



SECURITY COUNCIL

OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-THIRD YEAR

SUPPLEMENT FOR OCTOBER, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1978

UNITED NATIONS



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New York, 1980

NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

**CHECK LIST OF SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE PERIOD
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S/12520/ Add.38-50	6, 16, 18 and 23 October, 7, 8, 16, 22 and 27 Novem- ber, 8, 18 and 27 December 1978		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Mimeographed	
S/12829/ Add.1 and 2	16 and 19 October 1978		Election of five members of the International Court of Justice: note by the Secretary-General transmitting the list of candidates nominated by national groups	Mimeographed. Circulated under the double symbols A/33/222/Add.1-S/12829/Add.1 and Add.2. See S/12829/Rev.1 and Add.1	
S/12829/ Rev.1 and Add.1	26 and 30 October 1978	<i>Idem</i>		Circulated under the double symbols A/33/222/Rev.1-S/12829/Rev.1 and Add.1 (see <i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Annexes, agenda item 17</i>)	
S/12830	19 October 1978		Election of five members of the International Court of Justice: note by the Secretary-General transmitting the curricula vitae of candidates nominated by national groups	Circulated under the double symbol A/33/223-S/12830. Replaced by A/33/223/Rev.1-S/12830/Rev.1	
S/12830/ Rev.1	25 October 1978	<i>Idem</i>		Mimeographed. Circulated under the double symbol A/33/223/Rev.1-S/12830/Rev.1	
S/12858/ Add.2	20 November 1978	a	Special report of the Special Committee against <i>Apartheid</i> on recent developments in the relations between Israel and South Africa	Circulated under the double symbol A/33/22/Add.2-S/12858/Add.2 (see <i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 22A</i>)	
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- i Complaint by Angola
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DOCUMENT S/12871

Note verbale dated 25 September 1978 from the Mission of Zambia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[3 October 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note dated 18 May 1978 on the question of the arms embargo imposed against South Africa by the Security Council in its resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to state the following.

Zambia is totally committed to the eradication of the devilish and obnoxious system of *apartheid*, which is the core of the existing scourge of racism and white minority rule, not only in South Africa but also in Zimbabwe and Namibia. To this end the Government and People of Zambia have spared no effort and have consistently advocated effective punitive international action against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa is but one of the measures that Zambia has repeatedly advocated. It goes without saying, therefore, that Zambia welcomes the adoption by the Security Council, albeit belatedly, of resolution 418 (1977) in this regard. Zambia does not have any military collaboration with the racist régime of South

Africa and, in furtherance of the objective of eradicating the *apartheid* system in South Africa, will co-operate fully with the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) to monitor the observance of the arms embargo.

It is the hope of the Government of Zambia that all members of the Security Council will, in future, be motivated to support, in good time, necessary measures against South Africa in order to enhance the effectiveness of those measures. The mandatory arms embargo was imposed against South Africa after the Fascist régime of that country acquired huge stockpiles of weapons and accumulated the technical know-how to set up its own armaments industry. In this regard, it is the considered view of the Government of Zambia that the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa should also include the prohibition of the purchase by any State of arms manufactured by South Africa or any other arms in its arsenal which it might wish to resell.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia requests that this note should be circulated to all Member States as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12875*

Letter dated 2 October 1978 from the representative of Sri Lanka to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[3 October 1978]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a communiqué issued today at the extraordinary meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have this communiqué circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) B. J. FERNANDO
Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Communiqué issued at the extraordinary meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries on 2 October 1978

1. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries met in extraordinary meeting at the United Nations on 2 October 1978 in order to consider action on issues before the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of special concern to the non-aligned countries.

2. They reaffirmed the vital need to translate into action the decisions of the final Declaration adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade^a and resolved to take all measures to promote its implementation. To this end, they agreed, *inter alia*, on the following items of priority on the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly:

- 24 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
- 26 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte
- 27 Question of Namibia [resolutions 32/9 A to H of 4 November 1977 and S-9/2 of 3 May 1978 and decision 32/307 of 4 November 1977]
- 28 Question of Cyprus
- 30 The situation in the Middle East
- 31 Question of Palestine
- 32 Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa [resolutions 32/105 A to N of 14 December and 32/105 O of 16 December 1977 and decision 32/406 of 16 November 1977]
- 50 Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security
- 93 Question of Southern Rhodesia

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/279-S/12875.

^a See A/33/206.

95 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in southern Africa

125 Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session [resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, para. 115]

50 Non-interference in internal affairs of States. The spreading use of mercenaries

Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development

Implementation of decisions adopted by Ministers for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade relating to economic issues

3. The Ministers resolved that pursuance of the above items and all other items on the agenda of the sessions of the General Assembly should be in accordance with the principles and guidelines indicated at non-aligned summit conferences and other meetings of the non-aligned, the most recent of which was the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs held at Belgrade. They renewed the mandate of the non-aligned working groups, contact groups and drafting groups.

4. The Ministers resolved to act in close co-operation with each other in respect of these and other issues of special concern to the non-aligned.

5. The Middle East crisis, the core of which is the question of Palestine, remains one of the most dangerous focal points of a possible world conflict.

6. The Ministers reaffirmed that a just peace in the region could not be established except within the framework of a solution based on total Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and on the basis of restoring to the Palestinian people their national, legal and inalienable rights and the practice of these rights, including the right to return, self-determination and setting up their national and independent State in Palestine, independent and equal participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole representative of the Palestinian people, in all conferences and international activities and spheres concerned with the Palestinian problem and offering all forms of support to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab States in their struggle to end Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories.

7. The Ministers also recalled in their entirety the sections relating to the Middle East and the question of Palestine in the Belgrade Declaration.

8. The Ministers requested the Co-ordinating Bureau to continue consultations, in particular with the Palestine Liberation Organization, on the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to the study of the Palestinian question, with a view to adopting measures leading to the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions relevant to the withdrawal from Palestine and Arab occupied lands, and the realization of the national and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

9. In the face of the grave events that have taken place in Nicaragua, where the massive use of force has resulted in loss of numerous lives and property and during which the Government of Nicaragua has violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a neighboring State, disturbing the peace and stability of the area, the Ministers expressed their deep concern and decided to follow the development of the situation closely.

10. The Ministers strongly condemned the racist régimes in southern Africa which have continued their policy of political repression, racism, *apartheid* and genocide in flagrant violation of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations and all norms of civilized international conduct. They expressed grave

concern at the build-up of arms, particularly arms in southern Africa, and called for the strict implementation of the mandatory arms embargo instituted by Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

11. The Ministers further condemned the repeated acts of wanton aggression by the racist régimes against Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Botswana and pledged support to these countries in their valiant efforts to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

12. The Ministers considered the question of Namibia in the light of renewed efforts at the level of the Security Council to bring an end to South Africa's continued illegal occupation and to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control. To this end, they noted the establishment, under the authority of the Security Council, of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

13. They recognized that this hopeful development for a settlement had come about mainly because of the supreme sacrifices made by the people of Namibia for their national liberation. They commended the Namibian liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), for having waged a heroic struggle and for its excellent display of statesmanship in the negotiations which made the Security Council action possible. They pledged the continued support of all non-aligned countries for SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. Having regard to the critical stage reached in the struggle for the liberation of Namibia, the Ministers decided to admit SWAPO as a full-fledged member of the non-aligned movement.

14. The Ministers condemned the racist régime of South Africa for its intransigence and arrogant attempts to hold sham elections in Namibia and thus install its puppets to power. They demanded that South Africa should desist forthwith from carrying out unilateral measures in Namibia in utter defiance of the United Nations, and that it should co-operate with the Security Council in its efforts to resolve the problem of Namibia.

15. The Ministers observed that in Zimbabwe the so-called Salisbury agreement of March 1978 had already collapsed and condemned all attempts by the Smith régime to maintain its desperate and savage control over the people of Zimbabwe. The Ministers were of the view that a permanent solution to the problem of Zimbabwe was possible only on the basis of the total transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe under the Patriotic Front.

16. The Ministers paid tribute to the peoples of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia in their courageous battle to eradicate colonialism, racism and *apartheid* in southern Africa in the face of inhuman repression, imprisonment, brutality and assassination, and pledged full solidarity with them.

17. The Ministers called for the speedy implementation of the Action Programme for Economic Co-operation adopted at Belgrade.

18. They welcomed and endorsed the Declaration adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the States members of the Group of 77 on 29 September 1978,^b which focuses on the important economic issues facing the non-aligned and developing countries and which also highlights the priority economic issues before the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, and, considering the part played by the non-aligned countries in the Group of 77, reiterated the view expressed at the fifth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo, that the movement should "continue to maintain and strengthen its solidarity with the Group of 77".^c

19. The Ministers urged those countries which had not yet done so to accede to the Convention which would make operational the Solidarity Fund for Economic and Social Development of the Non-Aligned Countries.

^b See A/33/278.

^c A/31/197, annex II, Sect. IV, para. 8.

DOCUMENT S/12876

**Letter dated 13 September 1978 from the representative of Cape Verde
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]
[3 October 1978]

I have the honour to present my compliments and to transmit to you herewith the following reply from the Government of the Republic of Cape Verde to your note of 18 May 1978:

(a) The Government of the Republic of Cape Verde is in full agreement with Security Council resolution 418 (1977);

(b) The Government of the Republic of Cape Verde does not maintain relations of any kind with the régime in South Africa.

(Signed) Amaro Alexandre DA LUZ
Permanent Representative of Cape Verde
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12877*

Letter dated 2 October 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[3 October 1978]

I have the honour to refer to a letter from the representative of Turkey dated 27 September 1978 [S/12867], whose annex contained a document issued by Mr. Rauf Denктаş which quotes malicious allegations made against the President of Cyprus before the Assize Court of Larnaca by a certain Poyadjis, who stood accused of a series of crimes. That statement, made during those proceedings, proved to be fabricated and false by irrefutable evidence of facts and was thus completely demolished.

Mr. Denктаş gives extracts of that false statement and expands on them, but deliberately omits to mention that those allegations were definitely negated during those proceedings; furthermore, he evades reference to the judgement of the Court, which was already issued on that date.

The judgement clearly establishes that the allegations in question were flatly contradicted in every detail by Poyadjis' previous voluntary statement and by evidence of his own witness, Vassos Pavlides, as well as by the register of the National Guard, which conclusively shows that Achilleas Kyprianou and Poyadjis never served in

the same camp and therefore proves that the latter was lying when he said that he had the opportunity to become acquainted with Achilleas Kyprianou while serving in the same group with him.

The bench, having examined the evidence and analysed the version of the accused, came to the following conclusion: "We are of the opinion that the accused, by distorting certain facts and existing realities and after embroidering details thereon, fabricated a satanic story for evil purposes".

Of significance is the peculiar antithesis between Mr. Denктаş seeking talks with the President of Cyprus, ostensibly in a move for co-operation towards solving the internal problem of Cyprus, and at the same time publicly trying to throw mud at the President by the illegal use of false allegations.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/282-S/12877.

DOCUMENT S/12878*

Letter dated 3 October 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[4 October 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 3 October 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/283-S/12878.

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 3 October 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a resolution of the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, dated 2 October 1978, which concerns the representation of the Republic of Cyprus at the United Nations and the policy of the Turkish Cypriot community for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

I should be grateful if this letter and the resolution annexed herewith were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION

The Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus

Reiterates its unanimously adopted resolution No. 1 of 5 November 1976 [See S/12240] that there was no legal and constitutional head of State in Cyprus to reflect the bicomunal nature of the State and that the head of the Greek Cypriot Administration could not represent the Republic or the Turkish community of Cyprus;

Unanimously resolves that Mr. Kyprianou, the present head of the Greek Cypriot Administration, cannot represent the Republic or the Turkish community of Cyprus; and,

Reminding the world public opinion that the organs and persons who could represent the Turkish Cypriots were freely determined by the general elections held in June 1976 in accordance with the Constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus,

Reiterates the fact that, in order that the new Federal Republic of Cyprus may be established, it would be necessary for the Cyprus problem to be solved in accordance with the results achieved by the intercommunal talks held in Vienna and within the framework of the agreement reached in principle between Mr. Denktaş and the late Archbishop Makarios on 12 February, 1977; and

Stresses from this point of view the necessity for the commencement of the intercommunal talks as soon as possible;

Having regard to the aforesaid considerations unanimously:

(a) *Calls upon* the United Nations organization and its distinguished Secretary-General to take the necessary steps towards the commencement of intercommunal talks;

(b) *Declares* that the problem cannot be solved by unilateral actions;

(c) *Denounces* such unilateral actions.

DOCUMENT S/12879*

Letter dated 5 October 1978 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/French]
[5 October 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of two appeals dated 5 October 1978 by the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning the situation in Lebanon.

I have the honour to request that you should have these urgent appeals circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council and that you should publicize them as widely as possible.

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Appeals dated 5 October 1978 by the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning the situation in Lebanon

I

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announces today, Thursday, that on Wednesday its delegation in Lebanon launched an appeal to the parties concerned to conclude a truce for the evacuation of the wounded in the eastern part of Beirut.

ICRC states that its delegation in Lebanon and the Lebanese Red Cross are finding it increasingly difficult to go to the relief of the combat victims. The ICRC emergency dispensary in the Ashrafieh district—which has already taken in dozens of wounded since the end of September—could not be reached with fresh supplies of medicaments and food on 4 October because of the intense gunfire.

Another matter of concern for ICRC and the Lebanese Red Cross is the situation of tens of thousands of East Beirut inhabitants who have fled to the mountains. A credit of 500,000 Swiss francs has been opened, according to ICRC, to enable local purchases of goods to be made in aid of these refugees. ICRC is taking steps to reinforce its delegation in Lebanon,

which at present is composed of a dozen delegates and about 30 Lebanese employees.

The Lebanese Red Cross appeals urgently to the Lebanese head of State, to all world Powers, to the United Nations and to all national Red Cross societies throughout the world to provide aid and to intercede to put an end to the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people in Lebanon. The civilian population, hospitals, dispensaries, public shelters and homes—none have been spared.

On behalf of humanity, on behalf of the most elementary principles of human rights, on behalf of the children, women and old people who are dying by the hundreds, we beg you to act.

II

The delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Lebanon launched on 4 October 1978 an appeal to the parties concerned to conclude a truce for the evacuation of the wounded in the eastern part of Beirut.

The ICRC and the Lebanese Red Cross are finding it increasingly difficult to go to the relief of the combat victims. The ICRC emergency dispensary in the Ashrafieh district—which has already taken in dozens of wounded since the end of September—could not be reached with fresh supplies of medicaments and food on 4 October because of the intense gunfire.

Another matter of concern for ICRC and the Lebanese Red Cross is the situation of tens of thousands of East Beirut inhabitants who have fled to the mountains. A credit of 500,000 Swiss francs has been opened to enable the ICRC delegation to make local purchases of goods in aid of these refugees. In Geneva, ICRC is taking steps to reinforce its delegation in Lebanon, which at present is composed of a dozen delegates and about 30 Lebanese employees. It intends to dispatch at short notice a dozen more delegates, doctors and nurses. In addition, an appeal is in preparation asking donors (mainly Governments and national Red Cross Societies) to come forward with more funds.

This appeal will be launched as soon as cessation of the very severe fighting will allow an estimate to be made of the number of wounded, homeless and displaced persons.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/288-S/12879.

Letter dated 5 October 1978 from the representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[5 October 1978]

As you know, in the course of the efforts of the Five to facilitate an internationally-acceptable settlement of the Namibia question, we have consulted all the political parties in Namibia. One of those parties, the Namibia National Front, has addressed the enclosed statement to us with the request that it should be brought to the attention of Member States. Because the Namibia National Front did not participate in the proceedings of the Security Council on 29-30 September 1978 [2087th and 2088th meetings], we request, without commitment as to the substance of the views stated, that this letter and its enclosure should be circulated as a document of the Council.

(Signed) William H. BARTON
Permanent Representative of Canada
to the United Nations

(Signed) Rüdiger VON WECHMAR
Permanent Representative of the
Federal Republic of Germany
to the United Nations

(Signed) Jacques LEPRETTE
Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations

(Signed) Ivor RICHARD
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations

(Signed) Andrew YOUNG
Permanent Representative of the
United States of America
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement dated 29 September 1978 by Mr. R. V. Rukoro

We are deeply conscious of the importance of this occasion and the deliberations on which we are embarking here. There can be no doubt that the success or failure of these deliberations and the Secretary-General's subsequent efforts to implement the present resolution will determine the future shape of the southern African continent itself. The Central Committee of the Namibia National Front (NNF) has asked me to set before you today, in clear and comprehensive terms, the view it takes of this enterprise and to emphasize the importance which it attaches to the success of these deliberations.

Over the past year and a half, painstaking negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the Namibia problem have been undertaken by the five Western States members of the Security Council with the support of the five front-line African States and, indeed, the whole international community. At this juncture, the fruits of those negotiations are in jeopardy. The South African Government, faced with the inevitable collapse of its chosen group, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, has decided to reject the recommendations of the Secretary-General and to embark upon an internal settlement devised to install a puppet government controlled from Pretoria. We have categorically rejected this move on the part of South Africa and would continue to oppose any imposition of puppet structures by South Africa on our people and country.

The NNF, an alliance of political parties and patriotic groups in Namibia, is a progressive power bloc representing a wide

section of the Namibian population. We have over a long period of time fought relentlessly for genuine national independence and social justice and will continue to do so until these goals are achieved.

The NNF supports the recommendations of the Secretary-General and consequently rejects and opposes the decision of the South African Government to proceed unilaterally with bogus elections in Namibia. We are determined to continue our just struggle for self-determination and national independence.

The NNF has at all times insisted that the necessary prerequisite for free and fair elections in Namibia must include, *inter alia*, the cessation of all hostile acts, the withdrawal of all but 1,500 South African troops as stipulated in document S/12636 of 10 April 1978, the release of all political detainees including those held outside Namibia, and the repeal of all discriminatory legislation and administrative rules. We believe that, until the conditions set out above have been attained, and all Namibian exiles who so wish have returned to Namibia, no fair election campaign is possible. In the light of the aforementioned, the NNF considers April 1979 to be the very earliest date to be considered for the holding of elections to elect members of the Constituent Assembly. The NNF shares the view of the Secretary-General that it should be the prerogative of the Constituent Assembly to determine the actual date of independence.

The NNF feels that the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) must of necessity comprise sufficient numbers to enable it to undertake effectively all tasks envisaged in the proposals contained in document S/12636. Accordingly, the NNF fully supports the Secretary-General's recommendations to the Security Council in this regard. The NNF, however, insists that proper and adequate consultation regarding the composition of the military component of UNTAG must take place with all the parties concerned.

The views expressed in the paragraph above apply equally to the civilian component of UNTAG. The concept of a civil police component of UNTAG, as contained in paragraphs 28-30 of the Secretary-General's report [S/12827] and as further elucidated by the Secretary-General, appears to be consistent with the proposals contained in paragraph 9 of document S/12636.

The NNF notes that the Secretary-General's report is silent on the process of registration of voters initiated by the Administrator-General of Namibia. The NNF has on various occasions expressed its strong criticism of the unilateral action taken by the South African representative in proclaiming regulations which, in terms of paragraph 5 of document S/12636, required the prior approval of the United Nations Special Representative for Namibia, and which, *inter alia*, determine the qualifications of voters. The NNF therefore suggests that the question of registration of voters should stand over for negotiation between the Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, and the Administrator-General, once the report of the Secretary-General is approved by the Security Council and the official transition period begins. A compromise can then be considered as suggested by the NNF in previous statements:

(a) The extension of the period of registration to about 31 December 1978, with additional appropriate extensions where necessary for exiles or detainees at present outside Namibia to return;

(b) The compilation of a central voters roll as specified in the Western proposal; a reasonable opportunity thereafter to challenge registrations;

(c) Adequate safeguards during the elections to ensure against multiple voting by persons who have registered more than once;

(d) A provision to the effect that birth or residence in the Port and settlement of Walvis Bay should be deemed to be birth or residence in Namibia.

The NNF considers the Secretary-General's report to be both realistic and to present the only practical possibility of a peaceful solution to the Namibian problem which would be in the interest of the Namibian people and, indeed, of all South Africa.

We must also point out here that this august body and particularly the five Western Powers will fail in their duty if effective and persuasive action is not contemplated and taken against the new devices of the Pretoria régime aimed at installing a puppet government in Namibia.

In conclusion, the NNF will fail in its duty if we do not comment on some aspects of the resolution just adopted by the Security Council. There is, in our view, no justification whatsoever for SWAPO—a party that has been rather intransigent over the past few months—to be singled out and praised for its preparedness “to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report” [resolution 435 (1978)]. Moreover, SWAPO-N is not the only political movement in Namibia that is prepared to co-operate with the implementation of the Secretary-General's report. As already pointed out, the NNF was the very first and for a long time the only movement that gave

unqualified support to the efforts of the Five and subsequent negotiations. We therefore feel that the Council's deliberations on the Namibia question should not be used as a platform for partisan and divisive politics, especially by those who have recently made an appeal to the Africans in Namibia to rise and reject Vorster's proposed elections. In our view, some of the paragraphs of this resolution are providing ammunition to the South African Government's efforts to question the impartiality of this body.

As regards impartiality, we believe that it is not only essential to safeguard the impartial implementation of the Security Council's plan at the Secretariat level but it is also very important for the political organ, the Security Council, that draws up that plan to involve all the Namibian political parties without favour or fear. Impartiality cannot be argued on good foundation while a large, the largest, segment of the Namibian liberation movement is excluded from the deliberations of the Council. We believe that an equitable arrangement to accommodate all the Namibian political parties can and must be worked out. We trust that our approach will commend itself to you as constructive and as being in accord with both the spirit and the letter of free and fair elections as envisaged in Council resolution 385 (1976).

DOCUMENT S/12881*

Letter dated 4 October 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[5 October 1978]

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 4 October 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 4 October 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to a letter dated 2 October 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Zenon Rossides, the representative of the Greek Cypriot Administration [S/12877].

In his letter, Mr. Rossides has unfortunately failed to state the fact that Mr. Poyadjis, who has claimed that Mr. Achilleas Spyros Kyprianou, the son of the Greek Cypriot “President”, is the leader of a new underground terrorist organization in the south and has been involved in various illegal activities, has since appealed to the High Court. Therefore, the allegation of Mr. Rossides that the statement of Mr. Poyadjis “proved to be fabricated and false” is a matter yet to be finally decided and adjudicated upon.

It should, however, be pointed out that the Court which so swiftly decided to reject these statements by an EOKA man has not been constituted in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and, during the period 1963-1974, acted as a political throng of the illegal and unconstitutional Greek Cypriot Administration in order to deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their constitutional rights as well as of their basic human rights. It is significant that, although hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were murdered and thousands were wounded or maimed during these 11 years, not a single Greek Cypriot was tried or convicted by “the courts” which now try a political opponent

of Mr. Kyprianou. Similarly, although Turkish property in 103 villages was destroyed and/or looted and all conceivable rights of the Turkish Cypriots were denied for 11 years, these “Greek Cypriot courts” never provided justice to the Turkish Cypriots and continued to do to the Turks what the gunmen could not do.

Furthermore, it is also important to note that the Greek Cypriot police, which is another unconstitutional organization, has failed to produce relevant documents which they had confiscated from Mr. Poyadjis substantiating his statements regarding the involvement of Mr. Kyprianou's son in the said plot.

The purpose of the Turkish Cypriot side in highlighting this event was to let the General Assembly and the Security Council know the motivating factors which prevent Mr. Kyprianou from starting a dialogue with the Turkish Cypriot side for the settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a bi-zonal federal system as agreed between the late Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Rauf R. Denktas. It is again significant that the presentation of a relevant document by the Turkish Cypriot side to the General Assembly and the Security Council is being used by Mr. Rossides as a new reason for not starting the dialogue with the Turkish Cypriot side. While we reject the description of my previous letter [S/12867] and its annexes as “mud-throwing”, it will be pertinent to state that, if allegations of mud-throwing can suffice to prevent the intercommunal dialogue from starting, the Turkish Cypriot side, and especially Mr. Denktas, would have innumerable causes for rejecting a dialogue with the Greek Cypriot side. The multitude of baseless, vulgar and insulting allegations made by the Greek Cypriot side against the Turkish Cypriot leaders in particular, and the Turkish Cypriot community in general, would fill a number of volumes; and yet in his meeting with you today, Mr. Denktas has renewed his call for the resumption of the dialogue between the two communities. He has offered to meet Mr. Kyprianou with or without an agenda while the two leaders are in New York, believing that such a meeting will be fruitful from all points of view. Again, in his appeal to the Islamic countries today, Mr. Denktas has reiterated the flexibility of the Turkish Cypriot side and has renewed his positive stand for the resumption of the intercommunal dialogue which you and all those who understand the Cyprus problem well know is the only way to finding peace in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/290-S/12881.

