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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FOURTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York
on Tuesday, 27 April 1965, at 3.15 p.m.

PRESENT:Chairman:

Mr. QUALISON-SACKEY Ghana

Members:

Mr. PAZHWAQ Afghanistan

Mr. BOUATTOURA Algeria

Mr. GARCIA DEL SOLAR Argentina

Mr. McCARTHY Australia

Mr. WALDHEIM Austria

Mr. SETTE CAMARA Brazil

Mr. COX Canada

Mr. HAJEK Czechoslovakia

Mr. ALVAREZ VIDAURRE El Salvador

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY Ethiopia

Mr. SEYDOUX France

Mr. CSATORDAY Hungary

Mr. CHAKRAVARTY India

Mr. SALEEM Iraq

Mr. VINCI Italy

Mr. MATSUI Japan

Mr. MISKE Mauritania

Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO Mexico

Mr. de BEUS Netherlands

Mr. SANU Nigeria

Mr. ENVER Pakistan

Mr. WYZNER Poland

Mr. HASEGANU Romania

Mr. WILLIAMS Sierra Leone

Mr. de PINIES Spain

Mr. ASTROM Sweden

Mr. PACHARIYANGKUN Thailand

Mr. FEDORENKO Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

Mr. EL-KONY United Arab Republic

Mr. HOPE United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

PRESENT (continued):

Members (continued):

Mr. YOST

United States of America

Mr. SOSA-RODRIGUEZ

Venezuela

Mr. LEKIC

Yugoslavia

Secretariat:

Mr. VELLODI

Secretary of the Committee

Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) said that although there was scope for improvement in the Charter, the Committee's terms of reference did not include the amendment of that instrument. The Committee must therefore find a solution to the problem before it within the provisions of the Charter. Experience had shown clearly that a General Assembly resolution which did not conform to those provisions could not solve a problem, even if such a resolution were supported by all the great Powers.

The need for a comprehensive review of the question of peace-keeping operations had arisen because of a conflict in the interpretation of certain provisions of the Charter. Although that conflict was not new, much of the difficulty had been caused by attempts to extend the provisions of the Charter through General Assembly resolutions. A case in point was the "Uniting for Peace" resolution (General Assembly resolution 377 (V)), which had sought to substitute a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly for the great-Power unanimity in the Security Council and to empower the Assembly to take all action, including enforcement action, when the Security Council was unable to act. That attempt at substitution had been unrealistic if not also improper. The International Court of Justice had since made it clear in its advisory opinion that enforcement action, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, was the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council. Moreover, it was generally agreed that, notwithstanding the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, the General Assembly was not competent to take any enforcement action.

The Committee had to consider two questions. It had to find ways and means of meeting the deficit with which the Organization was faced and to consider the political and constitutional problem of which the so-called arrears problem was merely an off-shoot.

The financial problem had two aspects: the question of so-called arrears and the question of financing peace-keeping operations in the future. With regard to the second aspect, it was obvious that the method of financing in the future would have to be related to a decision as to which authority was competent to initiate and conduct peace-keeping operations. This Committee had to consider and indicate what the constitutional basis should be for the initiation, authorization, control, conduct and financing of future peace-keeping operations. With regard to the first aspect, his delegation saw no practical alternative to voluntary contributions.

Under resolution 377 (V) the General Assembly had set up a Collective Measures Committee to report to the Security Council and the Assembly on methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. That Committee had recognized that Member States could not be compelled to contribute

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to peace-keeping operations against their will and that negotiations would be needed to persuade each State to make equitable contributions. If some States refused to contribute, the burden would have to be shared among the co-operating States. It was clear that the "Uniting for Peace" resolution did not contemplate forcing unwilling countries to pay an equitable share of the cost of peace-keeping operations. The cost of peace-keeping operations in Korea had been borne by the participating countries and new methods of financing had been adopted in regard to West Irian, Yemen and Cyprus. Past practice indicated that even when an operation was sanctioned by the Security Council its cost was not always or necessarily shared by all Member States. Nor had the Assembly, except in the case of UNEF and ONUC, ever attempted to force unwilling States to contribute to peace-keeping operations.

