CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 17 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. P. LIND (Sweden)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
	Mr. E. HOSANNAH
Bulgaria:	Mr. C. LUKANOV
	Mr. G. GHELEV
	Mr. G. YANKOV
	Mr. I. BOEV
Burma:	U HTOON SHEIN
Canada:	Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
	Mr. S.F. RAE
	Mr. R.M. TAIT
	Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. KLUSAK
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. A. MIKULIN
	Mr. J. CHMELA
Ethiopia:	Ato S. TEFERRA
India:	Mr. R.K. NEHRU
	Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
	Mr. K. NARENDRANATH
	Mr. S.V. PURUSHOTTAM
Italy:	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
	Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
	Mr. S. AVETTA
	Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:	Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
	Mr. M. TELLO
	Mr. J. MERCADO
Nigeria:	Mr. L. C. N. OBI
Poland:	Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Romania:	Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
	Mr. E. GLASER
	Mr. I. IACOB
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU
Sweden:	Mr. P. LIND
	Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
	Mr. B. VEGESACK
	Mr. J. PRAWITZ
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
	Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH
	Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV
	Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. A.F. HASSAN
	Mr. A. OSMAN
	Mr. M. KASSEM
	Mr. S. El FATATRI
United Kingdom:	Sir Harold BEELEY
	Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
	Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON
	Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:	Mr. W.C. FOSTER
	Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE
	Mr. D.S. MACDONALD
	Mr. R.A. MARTIN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the 217th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I wish to draw to the attention of the Committee that a second revision of the draft report (ENDC/146/Rev.2) has been circulated. I propose to call first on the speakers who have indicated their wish to make general statements, and at the conclusion of those general statements we shall turn to the consideration of the revised draft report.

Before I give the floor to the first speaker, allow me to express my sincere thanks for the kind words of welcome which members of delegations addressed to me on my return to the Committee last week.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is holding its last meeting in 1964. The time has come to weigh up and assess everything which has happened in our negotiations in the Committee during the last two sessions; the day has come for a summing-up. From the formal point of view, the results of our work are contained in the draft report of the Committee to the General Assembly, (ENDC/146/Rev.2), which the two co-Chairmen have submitted jointly for consideration by the Committee. Let us try, however, to bring to light what lies behind the jejune, laconic, formal paragraphs of the draft report.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee began its work in January 1964 in an atmosphere of increased hopes for success, and in an atmosphere of definite and — I would say — fully-justified optimism. There were indeed some well-known reasons for this assertion. The conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1); the agreement, endorsed by a unanimous decision of the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117), to refrain from placing in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons; the reduction in the military budgets of the Soviet Union and the United States by way of "mutual example"; and, later, the parallel decisions taken by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to reduce the production of fissionable materials for military purposes (ENDC/131, 132; ENDC/PV.186, p. 34) — all these had brought about some substantial changes for the better in the picture of the general situation of international affairs. These steps taken by the nuclear Powers were aimed at slowing down the nuclear arms race to some extent; and they seemed to have broken the vicious circle created during the long years of the "cold war" in regard to nuclear weapons.

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A powerful factor conducive to the success of disarmament negotiations was the movement by millions of people of all continents, races and nations in favour of finding more rapidly a solution to the main problem of the nuclear age: namely, the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. One of the most significant results of the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests was the crystallization in the mind of humanity of a new, deeper and more active awareness of the fact that the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war can be solved by the joint efforts of States.

At its last session, the General Assembly, the most representative forum of States in the world, by urging the Committee to reach agreement on the problem of general and complete disarmament and on measures which could serve to reduce international tension, lessen the possibility of war and facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament (A/RES/1908(XVIII); ENDC/139), likewise made its contribution to the creation of favourable conditions for the work of the Committee.

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance in this respect of the personal part taken by the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union and the United States of America in defining the main tasks of the disarmament negotiations in 1964. Referring to those problems on which -- in the opinion of the Soviet Government -- some reasonable prospects for agreement might exist in 1964, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, made the following statement on New Year's Eve:

> "We believe that we should try to limit the armaments race step by step, so as to prepare the most favourable conditions for a radical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/118, page 5)

Mr. Khrushchev went on to say:

> "In 1963 hope for an improvement of the international situation was awakened in the peoples of the world. Let those on whom an improvement depends do everything this year to ensure that this hope grows stronger so that it may be possible at the next New Year's Day to carry a stage further the cause of peace." (ibid, page 6)

President Johnson said almost the same thing in his message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 21 January 1964, in which he stated:

> "Today your search begins anew in a climate of hope. Last year's genuine gains have given us new momentum ... Let us pray that the tide has turned --

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that further and more far-reaching agreements lie ahead -- and that future generations will mark 1964 as the year the world turned for all time away from the horrors of war and constructed new bulwarks of peace." (ENDC/120)

In the light of these facts and statements one may say without exaggeration that never before had States begun disarmament negotiations in so favourable an atmosphere as that which existed eight months ago in January 1964.

In 1964 our Committee has been working for seven months, if we exclude the period of the recess. Our work has covered a wide range of questions which have been given thorough and detailed consideration in the Committee.

Throughout the Committee's work the Soviet Union and the other socialist States have made energetic and persistent efforts to find more rapidly a solution to the problems of disarmament and to take the utmost advantage of the favourable pre-conditions which had been created for our negotiations. In doing so we have based ourselves -- as we always do -- on the position that only bold, resolute and large-scale measures in the field of disarmament can eliminate the terrible threat which hangs over mankind -- the threat of a devastating nuclear war.

In accordance with this position of principle, the Soviet Union proposed the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2, article 5, paragraph 1) -- a measure which is feasible in present conditions and is the surest way to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. But, as everyone knows, the Western Powers began to object to this measure on various pretexts, and stated that for reasons of security they could not renounce nuclear weapons entirely during the first stage of disarmament and were consequently unable to agree to the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage. The objections of the Western Powers to this proposal were, of course, artificial and unfounded, and merely showed their unwillingness to be deprived, in the very first stage of disarmament, of the possibility of using nuclear weapons. But, in the interests of reaching agreement, the Soviet Union agreed that an exception should be made to this proposal and that, as an additional guarantee for the security of both sides, a strictly limited number of intercontinental, anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles should be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States in their national territories until the end of the second stage of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1, article 5, paragraph 1). Then, however, the Western representatives began saying here that it would be a good idea to extend the "nuclear

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umbrella" to the third stage of disarmament as well. The Soviet Union also took into account this desire of the Western Powers, when it agreed to the maintenance of the "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the third stage -- that is, until the end of the disarmament process. (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1)

Being guided, in submitting proposals for high-priority measures, by considerations of their effectiveness and real importance in the process of disarmament and in slowing down the arms race, the Soviet Union put forward (ENDC/123) and developed in the course of the Committee's negotiations in 1964 a series of proposals for the elimination of bomber aircraft, the reduction of military budgets, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, the reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States, the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, measures to prevent surprise attack, and the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

Taking into account the dangers which mankind will inevitably have to face if effective steps to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons are not taken now, the Soviet Union prepared and submitted for consideration by the Committee its proposal (ENDC/123) on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. At many of the Committee's meetings, the delegations from the socialist countries have endeavoured to come to an understanding on a comprehensive agreement in this regard, and tried to show how important it is for an agreement of this kind to preclude any possibility of direct or indirect access to these weapons by those who do not now possess them, including access to nuclear weapons by participation in a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force.

