

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE
EMDC/PV.61
25 July 1962
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 25 July 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. LACHS

(Poland)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ADALDO CASTRO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARABUPE
Miss M. GOES

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. H. MINICHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSILEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. D.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. H. ZEMLA
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO GETACHEW K'BRETT

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K.K. RAO

Italy:

Mr. C. RUSSO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. V. MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CAGIATI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA HERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. A. ROGULSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Mr. W. WIECZODEK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. H. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. H. STAHL
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. L.I. MENDELEVITCH
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. V.V. ALDOSHIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. EL-ERIANI
Mr. G. EL-ABD
Mr. A.E. ABDEL-HEGUID
Mr. S. AHMED

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the sixty-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before we start our business for today I wish to remind you that we decided yesterday to proceed in accordance with the recommendations made by the two co-Chairmen, and that consequently we should today discuss point 5 (a) of the document (ENDC/52) accepted at our last meeting -- that is:

"Basic obligations concerning the measures of disarmament, verification and maintenance of international peace and security in the first stage and the time-limits for their implementation ..."

Then follow the relevant articles of the proposals.

While discussing point 5 (a), the Conference will bear in mind paragraph 3 of the document, which reads:

"In regard to the subject matter of each sub-paragraph of paragraph 5 below, it is proposed that it should be first considered at the plenary meetings of the Committee. During such consideration all delegations may submit relevant treaty language. At a suitable time during the consideration, the respective sub-paragraph should be referred to the two co-Chairmen of the Committee for further detailed consideration with the aim of bringing positions closer together and of agreeing on the text of appropriate articles of the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, taking into account the proposals that may have been submitted by all delegations. The co-Chairmen will give periodic reports to plenary sessions, as appropriate, on the progress of their work."

I suggest that, in view of the decision taken yesterday, this procedure be adopted.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Yesterday the Eighteen-Nation Committee adopted the procedure to be followed in our future work. In accordance with this procedure the Soviet delegation intends to consider today the provisions of article 4 of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2, p.5) which sets forth the tasks for stage 1 of the programme for general and complete disarmament, and of article 19 (ibid. p.13), which lays down the time-limits for implementation of the disarmament measures in stage 1. In this connexion we shall

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also deal briefly with the sections of the United States document (ENDC/30) which deal with the general disarmament obligations of States in the first stage of disarmament and with the time-limits for their implementation.

What is the general scope of the obligations to be assumed by States in stage 1 of the programme of general and complete disarmament? In other words, what are the tasks of the first stage of disarmament?

The general discussion which took place in the first phase of the Committee's work has shown that the great majority of delegations agree that the main content of the first stage of any disarmament plan should be such disarmament measures as would constitute decisive steps towards eliminating the threat of a devastating thermo-nuclear war. The Soviet Government has repeatedly proposed that at the very beginning of the disarmament process nuclear weapons should be prohibited, their production discontinued and all stockpiles eliminated. Thereby the threat of a nuclear war would be removed.

However, that way was closed to us since the Western Powers have... on various pretexts which I do not intend to deal with now -- invariably rejected that way of solving the problem. There remained another way of saving mankind from the threat of a devastating nuclear war, and that was to eliminate all means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, thereby immobilizing and neutralizing those weapons and making them unfit for use. That is the idea which is embodied in article 4 of our draft treaty.

As can easily be seen, the most important measure of stage 1 of the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament is the proposal for the complete elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons. The complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the very beginning of the disarmament process would in fact remove the threat of a nuclear war. Addressing the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, said:

"Without rockets, aircraft, surface warships or submarines, nuclear arms would no longer be dangerous, even if an unscrupulous Government stowed some of them away. The destruction of all means of delivery would make it impossible for any country possessing atomic weapons to strike a nuclear blow at other countries." (ENDC/47, p.10)

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Another important measure of stage 1 of the Soviet disarmament plan is the proposal for the elimination of all foreign bases in alien territories and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from such territories. These measures, as is indicated in article 4 of the Soviet draft treaty, must be carried out simultaneously with elimination of the means of delivery. This linking is entirely logical and necessary: it follows from the nature of the foreign bases themselves. As is well known, these bases are constructed not for defence, but for offensive operations against other countries. They are springboards for attack. The existence of foreign military bases in alien territories and the presence of foreign troops in such territories are a source of tension in relations between States. They constitute a threat not only to the Soviet Union, its allies and all peace-loving States but also to the peoples of the countries where they are located. Indeed, it is clear to everyone that if aggressive forces decide to use foreign military bases located, for instance, in the territories of countries such as the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Turkey, Japan, Greece, South Korea and a number of other countries for attacking peace-loving States, then the peace-loving States will be compelled to strike back at those bases in self-defence. The fact that some Western strategists are nursing plans to use such bases for the purpose of striking a nuclear blow at the Soviet Union is something which is being openly discussed in the West.

The elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as well as measures to eliminate foreign military bases in alien territories and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from such territories, would also solve many other very important problems in the first stage.

First, we would thereby remove not only the threat of aggression by one State against another with the use of nuclear weapons. The possibility of a surprise attack with the use of conventional armaments by one State or group of States against another State or group of States would also be lessened, because the armed forces of the two main military alliances, namely the Warsaw Pact and the countries belonging to the NATO military bloc, would be withdrawn within the boundaries of their national States, that is to say where they ought to be in time of peace.

Secondly, elimination of all means of delivery and the cessation of production of these types of weapons, leading to the immobilization of nuclear weapons, will make it pointless to go on spending huge sums of money and enormous resources on the

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production and testing of these weapons of mass destruction. Hardly any State will continue to spend enormous sums on the production of nuclear weapons if they cannot be used for the simple reason that there are no means for their delivery. This will enable us to lift a heavy burden of taxes from the backs of the people, to divert immense resources to the development of peaceful branches of the national economy, and to increase the standard of living in both developed countries and countries whose economic development is lagging for various historical reasons.

Thirdly, the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the disarmament process, that is in stage 1, will make it impossible to use outer space for military purposes and will open up unlimited opportunities for co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

Finally, the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons will greatly simplify the problem of control. One hundred per cent elimination of the means of delivery will make it possible to agree on 100 per cent control over the implementation of this measure.

Addressing the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace, Mr. Khrushchev said:

"By proposing that disarmament be started with the abolition of all nuclear weapon vehicles, the Soviet Union, which has the world's most powerful global and intercontinental missiles, is relinquishing of its own free will a most important military advantage. But we take this step without faltering because we believe that it would expedite the solution of the disarmament problem.

"For our part, we insist that the Western Powers should agree to abolish all their military bases on foreign soil and withdraw their troops from foreign countries. Those bases have been set up for aggression and not for defence. It must be obvious to anyone that, for instance, the United States rocket and nuclear bases on the Japanese island of Okinawa or in Libya, on African soil, or the United States bases in Britain, Italy, Turkey, Greece and Thailand, are not needed for the defence of the United States. Whoever denies this is trying to pass black off as white." (ENDC/47, p.11)

A 30 per cent reduction of the means of delivery, as provided for in the United States outline (ENDC/30), would not eliminate the threat of a nuclear-missile

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war, because even the remaining 70 per cent of the means of delivery would be quite sufficient for an aggressor to unleash a devastating nuclear-missile war.

Consequently this measure would solve nothing as regard the main problem, namely elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union, advocating an effective solution of this fundamental question, cannot agree to this, especially as the United States would retain the network of military bases located in the immediate vicinity of our boundaries and designed to serve as springboards for aggression, springboards for the preventive war openly talked about in the West.

In this connexion I should like to recall what Mr. Gromyko said at our meeting yesterday:

"..... there will be no agreement on general and complete disarmament which does not provide for the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territory in the first -- I repeat, the first -- stage."

(ENDC/PV.60, p.37)

Under article 4 of the Soviet draft, the States parties to the treaty would assume a definite obligation to reduce their armed forces, conventional armaments and their production, and military expenditures (ENDC/2, p.5). The specific scope and order of implementation of all the disarmament measures set forth in this article are defined in subsequent articles, as included in the relevant sections of stage 1 of the Soviet disarmament programme.

The statement of the Soviet Union that it is prepared to accept the proposal of the Western Powers for a 30 per cent reduction of armaments, other than means of delivery, in stage 1, and the statement made by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko, at yesterday's meeting on our readiness to agree to setting the levels of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States at 1,900,000 in stage 1 (ENDC/PV.60, p.36), inspire the hope that we shall be able to reach rapid agreement on these questions and to draft the appropriate clauses of the treaty. We shall deal with the content of these articles in greater detail later when we come to consider them. For the moment I should merely like to emphasize that, without a precise and clear definition of the common tasks which are to be fulfilled in stage 1 of the disarmament programme, it will be very difficult and even impossible to make progress towards agreement on those articles of the treaty that embody the concrete disarmament measures for stage 1 and the setting up of control over their implementation.

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If we now turn to the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty, we see that in this document also there is an introductory text in regard to the measures of stage 1. Consequently the United States side is aware of the need to include in the draft treaty an article that would define the tasks of stage 1. The fact that the two documents before us reflect a common trend of thought in this respect should undoubtedly facilitate our efforts to prepare a working draft of an article defining the general obligations of States concerning disarmament for the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

At the same time, when we examine the introduction to stage 1 of the United States draft, we cannot help coming to the conclusion that this wording is obviously inadequate. This is particularly evident if we compare this text with article 4 of the Soviet draft. Whereas in the Soviet draft the main content of stage 1 is defined in a concise manner, in the corresponding section of the United States document the main emphasis is switched from disarmament measures to secondary, subordinate measures -- the setting up of an international disarmament organization for control and verification, the implementation of measures in the field of security, and so forth.

