



# Security Council

Forty-ninth Year

**3434**<sup>th</sup> Meeting

Friday, 30 September 1994, 5.50 p.m.  
New York

UN LIBRARY  
UN/SA COLLECTION  
OCT 03 1994

*Provisional*

---

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Yañez-Barnuevo . . . . .	(Spain)
<i>Members:</i>	Argentina . . . . .	Mr. Cardenas
	Brazil . . . . .	Mr. Valle
	China . . . . .	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	Czech Republic . . . . .	Mr. Kovanda
	Djibouti . . . . .	Mr. Olhaye
	France . . . . .	Mr. Mérimée
	New Zealand . . . . .	Mr. Keating
	Nigeria . . . . .	Mr. Gambari
	Oman . . . . .	Mr. Al-Sameen
	Pakistan . . . . .	Mr. Marker
	Russian Federation . . . . .	Mr. Sidorov
	Rwanda . . . . .	Mr. Bakuramutsa
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . . .	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America . . . . .	Mrs. Albright

## Agenda

### The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 908 (1994) (S/1994/1067 and Add.1)

*The meeting was called to order at 5.50 p.m.*

**Adoption of the agenda**

*The agenda was adopted.*

**The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)  
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to  
resolution 908 (1994) (S/1994/1067 and Add.1)**

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Croatia, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sacirbey (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Mr. Nobile (Croatia) took places at the Council table.*

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have also received a request dated 30 September 1994 from His Excellency Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to address the Council. With the consent of the Council, I would propose to invite him to address the Council in the course of the discussion of the item before it.

If there is no objection, it is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 908 (1994), document S/1994/1067 and Add.1.

Members of the Council also have before them document S/1994/1120, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following oral revisions to be made to the draft resolution contained in document S/1994/1120, in its provisional form: in the third preambular paragraph, the words "an overall" should be inserted before the word "negotiated" and the comma should be deleted after the words "former Yugoslavia". It is my understanding that the revised text is available in Spanish and in English.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following other documents: S/1994/1045 and S/1994/1108, letters dated 9 and 28 September, respectively, from the Chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/1058 and S/1994/1095, letters dated 15 and 26 September 1994, respectively, from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1994/1062, letter dated 16 September 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

The first speaker is the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I now call on him.

**Mr. Sacirbey** (Bosnia and Herzegovina): I will keep my comments brief and to the point, although, frankly, we have much to be disappointed about in terms of the response of the Security Council, other responsible international institutions and in particular the Contact Group to the concerns that we have expressed.

Once again, our willingness to compromise and cooperate with the Contact Group is being misappropriated and manipulated through deliberate misinformation. More to the point, commitments to address the urgent situations in Sarajevo, Srebrenica and other besieged areas are being marginalized. These matters deserve to be dealt with urgently in the context of the draft resolution before us in a clear and direct fashion.

With respect to the renewal of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate and, in particular, the draft resolution before us, we must make two clear reflections. First, every Security Council resolution mandating UNPROFOR has been adopted in the context of the unadulterated commitment of the Council to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, although

some elements within the civilian and military authorities of UNPROFOR relentlessly refer to a peace-keeping mission, in fact UNPROFOR's mandate has always been more complex and by definition required more resolve and commitment in addressing the victim's needs.

Within UNPROFOR's mandate there is no reference to peace-keeping but specific assignments that even call upon "the necessary measures" and appropriate responses to attacks on civilian safe areas and violations of humanitarian standards.

With respect to the two above-mentioned fundamental points, any threats directed at the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its defence forces exercising the responsibility of defending its civilians, territorial integrity and sovereignty must be viewed as contrary to the word and spirit of the relevant Security Council resolutions, whether such threats come from those who initiated aggression against our Republic in the first place, or who may be in the Republic on the basis of current United Nations resolutions.

Similarly, attempts to redefine the UNPROFOR mandate to reflect a fear or lack of will to exercise the Security Council's directives must not be accepted as a de facto basis for continuing the mandate. This unwillingness to carry out the United Nations mandate must be either publicly rebuked when publicly expressed in the international press, or result in a request to the Secretary-General to change those individuals who make such statements, especially when such individuals act in direct contravention to existing United Nations resolutions and, of course, the United Nations Charter; or, those who do not have the will to carry out their mandate, as pointed out in various United Nations Security Council resolutions, should be replaced; or, if there is a practical incapacity to execute the original mandate, then the mandate must not be sacrificed. Instead, additional resources should be provided or the mandate itself must be fully terminated.

