

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 February 1988 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Harald Rose (German Democratic
Republic)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 437th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, which will be entirely devoted to statements by high-ranking officials of member countries.

On behalf of the Conference, I should like to say how much we appreciate the visits to the Conference by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, H.E. Dr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, Hungary, H.E. Dr. Péter Várkonyi, Italy, H.E. Mr. Giulio Andreotti, and the Federal Republic of Germany, H.E. Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who will all be addressing us today. I wish to extend to the Ministers present a warm welcome in our midst, and later I shall have the pleasure of also welcoming H.E. Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

I wish also to welcome the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Jan Martenson.

The countries represented by these Foreign Ministers play a significant part in efforts to achieve peace, security and disarmament. Thus, Indonesia's active policy of fostering co-operation in South-East Asia and the world at large is well known. As for Hungary, a nation with which my country is linked by brotherly bonds, the untiring efforts it makes with a view to advancing the cause of disarmament and strengthening international security command appreciation and respect the world over. Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany too are important partners in the dialogue on security and disarmament on the European as well as the global scale. In particular, their contribution to the INF Treaty has met with great attention lately.

This is the first time since the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum began meeting in its current constitution, which was agreed upon in 1979, that we have held a plenary meeting with so many high-ranking officials expounding the positions of their Governments. The visits of the Ministers offer an indication of their interest in the vital questions of disarmament facing the world today. They also enhance the role of the Conference on such questions and, I am sure, will encourage us to intensify our efforts in the search for agreement. The Ministers addressing the Conference represent States which have stressed the importance they attach to multilateral disarmament negotiations. The active role that their delegations play in the Conference is well known to us. I am convinced that the statements that we will be listening to today will be very useful for the future work of the Conference.

I wish to thank the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Hungary, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany for giving us the opportunity to hear their views, and I wish them a successful visit to Geneva.

I have on my list of speakers for today the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Hungary, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, H.E. Dr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja.

Mr. KUSUMA-ATMADJA (Indonesia): It is indeed a great pleasure and a privilege for me to address the Conference on Disarmament at this plenary session. It is by no means a coincidence that I have chosen this occasion to speak before this august body and the distinguished representatives gathered here. International events which have taken place during the past few months, and those which are projected to take place in the months to come, will have a significant bearing on all of us, and in particular on the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I am happy to note as well that today's session will be addressed by my esteemed colleagues the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and Italy.

Before I proceed with my statement, allow me first to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of February. Indonesia is fully cognizant of the role your country has played in promoting the cause of disarmament and world peace. I am confident that under your stewardship, the Conference, in the usually difficult first month of its new session, will speedily resolve the necessary procedural matters so that its subsidiary bodies can commence their substantive work as soon as possible.

I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey our sincere appreciation to your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, for the exemplary manner in which he has presided over the deliberations of the Conference.

As you may recall, during the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, we acknowledged that disarmament and development, being two of the most urgent challenges, constitute priority concerns of the world today. The world we live in is a world with finite resources. It is also a world of increasing interdependence among nations and intertwining of problems, where no country or region can realistically hope to achieve optimal development and security on its own. It is therefore imperative for nations to work together to attain the objectives of peace, common security and common prosperity which are prerequisites for national development and progress. Against the sombre background of the present world situation, characterized by both over-armament and underdevelopment, we need more than ever to exert our efforts to secure these goals. One such effort is to realize disarmament in order to enable us to redirect the massive flow of resources from the production, acquisition and constant refinement of armaments to the pressing needs of social and economic development, especially of the developing countries.

Nearly 10 years have elapsed since we adopted the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. In the course of this past decade, certain bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts have helped to nudge the world towards concrete agreements on some crucial issues.

With regard to bilateral efforts, it was last December that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev took a determined step towards making some of the objectives set forth in Reykjavik a reality. The signing of the INF Treaty by the Soviet Union and the United States, however

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limited its scope, is a real disarmament measure, being the first ever agreement actually eliminating a specific category of nuclear armaments. We are also encouraged to learn that the two nations have intensified their efforts to reach agreement on reducing their strategic nuclear weapons, hopefully to be signed at the next summit meeting in Moscow.

In our common quest for peace, regional efforts have also played their part. The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is one example. Last year a ray of hope, though still faint, was shown by the renewed activity and increased awareness on the part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries concerning the need to reduce their conventional forces and redress the imbalance in this area. In a region next to ours, the Treaty of Rarotonga, declaring the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone, has already entered into force. On the eve of the third special session devoted to disarmament, it is particularly gratifying to see these substantive disarmament and confidence-building measures, and not mere arms regulation, being agreed upon and being implemented.

Although much remains to be done, the achievements of the past few years are a source of encouragement, as they manifest a new trend and a hopeful beginning. It is undeniable that the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament has been and continues to be instrumental in making this development possible. Since its adoption it has ushered in a new era and provided a strong impetus to international efforts to promote disarmament and international security. Fully recognizing the value and the continuing validity of the Final Document, we should therefore strive to preserve and further strengthen the principles contained therein, particularly at the forthcoming third special session on disarmament. Thus it is of the utmost importance that we should endeavour to agree on practical and forward-looking measures that would fully and faithfully implement the disarmament strategy contained in the Final Document. The results of these efforts, at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, should in our view complement and reinforce each other in our effort to attain the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Let me now turn to some of the agenda items before us. It is nearly a decade since the Conference was designated as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Unfortunately, however, the Conference has yet to achieve tangible progress on any of its priority agenda items, especially on nuclear issues. This immobility stands in contrast to the international community's pressing calls for sustained collective efforts to avert the acutely perceived danger of nuclear war. It is an undeniable truism that such a war is not simply one problem among many which the world is facing: averting nuclear catastrophe is the essential condition in our endeavours to solve all other problems.

Last spring, we had an opportunity to finalize a draft convention on chemical weapons in time for SSOD-III, but prevailing circumstances prevented us from attaining this objective. While responsibility for such a state of

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affairs has to be shared by all of us, the Conference still has to prove its credibility and live up to its mandate. Hence, we should set aside mutual recrimination and exert our political will towards the early realization of a long overdue convention on the matter.

As testimony to our political will and commitment to ban chemical weapons, which are second only to nuclear weapons in their lethal power, Indonesia acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol without reservations as early as 1971. Remnants of old chemical weapons found subsequently in Indonesia were those left behind by the Dutch army during the Second World War, and these were destroyed with the exemplary co-operation of the Government of the Netherlands in 1979.

It is therefore natural that Indonesia, as a country which has never possessed chemical weapons, seeks the early finalization of the ongoing negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. Such an accord should not only ban these weapons but also provide for a sound verification régime, including provisions for a fact-finding mission to be sent upon request to a site where serious non-compliance is suspected. Furthermore, the Convention must uphold the principle of equality of nations. In this respect it should ensure that all States parties have equal rights and obligations in overseeing its proper implementation. For this purpose we should establish a General Conference or Consultative Committee whose decisions will be upheld by States parties and the organs of the Convention. Finally, while preventing the future production of chemical weapons, we should also ensure that the Convention will not unduly interfere with the activities of States in the field of chemical industries for peaceful purposes. On the contrary, it should in our view promote and foster international co-operation in the advancement of these industries for the benefit of all countries.

