The governments of many States have quite rightly raised this question, and, of course, the Czechoslovak Government has also done so. Having carefully weighed all these circumstances, the Czechoslovak Government has come to the conclusion that the present dangerous situation calls for increased efforts aimed at putting an end to the present unfavourable developments. We must mobilize the united efforts of all those who are interested in the maintenance of peace and in disarmament for a more intensive struggle to achieve these ends.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

That is why the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic welcomed the proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union to convene the United Nations Disarmament Commission, thereby enabling the present situation in the field of disarmament to be discussed with the participation of all States Members of the United Nations. That is why we also fully supported the proposal made in Cairo at the Second Conference of Heads of governments of Non-Aligned States to convene a world conference on disarmament which would be attended by all States (A/5763; p.23). The usefulness of this proposal was also confirmed by the resolution which was adopted at the session of the Disarmament Commission by the vast majority of the States Members of the United Nations (DC/224; ENDC/149).

We believe that this Committee, too, can and must make its contribution towards the achievement of these aims. The agreement to resume the work of this Committee was welcomed by most countries of the world as a decision which could help to improve the international climate. However, one must say from the outset that the resumption itself of these negotiations in no way alters the present tense and dangerous situation in the world. The Committee must at long last achieve concrete results which would help to reduce international tension, lessen the danger of war and slow down the arms race. If our Committee fails once again to justify the hopes that have been placed in it, there is a real danger that it will compromise itself definitely in the eyes of the peoples and world public opinion.

In order to fulfil the aforesaid requirement, the Committee's discussions should be mainly directed towards the adoption of measures the urgent necessity of which is stressed by the dangerous developments of the present time. Such measures were listed in the memorandum (A/5827 and Corr.1) submitted by the Soviet Government on 7 December 1964 at the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The socialist delegations urged the discussion of these measures also in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, where a number of other delegations supported them. The memorandum lists a number of measures the implementation of which would help to bring about an effective improvement in the international atmosphere and a relaxation of international tension. That is why the Czechoslovak delegation expressed at the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly its full support for that memorandum.

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At the present time some measures the implementation of which is particularly urgent have moved into the forefront. I am referring in the first place to the proposals to eliminate foreign military bases and to withdraw foreign troops from the territories of other States. The socialist countries have already been striving for a number of years to secure the implementation of these measures. The events of the last few months have once again confirmed in the most convincing manner their importance and urgency. The use of United States military bases and armed forces on the territories of other countries for aggression in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic has clearly shown the real purpose of foreign military bases and armed forces situated in the territories of other States in various parts of the world, and how dangerous the consequences of such a situation may be for international peace and security.

The delegations of the Western countries are seeking to minimize the importance of the proposals to eliminate foreign military bases and to withdraw foreign armed forces from the territories of other countries, and of other proposals by the socialist countries, claiming that they are mere "slogans" used by the socialist countries for propaganda against the Western Powers. But such assertions are merely a naive and utterly unconvincing attempt to avoid discussion of those urgent proposals, which are supported by the governments of many countries, not to mention world public opinion. In reality they are urgent measures the implementation of which would help to bring about a relaxation of international tension and improve the prospects for the solution of other questions on the agenda of our Committee.

Another important proposal the urgency of which is becoming ever greater in the present situation is the adoption of such measures as would help to lessen the danger of a thermo-nuclear war. I am referring above all to the question of banning the use of nuclear weapons, which has already been under discussion for a long time. It is not only the socialist countries that have urged the adoption of such a measure. As far back as 1961 Ethiopia and a number of other non-aligned States took a valuable initiative in that direction. They suggested the convening of a conference for the purpose of signing a treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons (A/RES/1653(XVI)). A valuable proposal for the banning and destruction of all nuclear weapons was also put forward by the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, which suggested as a first step in that direction the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

The Government of Czechoslovakia fully supports all these proposals because it considers that the banning of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step towards lessening the danger of a nuclear war. The urgency of such a step has once again been confirmed by recent events. It is well known that in certain Western countries, and particularly in the United States of America, during the past few months arguments and direct appeals have been heard with increasing frequency in favour of the use of nuclear weapons as a means of overcoming the difficulties in which the United States is involved as a result of its aggressive policy in South-East Asia. Such arguments, of course, have the most serious consequences for world developments in many directions. This is true, in particular, as regards the negotiations on measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, to which great importance was attached by the delegations that have already spoken in the general debate.