No one should be in any doubt that the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons can only be resolved on a basis of principle. This means that an agreement on this matter must be comprehensive and must not leave any loop-hole for getting round it. This question of principle cannot be approached from the point of view of taking into account the interests of one or another of the opposing military alliances or -- as it would perhaps be more accurate to say -- from the point of view of satisfying the nuclear claims of one member of the NATO military bloc, Western Germany, since, as far as we know, apart from the Federal Republic of Germany, none of the other participants in these groupings is trying to gain access to nuclear weapons. We assert once again, with all possible emphasis, that this is the only way in which the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons can be solved.

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We note with satisfaction that a realization of the need for decisive action in the field of disarmament which would really eliminate the threat of nuclear war, a realization of the need to take advantage of the favourable situation for solving specific problems of disarmament, has been reflected in the attitude adopted by the non-aligned States members of the Committee, particularly during the session which is coming to an end today. The statements by the delegations of the non-aligend countries which appear in document ENDC/144 are all in varying degrees inspired by this realization. These statements, which contain a brief resumé of the proposals made by each of these delegations on the measures of disarmament and collateral measures which the Committee has been considering during 1964, constitute one of the most important annexes to our Comm ttee's report to the United Nations General Assembly.

We note with satisfaction that the representatives of the non-aligned States have raised their voices in the Committee in favour of the speediest possible elimination of all types of nuclear weapons. They have resolutely expressed themselves in favour of the idea that this is the only realistic guarantee for the security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. They have advocated the idea that existing stockpiles of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be destroyed in the very earliest stage of disarmament, with the exception of a minimum agreed number of missiles forming a "nuclear umbrella" or -- as some prople prefer to say -- a "nuclear shield" or "minimum deterrent". By advocating this solution of the problem, the non-aligned States have there-by made an important contribution to the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

The representatives of the non-aligned States in the Committee have also pointed out that the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force is the sole obstacle in the way of solving the urgent and vital question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and have insisted on the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. They have suggested that for the time being both sides should refrain from making any changes in the present situation in regard to the control, ownership, use and transfer of nuclear weapons and in regard to the training of nationals of non-nuclear Powers in the use of weapons of this kind. Frankly speaking, this way of stating the question is constructive and opportune, as it may prevent the world being faced with a fait accompli, which would deal an irreparable blow to the possibility of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

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One cannot refrain from mentioning the resolute statements made in the Committee by the representatives of Ethiopia and other non-aligned States, insisting that the Committee should recommend the General Assembly to convene an international conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.209, p.10).

The non-aligned States have put forward in the Committee several useful ideas on other questions as well, such as the reduction of military budgets, the elimination of bomber aircraft and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

Thus, on the main questions which have been discussed in the Committee, the majority of its members have adopted a clear-cut and positive position which could have been the basis for reaching a number of vitally important agreements in our negotiations. If the States members of NATO participating in the work of the Committee had associated themselves with this position, then one may say with confidence that we should already have had agreement on the basic problem of a programme of general and complete disarmament -- the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. That agreement would undoubtedly have set in motion all the other component parts of the programme of disarmament, and would have brought closer the achievement of agreement on them too. It is possible that a comprehensive agreement on the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons would have been ready for signature today, and might even have been already signed. We should also have achieved substantial progress towards agreement on other measures to slow down the nuclear arms race. In all the most important directions the Committee would have moved far ahead in comparison with the position in which we are today and in which we were on the day when the Committee resumed its work eight months ago.

Unfortunately, however, this has not happened. We have not achieved progress in any single direction at all. "Thus far, the Committee has not reached any specific agreement either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension" -- that is what is said in the Committee's draft report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly (ENDC/146/Rev.2, p.5). On the balance-sheet of the Committee's specific achievements for 1964, as for the previous years, there is the figure 0.

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It is no secret for anyone why the results of our work have been so negative. This has happened because, and only because -- as in the past -- the States members of the North Atlantic military alliance, whose representatives have uttered many eloquent phrases about disarmament in the Committee, have in fact continued to maintain an attitude which practically blocks any successful outcome of the negotiations.

The Soviet Union's constructive proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" as a basis for solving the problem of eliminating all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, and the constructive efforts of the non-aligned countries to achieve a practical solution of this question, have been countered by the NATO countries with their old and unrealistic plan for a gradual percentage reduction of delivery vehicles. This plan leads to the maintenance by the nuclear States of the material and physical possibilities of unleashing and waging nuclear war at all stages of disarmament, and even leads to the perpetuation of this threat. In order to justify this approach, the Western Powers have stubbornly tried to prove to the Committee that only the existing military "balance" can serve as the basis of the security of States, and that consequently all disarmament measures relating to armed forces and armaments should comply with the criterion of the maintenance by States, until the end of disarmament, of powerful armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons, the existing structure of their war machines, existing military alliances and so on and so forth. This shows that what prevails in the policy of the United States is not the idea of security through disarmament, but the concern to maintain military and strategic positions.

If the United States, in determining its policy in regard to disarmament, were to be guided by the interests of peace and considerations of the security of States, and not by military and strategic considerations, then one could say with confidence that the United States disarmament plan, though it would not be completely identical, would at least in its main lines differ very little from the programme of general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union, and the differences and divergences could be easily settled and overcome.

This militaristic approach of the Western Powers is, in fact, based on their political concept which has been expounded by the United States delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, namely that, in their opinion, the armed forces of States will continue to be the decisive factor in international affairs until the last stage

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of disarmament. But we do not agree with that opinion; we reject that concept. The only idea we can agree with is that the present moment is in fact characterized by a certain balance of the military strength of the sides. One might perhaps also accept the thesis that, so long as there is no agreement on general and complete disarmament, so long as the arms race continues and intensive military preparations are in progress, in these circumstances a state of balance of the military strength of the sides is a foundation, although an unreliable, unstable and precarious one, but nevertheless a foundation on which mutual security in our times to some extent rests. In these circumstances, "the balance of armaments" is an expression of the present situation regarding the military strength of the sides, which we take as a starting-point for disarmament. But the objective of disarmament is to move forward from an insecure and unstable peace based on "the balance of armaments" to a stable peace in which, following the elimination of the material instruments and means of waging war, the danger itself of an outbreak of war would be completely removed.

The gist of the matter is that during the disarmament process this military guarantee of peace, which -- as we have already said -- is unreliable, should be replaced by a guarantee of a stable peace on a different and non-militaristic basis, when the main factor guaranteeing the security of States in equal conditions of security will no longer be armaments, but the implementation of radical disarmament measures.

The position of the Powers of the NATO bloc is unsound, because they try to pass off the concept of the "balance of armaments", in the sense in which it expresses the present state of affairs in the world, as a factor which will determine and characterize relations between States up to the very end of the disarmament process. This position of theirs is fundamentally incorrect, and in the first place because, when we speak of balanced measures of disarmament, as stated in the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), what we have in mind, of course, is not that the war machines built up by the opposing groupings should be preserved intact during the disarmament process and not that the state of balance of the existing military strength of the sides -- which the representatives of the Western Powers emphasize -- should be preserved, but that measures for general and complete disarmament should not at any stage in the course of their implementation lead to anyone obtaining a

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military advantage, and that as a result of the implementation of these measures the security of all should be ensured equally at all stages.

The difference between these two approaches is very substantial. The first approach places the stress and emphasis on armaments, on maintaining the military structure and on preserving the existing war machine intact; and thus it does not permit, it actually blocks the implementation of serious disarmament measures which are radical in their scope and character. The second approach, on the contrary, proposes the implementation of radical disarmament measures as a means of guaranteeing the security of States, with the proviso, of course, that no State will thereby obtain any military advantage.