DOCUMENT S/12884

Note verbale dated 6 October 1978 from the representative of Zambia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[6 October 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations has the honour to transmit to the Secretary-General the following telex message addressed to him by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Mr. K. D. Kaunda:

"I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Zambia has decided with immediate effect, to use the southern route for transportation of its goods.

"You will remember that, in January 1973 and in furtherance of the United Nations' decision to impose mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, Zambia, despite exemption granted at our request, imposed a ban on the use of the route through Rhodesia for the transportation of her goods. This action was in addition to the total cessation of trade with Rhodesia with the exception of electricity from the jointly owned Kariba Dam. We have maintained this ban throughout the last six years and would have wished to continue with it except for a number of factors which now make it imperative for us to use the southern route again. I would wish you to be fully briefed on this situation in view of the fact that the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia was made by the United Nations.

"Zambia's annual requirements of fertilizer are approximately 200,000 tonnes of both nitrogenous and superphosphate fertilizers. Of this quantity, only 20,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate are manufactured locally, leaving the rest to be imported. Normally, arrangements for the imported fertilizers are finalized by January of each year. But this year, as a result of the non-availability of foreign exchange occasioned by low copper prices on the world market, it was not possible to place orders for this fertilizer. It was not until bilateral aid had been secured from the European Economic Community, the United States and Japan that it was possible to place orders from these sources.

"Although the suppliers in these countries did their best to expedite delivery, fertilizer did not start arriving at Beira, which was the only port then free to receive it, until July. Dar es Salaam was unable to handle the fertilizer. Initially, up to 60,000 tonnes were off-loaded at Beira for transshipment on the Beira-Moatize Railway and then on to Zambia by

road. Thereafter there was no more storage space at Beira and the rest of the remaining fertilizer—88,400 tonnes—was re-directed to the port of Maputo, also in Mozambique. So far, approximately 58,000 tonnes have been off-loaded at Maputo. But, as with Beira, it has now been established that the port cannot take any more fertilizer. We have therefore been compelled to find alternative ports in South Africa for the off-loading of the remaining 30,000 tonnes which had been planned for off-loading at Maputo. The decision to off-load at Beira and Maputo was in itself a desperate move because it will not be possible for all this fertilizer to reach Zambia before the planting season which is less than one month away. Indeed, we estimate that slightly less than 20,000 tonnes of that fertilizer in Beira will have reached Zambia by planting time. With respect to the fertilizer off-loaded recently at Maputo—58,000 tonnes—, only 20,000 tonnes have reached Zambia. It had been hoped to marshal sufficient rail wagons to transport from Maputo an average of 1,000 tonnes a day to Francistown and sufficient road trucks to tranship by road at the same rate from Francistown to Livingstone. But the operation has had many teething problems and these planned targets are as yet far from being achieved. But even if they had been capable of achievement, it would not have been possible, in the time allowed, to bring in all the fertilizer, both that at Maputo and that still on the high seas which was due to off-load at Maputo.

"Because of the imperative need to get all this fertilizer into the country in the remaining time, we have been compelled to divert the undischarged ships to South African ports. In addition to the problem of fertilizer, we also have the problem of a large tonnage of copper at the mines—approximately 70,000 tonnes—which cannot be transported to Dar es Salaam because of the limited capacity of the road and rail routes. It has also been decided to tranship this copper by rail through the southern route.

"I shall be most grateful if you will take note of this situation."

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zambia has the honour to request that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12885

Letter dated 6 October 1978 from the representative of India to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[6 October 1978]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, I have the honour to inform you that at its 316th meeting, today, the Committee considered the reported visit to the United States of America of Ian Smith and members of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. The Com-

mittee heard a statement from the representative of the United States in which he said, *inter alia*, that the United States Government had granted visas to Ian Smith and some of his colleagues to visit the United States. The Committee also heard from the observer of the Organization of African Unity the statement adopted by the African Group at the United Nations.

The Committee decided that, in view of the urgency and seriousness of this matter, the texts of the statement of the African Group and that of the representative of the United States, both herewith attached, should be transmitted to the Security Council for appropriate action by the Council.

I have the honour to request that this letter and its annexes should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Rikhi JAIPAL
Permanent Representative of India
to the United Nations*

ANNEX I

Statement of the representative of the United States of America

We have been involved jointly with the United Kingdom in a major initiative to settle the Rhodesian conflict.

Our involvement in this effort has been predicated from the outset on our commitment to democratic majority-ruled Governments in southern Africa. That commitment has not changed.

However, the situation has become increasingly dangerous in Rhodesia itself. As conditions worsen, so, too, do the prospects for resolving the conflict in a way that will bring peace and security to the people of Zimbabwe and to the region as a whole.

Over the past 18 months, we have spared no effort to try to bring the parties together. To our great regret, those efforts have thus far proved unsuccessful.

The situation is such that we cannot afford merely to let events take their course. We must, if anything, redouble our efforts.

Nor can we afford to miss any opportunity, no matter how remote it may seem, to impress upon the parties the need for negotiation and compromise as the only alternative to an increasingly brutal war.

Last April, Secretaries Owen and Vance visited Dar es Salaam and Salisbury in an effort to reconcile the differences between the parties. Their visit to Salisbury underscored our determination to maintain a dialogue with all parties in an effort to bring about a settlement.

As you know, Ian Smith and the other members of the Salisbury Executive Council have sought permission to visit the United States in response to an invitation issued by 27 members of the United States Senate.

We have weighed that request with utmost care, having in mind our responsibilities as a Member of the United Nations and our desire to see an end to the Rhodesian conflict.

In the interest of making every effort to conclude a Rhodesian settlement, we have decided, as an exceptional matter, to grant Smith and other Executive Council members permission to visit the United States.

We intend to use this unique opportunity to continue the discussions with Smith and his colleagues to convince them of the necessity of moving towards a genuine transfer to majority rule.

We continue to regard the Anglo-American proposals as the basis for such a settlement.

We believe that this transfer of power can only take place by means of a negotiated settlement calling for free and fair internationally supervised elections through which the will of the people of Zimbabwe can be expressed.

We will continue to comply with Security Council sanctions until the negotiation process leads to the formation of a legal, internationally recognized Government in that country.

ANNEX II

Statement of the African Group

The African Group at the United Nations has learnt with dismay and profound concern of the decision of the Government of the United States to allow entry to the head of the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith. The Group is constrained to remind the United States Administra-

tion that its decision is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and in direct violation of the letter and spirit of the Security Council resolutions, particularly resolutions 253 (1968) and 423 (1978). In the view of the African Group, this development casts serious doubts on the Administration's much vaunted "new policies" towards our continent. It would also appear to be intended to give credibility to Smith's claim to have evolved an internal settlement, a claim which has not only been rejected but also condemned as a colossal fraud by the Security Council in resolution 423 (1978), paragraph 2, which "declares illegal and unacceptable any internal settlement concluded under the auspices of the illegal régime and calls upon all States not to accord any recognition to such a settlement."

Article 2, paragraph 5, of the Charter states that "all Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action". While the African Group recognizes the principle of sovereignty of States, it, however, wishes to remind the United States Administration that "this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII", as stated in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. The Group also recalls, especially, paragraph 5 b of resolution 253 (1968), in which the Council calls on all States to

"Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe to be ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia and whom they have reason to believe to have furthered or encouraged, or to be likely to further or encourage, the unlawful actions of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia or any activities which are calculated to evade any measure decided upon in this resolution or resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966".

Ian Smith is the personification of the illegality in Southern Rhodesia.

The United States Government voted positively for that resolution and is therefore bound by its terms, in accordance with the provisions in Article 25 of the Charter, which states: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter".

The decision of the United States Administration, if implemented, would merely serve to provide solace to the Smith régime and certainly undermine further the efforts of the international community to isolate that illegal régime. The basic factor of seizure of power by Smith and a handful of white supporters from the British Crown to pre-empt independence and self-determination for the 6 million Africans continues to be the problem. This no nation should circumvent by any manoeuvres.

It is evident that the rebel leader would naturally interpret the gesture as proof of acceptability of his illegal régime and a weakening of the international community's commitment against it. Furthermore, the gesture will also serve to encourage the rebel leader to intensify his persistent acts of aggression against the independent African States of Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. Such a gesture to the rebel leader can only serve to embolden the illegal régime in its recalcitrance and continued defiance of the will of the international community, enable the rebel leader to persist in his treasonable acts against the administering Power and further encourage him in his policies of repression and callous brutality against the people of Zimbabwe.

In spite of this retrogressive step, the African Group would like to believe that the United States Administration is still interested in exploring the possibility of a negotiated solution to the Zimbabwe question. The African Group recalls also that the United States Administration is one of the co-authors of the Anglo-American proposals for settlement of the problem of Zimbabwe. It is logical to expect that the United States Administration would scrupulously avoid any acts which would further aggravate an already depressing situation or place its own settlement proposals in jeopardy.

Africa expects the United States Administration, which has made pronouncements to the effect that the respect for human rights constitutes one of the corner-stones of its foreign policy, to rescind its decision, bearing in mind the morality inherent in the burning issues facing mankind today in southern Africa,

as well as the legal and binding obligation it has to discharge under the Charter as a permanent member of the Security Council.

The African Group also appeals to all States to deny transit facilities to the rebel Ian Smith and his collaborators.

The African Group draws the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly to this act which violates relevant United Nations resolutions, and urges these bodies to take urgent and appropriate action. For its part, the African Group expresses its total and unflinching support for the Patriotic Front.

DOCUMENT S/12886*

Letter dated 6 October 1978 from the representative of Burundi to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[6 October 1978]

I have the honour, on behalf of the Group of African States at the United Nations, to request you to circulate as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council the attached statement made by the African Group regarding the visit of the leader of the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith, to the United States of America.

(Signed) Artémon SIMBANANIYE
Permanent Representative of Burundi
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement of the African Group regarding the visit of the leader of the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia to the United States of America

[Same text as annex II of document S/12885 above.]

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/291-S/12886.

DOCUMENT S/12887

India, Kuwait, Mauritius and Nigeria: draft resolution

[Original: English]
[10 October 1978]

The Security Council,

... [text identical with that of document S/12887/Rev.1, with the exception of paragraph 4, which reads as follows:]

4. Expresses the hope that the United States of America will continue to exert its influence on Ian Smith to transfer power to genuine majority rule without further delay.

DOCUMENT S/12888

Letter dated 9 October 1978 from the representative of Chad to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[9 October 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you the Agreement between the Government of Chad and the Chad National Liberation Front—People's Liberation Forces (Armed Forces of the North), signed on 16 September 1977 at Khartoum.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) B. DESSANDE
Permanent Representative of Chad
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Agreement between the Government of Chad and the Chad National Liberation Front—People's Liberation Forces dated 16 September 1977

1. Talks were held at Khartoum from 2 to 15 September 1977 between the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Chad, headed by Colonel Djime Mamari Ngakinar, Vice-President of the Supreme Military Council, and the delegation of the People's Liberation Forces (Armed Forces of the North), led by Mr. Hissain Habre, President of the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North.

The members of the two delegations were:

For the Government

Colonel Djime Mamari Ngakinar, Vice-President of the Supreme Military Council;

Mr. Kotiga Guerinan, Minister of the Interior and Security;

Mr. Kérim Togoï, Minister of the Economy, Planning and Transport;

Mr. Galmal Youssoubomi Kirmiss, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation;

Mr. Boukar Abdoul, Director-General of Foreign Affairs;

Mr. Mahamat Abdelkerim, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Chad at Khartoum;

Mr. Mahamat Senoussi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Chad at Tripoli (designate).

For the Armed Forces of the North

Mr. Hissein Habre, President of the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North;

Mr. Mahamat Nouri, Inspector General of the Armed Forces of the North;

Mr. Taha Youssouf, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the North;

Mr. Ali Tahier, Secretary, Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North.

2. The purpose of these talks was to reach a peaceful solution to the armed conflict going on in Chad between the Chad Armed Forces and the People's Liberation Forces (Armed Forces of the North), to lay the foundations for national unity and to create a favourable social and political climate for mobilizing potential and human and material energies for the development of Chad.

3. The two delegations had separate discussions with President Nimeiri on the morning of Sunday, 4 September, and with Mr. Mansour Khalid, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, during the evening of Thursday, 1 September. The two delegations met in the presence of Mr. Izzeldine Hamid, Minister of State of the Council of Ministers, representing President Nimeiri, on Friday, 2, Sunday, 4, Wednesday, 7, Thursday, 8, Friday, 9, Sunday, 11, Wednesday, 14, Thursday, 15 and Friday, 16 September.

Also present at these meetings, on the Sudanese side, were:

Mr. Khalifa Karrar, Deputy Head of National Security;

Mr. Nur Eldine Satti, First Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

4. In his discussions with the two delegations, President Nimeiri stated that the Sudan and Egypt would act as guarantors of the implementation of any agreement resulting from the talks and that they would give Chad any assistance that would strengthen national unity and promote economic and social development in Chad.

5. The two parties agreed on the following principles:

(a) The existence of a genuine political willingness to reach an over-all solution of the present problem.

The two parties are also inspired by a sense of national responsibility and by the certainty that, in existing circumstances, peace and reconciliation are the only solution to the disputes between brothers in Chad that have gone on for some 10 years.

(b) The objective conditions and circumstances are more propitious than they have ever been for ending the armed conflicts. From this springs the necessity of reaching agreement as soon as possible.

(c) The two parties are aware that there are external forces exploiting political conflicts in Chad for their own benefit. The occupation of one part of Chad's territory is only one glaring example of that fact. In the circumstances, national unity has become even more essential in order to confront the common enemy.

(d) The two parties express their confidence in each other and have displayed frankness and foresight with a view to establishing peace and finding a just and lasting solution that will

take into account the real political situation in Chad and the social and cultural components that require the present régime and the organizations of the opposition to undertake the task of devising a formula that will satisfy the aspirations of all parties.

(e) The two parties affirm their determination to have these talks, and the subsequent steps and measures, conducted in a climate of absolute secrecy, so that they may not serve as fertile soil for hostile propaganda campaigns and so that these efforts may not be misinterpreted by certain enemy circles.

6. The two parties reached agreement that the first step towards the achievement of national unity in Chad would be a general amnesty for all political opponents within and outside Chad. The Supreme Military Council, the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North and all other fronts that support this Agreement will immediately order a cease-fire. It is only then that the climate will be favourable for carrying out the following steps:

7. The proclamation of general amnesty and the cease-fire will be followed by the release of all political detainees and prisoners.

8. The necessary measures will be taken promptly to form a Provisional Government of National Unity in which the representatives of the main opposition movements and of all social strata will participate.

To this end consultations will take place between the Supreme Military Council and the leadership group or groups of any opposition movements which choose to support the general amnesty and the call for national reconciliation.

9. The Provisional Government or the Provisional Government of National Unity will establish a detailed political programme and commit itself to applying it promptly according to a precise timetable.

The following points should be included in this political programme:

(a) General elections with a view to electing a constituent assembly.

(b) Drawing up of a new constitution and establishment of new institutions.

(c) Reorganization of the armed forces, the gendarmerie, the police and the national and nomad guard.

(d) Establishment of a plan of work for the liberation of occupied Chad territories.

(e) Revision of unequal and unjust agreements in force with other countries.

(f) Strengthening of relations with Arab, African and other friendly countries.

(g) Economic revival and taking over the key sectors of the national economy.

(h) Reorganization of the central and territorial administration and of the major state and para-state services.

(i) Reconstruction of regions devastated because of the armed conflict.

10. Genuine and sincere commitment to reconciliation with all other opposition factions.

11. Guaranteeing and respecting the legal rights of all Chad citizens and fundamental freedoms: freedom of expression, of movement, of association, of the press, etc.

12. The absorption of the Armed Forces of the North in the Chad National Army is accepted. Practical arrangements for their integration and their billeting and the settlement of material and administrative questions will be decided after the general amnesty and the cease-fire by a joint military committee comprised of persons from the two parties, according to the following principles:

(a) There shall be no transfers or individual assignments outside the Armed Forces of the North during the transitional period.

(b) Stationing within a military region shall be carried out according to unit, the numbers in any unit being not less than one company.

13. Formation of a bipartisan political and military committee to monitor and implement the Agreement. If necessary, this committee may, with the participation of the Sudanese side, be converted into a committee to arbitrate disputes concerning the provisions of the Agreement.

14. When the Agreement comes into force, the Armed Forces of the North shall publish by means of broadcasts over the national radio and in the press a communiqué in several languages. The Chad Government shall be informed in advance of the content of the communiqué.

Done at Khartoum on 16 September 1977.

Head of the Delegation of the Government of Chad: *Head of the Delegation of the Armed Forces of the North:*

Colonel Djime Mamari Ngakinar
Vice-President of the
Supreme Military Council

Hissein Habre
President of the CCEAN

Izzeldine Hamid
Minister of State of the Council of Ministers
Representative of President Nimeiri.

DOCUMENT S/12889

Letter dated 9 October 1978 from the representative of Chad to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[9 October 1978]

Following the circulation of document S/12857 of 21 September 1978 concerning the communiqué of 12 September 1978 issued at N'Djamena by the Government of National Unity, which appealed to those brothers still engaged in armed opposition to rejoin the great family of Chad, the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya saw fit to follow up that communiqué with a letter that he requested should be distributed as a document of the Security Council [S/12870].

On the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting herewith a statement of clarification and request you to have it circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) B. DESSANDE
Permanent Representative of Chad
to the United Nations

ANNEX

By its action in having distributed a letter in response to the communiqué issued on 12 September 1978 by the Government of National Unity, which appealed to those brothers still engaged in armed opposition to rejoin the great family of Chad, the Libyan Government, through its representative to the United Nations, is demonstrating clearly to the world that it is genuinely and profoundly disturbed by what is happening in Chad.

The Libyan representative maintains that the contents of the said communiqué with regard to accusations against the Libyan Jamahiriya are baseless and unfounded and "merely constitute fabricated accusations and fictitious claims".

There is reason to wonder what interest the Government of Chad might have in gratuitously accusing any of its neighbours unless it had irrefutable proofs of the latter's interference in its internal affairs. Contrary to the assertions in the Libyan letter, the Government of Chad has never denied the existence of internal difficulties.

That is, moreover, the essential reason why the Chad Armed Forces put an end, on 13 April 1975, to the régime which had created those difficulties.

Since that time, the new régime has made national reconciliation its highest priority, firmly convinced that on it depend the development and unity of the country. This national reconciliation has not been a mere statement of intent. The results achieved are ample proof of that. Nevertheless, if this work of national reconciliation has not been fully accomplished, that is primarily because it has been, and still is, seriously impeded by the Tripoli régime, which sees it as an obstacle to its expansionist aims.

It is common knowledge today that Libya is not only in military occupation of the Aouzou area in northern Chad but is giving material and financial aid to one of the armed opposition factions, which is so totally dependent on it as to have become its prisoner.

Furthermore, the members of the Libyan Armed Forces,

trained by their foreign masters, are fighting openly beside this faction against the forces of order.

It is absolutely clear that the purpose of Libyan expansionism is to annex the whole Chad region of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti and Kanem, or approximately one half of the national territory.

Libya is thus using certain Chad rebel elements in order to satisfy its hegemonic ambitions. That is, beyond any question, an attitude contrary to the principles of international law, in particular those relating to territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

The truth is that Chad is being subjected to outright aggression by the Tripoli régime which, moreover, makes no secret of it. Otherwise, how can the following two contradictory statements in the letter in question be reconciled: "the problem that the Government of Chad is facing is absolutely an internal one and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has no responsibility in this regard" and "the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya did seek and is always seeking a conciliation between the Government of Chad and the Chadi revolutionaries"?

If Chad's problem is absolutely an internal one, as the Libyan representative states so categorically, why is Libya taking such an interest in it, when it has received no express invitation from the Government of Chad to become involved?

The Government of Chad has always asked Libya to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs. The affairs of Chad concern the people of Chad and them alone.

However, with the help of its wealth and its military power, Libya is using all possible means to create the worst possible difficulties in Chad in order better to dominate it and thereby annex a large part of its territory.

What other explanation is there for this unexpected, even hostile, reaction of Libya to a communiqué issued by the Government of National Unity as an appeal to all the people of Chad to unite in order to safeguard the unity of the country and ensure its economic and social development in peace?

It is truly heartbreaking to note that the Tripoli régime, with which the N'Djamena Government wishes to normalize its relations, is trying to sabotage any initiative aimed at the restoration of peace in Chad, the defence of its territorial integrity and the consolidation of its national unity.

In spite of the Libyan diversionist manoeuvres, Chad remains convinced that an urgent and equitable solution will be found to this serious dispute between two fraternal neighbouring countries, within the framework of the relevant resolution of the fifteenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, adopted in July 1978 at Khartoum.^a For the present, the Government of Chad, strengthened in its conviction that Chad is the victim of Libyan aggression, firmly upholds the terms of the communiqué of 12 September 1978.

With regard to the fallacious Libyan allegations, the Government of Chad would merely call to witness the international community in general and the members of the Security Council in particular and request that a fact-finding committee should be appointed forthwith to ascertain on the spot the truth of the statements which it has made and which it maintains.

^a A/33/235, annex II, resolution AHG/Res. 94 (XV).

DOCUMENT S/12890*

Letter dated 9 October 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[10 October 1978]

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 9 October 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 9 October 1978 from
Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention certain recent incidents which I feel have the propensity of adversely affecting prospects for the peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. It is especially disappointing, though noteworthy, that at a time when efforts are being made through your good offices to bring about the resumption of the intercommunal talks with a view to achieving a permanent and just solution of the Cyprus problem, the Greek Cypriot leaders and their administration should see fit to continue to follow a policy which will undoubtedly undermine positive initiatives.

In this connexion I felt it was incumbent upon me to inform you of the following:

(a) We have learnt with profound regret that the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, while speaking to the Greek community over the New York radio during his current visit to the city, declared quite openly that "we (the Greeks) shall continue our long-term struggle until the Greek flag is once again hoisted and flying on the bastions of Famagusta, Kyrenia, Morphou and the Karpas". This statement, which certainly does not augur well for Cyprus, is clearly incompatible with the United Nations resolutions, as well as with agreements reached between the two communities for the establishment of a bi-national, independent federal republic on a partnership basis. Furthermore, it definitely leads one seriously to doubt the good faith and sincerity of the Greek Cypriot leadership. It is, indeed, ironic that this statement, which is remarkably similar to statements recently made by other Greek Cypriot leaders manifesting intentions of "driving the Turks to the sea", should have come from the same man who, less than a week ago,^a put on an impressive show of pretence, in view of his

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/294-S/12890.

^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 22nd meeting.

past record, in the General Assembly to convince the august body of his alleged love of the Turkish community.

(b) A bill has been tabled before the Greek Cypriot Legislative Assembly for the legalization of the multitude of illegal and unconstitutional militia forces on the Greek Cypriot side. This enactment, which has ominous implications, is a fait accompli contrary to all United Nations resolutions and is unacceptable as a show of goodwill. At the same time it constitutes a serious development that will undoubtedly increase tension in the island.

(c) The Greek Cypriot authorities have arrested in Larnaca the captain of an Italian vessel on the grounds that it had earlier called at Famagusta port in the north, and subsequently sentenced him to a term of three months imprisonment or a fine of 400 Cyprus pounds. This action is yet another in a consistent series of malicious actions by the Greek Cypriot administration aimed at disrupting the Turkish Cypriot economy, in line with their over-all policy of isolating the Turkish Cypriot community economically and politically through a vicious international economic blockade, which no member of the United Nations could accept or connive in.