We must, even if necessary by the adoption of a new resolution, despite the risk of redundancy, re-establish the clear objectives of the UNPROFOR mandate and, most critically, reassert the primacy of the mandate and the civilian beneficiaries of that mandate rather than the self-preservation of those who are responsible for executing the mandate.

If we are to experience a consistent and real chance for peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina we must not constantly be told what UNPROFOR cannot do.

We must be told what it must and can do to promote the change from the current, unacceptable situation to the stated goals. The status quo within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the enemy of a civilian population that is continually victimized by the physical and psychological demands of the current situation. The status quo is also the enemy of the peace process and the interests of peace, stability and legality within our Republic, the region and the international community.

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Croatia, on whom I now call.

**Mr. Nobile** (Croatia): Mr. President, at the beginning allow me to extend to you my congratulations on your able presidency of this body for this month.

My Government has accepted a new United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate for the Republic of Croatia with the clear understanding of the serious consequences arising from the decision to the country in respect of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the overall peace process, and on the basis of firm assurances from the highest representatives of the international community that the situation in the occupied territories in Croatia shall immediately come under consideration in the work of the Contact Group.

My Government remains bound by the decision of Croatia's Parliament on the UNPROFOR mandate and it welcomes the elements of those decisions which have been incorporated in resolution 947 (1994), especially in respect of the "pink zones", the border monitors and the pilot projects for the return of displaced persons to their homes in the occupied areas.

Similarly, we welcome the Security Council's support for the mutual recognition between the successor States of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within their internationally recognized borders. My Government views that as the essential next step in the solution-seeking process in the region.

We firmly believe that this draft resolution sets the solution-seeking process in the right direction and hope that the Contact Group and the United Nations will immediately begin to pursue measures which are consistent with the letter and spirit of the draft resolution so that the relevant parties will not be compelled to consider a new UNPROFOR mandate after 100 days as

provided for by this draft resolution and the resolution of Croatia's Parliament.

Croatia cannot continue to tolerate a situation in which it bears the brunt of the cost owing to the lack of progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only in respect of UNPROFOR but also in other areas such as the care of Bosnian refugees. The linkage of Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina in this regard must be compensated for by the international community in a positive way. One aspect of a positive linkage involves the eventual lifting of the arms embargo against the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

My President informed the members of the Security Council in the meeting on 27 September that Croatia expected to be treated in the same way in this regard. Most importantly, the situation in the occupied territories in Croatia must be linked to the negotiating process pursued by the Contact Group in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We must emphasize that the decision to accept the new UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia was made in large part with the view that the Contact Group will immediately commence work on the comprehensive reintegration plan for Croatia which would provide local autonomy in pre-war Serbian majority areas in Croatia, with the same acceptance/rejection measures that should be applied to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and their proxies in Knin if necessary.

My Government must also emphasize the importance of the mutual recognition of existing borders between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), consistent with the final documents of the G-7 plus 1 summit held at Naples from 8 to 10 July, as the essential next step for the Contact Group's activities. Mutual recognition will secure the best possible alternative for the protection of minority rights in respect of the Serbian minority in Croatia and the Croat minority in Serbia and Montenegro - reciprocity.

Finally, I must express discontent and regret that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has been given the right to address the Council. It is the firm position of my Government that the UNPROFOR mandate is taking place only on the territories of the three sovereign United Nations Member States, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and therefore the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as an occupier should not be given any special status regarding this issue.

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Croatia for the kind words he addressed to me.

In accordance with the decision taken earlier in the meeting, I now invite the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

**Mr. Jovanovic:** The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shares the view of the Secretary-General contained in his report in document S/1994/1067 of 17 September 1994 that the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) should be renewed for a further period of six months.

In that context, the clear position of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reaffirmed in the letter by His Excellency Mr. Radoje Kontic, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to the Secretary-General on 9 September 1994 (S/1994/1045).