We are convinced that an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, or at the least a declaration by the nuclear Powers pledging themselves not to be the first to use such weapons, as was proposed once again by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, in his statement at the meeting of 3 August (ENDC/PV.220, p.18), would be of paramount significance especially in the present situation. At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize that we are speaking of a measure which it would be particularly appropriate for us to discuss in the present circumstances for other reasons as well. In several of the statements which we have heard so far in the general debate, the importance of the time factor has been very rightly stressed. An agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, or a declaration by the nuclear Powers pledging themselves not to be the first to use such weapons, would be a measure to achieve which there would be no need for long-drawn-out negotiation. Its achievement depends solely on the taking of a political decision by the Governments concerned. At the same time, there can be no doubt that such a decision would provide desirable evidence that the statements of the representatives of those States about the danger of a nuclear war, and the urgent need for measures that would lessen such a danger, are indeed meant in earnest.

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In the discussion so far stress has been laid -- particularly by the representatives of the Western Powers -- on the speediest possible adoption of measures to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons. In their statements they have eloquently shown the urgent need for such measures. In our opinion there is no need to waste energy in our Committee on proving the urgency of these measures. In the earlier negotiations, particularly during last year, the delegations of the socialist and non-aligned countries devoted much attention to this question and made considerable efforts to achieve agreement. Even then it became evident that only one serious obstacle was standing in the way of the conclusion of an agreement on effective measures to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons, namely, the plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO States. The delegations of the socialist countries put forward many weighty arguments to show that the implementation of such plans was incompatible with measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, as they would give access to nuclear weapons to other States, and in the first place to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Nevertheless, the Western Powers are still endeavouring to carry out their plans for the integration of nuclear armaments within NATO. Here, once again, the contradiction between their words and their deeds is fully revealed. In words, the Western Powers stress in the Committee the urgent need to take measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, but at the same time their actions within NATO are in precisely the opposite direction. For several weeks already discussions have been going on in NATO with the object of preparing plans for the integration of nuclear armaments within NATO. The implementation of these plans would lead to the actual dissemination of nuclear weapons, since it would enable other States to gain access to them, to participate in their control and in decisions regarding their use.

In their statements in the general debate the representatives of the Western Powers have expressed the hope that the socialist countries will give up their objections to a multilateral nuclear force or to any other form of integration of nuclear armaments within NATO. But in this connexion we are compelled to note that nothing has happened, either in the policy of NATO or in the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, that would justify any change in the position of the socialist countries on this question. On the contrary, negotiations on the integration of nuclear weapons are continuing within NATO

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and new proposals are being made for its implementation. The arming of the Federal Republic of Germany is continuing; its revanchist policy is being intensified and its territorial claims in regard to the socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia in the first place, are becoming greater. It is well known that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany still refuses to recognize the invalidity of the shameful Munich Diktat. The persistent efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany to gain access to nuclear weapons are being continued and intensified.

In this phase of the negotiations, I do not consider it necessary to examine in greater detail the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany on this question. It is enough to recall the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Schroeder, at the beginning of last July, to which reference has already been made in the statements of the representatives of other socialist countries, in order to understand quite clearly the position of the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to gaining access to nuclear weapons, and what the relevant circles in the Federal Republic of Germany expect in that regard from a multilateral nuclear force or from some other form of integration of nuclear armaments within NATO. In the aforesaid statement the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Schroeder, expressed quite clearly and very frankly the aims pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of nuclear armament. Amongst other things, he said that the Federal Republic of Germany "has a very clear idea of what minimal technical and organizational demands should be put forward" -- that is to say, of course, on the question of the nuclear organization within NATO -- "so that Germany too might be able 'convincingly' to deter a possible opponent." This statement speaks for itself. Any commentary would be superfluous.

