

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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30 July 1962  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday, 30 July 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

(Sweden)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINICHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSILEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU  
ATO M. HAMID  
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K. K. RAO

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. IBU  
Mr. L.C.N. OBE  
Mr. F.B. KOSOKO

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. S. ROGULSKI  
Mr. E. STANLEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. M. STAHL  
Mr. P. KALLIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. L.I. LEIIDELEVICH  
Mr. A.A. GRYZLOV  
Mr. V.V. ALDOSHIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID  
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT  
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D. MARK  
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the sixty-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LALL (India): I should like to address my main remarks today directly to the subject before us, which is sub-paragraph 5 (a) of the Procedure of Work (ENDC/1/Add.3).

Before I do so, however, may I welcome to our midst our colleague from Nigeria, Mr. Mbu? I had intended to do so on Friday, but of course there were other speakers then and I was not able to speak. However, I have already had the pleasure of serving with Mr. Mbu at another conference, and I therefore happen to know the pleasure and valuable help from him which are in store for this Committee. We all listened to his statement on Friday with deep interest, and we shall value greatly his co-operation in the months to come.

Concerning sub-paragraph 5 (a), I had hoped that there would have been more comment from all around the Committee by now on the interesting Working Paper presented to this Conference by the representative of Bulgaria on 25 July (ENDC/L.17)<sup>1/</sup>. It is clearly a document which seeks to arrive at a compromise in the formulation of general obligations relating to the first stage tasks. I should therefore like to talk with reference to it. Its first paragraph states clearly: "The first stage shall ... be completed within fifteen months." I think this is a matter on which there will be differences of opinion. We ourselves are in favour of a fast moving plan, but we foresee opposition, and have no difficulty in suggesting that instead of "fifteen" there should be dots inserted so that the period for the completion of this stage is left blank at the moment. I say this because we should naturally like to take into account the views of our United States colleagues and others who have supported them in the view that the plan should take a little longer. However, at the moment perhaps we could leave a blank there, without pinning ourselves to a specified number of months.

Then there is paragraph (1) dealing with the elimination of nuclear vehicles and all military bases in foreign territory, and so on. It is not my intention to comment on this matter. We have had long debates on it, and clearly there is a strong difference of opinion. I do not wish to suggest how the co-Chairmen will deal with this. Perhaps they will find words which are acceptable to both of them, and so give us an alternative paragraph (1). Therefore I shall refrain from comment

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<sup>1/</sup> See also Rev.1.

(Mr. Lall, India)

on that paragraph, but I should like to comment on the next paragraph which deals with the reduction of armed forces, armaments, and so on.

On the assumption that the co-Chairmen might use this working paper in an attempt to find compromise language in respect of many of the elements in the first-stage tasks, my delegation would formally submit and propose that the word "conventional" before the word "armaments" in the first line of its paragraph (2) should be deleted, and that the paragraph should read "to reduce their armed forces, their armaments, the production of such armaments, etc.". The reason we propose that is that the Government of India and my delegation are unable to accept the position that nothing should be done about nuclear armaments in the first stage. We regard nuclear armaments as the main problem before the world, and we are unable to take the view that in the first-stage tasks the reduction of armaments should be restricted to conventional armaments.

I should like to draw attention again to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations, and to point out that its sub-paragraphs (b) deals clearly and unambiguously with the -

"Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons." (ENDC/5, p.2)

That is a clear mandate, and in our view it would be very difficult for us in this Committee to agree to first stage tasks which overlooked that clear mandate. When there is such a clear injunction which has been accepted unanimously by the United Nations then, in our view, we must begin this task in the very first stage: and we have been heartened in taking this view to see certain very recent statements to which I should like to draw the attention of this Committee.

I shall take them chronologically, and I should like therefore first to draw the attention of the Committee to a statement which was made at the Accra Assembly in June this year on behalf of Mr. William C. Foster, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The statement was sent by Mr. Foster to be read out by the Chairman of the Conference at Accra, and it was so read out. This is what Mr. Foster said at the very beginning of his statement -- I am quoting it from the document which the United States delegation kindly sends me every morning, so I take it to be an authoritative text:

(Mr. Lall, India)

"The success of the Accra Assembly will be measured by its individual response to the question posed to all mankind by the threat of nuclear war." That is how Mr. Foster began his statement -- by referring to "the threat of nuclear war." Obviously that means that the United States Government, speaking through the officer who is directly in charge of its operations concerning disarmament, says that the main question is the threat of nuclear war -- "the question posed to all mankind by the threat of nuclear war".

Then I should like to turn to a part of the statement made by Mr. Khrushchev to the Moscow Conference on 10 July. There are many parts of that statement which bear on this subject. I will read only one, but we all know -- because it has repeatedly said so -- that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is what Mr. Khrushchev said:

"In this age of nuclear weapons, this age of rockets, the danger of a murderous nuclear war cannot be eliminated unless the means of mass annihilation are utterly destroyed and nuclear weapons prohibited. We are in favour of the complete destruction of the material means of warfare."

(ENDC/47, page 3)

There again we see the emphasis laid -- and rightly laid, we think -- on nuclear weapons.

Now I should like to turn to President Kennedy's statement of 14 July, which is the last, chronologically, of the three statements that I am going to cite at this moment. When he was speaking of the tasks before this resumed session of our Conference, President Kennedy said:

"In the resumed negotiations the United States will continue to seek agreement which will meet the dangers of the nuclear threat." (ENDC/44, page 1)

I submit that it is a question not only of the joint statement of principles, but also of the freely-expressed views of the leaders of government and others in positions of authority on the two sides -- let alone statements of countries such as yours, Madam Chairman, and mine, which are perhaps regarded as extremely averse to nuclear weapons for some reason which apparently the two sides sometimes consider as over-sensitive. Apart from the statements of all eight of our countries, statements which we could furnish here by the dozen, I am drawing attention to the fact that when they have spoken their minds freely in the recent past the leaders of both sides have said quite clearly that the main threat which the world faces is the threat of nuclear war.

(Mr. Lall, India)

So, for all those reasons, we would submit that the paragraph which deals with the question of armaments, the reduction of armed forces, etc, should leave out the word "conventional" and should allow this Committee to develop its views fully in forthcoming weeks on the elimination or reduction of nuclear weapons in the first stage, and I would hope that the co-Chairmen would take this into account. In any case, I make this formal proposal that the word "conventional" be deleted from this paper and, if they are looking at another paper or preparing their own joint compromise paper, then we would request that these views be taken into account in such preparation.

I think the next three paragraphs of the working paper are an effort to arrive at compromise language between the United States and the Soviet Union texts, and we will not comment on them. We think that they are conceived and worded in the right spirit, and they will probably be helpful.

But I want to raise another point regarding this paper, as I think something important is missing here. I should like to draw attention to both plans. I will take first document ENDC/2, which is the Soviet plan. On its page 13 I find that, before it goes on to part III and the second stage, it contains article 20 which is headed "Transition from First to Second Stage"; that appears directly under the stage I measures and is included in them. I should like to show that the United States plan does exactly the same thing on page 19 of document ENDC/30, where there is a sub-heading "I. Transition". Now what is "I"? The previous heading was "H", and if we go back several pages under stage I we find "A. Armaments". So from A to I -- that is, from page 4 to page 19 of this plan -- we have the first stage measures, and the second stage starts on the next page, which is page 20. So both plans include in the first stage measures the transition measures from stage I to stage II; and it is very important, I would submit, that in this document dealing with stage I we should pin down our approach to the question of transition. And in doing so we should again take into account the general sentiment in this Committee that we should proceed without interruption from stage I to stage II -- that there should be continuity.

I shall not again today quote the remarks in this connexion which were made by both Lord Home and Mr. Krishna Menon on 24 July (ENDC/PV.60), because I have already quoted those remarks, they are on record and certainly those two distinguished Ministers said that they were in favour of continuity.



(Mr. Lall, India)

I would submit that in this paper there should be a sixth numbered paragraph -- or perhaps a separate paragraph, because it might be said that in a sense transition is a little outside the actual first stage measure, although it appears in both plans again as part of the first stage. I would say that we should have a paragraph which would read.

"(6). And to proceed without interruption to the second stage measures of disarmament in the treaty on general and complete disarmament."

It is my formal proposal that that paragraph should be inserted. If another document is being considered or is being drawn up by the co-Chairmen, then I would request that those words be included in it.

I have said that there is a strong sentiment in this Committee: I have referred to what two Ministers said less than a week ago, and I should like to refer again to the statement made by Mr. William Foster which was read out at the Accra Conference because, after all, he is, as I said, the officer concerned directly in the direction and the leadership in this connexion in the United States. I shall quote quite extensively; Mr. Foster said:

"Central to our thinking is the idea that a wide measure of agreement can be negotiated and put into effect without waiting for a world from which all political, military and technical problems have been banished."

I will stop there for a moment, because that in itself is a most important quotation. Sometimes we have been told here, both in this room and, if I may say so, more often outside this room, that there are certain very grave problems in the world which stand as a road-block in the way of progress on disarmament, and that until those political difficulties are solved it is difficult to go ahead with disarmament. I should like to draw attention again to this spontaneous and freely-expressed view of Mr. Foster that we can make a great deal of progress and put into effect measures of disarmament without waiting for a world in which all political, military and technical problems have been solved. But here is what I am coming to which is germane to what I was dealing with, namely, the question of transition.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Mr. Foster continued by saying:

"Implementation of disarmament measures would then proceed without interruption until the goal of a disarmed world had been attained."

He said very clearly that we would "proceed without interruption until the goal of a disarmed world had been attained". I need not labour this statement with further quotations and citations, because we are aware that many of our countries take a very determined view on this point that there should be no interruption in the process of disarmament, but I would submit that as both the draft plans contain measures dealing with transition in their first stages we must include in this paper a clear statement that the States which will sign the treaty will proceed without interruption to the second stage measures of disarmament in the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

So much for this document and for the specific proposals which we have to make; but it is my duty, I feel, to remind the Committee of our philosophy regarding the contents of a stage of disarmament. That philosophy was clearly set forth by Mr. Krishna Menon on 24 July in his statement, from which I shall quote one sentence. Mr. Menon said:

"Therefore the impact that any stage can make on the whole quantum of arms and on the world must be sufficiently heavy to make a difference."

(ENDC/PV.60, p.16)

In other words, we do not take the view that we can have a very tentative stage of disarmament which makes no effective difference by its impact on the armaments situation. We believe that that would be not a stage, but just a collection of certain individual measures of disarmament which would not amount to a stage. A stage is always a part of a process which is of such a nature that it has its own logic -- a beginning, a middle and an end. A mere collection of a few measures is not a stage, and therefore we submit that this view which was expressed by Mr. Krishna Menon is entirely reasonable and entirely logical. It goes to the essence of the meaning of what should be contained in a stage of disarmament, and we think that it should be taken into account. There is no point in our setting down a few tentative, small, rather frightened measures and saying that they amount to a stage of disarmament. They do not amount to a stage of disarmament.