Ever since the outbreak of the crisis and hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has advocated a political and peaceful solution to the crisis on the basis of full respect for the equality of all the peoples of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and their legitimate interests. Within that framework, Yugoslavia supported the direct involvement of the United Nations in the political process and the presence of peace-keeping troops in the United Nations protected areas and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supports the Vance Plan and is interested in having it fully respected and implemented by all. UNPROFOR's presence in the protected areas has been of vital importance for the protection of the Serbian civilian population of Krajina, pending the negotiated settlement among the parties to the conflict which was indeed the main goal of the Plan. It has been precisely UNPROFOR that has ensured the consistent implementation of the Vance Plan, enabled the fragile peace to be maintained and prevented further confrontation of the parties to the conflict. The question of extending UNPROFOR's mandate should be viewed apart from the search for a political solution to the crisis. The extension of UNPROFOR's mandate and the protection of the Serbian population cannot be used by one side as an instrument for exerting political pressure in the negotiating process. On the contrary, the presence

of UNPROFOR is a precondition for facilitating a political solution.

The difficulties in implementing the mandate of UNPROFOR and the Vance Plan should not serve as a pretext for questioning its validity. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that the conditions for terminating the UNPROFOR peace operation have not yet been created and that the UNPROFOR presence in the protected areas is necessary until an overall political solution is reached.

As stated in the Secretary-General's reports on UNPROFOR, the Croatian Government has repeatedly - throughout the implementation of UNPROFOR's mandate - violated Security Council resolutions, provisions of the Vance Plan and other relevant documents of the United Nations regarding the protected areas. In his latest report, the Secretary-General rightly draws attention to the fact that the Croatian population in areas bordering the protected areas, with the obvious support of the Croatian authorities, has blocked UNPROFOR and made its work impossible, in direct violation of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 and the provisions of the Vance Plan. In addition, we are witnessing constant threats by the highest Croatian officials to resort to the use of force as the most efficient means of resolving the problems of the protected areas and imposing Croatian rule on Krajina. We fully agree with the Secretary-General's assessment that resort to a military option would have incalculable consequences and would be unlikely to lead to a durable peace.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia particularly shares the Secretary-General's view that not all efforts towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict have yet been exhausted. The recent agreement on the establishment of six working groups on economic issues and the resumption of negotiations on the opening of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway give ground for some hope. However, the Republic of Croatia has persistently attempted to politicize the current negotiating process and has, contrary to the Vance Plan, opened the question of a final political settlement. The Croats have not proved willing to negotiate on economic issues without simultaneously addressing political questions.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is convinced, however, that a three-phase policy is the only way to achieve peace. Building on the results of the cease-fire, negotiations should be speedily resumed on confidence-building measures and the re-establishment of

economic relations and infrastructure, which would enable a *modus vivendi* in Krajina to be established and the Vance Plan to be realized. When this has been carried out in full, conditions could be attained for the negotiation of the final political settlement.

For its part, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has continued to make efforts towards the normalization of relations with Croatia and in this context supports the work of liaison bureaus in Belgrade and Zagreb.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fully supports the Secretary-General's assessment that, in the absence of an overall political settlement acceptable to all of the parties, UNPROFOR's current presence and activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain invaluable. UNPROFOR has indeed played a major role in supporting humanitarian activities, facilitating local cease-fires and disengagements, and fostering reconciliation and cooperation between communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Any decision that might be geared towards lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims would have disastrous effects. It not only would contribute directly to the rapid escalation, and even the spread, of the civil war, but would clearly instigate the departure of the majority of the UNPROFOR troop-contributing nations, with incalculable effects.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has given its full support to the Contact Group's plan and has tried to convince the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept it. Yugoslavia is convinced that there cannot be any alternative to a peaceful solution and that the plan of the Contact Group offers a basis for resuming peace negotiations. In order to convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept the logic of peace, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has closed the border except to foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for humanitarian needs and has severed political and economic ties with the Bosnian Serbs. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is convinced, however, that a lasting and just solution to the conflict and crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be reached only by political means, taking into account the vital interests and full equality of all three peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We are convinced that a clear-cut, written agreement by the Contact Group that the Bosnian Serbs should have the equal right to establish confederal ties with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - just like those

that the Croat-Muslim federation has been allowed to establish with Croatia - would open the door for the Bosnian Serbs possibly to agree to the Contact Group plan.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is unfortunately obliged to express its profound regret that the draft resolution before the Security Council contains certain provisions that are outside the meritum of the question at hand and deal with issues that should be addressed in other Security Council resolutions regarding the situation in the former Yugoslavia, not in a technical resolution on the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate. We refer in particular to the third and fifth preambular paragraphs and to operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the draft resolution.