The representatives of the Western Powers are trying to convince us that the integration of nuclear armaments within NATO in accordance with their plans would not mean dissemination of nuclear weapons, that it would satisfy the claims of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of nuclear armaments and at the same time would constitute a guarantee against adoption of an independent nuclear policy by the Federal Republic of Germany. Let us leave aside the question of the extent to which those who put forward

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such assurances believe them themselves. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic itself has not the slightest ground for relying on such assurances. The historical experience acquired at great cost by the peoples of Czechoslovakia in their struggle with German imperialism, and the whole development of events in West Germany since the Second World War, provide more and more evidence that concessions to the claims of West German imperialism do not diminish its avidity and aggressiveness. On the contrary, they encourage it to intensify its pressure still further and to put forward ever new demands.

It seems to us that in the post-war period the Governments of the Western Powers have had sufficient opportunity to realize this. It is enough to recall what is left in the Federal Republic of Germany of the limitations in the field of armaments by which Germany was bound after the war, and what has become of the restrictions imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany under the so-called Paris Agreements of 1954 which were solemnly entered into by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany to gain access to nuclear weapons merely complete the picture. In our view it is high time that the Governments of the Western Powers drew the appropriate conclusions from all these facts. If for some reason they are unable or unwilling to do so, then they will bear a grave responsibility for the further development of events in Europe and throughout the world.

But they cannot expect the same of the socialist countries, which must evaluate the policy of the Western governments and, in the first place, the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the basis not of words but of facts. Post-war developments show that in regard to the socialist countries in Europe the Federal Republic of Germany is pursuing aggressive revanchist aims. Further clear evidence of this was provided by the gathering of so-called Sudeten Germans held on 6 and 7 June 1965 in Stuttgart. In connexion with that gathering of revanchists the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic published the following statement:

"Convincing evidence of the real intentions of the revanchists is to be found in the so-called 'Stuttgart Appeal', which was adopted at the conclusion of their gathering and which stated that the Sudeten Germans would not give up the right to the heritage of their homeland. They literally demanded 'the return of the German territories of our homeland in Bohemia, Moravia and Sudeten Silesia'."

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The revanchists obviously base this "demand" on the criminal occupation of a part of Czechoslovak territory in 1938 by Nazi Germany, and in order to carry it out they intend -- "to return to their homeland and exercise their right to self-determination as free people and to decide for themselves the question of their form of government and State allegiance".

The serious danger of such revanchist claims is also heightened by the fact that at the present time they are receiving quite open official support from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Among the main speakers at the Stuttgart gathering were Seehofer and Lemmer, ministers of the Bonn Government; for the Land Government of Bavaria Prime Minister Hoppel, and for the Government of Baden-Württemberg Prime Minister Kiesinger. Full support for their revanchist claims was also expressed by Chancellor Erhardt, who sent a message of greetings to the Stuttgart gathering. Militarization and, above all, access to nuclear weapons play a primary role in this revanchist policy.

Diametrically opposed to the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is the position of the German Democratic Republic, which opens up the real alternative of a peaceful settlement of the German question with due regard to the interests of peace and the security of all the peoples of Europe. The Government of the German Democratic Republic has on many occasions put forward valuable proposals calling on both German States to renounce nuclear armaments. Such an initiative also appeared in the statement made by the Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, O. Winzer, on 2 August of this year in connexion with the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Potsdam Agreements. In that statement the Government of the German Democratic Republic appealed once again to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that -

"... both German Governments should give up the manufacture, acquisition or use of nuclear weapons as well as the right to possess nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever."

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That position was also confirmed by the statement made on 1 August by the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Ulbricht, on the television of the German Democratic Republic. Once again he emphasized that -

"The national interests of the Germans in the West and in the East call for the renunciation of atomic weapons and of any participation at all by either of the German States in the possession of atomic weapons."

In that statement Mr. Ulbricht once again confirmed the willingness of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to accept an international agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, insofar as such agreements would cover also the Federal Republic of Germany.