It is most discouraging that, despite efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of the intercommunal talks and to reconcile the differences between the two communities, the Greek Cypriot leaders have chosen to intensify their vicious economic warfare against the Turkish Cypriot community, and at the same time continue to make statements which evidence hostility towards the said community. Such actions against the Turkish Cypriot community are clearly incompatible with the call in all the United Nations resolutions for an end to unilateral actions by either side.

It must be obvious to the Greek Cypriot side that its above-mentioned actions cannot possibly increase trust and confidence between the two communities, which must surely be a fundamental prerequisite to any permanent solution.

I should, therefore, like to express our anxiety at the provocative statements and actions of the Greek Cypriot leadership mentioned above, particularly since this is manifesting itself at a time when you are making efforts through your good offices to resume the intercommunal dialogue. For our part, the Turkish Cypriot side continues to hold the belief that the intercommunal talks afford the best means for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem, and we hope that the Greek Cypriot side will not further delay its return to the negotiating table on the basis of the accord reached in your presence in February 1977 between the late Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Denktaş.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12892*

Letter dated 9 October 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 October 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 9 October 1978 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/299-S/12892.

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 9 October 1978 from Mr. Rauf Denktaş to the Secretary-General

Mr. Spyros Kyprianou's inadmissible false pretence to speak for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community renders the content of his address to the General Assembly^a wholly void of any useful basis in the search for final peace and justice for Cyprus. It thus becomes unnecessary for the Turkish Cypriot side to answer Mr. Kyprianou in detail since the context in which he has addressed the General Assembly is a non-existent one from a political, constitutional and realistic point of view. I shall, therefore, touch upon some salient points.

It is very odd that Mr. Kyprianou has not touched upon the accord reached between the late Archbishop Makarios and myself in February 1977 at Nicosia.

This accord, on guidelines for the re-establishment of the bi-communal partnership in a non-aligned, bi-zonal federal republic, was a breakthrough in the Cyprus problem, which had begun in December 1963 and continued relentlessly until 1974.

Mr. Kyprianou ignored this all-significant intercommunal accord in the same way he chose to ignore the 11 years of Greek Cypriot aggression and its ensuing effect in splitting the administration of the country into two for 11 years, in order to paint his false picture of a Cyprus problem which arose, according to him, with the arrival of the Turkish troops.

We know that the General Assembly will not act on this false picture and will take full cognizance of the fact that, first, but for Turkish Cypriot resistance to Greek Cypriot aggression since 1963 and, secondly, without the final legitimate intervention by Turkey, after 11 years, in 1974 at the last hour, the independent Republic of Cyprus would have become a colony of Greece and the Turkish Cypriot community totally eradicated from the island.

Mr. Kyprianou's amnesia regarding the 1963-1974 period is self-induced as part of his persistent attempts to have the United Nations and all its organs assist him in completing the work of Hellenizing Cyprus at the expense of all the concepts of human rights and respect for international treaties.

It thus becomes our duty to restate the facts which Mr. Kyprianou has tried to conceal from the General Assembly:

(a) The Cyprus problem began in December 1963 when the Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish Cypriots in order to destroy the bi-nationality of the country and Hellenize it as a prelude to union with Greece. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus has been in Cyprus since then in order to prevent intercommunal fighting.

(b) As a result of the aggression, the Turkish Cypriot community was deprived of all its rights and treated as an outcast by being subjected to systematic inhuman treatment.

(c) The forceful ejection of the Turkish Cypriot elements from the bi-communal administration and the denial to them of all constitutional rights, coupled with the organic changes illegally made to all constitutional establishments, continued for 11 years.

(d) The coup of 1974 was the last attempt, by a different group of Greeks, to reach the same aim, viz., the Hellenization of Cyprus and union with Greece, by a more direct and brutal method.

The planned total massacre of Turkish Cypriots was immediately put into effect and the declaration of union with Greece was a matter of days. Thousands of Turkish Cypriots were taken as prisoners of war in Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos by the Greek Cypriot Administration.

^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 22nd meeting, paras. 2-67.

But for Turkey's intervention as guarantor of the Cypriot independence, these calamities would have become irreversible *faits accomplis*. As it is, even in spite of Turkey's intervention, Turkish Cypriots—all civilians—living in Greek-dominated areas were murdered by the hundreds.

(e) As a result of Turkey's intervention, the Greek Cypriot attempt to eliminate the Turkish Cypriots ceased.

In the course of intercommunal talks it was agreed to settle the problem on the basis of a bi-zonal federal system in a non-aligned republic of Cyprus.

As a result of this agreement, in September 1975, a final voluntary exchange of population was also agreed between the parties and fully implemented with the help of UNFICYP.

It was only thus that 65,000 Turkish Cypriots managed to rescue themselves from the inhuman treatment meted out to them for 12 years, and at the same time the Turkish Cypriot refugees for 11 years (nearly 30,000) also found homes to return to.

In February 1977 an agreement was again—and this time formally—reached between the late Archbishop Makarios and myself to settle the Cyprus problem on the basis of a bi-zonal federal republic.

On the basis of this agreement, the Turkish Cypriot side has furnished its proposals for starting the intercommunal dialogue. You, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, have described these proposals as concrete and substantive.

The Greek Cypriot side has refused to negotiate and maintains its intransigent attitude, relying on the fact that it monopolizes the international forums, thus preventing the Turkish Cypriot side from being heard.

This procedural advantage is thus abused by Mr. Kyprianou, who insults the intelligence of all the delegates by claiming so brazenly to speak for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community.

The reply of the Turkish Cypriot Legislative Assembly to Mr. Kyprianou on this issue was circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council [see S/12878].

Mr. Kyprianou forgets that in the administration that poses as "the Government of Cyprus"—since 1963—not a single Turkish Cypriot exists and that this Greek administration's record since 1963 is the denial and usurpation of all Turkish Cypriot rights, gross maltreatment and murder of Turkish Cypriots by the thousands, the destruction of 103 Turkish villages, mass murder of Turkish Cypriot civilians (including babies, children and aged persons), all in the name of union with Greece.

A valid resolution of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives reads as follows:

"Despite adverse circumstances, the struggle which is being conducted with the support of all Hellenes will continue until it ends in success through the union of the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland, without any intermediary stage."

I have repeatedly called upon the Greek Cypriot leaders to annul this criminal resolution, but have had no response, while Mr. Kyprianou himself is on public record as to the use to which he thinks he can put the independence of Cyprus:

"At this critical stage, as the Cyprus struggle is passing through, there is a great advantage which did not exist in 1955 and that is the fact that Cyprus is now an independent and sovereign State and, therefore, the struggle for union with Greece is easier and shorter than before."

His persistent attempts to deceive the world that he represents the Turkish Cypriots and his glossing over the period of 1963-1974 as years of normalcy can, I hope, be better evaluated in light of the foregoing.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12893

Note verbale dated 2 October 1978 from the representative of Denmark
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[12 October 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the latter's note dated 18 May 1978, requesting information for transmittal to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) on the measures taken by the Danish Government to implement the provisions of paragraph 3 of Council resolution 418 (1977), concerning a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

Investigations made by the Danish Government in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977) have shown that the competent Danish authorities have no information on any contractual arrangements with or licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles.

The Permanent Representative of Denmark further has the honour to refer to his note of 27 February 1978 [S/12510/Add.1] whereby the Secretary-General was informed of the Royal Decree on certain measures against South Africa which, *inter alia*, states that it shall be prohibited to grant or attempt to grant licensing arrangements to South Africa for the manufacture or maintenance of the items mentioned in resolution 418 (1977).

The Permanent Representative of Denmark has the honour to request that this note verbale should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12894

Letter dated 13 October 1978 from the representative of India
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[13 October 1978]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, I have the honour to forward to you for the information of the Council a copy of a letter dated 19 September 1978 from the representative of the United Kingdom, enclosing a copy of the *Report on the Supply of Petroleum and Petroleum Products to Rhodesia* by Messrs. T. H. Bingham and S. M. Gray¹ (the Bingham Report). I should like to add that this report is available for consultation by members of the Council in the secretariat of the Committee. However, I am enclosing herewith chapter XIV of the report containing the conclusions and observations.

At its 317th meeting, on 12 October 1978, the Committee discussed the report in general terms. The proceedings of its meeting will be available in summary record form.²

The Committee decided that it should be left to the Security Council to consider this matter at an appropriate time.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rikhi JAIPAL
Permanent Representative of India
to the United Nations

¹ London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1978.

² S/AC.15/SR.317.

ANNEX

Letter dated 19 September 1978 from the representative of the United Kingdom to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia

I should like to inform you of the results of an inquiry by Mr. Bingham, QC, and Mr. Gray into the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to Rhodesia. I enclose a copy of the report and, in view of its bulk, I leave it to you to decide whether to make individual copies available to members of the Committee or whether the enclosed copy should be available in the Secretary's office for those who wish to study it.

The inquiry was commissioned in April 1977 by my Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Mr. Bingham's investigation has been completed with the utmost speed consistent with a thorough investigation of the volume and complexity of the evidence submitted to him. The British Government and the oil companies under United Kingdom jurisdiction gave Mr. Bingham their full co-operation, and written and oral evidence was received from other organizations and individuals.

Upon receipt of the report, my Government decided that it should be published in full, once the consent of those giving relevant evidence to the inquiry had been obtained. My Government also concluded that, in the light of material contained in the report, it should be referred to the Director of Public Prosecution to consider whether further inquiries should be undertaken with a view to possible criminal proceedings for breaches of United Kingdom sanctions legislation. The report has accordingly been referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions. I shall keep you informed of any action he decides to take.

(Signed) Ivor RICHARD
Permanent Representative of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations

14.1. In this chapter we summarize our main factual conclusions, we summarize and review the major arguments advanced on behalf of the Shell and BP Groups and we make certain concluding observations.

14.2. We refrain from expressing any opinion as to whether any company or any individual has or may have at any time committed any criminal offence under the Sanctions Orders. Our terms of reference do not in our opinion permit, still less require, us to do so. We have, however, in annex III, gathered together information and references which may be of relevance in considering whether criminal offences have been committed: the information and references there given relate to the more important companies which feature either in the organization charts referred to in chapter I, paragraph 1.45, or in the chain of supply to southern Africa described in chapter I, section C.

A. *Factual conclusions*

14.3. It is convenient that we should summarize our main conclusions. In making this summary we would emphasize that:

(a) A proper understanding and fair appreciation of the facts summarized require reference to the indicated passages in the full text.

(b) The summary is of facts *now* known: many of the facts now summarized were not contemporaneously known to one or other or both of the Groups in London; some were not known until the relevant documents were assembled from many sources for presentation to us; some came to light in the course of the investigation. It would be wrong to assume that all the events now summarized were known to the Groups in London at the time the events were taking place.

14.4. Our main conclusions are these:

(i) Shell notified the Rhodesian Government before the unilateral declaration of independence that the Shell and BP Groups would continue to perform their contractual obligations unless or until *force majeure* prevented them doing so. There may have been informal expressions of opinion to the effect that sanctions were unlikely to be imposed and, if imposed, were unlikely to be effective. The Groups did not deliberately encourage the Rhodesian Government to make its illegal declaration of independence and did not assure that Government that it would maintain supplies if sanctions were imposed. (Chapter IV, paragraphs 4.3-4.16.)

(ii) It seems very likely that in the weeks preceding promulgation of the 1965 Sanctions Order stocks in Rhodesia rose above the normal level. We do not think that any major concerted effort to that end was made, and limitations on storage capacity precluded substantial stockpiling. We doubt if the margin by which stocks were increased significantly affected the subsequent course of events. (Chapter IV, paragraphs 4.17-4.23.)

(iii) It appears that stocks of refined products in Zambia immediately prior to the 1965 Sanctions Order were at a very low level. It may be that there was some interception in Rhodesia of supplies intended for Zambia, or a deliberate failure to consign to Zambia supplies which would otherwise have been consigned, but the evidence available to us does not show that this was so. (Chapter IV, paragraphs 4.24-4.28.)

(iv) We are satisfied that Shell did not, in the weeks immediately preceding the 1965 Sanctions Order, negotiate with the Portuguese to vary the form of documentation for imports in transit through Mozambique with a view to concealing the destination of products consigned to Rhodesia in the event of an embargo. (Chapter IV, paragraphs 4.29-4.38.)

(v) Upon the making of the 1965 Sanctions Order Shell, on behalf of Consolidated and the Shell and BP Groups, acted promptly to notify the Consolidated companies in South Africa, Mozambique and Rhodesia of the terms of the Order and to seek the compliance of those companies with its terms. A cargo of oil on the high seas en route for Rhodesia was diverted. Further supplies of crude were stopped. Orders suspected of being for Rhodesia were rejected. (Chapter V, paragraphs 5.2-5.5 and 5.43.)

(vi) Pumping of oil to CAPREF ceased on 31 December 1965 and the refinery closed down on 15 January 1966. No crude oil has reached the refinery since that date and it remains closed down. (Chapter IV, paragraph 4.22, and chapter V, paragraphs 5.49 and 5.74.)

(vii) The Consolidated management immediately stopped the dispatch of products from the Durban Refinery and the Luboil Blending Plant and (after a pause to assess the legal position) acted to prevent the supply from South Africa to Rhodesia of products which had traditionally been supplied from the Consolidated companies in South Africa to their affiliates in Rhodesia. (Chapter V, paragraphs 5.3, 5.8, 5.23 and 5.25.)

(viii) Oil products began to reach Rhodesia by the road route over Beit Bridge at a rate rising from about 35,000 gallons per day in February up to about 100,000 gallons per day in May 1966. Subsequently the quantities entering Rhodesia by this route declined. Supplies were sent partly by South African supporters of the Rhodesian régime and partly by South African and Rhodesian contractors, and were increasingly obtained by GENTA (the Rhodesian oil procurement agency). Transport belonging to the South African Consolidated marketing companies was not involved. Some transport belonging or leased to Rhodesian contractors but painted (or previously painted) with the colours of the Rhodesian Consolidated companies was used to obtain supplies; some of these companies' own transport may also have been used. It is certainly possible, though not proved, that the Rhodesian Consolidated companies actively participated in the procurement of supplies by road from the Transvaal. Another Rhodesian marketing company did so. The source of the products carried to Rhodesia by road cannot be clearly ascertained, but it is likely that they derived from all the South African marketing companies. (Chapter V, section C.)

(ix) The local management of the Consolidated companies in South Africa was impeded in its initial efforts to restrict the flow of oil to Rhodesia by the insistence of the South African Government that there should be no embargo within South Africa on supplies to Rhodesia and by the strong pro-Rhodesian sympathy of virtually all white South Africans employed by the companies. Despite these impediments the local management of Consolidated tried, during about the first six months or so after the 1965 Sanctions Order, to prevent or reduce the flow of oil to Rhodesia. (Chapter V, section D.)

(x) In February 1966 oil products began to be carried by rail from South Africa via Mozambique to Rhodesia. This traffic reached a peak in May 1966 and thereafter declined, ceasing altogether in March 1967. The quantity of all products carried by this route during 1966 amounted to some 87,000 tons. It seems highly probable that industrial customers of all the South African marketing companies bought rail tank cars of product surplus to their requirements and re-consigned them to Rhodesia. It seems clear that Parry Leon and Hayhoe Limited bought rail tank cars of product and re-consigned them to Rhodesia. The figures suggest that a substantial proportion of this traffic consisted of purchases by Parry Leon and Hayhoe from the Consolidated marketers in South Africa, and that some members of the South African management must have known of the destination of these products. (Chapter VII, paragraphs 7.2-7.5 and 7.60-7.62.)

(xi) In December 1966 Shell Mozambique delivered about 3,000 tons of oil products free on rail at Lourenço Marques to Parry Leon and Hayhoe pursuant to contracts made between Shell South Africa and Parry Leon and Hayhoe in Johannesburg. During 1967 about 150,000 tons were so delivered. Shell South Africa was under strong pressure from the South African Government, if not under legal obligation, to make sales to South African buyers able to pay the price, which is what Parry Leon and Hayhoe were. While the product probably passed technically through the ownership of Shell Mozambique, it was supplied by the Consolidated marketing companies in South Africa and was in the main transported to Mozambique from South Africa. Parry Leon and Hayhoe sold these products to GENTA and consigned them to Rhodesia. Additional quantities may well have been similarly delivered to Parry Leon and Hayhoe for carriage to the Transvaal. (Chapter I, paragraph 1.71, chapter III, paragraphs 3.3-3.5, chapter V, paragraphs 5.28 and 5.81, and chapter VII, paragraphs 7.18, 7.37 (ii) and (iv), 7.39, 7.58 and 7.59 (ii).)

(xii) When Mr. Vasconcellos in Mozambique appreciated that goods delivered to Parry Leon and Hayhoe, or some of them, were being carried to Rhodesia he raised the matter with the top management in South Africa. He was told (in effect) to continue making such deliveries. The management in South Africa was however concerned to avoid the affixing of rail tank car labels showing a Rhodesian destination within the Shell Moçambique installation and was insistent that no consignments were to be made direct to Rhodesian destinations. (Chapter VII, paragraphs 7.29, 7.30, 7.33 and 7.36.)

(xiii) Mr. Walker's personal position as a South African citizen and General Manager in South Africa with overall local responsibility for Mozambique was a difficult one because he could not faithfully comply at the same time both with the policy of the 1965 Sanctions Order that supplies should be denied to Rhodesia and with the policy of the South African Government that South African traders should be free to trade with Rhodesia. He believed it was arguable that since neither he nor Shell Moçambique knew for sure that any particular consignment was destined for Rhodesia there was no contravention of the 1965 Sanctions Order. (Chapter VII, paragraphs 7.25 and 7.37 (v).)

(xiv) Mr. Walker informed the British Embassy in South Africa of his view that oil for Rhodesia was going through various intermediaries from all the companies supplying South Africa, probably in about the same proportion as their share of the South African market, and that he believed the other companies would make good any shortfall in supplies made by the Consolidated marketing companies. (Chapter VII, paragraph 7.38 (iii).)

(xv) Until January 1968 the Shell and BP Groups in London believed that no sales were made by the Consolidated marketing companies in South Africa and Mozambique to customers who were known or thought to be selling the products on to Rhodesia. That belief was based on information and assurances given by the General Manager in South Africa, Mr. Walker. These assurances were passed on to Her Majesty's Government (HMG) which, until towards the close of 1967, fully accepted them. (Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.31-6.33, 6.35 and 6.39.)

(xvi) From about May 1966, when the scale of the supply to Rhodesia became known, HMG was very much concerned to stop that supply. During 1967 a number of schemes were explored and diplomatic moves made to that end. HMG came to believe that, without the co-operation of South Africa and Portugal, and in the absence of a restricted crude supply by the CFP Group to the SONAREP Refinery, the supply to Rhodesia could not (without an embargo on supplies to South Africa and Mozambique) be stopped altogether. The attention of HMG was then concentrated on achieving a position in which it could truly be said that British companies were not engaged in supplying Rhodesia and that no British oil was reaching Rhodesia. Towards the end of 1967 HMG began to suspect that customers to whom goods were delivered free on rail at Lourenço Marques by Shell Moçambique were consigning them to Rhodesia. (Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.7-6.10, 6.15-6.30, 6.39 and 6.72.)

(xvii) Information given to Shell in London in January 1968 led the Groups to believe that Parry Leon and Hayhoe, to whom goods were delivered free on rail at Lourenço Marques, might be consigning them to Rhodesia. A visit paid to South Africa and Mozambique by representatives of Shell in London confirmed that belief. (Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.42-6.52 and 6.55.)

(xviii) In about February 1968 Shell South Africa made an arrangement with Total South Africa that orders for products to be delivered free on rail at Lourenço Marques, placed on Shell South Africa by customers suspected of selling on to Rhodesia, should be fulfilled with product supplied by Total South Africa from its Matola installation in exchange for an equivalent quantity of product supplied to it by the Consolidated companies in South Africa at a convenient point or points in that country. (Chapter VI, paragraph 6.59, and chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.2, 8.6 and 8.7.)

(xix) On the 21st February 1968 representatives of the Groups disclosed to the Commonwealth Secretary that deliveries had in the past been made free on rail at Lourenço Marques to customers who had re-sold to Rhodesia and that arrangements had been made for orders placed by suspicious customers henceforward to be met from non-British sources at Lourenço

Marques. It may have been indicated that the CFP Group was the most likely non-British source and that a product exchange was involved. The details of the Total exchange arrangement were communicated to HMG in the course of the following year if not on that occasion. HMG considered that this was the best arrangement which could be made in the circumstances but realized that it would not of itself prevent or reduce the quantity of oil reaching Rhodesia. (Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.75, 6.76, 6.80 and 6.83.)

(xx) The Total exchange arrangement was implemented and operated for a period, during which orders placed on Shell South Africa by Parry Leon and Hayhoe and (after 1969) Freight Services were physically met with product supplied and handled by Total South Africa at Lourenço Marques against an equivalent supply elsewhere. This arrangement was superseded by an arrangement under which products supplied by the Consolidated South African marketing companies were handled through the Total installation at Lourenço Marques for a fee and then delivered by Total to Freight Services. This arrangement with Total ended at about the end of 1971. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.3-8.12.)

(xxi) After the ending of the arrangements with Total orders placed by Freight Services on Shell South Africa were met from products supplied by the Consolidated South African marketing companies and delivered by Shell Moçambique at Lourenço Marques. Most if not all of these products were consigned by Freight Services to Rhodesia. (Chapter VII, paragraph 7.37 (ii), and chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.16 and 8.23-8.25.)

(xxii) It was known to the top management of the Consolidated companies in South Africa and (after the event) Mozambique that the arrangements with Total South Africa had come to an end. It was known to the top management in both countries that deliveries to Freight Services at Lourenço Marques were handled by Shell Moçambique. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.12, 8.13 and 8.29.)

(xxiii) During visits to South Africa in early 1974 it came to the attention of Mr. Francis (Shell) and Mr. Sandford (BP) that the Total exchange arrangement had ended and that Shell Moçambique was handling deliveries to Freight Services. Mr. Francis told the local management of SERVICCO or Shell South Africa that steps should be taken at once to remove Shell Moçambique from the chain of supply to Freight Services. This was not done before the closure of the Mozambique/Rhodesia border in March 1976, although the quantities delivered by Shell Moçambique to Freight Services diminished following the opening of a direct rail link between South Africa and Rhodesia in September 1974. Mr. Francis discussed the matter with his immediate superior Mr. de Liefde and thought that he had effectively communicated an understanding of the problem. Such was not the case: Mr. de Liefde did not appreciate that Shell Moçambique might be in jeopardy nor that there was any departure from arrangements notified to HMG. Mr. Francis did not make any report on this matter to any other member of the Shell management nor ascertain whether his instructions to SERVICCO or Shell South Africa had been carried out, although he was led to believe for a time that Freight Services traffic to Rhodesia had switched from Lourenço Marques to the new rail link. Early in 1975 he learned that some Freight Services supplies to Rhodesia were still being handled by Shell Moçambique in Lourenço Marques but thought that these were minor residual deliveries which gradually petered out. Mr. Sandford informed his immediate superior Mr. Robertson what he had learned in South Africa and of the concern that he felt about it, but Mr. Robertson knew very little of the events in 1968 and misconceived the status of Freight Services and did not communicate any sense of urgency or alarm to the most senior levels of BP management or to Shell. Mr. Sandford pursued the matter with Mr. Francis but in October 1974 concluded (wrongly) that the new rail link had attracted the Lourenço Marques oil traffic and thus solved the problem. Thereafter he did nothing before his retirement in September 1975. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.38, 8.42-8.44, 8.55, 8.60, 8.69, 8.70 and 8.72-8.74.)

(xxiv) The quantities of product delivered to Parry Leon and Hayhoe and Freight Services free on rail in Lourenço Marques, either by Total South Africa (during the exchange/throughput period) or after that period by Shell Moçambique, pursuant to orders placed on Shell South Africa (or BP Southern Africa), and thereafter sold to GENTA and consigned to Rhode-

sia, were during the calendar years 1968-1975 inclusive probably not less than the following:

1968	165,000 tons
1969	180,000 tons
1970	190,000 tons
1971	220,000 tons
1972	275,000 tons
1973	300,000 tons
1974	300,000 tons
1975	250,000 tons

(Chapter VIII, section C.)