Whereas article 4 of the Soviet draft treaty gives a clear idea of what the world will be like as a result of implementation of the measures of the first stage of disarmament, a world without the threat of nuclear war, the United States draft in no way reflects the particularities of the first stage, because in regard to the disarmament measures themselves it does not go beyond a general sentence regarding the reduction of armaments and armed forces. Whether by chance or not, this sentence does not even explain, as the Soviet document does, which armaments are concerned--means of delivery or conventional armaments. Yet it is hardly necessary to prove that these types of armament cannot be equated. However threatening were the tanks and artillery of the Second World War, they can in no way be compared with the nuclear rockets of these days.

The Soviet delegation cannot consider as satisfactory such a vague and misleading formulation of the tasks of the first stage of disarmament. It seems to us that the United States draft is essentially an incomplete or selective list of what is envisaged in the United States plan for disarmament in the first stage. The United States, as we have already pointed out in the course of previous discussions in this Committee, wishes the first stage to be limited to half-measures

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which would not seriously affect weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. They would leave military bases and troops in alien territories completely untouched, and at the same time they would throw the doors wide open for legalized espionage under the guise of control. It is therefore not surprising that the United States introduction to the first stage reflects all the inadequacy of the half-measures provided for by the United States and their lack of correspondence with excessive demands in detection and verification. As you see, the divergencies are fundamental.

Yesterday the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, said:

"I can assure you that no government is more anxious than the Government of the United States to assume the responsibilities which go with the drafting, the signature and the execution of a treaty on general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.60, p.44)

We hope that these words will not remain a mere declaration, and that the United States Government will take steps to bring its position closer to the position of the Soviet Union. This would enable us to make rapid progress in agreeing the articles of the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I want to say a few words about the time limit for the implementation of the measures of the first stage. We have already pointed out earlier that the three-year time limit envisaged in the United States document for the first stage does not correspond with the desire of the peoples for the speediest possible implementation of general and complete disarmament.

According to the Soviet proposals, the first stage begins six months after the coming into force of the treaty; during these six months the international disarmament organization will be set up; the duration of the first stage is laid down as fifteen months. The Soviet Union considers this time limit realistic and well founded. If other delegations have other views, we are quite willing to discuss the matter. If the Western Powers are prepared to carry out general and complete disarmament in, say, five years instead of the four years proposed by the USSR, this question, as our Minister said yesterday (ENDC/PV.60 p.36), would not give rise to any great difficulties.

Thus the question of an overall time limit for the programme of general and complete disarmament, as well as the time limits for each of the stages of this programme and, in particular, stage 1, is a question on which agreement has to be

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reached. And the chances of reaching such an agreement, thanks to the flexible position of the Soviet Union, have increased considerably. It is important, however, that appropriate articles should be provided in the treaty.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that the Western delegations will agree to take article 4 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament as the basis for an article defining the tasks of the first stage of disarmament, and that the Committee will request the co-Chairmen to prepare an agreed working draft of the said article. The Soviet delegation hopes that the United States and other Western delegations will take a step forward to meet the position of the USSR in settling the main controversial questions namely, the general scope of disarmament in the first stage and the question of the time limit for the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament as a whole and of its separate stages.

The proposals of the Soviet Union, as formulated at the very beginning of our work in the Committee on this stage, show clearly that the Soviet Union is taking genuine steps to meet the position of the Western Powers both on conventional armaments and on measures for the prevention of war, and finally, on the level of armed forces and on the time limit for the implementation of the treaty as a whole and of its separate stages. Our steps to meet the position of the Western Powers give us every reason to expect that the Western Powers and, first of all, the United States of America will also take steps to meet the position of the Soviet Union and thereby facilitate the reaching of agreement on the first stage of disarmament. An agreement on these articles of the treaty would be an important step forward on the road to the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, since the measures of the first stage of disarmament lay, as it were, a foundation for the whole programme of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Today we begin our discussions under the new plan of work proposed by the co-Chairmen, agreed by the Committee yesterday and set forth in Conference document ENDC/52, as our Chairman has said. The United States delegation will in the coming weeks be discussing in depth and in the fullest possible detail the implementation and control of stage 1 measures and the interrelationship of those measures to each other. It appears to me therefore that this is an excellent opportunity, at the very outset of our discussions

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and in accordance with our work programme, to review in some detail the first stage measures in the United States draft outline treaty for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (ENDC/30). In connexion with these considerations I shall also discuss the introductory portion of stage I of the United States draft outline treaty on page 4 of document ENDC/30 which appears before section A of the United States draft treaty and sets forth in general terms the nature of the undertakings assumed by each party to the treaty.

But before I turn to those two subjects there are certain statements by the representative of Poland and the representative of the Soviet Union at our fifty-ninth meeting -- followed by Mr. Zorin's statement this morning in criticism of the general United States position on disarmament -- which have particular relevance to the first stage and which require a somewhat more fully detailed reply than the time remaining permitted me to give at the fifty-ninth meeting.

Our Chairman this morning, the representative of Poland, said at our fifty-ninth meeting some learned and interesting things about two general considerations which underlie our deliberations in this Committee -- that is, geography and the principle of balance contained in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, document ENDC/5, paragraph 5. Indeed, with some portion of what the representative of Poland found to say about these two considerations I find it quite possible to agree. I find it interesting that he believes geography treats East and West the same; for example, he said -- and here he was talking about geography:

"If the subject was raised, I submit that it was probably raised in connexion with the problem of communications and with the provisions of the first stage of the disarmament programme -- namely, the elimination of all nuclear vehicles and foreign bases and the corresponding reduction of conventional arms and armaments." (ENDC/PV.59, p.30)

What Mr. Lachs said is very correct in so far as it goes, but I submit that he has really overlooked the fundamental nature of the situation at the very heart of the problem that is confronting us, which Mr. Zorin was talking about this morning; that is, the sheer and truly enormous size and contiguous nature of the Soviet Union and the territory of its allies in Europe in relation to the relatively small size of the free world in Western Europe. Despite the fact that it took Columbus some forty-twoday to go from the old world to the new, in the ordinary commercial plane you can travel that distance today in some seven

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and a half hours; and Chairman Khrushchev has told us in a number of public statements that they have rockets which can go from the heartland of the Soviet Union to the heartland of the United States in half an hour.

So while this question of geography, this question of national boundaries, does exist, it really is not, I am afraid, going to get us very far in disarmament negotiations to insist that all of the problems of disarmament have got to be solved merely by looking at problems of national boundaries and not looking at what the actual political facts of life are -- that is, that smaller countries have had to unite in their own defence, and it does not take any time at all for these modern weapons to travel from the boundaries of one country to the boundaries of another. The distance from the Soviet Union to the present line of demarcation separating West Germany from the Soviet zone is roughly one-fifth as far in statutory miles as that from the United States to the same point. So the withdrawal of United States troops from the areas the United States has agreed, in association with its allies, to defend in Europe across the breadth of the Atlantic Ocean could leave the forces which remain to defend Western Europe at a very grave disadvantage when compared with the forces of the Soviet Union, both in relative size and in distance to the line separating those forces.

Coupled with the elimination of those nuclear deterrent forces, the acceptance of this proposal would mean setting up unacceptable imbalances during the very first stage of our disarmament programme. I emphasize the word "deterrent", and -- apart from the statements of Chairman Khrushchev with respect to the destructive power of rockets, their size, the type of megaton bombs they can carry, and so forth -- we believe that, at least as far as deterrent force is concerned, the West currently has superiority if attacked first.

Let me be very clear. I am not familiar with all this planning to which Mr. Zorin referred this morning regarding the West wishing to use these bases for pre-emptive attack on the Soviet Union, for a first strike against the Soviet Union, or as a springboard for attack on the Soviet Union; because all our thinking is quite to the contrary. What we have said is that if, in the course of the defence of the forces of NATO, there should be an overwhelming conventional attack on our allies by the Soviet Union and its allies, it is possible we might have to depend on those nuclear deterrent forces to defend Europe from the very considerably larger Soviet forces now in the Soviet zone of Germany. The current estimates are of the order of three to four times as many major Soviet units for each similar-sized United States unit in Germany.

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So that the acceptance of the theory that runs through the Soviet draft treaty that we would have to eliminate one hundred per cent of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage would really mean that the West would be almost one hundred per cent disarmed in the first stage, whereas the Soviet Union would remain armed with its conventional armaments. This is something that we are going to have to discuss here, something the two co-Chairmen are going to have to negotiate on, because somehow or other we have got to bridge this difference between us.

Now I know that I have tried to answer my Soviet colleague's statement about our using these bases as a springboard for attack on the Soviet Union before, but since he said again this morning that this is part of the current thinking and planning of the United States, let me again point out that it is not. President Kennedy, on 27 March of this year, gave an interview to a well-known American journalist, Stewart Alsop, who wrote an article in the Saturday Evening Post. Then the Presidential Secretary, Mr. Pierre Salinger, was asked about that. Mr. Alsop, in his article, had purported to quote President Kennedy to the effect that the United States might in some circumstances, where its vital interests were concerned, have to take the initiative in a nuclear war with the USSR. Mr. Salinger said then:

"The quotation given in the Alsop article must be read in the total context.