Various provisions of the draft resolution reflect exclusively, in a very one-sided manner, the position of the Croatian side and depart from the spirit and letter of the Vance Plan as the only internationally agreed document on the resolution of the crisis in the United Nations protected areas. They attempt, in operative paragraph 14, to impose certain political solutions which are in flagrant contravention of the Vance Plan, which provides for the political status of the protected areas to be resolved in negotiations between the parties in question only after all of the Plan's provisions have been implemented. In so doing, the draft resolution can lead down a dangerous path which could unravel the positive elements that have been achieved so far through the cease-fire and negotiations for the re-establishment of economic links. This might result in a serious deterioration of the situation in the United Nations protected areas, with unforeseeable consequences.

For its part, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, despite the remaining sanctions, will strive to facilitate the UNPROFOR peace mission in the former Yugoslavia and will continue to make the utmost efforts in the attainment of a just and lasting political settlement. We are convinced, however, that an urgent and unconditional lifting of all sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is the most effective way of contributing to the reinstatement of peace in the region.

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to vote on draft resolution S/1994/1120, as orally revised in its provisional form. If I hear no objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:*

Argentina, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Djibouti, France, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution, as orally revised in its provisional form, has been adopted unanimously as resolution 947 (1994).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

**Mr. Mérimée** (France) (*interpretation from French*): It is entirely right that the resolution we have just adopted should emphasize the essential role played by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia and pay tribute to the performance of those serving in that Force. The Force has been the target of some criticism - completely unwarranted, in the eyes of my delegation - which is especially paradoxical in that it has been voiced by those whose protection it provides or by some whose support for the cause they defend is usually purely verbal.

At a time when things are developing in such a manner that they may well eventually lead to the complete withdrawal of the United Nations presence from the territory of former Yugoslavia, my delegation feels it is legitimate to ask one simple question: Where would we be without UNPROFOR? For us, the answer is clear: There would be increased suffering for the civilian population, increased movements of refugees and irreversible developments on the ground that would confront the international community with an insoluble problem. In the worst-case scenario, there would be generalized conflict throughout the Balkans.

Of course, it would have been nice if more could have been done. But UNPROFOR has neither the mandate nor the military means to impose peace. Nevertheless, it has performed its task admirably, averting the resumption of hostilities, providing protection for humanitarian assistance and preventing the extension of the conflict beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia. In so doing, it has paid a heavy toll, for 118 Blue Helmets have died since the creation of the Force.

My delegation would like once again to pay them a solemn tribute.

Everyone is aware that we have undoubtedly reached a turning point in the history of the Force. Either a dynamic for peace will gain strength in the coming weeks, leading to the conclusion of an agreement that will be implemented in radically new circumstances, or, on the contrary, hope of a negotiated settlement will fade, and then decisions will inevitably have to be taken involving the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Thus this is undoubtedly the last time the Council will be called upon to extend its mandate in a routine manner.

The next stage, therefore, will be crucial and UNPROFOR will have a central role to play in it. It will have to reassure those parties that, although in a position of military inferiority, have made the courageous choice to negotiate. It will have to prove to them that they were right to place their trust in the international community. This means that UNPROFOR will have to strive to ensure strict implementation of the Council's decisions, particularly those concerning safe areas. This might imply the use of force, if necessary, especially to ensure respect for the exclusion zones. The French Government therefore hopes that very explicit instructions along those lines will be issued to the leaders of the Force. By demonstrating its determination, the international community will prevail over those who would gamble on chaos.

**Mr. Cardenas** (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We feel that the noble work of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia has had a positive influence on stability in the region and that it therefore deserves our praise.

The presence of that Force, to which Argentina has contributed a significant contingent, clearly demonstrates that the international community still hopes that peace and stability can be established in the area.

The freedom of movement of the forces of peace must be respected in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly, so that they may carry out their duties better, the long-sought agreement on their status must be concluded.

Pressure - whether in the form of preconditions, blockades or other policies - will not help resolve the differences or improve the situation.

In the present situation, Argentina considers it important to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for six

months. Then the Security Council will meet again to evaluate progress in the execution of the mandate, if events on the ground so require.

At the same time, we acknowledge that peace-keeping operations are a tool in the service of political negotiations and should in no way be understood to constitute lasting solutions. We feel that the parties to the respective conflicts are duty-bound to advance in good faith the in-depth negotiations that will result in the establishment of peace in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, at which time a peace-keeping operation will certainly no longer be necessary.