His Government accepted the principle of collective responsibility and had always paid its contributions and supported peace-keeping operations with men, material and money. It had tried to persuade others over to its point of view, but had been unable to do so. His delegation therefore supported the Ethiopian representative's suggestion that a solution to the problem of the present financial deficit should be considered along with the broader question of the future. His delegation wholeheartedly agreed that parallel negotiations should be held on both those questions. It must be remembered that operations such as those in the Congo or Gaza were unlikely to be repeated in the future without the prior adoption of acceptable financing arrangements. The principle of Voluntary payments suggested in the Afro-Asian proposals of 30 December 1964, to provide a basis for restoring the solvency of the Organization which his delegation had always supported, were in accord with the recommendations of the Collective Measures Committee.

With regard to the authority for the initiation, control, conduct and financing of peace-keeping operations, it was now recognized that all enforcement actions or actions of a coercive nature were the exclusive prerogatives of the Security Council. It was also generally agreed that action falling short of enforcement action and which was taken with the consent of the parties concerned was primarily the Council's responsibility. The General Assembly had also been given considerable powers under Articles 10, 11, 14 and 35 of the Charter. However, its powers were limited to the discussion of questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the making of recommendations. The duties of the Security Council and the General Assembly were therefore specific and well-defined under the Charter and were intended to be complementary. There was still a dispute as to the interpretation of the word "action" in Article 11, /...

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paragraph 2, of the Charter. It was perhaps not necessary to arrive at a precise definition of the word "action". What was now necessary was to arrive at an agreement as to where "measures" that could be recommended by the General Assembly under Article 14 ended and "actions" which could be taken only by the Security Council began.

The Soviet, French and Czechoslovak delegations seemed to hold the view that only the Security Council could approve the use of armed forces by the United Nations. The assumption of any authority by the General Assembly to adopt measures which lay within the specific powers of the Security Council was not permissible without an amendment of the Charter. They considered that the General Assembly had the power to discuss questions relating to the maintenance of peace and to formulate recommendations that did not infringe upon the Council's prerogatives. The representatives of Italy and Sweden had expressed the view that although the responsibilities of the Security Council and the General Assembly were clearly defined in the Charter, the General Assembly could undertake essentially voluntary operations, which required an invitation from or the consent of the country in whose territory the operations were to take place, as well as the agreement of all interested parties. If armed personnel were to be involved in such operations, there should be an absolute prohibition of the use of force except in self-defense. The case of Cyprus might perhaps suggest a possible compromise between those two differing views. Without deciding which interpretation of the Charter was the correct one, it might be possible to reach an agreement to the effect that the dispatch of armed personnel otherwise than for the purpose of observation or investigation should be within the exclusive power of the Security Council. A convention might then be established that where the parties primarily concerned concurred the great Powers might agree, save in exceptional circumstances or for special reasons, not to vote against a proposal involving the dispatch of armed personnel. That was what had happened in the case of Cyprus when it had been considered in the Security Council, and such a possibility might be explored further, with modifications if necessary. The responsibilities of the Security Council and the General Assembly in that field would be even more clearly defined, without any violence to the Charter.

With regard to future financing, when the Security Council made arrangements for a peace-keeping operation in accordance with Article 43, the General Assembly did not come into the picture at all with regard to the financing of that operation. When, however, the Council considered that the arrangements made under Article 43 might involve payments by the entire membership of the United Nations, it should

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ask the Assembly to apportion the costs among all Members. Once the Security Council took a decision on any peace-keeping operation and failed to make any financial arrangements under Article 43 or otherwise, it should be the responsibility of the General Assembly to find the means for financing that operation and to apportion the costs involved among Members. Those Member States which were not members of the Security Council would be reluctant to accept an assessment in which they had had no say. In making the assessment, the General Assembly would keep in view the principles laid down in document R-18. He wished to emphasize that the funds for any given operation should be obtained either through voluntary contributions or through an assessment which would be compulsory in nature. It would be impracticable to combine the two methods for any particular operation by giving option to only a few members not to make any payment and expecting at the same time the rest must all pay.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that members might comment in their statements on the United States paper contained in document A/AC.121/3 and the Soviet paper contained in document A/AC.121/2.

Mr. de PINIES (Spain) recalled that on 6 December 1956, in connexion with the question of financing the United Nations Emergency Force, his delegation had said that the issue involved was unprecedented and could not be settled on the basis of the criteria used in financing the normal activities of the United Nations. It had emphasized the principle of collective responsibility, discussed the need for financial participation by the countries most closely related to the origin and development of the conflict and said that a predominant role should be played by the permanent members of the Security Council. The last of those criteria, although not accepted by many delegations at the time, appeared today to have won general acceptance.