(xxv) When the business formerly conducted under the Consolidated Agreements in South Africa came to be split between the Shell and BP Groups, BP insisted on obtaining and obtained half of the business with Freight Services. Its chief local representative in South Africa knew what that business consisted of. So, with varying degrees of comprehension, did a small number of officers in London. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.33, 8.39 and 8.60-8.63.)

(xxvi) From March 1966 until the independence of Mozambique in June 1975 ships entering Beira with cargoes of oil or oil products were subject to scrutiny by patrolling vessels of the Royal Navy. The volume of refined products reaching Rhodesia through Beira between the 1965 Sanctions Order and the closure of the Mozambique/Rhodesian border in March 1976 was inconsiderable. No crude oil reached Rhodesia by this route. (Chapter IX.)

(xxvii) Throughout the period since the 1965 Sanctions Order some minor products have reached Rhodesia from South Africa by means of the railway line through Botswana. No attempt was made to intercept these supplies within that country either before or after the independence of Botswana because it was believed that Botswana was economically dependent on the railway line and vulnerable to economic retaliation by Rhodesia, and also because of South African insistence that the line should be kept open. The South African Government and the Consolidated marketing companies in South Africa were made aware of HMG's wish that supplies to Rhodesia by this route should be kept to a minimum. We are satisfied that the volumes of oil products carried by this route were modest, never reaching 10,000 tons in any year for which figures are available (1966-1969). There is no evidence that volumes increased thereafter. (Chapter X.)

(xxviii) Throughout the period from the 1965 Sanctions Order until the present, minor products such as lubricants, base oils, greases, SBPs and bitumen have in the main reached Rhodesia direct from South Africa. GENTA were probably not involved in the procurement of lubricants and base oils, but Freight Services and at least one other intermediary (DL Petroleum) were involved in these sales. The procurement of minor products other than lubricants and base oils may have been handled by GENTA but we think it more likely that GENTA procured bitumen only. Freight Services acted as intermediary in sales of all these products also. (Chapter XI.)

(xxix) During 1975 an increasing share of supplies to Freight Services was made by SASOL or SASRAF direct from the Republic of South Africa by the new rail link. The supplies came from NATREF. At about the time of the Mozambique/Rhodesia border closure in March 1976 SASOL or SASRAF took over all responsibility for the supply to Freight Services of those main products (in particular motor gasoline and gasoil) which NATREF produced. The South African marketing companies who had previously done business with Freight Services were, as to 85 per cent of the business so lost, compensated by increased access to the NATREF area of the Transvaal. So far as we have been able to ascertain, this situation has continued up to the present. It seems probable that neither the Shell nor the BP marketing companies in South Africa are now selling to Freight Services or to any intermediary who is known to be selling on to Rhodesia. (Chapter XIII, Sections A and D.)

(xxx) After a lapse of some years contact between HMG and the Shell and BP Groups concerning the enforcement of sanctions was renewed in the summer of 1976. In a letter to HMG dated 30 June 1976, following publication of *The Oil Conspiracy* in the United States by the Center for Social Action

of the United Church of Christ, disclosure was not made of the deliveries by Shell Mozambique to Freight Services between 1972 and March 1976 and the impression was given that the situation had remained substantially unchanged since February 1968. It was known to Mr. Francis (who drafted the letter) that such deliveries had been made, although he thought that they had begun later and stopped earlier. It was not appreciated by Mr. Francis' superiors in Shell that such deliveries had been made at all: Mr. Francis had discussed the matter with Mr. de Liefde but the latter had not grasped the situation. It is not entirely clear whether the contents of this letter were disclosed to BP before the letter was sent but BP received a copy of the letter subsequently and approved of it. The responsible senior management of BP at this time (June 1976) had not been involved in the discussions with HMG in 1968-1969 and did not appreciate the changes which had occurred in the arrangements then notified to HMG nor the possible implications of such changes. (Chapter XIII, paragraphs 13.18-13.23.)

(xxxi) Since a date very shortly after the 1965 Sanctions Order, the Consolidated marketing companies in Rhodesia have been subject to direction by the illegal Rhodesian Government on pain of criminal penalty for non-compliance. It has never been suggested to the Shell and BP Groups by HMG that they should liquidate those companies or suspend their operations; had either of these courses been attempted the Rhodesian Government would have appointed a Custodian of the companies. The Groups have received information concerning these companies sporadically, but not concerning procurement of supplies. Directors of the companies resident in England have played no part in their management. Shell (as the channel of communication under the Consolidated Agreements) have remained in contact with the companies and have been able to influence some policy decisions, but neither the Groups nor Consolidated have enjoyed any effective power of control. (Chapter III, paragraphs 3.11 and 3.14, chapter V, paragraph 5.4, and chapter XII, paragraphs 12.4-12.11 and 12.24-12.29.)

(xxxii) The primary role in procuring main products for consumption on the Rhodesian market was played (at least so far as the Consolidated companies were concerned) by GENTA, which appears to have allocated the available supplies to the existing Rhodesian marketers roughly in proportion to their market shares. So far as we know, Caltex Oil Rhodesia played no part in procuring supplies save in the early months of 1966. There is some evidence that the Consolidated companies in Rhodesia did, probably to a minor extent, participate with GENTA in procuring supplies. We have had no direct evidence concerning Mobil and Total. (Chapter I, paragraphs 1.74, 1.75 and 1.77, chapter V, paragraph 5.81, chapter VII, paragraph 7.57, chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.39 and 8.66 (ii) and (vi), and chapter XII, paragraphs 12.15-12.19.)

(xxxiii) At the time of the unilateral declaration of independence, total consumption of all petroleum products in Rhodesia was running at an annual rate of about 410,000 tons. The total fell after the unilateral declaration of independence but was restored to the old level by about 1969 and thereafter increased until it now stands at about 800,000 tons. (Chapter XII, paragraph 12.12.)

B. Submissions

1. Shell

14.5. At the outset of our investigation, Mr. C. C. Pocock, Chairman of The "Shell" Transport and Trading Company Limited, stressed to us that the principle of delegating managerial authority to local Shell companies was one in which the Royal Dutch/Shell Group really believes and which it fully practises. Apart from certain business principles which must always be observed, and matters such as financial policy and management appointments which are of direct concern to the shareholder, the business of management is entrusted to the local management. As a letter circulated to Shell companies in November 1976 put it, "fullest practicable managerial autonomy resides with each Shell company". We are satisfied that in practice very considerable managerial autonomy was granted to Group companies in Southern Africa during the period under consideration, although their performance was carefully monitored in London and non-routine decisions were the subject of consideration there.

14.6. It was stressed, secondly, that chief executives and local staffs within the Group were expected to obey the laws of countries where they lived and worked. This formed part of a Statement of General Business Principles drawn up by the Group and circulated to companies in 1976:

"Companies should endeavor always to act commercially, operating within existing national laws in a socially responsible manner, and avoid involvement in politics."

This recommendation reflected OECD guidelines accepted by HMG in 1976 (see *International Investment*. Guidelines for International Enterprises, Cmnd. 6525, 1976). Sir Frank McFadzean, himself a former Chairman of "Shell" Transport and Trading, laid particular emphasis on the importance, in his view, of local companies so far as possible avoiding involvement in national politics. We think that both elements of this principle, compliance with local law and avoidance of corporate political commitments, formed part of the Group's philosophy and practice in southern Africa throughout the period.

14.7. At the conclusion of our investigation, SIPC made to us a detailed written submission drawing attention to a number of factors which, it was said, must have affected the minds and conduct of those in Shell who were concerned with handling the many and difficult problems caused by sanctions. In summary, Shell contended:

- (i) That its belief from the outset was that sanctions could not prevent supplies of oil from reaching Rhodesia because ample supplies would be forthcoming from South Africa: the withholding of supplies to South Africa by Shell would have caused grave damage to British commercial interests there (including the sequestration by the South African Government of Shell's own assets) but it would not have stopped the flow of oil products to Rhodesia;
- (ii) That Shell was the subject not only of a conflict between the policies of the British and South African Governments but also of an irreconcilable conflict between the policy of the Sanctions Orders (which Shell thought could only be safely complied with by cutting off supplies to South Africa) and the policy of HMG that there should be no economic confrontation with South Africa: given the duty to comply with the local law this gave rise to the most acute practical problems;
- (iii) That acceptance of the Total exchange by HMG was inevitable if confrontation with South Africa was to be avoided, but it was felt by Shell to be a fairly transparent device since it involved continued contractual relations by Shell South Africa with (and facilitation of supplies to) Parry Leon and Hayhoe, who were known to be supplying Rhodesia; the only change was that the product supplied to Parry Leon and Hayhoe now belonged to Total South Africa who in exchange received products (supplied by English-incorporated Shell and BP trading companies) elsewhere in South Africa;
- (iv) That those concerned naturally and foreseeably interpreted HMG's concern as being to have a technical defence to the accusation that British oil was reaching Rhodesia, that defence being based on a narrow construction of the Sanctions Order;
- (v) That between 1966 and 1972 talk of a Rhodesian settlement was frequently in the air: since South African help was sought in persuading Mr. Smith to compromise there was an added reason for avoiding confrontation;
- (vi) That those who knew of the Total exchange must have appreciated that closure of the Mozambique border would necessarily have ended the Total exchange as arranged in 1968.

14.8. This submission raises certain questions involving the evaluation of government policy upon which we do not feel entitled under our terms of reference to comment. But it also raises factual issues upon which the evidence given to us does enable us to make observations;

(a) Shell did from the outset consider that sanctions against Rhodesia could not be effective unless South Africa also were blockaded. Within HMG also there was appreciation of difficulties which the sanctions policy faced. (Chapter V, paragraph 5.3.)

(b) Sir Frank McFadzean told us that it was his view and that of Mr. Berkin at the time of the 1965 Sanctions Order that if Shell had refused to supply South Africa the South Africans would have sequestrated Shell's assets; they also thought that the South Africans had enough engineers and that there was enough crude oil available to enable the South Africans to run SAPREF without Shell's co-operation. We have not investigated this matter, but have no reason to doubt Sir Frank and Mr. Berkin's contemporary judgement.

(c) In a practical (as opposed to a legal) sense there was an obvious conflict between the policy of HMG that oil trade to Rhodesia should be reduced as much as possible and the South African Government's policy that South African buyers should be free to buy oil within South Africa irrespective of the use or destination to which they intended to use or send it. (Chapter III, paragraphs 3.3-3.5, and chapter V, paragraphs 5.6-5.33.) For British citizens subject to the laws of both countries there was a conflict of jurisdictions in a legal sense. (Chapter II and chapter III, paragraphs 3.3-3.5.)

(d) Shortly after the 1965 Sanctions Order Shell expressed the view that the only sure way of avoiding a breach of the Order was to cease supplying the South African registered companies. (Chapter V, paragraph 5.17.)

(e) It was the policy of HMG in the years 1965-1969 at all costs to avoid economic confrontation with South Africa. (Chapter V, paragraph 5.21, and chapter VI, paragraphs 6.16, 6.20, 6.26, 6.27, 6.36, 6.72 and 6.85.) We have received no evidence as to policy in later years. It was recognized on all sides that the cutting off of supplies to South Africa by Shell and BP Groups was likely to provoke such confrontation. At his meeting with company representatives on 21 February 1968 the Commonwealth Secretary said that there were no doctrinaire or ideological objections to trade with South Africa, save in the arms field, and other similar statements were made on other occasions. (Chapter VI, paragraph 6.75.)

(f) The Consolidated marketing companies in South Africa and their employees faced very severe problems in seeking to give effect to the policy of the Sanctions Orders. (Chapter III, paragraphs 3.3-3.5, chapter V, paragraphs 5.89-5.93, and chapter VII, paragraphs 7.25-7.27.)

(g) The effect of the Total exchange was as summarized in chapter VIII, paragraph 8.7.

(h) The companies were initially doubtful as to the legality of the Total exchange but did not disclose those doubts to HMG (Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.65-6.68 and 6.75 (iv).) On 6 February 1969 Sir Frank McFadzean expressed the view that the exchange seemed "pretty thin" to him but "legally sound". (Chapter VI, paragraph 6.83(iii).) HMG was of opinion that "the legal position was sound and could be defended", and was never prepared to countenance what it regarded as breaches of the Orders by British companies. It was appreciated within the companies (as was the case) that HMG regarded it as important to be able to assert that British oil was not reaching Rhodesia. (Chapter VI, paragraph 6.83(iii) and 6.86.)

(i) There were two or three occasions over the years 1966-1972 when it was widely believed that a political settlement with Rhodesia might be imminent: for example, at the time of the talks on HMS *Tiger* and HMS *Fearless*, and at the time of the Douglas-Home proposals in 1971.

(j) Since the Total exchange (as arranged in 1968) involved delivery of refined products free on rail in Lourenço Marques before onward carriage of some or all of them to Rhodesia, the arrangement could not survive closure of the Mozambique-Rhodesian border. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.3 and 8.7.)

We have endeavoured to take full account of this submission by SIPC both in reaching and formulating our factual conclusions and in making the Observations which we do in section C of this chapter.

2. BP

14.9. The position of BP was in some respects the same as that of Shell and in some different. The main difference was that during those periods when and in those areas where the Consolidated Agreements were in force BP were, even as compared with Shell in London, one step further removed from direct involvement in the business operations of the local companies

(except, in the case of Mozambique, from 1 September 1975 onwards). We have treated this subject at greater length in chapter I, section B. The role of BP was necessarily subsidiary. Another difference, which would seem to have influenced BP's conduct on occasion (for example, in favouring immediate disclosure to HMG in February 1968), was the large Government shareholding in BP.

BP were, however, at one with Shell in their approach to the principle of managerial autonomy. The point was put by BP in this way:

"The South African subsidiary companies were not created or used as a sham to enable English companies to evade the requirements of English law. Their creation occurred many years ago. The autonomy which they enjoyed was conferred on them bona fide, and was a response to a problem which confronts every major business operating in many countries, namely, that the host governments insist that enterprises operating in their country be to that extent identified with the national interest of that country, and in particular that commercial policy be not dictated by the political policy of the group's home government. These are the conditions in which the BP Group trades in South Africa."

14.10. BP would endorse the principle that local companies should comply with local laws and, as the foregoing quotation makes clear, base their decisions on commercial rather than political grounds.

14.11. BP's overriding submission was that the Group management in London consistently co-operated in the enforcement of sanctions whenever its assistance was requested by HMG, and that where on occasion it was not able to assist its position was very fully explained to HMG. This is in our opinion true of the early years; but for various reasons summarised above there was not a full (or indeed any) explanation to HMG of the situation found to exist in early 1974, and when the South African business was split BP showed no reluctance to undertake half the Freight Services trade.

C. Observations

14.12. In offering observations upon certain of the facts recounted and summarized above, we wish to reiterate that we are excluding from our consideration questions as to whether any criminal offence has been committed by any company or any individual.

14.13. We think it unfortunate that Mr. Walker should, as General Manager in South Africa with responsibility for Mozambique, have failed between about the end of 1966 and February 1968 to lay the facts known to and suspected by him before his superiors in London and that he should have given categorical assurances which those facts did not warrant. The Shell and BP Groups in London and HMG were as a result led to misunderstand the means by which Rhodesia obtained its oil supplies. Because of this misunderstanding both the Groups and HMG unwittingly adopted false positions at that time.

14.14. The easiest course for Mr. Walker personally would have been to disclose his knowledge and suspicions to Shell Centre and let others bear the burden of deciding what to do. It has not become clear to us why he did not do so. He may have wished to avoid embarrassing the Shell management in London. He may also have wished to safeguard the business he was running in South Africa. Awareness of the very stringent South African official secrets legislation may have played a part. We do not think these considerations justify his conduct even if they explain it.

14.15. In making this criticism we bear in mind the submission made to us against attributing blame to relatively junior individuals. We are also acutely aware of the difficulty of Mr. Walker's position as a South African living in a society very unsympathetic to the policy of the Sanctions Orders. But as General Manager of the Consolidated operation in South Africa Mr. Walker was not in a junior position, and it must in our view follow that if fullest practicable managerial autonomy is to reside in each local company then the management of that company must be regarded as responsible for the decisions which it makes.

14.16. Given the prevailing management philosophy, the information received from local sources and the knowledge that existed in the Groups of local political attitudes in South Africa and Mozambique, we do not think the Groups are to be criticised for failing during 1966 and 1967 to send a team from London to investigate methods of Rhodesian supply directly. When, in January 1968, suspicion deepened, such a team was sent. We are surprised that the report made by that team did not cause some dissatisfaction with the information previously supplied from South Africa, but we have not heard that it did. The reason is, we think, that the facts were not, even in February 1968, known to the Groups nearly as fully as they are now.

14.17. It was in our view a proper course for the Groups, once apprised of the facts, to disclose them and the proposed solution to HMG and seek HMG's acceptance of that solution. We are unsure whether the proposed solution was fully communicated in February 1968 but during the year following HMG was given sufficient information to enable a fair judgement to be made. The contrary has not been suggested to us. The proposed solution was accepted. It was thereafter reasonable for the Groups to proceed upon that basis.

14.18. The Total exchange arrangement plainly did not have the effect of denying supplies of oil products to Rhodesia. That an arrangement having this deficiency was accepted by HMG had, we think, an important consequence. It induced among some of those most directly concerned (notably Mr. Francis and Mr. Walker) a belief that compliance with the Sanctions Orders was to be regarded as a matter of form rather than of substance, that it was the letter which mattered, not the spirit. The failure to communicate to or within Shell Centre certain matters which, as we think, should have been communicated may be traceable to this belief.

14.19. We think it possible also that, because of their differing viewpoints and backgrounds, HMG and the Groups may have seen the Total exchange rather differently. To HMG the arrangement was acceptable because it took British oil companies out of the line of supply to Rhodesia and enabled it to be said that British oil was not reaching Rhodesia. In the light of Britain's primary international responsibility for Rhodesia, that seemed an object worth achieving even though the arrangement would not deny oil to the illegal régime. To company representatives, familiar with product exchanges as an everyday fact of the international oil business, the exchange might, like other exchanges, have appeared to be merely an alternative means of making a supply. This approach may, we think, have coloured the thinking of some oil company employees.

14.20. When, following the Total exchange, official pressure on the Groups eased, there was a marked reduction in the prominence given to the whole question of Rhodesian sanctions among those within the Groups who were concerned with the affairs of southern Africa. This had a consequence of its own in the inadequate briefing on this subject of some key executives who came fresh to the southern African scene after 1968: on the Shell side, for example, neither Mr. de Liefde on appointment as Regional Co-ordinator nor Mr. McCutcheon on appointment as Managing Director of SERVICO was instructed as to the past history or the Group policy on this subject; the same was in varying degrees true on the BP side of Mr. Laidlaw when he became Regional Managing Director, Mr. Robertson when he became Regional Director of BP Trading, Mr. Savage when he became Regional Co-ordinator, Mr. Milne when he became the BP representative in South Africa and Mr. Trechman, either when he went to Mozambique as Senior Assistant in 1973, or when he became the local General Manager in September 1975. Bearing in mind the information given to HMG in February 1968 and HMG's request recorded in Sir Frank McFadzean's note of that meeting that it should be informed of any change in the situation, we think it clear that the Groups should not have allowed this subject to slip so far into the background. Those responsible for keeping HMG informed of any change in the situation could not do so without a reasonable working knowledge of what the situation was.

14.21. It was plainly the duty of Mr. Walker as General Manager in South Africa, knowing as he did the outline of what transpired between HMG and the Groups in early 1968, to inform Shell Centre of the ending of the Total exchange and the procedures adopted thereafter. Again we are unclear why he did not do so. Again we think the considerations listed in

paragraph 14.14 above played a part. We think also (despite his denial) that he was probably influenced by the lack of official and company concern currently apparent in relation to questions of sanctions enforcement.

14.22. When Mr. Francis and Mr. Sandford (both of whom had detailed knowledge of what transpired between HMG and the Groups in 1968-1969) learned in early 1974 of the ending of the Total exchange and of the arrangements which had followed it, their duty was in our opinion to make sure that the change in the arrangements notified to HMG was fully appreciated by the responsible members of the senior management of their respective Groups. While it was for the senior managements to decide whether a further approach to HMG was indicated and whether any (and if so what) action should be taken to stop supplies, those managements should have been put in a position to make the decision. Both Mr. Francis and Mr. Sandford raised the matter with their superiors, but neither effectively communicated the important fact that a system of supply was in force which significantly departed, in the renewed involvement of Shell Moçambique, from the arrangements notified to HMG in 1968-1969. This was unfortunate.

14.23. It was further, we think, the duty of Messrs. Francis and Sandford, after learning the true facts in early 1974, to take steps to satisfy themselves, directly or indirectly, that Shell Moçambique had been removed from the chain of supply to Freight Services (or, if it had not, to seek some alternative expedient). While the detailed steps to be taken could reasonably be seen as a matter for the local management, achievement of the result was clearly a matter of direct concern to the Groups themselves in view of their relations with HMG and the obligations of some companies and individuals under the Sanctions Order. Although for a time Mr. Francis believed that supplies had switched to the new rail link, he learned in early 1975 that some (as he thought, residual) deliveries were continuing to be made by Shell Moçambique to Freight Services. He was never positively told that these deliveries had ceased and should not, we think, have let the matter rest. We do not doubt the genuineness of Mr. Sandford's belief formed as a result of his visit to Matola in October 1974 that the Freight Services traffic had switched from Lourenço Marques to the direct route from South Africa, and we bear in mind the action which Mr. Sandford had already taken (see Chapter VIII, paragraph 8.38) and the fact that BP were at this time still two steps removed from formal responsibility for management of marketing in South Africa; even so, we think Sandford was easily satisfied.

14.24. Had the Groups in London appreciated that a change of obvious significance had occurred in the arrangements notified to HMG in 1968-1969, we think it clear that HMG should have been told and consideration given to what (if any) action should be taken to ensure that the Sanctions Orders were complied with. Their failure to tell HMG can be excused only on the basis (which we accept) of their ignorance or inadequate appreciation of the change which had occurred.

14.25. Once it was appreciated by the Groups in January

1968 that a situation had arisen in Mozambique of which the Groups had not previously been fully informed and which was not regarded as acceptable, it should in our view have been seen as unsatisfactory (a) for the British-registered company in Mozambique to be managed locally by Portuguese citizens not subject to the 1965 Sanctions Order and (b) for that company to report through and to be operationally subordinate to a management in South Africa which was inhibited in giving full effect to the policy of that Order. BP did at this time ask that the General Manager in South Africa should be relieved of responsibility for Mozambique. Shell had reasons for resisting the proposal and it was not pursued. It seems to us that this was a precaution which could and should have been taken and that the introduction of the Total exchange should not have been regarded as obviating the need for it. When, in 1975, BP appointed an expatriate General Manager in Mozambique, immediately answerable to BP in London, the appointment was unfortunately made without consideration of Rhodesian supplies: deliveries to Freight Services accordingly continued to be made until the Mozambique/Rhodesian border was closed, the General Manager having no instructions to the contrary.

14.26. The letter written by Shell to HMG following publication of the UCC Report in June 1976 was in our view bound to convey the impression, as it did, that the arrangements disclosed in 1968-1969 had remained continuously in force until closure of the Mozambique/Rhodesia border in March 1976. Since Sir Frank McFadzean as signatory of the letter had not been informed to the contrary and believed this to be the case, he cannot be blamed. But we think that Mr. Francis, as author of the letter, who knew that it was not the case, should not have allowed this impression to be given. Although we fully accept that he had no thought or intention of misleading either his superiors or HMG, we think that even (or perhaps particularly) at this late stage the need for full disclosure should have been apparent.

14.27. The criticisms which we have made have related in the main to failures to disclose, either within the Groups or by the Groups to HMG. We do not regard these failures as in any way unimportant. The Groups should have been able to base their actions and determine their conduct vis-a-vis HMG on the basis of such full and accurate information as was available. In the context of the relations prevailing between it and the Groups, HMG should have been able to base its policy towards the Groups and to determine its conduct internationally on a clear understanding of the salient facts so far as these were known to the Groups. In the event both HMG and the top management of the Groups, save for limited periods (the early months of 1966, the period of 2-3 years after February 1968 and perhaps the period after March 1976), were ignorant of facts which should have been the subject certainly of consideration and possibly of action. This ignorance led HMG and the top management of the Groups unwittingly to make statements and give assurances which they would not have done with full knowledge of the facts.