As to the situation in the Republic of Croatia, the Security Council is aware of the fact that, as the Secretary-General indicates in his report of 17 September, little progress has been made in the efforts to reintegrate the United Nations Protected Areas into the country or to return displaced persons to their homes.

This is frankly discouraging, but we must not minimize the progress recently made towards peace, particularly the most important achievement which the maintenance of the current cease-fire represents for the patient inhabitants of that country.

**Sir David Hannay** (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): In adopting this resolution, of which we were a co-sponsor, the Security Council is making clear the importance it attaches to the work of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in support of the international efforts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR's role has been essential, whether in peace-keeping, in assisting humanitarian efforts or in promoting cease-fires and negotiating agreements. We are concerned at the stalemate in Croatia and at the continuing bloodshed and defiance of this Council's resolutions in Bosnia. All too much remains to be done and the improvements that have been achieved remain fragile and incomplete. We pay a tribute to the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, his Force Commanders and the men and women of UNPROFOR who, often at great personal risk, have made this possible. They deserve the respect and cooperation of all concerned. It is therefore only right that, in deciding to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for a further six months, the Council has called for the necessary arrangements, such as status-of-forces agreements, to be finalized without further delay.

We also welcome the continuing cooperation between UNPROFOR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The latter's support for UNPROFOR is absolutely vital. The force has faced daily harassment, provocations and even deliberate attacks. UNPROFOR's freedom of movement and safety must be fully respected by all.

My Government is one of the largest contributors of troops to UNPROFOR. We also play a major role in NATO's activities in support of UNPROFOR, in the Sarajevo airlift and in the international aid effort. We fully support the continuation of UNPROFOR's presence. But UNPROFOR can only contribute to peace efforts if it is in a position to carry out its mandate effectively. In his report, the Secretary-General rightly drew attention to the uncertainties which have surrounded UNPROFOR's future. No peace-keeping operation can hope to succeed if it takes sides in a conflict. My Foreign Secretary has already welcomed the acceptance by the Bosnian Government of the fact that now is not the time to lift the arms embargo, thereby allowing UNPROFOR's work to continue. We must seize this opportunity and use the next six months to press ahead with efforts to achieve a just and lasting settlement. To this end, we shall need to sustain the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. We must also help UNPROFOR consolidate what they have achieved so far, for example by looking at ways to promote the demilitarization of Sarajevo.

Ultimately, it is on the parties themselves that the prospects for peace depend. My Government will continue to work with our partners in the Contact Group to achieve that peace. It is right that those who cooperate in the effort to achieve peace, by deeds as well as words, should benefit. Those who refuse to do so will only increase their isolation from the rest of the international community and prolong the suffering of their own people.

**Mr. Sidorov (Russian Federation):** The Russian Federation supported the resolution just adopted in the belief that the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is playing an extremely important role in efforts to settle the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It cannot be denied that, without the presence of the Force, the situation there would be incomparably worse from both the political and the humanitarian viewpoints.

At the political level, the need to continue the operation is dictated first and foremost by the key task of promoting a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Naturally, at

the same time everything possible must be done to ensure that the United Nations Force does not become a party to the conflict or a hostage to those forces participating in it. The parties to the conflict themselves should, at the same time, fully cooperate with the United Nations Force in the performance of its mandate, should commit no provocative or hostile acts against United Nations personnel, and should respect their neutral status. In this context, we should like particularly to emphasize that the effectiveness of UNPROFOR's efforts depends to a large extent on the existence of good will on the part of the parties to the conflict. This is true of virtually every aspect of the Force's activity, including its role in the "safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

With respect to Croatia, it is quite clear to us that the unimpeded fulfillment by the United Nations Force of its mandate in the Protected Areas is the most important prerequisite of the fullest possible implementation of the Vance plan. The role of UNPROFOR is no less important in the humanitarian sphere, which has become a significant factor in improving the living conditions of the population.

Russia attaches particular importance to the continued efforts of the countries of the Contact Group to develop their cooperation with the Security Council on the basis of the experience gained over recent months in the Bosnian negotiations. We consider it important to increase pressure on all parties, using the full range of positive and negative incentives in order to promote a comprehensive peace settlement. Such a settlement, as we see it, should be based on a territorial arrangement and on constitutional principles placing all parties on an equal footing.

**Mr. Keating (New Zealand):** New Zealand is pleased that the Security Council has decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for a further six months. The various missions of UNPROFOR - humanitarian, peace-keeping, the protection of "safe areas", preventive deployment - all help reduce the adverse consequences of the political and military conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and all help reduce the possibility that that conflict will become more widespread, more intense and more violent.