"The President's statement represents no change in American policy. It has always been clear that in such a context as a massive conventional attack on Europe by the Soviet Union, which would put Europe in danger of being overrun, the West would have to prevent such an event by all available means.

"This has been United States policy since the late nineteen-forties and it represents no change. The real change, as Mr. Alsop points out elsewhere in the Saturday Evening Post article, is in the strengthening of our defensive alternatives to nuclear warfare."

I think everyone here knows that the United States has been trying to augment its conventional forces so that in the event of such an attack it would not be necessary except as a last resort to resort to nuclear weapons. They asked the President about this at his Press conference. I am quoting from what the President said:

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"Yes, I think Mr. Salinger's statement made it very clear that this was intended to be merely a restatement of a traditional position where if a vital area -- and I think the area that Mr. Salinger used was Western Europe -- was being overrun by conventional forces, that the United States would take the means available, means to defend Western Europe. It was not intended to suggest, as Mr. Salinger said, that this meant that the United States would take aggressive action on its own part, or would launch an attack, a so-called preventive attack on its part.

"It is not our policy, nor the policy of previous administrations. ...The article read in context made it clear that we are saying that if there was an attack of overwhelming proportions by conventional forces in an area such as Europe, we would meet our treaty commitments."

I hope that that makes it clear that we are not trying to use these bases in Europe for any so-called first-strike or any so-called pre-emptive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. We are not thinking of any such thing or planning any such thing, and it is completely contrary to the policy of my Government.

Nevertheless, to return to the subject confronting us here, we do face these geographical situations; we do face these questions of separate nationalities and we do face the fact that several governments have wished to band together in their own self defence. Those are the problems that we face and the imbalances are the direct products of the geographical relationships between the Western States and the Soviet bloc. I submit that no amount of generalization can wipe out this fact.

Indeed, as the Chairman today, the Polish representative, said on 18 July:

"As I said on Monday, geography speaks to us with one language.

The globe is cast as it is, and our countries are situated where they are.

We cannot alter that." (ENDC/PV.59, p.30)

Mr. Lachs then went on to point out that "man, in mastering nature, has undoubtedly made tremendous progress.." (ibid.) At this Conference we must be continually alert to these methods of mastering nature and make allowances for them in any agreement we conclude on general and complete disarmament. Therefore one cannot expect to reduce arms in Europe without considering the relative distance of a major Power from the areas in Europe which it has agreed to defend.

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This leads me directly to the next subject, the problem of balance. We are all agreed, I believe, that balance -- as the representative of Poland said at the fifty-ninth meeting -- should not be in anyone's favour; indeed, the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) states in its paragraph 5 that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty should any State or group of States gain military advantage.

In our discussions, we are going to have to work out somehow a proper relationship between the percentage of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to be destroyed in the first stage, while at the same time maintaining this question of balance and correlating it to the percentage of conventional weapons and of manpower to be cut down in the first stage. We welcome the two proposals that have been made by the Soviet Union (ENDC/48); but, as I said the other day, they must be accepted in relation to the whole plan. While we are working this thing out, who is going to be the best judge of this state of balance? In the estimation of my delegation, it must be done as objectively as possible, and I suppose in the first instance the State which undertakes the reductions must of course undertake the first judgement. But the arms race must stop at some point and the present race must be ended -- frozen, as it were at some point -- and, hopefully, the sooner the better. Then, following that freezing, the balances achieved at that point must be reduced, equally for all across the board, until all arms of whatever kind or nature are reduced to zero. Those States whose reliance on conventional arms is the greatest because they feel in this way they have achieved a tolerable natural balance should not have that balance overturned in the course of reductions.

As I have said, the very same can be said about those States which have superiority in nuclear weapons, in order to balance confronting superiority in conventional forces. We will undoubtedly have some unknown, or some unpredictable situations which may arise as the result of some such artificial changes in the composition of forces and armaments. They may create a more dangerous and difficult situation in the course of disarmament than existed before, and it is our job here not to let this happen. The Soviet Union has recognized this principle in its extremely qualified acceptance of the Western proposal on percentage reductions in conventional armaments while leaving the other percentages in its draft treaty untouched (ENDC/2). Indeed, this is an area -- at least in so far as the continent of Europe is concerned -- where it is to the current advantage of the Soviet Union

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to take such an approach. But in this case, acceptance of a part of a proposal does not serve the cause of maintaining the natural balance. From our studies of how best to achieve this disarmament, my delegation maintains that the cut of arms across the board in the same or similar ratios or percentages must be made by all States on equal terms if this "natural" balance is to be maintained.

The United States proposals are firmly rooted in this "natural" balance, on the basis that it will enable this Conference to work out a truly meaningful treaty on general and complete disarmament and that it will not only save us much time and trouble, but possibly save us from failure, if we do not have to negotiate complex and intricate adjustments in arms levels in an attempt to create new compositions between forces with which none of us have had experience and to which we are not accustomed. The negotiation of new arms balances is a rock on which many past disarmament conferences have foundered; and in elaborating our plan we have done our best to try to avoid foundering on this rock.

I should like to cover one more point before I move on to certain aspects of stage I proposals made by the United States. Our Soviet colleague said on 18 July. of conventional arms reductions:

"This is an actual fact: we accept your proposal. Why are you dissatisfied? You say that we accept this principle only for a specific category of armaments. But in reply to this I would point out that in your own proposal and in your own plan ... you do not extend this principle to all kinds of armaments either. This is another hard fact. In your own proposal you talk of a 30 per cent reduction in the first stage, but not of all types of conventional armament. Is this a fact or not? Anyone familiar with your outline will say that it is a fact." (ENDC/PV.59, p.36)

I will try to make clear once more what I said at the fifty-ninth plenary meeting. To do so I need only repeat what I said just a few minutes before Mr. Zorin made the statement I have just quoted. I said:

"First, the Soviet proposal includes a 30 per cent reduction in the first stage of all conventional armaments as against the United States proposal that the first stage cut should include those major armaments which are more easily verifiable at the initial stage of the disarmament process. I wonder whether the Soviet Union realizes the increased amount

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of verification in the first stage such an arrangement as it proposes, including lighter armaments, would require, and whether it is prepared to express its views on how such verification would actually be implemented." (ENDC/PV.59, p.17)

It was therefore in an effort to accommodate the Soviet Union's well-known sensibilities over inspection, as explained to us yesterday by Foreign Minister Gromyko (ENDC/PV.60, p.37), that these measures concerning light arms were moved back into the second stage. Light arms, such as mortars, small arms, small naval vessels and light aircraft, can be easily hidden and can be manufactured in small factories. Light arms of this type standing alone, with 70 per cent of major conventional arms remaining at the level of stage I, do not constitute a major aggressive threat to the parties to the treaty. Indeed, the United States has no objection in principle to the consideration of such measures in stage I. It is merely to solve the difficult question of verification of measures involving such large quantities of small types of light arms equipment that the United States plan proposes to begin reduction in stage II when widespread measures of verification will have been instituted; but, as I say, we have no objection in principle to the consideration of the measures with respect to light arms in stage I.

As I noted on 18 July (ENDC/PV.59, p.17), we shall be most pleased to hear the concrete proposals of the Soviet Union on the verification measures it has in mind to ensure that the specified cuts might be made in these arms and that the remaining levels of mortars, rifles and other small arms do not exceed the specified amounts.

I should like to turn now to a discussion of the basic obligations each party will undertake in stage I of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. These obligations are to be found in the United States treaty outline, on page 4 of document ENDC/30, labelled "Stage I", and in the Soviet draft treaty document, in article 4 on page 5 of ENDC/2, labelled "First Stage Tasks". To refresh your memory and to point out what I have to say today, I should like to quote these very short portions of the United States and the Soviet proposals in full. The United States proposal reads:

"Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

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"During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

- "1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;
- "2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and
- "3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below." (ENDC/30, p.4)

The Soviet draft of the same portion reads as follows:

"The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases on alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories, and to reduce their armed forces, conventional armaments and their production, and military expenditures." (ENDC/2, p.5)

I believe I only have to read out those two introductory paragraphs to show that there are two fundamental differences between them. The first centres in the Soviet draft on the absence of general obligations to deal with verification and the measures to ensure a peaceful world during the course of disarmament. Perhaps this is merely a difference in emphasis, because in our agreed draft for part I of the treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/40/Rev.1) of 31 May 1962 the Soviet Union has conceded that such elements of our treaty as verification, the international disarmament organization and concurrent measures for keeping the peace must be included.

In addition, Chapter X and Part V of the Soviet treaty document (ENDC/2, pp.23, 25) include such measures, while article 18 of Chapter III of the Soviet draft treaty (ibid., p.13), includes as a part of first-stage measures certain undertakings to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to ensure international peace and security.

While my delegation does not agree with the present detailed texts or substance of these proposals of the Soviet Union, I believe that their very presence in its draft treaty establishes clearly that there should be no disagreement among ourselves over the principle that such measures should be included in the first

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stage, and this I think is good. In such circumstances it should not be too difficult to reach agreement on the inclusion of the appropriate references to verification and peace-keeping in the introductory portion of the first stage of our treaty.