The same position was taken by the Government of the German Democratic Republic in the Statement which the representative of the Soviet Union read to us today (ENDC/151). The Czechoslovak delegation fully supports his request that this Statement should be circulated as a Committee document. The Czechoslovak delegation cannot agree with the declaration of Mr. Foster, the United States representative, that under the Committee's rules of procedure the Statement of the German Democratic Republic cannot be circulated as a Committee document. It is well known that on a previous occasion a similar statement of the German Democratic Republic was circulated in that way. The Czechoslovak delegation is not aware that any changes have been made since then in the Committee's rules of procedure which would prevent it from acting in the same way in the case of the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic in connexion with the resumption of the Committee's work in 1965.

These facts determine the approach of the Czechoslovak delegation to the discussion of measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. I wish to stress once again that we consider the adoption of really effective measures on this question to be one of the most urgent tasks in the negotiations on disarmament. Such a measure, however, must include a ban on the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form. It must not leave any loophole for getting round the ban in any way whatsoever. But the main thing,

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which should be perfectly clear to everyone, is that the adoption of such a decision is incompatible with any plans for the integration of nuclear armaments with the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany and other States within NATO.

Recently numerous reports have appeared in the Western Press to the effect that the delegations of the Western countries are preparing the text of a draft treaty on measures to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. It can be gathered from these reports, however, that the draft treaty will not contain anything which would hinder the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force, or the integration of nuclear armaments within NATO in any other form, with the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany. That question has already been dealt with today in the statement of the representative of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Lobodycz, who has adopted a perfectly clear position on this question which is fully shared by the Czechoslovak delegation. In our opinion the submission of such a draft treaty would be devoid of any practical meaning, since a proposal drafted in that way cannot become a basis for businesslike discussion and would only waste the Committee's valuable time.

The question of the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests also occupies an important place in the Committee's negotiations. However, the statements we have heard up to now from the representatives of the Western countries do not hold out any great prospects of achieving progress in that direction either. Although their representatives do admit the existence of technical improvements and advances in regard to control, nevertheless they continue to insist on the unacceptable demand for on-site inspections. But the demand for the institution of such inspections is not justified by the need for effective and reliable control. The constant insistence on this can be explained in only one way -- by a desire to obstruct the reaching of an agreement.

In connexion with the question of underground tests the delegations of the Western countries once again revert to their old demand that the Soviet Union should publish its data on a detection system and should agree to the discussion of this question by experts. But such demands cannot lead to any results, as the representatives of the West must surely know. In the conditions now prevailing in the world there are reasons why the governments of some States cannot publish certain facts.

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This was pointed out, for example, by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, when he said that -

"Present relations among States are not such that one could freely exchange data in the field of nuclear weapons or give information on detection or verification machinery." (A/C.1/PV.1246, p. 61).

One can hardly assume that international relations have now improved in this respect.

In this connexion I should like to point out that at that time it was not only the Government of the Soviet Union that took such a position. This is shown also by several statements made by official spokesmen of the United States. For example, on 11 March 1963 the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Dean Rusk, stated in the United States Senate that United States capabilities for detecting violations of a nuclear test ban were better than could be fully disclosed. Much attention was given to the problem of the secrecy of the data on United States control systems in the field of nuclear tests by the former Senator Humphrey in his statement in the United States Senate in the spring of 1963, which was circulated as a document of this Committee (ENDC/82) and is available to all delegations. In our opinion it is quite obvious that in such circumstances the discussion of these questions by experts would be pointless and could lead only to endless procrastination.

On the question of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, once again we see complete contradiction between the words and the deeds of the Western countries. In particular the representative of the United States, in his statement during the general debate (ENDC/PV.218, pp.13 - 15) did not spare words about the importance of an agreement to prohibit underground tests. But those words are in sharp contrast with the fact that on 23 July, on the eve of the resumption of the Committee's work, a further underground nuclear test explosion was carried out in the United States. According to a report by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, it was the fifteenth experimental underground explosion this year. On 6 August the United States reported yet another underground test. Such acts by the Government of the United States cannot be regarded in any way as a contribution towards creating favourable

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conditions for negotiations in our Committee and, in particular, for the solution of the problem of underground nuclear tests. They show once again who is interested in avoiding the achievement of an agreement to ban underground nuclear weapon tests.