UNPROFOR's mission is not an easy one. The States and parties involved have a range of expectations of the United Nations, not all of which UNPROFOR is able to fulfil. We believe that UNPROFOR is doing an outstanding job of alleviating suffering and maintaining

a fragile peace. We thank the men and women serving the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia for performing this task in difficult and dangerous conditions. They deserve our support, and in this context we find it hard to understand that two States in whose territory UNPROFOR is deployed have yet to sign status-of-forces agreements with the United Nations in respect of the UNPROFOR deployment. This is long overdue and we believe that it is urgent to remedy this situation.

But if UNPROFOR is to continue to be supported, the status quo cannot be continued. UNPROFOR'S ongoing operation must be complemented by efforts on other fronts, first with respect to Croatia. The resolution that we have just adopted makes provision for the situation in the United Nations Protected Areas to be reviewed.

We know that the Government of Croatia is committed to the peaceful settlement of this problem, but it is rightly impatient at the slow progress on this front. It is unacceptable that a peace plan - a plan agreed some years ago and the subject of subsequent discussion - should still not be implemented. We therefore urge the parties, with the active assistance of the United Nations, to reinvigorate the progress towards implementation of the peace plan.

Secondly, in respect of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a number of steps were taken in the package of resolutions that this Council adopted last week. As we said at the time of the adoption of those resolutions, those measures needed to be followed up with further specific steps. We said, first, that there should be early recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia; secondly, that there needed to be firm and united resolve on the part of UNPROFOR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to use force where that is warranted for the protection of the safe areas and the enforcement of the exclusion zones. We know that the use of force has to be carefully calibrated, but in our view its use has contributed to stability.

Thirdly, the Council has made it clear on a number of occasions - most recently today - that the strangulation of Sarajevo must cease. Demilitarized lines of access to the city must be implemented.

Fourthly, we believe that the progressive withdrawal of the Bosnian Serbs to positions that are consistent with the territorial settlement proposal should be seriously pursued.

The Council has today adopted a presidential statement that begins to address some of these points, but in our view this is only a beginning. We think that it is quite reasonable for the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Government of Croatia to expect progress to have made been on all these fronts when the mandate of UNPROFOR next comes up for renewal.

In this connection, I note that the resolution we have just adopted is much less specific than we would have liked on a question which, in the view of my Government, is of the utmost importance - that is, the mutual recognition of the respective international boundaries by the States in the region of the former Yugoslavia. I wish to emphasize that, in our view, mutual recognition should be a starting point for the overall settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. It is implicit or explicit in all the peace plans that have been put forward. It cannot any longer be a subject for negotiation. Any State that equivocates on this matter runs the risk of having its bona fides in the peace process called into question.

**Mrs. Albright (United States of America):** In the six months since the Council last authorized the extension of the mandate of the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) the situation in the States of the former Yugoslavia has changed significantly.

In Bosnia, the most important development has been the Contact Group's presentation of its territorial proposal to the parties. The Contact Group has received consistent support from the Security Council, reaffirmed specifically in this resolution. Unfortunately, while the Bosnian Federation has accepted the proposal, the Bosnian Serbs have not. We will continue to demand that the Bosnian Serbs accept the proposal, which, in our view, represents the best opportunity for a just and equitable settlement to this conflict. Just one week ago, with its adoption of a resolution tightening sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs, the Council reminded the Bosnian Serbs that their continuing obstinacy incurs substantial costs.

In Croatia, a cease-fire is holding, but the promise of discussions between the parties has not produced the progress that had been hoped for. My Government strongly supports the basic precept, reflected in this resolution, that a settlement of the conflict in the Republic of Croatia - as in Bosnia - must be in conformity with its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. This

principle, which my Government considers an imperative, is reflected explicitly in this resolution.

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, economic difficulties have mounted, but conflict has blessedly not crossed its borders.

UNPROFOR itself has been on the front line of all these developments. The largest peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations, UNPROFOR has played an essential role in the international community's efforts towards peace. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR has enabled humanitarian relief to continue flowing. It has helped to maintain the cease-fire between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, upon which a meaningful Bosniac-Croat federation can be built. It has actively negotiated measures to reduce tensions. When these measures have been violated, UNPROFOR has been willing to take more robust steps.