DOCUMENT S/12895*

Letter dated 17 October 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[17 October 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the letter from the representative of Turkey dated 3 October 1978 [S/12878], to which a document is annexed containing a resolution by the "Legislative Assembly" of the so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus".

This pretended "Legislative Assembly" can hardly be representative of the Turkish Cypriots or of their interests, considering that in its election the Turkish army of occupation participated in the voting, for all its members and their families were unlawfully given full Cypriot

citizenship, including the right to vote, by an "enactment" of 7 February 1975. The colonizers from the interior of Turkey, massively transported since the invasion, were also given similar rights to citizenship and to vote.

No further argument is needed to show that such a "Legislative Assembly" is not the voice of the Turkish Cypriots, but rather the mouthpiece of the invader, under whose directions it functions.

The so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" is but a fictitious entity set up by Ankara on the invaded

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/315-S/12895.

part of the territory of Cyprus in an obvious design: first, to bring confusion into the burning international problem of Turkey's aggression and continuing occupation of the territory of Cyprus and make it appear as though it were merely an internal intercommunal issue; secondly, to force open the way to partition and demolition of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Such a unilateral act was calculated to forestall any other solution, thereby negating the meaning and purpose of a negotiating process.

As fully explained in our letter of 31 October 1977,³ both territory and population of that bogus state are but the fruit of aggression: the territory—is none else than the region of the Republic of Cyprus invaded by Turkey and under its occupation; the population—pretendedly the 18 per cent Turkish Cypriot community to be housed in 40 per cent of the island! As is well known, however, the invaded region has been depopulated by the wholesale expulsion of its indigenous majority (82 per cent), the Greek Cypriot people, in an abhorrent practice of racial discrimination. Alien population, transported mostly from Anatolia, Turkey, was massively implanted in usurped homes and properties to change by force the demography of Cyprus. All these activities continue in contemptuous disregard of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions.

It is but natural that such an amalgam of international crimes, brazenly presented as a State, was rejected out-

³ A/32/316.

right by the international community and was condemned by United Nations resolutions.

It should, furthermore, be noted that the setting up of such a State contravenes the Cyprus Constitution (1960) and violates its basic provisions for the preservation of the unity, independence, territorial integrity and demographic composition of Cyprus. And it should be recalled that it is on this Constitution alone that the Turkish Cypriot minority bases its claim to be a community with special rights arising from that Constitution. These rights cannot, therefore, be upheld, while at the same time the fundamental premise of the Constitution from which they arise is violated and demolished.

It is indeed regrettable that Ankara's negative and outdated policy for the partition of Cyprus brings her to such untoward contradictions with herself and to a needless conflict with the basic tenets of international society in our present day interdependent world. That policy, geared on force and domination which still persist, stands in the way of the desired mutual understanding, trust and co-operation for a peaceful settlement of the problem of Cyprus, in accordance with the unanimously adopted General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the subject.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12896*

Report of the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[17 October 1978]

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 32/20 of 25 November 1977, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it, at its thirty-third session, a comprehensive report covering the developments in the Middle East in all their aspects. A summary of that resolution appears in paragraph 91 below.

2. It may be recalled that, on 18 May 1973, the Secretary-General submitted a comprehensive report to the Security Council [S/10929] in which he gave an account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations since June 1967 to deal with the various aspects of the situation in the Middle East. A similar pattern is followed in the present report. Emphasis is given to the search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and to the status of the cease-fire, which has a direct bearing

on the efforts towards such a settlement. The other aspects of the Middle East problem are dealt with more briefly since they will be the subject of separate reports to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session in pursuance of the relevant decisions of the Assembly.

3. The present report is based mainly on information available in United Nations documents. In view of the decisions of the General Assembly on the control and limitation of United Nations documentation, reference will be made to the comprehensive report of 18 May 1973 and to other reports of the Secretary-General and official United Nations documents concerning the Middle East, whenever appropriate, in order to avoid duplication.

II. STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

4. The status of the cease-fire in the Middle East up to May 1973 is described in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 [*ibid.*, paras. 3-13]. There was only one United Nations peace-keeping operation in the area at that time, namely, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). Its main activities were to carry out three cease-fire observation operations established in pursuance of Security Council decisions, one in the Israel-Syria sector [*resolution 235 (1967) of 9 June 1967*], another in the Egypt-Israel or Suez Canal sector [*consensus of 10 July 1967 (1366th*

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/311-S/12896.

meeting)] and a third one in the Israel-Lebanon sector [*consensus of 19 April 1972 (S/10611)*].

A. *Establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force*

5. On 6 October 1973, hostilities broke again in the Egypt-Israel and Israel-Syria sectors. On 22 October the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (1973) in which it called for an immediate cease-fire, called upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) and decided that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations should start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The next day, as fighting continued in the Egypt-Israel sector, the Council adopted resolution 339 (1973) by which it confirmed its call for an immediate cease-fire and requested the Secretary-General to take measures for the immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces. In pursuance of this resolution, UNTSO observers were dispatched to the battle zone, but fighting continued [*S/7930/Add.2219*].

6. On 25 October the Security Council met again and adopted resolution 340 (1973) in which it demanded that immediate and complete cease-fire should be observed and that the parties should return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973, decided to set up immediately, under its authority, a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requested the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect.

7. On 26 October the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report [*S/11052/Rev.1*] in which he set forth the terms of reference of UNEF, the general considerations and guidelines for the functioning of the Force and the steps he proposed to take in order to set up the Force without delay. The next day the Council, by its resolution 341 (1973), approved the report of the Secretary-General and decided that UNEF should be established for an initial period of six months, subject to extension.

8. Shortly after the adoption of this resolution the first elements of UNEF arrived in the area of operation and, following their arrival, tension subsided and the cease-fire was restored. The situation in the Egypt-Israel sector has remained generally quiet since then. An account of the establishment and the activities of UNEF is contained in the reports of the Secretary-General on the subject [*S/11248 and Add.1-7 of April to August 1974, S/11536 and Add.1 of October 1974 and January 1975, S/11670 of April 1975, S/11758 of July 1975, S/11849 of October 1975, S/12212 of October 1976 and S/12416 of October 1977*].

9. The mandate of the Force has been extended as necessary by the Security Council on the recommendation of the Secretary-General and with the agreement of the parties concerned. The last extension of UNEF, as decided by the Council in its resolution 416 (1977) of 21 October 1977, was for a further period of one year, until 24 October 1978. The general terms of reference of UNEF remain as contained in the Secretary-General's report mentioned in paragraph 7 above, but the tasks of the Force were expanded in the light of subsequent agreements concluded between the parties (see paras. 67-76). The present task of the Force is essentially to supervise

the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975. In this connexion, the Force mans and controls a buffer zone between the Egyptian and Israeli forces, inspects areas of limited forces and armaments on both sides of the buffer zone and supervises the demilitarized character of the Abu Rodeis and Ras Sudar oil fields area.

10. The total strength of UNEF was initially to be in the order of 7,000, and this level was reached by January 1974. Later, as the situation in the Egypt-Israel sector quieted down, the strength of the Force was gradually reduced. At present, the Force is composed of seven contingents, from Australia, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Poland and Sweden, and has a strength of about 4,300. It may be mentioned for the record that four contingents which participated in UNEF at its early stages were withdrawn at the request of their Governments, the Irish contingent in May 1974, the Nepalese in August 1974, the Panamanian in November 1974 and the Senegalese in June 1976. Two other contingents, from Austria and Peru, were transferred to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force together with parts of the Canadian and Polish logistic components when that Force was established in May 1974.

11. Following the establishment of UNEF, the cease-fire observation operation carried out by UNTSO was discontinued, and UNTSO observers assigned to the area are now assisting UNEF in the performance of its tasks.

B. *Establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force*

12. Towards the end of the hostilities of October 1973, the Israeli forces moved forward of the 1967 cease-fire lines in the Israel-Syria sector and occupied a salient around the village of Sassa, some 40 kilometres west of Damascus. Following the adoption of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), the cease-fire arrangements were adjusted to the new situation and some of the UNTSO observers were redeployed around the new forward defended localities of the opposing forces [*S/11057, para. 9*]. With these adjustments the cease-fire observation operation in the Israel-Syria sector continued. There was no further forward movement of troops, but the cease-fire was marred by many firing incidents, mainly in the Sassa Salient, during the early months of 1974 [*see reports of the Secretary-General in the S/11057/Add. series*].

13. As described in paragraph 73 below, an Agreement on the disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian forces was concluded on 31 May 1974. This Agreement and its Protocol provided essentially for the strict observance of the cease-fire, a partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces on the Golan Heights, the redeployment of the Israeli and Syrian forces along agreed lines, the establishment of an area of separation between those two lines and of areas of limitation in armaments and forces on both sides of the area of separation. The provisions of the Agreement were to be supervised by a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

14. On 31 May, after being informed by the Secretary-General of the signing of the Agreement, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) in which it decided to set up immediately under its authority the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect. The Force was established for an initial period of six months, subject to extension by the Council.

15. UNTSO observers in the Israel-Syria sector were immediately assigned to the new Force and were soon joined by contingents transferred from UNEF. The cease-fire became effective upon the conclusion of the Disengagement Agreement. The area has remained generally quiet since then. The establishment and the activities of the Force are outlined in the reports of the Secretary-General on the subject [S/11310 and Add.1-4 of June, July and October 1974, S/11563 and Add.1 of November 1974 and January 1975, S/11694 of May 1975, S/11883 and Add.1 of November 1975, S/12083 and Add.1 of May 1976, S/12235 of November 1976, S/12333 of May 1977, S/12453 of November 1977 and S/12710 of May 1978].

16. The mandate of UNDOF has been extended as necessary by the Security Council on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, in much the same way as for UNEF. The last extension was for a period of six months, until 30 November 1978, in accordance with Council resolution 429 (1978).

17. As stipulated in the Disengagement Agreement, the strength of UNDOF has been maintained around 1,250. The Force, which is composed of personnel from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, consists of four national contingents and 90 observers detailed from UNTSO. Originally the four contingents were the Austrian and Peruvian infantry battalions and the Canadian and Polish logistic elements detached from UNEF. Later, in July 1975, the Peruvian contingent was withdrawn at the request of its Government and replaced by an Iranian contingent.

18. The UNTSO cease-fire observation operation in the Israel-Syria sector was discontinued after the establishment of UNDOF and, as indicated above, 90 observers were incorporated into UNDOF.

19. With the establishment of UNDOF, the United Nations had two peace-keeping forces and one observer mission in the Middle East. Consequently, the Secretary-General felt that it would be desirable to establish a co-ordinating mechanism for the activities and administration of those operations and, in August 1975, with the agreement of the Security Council [S/11808], he appointed Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo as Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East.

C. Establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

20. The cease-fire observation operation set up by UNTSO in the Israel-Lebanon sector continued to function until March 1978. Following the outbreak of the Lebanese crisis in 1975, the UNTSO area of operation in southern Lebanon came under the control of various *de facto* forces, and this situation often made the UNTSO operation very difficult. Nevertheless, UNTSO observers continued to man the five observation posts in southern Lebanon as well as their forward headquarters at Naqoura as best they could under exceptionally difficult conditions, and they continued to observe and report on the observance of the cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon along the armistice demarcation line [see reports of the Secretary-General in the S/11663/Add. series].

21. In a letter dated 13 March 1978 addressed to the Secretary-General [S/12598], the representative of Israel complained about an incident in Israel on 11 March, which resulted in 37 civilians dead and 76 others

wounded and for which the Palestine Liberation Organization had claimed responsibility. On 15 March the Israeli forces invaded Lebanon and by 19 March they had occupied all territory south of the Litani River except for a pocket around the city of Tyre.

22. On 19 March the Security Council adopted resolution 425 (1978) in which it called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory, decided to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States, and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 24 hours on the implementation of that resolution.

23. On the same day, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council [S/12611] setting forth the terms of reference of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the general considerations and guidelines for the functioning of the Force and a proposed plan of action. The general considerations and guidelines proposed by the Secretary-General are similar to those applied to UNEF and UNDOF. The Secretary-General envisaged the task of UNIFIL as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force would confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this was achieved, it would establish and maintain an area of operation as defined. In this connexion, it would supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. Later on the same day, the Council adopted resolution 426 (1978), by which it approved the report of the Secretary-General and decided that UNIFIL should be established for an initial period of six months, subject to extension.

24. The authorized strength of UNIFIL was initially set at 4,000. Subsequently, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council decided to increase it to 6,000 [resolution 427 (1978) of 3 May 1978]. As at the beginning of September 1978, the Force was composed of contingents from Canada, Fiji, France, Iran, Ireland, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway and Senegal and had a total strength of about 5,900.

25. The establishment and activities of UNIFIL have been described in the reports submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council [S/12620 and Add.1-5 of March to June and S/12845 of September 1978]. As indicated in his periodic report of 13 September, the Israeli forces completed their withdrawal from Lebanese territory on 13 June, but the fact that they handed over control of the border area to Lebanese *de facto* armed groups, rather than to UNIFIL, has continued to make impossible the full deployment of the Force and the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in the whole area of operation. Thus, while UNIFIL has made good initial progress, much remains to be done before the task entrusted to UNIFIL by the Council is fulfilled.

26. After considering the report of the Secretary-General, the Security Council decided, by its resolution 434 (1978) of 18 September 1978, to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of four months, that is, until 19 January 1979.

27. Before concluding this section, a reference should be made to a recent development which is not directly related to UNIFIL. On 6 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 436 (1978), in which the Council, after noting the deteriorating situation in Beirut and its surroundings and the appeal made on 4 October by the President of the Council and the Secretary-General, called upon all those involved in hostilities in Lebanon to put an end to acts of violence and observe scrupulously an immediate and effective cease-fire and cessation of hostilities so that internal peace and national reconciliation could be restored, based on the preservation of Lebanese unity, territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty. In the same resolution the Council also called upon all involved to allow units of the International Committee of the Red Cross into the area of conflict to evacuate the wounded and provide humanitarian assistance, and supported the Secretary-General in his efforts and requested him to continue these efforts to bring about a durable cease-fire. One day earlier the Secretary-General had asked Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan to undertake a humanitarian mission to the area with a view to extending the Secretary-General's good offices to facilitate the cessation of hostilities.

III. SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

28. The efforts undertaken by the United Nations concerning the situation in the occupied territories and the question of Jerusalem from June 1967 until May 1973 have been described in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 [S/10929, paras. 14-34].

29. The mandate of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories has been renewed by the General Assembly at every session since 1973, and the Special Committee has continued to report yearly to the Assembly on the situation in the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem.

30. * The General Assembly, at its thirty-second session, after considering the report of the Special Committee⁴, adopted three resolutions on 13 December 1977. By its resolution 32/91 A, it reaffirmed that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, was applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and called again upon Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention. By its resolution 32/91 B, it condemned "the massive, deliberate destruction of Quneitra perpetrated during the Israeli occupation and prior to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that city in 1974". By its resolution 32/91 C, it condemned certain Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories and demanded that Israel should desist forthwith from those policies and practices.

31. At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly will have before it a report of the Special Committee concerning Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, the destruction of Quneitra and the treatment of civilians in detention in the occupied territories⁵ and a report of the Secretary-General concerning the facilities made available to the Special Committee to carry out its tasks and to ensure the widest circulation of information regarding its activities and findings.⁶

⁴ A/32/284.

⁵ A/33/356.

⁶ A/33/369.

32. The General Assembly has also given special attention to three problems relating to the situation in the occupied territories, namely, the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the question of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the living conditions of the Palestinian people.

33. At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly decided to include in its agenda an additional item entitled "Recent illegal Israeli measures in the occupied Arab territories designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of those territories in contravention of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of Israel's international obligations under the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and of United Nations resolutions, and obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East".

34. After considering the item at its 47th to 52nd plenary meetings, the General Assembly, on 28 October 1977, adopted resolution 32/5, in which it deplored the Israeli activities listed in the item, called upon Israel to desist from such action and requested the Secretary-General to undertake urgent contacts with the Government of Israel to ensure the prompt implementation of the resolution and to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

35. In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General addressed an appropriate request to the representative of Israel to which the latter replied that the position and views of his Government had been explained in detail in his statements to the General Assembly during the debate on the question. The Secretary-General conveyed this reply to the General Assembly and the Security Council in his report of 30 December 1977 [S/12512].

36. The General Assembly also considered the question of permanent sovereignty over national resources in occupied territories and that of the living conditions of the Palestinian people at its thirty-second session. By its resolution 32/161 of 19 December 1977, the Assembly took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the first of these questions,⁷ reaffirmed that all measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities in the occupied Arab territories were illegal, and called upon Israel immediately to desist forthwith from all such measures. By its resolution 32/171, it requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its thirty-third session a comprehensive and analytic report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.

37. The Security Council examined questions relating to the situation in the occupied territories on several occasions. By a letter dated 19 March 1976 [S/12017], the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Pakistan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied Arab territories. The Council met from 22 to 25 March [1893rd to 1899th meetings], but no decision could be adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member.

38. In a letter dated 3 May 1976 [S/12066] the representative of Egypt drew the attention of the Security Council to developments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which were "a pitiful result of the continuation of Israeli occupation as well as an outright

⁷ A/32/204.

affirmation of the Palestinian people's refusal of the Israeli terrorist practices", and he requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the continued deterioration of the situation.

39. The Security Council held seven meetings on this question between 4 and 26 May [1916th to 1922nd meetings]. At the close of the debate, the President declared that, after consulting all the members of the Council, the majority of the members agreed on the following:

"Grave anxiety was expressed over the present situation in the occupied Arab territories; concern was also expressed about the well-being of the population of those territories.

"The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The occupying Power was therefore called upon to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention and to refrain from and rescind any measure which would violate them. In this regard, the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories, which alter their demographic composition or geographical character, and in particular the establishment of settlements, were deplored. These measures, which cannot prejudge the outcome of the efforts to achieve peace, constitute an obstacle to peace.

"The Security Council should continue to follow the situation closely."

40. In a letter dated 20 October 1976 [S/12218], the representative of Egypt requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider the dangerous and explosive situation in the occupied Arab territories resulting from continuing repressive measures by Israel against the inhabitants of those territories.

41. The Security Council held four meetings on this question between 1 and 11 November [1966th to 1969th meetings]. At the conclusion of the debate, the President, after consulting all the members, stated that the Council had agreed:

"1. To express its grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation.

"2. To reaffirm its call upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the territories and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.

"3. To reaffirm that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Therefore, the occupying Power is called upon once again to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention and to refrain from any measure that violates them. In this regard, the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories which alter their demographic composition or geographical character, and in particular the establishment of settlements, are strongly deplored. Such measures, which have no legal validity and cannot prejudge the outcome of the efforts to achieve peace, constitute an obstacle to peace.

"4. To consider once more that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon and the transfer of populations, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem, are invalid and cannot change that status, and urgently to call upon Israel

once more to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem. In this connexion, the Council deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967.

"5. To recognize that any act of profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security."

42. The Commission on Human Rights has continued to give attention to the question of human rights in the occupied territories. Most recently, it adopted resolutions 1 A and B (XXXIV) entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine". Those resolutions, which condemned Israeli policies and practices along lines similar to those of General Assembly resolution 32/91 mentioned above, were brought to the attention of the Assembly and the Security Council by the Secretary-General, at the request of the Commission, by a note dated 29 June 1978 [A/33/161-S/12758].

43. Since the General Assembly last discussed the matter, the situation in the occupied territories has been the subject of a number of communications addressed to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General and circulated as official documents of the United Nations [S/12563, S/12575, S/12640, S/12669, S/12725, A/33/151, S/12752, S/12762, A/33/165, S/12767, S/12777, S/12805, S/12806, A/33/206, S/12816, S/12820, S/12838 and S/12844 of February to September 1978].

IV. PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

44. The Palestine refugee problem and the United Nations effort to assist the refugees up to May 1973 were dealt with in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 [S/10929, paras. 35-42].

45. The General Assembly has continued to review annually the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on the basis of the reports submitted by the Commissioner-General of the Agency. Following its consideration of the Commissioner-General's report⁸ at its thirty-second session, the Assembly, by its resolution 32/90 A, reiterated its gratitude to the Agency in providing essential services for the Palestine refugees and, after noting with deep regret that the situation of the refugees continued to be a matter of serious concern, extended the Agency's mandate until 30 June 1981. The Assembly took this action without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of its resolution 194 (III), calling for repatriation or compensation of the refugees, which it noted with regret had not been effected. The Assembly also noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of its resolution 194 (III) and requested it to continue its work towards that objective.

46. The problem of financing UNRWA's operations has been a matter of increasing concern to the General Assembly. UNRWA's funding is derived almost entirely from voluntary contributions, mainly from Governments,

⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 13.

and for many years it has experienced difficulty in securing the financial support necessary to maintain its services. In its resolution 32/90 A, the Assembly noted with profound concern that the level of income available to UNRWA was still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements and called upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet UNRWA's needs. In particular, it urged non-contributing Governments to contribute regularly and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions. In a related decision, in resolution 32/90 D, the Assembly extended for another year the mandate of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and requested it to continue its efforts, in cooperation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the Agency.

47. The General Assembly has continued to give attention to the population and refugees displaced as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. In its resolution 32/90 B, it endorsed the efforts of UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance to those persons. After considering a report of the Secretary-General on the matter,⁹ the Assembly adopted resolution 32/90 E, by which it reaffirmed the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and called once more upon Israel *a* to take immediate steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants and *b* to desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories.

48. The situation of Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip has been of special concern to the General Assembly since 1971 when the Commissioner-General reported¹⁰ that, as a result of operations carried out by the Israeli military authorities, large numbers of shelters in refugee camps had been demolished and approximately 15,000 refugees had been removed. At its thirty-second session, after considering the reports of the Secretary-General on this subject,¹¹ the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/90 C, in which it called once more on Israel *a* to take effective steps immediately for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they had been removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation and *b* to desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters.

49. At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly also directed attention to two new questions concerning Palestine refugees. By resolution 32/90 F, it appealed to all States to make special allocations, scholarships and grants to Palestinian refugees and requested UNRWA to act as recipient and to make awards to qualified Palestinian refugee candidates. By resolution 32/111 on the health needs of Palestinian refugee children, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration with Governments of host countries and with relevant United Nations bodies, to undertake a sample survey to ascertain the needs of Palestinian children in refugee camps with a view to averting adverse effects on their health.

50. In addition to the annual report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA,¹² the Assembly will

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 55, document A/32/263.

¹⁰ A/8383 and Add. 1.

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 55, documents A/32/264 and Add. 1.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 13*.

have before it at its thirty-third session reports of the Secretary-General on the return of refugees to their camps in the Gaza Strip and the provision of shelters for them,¹³ on the return of the displaced inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967,¹⁴ on the allocation of scholarships and grants to Palestinian refugees¹⁵ and on the health needs of Palestinian refugee children;¹⁶ it will also have before it the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine¹⁷ and the report to be submitted by the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA.¹⁸

V. PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

51. In its consideration of the problem of the Palestinian refugees, the General Assembly adopted, in 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972 and 1973, resolutions in which it recognized that the problem arose from the denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that the full respect for those rights was indispensable for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East [*resolutions 2535 B (XXIV), 2672 C (XXV), 2792 D (XXVI), 2963 E (XXVII) and 3089 D (XXVIII)*].

52. In 1974, at its twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly included the item "Question of Palestine" in its agenda at the request of 56 Member States.¹⁹ In an explanatory memorandum attached to the request, the sponsors of the item stated that, although the General Assembly had been continuously seized with the question of Palestine since 1947, it had not at any time considered the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine as a separate item. It was therefore deemed incumbent upon the Assembly to consider the question of Palestine in its true and proper form, particularly as the Assembly had in recent years recognized and reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

53. During that session, three resolutions were adopted on the question of Palestine. On 14 October 1974, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3210 (XXIX), in which it invited the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in its deliberations on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings. On 22 November, by its resolution 3236 (XXIX), the Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including the right of national independence and sovereignty and the right to return to their homes and property from which they had been displaced and uprooted, emphasized that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people were indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine and requested the Secretary-General to establish contacts with PLO on all matters concerning the question of Palestine. On the same day, the Assembly also adopted resolution 3237 (XXIX), by which it invited PLO to participate in the capacity of observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly and of all international conferences convened under its auspices.

