

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/AC.121/SR.14
21 July 1965
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FOURTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 15 June 1965, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT:

<u>Chairman:</u>	Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY	Ghana
<u>Members:</u>	Mr. PAZHWAQ	Afghanistan
	Mr. AZZOUT	Algeria
	Mr. GARCIA DEL SOLAR)	Argentina
	Mr. QUIJANO)	
	Mr. POCOCK	Australia
	Mr. WALDHEIM	Austria
	Mr. SETTE CAMARA)	Brazil
	Mr. BUENO)	
	Mr. TREMBLAY	Canada
	Mr. HAJEK	Czechoslovakia
	Mr. ALVAREZ VIDAURRE	El Salvador
	Mr. GEBRE-EGZY	Ethiopia
	Mr. SEYDOUX	France
	Mr. CSATORDAY	Hungary
	Mr. CHAKRAVARTY	India
	Mr. PACHACHI	Iraq
	Mr. VINCI	Italy
	Mr. MATSUI)	Japan
	Mr. KATO)	
	Mr. BA	Mauritania
	Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO	Mexico
	Mr. SCHAAPVELD	Netherlands
	Mr. SANU)	Nigeria
	Mr. ODOGWU)	
	Mr. Amjad ALI	Pakistan
	Mr. LEWANDOWSKI	Poland
	Mr. HASEGANU	Romania
	Mrs. ZAINABU KAMARA	Sierra Leone
	Mr. AZNAR)	Spain
	Mr. TEMBOURY)	
	Mr. ASTROM	Sweden
	Mr. PANYARACHUN	Thailand

PRESENT (continued):Members (continued):

Mr. FEDORENKO	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Mr. Ahmed Tawfik KHALIL	United Arab Republic
Mr. HOPE	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. PLIMPTON	United States of America
Mr. SOSA-RODRIGUEZ	Venezuela
Mr. LEKIC	Yugoslavia
<u>Secretariat:</u> U THANT	Secretary-General
Mr. VELLODI	Secretary of the Committee

The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider Conference Room Paper No. 2, which had been prepared on the basis of Conference Room Paper No. 1 by the working group of seven members appointed at the preceding meeting, taking into account the suggestions and observations made by the members of the Committee.

Furthermore, the representative of Afghanistan had proposed the following addition to paragraph 8 of Conference Room Paper No. 2:

"The Special Committee agreed that the guidelines in regard to future peace-keeping operations, indicated in paragraph 52 of this report, be referred to all Member States of the Organization with a request that they should submit their views thereupon not later than 1 August 1965, so that the Special Committee could take these views into consideration in its further deliberations."

Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) congratulated the Chairman on his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ghana and wished him every success in his new post.

As a member of the working group, he felt it necessary to make some comments on the draft report before the Committee and more particularly on the passages altered by the working group. At the preceding meeting, almost all the members of the Committee had recognized that the document prepared by the working group would be only a draft interim report which could subsequently be sent to the General Assembly and that it would contain merely a factual account of the principal activities of the Committee. It should be borne in mind, however, that the primary objective was a return to a normal situation in which the General Assembly and the entire Organization could function normally. The principal obstacle to the achievement of that objective was the fact that some countries were threatening to insist on application of Article 19 of the Charter. That attitude was the origin of the current crisis and was motivated by the desire of those concerned to safeguard the privileges they had so far enjoyed and paralyse the Organization at the very moment when their aggressive policies were becoming more obvious every day.

From the beginning, his delegation had felt that the Afro-Asian proposal of December 1964 was the compromise which would solve the problem currently faced by the United Nations. The suggestion made by the representative of Afghanistan at the preceding meeting had come very near to that proposal but it had not been accepted unanimously and had been only partly incorporated in the document before

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the Committee. For example, paragraph 11 (a) did not indicate clearly enough the need for a return to a normal situation. What the Committee should do was to state clearly in its report that the question of the application of Article 19 would not be raised again, which would guarantee that the difficulties encountered by the General Assembly at its nineteenth session would not recur.