My Government is concerned at the increasing number of violations of the terms of the exclusion zones, and committed to their strict enforcement. I am confident that, should strict enforcement continue to be necessary, UNPROFOR will work closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to ensure that the intent of the Council to protect the safe areas is carried out.

In Croatia, UNPROFOR has been given an enormous task, much of which, as the Secretary-General has recently pointed out, it has been unable to carry out in the face of obstinacy. While this resolution calls for progress in implementing the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia, it rightly lays upon the parties - and my Government interprets this to refer especially to the Serb party - the responsibility to create the conditions that would allow UNPROFOR to fulfil its mandate.

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR has played a valuable role in deterring conflict, with the full support of the Government and people of that country.

In sum, an effective and vigorous UNPROFOR is vital to the success that we hope the political process will produce.

Finally, let me pay tribute to all the countries that have contributed troops to UNPROFOR, to those who have been wounded or killed in pursuit of its mission, and to all the troops who are serving and have served on behalf of the Security Council and the international community.

**Mr. Kovanda (Czech Republic):** The Czech Republic considers the continuing operation of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as exceptionally important for the continuing political discussions on a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the region.

The positive impact of the Protection Force has been different in each of these three countries.

In Croatia, we have witnessed the stabilization of the situation since a cease-fire in the United Nations protected areas was signed last March. We have seen a separation of the belligerent parties. Here UNPROFOR is operating as an actual peace-keeper.

In the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's role is different - protecting humanitarian convoys, ensuring the security of Sarajevo airport, monitoring the no-fly zone, and showing the flag in safe areas.

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR, under Chapter VI, is an instrument of preventive diplomacy, and, as such, it has a calming effect on a difficult and potentially explosive situation. Yet UNPROFOR is not a panacea. The balance of the pluses and the minuses, however, is, in our view, overwhelmingly in its favour. The Czech Republic, therefore, did not hesitate to vote for an additional six-month extension of its mandate, and would have been even happier with a longer extension.

Last week my delegation spoke at length about its views on the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its views on those aspects that were covered in the presidential statement that you, Mr. President, read out during our earlier meeting.

We see UNPROFOR's role in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as critical, even if it is a role that is sometimes criticized. The ever-tighter cooperation between UNPROFOR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one aspect we are particularly happy about. There is, of course, only so much that a military peace-keeping force can attain. The central role of the political process is inescapable. In this respect, the Czech Republic views the future of relations between Zagreb and Belgrade as one of the most important keys to unlocking the gate to a peaceful settlement in the entire region.

Six months ago there were certain hopes. Zagreb and Belgrade had started to talk, and discussions were also initiated, within Croatia, between the Zagreb Government and the Croatian Serbs. These hopes, however, have yielded disappointing results. The political process of implementing the Vance plan by reintegrating United Nations protected areas with the rest of Croatia is going nowhere. The process of freeing communications within Croatia - that is to say, road and railroad connections, water supply, telephone links or the Adria oil pipeline - is virtually frozen. This is where additional political attention and efforts of the parties have to be directed.

Over and above these concerns, which are very practical for people of various parts of Croatia, and, in the case of the Adria pipeline, for several other countries of Central Europe as well, there is the question of mutual recognition of the several States that emerged from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, mutual recognition within their internationally recognized boundaries. Last week, with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina's relationship with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), I made a point of this. This is equally valid for the relationship between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In our resolution we stressed the importance we attach to mutual recognition, and my delegation wishes to underscore this particular point.

One last point: both as a Security Council member and as an UNPROFOR troop-contributing country, with almost 1,000 men in Croatia, my delegation is particularly concerned by the continuing void in relations between the United Nations and Croatia. We still have not concluded a status-of-forces agreement, as several speakers have already mentioned. This, we feel, is strictly a matter of a political decision in Croatia, and, especially after our recent meeting with President Tudjman, we hope that such a political decision and the necessary political will to conclude such an agreement will become apparent.

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Spain.

For more than two and a half years now, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has made inestimable contributions to the channelling of humanitarian assistance, to the containment of hostilities and, most important, to making it possible to seek a negotiated solution to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Resolution 947 (1994), which we have just adopted and

which my delegation co-sponsored, renews the Force's mandate for six months, thus reflecting the unanimous opinion of the members of the Council and of the troop-contributing countries, as we saw a few days ago in the informal meeting we held with them and with the competent department of the Secretariat.