Two of the most important problems confronting the United Nations were the integration of under-developed and developing countries in a world-wide economic structure and the search for stable solutions to the series of problems raised by United Nations peace-keeping operations. Although the Special Committee was concerned particularly with the second problem, both problems involved the basic concept of the Organization and its very existence. Of the two prevailing views concerning the nature of the United Nations, one regarded the Organization as a diplomatic arena for international political struggle, that was to say, an instrument serving the interests of individual States; the other view, favoured by his delegation, was that the United Nations was an instrument of international

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co-operation. Infused with the vigour of many new States, the Organization had had to adopt measures which had enabled it to deal with the problems that arose and which had sometimes involved structural changes in the Organization itself; in his delegation's view, that had been due to a failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Charter, specifically those of Article 109. Although the modifications that had been made had enabled the Organization to create the necessary means for the fulfilment of its functions, nevertheless de facto changes gave rise to profound uncertainty regarding their constitutional legality.

The operations carried out by international forces under the auspices of the United Nations could be divided into two main categories: first, enforcement actions in connexion with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, which were fully covered by Chapter VII of the Charter; second, peace-keeping operations, resulting from a series of efforts by the United Nations to deal with situations which were not, in principle, contemplated in the Charter. In connexion with UNFICYP, for example, the Secretary-General had said (ST/SM/76, 26 May 1964) that the operation was not a repressive military action, undertaken under Chapter VII of the Charter, but was far nearer to a preventive and protective police action which could be of the greatest value as a precedent for the future.

Peace-keeping operations, on which he proposed to concentrate, could be classified in four main categories:

First, observation groups to supervise armistice lines or neutral zones: such groups had been sent to Lebanon in 1958, to West New Guinea in 1962-1963 and to Yemen in 1963-1964.

Second, military forces intervening between two fighting armies: that had been the case of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

Third, military forces entrusted with putting an end to an armed conflict and helping to maintain internal order: the United Nations operation in the Congo had been a case in point.

Fourth, the presence of military forces to prevent the expansion of a conflict and avert the outbreak of open civil war with possible international participation: UNFICYP was such a force.

Unable to apply the system of collective security provided for in the Charter, the United Nations had gradually developed a number of forms of executive action designed to keep the peace, which were of a preventive and protective

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rather than a coercive nature and were based more on persuasion and lateral pressure than on compulsion and enforcement from above. The legal basis for these measures was to be found, not in Chapter VII on action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, or Chapter VI on the pacific settlement of disputes, but in Chapter I, more specifically in Article 1 (1) and (4) and Article 2 (5).

It was urgent, therefore, to determine the most practical method for finding a formula, which would, as the Secretary-General had said (A/AC.113/29, page 5), enable the United Nations to receive the financial support which alone could restore its strength and solvency, be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Charter and not prejudice or compromise basic principles or policies to which any Member felt irrevocably committed.

The new peace-keeping system was a de facto modification of the Charter which was far removed from the provisions of the Charter and from the General Assembly's intentions in 1950 and had not won the unanimous consent of all Members. That had given rise to profound uncertainty, since a minority of States had challenged the constitutionality of the present United Nations peace-keeping system on two different grounds. On the one hand it was argued, with the USSR as the principal spokesman, that peace-keeping operations were always enforcement actions of the types provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter and hence that the General Assembly had acted ultra vires in assuming competence in the matter of peace-keeping. On the other hand it was argued, principally by France, that where the actions concerned were not enforcement actions, the General Assembly had the power only to make recommendations; it could not, therefore, impose the decisions taken by a majority of its Members upon States unwilling to accept them and could not, by giving its resolutions a financial content, acquire competence not conferred upon it by the Charter.

That divergence of views had brought about the present situation, for which a solution acceptable to all must urgently be found if the very existence of the United Nations was not to be endangered. If the Organization was to be a dynamic instrument of constructive international co-operation, and not a mere debating society, it must be adapted to the needs of the present and the demands of the

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future in a world in which interdependence and solidarity were the prerequisites for a peaceful order. The legal principles on which future United Nations actions should be based could be found in the Charter itself.

