

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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ENDC/PV.97  
14 February 1963  
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday 14 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. T. MBU

(Nigeria)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de BELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. R. L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSILKOV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. S. F. RAE  
Mr. E. A. GOTTLIEB  
Mr. B. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. V. PECHOTA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij MIKAEL INRU  
ATO M. HAALD  
ATO M. GHEDEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL  
Mr. A. S. MEHTA  
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. S. P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:  
Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:  
Mr. M. T. MBU  
Mr. L. C. N. CBI

Poland:  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:  
Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:  
Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C. H. von PLATEN  
Mr. S. LOFGREN  
Mr. ULF ERICSSON

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:  
Mr. V. V. KUZNETSOV  
Mr. S. K. TSARAFKIN  
Mr. L. J. MENDELEVICZ  
Mr. B. J. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:  
Mr. A. F. HASSAN  
Mr. S. AHMED  
Mr. M. KASSEH  
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J. K. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER  
Mr. C. C. STELLE  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. D. E. MARK

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the ninety-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of my statement I should like to express our thanks to your predecessor, Mr. Padilla Nervo, for the heartening words with which he welcomed us, the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on the occasion of the resumption of the negotiations. I am happy, after a few weeks of recess, to be able again to welcome you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the Committee, particularly the new representatives of Ethiopia Lij Imru, and the representative of the United States, Mr. William Foster.

In resuming the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee - incidentally the eighteenth member, France, is unfortunately still ignoring our efforts - we fully realise the truth of what was said the day before yesterday by the representative of Mexico about our negotiations not being ordinary routine negotiations. The problems which the Eighteen-Nation Committee is called upon to solve by their very importance go far beyond the scope of ordinary negotiations for the settlement of current problems in the relations between States.

Permit me to state briefly the position of the Czechoslovak delegation on certain questions on the solution of which we should first and foremost concentrate our attention in the present circumstances. The development of events in the world has again confirmed the urgent need to take effective measures to avert the threat of war, particularly a thermo-nuclear war which would have unimaginable consequences for humanity, for the peoples of the whole world. Therefore, the primary task of the Committee is to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament as the most effective means of excluding war from the life of mankind. This main direction in our work has been rightly reflected in the provisions of the agreement on procedure. We must, however, direct our utmost attention to reaching agreement on those measures whose implementation would lessen the danger of war, even before reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Undoubtedly negotiations for the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests occupy an important place in the efforts to put an end to the arms race and thereby lessen the danger of a nuclear war.

These questions have been on the agenda of our Committee (ENDC/1/Add.3-ENDC/52) for almost a year already, since the first days of its work. However, we are again compelled to note with regret that on none of the questions have any concrete results been achieved so far; there have been no concrete results which would justify the hopes placed in our negotiations by world public opinion.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

On the contrary, while negotiations have been going on in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Western Powers have continued to pursue a policy which is bound to lead to a further extension of the nuclear arms race. In particular, there is going on within the framework of NATO an intensive preparation of measures which will result in a further spread of nuclear weapons, thereby aggravating international tension and increasing the threat of war. The plans for creating a so-called multilateral NATO nuclear force and certain concrete measures which have already been carried out in order to prepare the conditions for the realization of these plans provide unquestionable evidence of this. I am referring mainly to the agreement concluded at Nassau between the United States and the United Kingdom which has already been mentioned here, and also the current negotiations concerning further steps in this direction.

We must also not lose sight of the serious danger for the development of the situation in Europe and in other parts of the world which is constituted by the military treaty recently concluded between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, a treaty which clearly serves the purposes of the militarists and revanchists of West Germany. It is no secret that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is making ever greater efforts to obtain nuclear weapons for the West German army and that these aspirations are meeting with sympathy and even support on the part of the allies of West Germany, despite the serious consequences which this would have for peace not only in Europe but throughout the world. Since our country is an immediate neighbour of the Federal Republic of Germany, we cannot fail to protest against such a dangerous policy which threatens the peace and security of the peoples and is directly contrary to the purposes of this Committee.