(Mr. Lall, India)

That is our philosophy, and we would request that it be taken into account by the co-Chairmen when they draft the document setting out the general obligations.

Before I close, I should like to refer to the two very interesting and enlightening statements, for which we were most grateful, which were made by Mr. Arthur Dean (ENDC/PV.62, p.29 et seq.) and by Mr. Zorin (ibid. p.33) in which they drew for us their concept of the picture of the world after the first-stage measures had been put into operation.

First, I should like to say that it was extremely interesting that, when they gave us their views of what the world would look like after the first stage measures under the Soviet plan, those two eminent and reasonable gentlemen painted entirely different pictures. That was very interesting. It seems that both of them are looking at the same measures of disarmament very differently. This is an extraordinary fact, and I think it is worth our while to dwell for a moment upon how extraordinary it is that the same measures of disarmament look so different when viewed from Washington and when looked at from Moscow. We have been told that geography does not matter, that it is the same for all of us; and I must say that I agree with a great deal of what our colleague from Poland so intelligently and forcefully said about geography (ibid. p.123). But there seems to be some other factor involved which makes these same facts appear very different.

In a moment I should like to come to what this strange element is which makes things appear so different; before I do that, I should like to say that so far as my delegation is concerned we were not very happy when looking at either picture. If I had gone to an art gallery to buy pictures and I had seen the two pictures painted by these distinguished artists, I would have bought neither. The reason is this. Of course, there will be dangers: both pictures contain dangers, and after we have finished the first stage of disarmament the world will not be a safe one. That is why Mr. Foster said that we must proceed without interruption until we attain our goal of a disarmed world.

I suggest that although there is merit in looking at the strategic picture at the end of stage I and at the end of stage II, there is very limited merit in it because when one looks at such a picture one tends to make static one point of time in a continuous process, and that we must not do. We must not look at the end of the first stage or the end of the second stage at a static moment, a frozen moment, a moment in which we will thereafter live, a moment the effects of which will

(Mr. Lall, India)

determine our sense of security and our sense of well-being. That is not what will happen. It is merely a point of time in a continuous process. I wish to draw attention to that because unless we remember it I am sure we shall all, with very good reason, be rather frightened of the strategic picture at the end of stage I and even at the end of stage II. We must remember that our goal is to move uninterruptedly to the end of stage III, and that is where the fear that afflicts us -- and naturally afflicts us -- today as a result of the appalling armaments situation will have been allayed.

Now I should like to return to that question which I said arises. It is the missing element which seems to distort or change the same facts when looked at from two points of view, and it is of course our old friend distrust and suspicion. In fact Mr. Dean referred to it in his statement on Friday. He spoke of the increased distrust and suspicion which would be created by the facts of the Soviet first-stage plan as he saw them. That is what is, I think, at the source of this distortion of the facts which takes place. I would submit with great respect to the two sides that I hope they will allow the unaligned countries here, the eight other countries that do not belong to the two sides, to help them to correct their vision in these matters. I should like to say that the Indian delegation will do its best to look at these facts objectively. I am sure, Madam Chairman, that you will -- I have never once seen you failing in objectivity -- and that other delegations will do so and will help our colleagues on the two sides to see the facts objectively.

In that connexion, Mr. Dean proposed a certain remedy. I quote from his words as I took them down and not from the text, because it is easier for me to do so and I think we should save time now. He said that he hoped that his Soviet colleagues would seek readjustment of their positions. He said he hoped that his Soviet colleagues would make compromise proposals, would move out of their old plans and so on and would, therefore, move towards the United States vision of disarmament (ENDC/PV.62, p.29). Without being misunderstood, I should like to say that I support that statement. But I also think that the United States must do the same. The United States also must move from its positions and it must move towards the Soviet positions or other ideas which might be expressed. In other words, this injunction which Mr. Dean addressed to his Soviet colleagues, I would take the liberty of addressing to both sides. Both sides must move in order to attack frontally the mutual distrust between them. It is not going to be good enough if, realizing that there is this distrust, one side or the other expects the other side to make all the movement.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I was very much interested in a portion of the statement by Mr. Green, the Foreign Minister of Canada, and I should like to draw attention to it in this connexion. He was at that time speaking about nuclear weapon carriers, but I believe that what he said has a wide application. He said:

"I am convinced that opportunity for genuine negotiations will exist only if neither side holds to totally uncompromising positions."

(ENDC/PV.60 p.31)

That is a very important statement, and one which comes from a country which happens to be aligned with one of the two great military blocs. I am afraid "bloc" is not a good word, because "bloc" sounds as though it were something that had been frozen, the dimensions of which were known. Regrettably, today the military arrangements on each side are not frozen; they are developing at a tremendous pace. So "bloc" is a very wrong word to use, but I use it because it has become one of the conventional words. I would again draw attention to what Mr. Green said. He said that there will be opportunities for genuine negotiations "only if neither side holds to totally uncompromising positions". That is a very important statement, and I hope that both sides will take into account those wise words of the Foreign Minister of Canada.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): We have just heard the representative of India point out that the views of the Soviet Union and those of the United States as expounded by their representatives here on the situation that would exist in the world at the end of the first stage of disarmament were very different, and we have heard some very pertinent observations from Mr. Lall in that connexion. In my statement today I am going to restrict myself to a rather smaller portion of the picture than Mr. Lall touched on: namely, the military and strategic consequences, as we see them, if the measures provided in the first stage of the Soviet disarmament plan (ENDC/2) were put into effect.

At our meeting last Friday the Soviet Union representative gave us an exposition of what, in the Soviet view, would be the strategic situation of the NATO alliance vis à vis the Warsaw Treaty countries at that point (ENDC/PV.62, p.34).

Representatives will recall that at the close of the meeting I remarked (ibid. p.51) that the Soviet representative's statement of the hypothetical strategic position

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was pretty one-sided. I have since carefully studied the portion of Mr. Zorin's statement which deals with this matter and, on this further examination, I feel that it gives a very misleading account of the strategic factors involved. Therefore it is necessary, in my view, to offer some criticisms in order that the Conference as a whole may be able to assess the matter, having before it the viewpoint of both sides. In preparing these remarks I have had the benefit of the advice of military officers who are attached to other delegations; but the conclusions are, I should emphasize, my own. No doubt some of my colleagues may wish to make statements also on to Mr. Zorin's strategic analysis.

The Soviet Union representative used a very simple method in making his comparison of the military capabilities of the NATO countries and those of the Warsaw Pact countries. He merely added up the figures of manpower in the armed forces given in the table on page 24 of the publication of the Institute for Strategic Studies entitled "The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances -- the Military Balance 1961-62". If indeed one could assess the military effectiveness of opposed coalitions for nations simply by adding up their known military manpower, that would greatly simplify the art of war. One would not require trained military staffs or very experienced generals to deal with strategic questions. An adding machine would suffice, and the answer to the question which side could win a war would be given immediately.

However, I should like first of all to make some criticisms even of the numbers which Mr. Zorin used in his numbers game. I refer to the tabulation given on page 72 of the verbatim record of our sixty-second meeting. There is a mistake -- probably in the transcription -- in that France is shown to have 1,900,000 men when it should have been 1,009,000 men, according to the Institute for Strategic Studies pamphlet, and even with that correction the total of Mr. Zorin's tabulation is 3,304,000 and not 3,334,000 as shown.

But by including all the nations of NATO except the United States and Canada Mr. Zorin ignores the fact that in computing what would be the balance of forces at a decisive point or area -- one where an offensive operation might be mounted -- it is only those forces that can be concentrated there within a short period of time that can be effective. He includes in his list the forces of Turkey, Greece and Portugal, which could not possibly reach a decisive theatre in Western Europe in time to affect a military decision. It is even doubtful whether it would be

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possible to move troops from Italy to the Western European front in time to be of any effect, as the history of troop movements from the Western Front to Italy in the First World War shows. Furthermore, Mr. Zorin has included the armed forces of the United Kingdom and Norway, all of which, according to the Soviet provisions for stage I, would be withdrawn to their home territories and could not reach the theatre of war except by passing over the sea -- an operation which is difficult and consumes much time, as I will explain more fully later.

Therefore the only forces which really should be included in this balance are those of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg. Let us, however, add for good measure the forces of Italy, and that would make 2,100,000 men in round numbers as the available manpower of the NATO alliance before the stage I reductions were effected. If the 30 per cent reduction were applied -- the assumption which Mr. Zorin goes on -- that would leave their strength at approximately 1,500,000 men, and those would be faced by 2,300,000 men of the Warsaw Pact Powers, according to Mr. Zorin's calculation, of which the Soviet armed forces would comprise 1,700,000. Thus the numerical equality which was alleged by Mr. Zorin in his statement is found to be an advantage of about 50 per cent on the side of the Warsaw Pact Powers when the real strategic factors are taken into account.

The fact that the forces of the Soviet Union would constitute such a relatively large part of the total in the Warsaw Pact group is of great importance. It is a principle proved by innumerable instances in military history that the effectiveness of a homogeneous national force is greatly superior to that of a more or less heterogeneous alliance although the two may be equal in numbers. The factors of command, organization, equipment, mutual understanding and confidence give the homogeneous force a very great advantage. In the last two great wars the Soviet Union has not had experience of the difficulties which arise in operating formations composed of several nationalities, and the Soviet delegation expert may possibly have overlooked that factor. I may say that I have commanded formations comprising several different nationalities, both in the Second World War and in the United Nations Emergency Force, and I have no hesitation in saying that in reckoning military effectiveness a considerable discount must be applied to the nominal numbers of a force made up of many allies.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Incidentally, the Soviet proposals (ENDC/48) would prevent the forces of the NATO nations training to operate as a group. Although it is not strictly relevant to the subject on which I am speaking, I must say that I cannot understand why the prohibition of joint manoeuvres was introduced into the Soviet draft for stage I when another article calls for all military forces to be withdrawn to their home territories in that stage. If national forces had always to remain on their own territory it is difficult to see how they could carry out joint manoeuvres at all. But this is apart from the main argument I am advancing in this statement.

The Soviet draft treaty sees the Soviet armed forces as having 1,700,000 men left at the end of stage I. It has been pointed out several times in this Conference that it is not numbers of men that give strength, especially offensive strength, to modern armies but the armaments with which they are equipped -- particularly tanks, artillery, mortars and attack aircraft. What will the Soviet Union have left in those most important categories of conventional military strength? I turn to the document from which Mr. Zorin has drawn his figures and which he presumably regards as a good authority. We note on its page 4 that in East Germany the Soviet Union has ten tank divisions, each with 400 tanks, and ten mechanized divisions, each with 250 tanks. On the next page it is stated that the total tank strength of the Soviet Army is estimated at 20,000 front-line tanks and 15,000 second-line or reserve tanks. Those 35,000 will, of course, be reduced by 30 per cent, and there will be 24,500 left, which is enough to equip about 60 tank divisions, including those that I have mentioned above.

Presumably, under the provisions of the Soviet plan for stage I, the divisions now in Germany would be withdrawn to Soviet territory, but they might be no further away than what was formerly East Prussia -- say near Kalinigrad. Kalinigrad is only about 300 kilometres from the mouth of the Elbe on the North Sea, a distance which could be covered in five days' march by armoured divisions.