One cannot help asking the question why, in this matter which appears to be quite clear, the Western Powers adopt such an unrealistic position, which is out of keeping with the spirit of the times. All this arises because the Western Powers cannot see or -- to be more accurate -- do not wish to realize that, as a result of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, profound qualitative changes will take place in the position of States in the world. It is impossible not to see the fundamental difference between what serves as a source of security for States -- although an unreliable one -- in our times, when enormous stocks of nuclear weapons and conventional armaments have been accumulated and the arms race is in progress, and what will serve as the main source for the security of States after the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, when the arms race will be stopped and the world will begin really to disarm.

These qualitative changes reside in the fact that, with disarmament, the extent of the security of States will depend directly on the scope and character of the disarmament measures being carried out, and on the rapidity and speed with which they are put into effect. The larger the scope of the disarmament measures being carried out and the more quickly they are put into effect, the more stable and invulnerable will the security of every State become.

It goes without saying that during the disarmament process the war machine and military structure of both sides will inevitably have to undergo some changes before they disappear completely. They will be weakened and dismantled, and one after another the most important component units, links and sectors will be cut away.

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That is what disarmament consists in and not merely in an arithmetical reduction. In these days, when a State may possess a huge arsenal of the most terrible weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear weapons and their means of delivery -- the main danger is the threat of nuclear war. It is undeniable that the removal of the threat of nuclear war must be the first objective to be attained in the very beginning of the disarmament process, and in the Soviet proposals this is provided for in the very first stage of disarmament.

Such is the realistic philosophy of disarmament in the nuclear age. It is based on the facts of life itself. It is the very foundation of the fifth Agreed Principle for disarmament negotiations, which reads as follows:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, p.2)

But the NATO countries are in fact refusing to adopt this approach -- the only reasonable one -- to a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Now, as formerly, they are obsessed with obsolete and rigid ideas. They view the world of the future, the future position of States when the world begins really to disarm, not in terms of dynamics and development, but metaphysically and statically, outside of development, and from the point of view of the conditions of the present time.

The Western Powers have adopted the same position in the Committee on other matters as well. To the unanimous demand of the peoples for the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, to the business-like and specific proposals of the socialist countries and the non-aligned States represented in the Committee, the NATO countries have replied by proclaiming a policy aimed at speeding up the creation of a multilateral nuclear force, within the framework of which the West German revenge-seekers will gain access to nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction.

The NATO countries have rejected all the other constructive proposals before the Committee aimed at slowing down the arms race and at bringing about a further relaxation of international tension.

For their part, the NATO countries have put forward for consideration by the Committee only such proposals as would lead not to disarmament but to the establishment

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of control without disarmament, control over the atomic industry of States, over the missile and aircraft industry, -- that is, proposals which would lead to the establishment of a far-flung network of international espionage in the most sensitive sectors on which the security of States directly depends. The implementation of proposals of this kind would not only fail to reduce the threat of nuclear war, but would in fact lead to its intensification and to new complications in relations between States.

The policy of the NATO countries in the field of disarmament has still not become positive -- that is the crux of the whole matter, that is the cause of the failure of the Committee's work in 1964, as in the previous years. Much has changed in the world, but so far there has been no change in the line, the policy of the Western Powers in disarmament matters.

No special perspicacity is needed in order to see the very close connexion between this line and the policy pursued by the United States of America and its allies in other international matters. The aggressive actions of the United States in the Tonkin Gulf area and the United States intervention in South Viet-Nam, the NATO conspiracy against the independence of the Republic of Cyprus and the new armed intervention of the United States of America, Belgium and some other countries in the internal affairs of the Congo, the continuing provocations against the Republic of Cuba and the stubborn refusal of the Western Powers to take the path of eliminating the vestiges of the Second World War in Europe -- all these are elements of one and the same policy. A policy which is based on a desire to continue the arms race, on a line aimed at suppressing the struggle of the peoples for freedom of independence and on a line designed to kindle military conflicts and unleash local wars -- a policy of this kind cannot, of course, give rise to any constructive initiative in the field of disarmament.

It does not give us any pleasure to speak of all these things, but we are forced to do so. Here in the Committee negotiations are being conducted on matters of such vital importance to the peoples, and the responsibility of all participants in these negotiations is so great, that it would be unworthy and exceedingly dangerous to refuse to look the truth in the face. And the truth is that, if there is no change in the policy pursued by the NATO countries in

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disarmament matters, then the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests and the other steps taken by States last year in order to slow down the arms race will remain merely isolated episodes in the development of international relations. The representative of India, Mr. Nehru, was quite right when he said in the Committee on 31 January 1964:

"... if there is lack of progress in our work, the earlier gains may be lost. That might easily create a setback in the international situation". (ENDC/PV.162, p.10)

The times require, on the part of the NATO countries, a different policy in disarmament matters -- a policy which would ensure an immediate solution of the main problem of our time: the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. The solution of this problem demands a bold approach to the matter. Time is passing rapidly by, events are developing at a headlong speed; and this reconsideration, this revision of policy in disarmament matters cannot be delayed without jeopardizing the interests of the peoples and the interests of peace throughout the world.

When we began disarmament negotiations after the Second World War, the world was already being threatened by a monstrous weapon of mass destruction, the atomic bomb. As is well known, the first military use of the atomic bomb was made by the United States strategic air force at the very end of the Second World War, "just before the curtain", as they say. On that occasion, the bomb annihilated the Japanese city of Hiroshima in a single second, destroying more than 150,000 human lives. This was an atomic bomb with an explosive power equivalent to the explosion produced by 20,000 tons of the conventional chemical explosive, trinitroluene. While fruitless negotiations were being conducted on disarmament, the armaments race was successfully developing. Soon, nuclear bombs with an explosive power of hundreds of thousands of tons made their appearance, to be followed, later, by megaton hydrogen bombs many thousands of times more powerful than the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. All this has happened before our eyes over the last fifteen to twenty years. But consider the fact that the discoveries and the break-throughs made in science during that time have been so great that, if we do not put an end to the armaments race now, if we do not take the path of resolute disarmament, we shall witness the development at an ever-increasing rate of new

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weapons of mass destruction ever more monstrous in their death-dealing capacity, weapons of virtually unlimited power and range of action.

All these terrible facts which characterize the life of our times have only one message -- namely, that any procrastination in solving the problem of disarmament increases the dangers threatening mankind. It should be obvious to everyone that in the field of disarmament palliatives are now of no use. In present conditions, States have no other choice than to take immediately the path of resolute, bold and far-reaching measures in the field of general and complete disarmament.

Today, as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament completes its work for 1964, we appeal to our Western partners -- and particularly the United States of America -- to make a decisive change in their policy regarding disarmament matters in a constructive direction. That alone will open up prospects for success in disarmament negotiations in the future. We for our part will always be prepared -- as we have been hitherto -- to turn into reality, through joint efforts, any possibility of reaching agreement which may emerge in the course of these negotiations. The Soviet Union, which has been fighting consistently and indefatigably for the solution of the disarmament problem, will not be found wanting.