Finally, I should like to express our indignation at the fact that the Government of the United States decided on the eve of the resumption of our negotiations to carry out a new series of underground nuclear tests. Naturally the question arises as to what purposes such a decision is meant to serve. Judging it objectively, it merely creates new obstacles for the present negotiations and jeopardizes the hopes for their speedy and successful conclusion. This is all the more regrettable because the new proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union for solving the problem of control over the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests have opened up new and wide possibilities for overcoming the last obstacles to an agreement on this important question.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Nevertheless, despite the dark clouds lowering over the horizon of our negotiations as a result of the actions of the Western Powers, I should like to express the conviction that the difficulties we have encountered are not insurmountable. We share fully the opinion which was expressed by the representative of Mexico on 12 February. I quote:

"We are here because we are not discouraged by difficulties nor intimidated by obstacles, and because there is no weakening of our will to unite our efforts to achieve the aim to which we are committed: an effective agreement which will put an end to nuclear weapon tests and halt the armaments race, as the first essential steps to make thermonuclear war impossible and to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.96, p. 5)

Guided by this conviction, the socialist countries are exerting every effort so that the work of the Committee may lead as soon as possible to positive results both in respect of our basic task, that is the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, and in respect of the remaining questions.

It is well-known that in the course of previous negotiations, the Government of the Soviet Union introduced a number of substantial changes into its original draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, taking into account the positions of the Western Powers. We consider these changes to be an important step towards bridging the gaps between the positions on certain fundamental questions and towards creating an acceptable basis for their solution. Unfortunately we are compelled to note that this flexible position has not met with the response it deserves on the part of the Western Powers.

The principle has often been sustained in the past that in order to find a solution to complex international problems it is necessary to seek for an acceptable basis and arrive at reasonable compromises between the different positions. It is regrettable that the Western Powers put their own interpretation on this rule, which has long been accepted in international relations, and consider it natural that only the socialist States should make concessions while they themselves are unwilling to respond by doing likewise. On the contrary, they respond to the concessions of the socialist countries by increasing their demands. It is obvious that such tactics do not serve the aims which we are here to achieve.

The representative of the United Kingdom drew a rather peculiar conclusion at our meeting on 12 February when he stated that in fact such concessions as the Soviet

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Union had made had been concessions to common sense rather than concessions to the Western Powers (ibid., p. 30). It follows inevitably from this that the Western position alone is in full accord with common sense. This, to say the least, is not a very modest point of view. It seems to us that Mr. Godber's conclusion is an example of an unsuccessful attempt to cover up and disguise somehow the unwillingness of the Western Powers to give common sense its due, which should be uppermost in our work.

From such a position there is only one step to a priori rejection of any constructive proposals of the other side aimed at resolving the most important individual problems. Precisely such an approach is typical of the first reaction of the representative of the United Kingdom to the draft declaration submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75).

My delegation has carefully studied the draft declaration and considers it an important document deserving close attention on the part of our Committee. The draft declaration pursues a clear purpose, namely, to reduce the threat of a military conflict between the nuclear Powers. There can be no doubt that the siting of strategic carriers of nuclear weapons on the territory of other States increases the danger of such a conflict. We are therefore convinced that if the States concerned assumed the obligations laid down in the Soviet draft declaration, this danger would be considerably reduced.

Thus the Soviet draft declaration does not represent an "astute political manoeuvre", as the representative of the United Kingdom tried to make out in his statement (ENDC/PV.96, p. 29). It is a useful and important proposal which could be of great significance from the point of view of the desire of the peoples to avert a war.

For this reason we fully share the position of the delegation of the Soviet Union, namely, that in view of the seriousness of the present international situation and taking into account the positive role which the assumption of the obligations laid down in the declaration would play, this draft should be one of the first items to be considered in the forthcoming negotiations in this Committee.