I am pleased to observe that the negotiations are moving encouragingly towards these goals. At this juncture, I would like to extend our deep appreciation to the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, and his assistants Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium and Mr. Macedo of Mexico, as well as the members of the Committee.

For more than three decades, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban has been a priority objective. It is self-evident that such an agreement would make a singular contribution in arresting the development of new weapons or the refining of those already deployed. It would also constitute a litmus test of the commitment by the nuclear Powers to work toward far-reaching measures of nuclear disarmament. Yet serious and substantive deliberations have been slow. Progress has long been stymied primarily on the question of verification, although national and international means of detecting violations already exist to ensure a high degree of compliance. Hence the conclusion of a test-ban agreement is now a realistic and attainable objective than can brook no further delay.

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My Government has welcomed the attention now being focused on verification in the context of its relevance to future bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements. It constitutes not only an essential element to promote disarmament agreements, but also a crucial component in their implementation. The roll of the United Nations in this area, especially in providing assistance, advice and technical expertise, should be fully explored. In this context, it is essential to address some of the fundamental aspects, including inter alia a clear definition of the interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear States, as well as the legal, technological and financial implications attendant upon the establishment of a verification agency within the United Nations system.

Great strides have been made in science and technology attesting to mankind's ingenuity and affecting every sphere of human activity. Nowhere is this use of technological prowess more apparent than in the ongoing efforts to militarize outer space, which would inevitably result in heightened strategic competition and greater mutual vulnerability and further deepen the global economic crisis. It would also critically impact on the ongoing programmes of peaceful satellite communications, especially those of States located subjacent to the geostationary orbit. Unless the major Powers adhere strictly to the existing legal restrictions and refrain from developing, testing and deploying space-based weapons, there is little doubt that the last frontier of human endeavour will soon turn into a new battleground. Over and above these, there is an imperative need for new and far-reaching measures. The ABM Treaty should be reinforced in the context of new technological developments, including provisions to prohibit anti-satellite weapons. The promotion of outer space activities exclusively for peaceful uses calls for substantive examination of the issues leading to effective and practical negotiation and agreements.

Turning to my own region, at the third ASEAN summit meeting in Manila last December, Indonesia together with its ASEAN partners pledged to intensify all efforts to achieve the early realization of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN), and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia as its integral component. The establishment of ZOPFAN and of a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone is particularly desirable in a region which has had a long history of endemic conflicts and instability as well as foreign interference and interventions by extraregional Powers. We are convinced that their realization would defuse regional tensions and foster conditions of stability conducive to economic and social development. In pursuing these objectives, it is hardly our intention to exclude the co-operation of States outside the region. Rather, our aim is to reduce the risk of renewed rivalry and strategic competition in South-East Asia.

Indonesia's faith in ZOPFAN is not based on theory but is born out of its own national experience. As some of you may know, economic development in Indonesia really began to take off only 20 years ago. The initiative was taken during the latter half of the 1960s, a decade when international stability was at a low level and armed conflicts were rampant in our region. In 1967, five nations strove to change this perilous situation and ASEAN was established. With each passing year, ASEAN has grown and matured. As a

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result confidence among the member countries has steadily grown, mutual suspicion and distrust have faded away and regional resilience and relative stability have been strengthened. Today ASEAN's achievements are often mentioned as a successful example of confidence-building measures, as peace and stability among its members have been established not through military means and competition in armaments but through sustained co-operation. Consequently the ASEAN region has entered a new era which it has never experienced before - it has become one of the fastest-growing economic regions in the world. One of the key factors contributing to this success has been the existence of stability and regional resilience, as a result of which these nations are able to channel their funds and resources toward their economic and social development with the least diversion for armaments. Encouraged by these modest achievements, Indonesia would like to see these favourable conditions extended throughout South-East Asia through ZOPFAN.

It is therefore our earnest hope that members of the Conference will extend their full support towards its realization. The formulation of the paragraph on ZOPFAN in the draft text of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as you may remember, has been agreed upon by the representatives of the Governments of South-East Asian countries in Geneva. Indonesia wishes to preserve this common commitment particularly since it can become a vehicle for these countries to work together in pursuing their common objective of peace and stability in the region.

I feel that I would be remiss if on this occasion I did not also share with you some of my thoughts on the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament itself. Ever since its reconstitution, it is disturbing to note that no acceptable framework has been found for negotiation on the priority issues. Consequently this unique negotiating forum for disarmament has continued to face serious difficulties. The inadequate attention that the Conference has been consistently subjected to, especially on the nuclear issues by the major Powers, is a regrettable manifestation of outmoded approaches of a bygone era in an age of interdependence and multilateralism. Such an unacceptable state of affairs can be surmounted only when all members of the Conference exercise their right and duty to participate in the negotiations. Bilateral and multilateral efforts in disarmament and security must be viewed as mutually reinforcing if effective agreements with universal acceptance are to be achieved. We therefore cannot accept a situation where the vast majority of States are reduced to mere spectators and excluded from assuming their rightful role on issues which so fundamentally affect their survival. They can and should be allowed to play a role in devising and implementing a comprehensive programme leading to general and complete disarmament.

While the past decade has been marked by several promising developments, these are but small steps in our common quest to establish genuine international stability by halting and reversing the arms race. If we are to move purposefully and progressively towards this common goal, there can be no alternative but to reach international agreements, especially disarmament agreements which are honoured and verifiable. We should also strive concurrently for the achievement of mutual trust, confidence and co-operation

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among States based on respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In an age in which science and technology have added a new and frightening dimension to the innovation and invention of armaments and weapons systems, the incessant arms race, fuelled by mutual mistrust and suspicion, has created a false sense of security and adversely affected global economic and social developments.

I am aware that, given the prevailing world situation, the establishment of conditions for the attainment of the goals of peace and security as I have described them may not be easy to attain. Some have even asserted that those conditions and goals are simply Utopian. I do not share that view. For the choice before humankind today is as real as it is stark. To quote from the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development:

"The world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order; it cannot do both."

We must continue to be guided by this message.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia for his important statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair and to my country. I now give the floor to my next speaker, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, H.E. Dr. Péter Várkonyi.

Mr. VARKONYI (Hungary): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to thank you for your friendly words of welcome addressed to me. It is a matter of profound pleasure for me that, in representing the Hungarian People's Republic, I have the opportunity to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament charged with the task of negotiating important issues of disarmament, vital for international security and for all of us personally as well. Inspired also by the bonds of friendship and close co-operation existing between our two countries, I would like to assure you of the full co-operation of the Hungarian delegation and its unconditional support for you in discharging your responsible duties.

My first opportunity to participate in the work of this prestigious international body is given a special character by the fact that three of my counterparts appear on the speakers' list for today. I have listened with great interest to the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, His Excellency Dr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja. It is a matter of pleasure for me to see His Excellency Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, in our midst, and I hope that His Excellency Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, will soon join us. I am looking forward

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to listening to their important statements. I feel encouraged by their presence, manifesting a political determination to promote the work of the Conference on Disarmament and to achieve concrete results, something I fully share.

It is encouraging to note that this year the Conference on Disarmament has been able to commence its work under more favourable conditions. The international atmosphere is more relaxed, and a propitious trend of development prevails in East-West relations. The Soviet-United States summit last December achieved results amounting to a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament, and intensive talks are under way to reduce strategic weapons and to strengthen the Treaty on anti-ballistic missiles. The latest efforts to resolve regional hotbeds of crisis are an indication that the favourable trends not only operate in East-West relations and in the field of disarmament, but make their effect felt in international relations as a whole.