It is stated also in the same section of the Institute for Strategic Studies document that there are nine divisions in the airborne forces of the Soviet Union and that two of them can be airdropped or airlanded in any single operation. The reduction of armaments under the Soviet plan would not require any of these highly trained and very powerful offensive organs -- tank divisions, airborne divisions or mechanized divisions -- to be disbanded or reduced in equipment so that they would be in any way immobilized or less powerful in offensive operations.



(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Obviously what the West has to fear is the possibility of a massive attack, but Mr. Zorin has stated that:

"..... In these new conditions an aggressor could not expect to achieve complete surprise. Furthermore, in view of the existence in the territory of States of a fairly extensive control network to supervise the elimination of delivery vehicles and the reduction of armed forces and armaments as early as stage I, no one will be able to hide preparations for unleashing war." (ENDC/PV.62, pp.36,37)

Mr. Zorin went on to say that any surprise that could be achieved would be much less than that of the attack by Hitler's Germany against the Soviet Union in 1941.

There are two points to be commented upon in the foregoing passage. First, the same type of armaments as enabled Hitler's forces to move by surprise to effect deep penetrations into the Soviet Union would still be in existence, as I have shown. Secondly, strategic military surprise is, as every officer knows, a relative matter. Surprise, in the sense of earlier preparation and concentration, if it gave only an advantage of ten days, might well be decisive. Mr. Zorin would seem to imply that the States of the Warsaw Treaty -- and, of course, the NATO States -- would no longer be able to achieve strategic surprise after the measures of stage I of the Soviet draft treaty had been carried out. Secrecy and concealment are the prime requisites for a surprise attack, and, as we know, the military system of the Soviet Union is very carefully shrouded in secrecy and we have seen in this Conference how pre-occupied the Soviet Union is to keep it so. However, it may be that Mr. Zorin intended to let us know that the Soviet Union was now willing to forgo the advantage of secrecy which the Warsaw Treaty countries now possess.

I have quoted his remarks about a control network. Do they mean that the Soviet Union has reconsidered its attitude in regard to the verification of disarmament measures? In the past Mr. Zorin has told us that control would consist only of permitting observers to watch the destruction of arms and the disbandment of personnel at certain selected sites. We have been told that we have no right to know about the quantity or location of any forces or armaments which remain. But, of course, if that attitude were maintained all the forces -- the very powerful offensive forces which I have mentioned -- would not be subject to inspection or observation:

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that is, unless the Soviet Union has now decided to include provisions for a network of observation posts such as was suggested in the "surprise attack" proposals of 1958 and which was one of the measures mentioned by Mr. Gromyko in his letter of 26 September 1961. But during this Conference we have so far been given to understand that no such arrangements would be tolerable to the Soviet Union, so all this obsession with secrecy is another reason why the West fears the possibility of a powerful land offensive by Soviet forces.

In the past the NATO alliance was even weaker than it now is in conventional forces and armaments, relative to the Warsaw Treaty Powers. It was the danger of mass attack by forces which could in a few days seize vital territory in western Europe that caused the NATO alliance to rely on the nuclear deterrent. The matter has recently been explained very clearly by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, quoting the explanation given by President Kennedy of the long-standing policy in this matter (ENDC/PV.61, p.31).

The aim of my argument today, as the Committee will have grasped, is to show that under the Soviet Union's stage I disarmament proposals the Soviet Union and its allies would still retain a great superiority in the means of conventional war which could be applied in a decisive area in Western Europe; but under the Soviet proposals the West would no longer have the nuclear armament which today deters any such adventure.

I want to say that I do not forget that the representative of the Soviet Union has assured us that:

"... the Soviet Union and its allies are not threatening anyone and have no intention of threatening anyone in the process of disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.62, p.62)

We welcome that assurance from Mr. Zorin, of course, and remember that we have heard such assurances before. But unfortunately, in the world as it is, when making calculations affecting national security and the defence of vital interests -- and disarmament affects both of these -- we have to count on what nations can do, what their actions might be if perhaps their destinies were controlled by persons less peaceful-minded than Mr. Zorin and Mr. Khrushchev.

Turning back to the factors of time and space, which are of the essence of military strategy, Mr. Zorin quoted some very strange views on the facility with which troops could be moved across the ocean. He referred to the possibility of the United States reinforcing its NATO allies in the event of a war with conventional

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weapons breaking out after the stage I reductions had been effected. I quote what he said:

"Moreover, if the Western European members of NATO should wish, in the event of a military conflict, to bring in the troops of their American ally to aid them, . . . modern transport liners, each of which can take an entire division with all arms and equipment, will cross the Atlantic within five days. Moreover, there is, as we know, transoceanic air transport.

"In his recent statement at the University of Michigan, the United States Secretary for Defense, Mr. McNamara, mentioned that the personnel of two American divisions can be rapidly transported to Europe by air."

(ENDC/PV.62, pp.40,41)

With reference to air-transported divisions, Mr. McNamara pointed out that their equipment, their armaments and arms were stored in Europe; but, of course, under the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty there would be no United States bases in Europe, or equipment either, and to move men into a battle area without all their armaments would be merely offering them up for slaughter.

I am afraid that the expert who advised Mr. Zorin in this matter of moving military forces across the ocean -- or even across a relatively narrow body of water such as the English Channel or the North Sea -- is not very well acquainted with the problems. If he would only study the extensive military literature, which his Western colleagues will be glad to indicate to him, describing the difficulties which the United States encountered both in the First World War and in the Second World War in transporting its armies to the European theatre -- and those difficulties were not chiefly due to U-boat operations -- and also the time taken to move the British armies across the Channel to the friendly territory of France at the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, his ideas on the speed with which such operations could be carried out would be drastically revised.

As for the airplane, it certainly speeds travel of personnel but it is not suited for moving bulk cargoes over long distances. Air travellers know very well how much a few kilos of excess baggage costs. But soldiers in heavily equipped units may require as much as 10 tons per man; and, apart from the dead weight, military equipment assumes inconvenient and extraordinary shapes. Problems of the military loading of ships and airplanes upset all ordinary transportation calculations. Apparently Mr. Zorin's adviser assumed that it would be as easy to move a division by air, and have it fully effective as a fighting organ on arrival, as it is to take passage in an aircraft from Geneva to New York.

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I note also that the representative of the Soviet Union is reported as mentioning at the same meeting that the distance from Siberia to the western boundary of the Soviet Union is twice as great as the distance across the Atlantic. (ibid. p.41) However, in spite of what he said earlier in his statement, there would not be any real reason for many of the Soviet armed forces to be in the Far East, where the Soviet Union's great ally, Communist China, could surely protect it from any attack from the countries he mentioned (ibid. p.39) as possible aggressors. Therefore the Soviet Union could concentrate its forces in the western part of its territory, and the long distance from Vladivostok to the Western Front is immaterial.

Before closing this critical review I should refer to another point. Mr. Zorin has told us that at the end of stage I in the Soviet treaty only land armies would exist in Europe. For some reason he believes he has reassured our United Kingdom colleagues when he tells us that an attack upon the British Isles would be impossible with those reductions in air and sea power. I wonder if he realizes what a disconcerting picture this really is for the British. What he is saying is that after the interlocking defence measures upon which the NATO alliance relies have been destroyed, and the countries on the western periphery of Europe are at the mercy of the Eastern bloc land armies, the British should be happy and content to be barricaded upon their islands. In short, Mr. Zorin wants us to believe that the British would be delighted to find themselves in the position which they enjoyed when the Napoleonic armies were camped across the Channel in 1811, or thereabouts, or during the Battle of Britain. It is precisely to avoid such a condition arising that the Western Powers founded a defensive alliance, and that seems so obvious that I will not labour the point further.

I cannot conclude without saying a few more words about the threat of nuclear war which the Soviet Union would have us believe, its plan would remove after fifteen months. Other Western representatives have given reasons why this proposal -- attractive indeed as a vision -- is unrealistic and impracticable. The arguments which I have given are intended to refute the contention of the representative of the Soviet Union that if there were no means of delivery of nuclear weapons left in the world, and the other measures of stage I of the USSR's disarmament plan were carried out, the NATO alliance would be in no danger because of Warsaw bloc superiority in conventional forces, and hence would have no need to rely on a nuclear force deterrent.

The Canadian delegation is as anxious as any other to see the threat of nuclear war removed from the world. But we are convinced that it can only be removed through the growth of understanding and confidence between the great nuclear Powers of the West and the East, and that understanding and confidence can best be built up within the process of staged, safeguarded disarmament -- such a process as is provided for in the United States outline of basic provisions for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30).

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): We are nearing the end of our discussion of point 5 (a) of our procedure of work (ENDC/52). Before it ends I should like to add a very short statement on behalf of the Italian delegation to follow the speech made by Mr. Burns, who expounded very thoroughly the technical reasons why the Western delegations cannot accept certain measures which the Soviet delegation has proposed for stage I.

Several of those measures, which have been thoroughly considered by the Italian delegation in previous discussions, seemed to be aimed in various but converging ways at a single goal: to deprive the militarily less powerful countries of Western Europe of the co-operation of their major ally at the outset of disarmament by destroying the balance which should on the contrary, according to the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), be maintained through the whole disarmament process. The total destruction of delivery vehicles, the complete liquidation of bases defined as foreign, the departure of allied troops, and the prohibition of joint manoeuvres -- all these measures taken as a whole appear to be directed toward the same object: the separation of the Western European countries from their American ally and their isolation at the very start of the disarmament process before mutual confidence was established.

We cannot accept this. In preparing the first stage of our treaty we must bear in mind that the world situation from the end of the Second World War until now has been marked by the existence of two great Powers of vast military might, one of which, having an outlook on life different from ours, is quite near at hand in Europe, while the other, closer to us in ideals, is separated from us by thousands of miles of sea. Italy is the only country of the Western European Continent represented in this Committee. Naturally I have no authority to speak for the others, but I am sure that our Western European partners share with us the same fears and the same aspirations. We all have one objective only: that peace, security and independence should be assured for all against every danger and every threat. How could we possibly feel otherwise?

Italy, like the other countries of Western Europe, is endeavouring to improve its own lot through the efforts of its peaceful people while co-operating in the development of other countries. The results of our efforts over the past fifteen years are well known. For us as for everyone else, war would be a tremendous catastrophe and the end of all hope. To safeguard our peaceful efforts, we and

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the other militarily weaker European countries have established, as we are entitled to do by the United Nations Charter, a defensive alliance in which countries on both sides of the Atlantic participate on a perfectly equal footing according to our free and democratic principles. All these countries ardently desire the end of the armaments race and the destruction of all armaments in a peaceful world by means of a disarmament treaty, so that the economic resources now swallowed up in this dangerous race may be devoted to progress and to the development of all the nations of the world.