The principle of mutual concessions and of taking into account the legitimate interests of both sides must be observed in the negotiations on all questions and first and foremost in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. But here



(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

again the systematic efforts of the Government of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries, aimed at achieving a reasonable compromise, taking into consideration the legitimate requirements of both sides, have not met with understanding on the part of the Western Powers.

It is therefore for good reasons that the question arises whether the Western Powers really desire to arrive at an agreement on the cessation of tests or, whether, on the contrary, they desire to retain the possibility of continuing further series of nuclear explosions. The course of recent events also fully justifies the raising of this question.

The Government of the Soviet Union has submitted an important new proposal regarding the use of automatic seismic stations for the purpose of improving the system of control over the cessation of underground nuclear tests (ENDC/PV.90, p.15). Desiring to go as far as possible to meet the demands put forward, especially by the United States, it has agreed also to two to three on-site inspections annually, despite the fact that it still considers there is no need for such inspections in order to ensure reliable control over the cessation of underground tests. Representatives of the Western Powers have repeatedly stated in the past that this problem is the last obstacle standing in the way of an agreement and that the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the principle of on-site inspection would lead to a speedy agreement. Now, however, the Western Powers are creating new obstacles in the path of this agreement by putting forward new demands.

Furthermore, in a situation in which the peoples of the whole world rightly expect that the new proposals of the Soviet Government will lead to a rapid solution of the problem, as I have already said, the Government of the United States decided to conduct a new series of underground nuclear tests.

The representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, stated at our meeting on 12 February that these tests were merely a continuation of the series begun in the autumn of 1961, and were merely a reply to the tests conducted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.96, p. 34). That is how I understood Mr. Foster's statement. But this statement does not sound any too convincing. It is known - and the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, referred to this again in his statement at our last meeting - not only that the United States began to conduct tests, but that it has conducted a considerably larger number of tests than the Soviet Union (ibid., p.36).

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Moreover, we do not think that Mr. Foster's statement fits in with what was said by the United States representative at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in October last year. At that time Ambassador Stevenson said the following, inter alia:

(continued in English)

"The United States is completing a series begun last spring. ... we are quite prepared to stop testing now as soon as we have dependable means of knowing that the Soviet Union is going to do likewise, is going to stop and stay stopped. If the USSR is satisfied with the progress in its present testing programme, a rare period of equilibrium may have been reached in this sector of the arms race. This is a time, therefore, when firm insistence by the General Assembly can forestall another cycle of nuclear tests. Let us make the most, I suggest, of this decisive moment before it passes from us". (A/C.1/PV.1246, p.47)

(continued in Russian)

In our opinion, to put it briefly, the decision of the United States Government to conduct a new series of underground tests can jeopardize precisely those prerequisites for reaching agreement, that equilibrium to which the United States representative referred at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and which the General Assembly also took into consideration in appealing for the cessation of all tests not later than 1 January 1963 (A/RES/1762(XVII) - ENDC/63). There can be no doubt that such action not only fails to help forward the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of tests, but, on the contrary, stimulates further intensification of the nuclear arms race.

I should like to put forward a few more considerations regarding concrete measures which would lead to a relaxation of international tension, to the strengthening of mutual confidence in international relations and, consequently, to the establishment of more favourable conditions for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The importance of such measures was rightly emphasized in resolution 1767 (XVII) adopted on 21 November 1962 by United Nations General Assembly.

During the negotiations that have already taken place, the delegations of the socialist countries have submitted a number of proposals, the adoption of which would lead to the achievement of these aims. First, there was the proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty States and the NATO States (ENDC/77). The conclusion of such a pact between the two groups of States, which include all the

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

States possessing nuclear weapons, would, in our opinion, be a timely response to the requirements of our times. It would help to eliminate mutual distrust and tension in international relations and would decrease the possibility of war by accident. Moreover, this measure does not call for any concessions, and does not create any strategic or other advantages for either of the sides: the gain would be on the part of the peoples of the whole world and the cause of peace and security.