Our renewed expectations and hopes in looking forward to this year's work in the multilateral disarmament and arms control forums, including the Conference on Disarmament, are not misplaced under these circumstances. I hope I am not mistaken in believing that the ever more frequent presence of and statements by the foreign ministers of various countries in the forum of the Conference on Disarmament is also explained by such expectations. The conditions are now at hand for the Conference on Disarmament to do more effective work and to produce tangible results.

We have found that the mutual dependence or interdependence of countries and regions now seems to be increasingly recognized as a reality of international relations. The interdependence of countries across the world, which is most dramatically manifest in the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, has grown to such an extent that peaceful co-existence and co-operation can be their only rational way of existence. Today it is all too obvious that the global challenges of the world transcend national boundaries. We must be aware that national or allied efforts are insufficient to remove the nuclear threat, to ease the problems of the world economy, to eliminate underdevelopment, hunger, terrorism, environmental pollution or regional hotbeds of crisis.

At the present level of technology, particularly military, and in the shadow of the existing stockpiles of weapons, no single country is able to guarantee its own security solely by military means, by increasing its own military strength. It is only through joint effort, by summoning a strong political will, by way of negotiations, that countries can create a modern set of conditions for their security that will allow the full development of inter-State confidence and co-operation by limiting their capabilities of mutual threat. We see these realities reflected by the latest Soviet-United States summit, which has made exemplary progress in the limitation of armaments and the relaxation of military tension. Another result of the summit meeting is the fact that the Soviet-United States talks on nuclear disarmament have been placed on a continuing basis after the signing of the agreement on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range

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missiles. We consider that maintaining the momentum of those talks and achieving early results in effecting large cuts in strategic nuclear weapon systems and preserving the ABM Treaty are of paramount importance. I deem it equally indispensable for the talks on the elimination of chemical weapons to conclude with success as soon as possible.

The favourable change in the political climate should be utilized in every way to ensure that lasting and irreversible changes in disarmament are achieved in Europe. To this end, joint efforts should be made to counter any extremist attempts to have the favourable effect of the Treaty eliminating medium- and shorter-range weapon systems reduced or even nullified by so-called "measures of compensation". The countries concerned should now seek to start early substantive talks on conventional disarmament and the further strengthening of confidence and security in Europe.

As is known, preparations for those talks are under way within the framework of the Vienna meeting, on the basis of the Budapest Appeal issued by the Warsaw Treaty member States in June 1986, and of the NATO response thereto. Together with the members of these two military alliances, every other country in Europe is extremely interested in ensuring that large cuts in conventional armed forces and armaments are effected, existing asymmetries and imbalances are reduced and capabilities for launching surprise attacks are eliminated as early as possible. The States participating in the process of European security and co-operation have good prospects for elaborating regional measures of disarmament and arms reduction. Cuts in conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe and gradual reductions in conventional warfare capabilities to a level of defensive sufficiency would, in view of the quantity and quality of such forces concentrated in Europe, have an effect going far beyond the really modest geographical confines of this continent and could open a new epoch in security policy.

In our experience, the improvement of the international atmosphere and the constructive development of relations between the two leading nuclear Powers have increased, not reduced, the responsibility and opportunities of small and medium-sized countries in making use of the favourable trends and strengthening them. Accordingly it is necessary for every country to make conscious efforts and initiatives at the international forums of wider scope such as the Conference on Disarmament.

Hungary has been striving, both in its bilateral relations and at international forums, to make an active contribution, commensurate with its modest means, to strengthening a less strained international atmosphere and reaching agreements guaranteeing security. We have been taking an active part in formulating a comprehensive concept of international security within the framework of the United Nations. At the Vienna meeting on European security and co-operation we have presented proposals in furtherance of an agreement. We are likewise seeking to promote the elaboration of the mandate for the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. In a recent Appeal jointly issued by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Social Democratic Party of Finland and the Italian Socialist Party, we have called for convening a meeting of experts from the non-nuclear-weapon

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States of Europe to study, in an open dialogue, the possibilities of early progress in security- and confidence-building as well as disarmament in Europe. These political parties proceed from the fact that all European countries have a vested interest in ensuring the irreversibility of the disarmament process. While recognizing the significant role of the nuclear-weapon Powers in preserving peace and security, they do not deem it to be exclusive, but maintain that we are not mere objects, but also active and resolved agents of the disarmament process.

The Hungarian delegation, therefore, wishes to contribute actively to efforts aimed at making the work of this Conference more effective.

The Conference on Disarmament is the single international body mandated to work for multilateral disarmament agreements. The question, therefore, arises: what is at the root of the paradoxical situation that, while the predecessors of this forum served to check the arms race and to promote disarmament by elaborating several important agreements, this body has, for a decade now, been unable to produce concrete results, although it saw its mandate extended in 1978?

As we look at it, the primary cause is political in nature. Not a single international organization, not even this one, can work with more success than desired by the States which the delegations here represent. The Conference on Disarmament too has reflected the international political tensions of the past decade, the commitment or non-commitment of member States to disarmament, and the degree of understanding that can be reached in matters of security policy.

It is also a fact that, during the period under consideration, the questions discussed have grown in complexity. Therefore, the desired agreements have also become harder to elaborate. The situation is further explained by the fact that formerly the draft agreements were almost completely elaborated when submitted to the much smaller Committee, whereas today the positions of 40 to 50 delegations have to be co-ordinated. So the task is multiplied.

The list of causes could be continued and analysed. However, I feel it is more useful to focus attention on the present time, on the tasks before the Conference. Nevertheless, I wish to state that we have considered the Conference on Disarmament to be an important and useful forum even in that "unproductive" period, because it has performed another function, namely that of serving as a forum for dialogue where representatives of countries have had an opportunity to set out their positions on security policy and disarmament, to submit their proposals and to confront them with one another. The collective knowledge thus accumulated will serve them well in their future work.

Let me now set out our position on some items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

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The main responsibility for nuclear disarmament is borne by the nuclear Powers, in particular the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet no other State can remain inactive, nor can this Conference, which has been seized with this issue for quite some time now. It is a deplorable fact that the Conference has not yet found the proper ways and means of addressing this issue. Still, we maintain that this Conference could make a contribution to nuclear disarmament without questioning the responsibility of the nuclear Powers primarily involved or taking over the tasks of other negotiating forums. The five nuclear Powers and the majority of the potential nuclear States are represented in this body. Therefore, the condition is at hand for the Conference to join the process of nuclear disarmament negotiations, as bilateral or other limited negotiations make progress.

Prohibition of nuclear weapon tests would be a crucial step on the road to halting the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. The continuation of tests is at variance with the efforts of the great majority of States to prevent the improvement of the existing types of nuclear weapons and the development of new ones. Hence we remain of the view that all nuclear weapon tests in all environments should be prohibited at once and for all time.

We are aware that certain countries take a different approach to this question; we cannot turn a blind eye to realities. Yet we believe that differences of view should not inevitably impede the start of substantive work in specific areas where positions can be seen to be drawing closer, despite certain divergences.

Accordingly, a possibility of progress appears to be open in, for example, detailed elaboration of verification procedures for the future treaty in their scientific, technical and organizational aspects alike. We consider it important that the Group of Seismological Experts should, as part of related efforts, continue with its work, to which we Hungarians remain ready to contribute.