Last Friday Mr. Zorin asked Mr. Dean whether he thought that the day would come when the American forces would leave Europe (ENDC/PV.62, p. 54 ). That question should not have been put to the United States delegation only, but also to all the other Western countries which, like the United States, are joined in a common defensive alliance by the will of their peoples freely expressed in their democratic parliaments. To Mr. Zorin's question I would reply that we wish for the coming of a peaceful world, a world without arms, where there would no longer be any need of military alliances and where peaceful co-operation between peoples would be directed solely into economic, cultural and spiritual channels for the welfare of all peoples. It is the wish of us all that this new world be created as soon as possible through our efforts here. At the same time no one should be surprised that, at the beginning of a process as new and risky as general and complete disarmament, when the Soviet Union refuses to accept even the phrase "in a peaceful world", we are bound for our part to preserve our co-operation with our major ally while cherishing the hope that in a new world this co-operation, at present so needful and precious, will become a past and distant chapter in our history.

Our Indian colleague has just exhorted us most eloquently to negotiate. (supra, p.12) He is right; I fully agree with this appeal, and I hope it will be heeded by everyone. But let us try to negotiate what is truly negotiable in stage I, and reserve further efforts for the next stages when they come up for discussion at our Conference. Let us try to negotiate with the Agreed Principles in mind as our guide. Let no one try to impose solutions which, as our socialist partners are well aware, the West cannot accept in stage I. If they are sincere, as we believe they are, they should understand this; and it is only from mutual understanding that agreement can emerge and develop, as we keenly desire.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I should like to associate myself with those of my colleagues who have congratulated our co-Chairmen on their agreement concerning the Procedure of Work which this Conference should follow. I hope they will also be able to agree on the basic questions in the list submitted to us in paragraph 5 (ENDC/52, p.2). I should also like to welcome the Nigerian Minister of Defence and tell him that my delegation is in full sympathy with the spirit of his speeches in this Committee.

At the meeting of 24 July, when we were honoured by the presence of a number of Ministers and heard their valuable statements, document ENDC/52 was distributed to the members of this Conference. It contains the co-Chairmen's recommendations for the procedure of work on the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. On the same day, at the Chairman's suggestion, the Committee approved these recommendations unanimously, as it does on the unfortunately rare occasions when the co-Chairmen agree on an important point. My delegation, like the others, found no fault with the recommendations and finds none now; but I should like to mention that I cannot see why the following restriction is included in paragraph 4:

"The present arrangements are not intended to apply to the consideration during plenary sessions of the question of a treaty for banning nuclear weapon tests and of questions relating to the work of the Committee of the whole." (ibid., p.1).

I do not think that this remark will ever prevent any delegation, if it feels so inclined, from referring to this important question. In fact it has not done so. A number of representatives have made valuable remarks in plenary session on the banning of nuclear tests. The representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, commenting on the words of our colleague from Brazil, said:

"...we shall undoubtedly be having an opportunity shortly for further discussions on this matter...". (ENDC/PV.61, p. 46).

The Soviet Union representative, also commenting on the remarks of various representatives on the suspension of nuclear tests, said:

"I therefore reserve my right to revert in the Three-Power Sub-Committee to these matters which have been touched upon today and then, if necessary, at subsequent plenary meetings of our Committee."

(ibid., p.47).

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I hope that the discussions on stage I of a disarmament treaty will not prevent us from devoting some of our time to the study of this vital question, nor interrupt our efforts to achieve as soon as possible a final nuclear test ban.

I think that the members of this Committee realize clearly that we have very little time in which to agree on any or all of the questions before us -- at any rate if we wish to fulfil our duty and purpose of sending to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the forthcoming General Assembly a constructive report marking real progress in our work. The 17th session of the General Assembly begins in the middle of September, and our report should be ready at the latest in the first week of September. According to the procedure approved at our meeting on 16 July (ENDC/PV.57, p.46), unless other arrangements are made we shall only meet in plenary fourteen times during August. Most of these fourteen meetings will be devoted to subjects connected with stage I of a treaty on general and complete disarmament -- the twelve problems listed in paragraph 5 of the co-Chairmen's recommendations approved on 24 July (ENDC/52, p.2). However, if the Committee so decides, some of these fourteen sessions will be devoted to collateral measures, such as methods to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons, and reduction of the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of communications. I agree with the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Green, that outer space should be regarded as a collateral measure and receive full consideration (ENDC/PV.60, p.29).

We should recognize that it is of prime importance to devote the necessary number of meetings to the question of a nuclear test ban, to which the world gives first priority, and which must be solved in the nearest future to reduce the risks of war and safeguard peace. We recognize that all the problems before us are of great importance, especially that which we might say includes all the others, an agreement on general and complete disarmament. But we cannot ignore that no real and permanent progress towards this will be possible unless the nuclear test race is stopped.

The Canadian Minister for External Affairs rightly said (ibid., p.26) that the question of nuclear tests is the most important of all and its solution would slow down the arms race and create the confidence necessary for progress towards general and complete disarmament. We might go on negotiating here on general and complete disarmament for months and years; but while the arms race continues to grow in



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volume, intensity and danger -- that is to say, while the Powers remain bound to the endless spiral of their nuclear tests -- I do not believe we shall advance one step towards the solution of any other disarmament problems. On the contrary, I fear that as time goes on each new series of tests will increase hostility and strengthen the chains which prevent the great Powers from breaking the vicious circle.

Mr. Russo, the Italian representative, said (ibid., p.46) that time is against us. But the moment is not past, and perhaps circumstances are now favourable for reaching an agreement that will put an end to the tests. If we miss this opportunity -- and let us hope that each State takes due note of the echo of the other's explosions -- no agreement will be possible and the Powers will claim in turn the fictitious right of retaliation. We know too well the "reasons" which both sides put forward to justify or explain their explosions. Both sides have proclaimed from time to time their intention of putting an end to the crazy nuclear race which condemns them and humanity to an indefinite series of nuclear tests and to the ever-increasing radioactive contamination of the atmosphere.

Life is movement and change. Nothing in the world remains fixed and immutable, and this inexorable law applies also to international life, in which the process of growth and change never stands still. The longer the nuclear Powers take to reach an understanding, the greater the likelihood that other Powers will succeed in entering the nuclear race. Every new member of the nuclear club will inevitably diminish the security of each nation and of the world. Each series of tests which the Powers carry out in turn puts the Power which conducted the last series under the scientific and political necessity of analyzing the new one, and it will proceed in its turn to reply with new tests and allege that it was forced to do so for reasons of national security, military balance, retaliation, imitation, or the right to the last turn; and so on indefinitely.

When will it stop? The reasons now given for answering one series with another will be just as valid in the eyes of the nuclear Powers next year and the year after, and can be invoked year after year till the end of the century -- if that were possible, which it is not, since everyone knows that if we cannot soon change course, the danger of a catastrophe destructive to all alike, the only outcome of this suicidal conflict, will grow greater every day. One of the greatest obstacles to a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests is the fear that the Power which carried out the last series of tests has obtained some military advantage from them, or made

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inventions or discoveries which give it a decisive nuclear lead. A Power entertaining this fear will not easily be persuaded to sign a treaty prohibiting tests so long as it has not tried in its turn to restore the military balance which it thinks has been upset by the opposing Power's tests.

The world is tired of listening to bad arguments in defence of a worse cause. In nuclear testing the great Powers are each other's prisoners. They say, "We will carry out no more tests unless we are forced to"; but in reality each side never stops driving the other and being itself driven. That is the true position. For this reason the other States represented on this Committee should in my opinion increase their efforts to free the nuclear Powers simultaneously from this strange slavery which each in turn suffers and imposes.

It is hard to believe that the analyses which scientists make of the nuclear tests conducted by the other side will ever lead them to the conclusion that the tests were repetitive, useless and sterile and have given the enemy no technical advantage. Quite the opposite: every analysis which one side makes of the other's tests provides evidence, or at least a reasonable suspicion, that some technical improvement and nuclear advantage has been obtained. So long as we do not fix by common consent a date for the final ending of the tests, no Power will find a suitable moment nor adequate scientific or political reasons for halting its tests.

The world condemns nuclear tests -- all of them -- and rejects the assertion that moral principles or the interests of world peace force the Soviet Union to carry out the tests it has announced. If any moral principle can be invoked, it is that which obliges all the nuclear Powers to make a final end to tests and to respect the rights of humanity to life, health and peace.

My delegation feels that, besides considering definite proposals on each of the subjects mentioned in the text and listed in paragraph 5 of the co-Chairmen's recommendations, we should try to reach an agreement to end nuclear tests. If we cannot do this before the end of the year, the truce that is bound to occur when each party has made its tests will be fleeting and precarious -- a mere, ominous interval devoted to the analysis and preparation of new series of tests. In the meantime there will always be the danger that the existing international controversies, or others which may arise, will interrupt or break off our negotiations on disarmament itself.

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Although our long-continued endeavours to reach a treaty finally banning nuclear tests have aimed at including within the ban absolutely all tests in every environment, we now think it might be possible to go back to the idea of ending atmospheric tests while continuing to negotiate on underground tests, if the present differences about the technical difficulties of detection and identification and the form of adequate control continue to hold up the framing of a treaty. Here too we might say that the best is sometimes the enemy of the good. In any case, whatever way we take, my delegation will still press my suggestion of 9 May (ENDC/PV.34, p.16) that the earliest possible date should be fixed for the final ending of tests.

So long as the Powers are legally entitled to conduct tests to improve their nuclear weapons and gain a military advantage, the mutual fear will continue and it will be difficult for them to find any moment suitable for abandoning the nuclear competition by treaty. If, on the other hand, a date were fixed by common consent, acceptable to both sides, on which nuclear testing would be finally brought to an end, the fear that either side would break the existing balance would disappear, and then it would be less difficult to reach agreement on control methods and the duties and powers of the international scientific commission suggested in the eight-power memorandum (ENDC/28). My suggestion of 9 May, with which you are all familiar, is a contribution to this end.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank the representatives of Sweden, the United Kingdom, Italy, Brazil and Nigeria for the sympathetic interest in the Mexican proposal which they have expressed at various meetings of this Committee.

In the light of what I have said about the limited time at our disposal for examining the problems I have mentioned, especially those listed in paragraph 5 of document ENDC/52, it is easy to see that if we wish to examine and reach a conclusion on every one of the twelve points in that paragraph, we cannot devote more than one plenary meeting to each. That would be impossible. On some, agreement will be difficult and the co-Chairmen will probably submit them to us in drafts full of brackets and double brackets. Others offer greater possibilities of agreement, and perhaps we ought to have begun with those. This was also suggested by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Relations (ENDC/PV.60, p.29) and, I think, implied in the proposals of subjects for discussion submitted by the United Kingdom representative (ENDC/50) on 17 July. The Italian representative, Mr. Russo, said that we should fix

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on certain practical questions where there is the greatest chance of agreement, and pass on from the phase of exposition of problems to that of concrete negotiations (ENDC/60, p.45).