There can be no doubt that such a step would help to improve international relations and would be welcomed with relief by the peoples of the countries assuming this obligation. It may also be presumed that the conclusion of a pact would meet with the support of the non-aligned countries, which are also suffering from the unfavourable consequences of the present tension in the world.

At the present time, the international community is faced with the urgent problem of uniting the efforts of all States with a view to consolidating international peace and security and eliminating all potential sources of world conflict. In the resolution of 18 December 1962 on consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the United Nations Charter (A/RES/1815 (XVII)), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly at its seventeenth session, an insistent appeal was again made to all States to avoid the threat of force or the use of force in international relations and to settle all disputes exclusively by peaceful means. Therefore, a confirmation of the obligation of mutual non-aggression between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries should not meet with any obstacle. As for the socialist countries, which have united for joint defence against aggression and which have no hostile feelings against any State whatsoever, they are prepared to conduct negotiations for the conclusion of such a pact.

In view of this we consider it essential that at this stage of the negotiations the Committee should seriously consider the urgent question of concluding a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries and that in doing so it should fully evaluate the possibilities which would be opened as a result of the implementation of that measure for advancing towards the solution of other urgent problems and decreasing the danger of war.

Among the urgent problems to which the Committee should turn its attention are the proposals for the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. It is generally known that the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic expressed its full support of the proposal of the Polish People's Republic to create

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

such a zone which would include Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Western Germany (ENDC/C.1/1). We are convinced that agreement on this proposal would have an extremely favourable effect on the general improvement of the situation in Central Europe and on the world situation as a whole.

The creation of other similar nuclear-free zones would undoubtedly also yield positive results. The fact that this idea was found to be attractive in the past is confirmed by proposals made in the United Nations by certain African, Asian and Latin American countries to create similar zones in other parts of the world. The Czechoslovak Government has always supported these proposals and it continues to hold this position today.

In conclusion, I should like to assure the Committee that our delegation came to Geneva with instructions from its Government to contribute to the fullest possible extent to the solution of the problems on the Committee's agenda. Our interest in achieving practical results in the disarmament negotiations derives organically from our policy of consolidating peace and peaceful co-existence among all States, despite differences in their social systems.

We realize that, in the present situation, where the crisis which recently occurred in the Caribbean area brought the world to the brink of a universal nuclear conflict, it is essential precisely at this time to seek guarantees for peace and international security not in a continued armaments race, not in the further piling up of the means of waging a devastating war, but in the united efforts of all States to maintain peace and to bring about general and complete disarmament. We want to believe that awareness of the reality of the danger which threatens us will strengthen in all of us the will to overcome existing obstacles and to achieve the positive results which the peoples of the whole world confidently expect from our Committee.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Before beginning my statement today, I should first like very sincerely to welcome Mr. Foster, Mr. Kuznetsov, Mr. de Mello Franco and Mr. Loutfi, who have resumed participation in the Conference's work, and also Lij Imru, who is taking part in our meetings for the first time. The presence and collaboration of these eminent persons indicate the importance of the stage reached by our Conference and guarantee that our work will be concrete and fruitful.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I should also like to request the United States and Ethiopian delegations to convey to Mr. Dean and Mr. Alamyehu, who are no longer with us, my warmest regards in the conviction that in their new responsibilities and their new posts they will continue to work for the cause which unites us all.

In the eloquent statement which Mr. Padilla Nervo made as Chairman at the ninety-fifth meeting, he remarked - as the Czechoslovak representative has just recalled - that the resumption of the Conference's work this time was not a routine matter. He even said: "... we should be unwise to ignore its transcendence." (ENDC/PV.96, p. 6). I could not agree more with Mr. Padilla Nervo. We only need to have read the newspapers these last few days, the papers of all countries, to realize to what extent world interest is focussed on our meetings and how any results that we may achieve are anxiously awaited everywhere, particularly with regard to the problem of the nuclear test ban. World opinion has followed the tripartite conversations in New York and Washington, at first with increasing hope and then with a return of anxiety when the negotiations were interrupted and transferred back to Geneva.