In conclusion I should like, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to thank our co-Chairman, the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, as well as Mr. Timberlake, who has temporarily deputized for him, and all their colleagues in the United States delegation, for the co-operation they have shown in the drafting of the co-Chairmen's recommendations on organizational and other aspects of the Committee's work. The Soviet delegation wishes to thank all delegations taking part in the Committee's work for their sincere efforts to make their contribution to the common cause of preparing an agreed programme of general and complete disarmament and collateral measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension. I should also like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Protitch, his Deputy, Mr. Epstein, and all the members of the Secretariat -- both seen and unseen -- who by their efficient guidance and highly-qualified technical services have made possible the day-to-day work of the Committee.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): The Bulgarian delegation has already had an opportunity of expressing its point of view regarding the results of our work, as well as regarding the reasons which have prevented the Committee from achieving tangible results either on a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament or on the collateral measures included in the Committee's agenda. We have also pointed out that the fears expressed by some delegations regarding possible criticisms of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee are justified. Moreover, the document which we have been discussing at our two last meetings — the draft report to the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/146 and Rev. 1, 2) -- tells by itself very eloquently whether such criticism would be justified, that is to what extent the Eighteen-Nation Committee has carried out the important tasks assigned to it by the resolutions of the General Assembly. The answer to this question is clear to everyone and it is reflected in the report, because in fact the lack of tangible positive results from our seven months' work in 1964 can neither be denied nor concealed. It is not a question of whether or not we would wish this fact to be the subject of criticism. Criticism is unavoidable and at the same time necessary. It is unavoidable because criticism reflects the concern of world public opinion and the peoples of all countries as a result of the continuing deadlock in the negotiations on a question which the General Assembly unanimously defined five years ago as:

"the most important one facing the world today" (A/RES/1378(XIV)).

Criticism is necessary because it is bound to have the effect of indicating and exposing the real reasons for the deadlock and it will thus help towards overcoming the obstacles which continue to stand in the way of rapid and substantial progress in the disarmament negotiations.

The fact that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is compelled to report, some three years after its establishment, that no concrete agreements have been achieved, is certainly bound to cause concern. The danger and risk with which the world may be faced are so great and so obvious that no one is entitled, nor indeed is he able, to close his eyes to them.

It is not enough to state that the arms race is dangerous. It is not enough to admit that disarmament is essential. It is necessary to draw the appropriate right conclusions from those statements and, at the same time, to recognize the need for rapid and bold decisions. But for this to become possible what is needed in the first

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

place is such an approach to disarmament problems as would show that States base their policies on the requirement of our times, namely, to ensure security by eliminating the material means of waging war; to ensure security and lasting peace by eliminating the danger of a nuclear war which is threatening all peoples.

"In fact, general disarmament, when observed by all, should produce ultimate balance. But it cannot be achieved overnight." (ENDC/PV.214, p.37)

That is what Mr. Foster told us.

It is beyond all doubt that general and complete disarmament cannot be achieved "overnight". However, it is also beyond all doubt that it will be impossible to arrive at general and complete disarmament either overnight or at any time if we wish to convince ourselves and the whole world that peace and security now and throughout the disarmament process depend and will continue to depend on the "rough balance and resultant stability" which, in the opinion of the United States representative, "helps to keep the peace" between the two sides (ibid.). It is precisely this approach to disarmament problems that constitutes the solid wall which defeats all the efforts of the peoples to achieve genuine disarmament and lasting peace. Unfortunately, the declarations of representatives of the NATO countries at our recent meetings have confirmed our conviction that they continue to maintain this exceedingly erroneous approach. Basing himself on the more than odd thesis that the implementation of radical disarmament measures in the initial stage "would be an invitation to aggression", the United States representative declared that:

"... the disarmament process must ensure that today's imperfect stability improves throughout all stages." (ibid., p.38)

That is where the root of the evil lies. As long as the Western Powers base themselves on such a radically erroneous premise there is a risk that the negotiations on disarmament will encounter serious obstacles for a long time yet. Actually, what sort of "stability" is concerned? Is it "stability" on the "brink of the abyss"? But "stability" and security of that kind do not lend themselves to "improvement", for the simple reason that they are more than imperfect, more than dangerous and, consequently, cannot serve as a starting point for any real disarmament.

The only right and at the same time realistic approach to disarmament problems is the approach which is based on the premise that the present general insecurity, the present absence of genuine security, must be radically changed in the direction of general security. But general security cannot be built on the basis of the ominous "invulnerable" power of thermonuclear weapons; it can be built solely on the firm basis of rapid and radical disarmament guaranteeing equal security for all.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

The present international situation demands from us not the "improvement" of the present state of affairs and the present so-called security, but a qualitatively different stability, a qualitatively different security. Such genuine security we see above all in the rapid and final liberation of the peoples from the gloomy prospect which the late President of the United States, Mr. John Kennedy, had in mind when he said that our planet might become uninhabitable.

Nevertheless, the position of the Western Powers persistently takes as its starting point the thesis that the only method which would enable mankind to build a world without weapons and without wars, the only method by which it would be possible to eliminate the menace of a thermonuclear conflict, is to maintain the menace of such a conflict, that is, in fact, to maintain the menace of total thermonuclear war. As a matter of fact, it is easy to perceive behind the disarmament "philosophy" of the Western Powers the absence of a deep and sincere conviction that disarmament is possible at all. In that "philosophy" one perceives the lack of conviction that the cause of disarmament is a just cause -- in a word, the lack of belief in the need for disarmament. From such disbelief to the absence of serious efforts and of a sincere desire for genuine disarmament there is only one step. But in this respect there is also reflected another tendency prejudicial to our negotiations which the actions of the United States give us cause to see in the very title of its "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1, and Add.1, 2, 3).

If we judge by the declarations of the delegations of the Western Powers, by their arguments on the basic problems of general and complete disarmament from 1962 up to the present day, it is difficult to escape the impression that they consider the achievement of general and complete disarmament to be impossible as long as the world is not at peace, that is as long as the relations between States and all unsettled and pending controversial international problems have not been finally resolved once and for all and, moreover, in the conditions of a world armed to the teeth.

Such concepts give rise to particular concern in the light of the foreign policy line pursued by some States, inspired by peace-endangering "theories" such as the need to fill the "vacuum" in this or that area of the world or the "right" of some particular Power to decide on behalf of other peoples, and against their clearly expressed will, problems of the social and political systems and problems of their own way of life.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

The Bulgarian delegation is profoundly convinced that it is of great and fundamental importance for future disarmament negotiations to make all these questions clear on the eve of the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, that is at the time when the Committee submits its report to that world organization for consideration.

However, it seems that the lack of results of the Committee's work does not particularly bother some leaders of the West. It is certainly a good thing that the Committee was set up -- that in itself was a success for the peace-loving forces. But the existence of the Committee is not enough; its abundant discussions are not enough -- we need results from its work; we need agreements on disarmament and the opening-up of wide avenues towards it.

There is no doubt that the reasons for the failure of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee are not of a "technical" nature. Still less is it due to the fact that the details of the various proposals have been more or less "insufficiently elucidated". Obviously, the reasons lie much deeper and the obstacles standing in our way are much more serious. Otherwise we should long ago have arrived at some agreements. To confirm what I have said, I shall give two examples taken from our last meeting.

The first example relates to the field of disarmament. The Indian delegation explained once again how it understood the "nuclear umbrella" proposal and the working group relating to it (ENDC/PV.216, pp. 28 et seq.). Mr. Nehru gave us to understand that India wished the possibility of nuclear war to be eliminated at the very beginning of disarmament. How can we fail to recall that the upholding of the very idea of a minimum deterrent was called by the Western delegations "imposing the proposal of one side"? How can we fail to recall the categorical statement of the United States delegation to the effect that the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to an agreed minimum at the beginning of disarmament was unacceptable to the United States Government (ENDC/PV.214, p.38)?

I take my second example from the field of collateral measures. The delegation of the United Kingdom once again called for the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Sir Harold Beeley made a categorical statement promising that after the conclusion of such an agreement the United Kingdom would not do anything that involved dissemination of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.216, p.10). But why did the representative of the United Kingdom not say whether his Government would

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sign an agreement prohibiting both direct and indirect dissemination, prohibiting both access to national and to multinational possession of nuclear weapons by countries not now possessing them?