But if, as things are, we want to make progress, we must change our methods so that we can get to work on definite drafts of articles, preferably, I suggest, presented first -- I repeat, first -- by the co-Chairmen, so that the Committee can in this stage of its work examine concrete proposals and not speeches, and make without loss of time precise suggestions on the texts submitted by the co-Chairmen and on the drafts or working documents submitted by any other member of the Committee.

We have studied very carefully all the speeches made at this and previous meetings on point 5(a), now under discussion, and the working paper presented by the Bulgarian delegation (ENDC/L.17<sup>1/</sup>). In my opinion it would be more useful to discuss this document than to go again over issues which have been examined before, on which learned and eloquent speeches have been made in agreement and disagreement, and with which our Committee is very familiar from its study of the disarmament plans presented by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2) and the United States (ENDC/30). I do not think it should be difficult for the co-Chairmen, aided by the competent staffs of their delegations, to submit to us draft articles or working papers on each of the twelve points listed in paragraph 5, so that our debates may be confined to those drafts. I hope our co-Chairmen will consider this suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): We have heard the comments which the representative of Mexico has made on the rather strained timetable of our proceedings, and also his proposal for a certain re-phasing of the work of the two co-Chairmen in relation to our deliberations. At this moment I think I can do nothing more than commend his comments and proposals to the attention of the Committee; and we might express the hope that we shall hear from the two co-Chairmen when they have considered the proposal.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): The discussion in our Committee has reached a stage where it is necessary to formulate a joint draft article containing the obligations to be assumed by the parties to the treaty on general and complete disarmament in order to accomplish the tasks of the first stage of general and complete disarmament. After having heard numerous speeches from representatives of

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1/ See also Rev.1

different countries, the delegation of Czechoslovakia remains convinced that for achieving this objective article 4 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) forms a sound and workable basis.

Two main categories of objections have been raised by the representatives of the NATO countries against the wording of that article. The first category concerns the alleged absence from the Soviet proposal of, as Mr. Dean put it,

"general obligations to deal with verification and the measures to ensure a peaceful world during the course of disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.61, p.20).

It is our understanding that this kind of objection is met by the wording of the draft article 4 of the treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/L.17) submitted by the Bulgarian delegation at the meeting held on 25 July (ENDC/PV.61). As everyone knows, that draft takes into full account the requirements contained in the United States draft and the objections of our colleagues from the NATO countries.

The second category of objections raised by the United States delegation and by other delegations of the Western countries concerns the requirement expressed in the Soviet proposal that the complete elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles, coupled with the simultaneous dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of all troops from foreign territories, should take place as early as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament. In all our discussions, that objection has been reiterated, and the reason given has been that the measure would create an unacceptable imbalance. Since that was repeated this morning by the representatives of Canada and Italy my delegation would like to try to reply to the objections.

First of all, the requirement to eliminate all nuclear delivery vehicles at the first stage would affect all States possessing such delivery vehicles in an equal measure and to an equal extent. Therefore, from that point of view one cannot speak of any "unequal position" in which any party to the treaty would find itself. Nuclear delivery vehicles would be destroyed by both sides, and that fact would have immense importance in connexion with the removal of the threat of a nuclear war because nuclear weapons which today undoubtedly constitute suitable means for aggression would be completely neutralized. I think that we should look at this problem from the point of view of the possibility of a nuclear attack, of a possible threat by the most dangerous instrument, capable of inflicting upon humanity the catastrophe of a nuclear war.

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The Soviet Union is ready to renounce the use of nuclear weapons entirely at the very beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament and to eliminate them completely in the second stage, just because aggression has no place in the policy of the Soviet Union. That again provides clear evidence of the fact that the nuclear force of the Soviet Union was built and is being built for the sole purpose of defence in response to the nuclear threat from the West, and that the Soviet Union is ready to give it up entirely as soon as the Western Powers themselves shelve their nuclear weapons and stop their aggressive nuclear threats.

The representative of the United States alleged that a 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles would render the countries which are members of NATO virtually powerless vis-à-vis the socialist countries in the field of conventional armed forces, particularly in Europe. That statement was repeated by the representative of the United Kingdom and, today, both by the representative of Canada and by the representative of Italy. But a detailed analysis from the military and strategic points of view made on 27 July by the Soviet delegation (ENDC/PV.62, pp.34 et seq.) quite clearly refuted that objection just by using technical arguments -- the type of arguments and reasoning so often invoked by the Western delegations during our discussions. When the Western delegations persist in repeating the assertion about the alleged imbalance resulting from the implementation of the first stage of the Soviet proposal, they are repeating something which is in direct contradiction to the pronouncements of the United States Secretary of Defence, which have been quoted here several times. As our delegation was the first to quote those statements in this debate it is superfluous for me to repeat them. But, after hearing the discussion of 27 July, we -- probably in common with all the delegations present here, -- took the advice of our military expert and also the advice gained from military literature concerning this point, and I should like to present our modest contribution to this problem on that particular level.

We have found that the newly-nominated Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, holds a view which, in relation not only to the actual manpower but also to the potential manpower of fit males of military age, supports the view advanced and the analysis made here by the Soviet delegation. In the book The Uncertain Trumpet, which certainly most of my colleagues know quite well, General Maxwell Taylor says, with regard to Europe, that the potential manpower of the countries members of NATO exceeds by a very large number -- namely, by 26.9 million--

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the potential manpower of countries of the Warsaw Treaty. Even if we added to that count the Asian and Latin-American countries, the United States and its allied in military blocs have for military purposes, according to General Maxwell Taylor, about 11,5 million men more than the Soviet Union and all its allies. These are considerations we may find in the military literature of the West.

Therefore, while the indisputable facts — confirmed even by the authority of Western military personalities — prove the untenability of the thesis that the immobilization and the subsequent destruction of nuclear weapons would lead to an alleged superiority of the socialist countries in conventional weapons, the Western delegations today have come forward with the allegation that the armed forces of the member countries of NATO, even if numerically equal to the armed forces of the socialist countries, would be at a disadvantage through being split under a number of national commands and through certain transport difficulties in Europe. That assertion too is unfounded. The Czechoslovak delegation thinks that, on the basis of experience and of the knowledge of our military experts, and on the basis of historical experience at the place where the main line of contact between the two military groupings exists now, we may be able to bring some contribution and to present to our colleagues some considerations worth thinking of.

First of all, would not the measures aimed at loosening the inner cohesion of military groupings and the withdrawal of forces from marginal territories of those groupings — that is, from the territories of their minor members — affect to an equal extent both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty? If we look at this question from the standpoint of objective geographical reality — which the United States and other Western delegations take so much pleasure in invoking — we may see that the direct contact of armies of the socialist countries and of the NATO countries in Europe takes place in areas in which, after the implementation of the first stage, it would hardly be possible to speak about unilateral military advantages for the socialist countries.

As everyone knows, that direct contact takes place in central Europe and in south-east Europe. In central Europe it is, on the socialist side, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic opposite to the German Federal Republic. In south-east Europe it is the Bulgarian People's Republic against Greece and Turkey. I think that even the military experts of the West will concede that the most powerful concentration of offensive power on this line of contact cannot take place on the socialist side in the conditions of the first stage of disarmament

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according to the Soviet proposals, but rather on the NATO side, where two of the most powerful armies on the European continent — that is, the armies of Western Germany and Turkey — are on the spot.

In the statement today by the representative of Canada there was mention of distances and of the difficulties, for instance, for the Portuguese or the Italian armies in arriving at the line of contact in central Europe. But let us take into consideration the fact that the Soviet army, under the conditions of the first stage of general and complete disarmament according to the Soviet concept, would be between 800 and 1,000 kilometres distant from that line of contact, whereas the distance between the eastern border of the German Federal Republic and its nearest powerful ally in NATO, France, is about 400 kilometres, not to mention the better communications network.

If, under those conditions, we analyse and take into consideration all those elements we certainly cannot subscribe to the rather apocalyptic picture drawn here by the representative of the United States on Friday and repeated or completed in the speeches of the representatives of Canada and Italy today. If we consider the position in the event of a possible conflict we certainly can see that there are many disadvantages on the side of those socialist countries that are on the line of contact where, in such a situation, an attack could theoretically take place. In speaking about the danger of attack it is necessary also to take into account certain historical experiences. Here our delegation would like to speak mainly on the line of contact in central Europe; historical experiences have shown that the attack on that line of contact in the last two decades has always come from the west.

Our Western colleagues have shown some concern in that connexion, as we saw from Friday's speech by Mr. Dean (ENDC/PV.62, p. 53) after the Soviet delegation had mentioned the German Federal Republic just by way of illustration in connexion with a realistic appraisal of the balance of power in the first stage. We have not much understanding of that kind of concern on the part of our Western colleagues, because it must be said that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic — and we do not wish to speak for anybody else — would have far more reason for concern regarding the possible results if we were faced with the conventional power of the German Federal Republic. In that connexion we need not go far into history, because it is well known from where and in what direction aggression has been committed in past decades in that specific area. If the West German army is commanded by the same generals as



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worked out and implemented for Hitler such plans of aggression as the Fall Grün against Czechoslovakia, or the plans directed against Poland and the Soviet Union, we are hardly likely to be satisfied by the assurances of the Western delegations regarding the alleged peace-loving character of those gentlemen and their superiors.

Therefore, if there are to be any apprehensions with regard to possible disadvantages -- apprehensions based not on abstract considerations and calculations but on concrete historical and geographical facts -- we are much more entitled to speak of them than are our Western colleagues. But we -- the Czechslovak delegation, our Government and our people -- are not pessimistic; we are convinced that the implementation of far-reaching measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament as proposed by the Soviet Union would free mankind from the greatest and most burning danger -- that of nuclear aggression and nuclear war -- and that that would also create a military situation and a political atmosphere in which the possibility of any aggression or war, including that waged by means of conventional weapons, would be substantially diminished.

Moreover, we think that if the United States and its allies in NATO are really interested in safeguarding their security by means of conventional forces and weapons, they should speak about that in connexion with the question of conventional forces and weapons -- with regard to which, incidentally, the Soviet Union also proposes absolutely equal conditions for itself and its allies and for the other side. And, as we heard in Mr. Gromyko's statement on 24 July (ENDC/PV.60, p.36), the Soviet Union is willing to meet the objections of the West regarding the levels of conventional armed forces, although in our opinion those objections are not fully justified.

We are afraid, however, that what we face in the case of Western objections against the Soviet proposal is not a preoccupation with safeguarding the security of the West by conventional means but a preoccupation with retaining nuclear weapons and, thus, the possibility of launching a nuclear attack, and of course with what our delegation has already called a kind of nuclear obsession by Western military and political circles, which try at all costs to discover and voice any objections which will result in keeping the world under the threat of nuclear weapons. That is something which our delegation -- and, I think, a number of other delegations here -- cannot understand and which we must frankly oppose. We ask our colleagues from the member countries of NATO very frankly whether the time has not come to revise, to

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reconsider, that kind of thinking — that method of not considering problems from the point of view of safeguarding the world and saving it from the threat of nuclear weapons — and to think along the lines of removing that threat as soon as possible.