It is for us now to take up the threads without delay and to continue the work where it was interrupted in order, if this is possible, to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. That is why, impelled by a sense of the responsibilities of which we are all aware, I should like at this stage of the Conference to make a most urgent appeal to all delegations to concentrate their efforts in particular on the nuclear problem, pursuing the task unremittingly in order to overcome the difficulties which still block the way to the conclusion of an agreement.

The Italian delegation is fully convinced of the importance and the urgency of elaborating a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and of the study of collateral measures. But in the scale of urgencies the problem of tests is of outstanding importance, and in my view heads the list. We know the reasons for this, because many delegations have frequently developed this argument here, and I should not wish to delay the Committee's work by reiterating the terrible dangers that nuclear tests represent for mankind. Mr. Kuznetsov referred to them again, quite rightly, at our last meeting.

In Italy, where there is grave awareness of these dangers, there has recently been radioactive rain which showered upon the peninsula fall-out particles from the latest atmospheric explosions. The radioactivity of milk has risen in Rome to 112 picocuries, and at Bari it reached, though for only a short time, the dangerous level of

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

189 picocuries. It is known that a level of 150 picocuries for three months is regarded by scientists as the safety limit for man tolerance.

It has often been pointed out here that the solution of the problem of nuclear tests is, so to speak, the test bench, the touchstone, of the possibility of our achieving general disarmament. I share that point of view. The prohibition of explosions is a condition precedent for further progress; for if we cannot agree on this essential point it is difficult to conceive of progress in other fields.

In speaking of the urgency of agreement on nuclear tests, the question of the extension of nuclear weapons, which is closely linked with it, must not be overlooked. It is only by speedily concluding a treaty banning tests that we can prevent the dangers of widespread increase in the number of countries possessing the atom bomb and the resulting threat to peace.

In this context the news we read this morning in the newspapers that China has started nuclear tests is not reassuring. Of course, these are reports from what our friends in socialist countries call the "bourgeois" press, and we await from the socialist press the confirmation or denial of this disturbingly bad piece of news.

I know that these arguments have been repeated several times here, but they cannot be stated too often, particularly now that, in my opinion, it is essential vigorously to resume work for nuclear agreement.

In negotiation there are often moments promising for agreement, but if they are allowed to slip by there is the risk that those positive conditions may not recur and that the positions of both sides will become further and further apart. There is the saying that we must strike while the iron is hot. At this moment, at this stage in our negotiations, I think that despite persistent difficulties the circumstances are fairly favourable. We are at an important crossroads in international politics and the situation is not without a glimmer of hope. It is clear to all that the opposing parties are studying and seeking each other in order to find a basis of understanding which may dissipate their mutual distrust and open to the world an era of tranquillity and peace. Our Conference is participating in this movement, from which I hope it will benefit in an atmosphere of better mutual understanding.

It was therefore with surprise and some regret that I listened last Tuesday to Mr. Kuznetsov's statement (ENDC/PV.96, pp.15 et s.) in which he made against the West baseless accusations which seemed to be prompted by increased distrust and suspicion.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I sincerely hope that the debate here will do something to provide the necessary clarifications and to dispel feelings for which there is no objective justification and which could hamper the progress of our negotiations.

Mr. Kuznetsov mentioned certain recent decisions by the Western countries and severely criticized our policy. Those decisions are part of the general framework of our policy, which has been and always will be established on the unshakeable foundation of the maintenance of peace and security for all. We are seeking that security through disarmament, through general and complete disarmament, but until this has been achieved we shall unfortunately be compelled to guarantee our security by a balance of armaments.