The second major divergence between the two drafts of the introductory section centres on the familiar problem of achieving a balanced reduction in arms, which we have just been discussing. The Soviet draft clearly desires to institute an imbalance between the East and the West in the first stage by requiring drastic changes in the overall composition of Western military forces -- changes in foreign bases, which in effect would mean the end of certain alliances; changes in composition which could only redound in the first stage to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

As I said earlier, I refer here to Soviet proposals on nuclear delivery vehicles, so-called foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops stationed outside their own national territory. These proposals are, of course, basically contrary to the fundamental philosophy underlying the United States proposal -- a philosophy with at least the broad outlines of which the representative of Poland, our Chairman this morning, was apparently in agreement in his statement of 18 July when he said:

"Again, Mr. Dean suggested this morning that in order to stop the armaments race we have to select a certain moment and seize it, but the point is really to seize it." (ENDC/PV.59, p.32)

Then, of course, the representative of Poland goes on to disagree with the way the United States treaty draft accomplishes that, but nevertheless his agreement with the principle seems clear.

Let me explain once again by quoting from my statement of 18 April, which set forth this philosophy in simple terms. I said:

"Let me explain at the beginning that with respect to disarmament the scheme of the United States plan is a simple one. Fundamentally it is that the nations of the world should seize a moment in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it then appears and to shrink it progressively to zero, always keeping the relative military position of the parties to the treaty as near as possible to what it was at the beginning." (ENDC/PV.23, p.6)

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Thus my delegation's view of what constitutes an equitable or "natural" balance is clearly that balance must be based on the military situation existing at the particular time seized by the parties to the treaty as the point at which to begin the reduction to zero.

At the same meeting I said of this particular philosophy:

"This is as it should be. Each nation understands its present forces; each nation understands its neighbours' present forces. The United States plan for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world maintains that position." (ibid., p.7)

Just how this balance will be maintained under the United States proposal has been covered in certain of our prior meetings. But now that we are discussing the general or basic obligations of the first stage certain aspects of the United States first stage can, I believe, be re-examined to make clear exactly how balance is safeguarded.

Fundamentally the United States proposes in section A (ENDC/3C, p.4) to make during stage I a 30 per cent across-the-board cut in all armaments, the reduction of which it seems practicable and possible to supervise. This includes a 30 per cent cut in all nuclear delivery vehicles and in all major or important conventional armaments. While, as I have said, the Soviet Union has in some limited respects accepted this means of reducing conventional armaments, it has seen fit to insist on imbalancing reductions in delivery vehicles as a complement to acceptance of this portion of the United States proposal on the reduction of all armaments.

This viewpoint of the Soviet Union increases the complicating factors pointed out previously with respect to Soviet demands for complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage without regard to reductions in conventional armaments. As I have pointed out, the Soviet Union still has not told us how it can ensure adequate verification of such a measure. Nor, so far at least, has the Soviet Union distinguished the various types of nuclear delivery vehicles which it desires to see eliminated, since as we all know certain civilian equipment can easily be converted to the delivery of nuclear weapons, as I have pointed out in some detail in previous statements to the Conference.

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In addition, there is the further problem of conventional equipment which will exist at the end of the first stage and whose purpose is dual -- that is, a particular type of aircraft may be capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional arms. The failure of the Soviet Union to deal with this very significant problem in its proposal is clear. On the other hand, the United States proposals deal with this situation directly. The United States proposes to shrink the quantities of all types of arms in equal percentages, so that what is commonly known as the "arms mix" of States will not be the subject of significant and imbalancing changes during the course of disarmament.

Other proposals in the United States first stage include a direct attack on the nuclear threat. While the capability of delivery nuclear weapons will be reduced by 30 per cent in the United States first stage, the weapons themselves will also be affected by United States proposals for reductions, as I shall point out. These proposals involve two salient aspects: freezing the present situation by a cessation of production, and a turn-down in the amount of fissionable material available to States for use in weapons by the transfer of agreed quantities of such material to non-weapons purposes.

The United States has offered to transfer a significant quantity of this fissionable material. It stands behind that significant offer and it is ready to implement its proposal. Or we are quite prepared to hear the Soviet Union suggest a larger amount. I can only repeat that we are prepared to hear all views on these proposals, in the hope that we can agree to transfer significant quantities of fissionable materials from all respective weapons programmes -- in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

Further significant United States proposals include those on the prohibition of the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear State; on a nuclear test ban; on the prohibition of placing into orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction; and on a group of measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications or surprise attack. As I listened to our Soviet colleague quote Chairman Khrushchev again, about how he could destroy us all, it seemed to me again that these measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation should come at the very top of our list.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Each of these measures affecting a State's level of armed forces, nuclear weapons stocks and ability to extend the arms race to areas which have thus far not felt its effect, directly complements the basic United States proposal for across-the-board percentage reductions of all armaments.

Keeping these salient features of our proposal firmly in mind, and once discussion is completed in the plenary meetings, in accordance with the programme of work we have adopted I will shortly be meeting with my Soviet co-Chairman to work out agreed proposals for the opening paragraphs of Stage I of our treaty. From the point of view of more efficient workmanship, my delegation would have preferred, rather, to leave the drafting of the introductory provisions of stage I of our treaty until the end of a discussion of the substantive measures. We had rather thought that we ought to discuss the measures first and then, after that, come back and draft the introductory provisions. However, our Soviet colleagues felt otherwise, and in view of this desire on their part that we should once again review the general nature of the obligations in the agreement, before proceeding to specific substantive discussions in depth, in the interest of moving our work forward at the most rapid possible pace we have agreed quite readily to discuss these obligations both in plenary meetings and in meetings of the co-Chairmen, with a view to arriving at a treaty text containing as much agreed language as possible.

Our objective is, of course, to try to get agreement; but we hope that we can, following the discussions here in the plenary meetings, proceed with this work as rapidly as possible, setting down the points on which we are able to agree, bracketing -- if we have to -- the text of those points to which we will have to return at some future date, so that at the earliest possible time we can begin consideration of the substantive proposals of the first stage.

Some representatives have asked why we did not suggest a fixed time schedule, a fixed amount of time to be given to each topic set forth in paragraph 5 -- why we did not set up a sort of daily timetable, setting forth the precise days on which we would undertake the discussion of each point. Some delegations have said that it would help them if when we got to certain points that require work of a

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highly technical nature they could have some idea in advance, so that they could get their experts here; that it would be very helpful. I think that probably my co-Chairman and myself, after we have had these discussions for several days, can try to submit to the Committee some more detailed outline of work, but it seemed to us that until we had tried this out it was not very feasible, really, to say that everybody would have to finish topic (a) in "x" hours and that they could not go back to it.

It will be noted that we have said in paragraph 5 that as a rule these topics in paragraph 5 will be dealt with by the Committee in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph 3; but in paragraph 4 we have provided that nothing is intended to preclude any delegation from raising and discussing any subject or proposal in any plenary meeting of the Committee. We believe that it would make our work more useful and more efficient, and that we would probably get on better. Nevertheless, in discussing a particular item, if it does occur to some delegation that it would like to go back to another item, or refer to the provisions of another item, or to the correlation between what takes place in stage I and what takes place in stages II and III, or if, in connexion with the whole question of verification, any delegation should want to go on and discuss the whole disarmament programme, it seems to us that we would have to leave that to the good sense of each delegation while at the same time hoping that it would stay within the general framework of what the Committee has adopted.

Before closing today I would like to state that my delegation will undoubtedly wish to return to some discussion of the general principles which I have discussed this morning in our substantive consideration of the various proposals which we have made, and then we will wish to return to a consideration of the basic obligations at the end of our discussion of stage I, and I would like to reserve my right to speak on those proposals at such future time or times as appear to us to be appropriate.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The agreement reached between the two co-Chairmen on the procedure to be followed by the Eighteen Nation Committee in its work on the first phase of general and complete disarmament (EIDC/52) is certainly an encouraging sign, despite the meagre results achieved so far in more than four months' negotiation. With certain exceptions, agreement

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has now been reached on the wording of the preamble to the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, (ENDC/L.7), and of its first section, defining its obligations and objects and in fact giving a more or less correct idea of the actual scope of the three consecutive phases of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/40/Rev.1). The obvious course is therefore, despite the difficulties encountered so far, to attempt to deal in the same manner with the other parts of the draft treaty, and especially to define the three successive stages of general and complete disarmament.

Furthermore, the two drafts, by the Soviet Union and the United States, are identical in providing that general and complete disarmament shall be carried out in three successive stages. The scope of each stage in the two draft treaties is, as we know, defined quite briefly in articles preceding the detailed account of each stage. The representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the United States have just spoken on this subject, and the latter made a very detailed comparison of the relevant articles. It is recognized in both proposals that, before a detailed account of the scope of each stage is started (an exact definition of the measures which the stage would cover) the scope of the stage should be defined, -- or rather, outlined and described -- in a brief, preliminary manner.