His delegation was not able to support the text proposed in Conference Room Paper No. 2 but, as a compromise, it would be prepared to accept the second paragraph proposed the day before by the representative of Afghanistan.

In its most recent statements, the United States delegation had given a distorted version of the facts by taking a one-sided view of the statements and positions of some Governments. The Committee should take an over-all view of the situation.

The Hungarian delegation was prepared to co-operate fully with the Chairman and would be glad if a suitable solution were found.

Mr. LEKIC (Yugoslavia), speaking on behalf of his delegation and on his own behalf, warmly congratulated the Chairman on his appointment to the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country, with which Yugoslavia had the most friendly relations.

His delegation was deeply concerned about the situation in which the Organization found itself and most disappointed with the lack of success of the Committee's work. When the vast majority of the Members of the Organization had agreed to suspend the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, they had done so in order to enable the Special Committee to tackle its basic task: the creation of the necessary conditions for the General Assembly to resume normal work. Unfortunately, since that date the positions of the principals had not changed, as could be gathered from the statements heard at the last two meetings of the Committee and prospects for agreement on a settlement of the United Nations finances were dimmer than at first. Consequently, despite a small measure of success, the crisis had deepened. His delegation thought that the Committee should face the facts: its failure was a new blow to the prestige of the Organization and would certainly make it more difficult to find a solution to the current problems of the United Nations.

(Mr. Lekic, Yugoslavia)

As the Yugoslav delegation had emphasized in the general debate at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, the crisis experienced by the United Nations was caused by the policy of some circles that were resisting all that was new and progressive in international relations. Never during the most severe cold war tensions had the General Assembly been so paralysed. The deficit was nothing new and it had never obstructed the normal functioning of the Organization in the past.

Also at the nineteenth session of the Assembly, the Yugoslav delegation had stressed that the present crisis reflected the unwillingness or inability of some countries to relinquish obsolete conceptions and approach international problems and their relations with other countries in a constructive manner, in the interests of peace and in the light of contemporary developments. Actually, such a stand benefited those who were opposed to the strengthening of the United Nations, and to the development and democratization of the Organization.

His delegation had also said that the prevention of the normal work of the General Assembly was harming the interests of all Member States, threatening the future of the Organization and preventing the improvement of international relations. It was therefore the duty of each according to his ability to contribute to a settlement of the crisis and normalization of the situation, while those who had a greater potential capacity to contribute to a solution bore a larger responsibility for doing so.

In that connexion, he recalled the statements he had made in the Special Committee on 26 March 1965 (A/AC.121/SR.1, third paragraph and last sentence in the fourth paragraph of his statement) and 23 April 1965 (A/AC.121/SR.3, last sentence of his statement).

In the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, the chain of events from the beginning of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly to the present had confirmed the fear that behind the alleged financial crisis of the United Nations lay an attempt to incapacitate the Organization, to prevent it from playing its role as an instrument for the maintenance of peace and security and to turn it into a mere debating club.

The vast majority of Member States had exercised great patience at the nineteenth session, accepting several successive suspensions and agreeing to

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abnormal voting procedures in the hope that a way might be found of overcoming the crisis in the Organization. The majority of States had finally accepted the establishment of the Special Committee hoping that it would find the means of enabling the Assembly to resume its normal work.

The development of the world situation had not facilitated the work of the Committee. The pursuit of a policy of force based on principles contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter was incompatible with participation in the work of a body whose purpose was to enable the world Organization to resume normal activity. It was the Powers which in practice ignored the principles of the Charter which had the least need of the Organization. Those were the main reasons why the Committee had not been able to reach agreement on any but secondary matters. The only matter of importance, before it, however, was that of securing the normalization of the General Assembly's work.