The organs competent to take decisions or make recommendations concerning peace-keeping operations were the Security Council and the General Assembly. However, the Security Council had primary, though not exclusive, responsibility in the matter; that principle was expressly stated in Article 24 (1) of the Charter and had been recognized in the working paper submitted by the United States to the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/AC.113/30). The Assembly could recommend peace-keeping operations only if the Security Council was unable to act. In his delegation's view, that principle could serve as an acceptable basis for compromise.

The Secretary-General exercised an important function in connexion with the development and execution of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Nevertheless, he remained subject to the discretionary limits which were determined for every executive function, by the political organs of the United Nations and by the Member States.

There remained the problem of finding formulas for financing peace-keeping operations in regard to which the Committee could discuss contributions to be made by the States most directly concerned, voluntary contributions and compulsory contributions by all States. It could also take into account the principles stated in General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV). All those points could, however, be better discussed at a later stage.

Mr. SETTE CAMARA (Brazil) said that his Government continued to adhere to the principle that the General Assembly was competent to initiate peace-keeping operations whenever the Security Council was unable to do so. It also considered that the General Assembly must of necessity intervene in the financing of peace-keeping operations whenever collective responsibility was involved. His delegation would continue to fight for the application of the principles set forth

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in resolution 1874 (S-IV) concerning the apportionment of peace-keeping costs among Member States. Lastly, a distinction should be drawn between peace-keeping operations undertaken under Chapter IV of the Charter and the enforcement action provided for under Chapter VII.

The fundamental issue involved was the legal power under the Charter to establish peace-keeping operations. For more than a year, efforts had been made to work out a formula acceptable to all parties concerned. In his opinion, those efforts had been unsuccessful mainly because the heart of the matter had not been tackled - the political and legal necessity of amending the Charter in order to adapt it to the realities of the day. Peace-keeping operations had been and were likely to continue to be one of the most important political devices employed by the Organization to maintain international peace in many troubled areas. In his view, the Organization would not be fulfilling its duties and obligations if it failed to amend the Charter in order to settle the problem of peace-keeping operations.

He recalled the proposal made by the Foreign Minister of Brazil during the general debate at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly that the Charter should be amended to include a new chapter, entitled "Peace-keeping Operations", between the present Chapters VI and VII. That chapter would set out the conditions under which peace-keeping operations would be undertaken and would provide in more precise terms for a method of financing such operations.

Although, as representatives had said, the Committee had not been convened to amend the Charter, there was nothing in the Committee's terms of reference to prevent it from recommending to the General Assembly the constitutional revision of certain provisions of the Charter. In that connexion, he recalled that in the course of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly the Afro-Asian and Latin American delegations had sponsored a draft resolution, almost unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, providing for a more adequate representation of the new nations of Africa and Asia in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. What had seemed unattainable would soon, he hoped, become a reality. No better solution could be found to the problem under consideration than a revision of these provisions of the Charter that gave rise to controversy.

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Concurrently with the debate in the Committee, members should proceed with their consultations, which might pave the way for an agreement on principles.

Mr. McCARTHY (Australia) said that his delegation had tried to address itself not to a definition of its position on individual points but to certain practical realities, the first of which was the need to enable the General Assembly to function fully again in September 1965. The consultations arranged by the Chairman and the Secretary-General were a most important part of the machinery established by the United Nations for finding a solution for many of its existing difficulties. At the same time, the general discussions in the Special Committee about the broad problems of peace-keeping had also contributed to progress towards an eventual measure of understanding.

While he agreed with those representatives who had emphasized the necessity and desirability for the broad membership of the Organization to be involved at appropriate stages, political realities nevertheless required that the permanent members of the Security Council should occupy the primary position and carry a prime responsibility in the common effort to resolve the Organization's difficulties. On the further realities which were involved, he wished to refer to some of the observations made before the General Assembly on 11 December 1964 by the Foreign Minister of Australia. The Foreign Minister had said that whatever faults might be seen in the collective security system of the United Nations and whatever might be said about the Security Council and the General Assembly, the chief danger had been created by the failure of Members to honour their own obligations. To talk about improving peace-keeping machinery before each Member individually faced up to the basic fact would be to avoid the central issue. Moreover, perfect fulfilment of their obligations by all Members would be impossible in a situation in which those who honoured their obligations suffered disadvantage at the hands of those who did not.