A great many delegations have hoped or asserted that the treaty drafted by the Conference should be neither the Soviet nor the United States draft. They have stressed that it should be a draft of the Eighteen Nation Committee to which all States can and should subscribe. The representative of India, Mr. Lall, reiterated this again the other day when he said:

"Let us face that fact. In the last analysis we are not going to accept either plan. It is not necessary at this stage, I would submit to the sponsors of the two plans, to point out any further -- and I say this advisedly and with respect -- the merits of the two plans. We have studied the two plans very carefully. As we were bound to do, and as it was our duty to do, we have listened very attentively to, and have read again and again, the carefully-argued justifications which have been propounded by the sponsors of the plans and by their various supporters; it is a little late in the day now to tell us that we must take one plan, or that one side must move forward and that the other side need not. Let us be realistic, as everyone said yesterday, and let us acknowledge that realism does not lie in that sort of approach." (ENDC/PV.58, p.27)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The representative of the United Kingdom expressed a similar attitude towards the plan which has to be drafted. In his speech of 2 May 1962 Mr. Godber declared:

"Both documents, however, are useful for our deliberations, and my point is that it is really immaterial what we call them at this moment because -- and I would emphasize this particularly -- the draft treaty that emerges will not be a Soviet draft, it will not be a United States draft; it will be a draft of the nations taking part in this Conference." (ENDC/PV.29, p.6)

A similar desire that the draft should be prepared by the Eighteen Nation Committee and not simply by one great Power has been expressed and supported by other delegations, including those of Italy and Canada.

We must say in all frankness that the definitions on which the draft treaty of the Soviet Union are based satisfy us completely in regard to the method and the time limits for tackling and fulfilling our Conference's task -- to concert a treaty on general and complete disarmament. This has also been the feeling of many other delegations. However, since the opinions of other delegations must also be considered, we thought it would be useful at this stage of our debate -- in order to ease the work of the Conference and reach agreement on general and complete disarmament -- to request all the delegations to reconsider their stated positions and to attempt to prepare a text containing the positive disarmament features of both drafts and the necessary complementary provisions. Our delegation has attempted to apply this method only to a small part of the draft treaty -- mainly to the articles defining the obligations and general scope of the first stage.

Article 4 of the Soviet draft lays down measures relating strictly to general and complete disarmament; whereas the corresponding article of the United States draft bears on a much larger variety of issues relating to complete and general disarmament, particularly the international disarmament organization, peace-keeping measures, the time limits for their execution, and the like. Mr. Dean drew attention to these issues again today (supra, pp.19-20)

In order to concord the two drafts, we have endeavoured to take the active and positive measures contained in both. We have also attempted to take into account the various statements and suggestions made here on the two drafts, and the desires and preferences expressed by the delegations, particularly those of the non-aligned countries; and we have prepared a text for article 4 of the future treaty on general and complete disarmament which we humbly submit for your consideration (ENDC/L.17).

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Allow me to read this proposal, which was circulated a moment ago and is headed "First stage tasks".

"The first stage shall begin 6 months after the entry into force of the Treaty (in accordance with article of the present Treaty) and shall be completed within 15 months.

"The States undertake, during the first stage:

(1) to eliminate simultaneously all delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and all military bases in foreign territory, and to withdraw all troops from such territory;

(2) to reduce their armed forces, their conventional armaments, the production of such armaments and their military expenditure as provided hereinafter;

(3) on the entry of the Treaty into force, to set up an International Disarmament Organization in order to verify in the agreed manner fulfilment of the obligations assumed;

(4) from the beginning of the first stage, to take measures to reduce the danger of war; and

(5) to take the measures set forth hereinafter for the maintenance of international peace and security." (ENDC/L.17)

The time limits prescribed in this text for fulfilment of the first stage are, as can be seen, six months for its start and fifteen months for fulfilment of all its measures.

We have adopted in our text for article 4 of the draft treaty the time limit proposed in the Soviet draft because we feel that this time limit is not only perfectly realistic and practicable, but is closer to the wishes expressed here by the majority of the delegations. Thus in his speech to this Committee on 20 March at the very outset of our work, the Defence Minister of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, said:

"Either we disarm pretty quickly or the process of re-arming will go on, because in any very gradual procedure anything that would be accomplished would be subject to suspicions and difficulties of various kinds and new causes of suspicion and conflict would emerge. That is, if very violent disagreement between two people is going to be adjusted over a very long time,

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having regard to the background of animosity and the suspicion which exists, they themselves would be worse off during that period in which a small improvement might be brought about. For that, if for no other reason, we have always advocated the speedy accomplishment of disarmament, so much so that my Prime Minister when speaking to the United Nations two years ago said that it is a question of trying to achieve it not all in one fine morning or in one piece, but as one piece with so many stages within it for the accomplishment of the whole thing in a short period of four or five years. As far as we are concerned, this is not borrowed from the Soviet treaty; it is the view of our Government." (ENDC/PV.5, pp. 27, 28)

Mr. Lall has referred to Mr. Krishna Menon's theme several times during our debates, and has even suggested a time-limit of two years for completion of the whole process of disarmament.

Yesterday Mr. Krishna Menon insisted, in his speech to the Committee, that:

"Either we must disarm in a reasonably short time or the problem will become far worse than before." (ENDC/PV.60, p.16)

And that we are seeking:

"to establish in our own time, and in a very short time, a world free from war." (ibid., p.6)

Another representative of the non-committed Powers, Mr. Atta of Nigeria, deprecated on 12 June not only the United States plan with its excessive time limits but also the Soviet plan for what he termed the slow pace of the nuclear disarmament process; he proposed appreciably shorter time limits, at least for this process (ENDC/PV.54, p.32). Identical or similar points of view about the rate of disarmament have been expressed by the representatives of other non-aligned countries on our Committee.

Furthermore, judging from the speeches of the Western Powers' representatives, it appears that they do not regard the time limits in the United States plan as final. Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, speaking of time limits on 2 May, said:

"If it can be shown that this" -- meaning the application of the first-stage disarmament measures -- "can be done effectively in a shorter period than the three years laid down in the United States plan, then I for one support it;..." (ENDC/PV.29, p.9)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

We therefore consider that the time limit proposed by the Soviet Union is reasonable and useful, and so we have incorporated it in our compromise text. However, both the time limit itself and other proposals submitted in this text can and undoubtedly will be subjects of negotiation and agreement between the delegations present. Some delegations may want even shorter time limits for general and complete disarmament, as they have said in the debate, and others insist on longer time limits. We are raising the issue at this stage of the negotiations with a proposal which to us seems fair; but we should like to hear the other delegations' views, to enable us to agree both on the time limit and on other problems which must be tackled and solved in the first stage.

We would point out that the text relating to the time limit for the fulfilment of the first-stage measures is a synthesis of the introduction to the first stage of the United States plan (ENDC/30, p.4) with article 19 of the Soviet draft (ENDC/2, p.13). Its wording, like that of some other parts, including the general words preceding the five items of article 4, is almost copied from the United States draft.

The first item in the article 4 submitted by the Bulgarian People's Republic for consideration by the Committee provides for the simultaneous elimination of all delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction. This is a radical measure, laid down in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles between the Soviet Union and the United States (ENDC/5). Paragraph 3(c) of the Joint Statement in fact provides for "Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction". The United States draft in its original form also provides for a measure of this kind in its section A entitled "Objectives", paragraph 2 (c): "Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction". Article 1, paragraph 2(c) (agreed between the two co-Chairmen and confirmed by the Committee) of Part I of the treaty which we are drafting contains similar words (ENDC/40/Rev.1, p.2).

Our draft lays down the essential measures to be taken at the start of general and complete disarmament in order virtually to obviate the threat of an attack or of a nuclear war. No one denies the importance of these measures, since nuclear weapon vehicles are the key to the practical problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war. That has been stressed by many speakers who agree on this issue.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Speaking at the meeting on 24 April, Mr. Dean, the United States representative, remarked on this subject:

"I fully understand the desire of all of us to deal with the danger posed by nuclear weapons delivery vehicles; it is these nuclear weapons delivery vehicles which, more than any others, have created a new condition in the world so that general war could place our civilization, as we now know it, in serious jeopardy. It is these armaments which have radically altered all concepts of national power, and altered them to a degree and in ways which we are only beginning to appreciate and understand. It is these nuclear weapons delivery vehicles which, more than any other devices, make necessary our quest for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world." (ENDC/PV.26, p.11)

Another representative, Mr. Lums of Canada, an armaments expert, said in his speech of 3 May 1962:

"...This problem of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles, which the Soviet Union draft treaty and the United States draft treaty propose to solve in different manners, is probably the crucial problem of disarmament. It is crucial to have some agreement upon it if we expect to move forward in regard to many provisions which must be included in the draft treaty that we are endeavouring to prepare." (ENDC/PV.30, p.9)

Consequently there is no need to dwell on the importance attached also by the delegations of the non-aligned countries to this problem of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. By way of illustration it will probably suffice to quote the words of the Indian representative, Mr. Dhall, who said in his speech of 3 May 1962:

"I must say that, so far as we are concerned, the Soviet proposal of the full elimination of the means of delivery as early as possible is an attractive one in its objectives ...

"The point, however, really is that all the established and feasible means of delivery for these weapons would have to be effectively destroyed under supervision." (ibid., p.19)

This unanimous recognition of the importance of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in eliminating the nuclear threat bears out our conviction that it will be possible to reach an agreement soon on the final elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is essentially linked with the simultaneous abolition of all military bases in foreign territory. During the discussion the importance of Agreed Principle No.5 of the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961 has been stressed on many occasions, namely that "all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced." (ENDC/5, p.2). During our recent meetings we have been repeatedly told that we must be realists. How can we possibly be realists without contemplating the simultaneous elimination of vehicles and of bases on foreign territory?