There is no need to go into the reasons for failure in the two cases I have cited -- they are quite obvious. But those two cases were not the only ones -- in a much greater number of cases agreements would have been possible at this session, if there had not been in the West the political considerations and "philosophy" of disarmament to which I have previously referred.

In trying to lay bare the reasons for the failure of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to point them out, we are prompted, as we have already emphasized, by our firm belief in the cause of disarmament, by the sincere desire of the Bulgarian people to work and to build their future in the conditions of lasting peace and security -- consequently, by their desire for the success of our negotiations.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria would like to reaffirm its conviction that rapid and substantial results can be achieved in the field of disarmament, if all the countries concerned are inspired by the same principle of peaceful co-existence between States and peoples by which the policy of the Bulgarian Government is inspired, as was stated once again from the tribune of the Bulgarian National Assembly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Todor Zhivkov, on 8 September 1964, the day of the twentieth anniversary of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Disarmament -- the exclusion of war from the life of the human community, the establishment of lasting peace on earth -- is one of the most cherished aims of the Bulgarian people and their Government. That will be the starting point of any Bulgarian delegation in any international forum where the negotiations which we are today suspending for a while are carried on.

Finally, permit me to express on behalf of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, as other delegations have done, our thanks to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, to his Deputy, Mr. Epstein, and to all the members of the Secretariat, especially the interpreters, who by their competence and at times arduous work have done everything they could to facilitate our task and to ensure once again the best possible conditions for the Conference of the Committee.

Mr. KLUSAK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): The discussion of the draft report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the work of the Committee (ENDC/146/Rev.2), affords us a suitable opportunity to sum up the results of the negotiations in the Committee this year. It has to be noted that the picture, as reflected in the report, is not at all a cheerful one. That is certainly true of our discussions during the past three months. During that time the Committee has held thirty meetings, but we have not succeeded in achieving agreement on any of the questions discussed nor, one can even say, any rapprochement of the positions. The results of the spring session were just as cheerless.

At the same time it has to be noted that almost the same picture is presented in assessing the work of the Committee from the time when it began its activities, that is since the spring of 1962. In expressing its dissatisfaction with such a situation, the Czechoslovak delegation is guided by the criterion of the tangible results to which the negotiations have led. In our opinion, that is the only correct yardstick.

In the past some delegations have tried to refute this criticism of ours by pointing out that the solution of the problems with which our Committee is concerned requires a longer time on account of their importance and complexity. They have also asserted that our assessment of the work performed by the Committee is excessively pessimistic, as the negotiations that have taken place in the Committee have helped to elucidate the positions of the parties on various problems and to arrive at a better mutual understanding. Those delegations maintain the same point of view also in regard to the work of the Committee at the present time. We believe that such an approach to our negotiations is not in accordance with the very purpose of our Committee, the basic task of which is to achieve tangible results.

As regards the importance of the questions we are considering and the time required for their solution, the Czechoslovak delegation is far from underestimating or simplifying them, and it is far from harbouring any illusions on that score. On the other hand, we cannot overlook the fact that in the whole three years of its existence the Committee has been unable to resolve a single one of the questions on its agenda, despite the fact that all the objective prerequisites exist to enable our negotiations to lead in the shortest possible time to agreement, at least on some of them. In fact, the great majority of the problems have long been ripe for solution. Concrete proposals have been put forward and explained more than adequately. The urgent need for their solution is emphasized still further by the present situation in the world.

(Mr. Klusak, Czechoslovakia)

The sterility of our discussions this year is all the more disappointing when we take into consideration the conditions in which our Committee resumed its work last January. At that time many delegations very rightly pointed out that the Committee was resuming its work in a more favourable atmosphere than ever before because during the past year there had been some relaxation of international tension.

In that regard certain steps accomplished in the field coming within the scope of the work of the Committee also played their part. The Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) banning nuclear tests in three environments was signed; a direct communications link was established between Moscow and Washington (ENDC/97); at its eighteenth session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, on the initiative of the United States and the Soviet Union, a resolution (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117) banning the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons in outer space. Shortly before the resumption of our negotiations the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States announced their intention to reduce their military expenditures for the following budgetary year. Then, at the beginning of 1964, their example was followed by the governments of several other States, including the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The next step in the same direction was the statements made in April this year by the Governments of the Soviet Union (ENDC/131), the United States (ENDC/132) and the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.186, p.34) concerning a cut-back of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

Those steps undoubtedly created favourable conditions for the work of the Committee. There was every reason to hope that our negotiations would at last lead to tangible results. Therefore it could be expected that after the resumption of the negotiations in our Committee in June we would succeed in reaching agreement at least on some of the most urgent questions. That expectation was reinforced by the fact that after the resumption of the negotiations the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted new proposals both in the field of general and complete disarmament and in the field of collateral measures. Our main attention was quite rightly devoted to those proposals in our deliberations.

In the field of general and complete disarmament there was a proposal (ENDC/PV.188, p.17) for the establishment of a working group to examine the technical problems connected with the implementation of the proposal for the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" or minimum deterrent, on the basis of the adoption by the Committee of the "nuclear umbrella" principle. That compromise proposal opened up a practical possibility of achieving substantial progress towards solving the main problem of general and complete disarmament, that is towards the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery

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vehicles. However, that possibility was not utilized because of the attitude of the Western Powers who stubbornly continued to maintain their old position, and failed to show the necessary readiness to seek for a reasonable, mutually-acceptable solution of the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles.

A similar situation was brought about in the negotiations on collateral measures. It was precisely in that field that one might have expected the work of the Committee to yield at last the long-awaited tangible results. Indeed, in that field several proposals were submitted, the implementation of which ought not to encounter any serious objective obstacles. Considerable attention was given to their consideration in the past and the Committee has devoted a good deal of time to discussing them again this year. The flexible attitude of the delegations of the socialist countries and the lead-giving proposals put forward by the delegation of the Soviet Union to facilitate the discussion created favourable preconditions for achieving agreement at least on some of them.

This applies above all to the adoption of effective measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, to the proposal for an agreed reduction of the military budgets of States or at least the adoption of an appeal to States to continue reducing military expenditure through unilateral measures and the application of the method of mutual example, to the proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft and to several others (ENDC/123). Considerable attention was also given to the proposal to sign a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, to the proposal to sign a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, and to the problem of a total ban on nuclear tests (ibid.). Our discussions have shown that in respect of all those problems the proposals submitted by the delegations of the socialist countries create a suitable basis for fruitful discussion and for achieving agreement in the shortest possible time.

That is why it is truly regrettable that we have again failed to take advantage of these favourable opportunities. Nor have any results been achieved by the efforts of the delegations of several non-aligned countries, which, prompted by a desire to contribute to the reaching of agreement, submitted several proposals aimed at finding a common basis for the solution of certain problems. The active efforts of the non-aligned delegations have been expressed both in the discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament, in connexion with which they have submitted several proposals aimed at facilitating agreement on the terms of reference of the working group,

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and in the field of collateral measures. Their lead-giving efforts in this direction have been expressed above all during the discussion of measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, the proposal to reduce military budgets, the proposal to sign a convention of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the proposal for a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, and other collateral measures.

The memoranda of the delegations of the eight non-aligned countries which are contained in document ENDC/144 and annexed to the Committee's report also give a general picture of their contribution to the work of the Committee. In these circumstances we are fully justified in asking what are the reasons for this unsatisfactory situation. The interests of the future course of the negotiations require that, in summing up the results of our work this year, we should frankly disclose these reasons, because only by doing so can we find a way to remove them and to overcome the existing obstacles in the future.