Great importance is attached to a balance of bilateral and multilateral efforts towards a comprehensive test ban. We welcome the talks now going on between the Soviet Union and the United States which seek to reach a complete ban by stages, but on a continuing basis. We consider the so-called threshold treaties, the future systems for their verification and the plans for further reductions in the number and yield of explosions as necessary steps leading to a general ban. In this context, we readily support such steps.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space is for us a key issue of international security and disarmament. We share the view that outer space is a common patrimony of mankind which should be reserved for and made available to peaceful activities at the service of common interests.

We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has ample possibilities at hand to contribute to the prevention of an arms race in space and to guaranteeing peaceful activities there. So far the Committee concerned with this issue has done useful work helping us to get better acquainted with the problems involved, but now we deem it timely for the Committee to proceed

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to elaborating concrete measures and international agreements. We would find it appropriate for the Committee to start devising a system that would guarantee the safety of satellites in orbit around the Earth, that is, the immunity necessary for their smooth operation. It would be equally useful for the Committee to consider establishing a system of verification to guarantee the peaceful character of research and activities in space.

In recent years the question of prohibiting chemical weapons has rightly commanded the attention of the participants in the Conference on Disarmament. To the satisfaction of all of us, the elaboration of the draft agreement has been progressing markedly. Nevertheless, I now feel obliged to voice concern, as the latest round of talks and events outside their framework fail to hold out much promise for early conclusion of the agreement.

Hungary continues to stand for complete prohibition under strict verification and control, and for the complete destruction of stockpiles. It is regrettable that the compromise proposals which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries put forward last year have not yet produced the rightly expected results.

I wish to pay tribute to the Soviet Government for having opened last year the chemical weapons facility at Shikhany to the delegations participating in the talks and to the international press, as well as having published data on Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons. Such moves make a significant contribution to strengthening mutual confidence and improving the atmosphere of negotiations.

However, the success of talks is by no means promoted by proposals to maintain rather than destroy the existing stockpiles, or even likely to result in their increase. The chances of agreement are impaired by the decision to start the production of binary chemical weapons in the United States. Such unfavourable developments are warnings that the Conference on Disarmament should redouble efforts for the speedy elaboration of the agreement.

Speaking on this point I should like to confirm that the Hungarian People's Republic has no stockpile of chemical weapons or industrial establishments manufacturing such weapons. It does not carry out any sort of research on chemical weapons, nor does it intend to possess such weapons in the future. Furthermore, I can reaffirm that no other country stores any kind of chemical weapons or carries out any kind of related activity in the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic.

We believe that openness regarding the possession or non-possession of stockpiles of different weapons serves to contribute to the strengthening of confidence. It would therefore be welcome if other countries did not keep the international community in a state of uncertainty. In the spirit of the draft agreement being elaborated, I can now inform this Conference that of the key precursors of chemical weapons, the following two are produced for civilian use in Hungary: chemicals containing a P-methyl and/or P-ethyl bond, at one plant, and methyl and/or ethyl esters of phosphorous acid, at three plants. All of these products are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

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The prohibition of radiological weapons constitutes a domain of the Conference's work in which results could be achieved within a relatively short time. With the rapid spread of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, more and more States are becoming interested in the success of negotiations on this topic.

The fact that radiological weapons do not yet form part of the arsenal of any State can be no obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty banning such weapons. On the contrary: given the political will, preventive measures are simpler and quicker to adopt than they would be after deployment of those weapons.

The other side of the problem is the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, which would meet a concrete need not only among the countries directly concerned, such as Hungary, but also among other States which may not even possess nuclear facilities as yet. Viewed from the angle of a real and rightful demand, the framework within which the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities can be achieved is a matter of secondary importance. The Conference on Disarmament is a fully appropriate forum for this purpose. However, no objection can be raised to the use of any other forum where the result appears quicker to achieve.

At present the question of conventional weapons is not included in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. However, in the so-called "decatalogue" which describes the mandate of the Conference, conventional weapons appear fourth following nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. So there is no obstacle of principle to this forum taking up this issue.

The results achieved or to be achieved in the limitation of nuclear weapons and in nuclear disarmament will thrust forward the question of reducing conventional forces and armaments. This is what we are witnessing for the time being in Europe, but the problem is by no means confined to this continent. The proposals which the Warsaw Treaty member States, among them Hungary, have submitted on this topic are related to Europe, but they also have a message for other regions. Their consideration at the Conference on Disarmament or other United Nations disarmament forums may prove to be useful.

This remark brings me back to the topic of how the Conference on Disarmament operates, and in general, to increasing the effectiveness of the machinery for multilateral disarmament negotiations.

I am aware that this Conference has for years been trying to improve its performance, and numerous proposals have already been made to improve the work and procedures of this body. In my view, the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will provide a good opportunity for reviewing the operation of the disarmament machinery, effecting the necessary changes, and exploring more efficient forms and procedures of negotiation.

(Mr. Varkonyi, Hungary)

Let me recall that the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States, at its meeting held in Prague at the end of last October, made several proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference. I would like now to call attention to a few ideas that may contribute to collective consideration of streamlining and improving efficiency. We believe that the time available for sessions could better be utilized for substantive work if the recurring procedural debates on the programme of work or the establishment of subsidiary bodies were spared. It would also be useful if the general debates at the beginning of sessions were reduced to two or three weeks, after which work would continue in the committees and other subsidiary bodies, where delegations, assisted by experts, could be engaged in really substantive negotiations.

We consider it necessary to increase the openness of the Conference. The representatives of all States should have the right to make statements in the general political debate at the beginning of sessions. The representatives of non-member States wishing to do regular work should also sit on the committees and other subsidiary bodies. To ask for that right annually is a waste of time. The number of informal meetings open to member States only should be reduced to a minimum. Wider scope should be left for preliminary consultations by the President and the Secretary-General for the purpose of getting better acquainted with positions, working more efficiently for a consensus. The principle and practice of consensus should be upheld with respect to decisions concerning international security and disarmament measures, without any possibility for anyone to misuse this principle.

Our proposals do not cover the full range of questions, but we stand ready to thoroughly consider and discuss any other proposal likely to make the work of the Conference more efficient and more successful. The Hungarian delegation is guided by this desire and this spirit in attending the Conference on Disarmament and preparing for the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We strive to promote the cause of maintaining and strengthening peace and international security and achieving disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and to my country. I now give the floor to my next speaker, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, H.E. Mr. Giulio Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (Italy) (translated from Italian): I would like, first of all, to thank you for the warm remarks you addressed to me, and, on my part, to sincerely wish you success in the fulfilment of the high responsibilities connected with the presidency of this distinguished gathering. While recalling the excellent work performed by your predecessor, Ambassador Morel, I would also like to express my best wishes to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Komatina, and to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Berasategui.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

I feel very pleased and honoured to address this Conference, which is the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament and which - at the beginning of its 1988 official session - raises even greater expectations in those who consider United Nations principles and activities to be the indispensable foundation of international coexistence.

Perhaps never before has disarmament raised so many hopes, convinced even the most sceptical, and justified such tenacious and patient negotiations over many years. Never before have we witnessed such a negotiation as the one just concluded on INFs, with such potential knock-on effects on other aspects of unresolved international issues. We are thus living in a special phase, whose opportunities must be grasped. For this reason, my friend Mr. Genscher and I are here today in Geneva together with other Ministers, participating at a just resumed negotiating session so full of expectations.