At the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, the Afro-Asian group, in an attempt to resolve the crisis, had proposed a plan which the Yugoslav delegation had whole-heartedly supported. It was grateful to the delegations of non-aligned and other countries, and particularly to the Ethiopian, Mexican and Afghan delegations, which had endeavoured to find a suitable solution. It was thankful also to the Chairman of the Committee and to the Secretary-General, for their excellent report (A/AC.121/4) which summed up the views expressed during the Committee's debate. That document might well serve as a basis for further work should the Committee be given a renewed mandate at the twentieth session.

The Afro-Asian plan had proposed that the financial deficit should be met by voluntary contributions. The later demand that countries should state in advance the amount of their contributions - which was incompatible with the principle of strictly voluntary contributions - had rendered that otherwise widely acceptable plan inapplicable. There was reason to fear that the pretexts employed at the previous session would be used again in 1965, and his delegation would not be reassured unless positive steps were taken to enable the Assembly to function normally at its next session.

The crisis of the United Nations was to a great extent a reflection of the present state of international affairs. The Organization was immobilized at the very time when mankind needed it most desperately, yet there seemed to be no

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possibility of reaching an agreement on future peace-keeping operations while the General Assembly was blocked as it was at present. As regards the financial problem, it should be settled through methods similar to those applied to the political problem.

The Yugoslav delegation firmly believed that the Committee should take a stand in favour of a return to normalcy. Whether it be through a resolution, a report or a recommendation to the General Assembly, the Committee should: (1) state that it was absolutely essential that the General Assembly should resume its normal work and that the question of Article 19 should not be raised in connexion with ONUC and UNEF expenditures; (2) declare that the Organization's deficit should be met through voluntary contributions by Member States, it being understood that that arrangement would not be construed as meaning any change in the basic position of any individual Member and should be accepted as a co-operative effort by all Member States aimed at strengthening the Organization with a view to creating a climate in which the future might be harmoniously planned; (3) authorize the Secretary-General to undertake, after appropriate consultations with Member States, any steps necessary for the achievement of that end.

Although those measures might not command the support of all members of the Committee, his delegation believed that they could not only save the Organization but even increase its effectiveness. While there were those who had tried in every conceivable way to render the United Nations ineffective, the overwhelming majority of States had acted and would continue to act to counter the public and private efforts of those who wished to harm the Organization. The Committee had now exhausted all the means at its disposal without achieving the normalization of the work of the General Assembly. It was therefore obvious that other measures should be contemplated.

Mr. FELORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that a number of delegations had expressed themselves in favour of deleting paragraph 12 of the Special Committee's draft report to the General Assembly (Conference Room Paper No. 2) in the version circulated on 14 June. Since paragraph 12 in the revised working paper circulated that morning provided for the continuation of the Committee's work beyond 15 June, it seemed pointless to determine in advance, in paragraph 11, the conditions in which the question of the Organization's financial

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difficulties would be settled. His delegation accordingly proposed that paragraph 11 of the Conference Room Paper should be deleted.

With respect to the report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly (A/AC.121/4), he considered that certain aspects of the document should be more closely examined if only because several delegations had stated in the course of the Committee's deliberations that it was unnecessary for the draft resolutions to reflect all positions since they were to be presented in the report. The latter contained a series of positive considerations which deserved emphasis. It was rightly stressed in paragraphs 46, 47 and 49 that, if the United Nations was to be developed as a really effective instrument for the preservation and maintenance of international peace and security, it was necessary to observe strict compliance with the provisions of the Charter, and that an acceptable formula for overcoming the difficulties which faced the Organization must fall within the terms of the Charter. The first part of the report, particularly sections I and IV, provided useful information on the various positions expressed by members of the Committee regarding the execution and financing of peace-keeping operations, and United Nations practice in that sphere. It should be noted, however, that the generalizations adduced were not always objective and represented one-sided expressions of view. At the same time, the report contained assertions which the Soviet delegation could not accept, particularly in the paragraphs dealing with the settlement of current financial difficulties. His delegation had repeatedly stressed that the solution of that question should be sought on the basis of the proposal formulated by the Afro-Asian countries on 30 December 1964. He wished to emphasize once again that his delegation could agree only to a solution which precluded the possibility of fresh provocations with respect to the application of Article 19 of the Charter. In the second place, certain passages in the report dealing with future peace-keeping operations were unacceptable. For example, there was no point in defining the term "peace-keeping operations", as suggested in paragraph 52. The only text binding on all Member States was the Charter of the United Nations, and it was that instrument, and not the practice which had been