It had always been recognized, the Foreign Minister had said, that the collective security system of the United Nations could not stop a war between the great Powers themselves if one of the great Powers was bent on war; the uneasy peace between those Powers had been maintained by old-fashioned methods of power politics which were not likely to be soon replaced. The special position of the great Powers was part of the political reality of the world today, and therefore

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Australia could not respond readily to any proposal that ignored the reality of the existence of the great Powers or limited them in the exercise of their primary responsibility. While moral lectures to the great Powers were not needed, the Foreign Minister wondered whether there were methods whereby the General Assembly could, under Article 11, assist the great Powers to remember at all times that the primary responsibility of the Security Council referred to in Article 24 had been conferred on the Council by the Members and that the Council acted on their behalf.

In actual fact, there had been a practical emphasis on the primary responsibility of the Security Council over the past two years as a direct outgrowth of relations between the great Powers. The Council had exercised that responsibility for the maintenance of peace on a number of occasions, most notably in relation to Cyprus. That was heartening as a recognition of the United Nations response to hard political facts. The General Assembly, as well as the Security Council, could work only within the confines of those facts. The Foreign Minister of Australia had said that the same political conflicts which could cause inaction in the Security Council would also be carried into the General Assembly; yet matters of life and death could not be left where they were if the Security Council was incapable of handling them. Thus, a further problem to be resolved concerned the conditions under which a matter which the Security Council had failed to handle could be handled by the General Assembly and what methods were to be used by the General Assembly (A/PV.1299).

Many delegations had urged that when the Council was unable to act, the General Assembly itself ought to be able to make appropriate recommendations. If a sufficient number of the Members of the General Assembly were concerned that peace should be maintained, they would no doubt themselves take the initiative in trying to deal with the situation. That capacity of the Assembly now existed, but it must be exercised with a great sense of responsibility and realism.

It was the financial consequences of decisions or recommendations which had given rise to the greatest division of opinion. The ideal to which all Members aspired was the principle of collective financial responsibility; however, there were undeniably important differences of opinion regarding the appropriate manner of implementing collective financial responsibility for peace-keeping operations. Practical realities might well require consideration of a wide variety of

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possibilities. The methods that had been adopted in the past with the agreement of Member States had varied widely. In the case of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority and the United Nations Observation Mission in Yemen, the parties directly concerned had been responsible for the financing; on other occasions, as in the case of UNFICYP, operations had been financed wholly by voluntary contributions. That element of flexibility had been and would continue to be most valuable in enabling the United Nations actually to perform its principal task of maintaining the peace. In that context, his delegation was interested to note the United States suggestion that account might be taken of any strong political objections raised by a permanent member of the Security Council to a proposed major peace-keeping operation, if others felt that a modification of that sort would serve a useful purpose. The Committee could consider that idea also - or perhaps some off-shoots of it - in addressing itself to practical possibilities.

His delegation strongly shared the belief that the United Nations should be made more effective in the maintenance and restoration of international peace, but it must be borne in mind during the Committee's deliberations and the informal consultations arranged by the Chairman and the Secretary-General that such aspirations could be founded only on a thorough awareness of practical considerations, for the United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly were not things in themselves but bodies composed of the Member States.

Mr. PACHARIYANGKUN (Thailand) said his delegation considered that in order for the Committee's discussions to be fruitful there had to be parallel efforts both on a consultative basis and in open meetings. It therefore hoped that the consultations between the President and the Secretary-General and the members and non-members of the Committee would go hand in hand with the formal meetings of the Committee itself.

With regard to the question of the financial difficulties of the United Nations, his delegation believed that it could be resolved amicably if Members, without prejudice to their basic positions, would make voluntary contributions to the Organization.

On the question of future peace-keeping operations, his delegation considered that the maintenance of international peace and security was one of the Organization's most vital responsibilities and that every Member shared in the responsibility for peace-keeping operations, as well as in the financing of them.

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However, special interests of certain Members and capacity to pay should also be taken into consideration when the General Assembly apportioned the expenses of such operations.

The Security Council had a primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. While his delegation recognized the special status of both the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, it felt that it would not be in keeping with the spirit and letter of the Charter if the permanent members were to feel free and unrestricted in exercising their veto power to frustrate the attempts of Members to preserve peace and tranquillity. It interpreted the wording of Article 24 to mean that the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security arose only by virtue of the power entrusted to it by the General Assembly. The purpose of the transfer of that power was "to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations". He therefore believed that neither the Charter nor the Member States had ever intended to give the Council extraordinary power to impede peace-keeping actions decided upon by the majority of the Members. The residual responsibility of the Assembly must surely be brought into full play if and when the Council for some reason failed to take positive action.

Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) said that at that stage he would confine himself to a few preliminary remarks and general observations. As had been said, the Committee was perhaps one of the most important bodies ever established by the General Assembly. Its task was to make an effort not only to overcome the grave difficulties which had confronted the United Nations at the beginning of the nineteenth session but also to seek constructive and practical ways and means by which the Organization could fulfil its basic purpose, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since the establishment of the Committee, the negotiations by the Chairman and the Secretary-General had been very useful, and the general debate in the Committee itself had been encouraging. The Committee's main objectives were, first, the normalization of the functions of the General Assembly and, second, the strengthening of the United Nations as an effective Organization. The experience of the past left no doubt that the most fundamental basis for achieving such objectives was agreement. However, real agreement could be reached only by finding a common denominator

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recognized as such by the entire membership of the Organization and using that common denominator in the interests of the Organization as a whole and not in the special interests of individual States. That common denominator existed: it was the Charter of the United Nations.

The Charter, however, was open to interpretation - a fact that was neither new nor accidental. The drafters of the Charter had deliberately omitted provisions that would have vested the ultimate power of interpretation in a particular organ. It was important not to forget the logical and ever-present inference that strict adherence to the Charter did not exclude adherence only to such interpretations as would be in the interest of preserving and strengthening the Organization. Perhaps that had been a factor in enabling the United Nations to cope with many situations not clearly foreseen when the Charter was adopted.

His delegation continued to agree with those who considered the difficulties confronting the Organization as being of a political nature, and it therefore favoured a political solution.

The urgency of the Committee's task and the shortage of time at its disposal had been rightly stressed. While he agreed with the Japanese representative that the question of future peace-keeping operations deserved the fullest consideration and that the Committee's creation constituted a momentum of vital importance that should not be lost, it seemed to him that agreement would first have to be reached on a number of preliminary points, such as the definition of peace-keeping operations, the classification of the various types of peace-keeping operations, and the planning of operations before they reached the organization and financing stage.

The Committee would also have to consider what kind of report it would submit to the General Assembly having regard to the time at its disposal. While bearing in mind the Committee's terms of reference, his delegation did not think it desirable to undertake to prepare concrete recommendations on all aspects of its work by 15 June, for example, or by some other early time-limit. He had some doubts about a procedure that might confront the Committee with hasty decisions on all aspects of the problem - including details of future peace-keeping operations.

He hoped that the Chairman and the Secretary-General would take that point of view into account in their consultations and negotiations. However, he could say that his delegation would agree with the majority of the members when the wish of the majority was determined. It was a good thing at that stage to see that all

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members of the Committee agreed on the desirability of the United Nations being able to undertake peace-keeping operations. There was also unanimous agreement that the Security Council had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and that the General Assembly also had responsibilities and certain functions and powers under the Charter. In that connexion the primary obligations of the permanent members of the Security Council should be kept in mind. It should be recalled that when the permanent members had been given their privileged position, it had been considered inconceivable that the Council would in practice act, or that the permanent members would take a position contrary to the wishes of the entire membership of the Organization. It could not be denied, then, that the principle of the primary responsibility of the Security Council presupposed the acceptance of a special responsibility by the major Powers to respect the view of the general membership.

Without contesting the relevance of the arguments advanced on the question of increased membership of the Security Council, his delegation agreed with those members of the Committee who had stated that the enlargement of the Council still left the majority of the nations outside the Council, and that their rights in matters affecting all Members should be recognized. It was therefore important to reach agreement on a better definition of the recommendatory powers of the General Assembly with a view to enhancing the Assembly's pacific settlement functions in harmony with the Security Council, as provided for by the Charter. In principle, there was no alarming difference of opinion on those points. It had been correctly stated that the Security Council and the General Assembly were complementary organs of the United Nations.

The principal issue that remained was how to deal with a given situation when the Security Council failed to act. The only element that could be used constructively in that respect was the element of flexibility which existed in the process of interpretation of the Charter. If the principle of collective responsibility was accepted, it could guide the use of that element of flexibility in the interests of all Members of the Organization. The acceptance of collective responsibility depended in turn on the degree of general consensus prevailing among the entire membership. Adherence to strictly legal criteria might make it

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difficult to expect solid progress to be made, but a realistic political understanding could produce a solution if all were determined to help the cause of peace and international co-operation.