Italy intends to work for peace and disarmament, at a time which it considers to be important for the future of mankind. We deem that, at this stage, we must specially intensify our efforts where our contribution can be more direct and immediate. I refer to those multilateral negotiations dealing with issues of primary importance for international stability: the negotiations on conventional forces, and on the global elimination of chemical weapons.

We have, therefore, come here to express our hope and to urge that the result attained on 8 December by the United States of America and the Soviet Union on intermediate nuclear missiles can also be achieved in the field of chemical weapons: the global elimination of an entire class of armaments. The Washington Treaty - and it is worth while stressing it once again - is of a significance which goes far beyond the number of weapons destroyed. It marks the reversal of a trend, signalling as it does not the mere cessation of the endless growth of highly destructive weapons - which throughout the last four decades appeared to be almost inevitable - but a significant reduction in the number of offensive systems threatening Europe. For the first time balance has been restored at a lower level and not, according to the easier ways of the past, at a higher one.

This development is of enormous political significance and importance. In fact, from a general viewpoint, new trends seem to be emerging in the context of East-West relations - with possible positive repercussions on the continuation of the disarmament process. From what I would term a more technical viewpoint, the Treaty can serve as a model for ongoing or forthcoming negotiations in other disarmament fields, within a bilateral context as well as a multilateral one.

Allow me, at this juncture, to make a special reference to three concepts which I would consider to be part and parcel of the East-West dialogue on arms reductions, and which may be also extended to the field of chemical weapons:

Asymmetry in reductions, all the more important in the case of chemical weapons, as the initial composition of each party's arsenals - however assessed - seems to us anything but identical,

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

The globality of their destruction, as in the case of INFs, shunning the illusion of partial balances, all the more if we consider the possibility for these weapons to be quickly transferred from one location to another,

Lastly, verifiability, which must be all the more rigorous and strict, the more closely related their components are to the industrial production process - as is the case for chemical weapons.

We are all aware - especially as Members of this Organization - of the need to sustain the present fast pace of the negotiating process through rapid and tangible results. The two major Powers have imparted greater speed to their bilateral dialogue, in line with the timetable they have drawn up for themselves, starting with the Moscow summit, which should take place within the first six months of 1988.

The INF Treaty, in fact, constitutes only a first step, which must be followed by others, entailing the drastic reduction of strategic armaments, the elimination of chemical weapons, and the re-establishment of the conventional equilibrium at lower levels. The conclusion of the Washington Treaty, to which the Europeans have made a fundamental contribution, must therefore be considered as a first move - and it is thus considered by Italy and Western Europe - in a long process aimed at achieving a more stable and transparent military balance. We certainly recognize the difficulties of this process, and are aware of the logical connections between its phases, though these should not be seen as the motive for insisting on a rigid time sequence. It should be clear to all, however, that negotiations should aim at establishing enhanced security, which is not merely the other party's insecurity. My presence here today, together with the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, is intended to bear witness to the firm political commitment which Italy strongly feels and wishes to fulfil vis-à-vis the entire international community for the attainment of this goal.

In the conventional field, Italy is participating in Vienna - together with the 22 other countries whose forces have an immediate bearing upon the military balance in Europe - in informal talks aimed at starting a new negotiation on conventional stability, at lower levels, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The disparities and asymmetries existing in the field of conventional forces indeed constitute a traditional source of tension and of serious distress in our continent. It is therefore necessary to redress them, and, as an urgent priority, capabilities to launch surprise attacks and to initiate large-scale military operations should be eliminated, so that we may concretely and effectively promote conditions of increased security, and of improved mutual confidence.

Chemical weapons increase general insecurity. Historically, they were the first arms which Europe's conscience rejected, considering them to be incompatible with the degree of development reached by our societies. This was done at a time when antagonisms were at a peak. Concerns on chemical

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

weapons gave the lead to the first serious thoughts on multilateral arms control, even though in 1932 the impossibility of agreeing upon appropriate verification methods prevented an attempt at banning their production. In the context of East-West relations, these weapons increase existing asymmetries, and render uncertain the nature of the response they might provoke, thus inter alia increasing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons.

In the case of regional conflicts, chemical weapons represent a constant temptation to escalate hostilities to levels which would justify the greatest alarm on the part of the international community. Their possession presupposes simple technology, not unlimited resources, and even a superficial training. Their components are internationally tradable, while nuclear arms are subject to extremely severe controls. The possible proliferation of chemical weapons poses a grave threat to mankind.

In recent years, regional conflicts have shown to us some of the devastating effects of chemical weapons. In Italy, we had direct evidence thereof when providing treatment to some victims of the Iran-Iraq conflict. On the basis of the conclusions reached by United Nations experts, the Italian Government has already expressed its strong condemnation of the repeated use of chemical weapons, especially against civilian populations. I personally have had the opportunity, in the past, to express my concern on the matter to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. This is why I would like to restate once again, in this forum, the importance of safeguarding and strengthening the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and to reiterate a strong appeal to all countries to refrain from the use of these means of mass destruction, in whatever context, and above all against unarmed populations.

For many years, Italy has had no chemical weapons, nor does it station them on its territory. It further believes that conditions should be created, as soon as possible, for the generalized and genuine renunciation of such weapons - or, even better, their rejection by all States.

After the traumatic experiences of the First World War, the Geneva Protocol was the first tangible expression of the conscious acknowledgement of the horror caused by chemical weapons. This Protocol, however, has not always proven to be sufficiently effective; hence the need for urgent steps towards the total banning of such weapons.

What I have been saying constitutes the rationale for the Italian Government's special activism in this field, starting with our February 1979 proposal concerning the establishment of an ad hoc working group for the thorough examination of a set of still unresolved problems - such as the purpose of the Convention, the destruction of arsenals, and the formulation of an international system of verification.

Our participation has always been guided by the hope and conviction that, step by step, we would come closer to achieving the final goal - as, indeed, has happened - of a convention envisaging the total prohibition of the production of new chemical weapons, anywhere and forever, as well as the complete destruction of existing arsenals, within well-defined time-limits.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

Today, this goal is within our reach. Although it is difficult to foresee any deadline for the conclusion of negotiations dealing with this complex matter, and although it would be inappropriate to sacrifice the goal of arriving at a truly effective and verifiable convention for the sake of saving time, I none the less believe it necessary to impart a decisive impulse to the negotiations. This can be done by availing ourselves of the important conceptual rapprochements which have recently occurred, and of the favourable international circumstances I mentioned earlier.

The remaining obstacles are mainly connected with the problem of verification, since - in this field more than in any other - only an effective system of controls can give all the signatory countries the certainty that the Convention will truly be implemented, with the appropriate mechanisms for ensuring general compliance. With respect to the ban on chemical weapons, we are convinced that this verification system should provide for:

Verification of the accuracy of the initial declarations;

Verification of arsenals, from the moment of the initial declarations to their destruction, and during transportation to the destruction sites;

The means to ascertain the destruction of existing arsenals and production plants;

The means to ensure that banned chemical warfare agents are no longer produced, either at old plants or at new ones, and that other chemical compounds which might constitute a risk according to the Convention are adequately controlled;

All evidence that member States do not obtain chemical warfare agents from external sources;

The prompt detection of any possible suspect activities.