The true reasons for the failure of the work we have done so far show up clearly in the light of certain circumstances which are indicative of the whole course of the negotiations in our Committee practically from the time of its establishment and which very significantly come to the fore when we assess the sessions of this year. The Czechoslovak delegation frankly pointed out these reasons during the negotiations, and the representatives of the socialist countries who spoke here before us mentioned them at the 216th meeting as well as today. I do not think, therefore, that there is any need to revert to them to any large extent. I should merely like to refer briefly to what we consider to be the main reason why our negotiations have yielded no results when discussing any of the questions. That reason is the general approach of the Western Powers to the problem of disarmament. Although the Western Powers have expressed themselves in favour of the principle of general and complete disarmament, their behaviour is not directed towards that objective. As the discussion carried on in the Committee has confirmed again this year, their approach is based on the striving to subordinate disarmament to their military-strategic concepts, the essence of which consists, as can be seen, in the striving to retain for themselves in the future the possibility of waging nuclear war. They do not see the way towards ensuring international peace and security in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, but in fact in the establishment of a system based on their thesis of the maintenance of the existing balance of forces, a principle which is in no way compatible with the

(Mr. Klusak, Czechoslovakia)

idea of disarmament. That is why the main characteristic of their proposals is in the final analysis a striving not for disarmament but for the introduction of control over disarmament.

A prerequisite for the success of negotiations on any international problem is that all the parties concerned should be ready and willing to reach agreement on a mutually-acceptable basis with due regard to the rightful interests of all the participating countries. But this requires that all the parties should adopt a flexible attitude and not continue to cling to their old rigid positions which they know in advance are unacceptable to the other side. We are bound to note, however, that it is precisely this basic prerequisite that has hitherto been lacking in our negotiations.

The discussions in the Committee have confirmed beyond all doubt that the socialist countries, and in the first place the Soviet Union, take an attitude of the utmost flexibility. This applies both to general and complete disarmament and to collateral measures. We find further evidence of this flexibility in a number of important proposals which have been put forward by the delegation of the Soviet Union during this stage of the negotiations also.

The behaviour of the delegations of the NATO countries is in sharp contrast with this flexible attitude of the socialist countries. The main characteristic of their approach is their clinging to old, unacceptable proposals, their reluctance to take the slightest step towards meeting the other side.

This applies both to the problems of general and complete disarmament, where the NATO countries have in fact not accepted any substantial modification of their plan submitted as far back as the spring of 1962 (ENDC/30), or in the field of collateral measures, where all their activity is limited to defending or further explaining and widening proposals in regard to which it is clear that they cannot become a basis for serious negotiations. On the other hand, the Western Powers prevent the adoption of quite realistic proposals which have often met with very wide support.

Another prerequisite in order to make it possible for international negotiations to lead to positive results is that the participants should, in a wider connexion, create conditions which would facilitate the solution of individual open questions and -- as has been repeatedly stressed in our discussions -- should not undertake anything that might cause the atmosphere of the negotiations to deteriorate. There is no doubt that the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force is not in accordance with this requirement.

(Mr. Klusak, Czechoslovakia)

Nor are disarmament negotiations helped by the creation of hotbeds of international tension in various parts of the world, since such actions constitute a serious threat to the development which last year led to a certain relaxation of international tension and created more favourable conditions for our negotiations as well.

I should like to emphasize that if we frankly point out the lack of results of our negotiations, this is not at all an expression of our impatience and pessimism. We consider that only such an assessment corresponds to the real situation and gives an exact, true picture of the actual facts. Such a frank, critical approach to our work is important precisely now on the eve of the discussion of the problem of general and complete disarmament at the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. If the nineteenth session of the General Assembly is really to contribute towards re-animating the Committee and giving it a new impetus, it is necessary to show the situation frankly, to expose its causes and roots and seek for possibilities of removing them. Any attempt to paint the results of our work in rosy tints, to justify or to conceal the fact that the negotiations in the Committee have not led to any results whatever, would not do any good and would only create false illusions.

The main responsibility for bringing about a change for the better in the disarmament negotiations rests on the Western Powers. As we have shown, their opposition to all realistic proposals for the solution of individual problems and their stubborn insistence on their unacceptable proposals has been the main obstacle which has defeated the efforts of all the other delegations aimed at bringing the positions closer together and reaching agreement.

In concluding my statement, I should like to express the hope that the Western Powers will avail themselves of the forthcoming recess in order to make a thorough review of their position and that in the future they will take into consideration to a greater extent the real state of affairs and show greater understanding in regard to the interests of the peoples and the consolidation of peace and security.

Lastly, I should like, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, to join all the speakers who have preceded me in thanking the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Protitch, Mr. Epstein and all the staff of the Secretariat, who by their conscientious efforts have created the best possible conditions for our work.

Mr. CORREA do LAGO (Brazil) (translation from French): In conformity with the unanimous decision of its members, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is today suspending its work until the beginning of next year. My delegation would like to take this opportunity of submitting a few considerations on the work which we have accomplished together in 1964.

My remarks will not be imbued with pessimism on account of the lack of positive results, nor with scepticism as to the value of the discussions which have taken place in this room. True, I should have preferred --like all those here present-- to have been able to speak today of concrete progress, important agreements, decisive steps, which would stimulate us in our common task of preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament, under strict international control. At the very least I should have preferred to have been able to congratulate the Committee on having succeeded in adopting fresh collateral measures with a view to further reducing international tension and strengthening confidence among States, thus facilitating our negotiations.

I regret that I am unable to do so, and I must admit that the optimism which prevailed at the opening of the present session was exaggerated. The euphoria induced in each one of us by the signing of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) led us to underestimate momentarily the difficulties which remained to be overcome. In that atmosphere, the great Powers submitted proposals and drafts to the Committee, with a view to widening the basis of the agreement; these drafts were chosen for their importance or because they appeared to embody the most favourable conditions for general approval.

Since January 1964, our debates have served to bring us closer to reality and to demonstrate eloquently that obstacles continue to bar our path. Apparently the short-cuts which we have taken have not enabled us to reduce to any appreciable extent the distance still to be covered, and to by-pass these obstacles. That is all the more regrettable as we have sometimes had the impression of being on the verge of achieving concrete successes which would have provided our negotiations with a more solid foundation.

I do not think, however, that the existence of such obstacles need astonish us. We have always known that the path was arduous, the obstacles immense, the resistances to be overcome deep-rooted. Moreover, we knew beforehand that we should only reach our goal by arming ourselves with extraordinary patience and unlimited perseverance.

(Mr. Correa do Lago, Brazil)

At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize certain aspects of our work which, in our opinion, are of the utmost importance. We have always acted in full awareness of the responsibilities arising out of the terms of reference given to us by the General Assembly. We have managed to maintain an atmosphere of mutual respect in our debates and we have accomplished our task with the greatest conscientiousness. In a Conference of an eminently political character, we have not forgotten the role of technical factors, nor the need to keep abreast of scientific progress. In this way, we have obtained a clearer idea of each other's points of view, which will undoubtedly help us to find solutions for our various problems at our next session.

Moreover, we know -- and this is the main point -- that we have no other alternative than to succeed in our mission. Outside disarmament, there is no security, and without security, there can be no durable peace. Without peace, the world in which we live would disappear in an atomic conflict the horrors of which can only be left to the imagination.

We hope that some of the numerous ideas and suggestions presented this year will be implemented in 1965. We should like the measures adopted to include the complete discontinuance of underground tests, a subject on which the group of eight non-aligned countries submitted a memorandum on 14 September (ENDC/145) and concerning which my delegation made several statements, both in our Committee and at the General Assembly of the United Nations. We also trust that the Conference will be able to find ways and means of allocating to economic development at least a part of the resources released as a result of our deliberations.