As one of the measures which might contribute to developing a closer relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, he suggested a modification in the procedure relating to the annual and special reports received by the General Assembly from the Security Council. In the case of disapproval of any measure which the Assembly had the power to disapprove, the Assembly should be able to make new recommendations. That could help to reduce the rigid separation of functions between the Council and the Assembly.

In conformity with the principle of collective responsibility of all Member States, the rights of the Assembly should be respected in matters of assessments and approval of financial burdens deriving from peace-keeping operations. He hoped that the Committee would give full consideration to the views expressed by the representative of India earlier in the meeting, which he fully endorsed. Although he agreed with other representatives that great changes had taken place since 1945, he had as yet not been convinced that the nature of those changes was really such as to require the inclusion of definite provisions in the Charter on which the entire membership could agree.

Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted with satisfaction the important statements that had already been made in the Committee by the representatives of various groups of countries, including some representatives who had been sceptical concerning the possibility of the Committee's doing useful work. That was all to the good, for the General Assembly had arranged for the present membership of the Committee precisely in order to ensure that a large number of States would be able to play an effective part in the consideration of all questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. His delegation therefore wished to stress again that the consideration of those questions should take place in the Committee itself and that it was inadmissible to substitute any other body for that purpose.

He agreed with the many representatives who had said that the Committee's efforts should be devoted first and foremost to the consideration of the problem of future United Nations peace-keeping operations. Such consideration would

(Mr. Fedorenko, USSR)

unquestionably have to be continued for, as everyone knew, the very future of the United Nations was directly linked to that problem.

As to ways and means of overcoming the Organization's present financial difficulties, a basis for their solution already existed. At the second meeting of the Committee, the representative of Ethiopia had recalled that during the nineteenth session of the General Assembly the Afro-Asian group had submitted a proposal which had been almost unanimously accepted (A/AC.121/SR.2, page 21).

On that occasion the Soviet Union had demonstrated its friendly attitude towards the Afro-Asian countries and its sincere desire to strengthen the United Nations by accepting the proposal of the Afro-Asian group, although from the point of view of the Soviet delegation, some of the provisions were contradictory and not all by any means were satisfactory. However, the Soviet delegation had accepted the proposal as a compromise, basing itself on the main consideration, namely, that it would create a situation which would guarantee that Article 19 of the Charter would not be used for provocative purposes and that the General Assembly would no longer be hampered in its normal work in accordance with its normal procedure. So that there could be no misunderstanding, he read out the text of the Afro-Asian proposal of 30 December 1964, emphasizing the provision which stated without ambiguity that the "question of applicability of Article 19 should not be raised".

Unfortunately, the United States had rejected the compromise plan of the Afro-Asian countries and had thereby made it impossible to reach a settlement of the financial difficulties of the United Nations at the first part of the nineteenth session. The Soviet delegation wished to reiterate that a solution of that problem was possible on the basis to which the overwhelming majority of Member States had already agreed, namely the Afro-Asian proposal of 30 December 1964. In that connexion, he regretted to have to note that the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Ethiopia (A/AC.121/L.1) did not include in so many words the key provision of the Afro-Asian plan which he had emphasized. Without that provision, it would be impossible to find a solution that would prevent a repetition of attempts to disorganize the normal work of the United Nations.

(Mr. Fedorenko, USSR)

The Soviet Union was ready for the solution of the problem. It based itself, in particular, on the assumption that a voluntary contribution by the Soviet Union, whose amount would be determined by the USSR Government itself, would completely do away with the artificially created question of so-called arrears and prevent any future provocative attempts to apply Article 19 of the Charter. If the United States reviewed its negative attitude and showed readiness to accept the Afro-Asian proposal of 30 December 1964, the road to agreement would be open.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said he wished to repeat what he had said in introducing the Ethiopian draft resolution, namely, that its object was to present the Afro-Asian plan. He would examine the documents to see whether there was indeed the discrepancy to which the Soviet representative had alluded.

The CHAIRMAN said that he had it in mind to begin another phase of informal consultations as soon as all the members of the Committee had spoken and had stated their position on the various ideas and suggestions. So far, twenty-one members had spoken, and he hoped that the others would make their statements as soon as possible since it might be difficult to schedule meetings in the following weeks.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.