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda item 54, document A/33/285.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, document A/33/286.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, document A/33/287.

¹⁶ A/33/181.

¹⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda item 54, document A/33/276.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, document A/33/320.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 108, document A/9742 and Add. 1-4.

54. In accordance with the request contained in resolution 3236 (XXIX), contacts with PLO were established and members of the Secretariat met with representatives of PLO as the occasion required. Following the adoption of resolution 3237 (XXIX), PLO appointed Permanent Observers to the United Nations, both in New York and Geneva. The observers of PLO have since attended meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council and other United Nations bodies on various occasions.

55. At its thirtieth session, on 10 November 1975, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3375 (XXX), by which, among other things, it requested the Security Council to consider and adopt the necessary resolutions and measures in order to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable rights and called for the invitation of PLO to participate in all deliberations on the Middle East held under the auspices of the United Nations. On the same day, the Assembly adopted resolution 3376 (XXX), by which it decided to establish a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, composed of twenty Member States (by its decision 31/318 of 22 December 1976, the Assembly raised the number of members to 23), and entrusted it with the task of recommending to the General Assembly a programme of implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people. The Committee was requested to submit its report and recommendations not later than 1 June 1976 to the Secretary-General, who was to transmit it to the Security Council for its consideration.

56. In May 1976, the Committee submitted its report requested by resolution 3376 (XXX) [S/12090].

57. The Security Council considered the report of the Committee during eight meetings, between 9 and 29 June [1924th, 1928th and 1933rd to 1938th meetings], but no resolution could be adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. On 21 July the Committee, taking note of the Council's action, reaffirmed its recommendations and submitted its report to the General Assembly.²⁰

58. At its thirty-first session, the General Assembly, by its resolution 31/20 of 24 November 1976, endorsed the recommendations of the Committee, urged the Security Council to consider these recommendations once again and authorized the Committee to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations. In pursuance of resolution 31/20, the Security Council met on 27 October 1977 [2041st meeting] to consider the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights, but it decided to adjourn the debate on the question.

59. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in its report submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session,²¹ stated that it had unanimously decided to reaffirm the validity of its recommendations endorsed by the Assembly at its thirty-first session. The Assembly endorsed the report of the Committee and adopted two resolutions. By its resolution 32/40 A, it urged the Security Council to take as soon as possible a decision on the recommendations endorsed by the Assembly in its resolution 31/20 as a basis for the solution of the problem of Palestine. By its resolution 32/40 B, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat of the United Nations a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights which would "prepare . . . studies and publications relating to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people"

and "promote maximum publicity for such studies and publications". In accordance with that resolution, the Secretary-General established the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights at the beginning of 1978.

60. Since the General Assembly last discussed the matter, the rights of the Palestinian people have been the subject of a number of communications addressed to the Secretary-General and circulated as official documents of the United Nations.²² The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People has submitted a further report to the General Assembly for its consideration at its thirty-third session.²³

VI. SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

A. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

61. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East after the June 1967 hostilities was highlighted by the adoption of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, within the framework of that resolution.

62. Resolution 242 (1967), which was adopted unanimously, defined the principles and requirements for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The efforts of Ambassador Jarring to promote agreement among the parties have been described in detail in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 [S/10929, paras. 45-67, 70-72 and 99-108]. It is sufficient to recall here that in May 1973 the parties continued to maintain irreconcilable positions and thus the basic deadlock in the search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict persisted.

63. The report of the Secretary-General was considered by the Security Council from 6 to 15 June 1973 [1717th to 1726th and 1728th meetings]. The debate was adjourned on the understanding that the Council would resume its examination of the situation in the Middle East at a later date. It resumed discussion of the report on 20 to 26 July [1733rd to 1735th meetings] but no decision could be reached.

64. In August 1973 the Secretary-General, after meeting his Special Representative at Geneva, paid a visit to the Middle East to discuss the situation with the Governments concerned and to determine in what way the United Nations and he as the Secretary-General might be helpful in the search for a peaceful settlement. In the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization, submitted to the General Assembly during the same month,²⁴ the Secretary-General stated that, despite all the efforts made by him and his Special Representative and the recent deliberations of the Security Council, a peaceful settlement in the Middle East remained elusive. The Secretary-General went on to point out that "time is not on our side in this highly explosive situation".

B. Hostilities of October 1973 and adoption of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

65. As stated earlier, hostilities broke out again in the Middle East in October 1973. On 22 October the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (1973) in which,

²² A/33/54, A/33/118, A/33/151, A/33/154, A/33/165 and A/33/206.

²³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 35.

²⁴ Ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

²⁰ Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 35.

²¹ Ibid., Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 35.

after calling for an immediate cease-fire, the Council called upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) and decided that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations should start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The subsequent decisions of the Security Council, including the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Egypt-Israel sector, have been dealt with earlier in this report (see paras. 5-11).

66. Following the establishment of the Emergency Force and the cessation of hostilities in the area, the Secretary of State of the United States of America launched an initiative to bring about agreements on a disengagement of forces, first between Egypt and Israel, and later between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. Four agreements were concluded between November 1973 and September 1975. In each case, an agreement in principle was achieved through indirect negotiations between the parties, conducted with the assistance of the Secretary of State, and then the detailed implementation of the agreement was worked out in direct discussions between the military representatives of the parties under the auspices of the United Nations.

C. Six-point agreement of 11 November 1973

67. On 9 November 1973 the Secretary of State of the United States informed the Secretary-General [S/11091] that the Governments of Egypt and Israel were prepared to accept a six-point agreement under which the two parties would scrupulously observe the cease-fire and would immediately begin discussions to settle the question of the return of forces to the positions that they had occupied on 22 October 1973 in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations. The Secretary of State also indicated that the parties would hold a meeting under the auspices of the Commander of UNEF to sign this agreement and to provide for its implementation.

68. On 11 November, the six-point agreement was signed by the military representatives of Egypt and Israel and by the Commander of UNEF, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, as witness, at a meeting held at kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road. Discussions on the implementation of the agreement began immediately thereafter under the auspices of the United Nations, and on 14 November the parties reached an accord providing for an exchange of prisoners of war, the supply of the Egyptian Third Army by United Nations convoys and the replacement of Israeli check-points by UNEF check-points on the Cairo-Suez road. Further discussions were held during November for the purpose of bringing about a disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces [S/11056/Add.4-6].

D. Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East

69. In December 1973, there were diplomatic contacts under the auspices of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America aimed at the convening of a peace conference on the Middle East at Geneva. On 15 December, the Security Council held a private meeting [1760th meeting] to discuss the arrangements for the proposed conference and adopted resolution 344 (1973), in which, after noting that a peace conference on the Middle East situation was to begin shortly at Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations, the Council expressed its confidence that the

Secretary-General would play a full and effective role at the Conference, and that he would preside over its proceedings. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to keep it informed of the developments in negotiations at the Conference and to provide all necessary assistance and facilities for the work of the Conference.

70. By identical letters dated 18 December 1973 [S/11161], the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America informed the Secretary-General that agreement had been reached among the parties to the Middle East dispute to participate in the Peace Conference under the auspices of the United Nations and under the co-chairmanship of the USSR and the United States.

71. The Peace Conference on the Middle East was convened at Geneva by the Secretary-General on 21 December. The Conference, in which the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America were represented, held three meetings, over which the Secretary-General presided. The Conference agreed to continue its work through the setting up of a military working group as well as of other working groups as needed. The Military Working Group was to start discussing forthwith the question of disengagement of forces. The working groups were to report to the Conference, which was to continue at the ambassadorial level, and the Conference at the foreign ministers' level was to reconvene at Geneva as needed in the light of developments [see S/11169]. The Secretary-General appointed Mr. Roberto Guyer, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, as his Personal Representative to the Conference.

E. Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 18 January 1974

72. The discussions held by the Military Working Group under the chairmanship of the Commander of UNEF in late December 1973 and early January 1974 led to an agreement on the disengagement of forces between Egypt and Israel. It was signed on 18 January at kilometre marker 101 by the military representatives of Egypt and Israel and by General Siilasvuo as witness [S/11056/Add.8]. The Agreement provided essentially for a limited withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east, for the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai, leaving between them a zone of disengagement where UNEF was to be stationed, and for the establishment of areas of limited armaments and forces on both sides of the zone of disengagement to be inspected by UNEF [S/11198 and Add.1].

F. Agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic of 31 May 1974

73. In May 1974, negotiations took place towards a disengagement of forces between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Agreement was signed on 31 May 1974 by the military representatives of Israel and Syria and by the Commander of UNEF as witness at a meeting of the Egypt-Israel Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, in which the representatives of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference also participated. In addition to the redeployment of the Israeli and Syrian forces in accordance with arrangements similar to those applied in the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 18 January 1974, the Agreement between Israel and Syria also provided for the return of the Syrian civilian administration to the area of separation and the supervision by a United Nations force of the demilitarized character of that area [S/11302 and Add.1 and 2].

74. On 31 May 1974, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) by which it welcomed the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, negotiated in implementation of its resolution 338 (1973), and decided to set up a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (see paras. 12-19 above).

G. *Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975*

75. In August and September 1975, new negotiations were held under the auspices of the Secretary of State of the United States towards the conclusion of a second agreement between Egypt and Israel. It was signed at Geneva on 4 September by the representatives of Egypt and Israel and witnessed by Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo, now Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East. The Agreement provided essentially for a further withdrawal of Israeli forces to a line east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes and from the oil fields of Abu Rodeis and Ras Sudar on the coastline of the Gulf of Suez, the establishment of a larger buffer zone controlled by UNEF and the return of Egyptian civilian administration to the oil fields, whose demilitarized character was to be supervised by UNEF. On the same day the military representatives of Egypt and Israel formally accepted a proposal by the Secretary of State of the United States, which provided for the establishment of an early warning system in the UNEF buffer zone to be manned separately by the United States and each of the two parties [S/11818 and Add.1-3].

76. The detailed arrangements for the implementation of the above Agreement were worked out by the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference and laid down in a Protocol to the Agreement, which was signed by the representatives of the two parties and witnessed by General Siilasvuo [S/11818/Add.5 of 10 October 1975]. In his report to the Security Council dated 17 October 1975 [S/11849], the Secretary-General outlined the implications of the Agreement for the operation of UNEF in the Egypt-Israel sector. The Security Council considered the report of the Secretary-General and, by its resolution 378 (1975) of 23 October 1975, decided to renew the mandate of UNEF for a period of one year. The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General by a note verbale dated 30 December 1976 that, since the Agreement of September 1975 was concluded on a separate basis and actually circumvented the Geneva Peace Conference, the USSR could not bear any responsibility for the implications of the Agreement, including the financing of additional expenses of UNEF resulting from it.

H. *Efforts to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference*

77. The Agreements between Egypt and Israel of 18 January 1974 and of 4 September 1975, as well as the Agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic of 31 May 1974, contained clauses stating in varying terms that the parties did not consider them as final peace agreements but as steps towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, as called for by Security Council resolution 338 (1973). In his periodic reports on the activities of UNEF and UNDOF, which were submitted to the Security Council before the expiry of the mandates of those Forces, the Secretary-General expressed the view that, although the areas of operation of the two Forces were quiet, the situation in the Middle East as a whole was unstable and would remain so unless

and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem could be reached. The Security Council, in renewing the mandates of the two Forces, expressed its concurrence with this view and called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973).

78. At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly considered both the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East. In its resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975 on the question of Palestine, which has already been mentioned earlier in this report (see para. 55 above), it requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to secure the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the work of the Geneva Peace Conference.

79. Later at the same session, the General Assembly considered the situation in the Middle East and, on 5 December 1975, adopted resolution 3414 (XXX) whereby it requested the Security Council to take all necessary measures for the speedy implementation of all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region through a comprehensive settlement, worked out with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, and within the framework of the United Nations.

80. In pursuance of the request contained in General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), the Secretary-General, on 19 November 1975, addressed identical letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, to bring the resolution to their attention. He also requested the Co-Chairmen to keep him informed of any action they might take in relation to the resolution. In his reply to the Secretary-General dated 9 January 1976 [S/11931], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR advocated the speediest possible resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference with the full and equal participation of the representatives of PLO.

81. Shortly after the adoption of resolution 3375 (XXX), the Security Council met to consider the mandate of UNDOF. In its resolution 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975 on the renewal of the mandate of UNDOF, the Council also decided to reconvene on 12 January 1976, to continue the debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question. In accordance with that decision, the Council discussed the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, in a series of 10 meetings in January 1976 [1870th to 1879th meetings], but no resolution could be adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. At the end of the debate, on 26 January, the Secretary-General made a statement in which he noted that the discussions of the Council had emphasized the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East problem and had reaffirmed the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries and announced his intention to undertake a new initiative.

82. In identical letters addressed to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on 27 January 1976, the Secretary-General requested them to let him know their thinking on ways of making progress towards a solution of the Middle East problem. In his reply [S/11985] the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed the view that the only reliable way to achieve agreement on all the

**Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force
for the period 25 October 1977 to 17 October 1978**

[Original: English]
[17 October 1978]

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ANNEX

Map. "UNEF deployment as of October 1978". (See end of volume.)

INTRODUCTION

1. This report describes the activities of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) for the period 25 October 1977 to 17 October 1978. The purpose of the report is to provide the Security Council with a comprehensive account of the activities of UNEF in pursuance of the mandate laid down by the Council in its resolutions 340 (1973) and 341 (1973) of 25 and 27 October 1973 and extended by its resolutions 346 (1974) of 8 April and 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974, 368 (1975) of 17 April, 371 (1975) of 24 July and 378 (1975) of 23 October 1975, 396 (1976) of 22 October 1976 and 416 (1977) of 21 October 1977.

2. Since my last report, dated 17 October 1977 [S/12416], the functions and responsibilities of UNEF have not changed. The situation in its area of operations has remained stable. The Force has continued efficiently to discharge its mandate and, with the co-operation of both parties, it has been able to contribute to the maintenance of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

A. COMPOSITION AND COMMAND

3. As of 16 October 1978, the strength of the Force was as follows:

Australia	46
Canada	840
Finland	637
Ghana	595
Indonesia	509
Poland	917
Sweden	634
TOTAL	4,178

The strength figures for the Canadian and Polish logistics components assigned to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) are not included in the above table.

4. In addition to the above, UNEF is assisted by 120 military observers, members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). This group of observers, designated Observer Group Sinai, is made available by UNTSO within the context of the terms of reference of UNEF which provide for UNTSO co-operation with the Force. The observers are assigned special tasks entrusted to the Force and come under the operational control of the Force Commander.

5. In my report of 17 October 1977, I had proposed reducing the operating strength of UNEF from 4,825 to the level of 4,215. During the period under review, this reduction was implemented without seriously affecting the capacity of the Force to carry out its assigned tasks.

6. Command of the Force continues to be exercised by Major-General Rais Abin. Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo continues as the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East.

B. DEPLOYMENT

7. During the period under review, there were only minor changes in the deployment of UNEF. The deployment of the Force as of 1 October 1978 [see attached map] was as follows:

(a) Swedish battalion: base camp at Baluza. It mans 3 forward command posts and 17 positions in buffer zone 1 in a sector that stretches from the Mediterranean Sea to a line south-east of Ismailia.

(b) Ghanaian battalion: base camp at Mitla. It mans 4 forward command posts and 18 positions in buffer zone 1 in a sector that stretches from the southern limit of the Swedish sector to a line south of Mitla.

(c) Indonesian battalion: base camp at Wadi Reina. It mans 1 forward command post and 8 positions in buffer zone 1 and 1 forward command post and 8 positions in the southern area along the Gulf of Suez in a sector that stretches from the southern limit of the Ghanaian sector to a line south-east of Ras Sudr.

(d) Finnish battalion: base camp at Abu Rudeis. It mans 3 forward command posts and 16 positions in the southern area along the Gulf of Suez and buffer zones 2A and 2B in a sector that stretches from the southern limit of the Indonesian sector to Abu Durba in the south. Checkpoints 33 and 42, owing to lack of activity, have been transformed into positions manned by the Finnish battalion.

(e) Canadian contingent: the Canadian contingent is based at El Gala Camp at Ismailia. A small group of about 20 personnel is deployed at the forward logistics base at El Tasa. It provides supply, maintenance, communications and air transport support to the Force and has supporting detachments spread throughout the UNEF area of operations.

(f) Polish contingent: the Polish contingent is also based at El Gala Camp at Ismailia. A group of about 165 personnel is deployed at the forward logistics base at El Tasa, and one engineering company is deployed at Suez. This company maintains small detachments at Abu Zenima (Finnish battalion area) and Checkpoint Mike (Ghanaian battalion area). The contingent provides maintenance and engineering, including mine-clearing, water, supply, construction, road maintenance and transport support. It also operates the UNEF hospital at Ismailia.

(g) Australian contingent: the Australian contingent is located at Ismailia. It provides helicopter support to the Force.

(h) UNEF headquarters: the headquarters of the Force is located at Ismailia. In addition, liaison offices are maintained at Cairo and Suez.

(i) Other UNEF elements are located as follows:

(i) Movement control detachments at Ismailia, Cairo, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Damascus and Port Said.

(ii) A ration depot at Cairo.

(iii) Military police detachments at Cairo, Port Said, Suez, Rabah, Eilat, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

(iv) Ismailia airfield is the operating base for two Buffalo aircraft, a chartered Skyvan and four helicopters. In addition, a Fokker F-27 aircraft provided for UNTSO by the Government of Switzerland is used by the four peace-keeping missions in the Middle East. It operates normal and special flights from its base at Jerusalem to Cairo, Ismailia, Beirut and Damascus.

(v) UNEF also provides some of the staff serving in the Office of the Chief Co-ordinator at Jerusalem. Other staff members in that office are drawn from UNTSO and UNDOF.

8. UNTSO military observers man seven check-points and observation posts, provide liaison with each of the battalions, serve in staff posts and carry out patrols. There are eight patrol teams deployed permanently. Observer Group Sinai is also tasked with the conduct of inspections of the limited forces and armament areas and missile restricted zones, as required by the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975 [S/11818/Add.1 and 2]. The Group is led by a Chief Military Observer attached to UNEF headquarters at Ismailia. He has representatives located at offices at Cairo and Jerusalem.

9. From 23 March to 17 May 1978, a reinforced company of the Swedish contingent was temporarily detached to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Movement control and signals detachments from the Canadian logistic unit were also detailed to UNIFIL during the formative stage of that Force.

C. ROTATION

10. With a few exceptions, UNEF personnel are on a six-month tour. The following personnel rotations took place during the period under review:

(a) Canadian contingent: personnel are rotated in small groups on a weekly basis.

(b) Finnish contingent: partial rotations of the contingent took place in February, May and August.

(c) Ghanaian contingent: the main body was rotated twice, in April and in October. Rotations were preceded by an advance party of 100 men.

(d) Indonesian contingent: the entire contingent was rotated in March/April and will rotate again in October/November.

(e) Polish contingent: the entire contingent was rotated twice, in November/December and in May/June.

(f) Swedish contingent: the entire contingent was rotated twice, in December and in June.

(g) Australian contingent: personnel are rotated partially every six weeks.

II. ACCOMMODATION AND LOGISTICS

A. ACCOMMODATION

11. During the period under review, all but two of the prefabricated buildings procured during previous mandates were completed. A total of 40 prefabricated buildings purchased during the eighth mandate were delivered in September and have been distributed to various locations in the buffer zone and El Gala Camp at Ismailia. Most of these buildings are to be completed in November, and the rest are being held in reserve to meet emergencies. All troops are then expected to be quartered under hard cover.

12. The new base camp for the Indonesian battalion at Wadi Reina was completed in April and the contingent moved there from Suez. The Indonesian battalion has also evacuated a number of houses at Ras Sudr, which will be allocated to the Polish detachment presently located at Suez. These arrangements have enabled UNEF to release a number of buildings.

13. Improvement projects, such as distribution systems for water, sewage and electrical power, have been carried out at El Gala Camp (Ismailia). A new ration depot is being constructed at El Gala, with estimated completion in December. The new depot will replace the present one at Cairo, allowing more cost-effective use of transport and personnel.

14. At Ismailia, the Youth Centre put at the disposal of UNEF by the Egyptian Government is used by the Ghanaian battalion for rest, recreation and transit accommodation and by UNEF headquarters for transit and as a communications centre. The Service Institute warehouse has been moved into this centre from its previous location at Cairo.

B. LOGISTICS

15. The supply of goods and services to UNEF continues to be handicapped by the long procurement lead times inherent in the United Nations system of international tendering and procurement, although some improvement has been achieved. The supply company of the 73 Canadian Service Battalion carried out this year a complete inventory of stock.

16. UNEF has experienced problems with power supply to the contingents deployed in the buffer zone. In September, 51 generators arrived in the mission area, and 40 more are expected to be delivered soon. Once they start operating, power supply for UNEF installations in the buffer zone will be greatly improved.

17. A new water pipeline from Israel-controlled territory to El Tasa with a reservoir of 500 cubic metres has been installed. However, UNEF continues to have water supply problems in the buffer zone. Liaison is being maintained with Egyptian and Israeli authorities in an effort to improve the situation.

18. The Canadian logistic operations centre at El Gala continues a full 24-hours-a-day operation, and Polish and Canadian logistic resources can be requested as required through this centre. The Polish engineer

company continues to perform mine and road clearance, water purification and building repair and construction. During the clearance operations, more than 48,000 mines, artillery shells, rockets and other pieces of explosive material were destroyed.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. FUNCTIONS AND GUIDELINES

19. The functions and guidelines of the Force as outlined in my previous report remain unchanged, as do the specific tasks entrusted to UNEF and to the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East by the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975 and the Protocol thereto [S/11818/Add.5 of 10 October 1975]. The Chief Co-ordinator and the Force Commander have continued the practice of separate meetings with the military authorities of Egypt and Israel on matters concerning the Force. Relations with the parties have been most cordial and productive.

B. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

20. In spite of some improvement in the freedom of movement of certain contingents, the existing arrangements still fall short of what is required for the integrated and efficient operation of UNEF as a military unit. Efforts to achieve full freedom of movement for personnel of all contingents are being pursued.

C. PERSONNEL MATTERS

21. The general discipline, understanding and bearing of all members of UNEF continue to be exemplary, reflecting credit on the soldiers and their commanders, as well as on the countries contributing contingents.

22. During the period under review, two members of the Canadian contingent and one member each of the Indonesian, Polish and Swedish contingents died as a result of accidents or other causes.

D. OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL OF 4 SEPTEMBER 1975 AND OF THE PROTOCOL OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1975

23. The Force has continued to supervise the observance of the cease-fire and has assisted in the implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975 and the Protocol of 22 September 1975.

24. In buffer zone 1, in the northern area, the Force has continued to provide a physical separation of the limited forces and armaments areas of the two parties. This separation has been achieved by check-points, observation posts and air and land patrols within the buffer zone and along the E and J lines. Within this buffer zone, UNEF also provides escort to selected non-United Nations visitors and to members of the parties travelling to or from the early-warning-system stations. A further UNEF responsibility in the northern buffer zone relates to the control of the entry and exit of the Egyptian citizens residing in the zone. At latest count, there are an estimated 7,000 persons living in the northern part of buffer zone 1.

25. During the period under review, Egyptian army units removed an estimated 64,000 mines from buffer zone 1. Israeli mine-clearing teams are to commence operations later this month. UNEF escort parties are provided for all mine-clearing teams.

26. In the southern area, along the Gulf of Suez, the Force continues to supervise the agreement concerning the demilitarized area and buffer zones 2A and 2B. Under the agreement, no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortification or military installations are permitted in the area. UNEF carries out its function by means of check-points and air and ground patrols. The common roads within the southern area are controlled by UNEF and escorts provided as required, in accordance with arrangements agreed to by the parties.