Realistic thinking cannot ignore at this stage of our work the following words by the Soviet Union representative at our meeting on 18 July:

"Liquidation of the military bases of the United States in Europe and elsewhere in the world will only be partial compensation for this enormous concession. To insist that the Soviet Union should waive even such partial compensation is, to say the least, unreasonable. In Mr. Dean's own words, it is unrealistic." (ENDC/PV.59, p.42)

The second paragraph of the compromise text submitted by our delegation should not, in our view, arouse any opposition. Its content and wording have been taken almost entirely from the United States draft-- item 1 in the introductory part of the first stage, on armed forces and conventional armaments. The concessions made by the Soviet delegation in this matter (ENDC/48), which were announced only this morning (supra, p.9) by the representative of the Soviet Union, together with the new provisions on conventional weapons, inserted in his draft, give us reason to hope that agreement can be reached without difficulty.

Items (3) and (5) of our delegation's paper have likewise been taken from the corresponding parts of the United States draft. The wording of item (3) is exactly that of the corresponding text in the United States draft--item (2) of the introduction to the first stage-- while the wording of our item 5 gives the precise meaning of the corresponding United States words.

Nor can we see how our item (4) can possibly raise any objection, since both the Soviet and the United States drafts contain measures to reduce the risk of war in the first stage.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The delegation of the Bulgarian People's Republic therefore submits this working paper with the aim and intention of contributing within its modest powers to an agreement on this issue. We trust that our text and the accompanying explanations will be considered by all Delegations, and that these, moved by the spirit of compromise our paper embodies, will very shortly agree to adopt on first reading article 4 of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The Bulgarian delegation requests the Secretariat of the Conference to circulate this draft as a Working Paper of the Eighteen Nation Committee.^{1/}

Mr. CASTRO (Brazil): On behalf of the Brazilian delegation I wish to express my appreciation of the very fruitful and helpful work undertaken by our co-Chairmen concerning the procedure of work in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the first stage of a treaty for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/52). We welcome this solution as a valuable compromise, and hope that the spirit of conciliation shown by the co-Chairmen on this question of procedure will have an effect on the substantive issues before us. We hope that the points mentioned in this document will prove to be points around which agreements can be built and not concrete points on which to disagree further.

My delegation sincerely hopes that, when the central procedural questions have been settled, the Conference will be able to proceed to a discussion of terms for a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is a tremendous task we have before us, and corresponds to the terms of reference assigned to us by the General Assembly, to which we are bound to report on the success or failure of our efforts. That report should be drafted at the proper moment with complete candour.

My delegation listened with the utmost attention and interest to the statements delivered yesterday before this Conference by the Foreign Ministers of Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union and Italy, and by the Minister of Defence for India, and I ask your patience and forbearance for a brief comment on one point which is common to all statements, the point dealing with the suspension of nuclear tests. Because of the lateness of the hour I did not want to raise it yesterday but, with permission, I will raise it now.

^{1/} ENDC/L.17 (see also Rev.1)

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

My delegation was particularly impressed by the Canadian Foreign Minister's statement (EIDC/EV.60, p.27) to the effect that the nuclear Powers had not fully explored the possibilities for agreement opened by the presentation of the eight-nation joint memorandum (EIDC/28) and have been engaged in rather fruitless debate on the subject. From the statements made at the meeting of 16 July, when the Conference re-opened under what appeared to us to be favourable circumstances, we had some reason to believe that we were moving closer to an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests, a subject which my Government considers as the most urgent on our agenda and to which it is prepared to give a first-rate priority.

We should be realistic enough to believe that we are not on the verge of concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We should be realistic enough to understand that, at the present stage of the world crisis, and until tension relaxes, no great nation is willing to forgo power and the precarious and highly doubtful benefits of power to protect its interests and security or even -- which is much more disturbing and disappointing -- to foster its political aims, whether of an offensive or a defensive character. If our efforts are to be taken seriously by world public opinion, they should rest on realities and, to use an expression so often quoted here, on the "facts of life" of today, not on the expectations of tomorrow. World public opinion, while alarmed by the disastrous acceleration of the arms race, may be resigned to wait until conditions will allow the conclusion of a treaty for general and complete disarmament. I do not wish to be unduly pessimistic in this connexion, but facts are disturbing things and the debates held in our last few meetings had a most sobering effect on our expectations.

What public opinion is not prepared to condone is any delay on the part of the nuclear Powers to come to an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. That is the immediate task before us and there is no evading the issue. Nuclear tests are not only an alarming aspect of the arms race; they are by themselves acts of war, actual shooting -- the first steps on mankind's road to ultimate destruction. Nuclear testing is war waged against people, not against dummies; against their health and not against their power. It is likewise war waged on the very dignity of man.

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

Let us squarely face the facts and let us not mince words. The situation is too serious to allow for delusions and fallacies. This Conference will be a dismal failure -- and no high-sounding words in the final report will disguise it -- if we close our proceedings in this second period of meetings without any substantial action being taken in this field. For how can we pretend that we are moving towards general and complete disarmament if we are unable, or reluctant, or unwilling to check even the actual shooting already going on? How can we envisage the future when we close our eyes to present and clear danger? How can we pretend that peace is round the corner when we are persisting on the road to war?

Our apprehensions on this matter have now been considerably enhanced by the official announcement on Sunday that the Soviet Government is soon to resume its nuclear testing programme. We regret this decision, as we have regretted all similar decisions in the past. As we said at the meeting of 16 July, when the Conference re-opened, we do not believe that any nation has, at any time, the right to test -- be it in the first, second or last place. We feel that nuclear tests are bad, regardless of where they originate. These were our words:

"We feel that we can no longer live in a situation of trying to know to which nation now falls the right and the turn to test. Now it is not the turn of any nation to test. Now should be the turn for peace, security and disarmament to be established in world affairs." (ENDC/PV.57, p.43)

World peace and security are not the sole responsibilities of the great Powers. To a common danger of death and destruction there should correspond a common and identical responsibility. Power has not brought security to the great Powers, which paradoxically now feel the most vulnerable and insecure.

We still think that the eight-nation joint memorandum is wide enough and flexible enough to serve as a rallying point for divergent views on a test ban. It is an attempt at reconciliation, an attempt at understanding, an attempt at compromise.

We shall carefully shun any polemics, and it is not our aim to pass judgement on deeds or intentions or to pin down responsibilities for omission or evasiveness. Powers have their reasons for not agreeing, and the main reason is lack of confidence. The role of the eight nations -- and it is not my intention to speak for all of them, since only the eight can speak for the eight -- is not, in my opinion, the role of judges or arbitrators, but the role of diplomats and conciliators.

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

If one of the great Powers fails to agree, all of us will have failed in our efforts. Disarmament is not a problem to be solved by vote, by pressure or by propaganda. It is a matter to be solved by persuasion, consensus and, above all, by confidence. If we fail in our efforts, all seventeen -- rather, all eighteen -- of us will be guilty. It will show that we have not lived up to our responsibilities before our peoples and before the peoples of the world, who have placed their trust in our unskilful hands.

It has been implied that a nuclear test ban is difficult to attain because the great Powers cannot or do not wish to agree on the intricate question of control, a problem which is based on confidence. It is well known, however, that the main divergencies and discrepancies do lie in the problems of detection and identification of underground tests, as the international control required for atmospheric and outer space tests does not appear to present so many insurmountable difficulties. Why, then, not concentrate our efforts on this question of atmospheric and outer space tests which are the most dangerous, actually and potentially, and the ones which have a most disturbing effect on mind, body and nerves? Why not, along the lines of the eight-nation joint memorandum, further explore the possibility of an agreement on the question of control of atmospheric and outer space tests and, at the same time, start a discussion on the adequate methods of detection and identification of underground tests?

We are of course prepared to accept any other procedure which would prove to be most conducive to an early agreement on the overall problem of nuclear tests. In this connexion, we have been encouraged by statements made recently before this Committee. I am referring to the statement made by Mr. Dean (ENDC/PV.57, pp.12 et seq.) and later by Mr. Rusk (ENDC/PV.60, p.42) concerning the presentation of new scientific data, and Mr. Lorin's expressed willingness to consider them. (ENDC/PV.50, p.16).

We are not asked to do what is impossible; but we are expected to persevere in our endeavours to the very limit of our capabilities. This is clearly within the field of reality, even taking into account the roughness of the cold war. We are not asking any nation forthwith to dispose of its nuclear bombs, before an adequate agreement is reached. We are just asking them not to start using them.

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

Of course, a time-limit may be established; the date of 1 January 1963 was suggested constructively by Mr. Padilla Nervo, the leader of the Mexican delegation, as a deadline. This might have the undesirable effect of stimulating experiments during the rest of the current year, but it would be definitely better than no suspension at all. We should be prepared to accept and even to argue in favour of such a deadline, which may prove to be the only realistic solution by which the present stalemate could be settled, as we are facing a rather peculiar situation in which every nuclear Power wishes to be the last one to conduct the tests and not the first one to agree on a test ban.

The establishment of a deadline might provide the great Powers with the opportunity of testing last at the same time and --- as the reasoning goes --- no one would be placed at a disadvantage. It is a sad concession to make, the concession to have more tests held, perhaps at an increasing speed, and yet it is a concession people perhaps will be willing to make if they have no alternative left. A test ban, even with a time-limit or a deadline, would be a recognition that power is not adding to security and that the problem of security is now closely interlinked with and contingent on the problem of peace. Without peace there will be no security for any nation, no matter how many missiles it may have stocked and no matter how many nuclear tests it may have conducted.