Since verification poses great technical problems, whose solution entails the involvement of scientists, I would suggest that they be asked to contribute - perhaps through a forum open to top specialists from all countries.

This meeting could be held in Rome or in Erice, in the same spirit as the meeting on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy we organized at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the autumn of 1986.

The further obstacles which still hinder the conclusion of the Convention are for the most part of a technical nature, although one cannot neglect their underlying political implications. I will mention only three of them.

In my view, the time has come to take up again a matter which has recently - and perhaps wrongly - been set aside: I refer to the matter of definitions (article 11 of the Convention). This is clearly a central issue

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whose consequences have a direct impact on the entire subject-matter of the Convention. As of now, we favour the setting up of groups of experts, limited in their composition, for the thorough examination of this issue within a time-limit to be agreed upon.

The destruction of existing arsenals, too, presents problems to be solved in a reasonably short time. The clear political will of all the participants in the negotiation to provide for the global elimination of arsenals in a 10-year time span must now be translated into the establishment of detailed procedures and modalities. We also believe that all production must completely stop upon the conclusion of the Convention. On this point, a greater negotiating flexibility - always taking into account the legitimate security requirements of all - might allow us to overcome the existing obstacles on the basis of solutions envisaging a quicker rate of reduction for the larger arsenals.

In the third place, if we really want to enhance the credibility of the Convention, then we must see to it that - through a mechanism of rigorous verification - no diversion of commercial products towards possible military uses can occur. This question, which pertains to the field of verification, must be addressed and solved comprehensively.

I believe that these measures, of a general and not discriminatory nature, should not raise excessive preoccupations for the industries of the most advanced countries. On the contrary, the higher the level of industrial development of a country, the greater its responsibilities and moral commitment to avoid the incorrect use, domestically or externally, of its industrial capabilities.

I note with satisfaction that on the question of challenge inspections it has recently proved possible to achieve a considerable rapprochement between diverse positions, including those of the United States and the USSR. I therefore suggest that every possible effort be made so that the convergence which has been taking shape is extended and translated in timely fashion into the formulation of a text capable of securing general consensus.

Lastly, as regards the institutional and organizational structures which will be entrusted with the implementation of the Convention, Italy considers that they should first satisfy the criterion of effectiveness, and of adequate and equitable representation of all States.

If we do not wish to waste what we have achieved over the years, the time has now come to make a conclusive effort, which Hans-Dietrich Genscher and I myself, together with other colleagues, have come here to urge, also through a possible acceleration of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. Some have proposed reducing the intervals between sessions; others have suggested a permanent session. I would like to propose reviving the institution of the "Friends of the President", each of whom might be given a specific task. Or we might decide to set up as many working groups as there are articles in the Convention. At this point, a limited group might even be given the task of expeditiously formulating proposals on ways and means of productively

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accelerating the proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee. I do not think there should be any opposition in principle to this proposal, also considering that - it would seem to me - the groundwork exists for reaching a solution to the satisfaction of all.

The Italian Government is firmly convinced that, within the framework of global and stable arms reductions, the elimination of chemical weapons is a priority.

However, we are certainly aware that the task of the Conference on Disarmament is not to deal only with chemical weapons to the exclusion of other problems. It is called upon to thoroughly examine numerous other important issues linked to arms control. We would like to see the negotiating dynamics which we note elsewhere applied to their solution too.

I would like to conclude my address with a touch of optimism. We are living at a time when the international community seems to be willing to start departing from some negative trends, such as the progressive and relentless accumulation of means of mass destruction, which it has grown accustomed to living with over the past four decades - as one grows accustomed to living with an illness, or as eyes get accustomed to darkness. Henry Kissinger provides us with this description of the major inconsistency of our time:

"The super-Powers often behave like two heavily armed blind men feeling their way around a room, each believing himself in mortal peril from the other whom he assumes to have perfect vision."

My moderate optimism stems from the realization that our countries are not only beginning to decrease the sheer weight of their armaments, but also to remove the blindfold that has, up to now, prevented each from clearly perceiving the other's intentions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now wish to inform you that the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany is on his way and will be with us in a few minutes. May I propose a brief recess so as to allow me to receive him? We shall resume the plenary meeting immediately afterwards.

The meeting was suspended at 12.05 p.m. and resumed at 12.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The meeting is resumed. I now wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, H.E. Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who has just joined us. May I note that the Minister has been following our work with continuous interest, since he has addressed the Conference on three previous occasions, conveying to us his views on important disarmament issues. I now give him the floor.

Mr. GENSCHER (Federal Republic of Germany) (translated from German): My visit and that of my friend and colleague, Giulio Andreotti, which were jointly arranged, are intended to underscore the great importance that we attach to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The simultaneous presence of the Foreign Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Republic of Indonesia demonstrates the growing readiness of countries in West and East, North and South, to undertake joint efforts in the field of disarmament and thus make our world more peaceful.

You, Mr. President, are an experienced and prudent diplomat well versed in multilateral disarmament negotiations. I wish you every success in your highly responsible office and assure you that you have the support of my delegation.

The two German States bear special responsibility for safeguarding peace and fostering mutually beneficial coexistence in Europe. It is particularly in our interest to take advantage of the opportunities afforded for improving West-East relations. Through responsible co-operation we can help to build a new and better Europe. The aim of the Federal Republic of Germany - as envisaged in the Harmel Report of the Western Alliance - is to create a peaceful order in Europe in which countries with different social systems can live alongside one another without fear and in peaceful competition.

My visit is taking place at a time when new thinking and actions have opened up the prospect of a fundamental change in disarmament and arms control. Since my last statement here in June 1986, the conditions for arms control have greatly improved.

Firstly, as a result of the Stockholm CDE Document of 22 September 1986 and the Washington Treaty on the global elimination of Soviet and United States intermediate-range missiles, a breakthrough has been made in efforts to attain adequate and effective verification rules. Mandatory on-site inspections have thus become firmly established as a central element of effective verification provisions of arms control agreements. A new perception has come about: reliable verification is necessary and indeed possible. Verification creates confidence.

Secondly, the principle of asymmetrical disarmament has been recognized. Whoever possesses more weapons has to scrap a greater number.

Thirdly, for the first time, it has proved possible to reach agreement on the global elimination of an entire category of weapons.

Furthermore, the perception that disarmament is conducive to greater security is gaining acceptance, as is the perception that in this nuclear age an arms race and confrontation, instead of disarmament and co-operation, heighten the danger of mankind destroying itself.

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This development marked by various major breakthroughs improves the prospects for further disarmament steps, for a co-operative security policy and for wider co-operation in all fields. This is the path to take if we are to safeguard peace permanently and prevent any war, whether nuclear or conventional.

Our responsibility extends beyond our time. In this nuclear age, the safeguarding of peace and the preservation of natural resources for ourselves and for future generations have become the central task of our political actions. We are deciding not only on life today, but also on the existence of life and nature on this globe for all time to come. Respect for human dignity imposes on us the duty to pursue policies which also enable future generations to live, allow them scope for free development and self-realization and leave them the freedom to determine their own destiny. However, freedom can only exist where there is still life. If we squander away peace and nature in this nuclear age, there will be no chance for reconstruction or restoration.