27. UNEF, in conjunction with the Chief Co-ordinator, continues to assist in conveying information concerning reconnaissance flights, as agreed to by the parties. Protests concerning overflights are passed by UNEF to the parties but can seldom be confirmed because of the high altitude of the offending aircraft and the Force's lack of technical detection capability.

28. The period under review has seen no major violations of the Agreement by either party. Minor incursions into the buffer zone by land or air have been reported to and acted upon by the parties in a satisfactory manner. Complaints by either party are relayed by the Chief Co-ordinator or the Force Commander to the party concerned. The co-operation of the parties with UNEF has been good.

29. The inspections of the limited forces and armaments areas and missile restricted zones, as provided in the Agreement, continue. The findings of the inspections are made available to the parties. Any questions or complaints raised by either party are normally resolved in conjunction with the Chief Co-ordinator and the Force Commander. Violations observed or confirmed by UNEF form the subject of a protest to the party concerned.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

30. UNEF has continued to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross representatives with facilities for family reunions and student exchanges, which have taken place in buffer zone 1. During the period under review, 4,785 persons crossed from Egypt to Israeli-occupied territory, and 3,704 crossed from Israeli-occupied territory to Egypt.

31. During the period under review, the remains of 17 Egyptian and 5 Israeli soldiers were found in the buffer zone and returned to Egypt and Israel, respectively. Five unidentified bodies were also found in the buffer zone.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

32. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNEF for a period of 12 months beyond 24 October 1978, the cost of maintaining the Force for that period would be of the order of \$80 million, based on the manpower requirements indicated earlier in this report and continuance of its existing responsibilities. This figure compares to the amount of \$76,321,000 appropriated for the present mandate. In implementing the budget for the present mandate, I have been mindful of the necessity of exercising the utmost economy consistent with efficient performance.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

33. In deciding in its resolution 416 (1977) to renew the mandate of UNEF for a further period of one year until 24 October 1978, the Security Council also called

upon all the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit at the end of the extended period a report on the developments in the situation and the steps taken to implement that resolution.

34. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and, in particular, the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973) have been dealt with in the comprehensive report on the Middle East problem [S/12896] which the Secretary-General has submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 32/20.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

35. During the period under review, the situation in the Egypt-Israel sector remained quiet. There were no incidents of a serious nature. The presence of UNEF has undoubtedly been an important factor in the maintenance of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and reaffirmed by the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975. The Force not only fulfils a buffer function between the Egyptian and Israeli forces but also provides its good offices to the parties in dealing with a variety of problems on the ground.

36. Despite the present quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be unstable and potentially dangerous and is

likely to remain so unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. It is my earnest hope that urgent efforts will be pursued by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view both to maintaining quiet in the region and to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

37. Taking into account all the factors involved and after consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel, I recommend the extension of the mandate of UNEF for a further period of one year.

38. In concluding this report, I wish once again to express my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to UNEF. I also take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, to the Commander of UNEF, Major-General Rais Abin, to the officers and men of the Force and its civilian staff, as well as to the military observers of UNTSO assigned to assist UNEF in the fulfilment of its responsibilities. All of them have performed with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council.

ANNEX

[Map. "UNEF deployment as of October 1978". See end of volume.]

DOCUMENT S/12898*

Letter dated 17 October 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[18 October 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 17 October 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 17 October 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 10 October 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Osman Örek, the Prime Minister of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/318-S/12898.

TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 10 OCTOBER 1978 FROM MR. OSMAN ÖREK TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention a revealing statement recently made by the "Minister of Interior" of the Greek Cypriot Administration during his visit to villages in the district of Limassol.

Speaking to the villagers, Mr. Veniamin is reported to have stated, *inter alia*:

"The struggle being waged by Cyprus today is a long and difficult one. Our aim should be to chase out the enemy and liberate our lands under occupation. This aim can only be materialized through a struggle to be conducted in awareness of the need for unity and our collective responsibility."

This is to put on record the Turkish Cypriot community's disappointment and dismay at this belligerent statement, at a time when the Turkish side is sparing no effort to resume the intercommunal talks with a view to reaching a fair and lasting settlement, without further loss of time.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

Letter dated 19 October 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[19 October 1978]

From 16 to 18 October 1978 the Foreign Ministers of the five Western members of the Security Council held discussions with the South African Government on the future of South West Africa.

The following documents have now been released by the South African Prime Minister, the Honourable P. W. Botha:

(a) Introductory statement made by the Prime Minister of South Africa at the meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the five Western members of the Security Council at Pretoria on 16 October 1978.

(b) Joint statement by the South African Government and the five Foreign Ministers regarding South West Africa dated 19 October 1978.

(c) Statement by the South African Government following the acceptance of the above-mentioned joint statement by the South African Government.

I should appreciate it if this letter and the three annexes could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) David W. STEWARD
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of South Africa
to the United Nations

ANNEX I

Introductory statement made by the Honourable P. W. Botha, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, on 16 October 1978

You and those who accompany you are most welcome as representatives of your countries, as well as in your individual capacities, to the Republic of South Africa and Pretoria.

It is the sincere hope of our Government and peoples that your historic visit will accomplish the rediscovery of the Cape of Good Hope, its strategic importance and its friendship to the free world.

Allow me to invite you to avail yourself of the opportunity of seeing more of our country than this conference room. You owe it to yourself, but also to the world. We are prepared to create the necessary facilities, considering your limited time. While you travelled so far I hope you will allow my colleague of Foreign Affairs to organize, for instance, a visit to Cape Town and the Witwatersrand. I am also very glad that some of you have found it possible to visit Windhoek and to have discussions with representatives of those most directly concerned with the future of South West Africa. Before we come to specific points, I should like to express my views to you as leading members of the Western world on some salient features affecting the strategic situation in southern Africa. I, consequently, request your indulgence for a short while.

The ideals for which the West stands—and I refer especially to those democratic principles of individual and political freedom—are as dear to us in South Africa as they are to you. South Africa is part of the free world and is anxious to discuss problems that have arisen between us and the rest of the family of nations, on the basis of mutual respect. We have understanding for the points of view of others and hope that, on their part, those who are animated by goodwill would appreciate the real nature of the grave problems which face the southern African subcontinent.

As a country, we deplore the ideology of communism and are prepared not only to fight to preserve the democratic ideals but actively to oppose communism.

I would ask you to recall that in the years since South Africa became a unitary State, following the Act of Union in 1910, we

have fought together with four of the five countries represented here today. In World Wars I and II, South Africa, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, was to be found playing its part in the defence of the common ideals of Western democracy. In Korea, we joined the group of Western countries in the fight against communist aggression and expansionism.

It is perhaps ironic that the current dispute with the United Nations can be traced back to a war in which South African forces, acting on behalf of and in concert with Great Britain, seized what was then German South West Africa and held it as captured territory until it was turned over to the South African Administration as a Mandate from the League of Nations at the end of the First World War. During the First World War this country brought upon itself a bloody civil war in which some of the best people of South Africa died as a result of our participation on the side of the West—and, more specifically, because the Government of the time conquered South West Africa. That was the price which South Africa paid—civil war and insurrection, because the interests of the West had to be served. One hundred and ninety thousand white soldiers took part in the First World War on the side of the West; 60,000 non-whites took part; 12,450 died in battle. During the Second World War, South Africa once again stood on the side of the Allies, in spite of discord and divisions within its own ranks. South Africa supplied 400,000 soldiers. Twelve thousand died. Then came the Berlin airlift. In the Berlin airlift, 10 South African crews of three men each undertook 2,500 flights and delivered 8,000 tons of supplies to West Berlin. Then came Korea. South Africa made 800 members of the Air Force available to Korea. We appreciate that Korea still has the decency to invite us to its festivities, and we shall attend them. All these are South Africa's contributions to the West.

From that time until the present era, South Africa has been concerned with, and responsible for, the security of the Territory of South West Africa. For many decades this was not a serious problem. Only in recent years has the security of South West Africa become affected by new developments in the southern African strategic context.

These new developments to which I refer concern, of course, the entry of Soviet Russia into Africa and, more especially, into southern Africa. Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa affects us in the southern tip of the continent less than does their activity in our neighbouring States, but I would suggest, gentlemen, that, for your countries and for the whole of the free world, you should be vitally concerned at these developments throughout the African continent. I am not so presumptuous as to suggest that you are not so concerned.

I feel it unnecessary on such an occasion to analyse in depth and in detail the Soviet over-all strategy to further its policy of imperialism and expansionism to all quarters of the globe. What I do want to cover, however briefly, is the South African perception of the threat of communist expansionism in southern Africa. In passing, I cannot ignore the dramatic build-up of the Soviet blue-water fleet in the Indian Ocean, which does not concern only African strategists but from all reports available to me is very much a matter of concern for NATO, who have drawn up contingency plans for the protection of the oil-route round southern Africa.

The first obvious intrusion by Communist Russia into the affairs of southern Africa was, of course, Angola, and in conformity with what I said earlier on, we in South Africa were prepared to risk physical conflict in order to stop a Marxist-orientated group from seizing power in that country which would rob the Angolan people of their right of self-determination. We are thankful that in spite of lack of promised support from the West, we succeeded in halting chaos and Cuban advance into South West Africa.

Russian intervention in Angola, through their Cuban surrogates, clearly had only one purpose. This was no war of national

liberation, with so-called freedom fighters supported by the USSR against so-called colonialist oppressors. The Portuguese had gone, and the issue was—who was going to rule in Angola—the pro-Western UNITA or FNLA, or the pro-Communist MPLA? The Russians were determined to get MPLA into power, and having cocked their noses at the West, they did so.

The West may say that it does not matter that there is a Soviet-imposed Marxist Government in Angola. While we accept that the people of any country, including Angola, have a right to choose their own government, even a Marxist government, we in South Africa believe most strongly that it is an entirely different matter if such a government is imposed on the people by force under Soviet direction. We see this as the thin edge of the wedge—or to quote an American strategic view—the start of the domino theory.

When FRELIMO came to power in Mozambique, the South African Government stated, as a matter of policy, that it was not for us to choose a particular type of government for that country. We indicated that we would be prepared to co-operate with the new Government on a basis of non-interference in each other's affairs provided they respected our sovereignty. This, in itself, assumes that Mozambique would not make available its territory as a springboard for action against the Republic. In the short term, we do not expect this to happen, but looking ahead, one must take cognizance of developing relations between FRELIMO and the Soviet Union.

Russia may not have a large physical presence in either Angola or Mozambique at the present moment, but when the chips are down and it really matters in a strategic sense in the fundamental conflict between East and West, Soviet troops, aircraft and ships could reach those territories within hours rather than days. The Soviet capability to reinforce very rapidly—even half-way across the globe from Russia—has already been amply and chillingly demonstrated.

Let us suppose that in addition to Angola and Mozambique, the Soviet Union were to get a firm foothold in South West Africa by imposing a satellite government. This is not a far-fetched possibility. There could be little doubt that Sam Nujoma's SWAPO has already become a Soviet pawn and is determined to seize power by subversion, intimidation and other forces. This, incidentally, is the main reason why SWAPO is so determined to get the South African forces out of South West Africa. If you, gentlemen, have any doubts about SWAPO's intentions, we shall gladly make available to you the information our intelligence has collected. But I dare say much of this is already available to your own intelligence authorities. To get back to my point: say the Soviets and SWAPO succeed, what then?

—South West Africa, together with Angola, would provide the USSR with a solid bloc along the west coast of central and southern Africa, enabling it to be used at will to the detriment of southern Africa and the free world. It would, for example, control South West Africa's mineral resources, including its uranium.

—Botswana, Bophuthatswana, the Transkei and Lesotho could wittingly or unwittingly become pawns in the Soviet master game.

—Cuban troop presence in Angola could be reduced, making the Cubans available for further adventures on behalf of their Russian master, e.g. against the Western-supported State of Zaire, where, already, the United States claims to have evidence that the Cubans were behind the invasion of the Shaba Province earlier this year.

—If Mobutu's shaky hold on his country were to be broken, he would almost certainly be replaced by a Marxist, and we would then be faced by a situation in which the Marxist-orientated countries of the Congo, Zaire and Tanzania would form a belt across Africa from east to west, effectively cutting Africa in half and isolating southern Africa to be dealt with at leisure.

—Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi would be largely dependent upon the goodwill of the four Marxist seaboard States of Angola, Zaire, Tanzania and Mozambique for their imports and exports and thus liable to an economic stranglehold which could force them to toe the Marxist line.

—The isolation of the Republic of South Africa, economically, politically and militarily would then be complete and final,

and Russia would be standing before her ultimate strategic goal in Africa.

We cannot escape the impression that at least some Western countries, while expecting South Africa's active co-operation in search of peace, nevertheless take steps which we cannot interpret as otherwise than hostile.

It would seem that they hold the view that stability in southern Africa and our future are to be sacrificed in the hope of satisfying the third world and thereby indirectly curtailing Soviet expansion. This is a vain hope.

I know you will say that the best way of avoiding such a situation is to find internationally accepted settlements in South West Africa and Rhodesia. We are aware of the benefits which can flow from such solutions. It is this realization which has motivated South Africa to commit herself over the past 18 months to negotiations with the five Western countries, with the objective of achieving an internationally recognized settlement. South Africa has conducted these negotiations in all sincerity and good faith.

But, gentlemen, it would be of little avail if an internationally accepted settlement were to be reached in South West Africa at the cost of internal stability. A chaotic South West Africa or a country dictatorially ruled by a Soviet puppet, although internationally recognized, would be poor compensation to a people who had been promised orderly independence by the end of this year. If the people of South West Africa, or a substantial portion of them, were to believe that they were mere pawns in an international game, in which their wishes did not count, and were not even ascertained, we would have failed dismally. I hope this can be avoided.

We have reached a critical juncture, and the results of the present discussions might affect the whole of southern Africa for many years to come. It is my Government's hope that we can avoid running over hastily into a tragic confrontation. The present situation is delicately poised, and we have to move with caution. In this framework, the envisaged December elections in South West Africa should be seen neither as a final step nor a South African challenge to the international community. As we said in our reply to the Five on 6 October:

"All options will be open to the elected representatives and they will, therefore, also be free to recommend acceptance of the Secretary-General's report. South Africa will, at that time, point out to them the various alternatives and their likely consequences, both internally and externally. South Africa will also again bring to their attention the views of the Five in regard to the requirements for international recognition of an independent South West Africa."

Before concluding my remarks, I wish to draw your attention to the substantial progress South West Africa and its peoples have made under the guidance of my country.

South Africa's support is not only a matter of money but also embraces railways, harbours, post and telegraph services, research in various directions, water supply, and power supply and development. General economic development, such as banking, agriculture, mining, took place under the leadership of the Republic of South Africa.

Since 1961 to 1977 (not to mention earlier statistics), the Republic of South Africa contributed to South West Africa development in the form of special subsidies, loans for electrical supply and building of main roads, the sum of not less than R 637 million. This amount does not include the more or less R 200 million we are spending annually on our peace-keeping forces to maintain the security and peace in South West Africa against Marxist insurgency from outside.

Let me be quite candid with you.

An independent South West Africa with a responsible government will have to take cognizance of these facts.

An irresponsible government, motivated by Marxist theories can only destroy South West Africa and its infrastructure in the same way it brought chaos, hunger, lack of health services upon and destroyed potential economic growth in Angola and Mozambique. Quite correctly a leader in Kavango stated in clear terms: "I say that the Republic of South Africa is our best friend".

Finally, gentlemen, let me advise you, we have a practical vision for southern Africa. Firstly, as far as the internal affairs

of my country are concerned, we did not as a Government create plural societies.

They are South Africa's proud heritage. We do not see this state of affairs as our eventual doom. We accept it as our challenge and an addition to our other resources of wealth. The beauty of the creation itself is to be found in its diversity. The diversity of our peoples is not an unbearable burden. It is an opportunity to serve humanity.

It is true we also inherited many unnecessary discriminatory measures from colonial history. We have already done away with some of them and will continue to do so wherever common interest can be served.

Furthermore, the freedom and right of self-determination and self-expression we demanded, fought for and achieved for my own people, we are prepared to grant to others. We shall, at all times, follow the road of constitutional and evolutionary development in this regard. We shall, with determination, withstand revolution and the creation of chaos. We have the unqualified support of most South Africans on this principle.

Thirdly, I personally have already contributed my efforts towards creating a new dispensation for Coloured and Asian South Africans on the basis of mutual co-operation and responsibility for the future. Our Coloured and Asian communities have made rapid progress during the last few decades.

Consultations on different levels have been accepted. Parliament will attend to these further matters within a few months. As to our black peoples—nobody forces them to accept independence, although they are all enjoying self-government. The Transkei and Bophuthatswana attained their goal by constitutional means, without bloodshed, and are certainly deserving of better treatment from the civilized, democratic world.

We have problems still to be solved, many of which resulted from the colonial period and rapid industrialization. We can be trusted to cope with these problems, through discussion and deliberation, in a civilized South African way. We are a country of relaxed peoples; the only people in my country who are not relaxed are those who make themselves available to serve revolutionary and communist causes and who prefer militant action against orderly government.

We believe in a community of free nations in southern Africa—where proper health services, training of people, higher standards of living, proper housing of families, opportunities for work and economic progress will be possible.

Our neighbouring States in southern Africa need technological, scientific and other forms of assistance. They need capital for sound development. They do not need terrorists who exploit their territories.

The Republic of South Africa is capable of contributing its proper share in a positive way.

My advice is stop shouting at us. Stop creating stumbling blocks in our way. There is a different, more wise approach to deal with us.

Our different indigenous peoples—white, brown and black—have never been slaves.

We do not intend being slaves, now or in future.

ANNEX II

Joint statement of 19 October 1978 by the South African Government and the Foreign Ministers of the five Western members of the Security Council

1. On 25 April 1978, the South African Government announced its acceptance of the proposals of the Western Five for an internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibia problem. However, when the United Nations Secretary-General published his report [S/12827] on the implementation of the proposals, the South African Government expressed concern that certain aspects of the report were not in accordance with the Western proposal. The areas of concern were the size of the military component of UNTAG [United Nations Transition Assistance Group], the question of consultations, the proposal for police monitors and the date of the elections. The statement by the Secretary-General in the Security Council on 29 September [2087th meeting] addressed itself to clarification of these areas of concern.

2. The five Foreign Ministers and the South African Government discussed these clarifications further, in order to estab-

lish common ground on the implementation of the report of the Secretary-General.

The following main points were examined:

(a) *Police force*

While the South African delegation considered the number of civilian personnel envisaged for police-monitoring responsibilities excessive, it believed that the Secretary-General's explanatory statement in the Security Council had removed South Africa's preoccupation with the character and role of the personnel concerned. It had become clear that the functions of the existing police forces would not be affected.

(b) *Consultation*

The Five intimated their agreement that they were committed to the principle of fair consultation, emphasizing that this had been reaffirmed by the Secretary-General in his explanatory statement of 29 September in the Security Council. This would cover, *inter alia*, the composition and actual size of the military component of UNTAG. The Five intimated that they would seek confirmation that their interpretation coincided with that of the Secretary-General. On that basis, the South African delegation felt that the question of consultation could be resolved.

(c) *Troops*

The composition and the actual total figure of UNTAG would be determined by the Secretary-General after consultation by his Special Representative with the Administrator-General in the light of the prevailing circumstances.

3. The South African Government and the five Foreign Ministers accordingly believe that it would now be appropriate for the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, to resume his discussions with the South African Administrator-General of Namibia within the framework of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), which endorsed the Secretary-General's report. The aim of these discussions would be to work out the modalities of the proposed elections under United Nations supervision and to fix a date for these elections. The five Foreign Ministers therefore intend to recommend to the Secretary-General that he should instruct Mr. Ahtisaari to proceed to Windhoek as soon as possible. In addition, it was regarded as appropriate to recommend to the Secretary-General that he should begin consultations on the composition of the military component of UNTAG.

4. The South African Government stated that the planned December elections must be seen as an internal process to elect leaders.

The South African Government will thereafter use its best efforts to persuade them seriously to consider ways and means of achieving international recognition through the good offices of the Special Representative and the Administrator-General.

In implementation of this goal, the Special Representative would consult the Administrator-General on all aspects of the Secretary-General's report (including the fixing of a further election date).

5. The five Foreign Ministers stated with regard to the unilateral elections in December that they saw no way of reconciling such elections with the proposal which they had put forward and which the Security Council had endorsed. Any such unilateral measure in relation to the electoral process will be regarded as null and void.

ANNEX III

Additional statement of 19 October 1978 by the South African Government

No South African troop reduction without peace. Election date not to be affected by continuation of violence

1. The South African delegation stressed that the reduction of South African troops in South West Africa would only commence if and when a complete and a comprehensive cessation of hostilities had been brought about.

2. A continuation of violence can therefore interrupt and delay indefinitely the reduction of South African troops and therefore conceivably also the holding of elections.

3. To prevent any party from unilaterally delaying the holding of elections, it is therefore necessary that a firm election date should be fixed. This date must then be adhered to, irrespective of whether there is a cessation of hostilities and a consequent reduction of South African troops.

Letter dated 17 October 1978 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/French]
[19 October 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of an appeal from the International Committee of the Red Cross dated 17 October 1978 concerning the situation in Lebanon.

I have the honour to request you to have this urgent appeal circulated to all States and all agencies as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Appeal issued on 17 October 1978 by the International Committee of the Red Cross for relief and assistance in Lebanon

1. General situation

1.1. The fragile cease-fire observed in East Beirut and Metn since 7 October has at last allowed the wounded to be removed to hospitals in Beirut and other parts of the country and has permitted the supply of food, albeit on a very small scale, to the civilian population.

To move from one place to another is still very hazardous and difficult, because of snipers and the vast amount of rubble in the streets. Protection and assistance operations are greatly hampered by delays in crossing the lines separating the combatants.

Tension is still running very high in Lebanon and fighting may break out again at any moment.

1.2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is launching today an appeal to Governments and National Red Cross Societies to meet those needs which are at present known. Further appeals may follow when a clearer view is obtained or if there is a radical change in the situation.

2. Needs

2.1. Emergency medical supplies and personnel are covered for the time being. ICRC has dispatched three doctors and four nurses to Lebanon. On 15 September it sent various medications, sufficient for about 5,000 casualties, as a precautionary measure in the event that fighting breaks out. Plans must be made to send further supplies, especially for displaced civilians.

2.2. Estimates of the number of people who have fled from East Beirut and North Lebanon to neighbouring areas (districts of Metn, Kessrouan and Jbeil) vary greatly even today, but all observers put it at over 500,000.

Although all those displaced persons may not be in the immediate need of assistance, the Lebanese Government and the Red Cross are basing their assistance plans on a figure of about

50,000 families who need help right away. ICRC is a major contributor to those assistance programmes by providing blankets, powdered milk, baby food and children's clothing.

2.3. ICRC must again increase its staff in Lebanon and must maintain its strength there for many months to come.

ICRC must also purchase ambulances, utility trucks and radio transceivers for its joint operations with the Lebanese Red Cross, to which this equipment will be donated after the operation.

Operating expenses for October are estimated at 400,000 Swiss francs. Purchases of relief in Europe and Lebanon will exceed 500,000 Swiss francs for the same month. The balance of the special budget for Lebanon is already entirely committed for November and December. To continue its operations, ICRC must receive at least 3 million Swiss francs.

3. Action already undertaken by ICRC

(a) Purchase of 10,000 blankets in Europe which were sent by air freight to Lebanon;

(b) Purchase of 10,000 blankets at Beirut;

(c) Twenty tons powdered milk were sent from Switzerland;

(d) Purchase being negotiated in Lebanon of 20 tons of baby milk;

(e) 35,000 francs have been allocated for the purchase of 2,000 sets of baby clothing at Beirut;

(f) 50,000 francs have been allocated for the purchase of detergents in Lebanon.

Moreover, on 15 October, the Red Cross of the Federal Republic of Germany sent 10,000 blankets and 16 tons of baby food by air freight.

4. Appeal

It is hoped that ICRC will receive the following soon from Governments and National Societies:

(a) 100 tons of baby milk;

(b) 10,000 sets of clothing for children two to five years of age;

(c) 50 tons of baby food;

(d) A minimum of 50,000 blankets;

(e) 10,000 layettes;

(f) Three million Swiss francs for operating and logistics costs and relief purchases.