The attention which is being given to partial measures the implementation of which would lead to a relaxation of international tension does not mean any diminution of the importance of negotiations on general and complete disarmament; the achievement of the latter remains the most important task of our Committee. In regard to the main problems on which the Committee's attention should be concentrated in negotiations on general and complete disarmament, the Czechoslovak delegation still thinks that the key to the solution of this question is the reaching of agreement on measures which constitute the axis of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament: that is, on questions connected with the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. The Committee has devoted a good deal of time to the discussion of these questions in the past. But owing to the position of the Western Powers, which refuse to agree to the implementation of radical and consistent measures for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, no results have so far been achieved.

However, this can hardly be a reason for the Committee, in the field of general and complete disarmament, to go on to discuss other questions, since without the solution of these key problems it will be impossible to achieve any progress in the disarmament negotiations. If the Western Powers really want to achieve general and complete disarmament, they must adopt a realistic position on the question of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Only on this condition will the Committee be able to achieve real progress in discussing this pivotal question in accordance with the interests of the peace-loving peoples of the whole world.

Those are the views of the Czechoslovak delegation on some of the basic problems confronting the present session of our Committee. The tense international situation in which the Committee has resumed its work is in no way conducive to the solution of those problems; but at the same time it emphasizes their importance and the urgent need for their solution. Therefore it is necessary that all forces which wish to ward off

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the threat of war and are anxious for the adoption of measures that would lead to a relaxation of international tension and to a halt in the arms race must redouble their efforts to secure concrete results in our negotiations. For this, however, it is essential that the Western Powers, and particularly the United States, should renounce their aggressive foreign policy, the further intensification of the arms race, and all acts which cause increased international tension. Only if these conditions are met can our talks lead to positive results.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I listened with interest to the speech of the representative of Sweden, who unfortunately has now left. As usual, her remarks were very thoughtful and, I believe, give all of us here the opportunity for a careful analysis of those thoughts. Certainly we in the United States will approach them in that spirit and will, I am sure, have some comments to make on them later on.

On a different note, I must reserve the right to reply at a later meeting to the distorted charges and the hackneyed accusations which have been made concerning the policies of my country, and also similar distortions concerning the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. Apart from their unfortunate polemics, the statements we have heard so far from the representatives of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia are notable for the manner in which they have ignored resolution DC/225 adopted on 15 June 1965 by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (ENDC/149). That resolution was adopted by a vote of 83 to 1, with 18 abstentions. The Soviet Union and its allies were among those who abstained.

The United States certainly does not believe that this Committee or any delegation is in any way limited by the terms of that resolution. But, as Mr. Cavalletti pointed out (ENDC/PV.221, p.21), it was the Soviet Union which requested the meeting of the Disarmament Commission in order to seek guidance for our work. It seems rather strange, therefore, that the Soviet representative had nothing to say about the only resolution adopted by the Commission which is addressed to this Committee, but had a lot to say about his own two resolutions which were not put to a vote (DC/218,219). I hope this does not mean that the resolution which was passed has already been relegated to the Soviet limbo of non-history.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

We cannot ignore that resolution, because it expresses in a general way the most recent views of the vast majority of the United Nations. In so far as the United States is concerned, we endorse the priority recommended by that resolution for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement and a non-proliferation agreement. We also welcome its recognition of the need for a programme of certain related measures, some of which are dealt with in United States proposals before this Committee. Clearly this resolution marks the direction in which we must move if we are to be responsive to the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of mankind.

If, as the Soviet representative observed in his statement on 3 August, (ENDC/PV.220, p.9) I did not refer in my previous statements at this session to the need for continued efforts towards general and complete disarmament, it was because I was discussing the priorities dictated by the danger of nuclear proliferation. However, let me assure the Soviet representative that, even while giving priority attention to the imminent threat of nuclear proliferation, the United States is determined to work for general and complete disarmament as part of our continuing effort to achieve a better and safer world through the application of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

I hope, however, that the Soviet representative is prepared to agree with me that, at this moment, the most effective contribution we could make towards preparing the way for general and complete disarmament would be agreement on measures to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race. That is what is stressed in the resolution contained in document DC/225 of the Disarmament Commission; and that is precisely what the United States has urged for discussion and negotiation in its proposals over the past year.