That is the point of view we should like once more to stress. We are convinced that that is the opinion of most of the delegations in this Committee — that as early as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament effective measures must be taken to eliminate above all the danger of a nuclear war. Every unbiased person must agree that if a total of 70 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles and all nuclear weapon stockpiles — which, as we heard on the occasion of the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace, amount today to 250,000 megatons throughout the world — were maintained, as provided for under the United States proposal, that not only would not diminish but would increase the danger of a nuclear war. We cannot stress too much or insist at too great length that that danger of a nuclear catastrophe is, by its very character, something which cannot be diminished by percentage measures; it must be faced by a measure which would at once, if not eliminate completely, at least immobilize and neutralize that terrible threat to humanity as a whole. I think we must insist that this question should be reconsidered and that the Western delegations should take these realities into consideration from the point of view of the security not only of all the nations taking part in this Conference but of all humanity.

We have on many occasions expounded our view that the 100 per cent elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage would also make possible 100 per cent adequate and effective international control, which of course could not be carried out under the United States proposal. All the problems that control, inspection and verification would meet in the conditions of the Soviet plan (ENDC/2) would also occur in implementing the measures provided for in the United States plan (ENDC/30 and Corr.1), in addition to the fact that adequate control in connexion with the 30 per cent reduction is not provided for in the United States proposal, which creates much more of a problem.

Our delegation would like to ask our colleagues once more, in comparing the two proposals, to look at the problem from the point of view of the greatest security for all nations and for humanity — that is to say, from the point of view of the possibility of removing the threat of nuclear war in the first stage. All the objections voiced by the Western delegations tacitly recognize that the Soviet

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proposal really removes such a possibility and, if implemented, really would be a major contribution to the security of the world. So the Soviet analysis, and the considerations based on it, give us a clear picture showing that if all the nations discussing this problem were concerned to maintain the possibilities of defence, and not of aggression, the situation that would be created on the basis of the Soviet proposals would certainly be less favourable to a potential aggressor than the situation which would be created on the basis of the implementation of the United States plan -- because, first of all, the maintenance of 70 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles, with all the stocks of nuclear arms, plus the control planned and proposed by the United States, would certainly give a premium to a potential aggressor.

Of course the Western side maintains that it does not intend to undertake an aggression. Well, we do not wish to contest those intentions but, after having heard Mr. Burns's military considerations, we should like once more to draw attention to the fact that, apart from the maintenance of 70 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles, the kind of control which Mr. Burns was stressing -- which means knowing about the quantity and location of any force of armaments which remain, as I read it from his statement -- is just the category of control to which the words of Henry Kissinger, the well-known authority on military problems and arms control in the West, apply. I would like to quote from his book, The Necessity for Choice, page 219, where he speaks about this kind of control and says that:

"... such surveillance may help a potential aggressor more than the defender, thus violating one of the cardinal principles of arms control. The defender learns only what he already knows: the instant readiness of the aggressor's force. At best he gains an additional warning time, which is so short that his retaliatory force cannot possibly be designed to make use of it."

Here, of course, he speaks of this control under the existence of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which the United States proposal presupposes. He goes on:

"The aggressor, on the other hand, gains vital strategic information. He learns the exact location of every missile at every moment -- thus nullifying to a considerable extent whatever advantage his opponent may have achieved through mobility. He will know precisely the pattern of operation of the retaliatory force he is planning to destroy. The conclusion is inescapable: that inspection to obtain tactical warning may detract from stability rather than add to it."

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

That is the kind of inspection we are being offered in connexion with the implementation of the first stage under the United States proposal.

Those are the observations that the Czechoslovak delegation, after having consulted our military experts as well as the relevant military literature both of the socialist countries and of the NATO countries, would like to present for the consideration of our colleagues, and above all of the co-Chairmen who will be drafting a joint article containing the obligations of the parties under the treaty on general and complete disarmament in the first stage. We express the hope that it will be possible for the countries members of NATO to reconsider their position in the course of our discussion and, as has happened in some other cases, to see that their objections to the Soviet concept of stage I are not well founded.

We know, of course, that such a reconsideration will take a certain time. Meanwhile, perhaps it will be possible for our co-Chairmen, in drafting the joint proposal, to show this issue in brackets and double brackets. But, of course, we should like to stress once more that in view of the main objective of the first stage it is indispensable to solve the problem on a basis whereby the nuclear threat would be removed in the first stage.

At the same time I should like to point out that in the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation the amendment to article 4 submitted by the delegation of the Bulgarian People's Republic (ENDC/L.17<sup>1/</sup>) provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the final form of that article.

I should like to express the hope that on the basis of the agreed procedure of work (ENDC/52) of this Committee it will be possible to discuss all the provisions of the first stage of general and complete disarmament and to produce a joint draft by the beginning of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, because we all know that time really presses and it is necessary for this Committee to present the seventeenth session with a certain positive result.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): Before I turn to the topic on which my delegation wishes to speak today, I should like to say that the United States delegation has listened with great attention and will give the most careful consideration to the statement made today by the representative of Mexico with regard to a test ban agreement, and we shall, of course, also consider the suggestions which he has made with regard to the general procedure of work of our Conference.

1/ See also Rev.1.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Today I should like to comment briefly on the reference by the representative of Mexico to paragraph 4 of the procedures recommended by the co-Chairmen and adopted by the Committee (ENDC/52). I can assure him -- and I am sure that Mr. Zorin will support this -- that it was not at all the intention of the co-Chairmen, in presenting that draft, to preclude from plenary discussion the question of a treaty for banning nuclear weapons tests or questions relating to the work of the Committee of the Whole. The second sentence of paragraph 4 might perhaps have been better drafted, but the intention was that -- in addition to the flexibility provided by the first sentence with regard to a delegation's raising and discussing any subject or proposal in any plenary meeting of the Committee -- it should make it clear that the recommended agenda applied only to the work on the first stage of the treaty on general and complete disarmament and was not intended to preclude the possibility of plenary meetings, or indeed a series of plenary meetings, devoted to the questions referred to in its last sentence.

Last week, in accordance with the procedural recommendations to which I have just referred, various delegations proceeded with a discussion of item 5 (a); on the agreed agenda, and we have heard discussions on that topic this morning from various delegations. The item is entitled "Basic obligations concerning the measures of disarmament, verification and maintenance of international peace and security in the first stage and the time limits for their implementation".

The United States attaches importance to the substance of an article of the treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world which would set forth the basic obligations and time limit for the first stage. Just as Part I of the treaty sets forth an outline of treaty obligations pertaining to the entire disarmament plan, so in the first article applying to stage I we should find the essential principles governing the reduction of armaments and armed forces which will take place during that stage.

Moreover, we believe that it is also well to state the period of time during which the obligations of stage I will be implemented in this initial article. It will, of course, remain for later articles to spell out the precise obligations of stage I and the exact manner in which all those obligations are to be carried out and verified.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

In the light of these considerations, my delegation has prepared and would like now to present for the consideration of the Committee a United States proposal for the text of article 4 of the treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. It is entitled "Basic obligations and time limit of stage I", and the text is as follows:

- "During stage I the Parties to the Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of Articles \_\_\_\_\_ through \_\_\_\_\_, undertake:
1. To reduce their armaments, including nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and major conventional armaments;
  2. To limit their production of armaments;
  3. To reduce their armed forces;
  4. To halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons and to take other measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war;
  5. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure verification of the obligations undertaken;
  6. To implement the measures set forth hereafter for verifying compliance with the Obligations undertaken;
  7. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace and ensuring international security;
  8. To carry out all other obligations undertaken with respect to Stage I of the Treaty.

Stage I will begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and will be completed within three years from that date, subject to the provisions of Article \_\_\_\_\_."

I ask that this document be circulated by the Secretariat as a working paper.<sup>1/</sup>

In the course of preparing this draft article the United States delegation has considered articles 4 and 19 of the draft treaty (ENDC/2) of the Soviet Union and the draft article 4 (ENDC/L.17<sup>2/</sup>) submitted to the Committee by the delegation of Bulgaria. We have, of course, kept in mind the introductory language of stage I of the United States "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament

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<sup>1/</sup> ENDC/L.18

<sup>2/</sup> See also Rev.1.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

in a peaceful world" tabled at this Conference on 18 April (ENDC/30). When preparing this document we had not had the benefit of the statements and proposals which were made this morning by the representative of India and which, of course, we shall take due account of in further considerations.

In presenting our draft article 4 to the Committee I should like to comment briefly on some of its provisions. The Committee will note that paragraph 1 refers to the reduction of armaments, including nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and major conventional armaments. It must be obvious to us all from our previous discussions that a nuclear weapon delivery vehicle is not something that is susceptible of either an all-inclusive or exclusive definition. There is no reason why any nuclear weapon delivery vehicle could not be used to deliver a conventional warhead. Given the present state of technological development, the converse is also almost true. Therefore the United States outline treaty does not specifically distinguish between nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and conventional armaments. Rather, our plan breaks down the armaments mix into various categories and types and calls, as representatives are aware, for an across-the-board 30 per cent reduction in stage I.

Because no meaningful distinction can be made between nuclear and other delivery systems, paragraph 1 of our draft article 4 which we have submitted to the Committee today calls for the reduction of both nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and conventional armaments under the same general heading of armaments. It is our view that the subsequent specific treaty provisions to be included in stage I should likewise follow this pattern of dealing with armaments in a uniform way. However, we have included a specific reference to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in this article on basic obligations of stage I because we wish to make it absolutely clear that this kind of armaments must be included within the armaments to be reduced in this stage.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of our text contain important further basic obligations, but I believe that they are self-explanatory.

In view of the importance which all of us here attach to the necessity of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war as soon as possible in the disarmament process we think that such measures as set forth in paragraph 4 of our proposed text should be a part of the basic obligations undertaken in stage I, and Mr. Lall today mentioned the importance of having something relating to the nuclear threat in article 4 (supra, p.8).

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

It is the position of the United States delegation that a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, as well as other measures to reduce the threat of a nuclear war, must be important parts of the first stage of a balanced disarmament plan. Those are measures aimed at nuclear weapons themselves and they should therefore be included among the basic obligations of article 4. We believe strongly that feasible first-stage measures directed against the production of nuclear weapons and stocks of fissionable materials have a major role in reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war.

It is the position of the United States that during stage I a meaningful across-the-board reduction must occur in the over-all war-making capabilities of the parties to the treaty. That would include balanced implementation of all of the first four paragraphs of our draft article 4.

It is also of fundamental importance to us that, in the absence of trust in the relations between all nations, a fact which is recognized by our Soviet colleagues as well as ourselves, nations cannot be expected to disarm unless they are assured that other nations are doing likewise. Therefore, appropriate language on verification has been included in paragraphs 5 and 6 of our proposed article 4 to reflect these basic obligations.

Paragraph 7 likewise embodies a principle which the United States regards as fundamental. It is that arrangements for keeping the peace and ensuring international security must be gradually strengthened and improved over the entire disarmament process beginning with the first stage. We were glad to note that the Bulgarian draft contains language similar to our paragraphs 5 and 7, but we think that the idea contained in paragraph 6 should also find explicit expression.