The building up of a multilateral NATO force was depicted by Mr. Kuznetsov as a machiavellian system to open the way to possession of the atomic bomb by certain countries which do not possess it at present. In this connexion the Italian Prime Minister, in a foreign policy debate in the Italian Parliament on 26 January last, after reaffirming Italy's desire to contribute to an agreement on disarmament, categorically stated that the NATO multilateral force would not permit other countries to possess a nuclear bomb. I believe that we should have confidence in a head of government when he makes an official policy statement which, according to democratic practice, involves him in an obligation towards his country. Anyone who cares to study the system which we contemplate will be convinced - if he is acting in good faith - that the multilateral force contains obvious guarantees against the widespread extension of nuclear weapons.

As for the development of Western submarine defence, also mentioned by Mr. Kuznetsov: it is obvious, as I have said, that in the absence of agreement on disarmament no State can abandon the normal process of modernizing its defence. On our side, I do not think we are asking the Soviet Union to do so, and I do not believe it will. In this connexion, however, it must be recognized that there is a clear difference between the decisions of the Western democratic governments taken within the framework of their defence and those taken by other governments, since in all Western countries decisions are taken and agreements adopted openly after public debate in the national parliaments, where all parties are represented. Public opinion can thus freely express any criticisms; the information is there for all, and there is no concealment. Moreover, defence in the West is based, as everyone knows, on

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

close collaboration between allies, which we are ready to terminate at the right time under a disarmament agreement but which we obviously cannot give up until a balanced and controlled agreement is achieved.

It will cause no surprise, therefore, that we are unable to accept the text of the declaration submitted last Tuesday to the Conference by the Soviet delegation. (ENDC/75). That delegation knew perfectly well that its new proposal flouted the whole principle of balance in disarmament and would not be acceptable to the Western Powers. One wonders why at this most important stage in the negotiations, when every effort should be concentrated on the conclusion of a nuclear agreement, the Soviet delegation should take a step which can only delay the discussions and our progress towards agreement on this essential question of the banning of nuclear tests.

I should also like to express the wish that pessimistic and polemical statements should not be allowed to disturb the conditions for agreement on a test ban, which, regarded objectively, are now favourable, thanks to the efforts of all and, particularly recently, of the Soviet Union. We warmly welcomed the agreement of the Soviet Union to the principle of control over nuclear tests. The Italian delegation regards that - and I think this is a general view - as important and encouraging progress. The Soviet Union has certainly realized that, in invoking the principle of balance as ground for rejecting an agreement restricted to nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, it could not at the same time reject the principle of control, which with that of balance, constitutes an essential pillar of any agreement. However, we know the reservations and the difficulties which the Soviet Union has in general with regard to control, and we take note of the effort of good will made by the Soviet Government to come closer to our views. We hope that this may at last open the way to the conclusion of the agreement that we all desire - a reliable and binding agreement banning all tests in all environments.

I consider that we now have all the essential foundations for the successful conclusion of our talks, because there is identity of view on the structure and main elements of the treaty. We know that under the treaty control would be exercised by national control posts supplemented by automatic stations. We know that in certain cases there would be on-site inspections to determine the nature of doubtful phenomena, and that an international commission would supervise the functioning of the system. This result is important and encouraging. The West has contributed to the present situation in the negotiations by making important concessions, well known to all who



(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

have followed our work. We need only reflect that not long ago the Western Powers were asking that numerous control posts established on the territories to be inspected should be manned by international personnel in order to realize the distance which the Western Powers have come in order to reduce the gap between the two sides.

I should like also to point out that this undoubted rapprochement of the two positions has been decisively influenced by the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations (ENDC/28), because, several of the ideas contained in that document have been taken up and adopted by both parties. That, I think, should encourage the non-aligned countries to continue their practical contributions to the negotiations, and we hope that they will do so within the next few days.

That said, what now has to be done is to develop and translate into practice the important outline on which agreements of principle have been based. Obviously the task is not easy, as the facts have made plain; but I hope we shall succeed in achieving it with the help and collaboration of all present here. In my view the three constructive elements of the treaty to which I have just referred - control posts, inspection and the international commission - are three interrelated elements which to a certain extent exert a reciprocal influence, so that they must be considered first separately and then together, with a thorough study of their mutual relationship. It is through the harmonious fusion of those three elements translated into treaty language that we may achieve a satisfactory set of guarantees.