Frankly, I cannot take very seriously Mr. Tsarapkin's description of these "old proposals". If the age of proposals were a significant factor, most of those included in his Government's memorandum of December 1964 (A/5827 and Corr.1) should long since have been retired from active service. What matters is not the age of proposals, but whether they are responsive to the threat that faces us and offer some prospect for agreement. I propose to evaluate the three Soviet proposals suggested for action at this session in terms of these criteria. I will ignore the fact that two of them are among the most ancient contenders in the disarmament lists.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

One of these is the question of withdrawing troops and military bases situated in foreign countries. Despite what happened in the recent session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Soviet representative in his statement on 3 August again sought to link this Soviet proposal with the unfortunate situation in Vietnam.

During the debates in the Disarmament Commission a considerable number of the 114 members of the Commission expressed their opinions on the subject of troops and bases abroad. Although the Soviet representative implied that a majority supported the Soviet Union's views on this matter, I suggest that available evidence indicates that a contrary interpretation is probably more accurate. I cannot refer to a vote on the matter, since the Soviet Union did not press to a vote its draft resolution on the subject (DC/218). But I can say that, having made our own private assessment of the estimated vote for that Soviet proposal, we were not surprised that it was not put to a vote.

The record of the debate in the Disarmament Commission shows that many representatives noted in their statements that the Soviet proposal to get rid of all troops and bases in other countries failed completely to acknowledge the right of States to provide for their own defence by entering into agreements for accepting troops and bases of friendly countries on their territories. Mutual defence arrangements, which are essential in today's interdependent world, are expressly safeguarded by the United Nations Charter. This omission in the Soviet proposal is by no means inadvertent; rather, it favours Soviet interests in two ways.

First, by forbidding smaller or weaker countries to protect themselves through arrangements with other nations, the Soviet proposal would leave them vulnerable to the form of aggression which communists now call "wars of national liberation". What is the essence of this doctrine? As Secretary Rusk observed in a speech to the American Society of International Law on 23 April of this year, a so-called "war of national liberation" is any war which furthers communist aims. As he said then:

"It is used to denote any effort led by communists to overthrow by force any non-communist government. Thus the war in South Vietnam is called a 'war of national liberation'. And those who would overthrow various other non-communist governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are called the 'forces of national liberation'".

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Secretary Rusk further stated:

"It is plain that acceptance of the doctrine of 'wars of national liberation' would amount to scuttling the modern international law of peace which the [United Nations] Charter prescribes, and acceptance of the practice of 'wars of liberation', as defined by the communists, would mean the breakdown of peace itself".

We hope for a world free from aggression, a world in which there would be no need to maintain troops and bases abroad. However, so long as aggression persists, its victims and potential victims have a right to seek protection. As our late Ambassador Adlai Stevenson remarked in an address in Toronto only last May: "Until the international community is ready to rescue the victims, there is no alternative but national power to fill the peacekeeping vacuum".

The second way in which the Soviet proposal is inequitable lies in the fact that it would tend to upset the existing military balance to the detriment of my country and its allies. A look at the map will illustrate this fact. Moreover, in upsetting the balance, this proposal would violate the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). I would only add -- and I wish to emphasize this -- that the Soviet proposal on troops and bases as viewed in relation to the unfortunate events in South-East Asia amounts to propaganda which cannot help to bring about a peaceful solution there. As my Government has repeatedly stated, we seek no bases in Vietnam and our troops will be withdrawn once the aggression ceases and a settlement is achieved by negotiation.

As usual, the Soviet representative presented his now familiar upside-down version of the origin of the present situation in Vietnam. The Canadian representative corrected this version of history in his statement to the Disarmament Commission in New York on 7 May when he quoted from an address made on 26 March of this year by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. On that occasion the Canadian Secretary of State pointed out that, as a member of the International Control

Commission, his country has closely observed the situation in Vietnam over the past eleven years. He added:

"Almost from the beginning of that period the authorities in North Vietnam have engaged in inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in South Vietnam. That support has taken the form of armed and unarmed personnel, of arms and munitions, of direction and guidance.(DC/PV.76, p.73 of the provisional text)."