With respect to the time limit for stage I, I should like to reiterate that the United States has always held the pragmatic view that the amount of time required for implementation of any stage of disarmament will depend upon the nature and scope of the measures agreed and undertaken, the time required for verification and the period needed to implement the specified peacekeeping measures. It is on that basis that we have concluded that three years would be a reasonable time for the orderly implementation and verification of the obligations we have proposed to be undertaken in stage I. Of course, if the measures finally agreed on for stage I were substantially different from present United States proposals that would have its effect on the time needed for their implementation.



(Mr. Stelle, United States)

I wish to make one additional comment on the paragraph dealing with the time limits. As my colleagues all know, the United States treaty outline provides for the possibility of extending, in certain circumstances, the time-limit for the completion of stage I by not more than three months. It is for that reason that we have included in our draft article reference to a later article -- and a blank is left for it -- which would deal with the question of transition. Again this morning Mr. Lall referred to the desirability of having the question of transition included in some way in article 4 (supra, p. 8 ). I should like to emphasize, however, in view of Mr. Lall's remarks, that any prolongation of stage I could only be long enough to provide assurance that all undertakings to be carried out in stage I had in fact been carried out, that all preparations required for stage II had in fact been made, and that all militarily significant States had become parties to the treaty. Those are the conditions which, in general terms, we believe must be fulfilled before proceeding from stage I to stage II. They are conditions which must be fulfilled if the security of all nations is to be ensured during the disarmament process.

In conclusion I would state that our text is, of course, an accurate reflection of the more detailed provisions contained in stage I of the United States proposal, and indeed it highlights the substantive differences between that proposal and the corresponding Soviet proposal. We do not pretend that this text reflects a compromise on substance. It is, however, a compromise in form. The language of our proposal changes the form of the similar language in our treaty outline and harmonizes to a major degree with the form of the proposal of the Bulgarian representative. Our Soviet colleague has said he approves of that proposal, and therefore we know he approves of its form.

Even though this is not a change in substance, we do believe it may help us in our negotiations. Our Soviet colleague is well aware, as I am sure are all the members of the Committee, of the amount of time and effort that was spent in negotiating part I on, really, the question of form. The American draft had two sections, the Soviet draft had three articles; we eventually met the Soviet point of view. We have now met what we assume is an agreed form on the part of our Soviet colleague. In doing so we think that we have set out fairly clearly items which will highlight the major remaining problems between the United States position and the Soviet position. We think that will help us to achieve fairly rapidly a bracketed text and that, as we go on to consideration of the other agenda items which are matters of substance, any agreement or any drawing together of positions can then be registered in a later draft which the co-Chairmen may work out.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

I might say on behalf of the United States delegation that this concludes what we have at present to say on item 5 (a) and that we are quite prepared, if our Soviet colleague agrees and the Committee agrees, to proceed to the discussion of the next item of a first-stage agreement in a general disarmament treaty, item 5 (b) (ENDC/52).

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today we have heard a number of statements by representatives dealing with various matters - questions concerning our future procedure, as well as questions of substance pertaining to stage I of disarmament which has been the main subject of our discussion during these last few days.

The last statement of the United States representative clearly shows that we are approaching the conclusion of our debate on this question of stage I and that we can start discussing sub-paragraph (b) of our agreed plan of work (ENDC/1/Add.3), which we will do, I take it, at our plenary meeting on Wednesday.

Today we have heard a number of views concerning the substance of the measures to be included in stage I. They were apparently answers to those put forward by my delegation in the course of past meetings, especially at our last meeting. In view of the lateness of the hour, I do not propose to speak now on all the questions touched upon this morning, including the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, which deserves special attention and discussion; we shall no doubt come back to it after a while, especially after the Three-Power Sub-Committee has discussed that question with due regard to the latest proposals which, as we know, are being prepared by the Western Powers. Therefore I shall not deal with that question, because we shall come back to it later, since it deserves to be discussed in a separate and special manner.

Today I should like merely to answer briefly some of the remarks made by the representative of Canada on the question of the balance of forces between the NATO countries and those of the Warsaw Pact, as it would appear as a result of the implementation of the first stage of disarmament. Since this is closely connected with the very essence of the problem of stage I and with the definition of the general scope of the measures of stage I, I think it necessary to give some explanations and to make some remarks in this regard.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

First of all, Mr. Burns spoke briefly at the beginning of his statement about a certain discrepancy between the figures and the errors which occurred in the verbatim record (supra, p. 14). However, when Mr. Burns corrected the total figure, he made an error himself. Therefore I shall now put him right. In particular, he said that there was an error in regard to the armed forces of France - the figure should be 1,009,000 instead of 1,900,000. That is certainly correct. That is actually what I said, but apparently this was inaccurately reported in the verbatim record and we have inserted a corresponding correction in the final verbatim record. France has 1,009,000 men; that is correct.

But when Mr. Burns said that the total was not 3,334,000 and that the correct figure for the total should be 3,304,000, and that there were 30,000 too many, I should like to point out that he evidently has not read carefully enough the table published by the British Institute of Strategic Studies, because in that table the figure for Portugal is 79,000 and not 49,000, as erroneously stated in the provisional verbatim record. So these 30,000 have been found and the figure of 3,334,000 is perfectly correct. That is my first remark.

Regarding the arguments and objections which Mr. Burns ventured to put forward in connexion with our views concerning the balance of forces, his first remark was that we should, strictly speaking, exclude the figures I quoted relating to Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and Norway, as well as to Portugal to some extent.

I see no reason at all for doing so. Indeed, why do you consider it necessary to exclude Turkey with its army of 500,000 men? Has not Turkey a common frontier with the Soviet Union? It has. It also adjoins the territory of Bulgaria, which is an ally of the Soviet Union. Is this not so? It is. You are computing the over-all balance of forces of the whole NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact countries. Then why exclude Turkey? In order to stand up to Turkey in the event of a military conflict, will not the Soviet Union be obliged to keep an appropriate number of troops facing Turkey? Yes, because Turkey might threaten vitally important areas of the Soviet Union abounding in oil, mineral deposits and so forth. Therefore Turkey cannot at all be excluded. Then why do you exclude it? You are a military man, and I think if you were a member of our General Staff you would not discount Turkey. This argument of yours is completely devoid of foundation.

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Secondly, there is Greece. Why do you exclude Greece? Greece faces Bulgaria and, to a certain extent, Romania, etc. Why do you exclude Greece? Greece also is a member of the NATO bloc - is it not? It faces countries that are members of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, if you are computing the over-all balance of forces, you cannot exclude Greece.

Further, you exclude the United Kingdom, and the reason for excluding the United Kingdom is that if it withdrew its forces it would be, as it were, cut off from the continent of Europe. We consider the United Kingdom to be a European country. It appears that the United Kingdom is now anxious to enter more closely into the European family of nations by joining the Common Market. It is obvious that the United Kingdom cannot be excluded from Europe.

Furthermore, the troops of the United Kingdom are very closely linked with the whole system of the NATO military alliance. That is beyond dispute. But Mr. Burns ventured to say that, under our plan, the United Kingdom would again be practically in the situation that existed in the days of Napoleon or during the Second World War, when it was isolated from Europe.

I must say that I was rather surprised that such a knowledgeable man as Mr. Burns should indulge in such elementary errors of general knowledge. In the days of Napoleon the United Kingdom was hostile to France, whereas now it is an ally of France. At the time of the Second World War, the United Kingdom was hostile to Germany, whereas today Germany is an ally of the United Kingdom. Is there really no difference? It is one thing for the British to cross the Channel when the coasts where landings are to be made are hostile: it is a different matter when France and Germany are allies and the whole coast is an allied one. Is there really no difference? I think it is obvious to everyone that there is a substantial difference.

And, of course, we cannot separate the United Kingdom from Europe and say that in the present circumstances the United Kingdom would not be able to participate with her troops in European affairs if there happened to be an armed conflict. I consider that to be an absolutely elementary error of general knowledge. I am sorry, Mr. Burns, but this is a fact. And to cross the Channel when on the other side of it you have your allies, France, Germany and other Powers and there is not a single hostile country, is not very difficult for the United Kingdom, as you yourselves realize, with modern means of transportation. And although you said that during both the First and Second World Wars there were great difficulties in transporting troops by sea, in

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supplying them and so on, nevertheless the main difficulty was always enemy action in connexion with crossing the seas, the presence of submarines and other fleets, the presence of bombers and so forth.

But under our plan for the first stage of disarmament there would no longer be any bomber aircraft, any submarines or any large warships. In these circumstances would there not be a radical difference when it came to solving the question of landing troops from the United Kingdom on the continent of Europe? I think this is elementary enough for all to realize that we cannot exclude the United Kingdom from the number of allies of European countries, who would be able to land immediately a considerable number of troops on the continent of Europe, should a conflict break out, since there would be no bomber aircraft, no submarines and no navy capable of conducting operations at long distances from their main bases.

It is perfectly clear that there would be hardly any difficulties in this respect. Therefore we cannot leave the United Kingdom out of account in computing the balance of armed forces. You also leave Norway out of account. Why? In the first place, Norway has a common frontier with the Soviet Union. Even though it is a small frontier, it is nevertheless a frontier. Secondly, Norway can always transfer its troops, if necessary, for the purpose of taking part in any NATO operations. Would there be any difficulty for Norway in this matter? Of course, from the point of view of military potential, Norway is not a very great Power and in the overall balance of forces it may not represent very much; nevertheless, in an over-all computation, if that is what you are making, you cannot simply exclude Norway.

Therefore all your arguments for excluding from the over-all balance of the armed forces of NATO such countries as Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and Norway cannot be taken seriously, in my opinion, and do not correspond to the actual situation.

Your second argument concerns the disposition of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. You said that the Soviet Union could keep all its troops on the Western frontier because its rear was secure, as it were, in the East; but you said nothing at all about our southern frontier. Mr. Burns, you are a well-informed military man. How then can you exclude the southern or the south-eastern frontiers of the Soviet Union? According to the British Institute of Strategic Studies, there are 210,000 Iranian troops, 182,000 Pakistani troops - how can you leave them out of account? Iran also has a common frontier with vitally important areas of the Soviet Union, and you certainly cannot exclude it. I am not taking the Far East, where Japan has 235,000 and South Korea 600,000. These, however, are armed forces which cannot be disregarded in computing the balance of forces.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I do not intend at present to deal with the problems of the Far East, because that is a particular question. The countries of the Far East have their own strategic problems and concern for their security in connexion with the hostile attitude towards them on the part of the United States and its allies in the East. But even if we take into consideration your assessment to some extent and agree that it might be possible to reduce the number of Soviet troops there - although our General Staff thinks otherwise -, in any case you cannot leave out of account almost 400,000 men on the south-eastern frontier of the Soviet Union, apart from Turkey.