It is rather disappointing to conclude that we are still facing the situation described by the head of the Brazilian delegation, Mr. de Mello-Franco, at the meeting of 3 June 1962, which he characterized as follows:

"Hence it could, of course, be said that ... the nuclear Powers have a sort of understanding against --- I will not say all the other Powers --- but at least against those which are not linked with the direct interests of these two great Powers ..." (ENDC/PV.53, p.28)

Having confided to member nations round this table my apprehensions and my feelings on this most crucial matter of a nuclear test ban, I wonder whether the eight nations should not combine their efforts in a new endeavour to save this Conference from failure and frustration and to save the joint memorandum from the "limbo" referred to by Mr. de Mello-Franco on a previous occasion. I wonder whether something new should not be undertaken to strengthen our proceedings, for time is running short both for the Conference and for mankind.

Mr. LALL (India): I have asked for the floor to intervene briefly on a certain matter, but before I do that may I join with my Brazilian colleague in congratulating our co-Chairmen on having arrived at their agreement on procedure (EIDC/52). I should also like to join in his hope that this spirit of conciliation will continue so that it leads to tangible agreements. Once again, we have been spared protracted discussions on procedure by this wise step taken by our co-Chairmen. We are indeed grateful to them.

Before I come to the small point which I was going to raise, may I also say how much we found ourselves in agreement with the spirit of the remarks made by the representative of Brazil on a test ban? We fully share the sense of urgency in his statement. This matter is certainly one which engages the attention not only of this Committee but of all the world, and delay in reaching a solution will carry with it a most heavy responsibility, especially for those who are conducting tests. We entirely agree with Mr. Castro's view on the unjustifiedness of tests by any country at any time, anywhere.

I need not go into that matter further, because the leader of the Indian delegation, Mr. Krishna Menon, dealt with it in his statement yesterday.

(EIDC/PV.60, pp. 7 et seq) I should only like to say in these brief introductory remarks, which are based on the most interesting and forceful statement of our Brazilian colleague, that my delegation has a somewhat different view with regard to the urgency and importance of disarmament itself. We are persuaded that, in addition to the test ban, which is certainly an urgent necessity, it is equally necessary and urgent for this Committee to implement the General Assembly resolution (1722 (XVI)) which has laid upon us the clear task of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Now I should like to say two small things, and that is why I have asked for the floor today. One is that the position of the Government of India regarding the total period for disarmament and the period that each stage should take was set out again by Mr. Krishna Menon yesterday, and I should like to draw the attention of all our colleagues to this position which, if I may say so, is the position we have at various times tried to state in this Conference. Mr. Menon said:

(Mr. Lall, India)

"First, we believe that the intensity of impact of any individual stage, as well as the total period of disarmament, must be limited to a short period, because it is the considered opinion of my Government, repeatedly expressed by my Prime Minister in Parliament, that either we must disarm in a reasonably short time or the problem will become far worse than before." (EMDC/PV.60, p.16)

A little later Mr. Krishna Menon said:

"Secondly, the period that each stage takes and the period which the whole programme takes must be comparatively limited because otherwise there will be sufficient time within the stages for nations to resume the process of armament ...

"Thirdly, it is necessary that there should be no intervals between stages ... In other words it has to be a continuous process ..." (ibid.)

I wish to quote also what Lord Home said with reference to these parts of Mr. Menon's statement. He said:

"There again, if I may, I would like to remark with Mr. Krishna Menon that there is virtue in continuity, but there is also virtue in speed, and we must try to get on with this job as quickly as we can." (ibid., p.20)

We were very glad indeed to hear those words from Lord Home yesterday. They show that there is, if I may say so, a growing feeling that continuity and rapidity are both essential to an effective disarmament plan. That is the view which we have often stated in this Conference.

Our colleague from Bulgaria mistakenly said today (supra, p. 29) that I had suggested a two-year period for the whole process of disarmament. I do remember having once said that we had noted the four-year period proposed by the Soviet Union and that we would have thought that those countries which attached a **great** deal of importance to effective measures of control would perhaps propose an even shorter period, taking into account the fact that rapidity in disarmament helps the process of control to be rapidly effected and reach totality, which has always been stressed by certain countries. That is what I said. But the essence of our position regarding the need for a fairly fast-moving plan was set out yesterday again by Mr. Krishna Menon in the words to which I have drawn attention. As I have said, we were very glad to observe the degree of endorsement of that view which was contained in the remarks made by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Lord Home.

Mr. EL-ERIAN (United Arab Republic): May I first, on behalf of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, congratulate our co-Chairmen on their conciliatory spirit and their persevering work and patience which have resulted in enabling this Conference to agree on its method of work and in settling the procedural aspects of this work? At the first meeting of this resumed session the Committee was able to reach agreement, thanks to the co-Chairmen, on methods for accelerating our work and increasing the element of informal discussion and practical negotiation. Again thanks to the commendable initiative of the delegation of the United Kingdom and the conciliatory spirit of the co-Chairmen, the Committee yesterday reached a very valuable compromise which, it is hoped, will enable the Conference to go on and record speedy progress on the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

My delegation has listened with the greatest care and the closest attention to the statements made at yesterday's meeting by the distinguished Foreign Ministers. Those statements contain a valuable assessment of our work during the first period as well as valuable suggestions with regard to the second period of the Conference. While these statements have highlighted the difficulties and complexities involved in disarmament and related matters, while they have revealed the different approaches, they have nevertheless contained reassuring declarations of the determination of both sides to continue negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It is the earnest hope of the delegation of the United Arab Republic that this second period of our work will record advances which will take into consideration what has already been achieved in the first stage and will justify the hope that was expressed by Mr. Lall, in his capacity as Chairman of the first meeting of the second period of our work, when he stated that he hoped that our second report to the General Assembly would be one which would record substantial progress in our work (ENDC/PV.57, p.6).

My delegation wishes to put on record its appreciation of the additions and modifications (ENDC/48) which the Soviet delegation has proposed to its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, and commends the spirit in which those modifications have been advanced and the gesture they imply. We hope that additional modifications and adjustments by both sides will be forthcoming.

(Mr. El-Erian, United Arab Republic)

May I now turn to the subject of nuclear tests? The position of the United Arab Republic on this rather urgent problem is well known. In their statements to the Conference in its first period, our Minister for Foreign Affairs and the chairman of my delegation, Mr. Hassan, more than once restated the position of my Government in this respect. As the representative of Sweden rightly reminded us, and as the representatives of India and Brazil also stated today, this is one of the most urgent problems before us. My delegation notes with gratification that scientific progress has been announced by the United States Government in relation to the question of the detection and identification of nuclear tests. It is our earnest hope that this scientific progress will produce a larger element of agreement on the proposals submitted in the eight-nation joint memorandum (ENDC/28) of 16 April and thus contribute in considerable measure to the speedy conclusion of a test ban treaty, which, as has been rightly pointed out by many representatives, is one of the most urgent tasks before us. In this connexion, I would like to recall the statement of the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic to this Conference on 23 March, when he said:

"We trust that in the meantime the four Governments which are principally and directly involved in this vital matter will come more into line with the feelings and convictions in this regard of all the peoples of the world and that they will actually, if not yet contractually, withhold any further nuclear weapon tests in order, among other things, to afford a better and wider scope for agreement than seems at the present moment to be available." (ENDC/PV.8, page 32)

Those are the few remarks I deemed it appropriate to make on behalf of my delegation at this stage of our deliberations. In conclusion, may I voice the hope which has been expressed by many representatives before me that this resumed session will mark a new phase of constructive negotiations and practical solutions to the problem of disarmament, and thus translate into reality the hopes and aspirations which the peoples of the world place in this Conference?

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I want to intervene only quite briefly this morning in order to make one or two points, and firstly to express my thanks and gratitude, as others have already done today, to our co-Chairmen for their agreement on this document ENDC/52 setting out our future procedures. The

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

representative of the United Arab Republic, who preceded me, was kind enough to attribute some part of this to the United Kingdom in view of the document (ENDC/50) which we submitted last week. If that helped our co-Chairmen forward, then I am very happy indeed, and I am also happy that they found themselves able to incorporate so many of the points from our document in their agreed procedure. The fact that they have not put them in the same order as that in which I had placed them does not trouble me in the least; my main purpose was to see that we got effective discussion and debate and that we concentrated our thoughts on particular issues instead of having generalized statements with little relation one to another.

In this connexion I note, of course, that paragraph 5 (a), which we are discussing today, is not one of those that I put forward, but most of the others are, I think. This one is a fairly wide one and my own view had been that it would be easier to provide an introductory passage to stage I if we had agreed what would go into stage I. However, I see no harm whatever in having certain discussions at this stage, although I hope they will not be too prolonged because of the general nature this passage must have, and that we can then go forward to discussion of the particular measures concerned.