He went on to state:

"This is a judgement fully supported by evidence, including evidence presented by the International Control Commission(ibid)."

I leave it to this Committee to judge the facts.

In his statement of 3 August (ENDC/PV.220, pp.17,18) the Soviet representative also revived his Government's proposal for a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and, pending such an agreement, for a non-first-use pledge by the nuclear Powers. My Government has offered assurance that it will not use any weapons, nuclear or otherwise, with aggressive intent. As Secretary Rusk pointed out in a letter of 30 June 1962 to the Secretary-General, however, the Charter of the United Nations makes a distinction, not between one weapon and another, but between the use of force for aggression and for defence. He went on to say:

"It is the firm belief of the United States that the only sure way to eliminate the threat to mankind posed by nuclear weapons is to remove them from the arsenals of the nations through a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

The Soviet approach to this matter offers no basis for a useful discussion.

In short, these two Soviet proposals hold no prospect for agreement, nor are they addressed to the really critical problem of nuclear proliferation. I do welcome, however, the inclusion of a non-proliferation agreement among the items which the Soviet Union has suggested for action now. Here indeed is an urgent item and one on which we must strive for early agreement.

I expect to discuss this matter at some length in the coming days, but I would like at this stage to comment on only one aspect. The threat of nuclear proliferation is world-wide. Potentially it affects the security of every nation. It is not the kind of threat that can be averted by the actions of any one country; nor can it be averted by focussing our attention on any single country. This must be as clear to the Soviet Union as it is to my Government.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Yet the Soviet representative and his colleagues from Poland and Czechoslovakia today, and previously his colleague from Bulgaria, once again approached it from the standpoint of an unwarranted polemic against the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO. Once again the Soviet representative has sought to impose a Soviet condition on the very discussion of a possible non-proliferation agreement. I am compelled once more to appeal to him to co-operate with us in examining this matter in all its aspects and from the point of view of all countries anxious to prevent nuclear proliferation. The Soviet preoccupation with one aspect of this problem is by now fully understood by us all. I suggest that the Soviet representative should now permit us at least to examine the matter from the point of view of the preoccupation we all share regarding the world-wide dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Similarly, I hope the Soviet representative will not continue to reject out of hand any consideration of means of moving towards agreement on a comprehensive test ban unless we accept his Government's view on inspections. Such a position could be justified only as a device to prevent any search for agreement. I sincerely hope that is not the intent of the Soviet Union.

On this question, as on the United States proposals for a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons and to explore a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/120), we wish to exchange views and search for areas of agreement. These measures are related to the problem of preventing nuclear proliferation. They are thus responsive to the resolution strongly supported by the Disarmament Commission. I would hope that the Soviet response to the desire expressed by so many nations for progress in these areas would not be a flat nyet or rigid insistence on unilateral conditions before the matter can even be discussed.

Although he did it in a distorted context, the Soviet representative in his earlier statement himself took note of the importance of curbing the nuclear arms race. He cited statistics presented by Secretary of Defense McNamara on 14 July regarding the status of United States strategic and conventional forces (ENDC/PV.220, p.8). As the late Ambassador Stevenson and I stated in the Disarmament Commission debate, the United States has initiated a number of self-restraining actions to limit and in some areas cut back its present and planned nuclear deterrent forces. But the Soviet Union's refusal even to discuss seriously such measures as a cut-off of fissionable material production for weapons and a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles

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seems to be an indication of its unwillingness to go along with a mutually-acceptable programme for halting the nuclear arms race. While the Soviet representative has chosen to present only some carefully-selected statistics regarding the United States, I can assure this Committee that the build-up in strategic and other armaments continues on the Soviet side as well. Even if published Soviet statistics are hard to find, there have been a number of recent public statements by Soviet leaders confirming and even boasting about their build-up.

Let me conclude by stressing that, regardless of the bitter needs arising from the situation in Vietnam, we have come here anxious and prepared to engage in serious discussions looking towards concrete means of preventing nuclear proliferation and halting and turning back the arms race. If the Soviet Union will show an equal desire to make concrete progress, then we shall achieve it. If not, it will not be the United States nor even the situation in Vietnam that can be blamed.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 222nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Correa do Lago, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 12 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.