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followed in the past - which it should be noted in passing, was contrary to the provisions of the Charter - which should constitute the basis for all discussions in that regard. In that connexion his country could not accept the argument that it was necessary "to face up to the realities of the situation" (para. 48), because it was impossible to accept the practice of violating the Charter. Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 52 also gave rise to objection. The definition of the functions and powers of the Security Council and of the General Assembly as complementary, might lead to an incorrect interpretation of the provisions of the Charter, which were perfectly clear. Furthermore, it was impossible to agree to the proposition that the General Assembly and the Security Council should co-operate on the financing of peace-keeping operations (para. 52 (g)). Under the Charter, decisions regarding the costs of peace-keeping operations were the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council. Lastly, the Soviet delegation could not accept the reference (para. 52 (j)) to regulation 15.1 of the Financial Regulations of the United Nations, which dealt with expenditure under the regular budget, the amount of which was fixed by the General Assembly, and did not cover peace-keeping expenditures, which were the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council.

Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America) said that one of the most interesting questions discussed by the Committee had been that of the difference between the peace-keeping operations conducted by the United Nations up to the present and the enforcement action provided for under Article 42 of the Charter. That important distinction had been explained clearly by the Secretary-General in his speech to the Harvard Alumni Association on 12 June 1963. The Secretary-General had stressed that a more realistic idea of peace-keeping had been tacitly substituted for that of collective security as defined in Chapter VII of the Charter. The idea that conventional military means could be employed by or on behalf of the United Nations to combat aggression and to maintain peace appeared to be impractical at the present time. Peace-keeping forces were in fact very different from the forces envisaged under Chapter VII, although that did not mean that their existence contravened the provisions of that Chapter. They were essentially peace-keeping forces and not combat forces, and they acted only with the assent of the parties directly concerned. The Secretary-General had observed in that address that there had been a long history of peace-keeping actions which had involved the use of military forces but were not enforcement actions; such peace-keeping actions had

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been carried out in Greece, in 1947; in Kashmir, starting in 1948; by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine starting in 1949; by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), starting in 1956; in Lebanon, in 1958; in the Congo, starting in 1960; in West Irian, in 1962-1963; and in Yemen, in 1963-1964.

The Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly had noted in their report (A/AC.121/4) that all United Nations peace-keeping operations, except in the cases of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), had been authorized by the Security Council. In the case of UNEF, voted for by the Soviet Union, the Security Council had placed the matter before the General Assembly so that the latter might make recommendations. As for UNTEA, the Soviet Union had itself voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution authorizing the operation. That was the procedure to follow, and the Security Council should, as it had normally done in the past, authorize future peace-keeping operations. However, the General Assembly should assume that responsibility in appropriate cases whenever enforcement measures were not involved. As Dag Hammarskjöld had stated in 1957, enforcement action taken by the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter continued to be the responsibility of the Security Council, the relative functions and importance of the General Assembly and the Security Council reflecting in practice the general political situation within the constitutional framework, whose conformity with the fundamental principles of the Charter had, according to him, been ensured. Furthermore, Chapter VII did not deal exclusively with enforcement action, but envisaged other types of peace-keeping operations.

Article 50, for instance, referred to "preventive or enforcement measures" and Article 40 mentioned the provisional measures which could be taken to prevent a situation from being aggravated and becoming a threat to peace. Non-enforcement measures of that kind taken under Chapter VII of the Charter belonged to an area in which the primary responsibilities were assumed by the Security Council, but in which the General Assembly had in the past exercised residual responsibilities. In the best interests of encouraging the development of a world of peace and order, the General Assembly should continue to exercise its recommendatory authority in this area.