Although with each renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate the Council's attention has been focused mainly on the situation in the Republic of Croatia, the effects of its renewal have just as much importance for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, since in each of those countries UNPROFOR plays a noteworthy role.

With regard to Croatia, we share the frustration and impatience of its people and its Government over the lack of concrete progress in the situation in the Krajinas, aside from the cease-fire's holding. It is regrettable that the Vance plan and numerous Security Council resolutions have still not been fully implemented. One third of Croatian territory is still not under the authority of the Government today, and scant progress has been made in the implementation of confidence-building measures. This has inevitable side-effects on the daily life of the civilian population in those zones, not to mention the situation of many refugees and displaced persons.

As we have stated on other occasions, the so-called United Nations protected areas constitute an integral part of the Republic of Croatia, whose sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected. It is obvious that there will be no possibility of a comprehensive settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia until there is a solution for the Krajinas.

Clearly, the objective of the United Nations is not to preserve an unacceptable status quo. It is the parties who have the responsibility to resolve the problems still pending with the assistance and cooperation of UNPROFOR under the terms of its mandate and according to the means at its disposal.

In respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council has just issued a statement expressing its concern over the deterioration of the situation in Sarajevo and also urging that the cease-fire and the zone of exclusion be respected and that communications and essential public services be fully restored. The statement condemns in particular the attacks perpetrated against UNPROFOR troops and warns against possible reprisals by the Bosnian Serb party.

I wish to underline that resolution 947 (1994), which we have just adopted, broadens UNPROFOR's mandate with regard to, among other things, the civilian police (UNCIVPOL), with the aim of promoting the protection of people and minority groups throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In addition, we must stress that in his report of last 17 September the Secretary-General expressed the conviction that a possible lifting of the arms embargo would bring with it unacceptable risks for UNPROFOR, would entail a change in the logic of peace-keeping and would require the withdrawal of the Force. Spain shares that view.

With regard to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the usefulness shown by the preventive deployment of the Force requires no additional study, now that we are proceeding to the renewal of its mandate. We subscribe to the Secretary-General's opinion, reflected in the resolution we have just adopted, that that Republic, along with Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), must reach without delay an agreement with the United Nations on the status of UNPROFOR forces.

We were pleased at the Secretary-General's initiative to request the support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to have recourse to aerial power in the defence of UNPROFOR personnel and for the protection of the safe areas, in conformity with Security Council resolutions. Today NATO's decision, at the request of the Secretary-General, to extend the use of aerial power to the territory of Croatia, in defence of UNPROFOR, and to the safe area of Bihac, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, seems an equally wise decision. The Serbs, be they from Bosnia or from Croatia, should not forget that the terms of the decisions of the Security Council and NATO are still valid; nor should they harbour any doubts about the determination of the United Nations and NATO to apply those decisions when necessary.

Finally, I wish to recall that, in the final analysis, the resolution of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia is not in the hands of the international community or of UNPROFOR. A solution depends basically on the peoples of the region, and an essential element for achieving such a comprehensive settlement would be the mutual recognition, within their internationally recognized borders, of all the States that have emerged from the former Yugoslavia along with the rightful respect for and protection of the legitimate rights of minorities in each of

those States. The efforts of all parties should be directed towards that end of achieving a negotiated comprehensive settlement, with the assistance and encouragement of the international community, through coordinated actions on the part of the United Nations, the Contact Group and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

In conclusion, I should like to pay tribute once again to the men and women of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and reiterate our confidence in the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, Mr. Akashi, and the commanders of UNPROFOR, General de Lapresle and his colleagues.

I shall now resume my functions as President of the Council.

The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina has asked to make another statement, and I now call upon him.

**Mr. Sacirbey** (Bosnia and Herzegovina): Because of the sensitivity of the issue, although the arms embargo was not a direct matter for the Council's consideration today, I find it necessary to correct the representation made just now by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding the compromise offer of our President, His Excellency Alija Izetbegovic, on this matter.

I emphasize that we have not agreed to a delay in the lifting of the arms embargo. Instead, His Excellency Alija Izetbegovic has clearly demanded the immediate, *de jure*, lifting of the arms embargo against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with only deferred application for six months. His Excellency Alija Izetbegovic has also emphasized that if this compromise offer is not effectuated, then we will reassert our right, and demand, for an immediate, *de facto* as well as *de jure*, lifting, even if undertaken by unilateral means.

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): There are no further speakers.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

*The meeting rose at 7.05 p.m.*