Before concluding I should like to express my satisfaction at having participated in the work of this Conference, to which Brazil attaches the utmost importance and which it is following with the greatest interest. I should like to thank the co-Chairmen for their care in preparing a report which accurately reflects the Committee's efforts to perform the task assigned to it by the General Assembly. Lastly, I should like to express my delegation's gratitude to Mr. Protitch and Mr. Epstein for their invaluable co-operation, as well as to the members of the Secretariat for the competence and zeal with which they have performed their tasks.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I regret the fact that it is necessary once again for me to comment unfavourably on certain statements made by the Soviet representative. It seems to me to be unfortunate that near the end of his otherwise interesting statement this morning -- at our last meeting of this session -- he should choose to renew his Government's false charges against the policies of my own country as well as those of our allies, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany. It seems to me that this is not the way to improve the atmosphere or indeed the prospects for future negotiations. This is not the way to convince other nations that the Soviet Union sincerely desires to achieve mutual understanding; this is not the way to lessen the tension or lay a basis for disarmament. The patience of the United States is great, but it is not unlimited. However, at this our last meeting of the session I do not intend to follow the example of the Soviet representative and engage in polemics.

At our first meeting this year I read a message from President Johnson (ENDC/PV.157, pp.10 et seq.). It began:

> "There is only one item on the agenda of this Conference -- it is the leading item on the agenda of mankind -- and that one item is peace." (ENDC/120, p.1)

Today I should like to read another message from President Johnson, as follows:

> "Peace is still the one item on your agenda and the leading item on the agenda of mankind.
>
> "Our Conference was formed because nations have learned that peace cannot be assured by military preparedness alone. They have learned that they must work together if our world is to be moved toward lasting peace instead of war.
>
> "War is senseless in the world of today when a single nuclear weapon can contain more explosive force than all the bombs dropped in World War II.
>
> "War is senseless when nations can inflict devastating damage and incalculable suffering on each other and the rest of the world in the space of an hour.
>
> "I pledge the best efforts of which my country is capable to prevent such a war. To this end -- to deter aggression -- my country is maintaining the most powerful defence force in its peacetime history.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

But in the world of today, the quest for peace demands much more than military preparedness. It demands the elimination of the causes of war and the building of a firm foundation for peace.

"In the quest for peace, this Conference has already played a significant role.

"Already the world is somewhat safer because of the efforts of the nations represented here. The air we breathe is no longer being contaminated by nuclear tests. Nuclear weapons are being kept out of space. Announcements have been made that planned production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons is being limited. Better means of emergency communications exist to help prevent an unintended nuclear exchange. For the first time, friends and adversaries alike have taken steps together to bring the nuclear arms race under control.

"Limited as they are, these achievements are cause for some satisfaction. They followed sixteen years of post-war disarmament talks which produced neither agreement nor the basis for agreement.

"The year 1961 saw the first steps to build the basis for later agreement. The McCloy-Zorin negotiations produced a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles to guide disarmament deliberations.[1] This was followed by agreement on the framework for this Conference. In my country, a new arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created to give new impetus towards the goal which we all share. This is a goal which the United States Congress described as 'a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.'

"This Conference began in 1962. In that year, your deliberations included three proposals which formed the foundation for the three forward steps taken in 1963 -- the nuclear test ban treaty,[2] the communications link between Washington and Moscow,[3] and the United Nations resolution against nuclear weapons in space.[4]

1/ ENDC/5.
2/ ENDC/100/Rev.1
3/ ENDC/97.
4/ A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

"The year 1964 has witnessed announcements by my country, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom[1] that the planned production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons would be limited.

"This year also brought more concrete proposals for safeguarded and realistic agreements than any other year since before World War II. These proposals have included urgently needed steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. They have included measures to cease the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and to freeze the numbers and characteristics of strategic delivery systems. They have included plans to decrease the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack.

"This year has not witnessed agreement on any of these proposals. We hope that, like 1961 and 1962, it has witnessed the groundwork being laid for the agreements of the future.

"The road to peace is not an easy one. The concrete gains so far achieved required long and diligent effort. So will the accomplishments of tomorrow.

"As you recess temporarily your deliberations in Geneva, let each nation represented here resolve to continue at home its consideration of the proposals made at this Conference. Let each nation use this time for reflection. Let each nation return to the reconvened Conference prepared to take additional steps towards peace.

"Let us all contribute to building a safer tomorrow."

I ask that that message from President Johnson be circulated for the information of the Conference.[2]

Now let me call the attention of members of the Committee to President Johnson's remark that this Conference has already played a significant role in the quest for peace. My Government has long believed that this Conference is an extremely useful forum for the exchange of views and the conduct of negotiations. As I have probably said to many of you, if it did not exist we should have to create something like it.

During the first two years of our Conference, differences over the manner of achieving disarmament became increasingly apparent. Those differences arose over the need to provide balance, verification and peace-keeping machinery. All three

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1/ ENDC/132, 131; ENDC/PV.186, p.34.

2/ Circulated as document ENDC/147.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

points featured in our consideration of nuclear delivery vehicles this year, and, in spite of this year's passage, we do not seem closer to our goal. Yet the exchange of views has at least clarified the differences.

The radical reduction in strategic armaments which the Soviet Union has proposed for the first stage of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1, pp.5 et seq) would be decidedly in its favour. It would upset the present balance and create more danger than it eliminated. No nation can be expected to risk war in order to achieve disarmament. There is no safe short-cut to the millennium.

We must recognize the facts of the present, establish goals for the future, and move towards those goals in a step-by-step, evolutionary process. That is the approach of the United States plan for disarmament (ENDC/30 and Corr.1, Add.1, 2, 3). That is also our approach to collateral measures.

The sharp disagreements over methods of achieving disarmament led the Conference this year to focusing greater attention on collateral measures. The United States presented proposals to the Conference which were intended to reduce the area of disagreement on all three main points of disagreement -- balance, verification, and peace-keeping. We designed those proposals so that they would not disrupt the present rough balance between the two sides. We designed them so that effective verification could be provided without as much inspection as that required for general disarmament. We designed them so that their adoption would not produce an immediate requirement for a significant strengthening of present institutions for keeping the peace.

By planning our proposals to reduce the areas of difference on each of the three points of disagreement, we hoped to make them more acceptable to all concerned. Moreover, by focusing on methods to halt the nuclear arms race and turn it around, we hoped to find the easiest way to lay a foundation for disarmament.

We proposed a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons (ENDC/120). To begin the actual disarmament process, we suggested the mutual destruction of substantial numbers of B-47 and TU-16 bombers (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.).

We proposed a cut-off in the production of material for use in nuclear weapons (ENDC/120). To reduce the stocks of those explosives available for weapons, we suggested the transfer of large quantities of such material to peaceful purposes (ENDC/PV.191, pp.9,10).

(Mr. Foster, United States)

To halt the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, we called for agreement on four additional steps:

(1) that nuclear weapons should not be transferred into the national control of nations which do not now possess them;

(2) that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes should take place under IAEA or similar safeguards;

(3) that major nuclear Powers should accept in an increasing number of their peaceful activities the same safeguards as those they recommend for non-nuclear Powers; and

(4) that an effectively verified ban should be placed on all nuclear tests -- those underground as well as those above ground (ENDC/120).

Finally, we suggested measures which would help to reduce the risk of war, increase the peaceful settlement of international disputes and improve the ability of the United Nations to mobilize peace forces for coping with limited conflicts.

Having summarized the proposals made by my country this year, I should like to comment briefly on the joint memorandum which relates to one of them -- the eight-nation memorandum on a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/145).