The perceptions guiding President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev since Reykjavik stem from the responsibility borne for mankind, both now and in the future. We have become a community striving for joint survival. The safeguarding of peace calls for collective efforts. Everyone must participate - the nuclear Powers and all countries in West and East, in North and South.

In my last statement here, I urged that use be made of the opportunities for constructive steps deriving from the simultaneous existence of bilateral negotiations and multilateral negotiating forums. It is in our common interest that these parallel lines of negotiation should move ever closer together.

The West's security policy is aimed at comprehensively safeguarding peace. Apart from defence, efforts towards disarmament and arms control are an indispensable, integral part of our security policy. Forward-looking security thinking must not be confined to how wars can be made less horrifying; it must ensure that they cannot be waged at all. On 20 October 1987, President Mitterrand of France said in Aachen: "Let us at last stop planning how to win wars; let us instead plan as quickly as possible how to prevent them."

A security policy geared towards preserving peace requires systematic thinking beyond existing conceptions. Our aim must be to devise effective structures for a co-operative security policy. We must create security of a new, higher quality. That implies more than equilibrium. Above and beyond equilibrium and deterrence, we need war-preventing structures of a new dimension. This also calls for new forms of co-operation.

In his standard work on disarmament, the Spanish author and politician Salvador de Madariaga stated in 1929: "The solution of the problem of disarmament cannot be found within the problem itself, but outside it. In fact, the problem of disarmament is not the problem of disarmament. It really

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is the problem of the organization of the World-Community". That was probably still a Utopian point of view under the conditions prevailing in the 1920s and 1930s. But in the conditions of this nuclear age, that Utopian outlook inevitably changes into the necessity to organize joint co-operation for the safeguarding of peace.

A co-operative security policy requires the following:

Firstly, disarmament steps must be taken that eliminate superiority and establish equilibrium at a lower level in all areas of the military balance. To prevent all wars in future, with weapons of any kind, there must be no exceptions in the renunciation of superiority and the readiness for arms control.

Secondly, qualitative changes are needed in the structure of armed forces. Neither side should possess a capacity for invasion.

Thirdly, effective mechanisms for global political crisis management are needed.

Fourthly, the network of confidence-building measures must be expanded and become ever closer.

Fifthly, multilateral arms control agreements of universal validity are needed; the Geneva Conference on Disarmament is a highly competent body suited for this purpose. Collective responsibility for peace inevitably requires intensified efforts for multilateral negotiations.

Sixthly, hostile preconceptions must be dispelled; peaceful attitudes and mutual respect must be fostered. This requires open societies as well as the realization of the United Nations human rights Covenants and of all pledges given by the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.

Seventhly, co-operation to the mutual benefit in all fields must be widened and deepened. In this interdependent world we must create positive mutual dependence and make movement towards co-operation on equal terms irreversible. For Europe, the Helsinki Final Act charts the course towards a peaceful order in Europe or the construction of a common European home, as it can also be called. We seek broad-based co-operation between West and East which brings the countries of our continent ever closer together. As a firm member of the Western community based on shared values, of NATO and the European Community, we thus develop our central relations with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries.

I should now like to concentrate on disarmament in the nuclear, conventional and chemical fields.

The conclusion of the INF Treaty is a step of historic importance. The elimination of the threat directed against Western Europe means increased security for us. During my visit on 3 February 1983 I stated here: "We regard this zero solution, for both sides as the best and most desirable

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outcome of these negotiations." The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany now has a strong interest in seeing the Treaty put into effect soon, so that the elimination of United States and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles can be started.

The INF Treaty must not remain an isolated event. It will not acquire its true historic importance until it becomes the point of departure of, and paves the way for, a broad-based process of disarmament. We support the new approaches adopted by the two super-Powers in living up to their nuclear responsibility. By seeking co-operative solutions they intend to reduce the risks arising on both sides from the existence of these weapons of destruction. The non-proliferation Treaty requires such conduct of them.

We Germans emphatically underline this duty to seek nuclear disarmament, we are not a nuclear Power and do not want to become one. Together with our partners in the North Atlantic Alliance we pursue a comprehensive approach to arms control and disarmament. This approach comprises the following: a 50 per cent reduction in United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, the establishment of conventional stability in the whole of Europe and marked reductions in United States and Soviet short-range missiles to equal ceilings. The Federal Republic of Germany will do its utmost to help attain these goals.

We fully support the intention of the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude in the first half of this year an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive weapons. The improved strategic stability at a lower level of arms produced by such an agreement is in the interest of all countries. We also realize that the nuclear threat to Western Europe will be reduced with every strategic nuclear weapon eliminated on the Soviet side. We assume that such an agreement will be accompanied by an understanding to adhere to the ABM Treaty for a specific period in order to guarantee the necessary predictability in the field of defensive systems, too.

As regards United States and Soviet short-range nuclear missiles, the aim must be to attain through negotiation reductions to equal ceilings on both sides. In this field the West is confronted with a large Eastern preponderance, whose unilateral elimination would greatly improve the prospects for future negotiations.

For us, nuclear weapons serve exclusively to prevent war; they thus perform a political function. Any blurring of the qualitative distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons would lead to the precipitous path of thinking in terms of war scenarios and thus believing in the wageability of wars. The belief that nuclear conflicts can be kept within limited theatres ignores this political function. Nor are nuclear weapons intended to offset conventional inferiority. The combination of conventional and nuclear means of deterrence reflects a political constraint for both sides to ensure that military conflicts do not arise in the first place, solve conflicts solely through negotiations, and slowly but steadily move from confrontation to co-operation.

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We strongly advocate that negotiations on conventional stability in Europe be started as soon as possible. No country has a greater interest than the Federal Republic of Germany in seeing the conventional imbalance existing in Europe to the West's disadvantage being removed and a state of lasting stability being achieved in this field, too. The Federal Republic of Germany not only bears the main burden of Western conventional defence, but would also be the first victim of a conventional war in Europe.

At the "mandate talks" now taking place in Vienna between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, important progress has already been made. A mandate for negotiations on conventional arms control must form part of a balanced concluding document of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting.

The aim of future negotiations in the conventional sphere cannot solely be to reduce the number of weapons and forces to an equal level, because equilibrium alone is not sufficient to prevent the outbreak of military hostilities, as history unfortunately proves. Instead, the new security thinking of a higher quality must prove its worth in conventional arms control negotiations. One of the objectives of the negotiations must therefore be to attain a situation on both sides in which the armed forces are geared exclusively to defence needs and do not possess any capacity for invasion, as is already the case on the Western side. In our Western concept there is no room for any notions of large-scale, cross-frontier counter-offensives involving the penetration of ground forces into Central and Eastern Europe.

The declaration on conventional disarmament issued by NATO in December 1986 defines a particularly important goal of Western security policy. The aim is to create additional stability through asymmetrical disarmament and the elimination of offensive capacity. To eliminate the capacity for surprise attacks and large-scale offensive actions, efforts towards reduction should first focus on ground-based, combat-essential major equipment, especially tanks and artillery. In view of the East's superiority, the goal of equal ceilings calls for considerably greater reductions by the Warsaw Pact than on the Western side. We hope that the Warsaw Pact maintains its readiness for asymmetrical reductions first displayed in connection with the INF Treaty. In the conventional sector, too, the principle applies that whoever has more weapons must scrap a larger number.