In this connexion I think it might be helpful too if we could decide that as a regular part of our procedure the outgoing Chairman of the day, in consultation with the two co-Chairmen, should intimate to the rest of us which particular item we would be discussing at our next meeting. At times it may be clearly apparent that we have concluded discussion of a particular matter, at others it may not, and I would not want there to be any confusion in the minds of myself or my colleagues on this point. So perhaps our two co-Chairmen could consult together so that at the end of one plenary meeting we may know clearly what we shall be discussing at our next meeting. This, of course, in no way derogates from the provision in paragraph 4 of document ENDC/52 that should any representative wish to deal with a particular matter, because of its urgency, at any particular meeting, this should be possible, or from the wording in paragraph 5, which makes it clear that we are not to be tied precisely. I think this document does provide that element of flexibility which we require, while at the same time giving us a clearly directed way in which we should proceed. I therefore welcome it most warmly and congratulate our two co-Chairmen in relation to it.

(Mr. Godler, United Kingdom)

We have heard one or two interesting contributions this morning. Our two co-Chairmen have both launched us into discussion of paragraph 5 (a) --- namely, the introductory measures -- and I have listened with care to what has been said by a number of representatives on this matter. Quite clearly, it is going to be difficult for us at this stage to finalize our comments in relation to this because, as I have said, we have got to get into the substantive discussion, but I hope we can agree fairly soon to refer these matters to our co-Chairmen for preliminary drafting of a treaty text, which will clearly have to have in it a number of parallel provisions from the two sides.

There is the question, which has been raised by several representatives, of time limits and, of course, the two positions in regard to that are well known. I was glad that our Bulgarian colleague did me the honour of quoting me in relation to that this morning (supra, p.29). My position on this has always been quite clear. Indeed it was reinforced by what my colleague, Lord Home, said yesterday, which the representative of India quoted this morning -- namely, that the United Kingdom delegation is anxious to complete this work in the shortest time which we consider feasible and proper, but it must be related to the tasks which are to be carried out (ENDC/PV.60, p.20). And my own view in relation to this preliminary article is that we have got to decide what tasks are going to be carried out in the first stage, before we seek to determine the time that the first stage will take. As I have indicated before, if it can be shown that those tasks can properly be carried out in a shorter period than the three years laid down in the United States draft I, for one, would favour that; but I want to be quite clear that the tasks are such as can be carried out in such a period. Therefore, so far as a time limit is concerned I believe we cannot finalize anything at this particular moment of time.

On the point on which I think the representative of the Soviet Union dwelt for a little while, the question of foreign bases, I was a little disappointed -- more than a little disappointed -- yesterday when I heard his Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, say these words which Mr. Zorin has quoted this morning:

"We can say most definitely that there will be no agreement on general and complete disarmament which does not provide for the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territory in the first -- I repeat, the first -- stage." (ENDC/PV.60, p.37)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Now I was sorry when I heard that said. I was more sorry when I heard it repeated this morning, because I think it is unrealistic. I think the arguments have been put forward many times in the past in relation to this, and I do not intend to go into it at length now, but I do say that this proposal, put forward in this way, is only going to increase our difficulties. My own view has always been that the problem of foreign bases is the same as the problem of all bases -- that if general and complete disarmament is to be carried out bases will have to be eliminated wherever they exist -- and that it is no good any representative here pretending that the elimination of all foreign bases in the first stage would not offend against paragraph 5 of the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), the principle of balance, in relation to countries in Western Europe, for instance, including the United Kingdom, which would be affected very materially by this. Of course those bases must go, but in my view their elimination cannot be carried out in the first stage.

This is a new provision to which our Soviet colleagues have sought to give greater emphasis as the Conference has gone on. It surprised me when it was first mentioned, right at the beginning of our Conference, and it has surprised me even more that they have given such added weight to it, because when the reference to this occurred in the Agreed Principles -- which, after all, are the guiding light -- in paragraph 3(a), it was merely to the "disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases ..." (ENDC/5, p.2). That is the only reference to bases in that regard and it seems to me that that is the right context in which to put it, and to seek to highlight it and to dramatize it in this way is only to seek to add to our difficulties and not to detract from them.

I therefore do appeal to our Soviet colleagues to give this some further thought and not to seek to make it a major issue. I do not see any reason why it has to be. I do not see why it need prevent the carrying out of general and complete disarmament, because it is nonsense to pretend that if armaments as a whole are being reduced, the fact that they are being reduced as a whole is not also going to reduce the capability of bases. Such bases as there are in Western military groupings -- defensive military groupings -- are there for defensive purposes, but their effectiveness will obviously be lessened as the disarmament process goes on.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

If necessary, it might be possible to write in words in relation to that, but they must be reduced gradually -- that is my point. To pretend, as some Soviet speeches have pretended, that while a 30 per cent reduction of armaments in the first stage is being carried out this will in no way affect the effectiveness of foreign bases, is to talk military nonsense. This must be. Therefore it is right, in my view, that this should be taken in in the comprehensive view. I do not want to stress it further now; I merely refer to it in this way because of the comments which were made yesterday in this regard.

The United Kingdom delegation wants to see progress in spelling out the obligations of the first stage, but we do not want to see anyone putting forward matters on which there cannot be agreement -- on which we do not think there need be agreement in order to achieve effective general and complete disarmament, abiding by the Agreed Principles, and in particular paragraph 5 dealing with balance.

Now there are other aspects in regard to the first stage. There is the question of conventional armaments, and here I have already welcomed the fact that the Soviet Union has seen fit to agree to the percentage suggested in the United States plan. That is helpful. Then there are other problems, including the major problem of nuclear delivery vehicles. Here, again, the Western position is quite clear, and I hope very much that our Soviet colleagues will agree to some amelioration of the attitude that they have taken up in regard to it; but I was a little puzzled this morning by Mr. Zorin's reference to this (supra, p. 8) when I understood him to say, from the interpretation -- I hope I have got it right -- that 100 per cent elimination of nuclear vehicles would enable 100 per cent inspection in this regard. Well, now, he has never spelt out to us how this can be, in the light of the known Soviet views in regard to inspection -- views which were reinforced by Mr. Gromyko again only yesterday (ENDC/PV.60, p.37); views with which we do not agree, and on which our position was set out clearly by my own leader, Lord Home, only yesterday (ibid., p.20), to which I need not refer again. However, I do say that the Soviet Union has increased the complications of verification in seeking to put too high a figure, just as I say that this 100 per cent proposed elimination also offends against the Agreed Principles.

And I do hope that we shall not be hearing again what we have heard on various occasions before, and what Mr. Gromyko repeated yesterday (ibid., p.37): this claim, first put forward, I think, by Mr. Khrushchev, that the Soviet Union is

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

prepared to accept any Western proposals on control provided that the Western Powers accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Gromyko said, "What could be simpler?" I must say, "What could be more misleading?" -- more misleading because the Soviet Union must know that its proposals on general and complete disarmament are unacceptable because they offend against the Agreed Principles, as I and other Western spokesmen have shown in the past. Therefore, to put forward proposals that one knows are unacceptable, and to say that if the other side accepts them one will accept the other side's proposals on control, seems to me unrealistic. It is only a propaganda, or polemical, approach. I do hope we shall not have further repetitions of that.

I listened with care this morning to what our Brazilian colleague had to say in regard to nuclear tests. Of course we respect very much the view which he has put forward. My delegation is very anxious indeed to conclude a treaty. We accept the responsibility which falls on those who have these grim weapons, and we shall certainly do all we can to press forward for the agreement of a treaty. I do not wish to develop it further at this moment, because we shall undoubtedly be having an opportunity shortly for further discussions on this matter, but I would like the representative of Brazil to know that I do fully understand the point of view which he put forward.

These are just a few comments in regard to this matter which we are discussing this morning. I might wish to come back to some of these points later on, but I would only repeat that I hope we can fairly soon -- I do not wish to seek to foreclose discussion in the least, but fairly soon -- move from this particular aspect to one of the substantive issues and give our co-Chairmen the grim and difficult task of trying to agree with one another on the wording for this particular introductory article.

Mr. ZCRIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I merely wished to say that today we have had some discussion on paragraph 5(a) of the procedure of work recommended by our co-Chairmen (ENDC/52). But it is quite obvious that this discussion is far from being concluded. That is why I have agreed with my colleague, the United States co-Chairman, to propose that this item be discussed on Friday in plenary meeting, and therefore I do not wish to detain the members of the Committee today by anticipating the comments which the Soviet delegation intends to make in connexion with the views expressed today.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I also hope that the other delegations, after carefully studying the verbatim record of today's meeting as well as the views that were put forward during our previous discussion, will be able to take an active part in the discussion of this important question of the introductory part of the draft treaty at our next plenary meeting on Friday.

We shall, of course, study carefully the proposals which were put forward today by the representative of Bulgaria concerning the drafting of this article 4 on the tasks of the first stage of the draft treaty, and we shall state our views in this regard also at our next meeting.

In connexion with the remarks made by a number of delegations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, I think that we shall discuss this matter more fully tomorrow in the Three-Power Sub-Committee. I therefore reserve my right to revert in the Three-Power Sub-Committee to these matters which have been touched upon today and then, if necessary, at subsequent plenary meetings of our Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): Since no other delegation wishes to speak, we will proceed to the communique. I would say, first, with regard to the question raised by the representative of the United Kingdom, that I think a reply to it was implied in the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union that the two co-Chairmen recommend that we continue with the debate on the item which we have begun to examine this morning.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its sixty-first plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations at Geneva under the chairmanship of Mr. Lachs, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Bulgaria, Brazil, India, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom.

"The delegation of Bulgaria tabled a working paper.^{1/}

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 27 July 1962 at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

^{1/} ENDC/L.17; see also Rev. 1