We have long urged a comprehensive test ban to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not now possess them. Our support for such a ban was reaffirmed by President Johnson in his message to the Conference of 21 January 1964 (ENDC/120). It was reiterated by my delegation as recently as 8 September, at our 214th meeting.

We read the joint memorandum as proposing an agreement to ban all nuclear tests -- an agreement which would provide verification satisfactory to both sides. The United States is, of course, not willing to accept a prohibition on all its tests unless it can have adequate assurance that the other side is actually adhering to the same restraint.

The joint memorandum proposes an exchange of scientific and other information between nuclear Powers. My delegation has repeatedly suggested that if the Soviet Union has information on how to detect and identify all underground events by using distant instrumentation it should supply that information to other governments. As far as my Government is concerned, it will gladly co-operate in an exchange which will give each side information available to the other on techniques for detection and identification of underground tests.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The joint memorandum also suggests improvement of detection and identification techniques, if necessary. Because my Government has long believed that such improvement is necessary, we are continuing to carry out an extensive research programme for this purpose.

The joint memorandum reflects the sincere desire of the eight nations to hasten the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. That desire is shared by my nation and, I believe, by most of the nations of the world. We believe the memorandum to be a most useful contribution to this Conference, another among the significant contributions made by the eight nations.

The main reason for the adoption of a comprehensive test ban is to erect a further obstacle to the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not now possess them. That is an interest which we all share. One of our foremost concerns here is the danger of nuclear war. Think for a moment how that danger would be increased if five, ten or even twenty nations had nuclear weapons. Every increase in the number of nations having nuclear weapon capabilities muptiplies the chances of an accidental or unintentional nuclear exchange -- an exchange the effects of which would, as we all know, not be limited to the nuclear Powers.

That is why, out of all the proposals referred to by President Johnson in the message I have just read, he placed in the "urgently needed" category steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. That is why, in a speech which he made yesterday in Seattle, Washington, he said that our work against nuclear spread must go on. That is why my delegation has laid so much stress on non-proliferation this year; and that is why I hope we shall make early progress on non-proliferation when we meet again.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

As we close our session this year, let me describe to you the kind of world which I think could be produced by future agreement on the collateral measures we have advanced this year. Those measures would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which do not now possess them; halt the increases and reduce the stocks of the explosives and strategic vehicles for nuclear weapons; inhibit the production of new and improved strategic aircraft and missiles; limit the danger and devastation of a nuclear exchange; reduce the risk of both nuclear and conventional war; improve the institutional machinery for keeping the peace; reduce still further the tensions between the two sides; and free vast resources to help satisfy the unmet needs of mankind.

Those results would not produce the millennium, but they would help build the "safer tomorrow" of which President Johnson's message speaks. Moreover, they would open the door to disarmament and to a better world order, and they are achievable in today's world.

Our labours here this year have not been in vain. Each of our governments understands better our common objectives and what we must do to achieve them. On behalf of my Government let me state that we look forward to a prompt resumption of our labours, with the sincere hope of achieving early agreement.

In conclusion, I should like to thank my fellow-Chairman, Mr. Tsarapkin, and his deputy, Mr. Mendelyevich. I would also thank the other members of the Committee for the constant co-operation and help they have given to me and to my delegation. I should like also to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and his deputy, Mr. Epstein, and the whole staff of the Secretariat -- in particular the interpreters, for their outstanding contribution and the patience they have shown to us during these many weeks.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): Since no other delegation wishes to make a general statement, the Committee will now turn to the consideration of the second revised draft (ENDC/146/Rev.2) of its final report.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): Since I was one of the representatives who made some rather critical comments (ENDC/PV.216, pp.35 et seq.) on the first draft of the Committee's report (ENDC/146), I think it is only fitting that I should express my satisfaction at the efforts made by the co-Chairmen, which have resulted in meeting to a considerable extent the wishes of my delegation and others. My delegation sees no insurmountable difficulties in subscribing to the draft report before the Committee. I would only propose that one amendment be made; it is not of a substantive nature, but results from a typographical error; in the last paragraph on page 1 the date should be 14 September 1964, not 4 September 1964. With that amendment, we endorse the report.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): The amendment proposed by the representative of Nigeria will be made: the date in question will be changed to 14 September 1964.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): As you know, my delegation also made certain reservations at the last meeting (ENDC/PV.216, pp.32,33) concerning the draft report, principally on two points. In my opinion, the first version of the draft report (ENDC/146) gave too negative an impression of our work, and perhaps tended to give insufficient prominence to the contribution made by all the delegations. I am very happy to note that the revised text circulated this morning is much better. The defects of the first draft have been corrected and its shortcomings made good.

I consider that the paragraphs which have been added to part II usefully supplement the report, bringing out the serious nature of our work, the active participation of all the members of the Committee in our negotiations, and our hopes for the future. These paragraphs meet the requirements which I formulated and give my delegation full satisfaction.

I would even emphasize that this is the first time that our report to the General Assembly of the United Nations departs from its usual reserve, passes judgment on our work and expresses an opinion -- and a positive one -- on our activities. This fact, even in the absence of an agreement, represents progress, something positive, and gives us confidence in the future.

(Mr. Cavelletti, Italy)

Accordingly, I would express my warmest thanks to the two co-Chairmen for having kindly taken into consideration the observations which I made. I also thank them for the very useful work they have accomplished and for the valuable support they have given us during this session.

In conclusion, I should also like to associate myself with the thanks already expressed to the members of the Secretariat, to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, to his Deputy Mr. Epstein, and to their collaborators, seen and unseen. Mr. Protitch and Mr. Epstein are a valuable help to us in our work and they are entitled to all our gratitude.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): The Mexican delegation would also like to thank our two distinguished co-Chairmen for embodying in the report the suggestion made by our delegation at the previous meeting (ENDC/PV.216, p.38) and the distinguished members of the Secretariat, Mr. Protitch, Mr. Epstein and their collaborators, for their speed and efficiency in letting us have the final text of the report so quickly.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): Since there are no other comments, I take it that the Committee wishes to adopt its draft report (ENDC/146/Rev.2) to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): This is the last meeting of our second session this year, a session which has lasted three-and-a-half months. We approach the recess with feelings of great disappointment that no specific agreements have been reached. We do not, however, adjourn in any mood of despair. We sense that our work has helped to prepare the ground for the achievement of progress in future negotiations on general and complete disarmament and on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension. That has given encouragement to our determination to continue our endeavours in this Committee when we reconvene early next year.

I should like to express the hope, which I believe is generally shared, that when it reconvenes the Committee will be able not only to take advantage of the preparatory work it has done in the current year but also to benefit from constructive developments at the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly and from the review of their positions that all parties concerned may be expected to make during the recess period.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

Before closing the session, I am sure that I speak for the whole Committee when I express our deep appreciation to our friends, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and his Deputy, Mr. Epstein, for their unremitting and kind assistance; and to all the other hard-working members of the Secretariat for their excellent and devoted service on our behalf. I feel certain that I also speak for the Committee when I pay a tribute to our co-Chairmen for their considerate and prudent guidance of our work.

Finally, let us all thank each other for friendly co-operation and wish each other success.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 217th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador P.Lind, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, the United States, Nigeria, Italy and Mexico.

"The delegation of the United States submitted a message from President Lyndon Johnson to the Conference.[1/]

"The Conference adopted a report on the Committee's deliberations for the period 21 January 1964 to 17 September 1964 to be transmitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly.[2/]

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on a date to be decided by the co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee, as soon as possible after termination of the consideration of the question of disarmament at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly."

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

1/ ENDC/147.

2/ ENDC/148.