Efforts for conventional stability cannot be separated from a consensus on the philosophy underlying defence. In negotiations on conventional arms control, one of the aims must therefore be to reach a consensus on the function of armed forces in order to elaborate principles that make it possible to determine the strength, structure, matériel and deployment of armed forces needed for the declared function of self-defence and the prevention of war.

The early conclusion of a convention for the global prohibition of chemical weapons continues to be a matter of high priority, in our view. In reality, they are not weapons, but devices for destroying man and nature.

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These devices must be destroyed. It is a gruesome coincidence that some of the most terrible nerve gases were discovered by chance during research into insecticides.

Chemical weapons are not regarded as a deterrent in the war prevention strategy of the Western Alliance. As stated in the Federal Defence Ministry's White Paper of 1983, NATO relies mainly on conventional and nuclear forces even as a deterrent against the use of chemical weapons by the Warsaw Pact. Only a limited amount of chemical warfare agents is thus kept ready for retaliation in the event of a chemical attack. Since chemical weapons do not therefore perform any function in the North Atlantic Alliance's strategy for the prevention of war, there will be no need to possess them when the stocks of all other countries have been destroyed under a chemical weapons convention.

The Federal Republic of Germany does not possess any chemical weapons, and gave a solemn pledge in 1954 not to produce any. My country also unconditionally recognizes the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Even in peacetime, chemical weapons pose a considerable risk. A chemical weapons convention must curb the alarming proliferation of these weapons. It must counter the danger of chemical weapons becoming "cheap weapons of destruction" in third world trouble-spots. The suffering of the victims of chemical warfare brings home to us the urgent need for action. We followed very closely the remarks by non-aligned representatives at the recent Pugwash Conference to the effect that the third world in particular considers itself exposed to the danger of the use of chemical weapons and is thus interested in a global convention prohibiting such weapons. This bears out our view that regional solutions are not desirable. It also confirms our conviction that most countries will accede to the convention from the start. Our common task will be to urge all States to accede to the convention as soon as it has been concluded.

Chemical weapons must not have a future. This basic consensus of the Geneva Convention on Disarmament must not be called into question. My Government welcomes the fact that the declaration issued at the Washington summit on 10 December 1987 reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations towards the conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention on chemical weapons. In the summit declaration of 21 November 1985 too, the two sides agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. Now is the time for a practicable consensual solution on the basis of the thorough preparations by this Conference thus far, and not for introducing new concepts.

The Conference has before it a draft convention which, thanks to the energetic efforts of the delegations, already contains formulations on large parts of the subject-matter to be covered by the Convention. On virtually all problems, carefully considered proposals have been presented in the form of working papers drawn up by delegations and by the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee and its Working Groups. We knew from the beginning that verification issues would cause the greatest difficulties. This is not a new problem. The right solution to this problem would not be to dispense with a

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chemical weapons convention, but to seek stringent verification arrangements which effectively preclude the creation and possession of a militarily relevant chemical weapons potential. At no stage over the years have we doubted that effective verification mechanisms can be developed through joint efforts. Moreover, the effectiveness of the agreed verification measures can be examined during the 10-year destruction phase and improved if necessary. In the light of the results achieved at this Conference to date, we are confident that such a verification system can be attained soon. The conditions for this have improved.

On the difficult issues of challenge inspections and the so-called control of non-production, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has made palpable progress in recent months. At this point I should like to thank Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, who in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has greatly helped to advance the negotiations by dint of his excellent direction of them.

The greatest advances have been made in the area of challenge inspections. The Soviet Union's readiness to accept in the context of arms control and disarmament the mandatory on-site inspections proposed by the West has had a positive impact in this respect. An important development was the announcement here by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in August 1987 that the Soviet Union consents to mandatory challenge inspections - in other words, international on-site inspections at short notice, whenever and wherever requested by another participating State. This must now be translated into concrete textual proposals. All countries are now called upon to reach agreement on a suitable section of the Convention, thus filling a sizeable gap in the current draft.

In the field of verification of the non-production of chemical weapons, the verification regulations for the chemical industry have been largely elaborated. As a result of the listing of chemical substances, a satisfactory system for monitoring non-production is available and can be adapted to the latest developments at any time by modifying the lists.

The Federal Republic of Germany has in the past contributed to the development of effective non-production controls and will continue to do so. In our working paper of March 1987, we suggested arrangements for the exchange of data between national authorities and the international organization to be set up under the Convention. In January of this year, our delegation presented ideas concerning the registration of super-toxic lethal chemicals used for civilian purposes and concerning extended controls throughout the chemical industry in the form of ad hoc checks. We feel that with these proposals further gaps in the verification régime can be plugged, and that the fears voiced by numerous countries can be dispelled. My Government has the full support of our domestic chemical industry for these proposals.

Important work has also been done in determining the nature of the international organization to be set up under the Convention. Our aim must be

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to establish a fully functional organization which can reliably monitor the comprehensive implementation of the ban on chemical weapons. We consider the financial questions arising in this connection to be solvable.

Apart from progress in the subject-matter itself, it is pleasing to note that there have been accompanying confidence-building measures which have had a positive impact on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Following the initial steps by the West, i.e. the United States declaration of details of its chemical weapon stocks in the summer of 1986, the Soviet Union presented to the members of this Conference examples of Soviet chemical weapons at its chemical weapons facility in Shikhan in October 1987. A Soviet delegation was able to inspect the chemical weapon destruction facility at Tooele in the United States. As early as 1984, we demonstrated to Soviet experts our facility in Munster for destroying any old stocks of chemical weapons discovered.

It is also encouraging to note that the United States is willing to exchange data on existing quantities with the Soviet Union even before the completion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. In December 1987, the Soviet Union declared that the stocks of chemical weapons on its territory do not exceed 50,000 tons of warfare agents. This step should be welcomed. However, this again gives rise to the need to clarify the large discrepancies between Western estimates and Soviet figures. The verifiable disclosure of data would therefore be another step towards dispelling distrust. It could simultaneously counter the fear expressed with regard to maintaining security on account of the different sizes of the chemical weapons stocks existing at the start of the 10-year destruction phase. In order to take account of the disparities in the chemical weapon arsenals of participating States, those countries with the largest stocks could first destroy some of their chemical weapons until an agreed level is reached. Only then would linear destruction by all countries possessing chemical weapons be commenced. At the same time as the Convention comes into effect, a ban on production that is subject to verification procedures would come into force. Energetic efforts should now be made to advance the negotiations so that a convention on the global, comprehensive and dependably verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is reached as quickly as possible.

The political momentum in the negotiations must be maintained in order that the basic consensus of the Geneva Disarmament Conference is not called into question.

The Federal Republic of Germany will perseveringly work towards the goal of making peace safer in Europe and world wide. The progress made in recent months in the ongoing arms control negotiations not only confirms that the course embarked upon is the correct one. This progress is also an incentive for the future. The Washington Treaty is a long hoped-for victory of common sense over the arms spiral which seemed to be moving incessantly upwards. It has initiated a process which can make the world more peaceful. We shall do our utmost to ensure that this process is not disrupted, but

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systematically continued. As the philosopher Hans Jonas stated, behind this is not an exuberant yearning for paradise on Earth, but a more modest hope: that the Earth remains habitable for future generations, and that mankind survives in dignity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany for his important statement, and I thank him for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any member wish to take the floor?

I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 9 February at 10.a.m.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.