First, each element must be examined separately and its precise scope determined. As for the control posts, automatic or otherwise, we must know what instruments will be installed in them, their practical and scientific capabilities, their range of action, their degree of accuracy, and the like. Concerning inspections we must know their scope, the authority and degree of independence of the inspectors, the methods and procedures by which the decision to inspect will be taken and executed, and so on. Similar explanation will be needed with regard to the composition and functioning of the international commission.

When we have reached agreement on these basic definitions, we can assemble our material and see how the three elements of the agreement - control posts, inspections, and the international commission - can combine to achieve the objective of the treaty in order to provide a satisfactory guarantee against clandestine tests. The function of these elements seems to me to be, so to speak, interdependent, and it may be that if the role of one is enlarged, the role of another may be diminished. That, I think,

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

is the stage in our negotiations when we shall be able to tackle, and I hope resolve, the question - so controversial at the present time - of how many inspections and "black boxes" will be needed.

Allow me to say that I have confidence that agreement will be reached. I base that confidence on the conviction that there is here a sincere desire on the part of all to find an area of agreement, and that the difficulties lie in the search for formulae that can translate that common will into practical and technical terms. Those difficulties, I believe, can and must be overcome.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation is very happy to rejoin, round this green baize rectangle, the many colleagues who are back here again for another session.

We hope for a more productive session of our Conference. We would hope that we shall make progress other than our daily progression round this table in a counter-clockwise direction which, one might say -- if one wished to be unkind -- is about all the progress that we have made during the great many weeks of our labours here. We also should like to join the other representatives who have spoken before us in greeting Mr. Foster, who comes here for a time to lead the United States delegation, and Lij Imru, the representative of Ethiopia.

I was struck by the view expressed by the representative of Mexico when he said on 12 February 1963:

"We are here because we are not discouraged by difficulties nor intimidated by obstacles, and because there is no weakening of our will to unite our efforts to achieve the aim to which we are committed: an effective agreement which will put an end to nuclear weapon tests and halt the armaments race, as the first essential steps to make thermonuclear war impossible and to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.96, p. 5)

The Canadian delegation is very much in accord with the priority which the representative of Mexico has allotted to this task which lies before us.

This morning I shall be confining my remarks in the main to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The Canadian delegation strongly urges that this Conference should focus its attention and its major efforts on this area until success is achieved, both because of the intrinsic importance of the matter and because the nuclear Powers in their negotiations on this question are so close to agreement. Of course we hope that the Conference will soon resume discussion on

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

the other important subjects that are before it. In particular, I welcome the statement which we have already heard in favour of greater emphasis on the work of the Committee of the Whole. We fully endorse the view that in this round of negotiations we should spend much more time and effort on collateral measures than we have done in the past. We share what seems to be a general feeling among those who have already spoken that it has become increasingly important to agree upon a number of those measures. If we are to realize a far-reaching programme of disarmament, it is self-evident that a climate of trust and co-operation between the two sides must be created.

We have noted in the statements made -- and in particular I would refer to the statement made this morning by our Czechoslovakian colleague -- that the Soviet Union and other socialist States favour a certain number of interim measures and we know that the Western Powers have other collateral measures that they would like to have discussed. Because one side wants to discuss certain of these collateral measures and the other side other measures, is it necessary for all of them to be ignored and for none of them to be discussed? The Canadian delegation would like to urge the co-Chairmen to make a selection for discussion from the subjects which have been put forward as measures which can reduce the risk of war and can help to improve the climate for general disarmament. We have tried to do that before but unfortunately we have not achieved very important results in that particular area. We feel that if, in conjunction with agreement on a test ban, we could develop agreements on a number of collateral measures, this Conference would have gone far towards reversing the arms race.