To maintain that the General Assembly had no authority in the matter and the Security Council a monopoly amounted to saying that a permanent member of the ...

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Security Council could block any action or measure intended to maintain peace or to prevent the development of a situation which might threaten peace. Arguments against that proposition had been eloquently expressed on 29 April 1965 by the representative of Venezuela, who, like many other representatives, had also referred to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice approving the organization by the General Assembly of peace-keeping operations not constituting enforcement measures. It should also be noted that seventy-six delegations, including the overwhelming majority of African, Asian and Latin American delegations, had accepted the opinion of the International Court of Justice. The inescapable conclusion to which all those facts led was that the present Secretary-General and his predecessor, as well as the overwhelming majority of delegations, had clearly decided in favour of the following propositions: (1) the peace-keeping operations conducted by the United Nations up to the present had not constituted enforcement measures; (2) the primary responsibilities in that field rested with the Security Council; (3) the General Assembly possessed the residual authority to recommend operations of that kind. That also was the opinion of almost all the Member States.

The United States delegation was gratified to note that, in spite of the stubborn opposition of a small minority, the prevailing trend in the Committee was against any limitation of the Assembly's right to recommend peace-keeping operations. The United Nations had already on many occasions encountered the opposition of one great Power. It had encountered that opposition when it had been a question of launching the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in 1950, establishing the United Nations Special Fund in 1957, and amending the Charter to expand the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. That opposition had not prevented the United Nations from going ahead, and the great Power in question had finally come to share the views of the majority. He believed that if those delegations which were convinced of the General Assembly's right to recommend peace-keeping operations held firm, the opposing minority would realize that it was mistaken and that it was in the interest of the United Nations and of all Member States to preserve that right of the General Assembly, which had in the past proved to be an effective instrument for the maintenance of peace.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that the Working Group had tried, in paragraph 11 of the draft report, to give a true picture of the situation which might help the Committee in its future work. However, if the Committee felt that that paragraph simply repeated what was already clearly stated in the Committee's terms of reference, his delegation would not oppose its deletion.

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Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) requested the representatives of the USSR and the United States to indicate very clearly their positions concerning paragraph 11 of the draft report. He himself believed that if paragraph 11 was deleted paragraph 12 became meaningless, since it might give the erroneous impression that all the Committee had to do in order to "complete" its work, was to consider the matters relating to future peace-keeping operations, whereas in fact no agreement had yet been reached on any specific point.

His delegation also wished to point out that, while the two largest Powers were entitled to maintain their own proposals, the small Powers were also concerned for the future of the United Nations and would like to have time for consultations in order to express their common views.

Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) said he wished to add to what had been said by the representative of Afghanistan that, if paragraph 11 was deleted, the draft report would no longer contain any mention of the strong desire of all Members of the Organization to ensure the normal functioning of the General Assembly. As that was a vital point, his delegation considered it essential to mention it in the draft report. It therefore proposed the following text which could, if necessary, replace paragraph 11:

"The Special Committee would like to bring to the attention of the General Assembly that there exists a unanimous desire among the Members of the Organization to ensure the normal functioning of the General Assembly when it reconvenes in September."

Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) said that he could not accept the solution, advocated by the USSR, and not objected to by the United States representative, of mentioning only concrete facts in the report. He agreed with the representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan that it was essential to emphasize the strong desire of all Members of the Organization to ensure the normal functioning of the General Assembly when it reconvened in September. The Committee could, however, postpone until a later date its consideration of the methods to be employed in order to solve the difficulties encountered. Consequently, his delegation, although it would have preferred to retain the two sub-paragraphs of paragraph 11, proposed that the report should state simply that the Committee strongly desired to ensure

(Mr. Pachachi, Iraq)

the normalization of the work of the General Assembly, omitting any mention of solutions which might cause some members of the Committee to fear that the methods to be employed in order to achieve that end were being prejudged.

Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said, in reply to the question put by the representative of Afghanistan, that he was prepared to clarify his delegation's position further. In the first place, the Soviet Union had always favoured, and continued to favour, a resumption of the normal functioning of the General Assembly. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries were in no way responsible for the fact that it had been impossible to achieve that goal and to consider the many items on the agenda of the nineteenth session. The USSR had pointed out, and continued to point out, that the abnormal situation was the result of the provocative policy pursued by the United States delegation. It was precisely the United States which, for selfish reasons, had artificially created a financial crisis, thus paralysing the work of the Assembly. Many countries had exerted great efforts to find a solution to those difficulties. Mention must be made, first and foremost, of the Afro-Asian countries' draft of 30 December 1964. The Soviet delegation, bearing in mind the interests of the United Nations and wishing to ensure a return to normality as soon as possible, had endorsed that draft despite its weaknesses and its inadequacies. Thus, there was on the one hand the vast majority of countries, which had approved the Afro-Asian plan of 30 December 1964, and on the other hand a group of States which had rejected the plan and which persisted in blocking and sabotaging the work of the General Assembly.

It was impossible, therefore, to separate the Soviet Union from the great majority of countries which had supported the Afro-Asian plan. The United States had not abandoned its provocative policy and it refused to accept the plan, which was a compromise and which stated that the question of the applicability of Article 19 to peace-keeping operations would not be raised. If the United States really wanted the normalization of the work of the General Assembly, it would accept that proposal and that plan which had been supported by the majority of the Member States. It was regrettable that the United States representative had still not given a positive reply to that question. To rely on interpretations or flights of fancy and to trust in the goodwill of the United States would, in the circumstances, be unduly hazardous. It was quite clear that the Committee had not

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reached a consensus concerning the recommendations, and his delegation therefore agreed that paragraph 11 of the Conference Room Paper should be deleted.

The United States representative had distorted the true reasons for the disorganization of the General Assembly. There was no need, at that hour, to go into details. It sufficed to thank the United States representative for having in fact admitted that past peace-keeping operations had little in common with the measures prescribed in the United Nations Charter, and particularly in Article 42. Thus the United States representative had himself acknowledged that past United Nations peace-keeping operations, especially in the Congo and the Middle East, had been illegal. The United States could not, therefore, deny that those operations were not in conformity with the Charter and, consequently, it could not but admit the artificial and provocative nature of the question of arrears. In the light of those admissions by the United States representative, his assertion that there was no country which respected the United Nations and its Charter more than the United States seemed completely hypocritical. The United States representative might be asked on what provisions of the Charter the ruling circles at Washington had based their armed intervention in the Dominican Republic. He might be asked who, then, had trampled underfoot the national sovereignty and independence of the Dominican people, and on what provisions of the Charter the White House had based its occupation of that small Latin American country. He might be asked on what principles of the Charter Washington based its continued flouting of the elementary rights of the Dominican people, who had risen against the injustice and cruelty of the regime in power and against its foreign oppressors. As for the United States representative's attempts to insinuate that the Soviet Union contested the rights of the General Assembly with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Soviet delegation had many times pointed out how absurd and demagogic they were. The Soviet Union, while favouring scrupulous respect for the prerogatives of the Security Council, believed that the General Assembly too fulfilled an important function in that sphere.

Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America) said that although it regarded paragraph 11 as acceptable despite a few shortcomings, his delegation would not object to its deletion. In any event, since the records of the Committee's meetings would be annexed to the report, the General Assembly would know that the Committee had expressed a strong desire to see the Assembly resume its work under normal conditions.

In the course of his statement, the USSR representative had used the word "provocation" on several occasions. While he was certain that the Soviet Union regarded as provocations the very existence of Article 19, the advisory opinion which the International Court of Justice had given in the matter and the fact that the General Assembly had accepted that opinion, he nevertheless hoped that when the Committee resumed its work a harmonious atmosphere free from any provocation would prevail at its meetings.