In any case, when we said that the Soviet troops on our western boundaries would be less by at least 200,000, it was a minimum figure. I need hardly mention that the figures published by the British Institute of Strategic Studies were taken by us only for the sake of argument, because they are the figures in which you yourselves place most reliance. That is the reason why we took your figures. But if we take these data from the point of view of the real assessment of our forces, it will be seen immediately that there is something wrong with these figures, because, for instance, the Soviet Union is stated to have had 3,800,000 in 1961. But everyone knows the figures for the Soviet Union that were published when it reduced its armed forces by 1,200,000 men. It was officially published that we had 3,600,000 men and not 3,800,000.

So we find in the Institute's figures 200,000 men in excess of our figure. We preferred not to correct this figure, because we considered that it would be more convincing for you if we used your figures rather than ours. Even on the basis of your figures the correlation of forces would, as we have shown, be far from establishing any superiority of the Soviet Union and its allies, after the implementation of the first stage of our disarmament plan. This is a fact which you cannot refute, and all the arguments which you have put forward today are not serious enough to be taken into account because, as I have shown, they unjustifiably discount important elements which are of essential significance in the strategic situation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

Further, you spoke about the tanks and airborne divisions of the Soviet Union, the possibilities of using them, etc. But, Mr. Burns, you surely realize perfectly well that airborne troops can only be useful for large landing operations under two conditions: first, there must be bomber aircraft to prepare and ensure the landing of

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these troops; secondly, there must be the possibility of supplying these troops and the possibility of linking them up quickly with the advancing land armies and so on. But, as I showed last time - and you could not refute it - if there are no bomber aircraft, airborne troops lose their value. They cannot penetrate very far, because to do so they must be assured of supplies and support, otherwise they will be surrounded and destroyed.

For this reason all your arguments on this score, in view of your military knowledge, Mr. Burns, are rather surprising. I think that this counting of divisions and so on is a matter to be dealt with directly by the military staffs. We are not dealing with that here. We are dealing with a general political analysis and the question is: Is it possible to devise basically a solution which will not weaken the forces of one or the other bloc? We say, and you have not been able to deny, that basically there will still be an approximate equality of forces. We have drawn this conclusion on the basis of analysis of the correlation of forces given by your sources and not by ours. This is a real fact which all the members of the Committee cannot but take into account.

I should like to comment on another point which has already been touched upon by the representative of Czechoslovakia (supra, p.32 ). He has already said that you yourselves recognize that our forces would be at least 800 km distant from the line of contact in a conflict (if such a conflict is possible), whereas the forces of the Western countries would be 400 km distant. Thus your forces would have to advance only half the distance. Again that is something which you cannot deny.

If Mr. Burns as a qualified military specialist puts forward this type of argument, it only goes to show how weak is the basic position of the Western Powers and that they cannot put forward anything else. That is the point.

The point is not that military considerations make it impossible to carry out disarmament along the lines we propose; the point is that the political considerations to which you adhere prevent you from agreeing to it. But that is a different matter. The question is whether you desire effective general disarmament or not. It is not a question of military strategy; it is a political question. In order to prove the alleged impossibility of carrying out this plan, you resort to arguments which, as has been clearly shown just now, do not carry much weight.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

My last remark in this connexion refers to what you said, Mr. Burns, at the very end of your statement (supra, p. 20 ). You said you would not deal with the question of a nuclear threat, because it had been dealt with by other speakers and you could add nothing to what they had said on this subject. But all the members of our Committee remember perfectly well and know that the other speakers could prove nothing on the question of how they would eliminate the threat of nuclear war, because there is nothing in the plan of the Western Powers that would really eliminate the threat of nuclear war in the first stage of disarmament. And you cannot add anything further to this, because there is in fact nothing to add.

With regard to what the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, said today when he referred to the United States new draft text for article 4, what we see in paragraph 4 does not solve the problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war. Halting the production of fissionable materials is not a solution to the problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war in stage I. It completely fails to solve the problem, as anyone can understand. Nuclear bombs remain and delivery vehicles remain, so how do you solve the problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war and how do you prevent the threat of nuclear attack? In no way. But that is precisely the problem of stage I: how to ensure that the threat of a nuclear war is eliminated in the very first stage.

Our plan does solve this problem. You cannot deny that. We solve this problem because we completely liquidate all delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. This solves the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, whereas in your plan there is nothing that solves this problem. That is the main point of difference between us, the main defect of your plan and, conversely, the main merit of our plan, while the balance of power to which you refer is not disturbed in our plan. What we said at the last meeting is not shaken by the military considerations put forward by Mr. Burns.

Those are the remarks I considered it necessary to make.

With regard to the programme of our further work, we shall naturally discuss all the considerations on this subject which were put forward today, in particular by the representative of Mexico, who expressed some views on the matter. We shall also consider in detail the proposed draft article 4 submitted today by the United States (ENDC/L.18). Unfortunately, however, I must state - as Mr. Stelle himself stated - that this is not a change in substance of the position of the United States; that



(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

even if there is some compromise, it is a compromise in form, as he himself admitted. Consequently there is no compromise at all in this draft, and I therefore doubt whether we could make use of it to find a real compromise. Since there is no compromise here, or a compromise in form only, what basis could it provide on which to look for a compromise? Therefore I have my doubts on this score; but we shall naturally discuss all the drafts which have been submitted - the Bulgarian draft, our own draft and the United States draft - the previous and the present. I think we shall have to proceed to consider a specific draft, and from Wednesday onwards, apparently, we shall start discussion on paragraph 5(b), which will enable us to consider more thoroughly the problem of elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I do not intend to detain the Committee for long. I merely want to say a few words in the debate, now drawing to its close, on item 5(a) of the co-Chairmen's document on procedure of work (ENDC/52), and on the various comments which have been made on my delegation's proposal (ENDC/L.17)<sup>1/</sup>. First, we should be glad we have finished our discussion so swiftly that we can now ask our two co-Chairmen to put article 4 into its final form. This, if I am not mistaken, is in fact provided for in paragraph 3 of the co-Chairman's Recommendations on the Procedure of Work, and we hope that it will soon be possible to draft which will take into account the compromise working paper which we have submitted in an effort to further the Conference's work.

I should now like to say a few words on the proposal submitted by the United States delegation (ENDC/L.18), and to show how it differs from our delegation's proposal. As the representative of the United States himself said (supra, p.41 ), this proposal is only a compromise in form. It simply sets out the United States proposals, and gives us hardly anything to work on. It may be a compromise in form, but the **substance is unchanged**.

I should like also to dwell on some comments by the representative of India, who wants the time-limit in our draft to be left unspecified. We certainly have no hard-and-fast objection to this idea, provided that we do everything we can to fix this time-limit so as to shorten the duration and increase the amount of the disarmament that can be written into the paragraph in accordance with Mr. Krishna Menon's disarmament philosophy.

<sup>1/</sup> See also Rev.1.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The destruction of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons has produced a long discussion, which, though it did not touch on our proposal, will no doubt help us to clarify the respective positions and to decide whether this provision should be included in the draft or not. We should like to point out, however, that our draft deals with nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and military bases separately. This paragraph really deserves to be considered by itself, because nuclear weapons delivery vehicles are of prime importance, and it is they which, as it were, have changed the nature of modern war. That is why we think that they deserve a special place in the final draft, and especially that our proposal should be taken into account by the co-Chairmen and the Committee.

I should now like to dwell on the elimination of nuclear weapons, of which the Indian representative spoke (supra, p. 6 ). We have never been opposed to this; on the contrary, we favour the elimination of nuclear weapons. We should like to achieve this as soon as possible, and we have no objection to the idea of carrying it out as early as stage 1. We should also like to stress that paragraph 4 of the United States outline makes no provision at all for any diminution or reduction of nuclear weapons. It merely says that the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons is to be halted. We think it possible to submit a separate text on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which could certainly be incorporated if the United States delegation agreed. We refrained from mentioning nuclear weapons ourselves because we wished to bring these two drafts closer together, to work on them.

As I have noted, the United States draft makes no provision for nuclear weapons; there is just one reference to halting the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, which is not a real disarmament measure. We refrained from mentioning this, because it certainly does not deserve mention in an article on disarmament. That explains why there is nothing on this subject. If, however, some delegation wishes to propose the insertion here of provision for the elimination of nuclear weapons, I do not think there would be any difficulty, at least as far as we are concerned, in writing it into this article 4, provided the United States delegation did not object.

We did not mention the period of transition either, because we thought it belonged to another article and need not appear in article 4. However, we quite agree with the Indian representative, who said (supra, p. 9 ) that disarmament should

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

continue without interruption, that there ought to be no difficulties in proceeding from one stage to the next, and that these stages should follow on immediately and without obstacles. We do not think that, as the United States representative said again this morning, a special interval should be provided for reviewing what had been done and for ascertaining whether the conditions for transition to the next stage had been fulfilled. We feel, on the contrary, that the process should continue without interruption from one stage to the next.

Lastly, we hope that the two co-Chairmen will succeed in drafting a text which will be acceptable to the Conference. We hope it will not contain too many brackets, and that, indeed, the sponsors will do all they can to remove the brackets which still encumber the two drafts of the Soviet Union and the United States. I hope there will be as few brackets as possible, and that we can work really effectively towards the fulfilment of our task, submit the most suitable and acceptable draft to the United Nations General Assembly at its next session, and report on our progress towards disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I will be very brief, but in view of my lack of success in convincing Mr. Zorin of the inapplicability of some of his strategic arguments the other day, I think I ought to say that I was not really very hopeful of doing so, at least the first time he studied what I had to say. But neither have I been convinced by the repetition of his arguments with which he favoured us later in the proceedings. I think we can now leave this matter of the strategical situation that would exist at the end of the imposition of the measures proposed in stage I of the Soviet draft treaty to the judgment of the non-aligned members of this Committee. That is to say, they can examine the arguments which have been advanced by Mr. Zorin and those which have been advanced by the Canadian delegation, and form their own conclusions.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I do not want to delay my colleagues, but I should like to say just two things. I think it would be churlish of me not to express my gratitude to the representative of the Soviet Union for standing up for the British as being true Europeans. That is something we appreciate most deeply, and I shall welcome his help in other negotiations that are going on at the present time.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Secondly, I regret to say that I find myself as unconvinced by Mr. Zorin's arguments as was Mr. Burns. I was struck by the interesting analogies he drew in relation to the NATO Powers, but it was what he did not say rather than what he did say that impressed me. As I listened to Mr. Burns, two of his most powerful arguments seemed to me to be the strong advantage of a single State with a large number of troops under its own command, which must have very substantial military advantages, and the massive numbers of Soviet tanks. Neither of those was referred to by our Soviet colleague. No doubt he will explain their relevance to us on some future occasion.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): Tomorrow morning is the deadline for submitting drafts in relation to point 5(a) of our agenda, dealing with basic obligations in the first stage of disarmament. The second is that at our forthcoming meeting, which the co-Chairmen have agreed should take place on Wednesday, we hope to begin consideration of point 5(b) concerning disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its sixty-third plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mrs. Myrdal, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Czechoslovakia, the United States, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and the United Kingdom.

"The United States delegation tabled a working draft of article 4<sup>1/</sup> of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 1 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.