But I believe we are all agreed that the most promising avenue for immediate progress is to press for the conclusion of a treaty to halt nuclear tests. In the view of the Canadian delegation, a decisive point has been reached in the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. In the next few weeks this Conference must show that it can achieve results on that all-important question if it hopes to retain the confidence of the nations which have set it its task. That is a sobering thought, but we can undertake renewed efforts to negotiate a test ban treaty, encouraged by the fact that the problems involved have been simplified since we last met.

The recent exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev (ENDC/73) and President Kennedy (ENDC/74) would appear to have brought an agreement on the cessation

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

of nuclear tests almost within our grasp. We warmly welcome the evidence in those letters that both sides seem prepared to make the changes in their respective positions which are necessary if a mutually acceptable accord is to be reached. The Canadian delegation has also been encouraged by the tone of most of the references to the test ban question which are contained in the opening statements made by the representatives of the nuclear Powers. In our view the recent statements by the two sides demonstrate that disagreement over the matters of principle which for so long blocked the discussion is now finally removed. As was pointed out on Tuesday (ENDC/PV.96, p. 9), and again today by the representative of Italy, a common basis has been re-established upon which permanent agreement can be built. The fundamental elements which should go towards making up a test ban system now appear to be agreed. That is a major step forward and it presents this Conference with an opportunity which we cannot afford to let slip.

What should be our next step? I think the answer to that question is clear. Both sides now agree that the system under which they would be prepared to enter into a treaty to ban all nuclear tests would be composed of three principal elements: First, nationally manned and operated seismic stations; second, a number of automatic recording stations which would both provide a cross-check of the data received by the international centre from nationally manned stations and themselves provide additional data; and, finally, a number of on-site inspections which would provide assurance that the residua of unidentified phenomena are not the result of nuclear explosions.

A difference of opinion still exists over the number of automatic stations and the number of on-site inspections which are required. It seems to us, as it does to our Italian friends, that the best method to resolve the difference is simply to set it aside for the moment and to concentrate on serious negotiation on the details of what both sides accept as the three fundamental components of the system. We are confident that if those negotiations are conducted with good will on both sides the difference which exists over the number of inspections will become less of an obstacle. Indeed, it seems to us that the question of numbers cannot possibly be decided until both sides have reached a clear understanding of and agreement upon precisely what is involved in the three basic elements which all agree the treaty should establish. At the present time no one can say on the question of inspections that the number of three is right, that the number of ten is right or that the number of six and a half is right.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Therefore, the Canadian delegation earnestly appeals to the nuclear Powers represented here to undertake without delay the negotiations for which a basis has been well laid in the letters which Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy exchanged at the turn of the year. We hope that those negotiations will continue in private and in formal negotiations between the nuclear Powers in the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests and that there will be frequent reports to the Committee as a whole. For its part, the Canadian delegation will do anything it can do to help towards a successful outcome. We would appeal to all concerned to show the good will and willingness to compromise which were apparent in the exchange of correspondence I have cited.

Now that the most difficult steps towards agreement have been taken, what is needed is a final effort to overcome the few outstanding differences which separate these two sides. Some of us here have been reading with admiration of the feats of certain mountaineers -- French, Italian and German -- who recently conquered in terrible weather heights which have never before been reached by man in winter. It does seem to me that perhaps we should take inspiration from that fact. The nuclear Powers are within a few scores of metres from the top of these peaks, having got there with great difficulty. We should like to see them make the further effort to reach the top. What is needed is a final effort to overcome the few outstanding differences which separate the two sides. Those differences are small indeed compared to the obstacles which existed when the nuclear test ban was last discussed in this Committee. Any disadvantage which either side might possibly suffer by making a compromise is of small significance when compared to the benefits which would flow from a nuclear weapon test ban agreement. It remains for this Conference to fulfil its responsibility by ensuring that the final negotiation over the details of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is quickly and successfully concluded.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninety-seventh plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mbu, Minister of State and representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Italy and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 15 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.