Mr. SEYDOUX (France) said that the suggestion to delete paragraph 11 of the report seemed very reasonable to the French delegation. As it was an interim report, nobody would be surprised that the Committee had confined itself to transmitting to the General Assembly, without any conclusions, the documents containing an account of the proposals which had been made and the ideas which had been put forward during the first stage of its work. However, in order to take into account the view expressed in particular by Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Iraq, the French delegation proposed the replacement of the paragraph in question by a single sentence to read:

"The members of the Special Committee unanimously considered that the General Assembly, when it reconvenes, must conduct its work according to the normal procedure established by its rules of procedure."

Mr. AZZOUT (Algeria) considered that, whatever wording might be used to replace the present text of paragraph 11, it was essential to stress the need for the normalization of the work of the General Assembly and to take into account the solution proposed in December 1964 by the Afro-Asian group, i.e. to restore the Organization's solvency by means of voluntary contributions by its Members. It might perhaps be appropriate, as the representative of Afghanistan had suggested, to allow the representatives of small nations time to consult together.

Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) thanked the representatives of the United States, France and the USSR for their answers to his question. Although regarding the Pakistan delegation's text as unsatisfactory, he would prefer a clearer and more precise wording; he therefore proposed that paragraph should be replaced by the following sentence:

"All members of the Special Committee expressed their unanimous desire to ensure the normal functioning of the Assembly, when it reconvenes, through a co-operative effort by all Member States aimed at the strengthening of the United Nations."

World public opinion must not be given the impression that the members of the Committee did not agree on the need to strengthen the Organization.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that his delegation was prepared to accept any one of the texts proposed by Pakistan, France and Afghanistan.

Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) preferred the text proposed by the French representative, which had the merit of being brief and of stating clearly the view of the members of the Committee regarding the normalization of the work of the General Assembly.

Mr. VINCI (Italy) considered it pointless to repeat views which were already known and to introduce into the discussion matters which had nothing to do with the problem before the Committee.

He noted that in spite of repeated appeals delegations representing a minority maintained an absolutely rigid position; they could not, however, hope to win acceptance for their view over that of the majority, which had already demonstrated its flexibility.

The USSR representative had proposed the deletion of paragraph 11 of Conference Room Paper No. 2, a suggestion which the United States representative had accepted in a spirit of compromise; other representatives felt that the paragraph should be replaced by a new text. The Italian delegation reserved its right to revert to that matter later on.

As he had said at the previous meeting, he was convinced that if an agreement was not reached before the deadline set for the conclusion of the Committee's work, the consultations provided for in paragraph 1 of General Assembly

(Mr. Vinci, Italy)

resolution 2006 (XIX) should be continued until the solvency of the Organization was restored and the General Assembly had resumed its work under normal conditions.

Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America) supported the Afghan representative's extremely constructive proposal for an addition to paragraph 8 of Conference Room Paper No. 2.

With regard to paragraph 11, he would be prepared to accept either the suggestions of the French representative or those of the Afghan representative. The latter's text seemed more satisfactory to him, however, because it not only provided for a return to normality but also stressed the desire of Member States to co-operate with a view to the strengthening of the Organization.

He did not see why sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 11 should not be retained; the Afghan representative's text might replace sub-paragraph (a) of the proposed text.

Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, with regard to substance, he was in agreement with the ideas expressed in the texts submitted by Afghanistan, France and Pakistan. So far as form was concerned, he would prefer the text which the French delegation had proposed to replace paragraph 11.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Special Committee should decide to replace paragraph 11 by the following text, which incorporated the proposals of the representatives of the aforementioned three countries:

"The members of the Special Committee agreed that the United Nations should be strengthened through a co-operative effort and that the General Assembly, when it reconvenes, should conduct its work according to the normal procedure established by its rules of procedure."

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN further proposed that the Committee should adopt the draft report to the General Assembly, as amended, as a whole.

The report, as amended, was adopted as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN thought that there were no grounds for pessimism regarding the future. The Committee had done excellent work and, when the General Assembly

met again in September, it would of necessity consider it impossible not to resume its normal work. He thanked the members of the Committee for the co-operation they had given him, and announced that unless some unforeseen circumstance arose, the Committee would not meet again until August.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.