5. Forwarding and relief

Consignments to Beirut should be sent by air, care of ICRC Delegation, Immeuble Makarem, rue du Koweït, Ras-Beyrouth. Donors are earnestly requested to inform ICRC Geneva beforehand of weight, volume, value, number of packages and other relevant details of each consignment.

For subsequent consignments by sea, please contact ICRC Geneva first to find out which Lebanese port is most suitable.

J.-P. HOCKÉ
Director of Operations

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/329-S/12901.

DOCUMENT S/12902

Letter dated 21 October 1978 from the representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[21 October 1978]

On instructions from our Governments, we have the honour to transmit the text of the joint statement issued

at the end of the talks between the Foreign Ministers of the five Governments and the South African Government

held from 16-18 October 1978, together with the text of a further statement issued at the same time by the five Ministers.

The five Governments reaffirm their continued commitment to their proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in document S/12636 and their support for the Secretary-General's report [S/12827] and his explanatory statement [S/12869], as approved by the Security Council in resolution 435 (1978).

We should be grateful if this letter and the accompanying annexes could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul A. LAPOINTE
*Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada
to the United Nations*

(Signed) Rüdiger VON WECHMAR
*Permanent Representative of the
Federal Republic of Germany
to the United Nations*

(Signed) Jacques LEPRETTE
*Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations*

(Signed) Ivor RICHARD
*Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations*

(Signed) James F. LEONARD
*Acting Permanent Representative of the
United States of America
to the United Nations*

ANNEX I

Joint statement by the South African Government and the five Foreign Ministers

[Same text as annex II of document S/12900 above.]

ANNEX II

Statement issued on 19 October 1978 by the five Governments

The fixing of a date is necessary to provide a firm framework for the electoral process and to reduce uncertainty. The proposals of the Western Five adopted by the Security Council establish a number of prerequisites before the official political campaign starts. In this connexion, the South African Government stressed that the withdrawal of South African troops would only begin upon cessation of hostilities. The Five pointed out that this would be brought about following notification to the Secretary-General of an agreed cease-fire. No party can be allowed to delay unilaterally the holding of United Nations-supervised elections. If the agreed date of the election appeared to be at risk through acts of violence or intimidation or any other failure to carry out the provisions of the proposals, it would be for the Secretary-General to bring the matter immediately to the Security Council, and the Governments of the Western Five undertake to support necessary action in the Council. The five Western Governments undertake to maintain observers at Windhoek during the transitional period and to do everything possible to ensure the implementation of the proposals leading to elections on the agreed date.

The five Foreign Ministers are confident that the Security Council would respond promptly and effectively to any situation where the agreed date of the election appeared to be at risk and would maintain that election date and that there will therefore be no case for any unilateral action.

DOCUMENT S/12903

Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)

[Original: English]
[21 October 1978]

1. At its 2087th and 2088th meetings, held on 29 and 30 September 1978, the Security Council considered my report submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia [S/12827]. The Council also had before it the text of an explanatory statement [S/12869] which I made at the 2087th meeting.

2. At its 2087th meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), the text of which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976 and 431 (1978) and 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978,

"Having considered the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) [S/12827] and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 [S/12869],

"Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa to the Secretary-General,

"Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization to the Secretary-General [S/12841],

"Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

"1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation [S/12636] and his explanatory statement;

"2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976);

"3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;

"4. Welcomes the preparedness of the South West Africa People's Organization to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from its President of 8 September 1978;

“5. *Calls upon* South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

“6. *Declares* that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and the present resolution, are null and void;

“7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council not later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of the present resolution.”

3. The present report is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 7 of the above resolution.

Establishment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group

4. In accordance with the Security Council's decision contained in paragraph 3 of its resolution 435 (1978), and with the assistance of my Special Representative, I have initiated action in respect of a review of the necessary administrative and other arrangements regarding the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) as a whole, including the military component, within the context of my explanatory statement.

5. Following the Council's decision, a small nucleus of Secretariat staff was detailed to assist the Special Representative in the performance of his duties at Headquarters, pending further developments in relation to the full implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The residual administrative and technical staff which remained at Windhoek after the return of the survey mission has continued with the preparatory tasks assigned to it in regard to local administrative arrangements for UNTAG. Throughout this period, I and my Special Representative have been making preliminary contacts with Member States and with the specialized agencies and institutions associated with the United Nations, particularly in regard to the availability of skilled personnel. In this regard, I wish to place on record my appreciation of the co-operative attitude of all concerned.

6. In addition, exploratory consultations with a number of Governments indicate that national contingents of experienced civilian police, selected in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical representation, could be made available for service in Namibia as necessary.

7. Further, as indicated in my explanatory statement, I instructed my Special Representative to explore with the Governments of the African States neighbouring Namibia practical ways to facilitate his task. In consultations with the Governments of Angola, Botswana and Zambia, I and my Special Representative have received reiterated assurances of their fullest co-operation in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

Question of co-operation by South Africa

8. Immediately following the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), I communicated the text of the resolution to the Government of South Africa. Further, at meetings held at my request on 30 September and 11 October 1978 with the Chargé d'Affaires of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations, I discussed questions concerning the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) within the context of my explanatory statement.

9. In addition, I entered into further consultations with the five Governments which submitted the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation [S/12636], in the light of the assurances which they had given me of their continued good offices to facilitate the implementation of my mandate.

10. The Foreign Ministers of the five Governments concerned, namely Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, held discussions at Pretoria from 16 to 18 October 1978 with the Government of the Republic of South Africa in regard to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Texts of official communications issued after these discussions have been circulated as documents S/12900 and S/12902.

11. On 20 October, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, accompanied by representatives of the other four Western Governments, on behalf of their Foreign Ministers, informed me of the results of the talks at Pretoria, following which we had an exchange of views on the matter. In the light of these exchanges of views, I have initiated further consultations with others concerned.

12. Within the context of the mandate entrusted to me by resolutions 431 (1978) and 435 (1978) respectively, I and my Special Representative are continuing with our endeavours in regard to the issues concerned, within the competence prescribed in the relevant Security Council decisions.

DOCUMENT S/12904

Note verbale dated 5 October 1978 from the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[23 October 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note of 18 May 1978 concerning implementation of the provisions of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to communicate the following.

The Federal Government would like to recall that the Federal Republic of Germany has for many years fol-

lowed a policy of strict embargo concerning the export of weapons to South Africa.

After the adoption of the Security Council resolutions 181 (1963) and 182 (1963) of 7 August and 4 December 1963 respectively, the Federal Republic of Germany, although not yet a Member of the United Nations, reaffirmed its embargo policy towards South Africa in an internationally binding statement [see S/5658/Add.1 of 21 April 1964].

This embargo policy is based on the Law on the Control of Weapons of 20 April 1961, and the Law on Foreign Trade and Payments of 28 April 1961. According to existing legislation, the export of weapons as well as the export of technology for the production of weapons and other armaments is subject to authorization. In view of the existing embargo, such authorization for exports to South Africa has not been granted.

After the adoption of resolution 418 (1977) the Federal Government investigated whether any licence for the production of weapons or other armaments had been granted to South Africa. It has satisfied itself that, to the best of its knowledge, no such licence has been issued. In pursuance of resolution 418 (1977), the Federal Government has issued an additional regulation which sub-

jects to authorization the granting of licences and patents and the transfer of restricted knowledge for the production or maintenance of weapons or other armament goods to persons or companies residing in the Republic of South Africa.

Since the Federal Government is determined to abide faithfully by its obligations, it will apply this regulation by not authorizing such licences or the transfer of any knowledge relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles to the Republic of South Africa.

The Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has the honour to request that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12905*

Letter dated 23 October 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[24 October 1978]

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 23 October 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I would be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 23 October 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 9 October 1978 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Örek, Prime Minister of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 9 OCTOBER 1978 FROM MR. OSMAN ÖREK TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to the current deliberations of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly on the "Question of Cyprus" and to invite once again your attention to the following pertinent facts concerning the proper representation of the Republic of Cyprus:

1. The Republic of Cyprus is a bi-national State, based on the existence of two ethnic communities in the island, and the 1960 Constitution of the Republic envisages the participation of these two communities in the administration of the State in all its organs. Lawful authority in Cyprus has to be based on the will of both the Turkish and Greek communities, and this authority can neither be assumed nor exercised by either community without the consent of the other.

2. It is, indeed, ironical that, after continuously violating and disregarding the 1960 Constitution for 15 years—having, on several occasions, publicly declared that they considered this very Constitution as "dead and buried" and hence no longer valid—the Greek Cypriot leadership should now suddenly come up with an insincere suggestion purporting that a return to the 1960 Constitution in Cyprus would help solve the problem. This sudden change of policy by the Greek Cypriot leadership can only be regarded as a blasé tactic aiming to deceive world public

opinion regarding the true facts and realities obtaining in the island; it is yet another of their efforts to undermine the resumption of the intercommunal talks and thus gain time, in order to implement their actual policy of self-professed "long-term struggle". But even if, for the sake of argument, we were to assume, for a moment, a return to the 1960 Constitution, the proper representation of the Republic of Cyprus, as regards foreign affairs, would still have to conform with the relevant stipulations of the Constitution set forth below:

"Article 50. 1. The President and Vice-President of the Republic, separately or conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives or any part thereof concerning:

"(a) Foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both participate. For the purposes of this subparagraph, 'foreign affairs' includes:

"(i) The recognition of States, the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations with other countries and the interruption of such relations. The grant of acceptance to diplomatic representatives and of exequatur to consular representatives. The assignment of diplomatic representatives and of consular representatives, already in the diplomatic service, to posts abroad and the entrusting of functions abroad to special envoys already in the diplomatic service. The appointment and the assignment of persons, who are not already in the diplomatic service, to any posts abroad as diplomatic or consular representatives and the entrusting of functions abroad to persons, who are not already in the diplomatic service, as special envoys.

"(ii) The conclusion of international treaties, conventions and agreements."

Furthermore, article 57, paragraph 3 stipulates that:

"If a decision relates to foreign affairs, defence or security as in article 50 set out, the President or the Vice-President of the Republic or both shall have a right of veto which they shall exercise within four days of the date when the decision has been transmitted to their respective offices."

3. In 1963, when the first onslaught was launched against the Turkish community by the Greek side for the purpose of uniting the island with Greece, the Turkish Cypriot officials were ousted from the executive, legislative and judicial organs of the State by force of arms and were never allowed to resume their duties. Their positions were subsequently filled with Greek Cypriot officials and the Government of Cyprus became a Greek Cypriot monopoly.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/336-S/12905.

4. The continuous violation of the Constitution by the Greek side ever since 1963 and the forcible ejection of Turkish Cypriot officials from the Government in that year rendered this Government illegal and unconstitutional. Yet, owing to its *de facto* superiority over the Turkish community, which was achieved by force of arms, the Greek Cypriot Administration managed to pose to the world as "the Government of Cyprus" until 1974. It is clear, however, that the claim of the Greek Cypriot Administration to governmental authority in Cyprus was neither based on the Constitution nor on the will of both communities in Cyprus. Therefore such an entity or authority as the Government of Cyprus has not existed since 1963.

5. The Greek coup d'état of 15 July 1974 represents the final blow to the Constitution and the independence of the Republic. It was the timely intervention of Turkey that saved the independence of Cyprus and eliminated the danger of total annihilation of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish peace operation also put an end to the *de facto* superiority of the Greek Cypriot Administration and, as a result, two autonomous administrations, each exercising control over its respective region in the island, were established.

The existence of two communal administrations in Cyprus was recognized by the three guarantor States—Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom—by their Declaration at Geneva on 30 July 1974 [S/11398]. Furthermore, subsequent resolutions adopted by the General Assembly recognized the existence of two communities in Cyprus and stressed, *inter alia*, that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus was the concern of both the Turkish and Greek communities, which should be decided through negotiations held on an equal footing. Until such constitutional system is established within the framework of the final solution to the Cyprus problem, it is natural that each community in Cyprus should run its own affairs both at home and abroad. Neither one of these communities has been entrusted, through mutual consent, with the authority to represent Cyprus as a whole in internal or external affairs.

6. As you are well aware, on 13 February 1975, in order to forestall Greek Cypriot efforts aimed at reducing the Turkish Cypriot community to the unacceptable status of utter "statelessness", the autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration was restructured as "The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" and, in the referendum held on 8 June 1975, its Constitution met with the approval of the overwhelming majority of the Turkish Cypriot community. Under this Constitution, free and democratic elections were held on 20 June 1976 in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and new representatives were elected, by universal suffrage, to the legislative and executive organs of its Government at both central and local levels.

It should be noted, however, that the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus does not claim to be a fully independent, separate State. Its Constitution is clearly an interim Constitution, drafted in such a way as to leave the door open to amendment, if and when the proposed Federal Republic of Cyprus, of which the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus will be a component State, is set up. In the meantime, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which today is the only legitimate authority entrusted by public referendum with the task of running the affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community, will continue to exercise the inalienable political rights accorded to this community by international agreements, in 1960, as the co-founder partner of the bi-national Republic of Cyprus (see enclosure 1).

7. At the summit meeting of 12 February 1977, held at Nicosia in your presence, between His Excellency Mr. Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, and the late Archbishop Makarios, the establishment in Cyprus of an independent, bi-communal, bi-zonal, federal republic was agreed upon. To this end, the Turkish Cypriot side has since been showing every effort to resume the intercommunal talks and, in April 1978, submitted new peace proposals for the resumption of these talks, which were described by you as "concrete" and "substantial". Upon the rejection of these proposals by the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriot side also made it known that it was prepared to start the talks on an open agenda and, on 20 July 1978, it went further and proposed the reopening of Varosha, which would allow the resettlement of as many as 35,000 Greek Cypriots in the town, commencing shortly after the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

In the absence of a central authority in Cyprus capable of representing both communities of the island and at a time when intensive efforts are being made for the resumption of the intercommunal talks with a view to determining, *inter alia*, the constitutional system of the Republic, it is obvious that the Greek Cypriot Administration does not have the right or authority to represent the country unilaterally either at home or abroad. It is also obvious that, if allowed to do so, the Greek Cypriot Administration will have no reason to sit at the negotiating table with the Turkish Cypriot side to talk peace terms, and the present state of stagnancy will drag on, no matter how much goodwill is shown by the Turkish Cypriot side as regards the resumption of the talks and an over-all peaceful solution. In this regard, I should like to invite your kind attention to the latest resolution of the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (resolution No. 22 of 2 October 1978, the full text of which is given in enclosure 2), which reiterated that, since at present there is no legal and constitutional head of State in Cyprus to reflect the bi-national nature of the State, the head of the Greek Cypriot Administration, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, cannot represent the Republic or the Turkish community of Cyprus.

In view of the recognition of the bi-communality of Cyprus both at the intercommunal as well as at the international level, the Greek Cypriot Administration's continued attempts to act as the sole representative of Cyprus as a whole is obviously devoid of any legal basis. I wish to stress, therefore, that the recognition of Mr. Spyros Kyprianou as the President of the bi-national Republic of Cyprus, or of his appointed Permanent Representative to the United Nations as if he were the true representative of the whole of Cyprus, would amount to allowing the Greek Cypriot Administration to consolidate its unconstitutional status as the so-called "Government of Cyprus" and affording it with the opportunity to continue its policy of discrimination against the Turkish Cypriot community. It would also encourage this Administration to continue its present intransigent policy as regards the intercommunal talks, and would thus hamper prospects for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate once again that, until a mutually agreed solution is found to the Cyprus problem, the only proper and constitutional authorities entitled to represent the Turkish community of Cyprus, both at home and abroad, are the appropriate authorities and representatives of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, and that anything said or done by the representatives of the Greek Cypriot administration will not be binding on the Turkish Cypriot community.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

ENCLOSURE 1

Joint resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly on the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus

The Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly of the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration, having met in a joint session in Nicosia this thirteenth day of February 1975 and having taken into consideration the fact

That the Turkish Cypriot community has been continuously obstructed by the Greek Cypriots from exercising its rights under the Constitution,

That the Turkish Cypriot community was forced to live for years under unbearable conditions, deprived of all their economic rights and means under threats and oppression, in areas where they had gathered for self-preservation and for ensuring their security of life and property, and

That, as a result of the Greek Cypriot attempts and threats in the years 1963, 1967 and 1974, to end the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community, which is one of the founders of the Republic, was forced to resist such attempts at the expense of grave sacrifices,

Have come to the conclusion that there is no possibility of their living together with the Greek Cypriot co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus; and

Resolution No. 22 adopted on 2 October 1978 by the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus

The Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus,

Reiterating its unanimously adopted resolution No. 1 of 5 November 1976 that there was no legal and constitutional head of State in Cyprus to reflect the bi-communal nature of the State and that the head of the Greek Cypriot Administration could not represent the Republic or the Turkish community of Cyprus,

Unanimously resolve that Mr. Kyprianou, the present head of the Greek Cypriot Administration, cannot represent the Republic or the Turkish community of Cyprus, and

Reminding world public opinion that the organs and persons who could represent the Turkish Cypriots were freely determined by the general elections held in June 1976 in accordance with the Constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus,

Reiterates the fact that, in order that the new Federal Republic of Cyprus might be established, it would be necessary for the Cyprus problem to be solved in accordance with the results achieved by the intercommunal talks held in Vienna and within the framework of the agreement reached in principle between Mr. Denktaş and Archbishop Makarios on 12 February 1977, and

Stresses, from this point of view, the necessity for the commencement of the intercommunal talks as soon as possible,

Having regard to the aforesaid consideration, unanimously:

(a) Calls upon the United Nations and its distinguished Secretary-General to take the necessary steps towards the commencement of intercommunal talks;

(b) Declares that the problem cannot be solved by unilateral actions;

(c) Denounces such unilateral actions.

Having come to the conclusion that the only way to bring tranquillity, security and permanent peace to the island is for the two communities to live side by side in their respective region, developing their own internal structure,

Having noted the fact that the Greek Cypriot community has not made any constructive response to the proposals for the establishment of an independent Federal Republic of Cyprus on the above reasonable basis,

Having taken into consideration the necessity of putting the Turkish Cypriot community's social and economic life into a new healthy order,

Having confirmed their belief and determination to oppose resolutely all attempts against the independence of Cyprus, and its partition or union with any other state,

Believing in the necessity of the non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus and expressing their determination not to allow the island to become subservient to any foreign interest,

Mindful of the necessity of creating in their own region the legal basis of an order leading to the establishment of the future independent, Federal Republic of Cyprus, and

Reaffirming that their final objective is to unite with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of a bi-regional federation,

Have resolved that the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration should be restructured and organized on the basis of a secular and federated state, until such time as the 1960 Constitution of the Republic, the basic articles of which were determined by international agreements in compliance with international law, is amended in a similar manner to become the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cyprus, and until the said Federal Republic is established.

With this object in view, a 50-member constituent assembly will be set up under the chairmanship of the president of the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration.

DOCUMENT S/12906**Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the representative of Burundi to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]
[25 October 1978]

On behalf of the Group of African States at the United Nations, I have the honour to request you to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider South Africa's defiance of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

(Signed) Artémon SIMBANANIYE
Permanent Representative of Burundi
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12907***Letter dated 26 October 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]
[27 October 1978]

I have the honour to refer to a letter dated 9 October 1978 [S/12890] addressed to you by the representative of Turkey, attaching as annex a document containing allegations calculated to create confusion by falsifying facts.

Thus the allegation that the President of Cyprus, in a radio address to the Greek community in New York, spoke of hoisting the Greek flag on the bastions of

Famagusta, Kyrenia, Morphou and the Karpas is a pure fabrication. No such statement or any to the like effect was made by President Kyprianou.

In this connexion, it is pertinent to remark that, whereas the flag of the Republic of Cyprus flies over all government buildings and is on display on all occasions, by contrast, in the area of Cyprus under the control of the Turkish army of occupation—the so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus"—no Cypriot flag has ever been seen at any time. It is only the flag of Turkey that is in abundant display, signifying that 40 per cent of the

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/342-S/12907.

territory of the Republic is under the foreign occupation of Turkey, and to all intents and purposes is treated by Ankara as a part of the territory of Turkey coming within the Mersin district.

Another allegation in that document, which speaks of the "enactment" of a bill tabled by the House of Representatives for the legalization of illegal militia forces, is equally a fabricated untruth. This allegation is flatly con-

tradicted by the records of the House of Representatives and other irrefutable evidence.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12908

Letter dated 30 October 1978 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[30 October 1978]

I have the honour to inform you that the Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at Cairo on Thursday, 26 October 1978, decided to renew the mandate of the Arab peace-keeping force for six months.

Earlier, as you have already been informed, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States contributing to this force (the Syrian Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar), together with the Ambassador of the Sudan at Beirut, at the invitation of the President of the Lebanese Republic, held a meeting at the Palace of Beit ed Dine. President Sarkis himself presided over the meetings, which were also attended by the President of the Council, Mr. Salim El-Hoss, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fouad Boutros.

Eight resolutions were adopted at this meeting and were made public on Tuesday, 17 October 1978. These resolutions concerned the possible renewal of the mandate of the Arab peace-keeping force and the framework within which the new mandate was to be carried out. I attach hereto a copy of the resolutions, so that they may be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Subsequently, at its weekly meeting held on 25 October 1978, the Council of Ministers adopted a programme for the implementation of these resolutions. A set of measures was also adopted to ensure full observance of the cease-fire proclaimed on 6 October 1978, which continues to be observed over a wide area, including the city of Beirut.

I take this opportunity to transmit to you the thanks of the Lebanese Government for your continuous and invaluable efforts to restore peace to Lebanon.

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

ANNEX

The eight resolutions of Beit ed Dine

1. It is necessary to establish the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial security of Lebanon within the framework of its democratic régime, together with the exercise by the State of its authority over the whole of Lebanese territory, the removal of any armed presence and position to make way for the establishment of a strong central authority capable of rebuilding the State institutions affected by events, as part of the strengthening of the unity of the territory and people of this country.
2. The elimination of all armed presences and the collection of arms, the unlawful carrying of which shall be prohibited.
3. The strict and full implementation of the resolutions of the Riyadh and Cairo summits.
4. The halting of information campaigns with a view to preserving the unity of the country, enforcement of the law governing the press and the prohibition of all illegal audio-visual information media.
5. The preparation of a timetable for the constitution of the army on a national balanced basis, with a view to enabling it to play its part in promoting national security and to replace the Arab striking force in Lebanon.
6. Action with a view to achieving national understanding among all parties to the conflict, in order to promote national unity and the adoption of reforms designed to consolidate national unity and to help in eliminating the causes of the conflagration in Lebanon.
7. The enforcement of the law against all those collaborating with the Israeli enemy and the condemnation of all forms of co-operation, on the basis of Lebanon's membership in the Arab world.
8. The establishment of a liaison commission, including representatives of Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Kuwait, to be placed at the disposal of the President of the Republic and to carry out any mission which he may assign to it, in accordance with the principles and bases referred to above.

DOCUMENT S/12909

Letter dated 31 October 1978 from the representatives of Gabon, Mauritius and Nigeria to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[31 October 1978]

We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, Permanent Observer of the South West

Africa People's Organization to the United Nations, during the course of the Council's consideration of the situation in Namibia.

*Signed by the representatives of the following
States members of the Security Council:*

Gabon
Mauritius
Nigeria

DOCUMENT S/12910

Note verbale dated 30 October 1978 from the Mission of France to the Secretary-General

*[Original: French]
[1 November 1978]*

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his note of 18 May 1978 concerning the implementation of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, on the question of South Africa.

As has already been stated, upon the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution, the French Government issued the necessary instructions for the implementation of its provisions. Furthermore, in view of the long-standing existence in France of strict legislation governing the manufacture and sale of arms (whereby no arms can be exported without the explicit agreement of the competent government authorities and any external marketing operation requires a specific authorization, which may be withdrawn at any time), the French Government cancelled all previously granted authorizations. All deliveries were thereby halted, and all contractual arrangements relating to the supply of arms to South Africa became *de facto* null and void. In particular, contracts

relating to the training of personnel in the use of the arms and related *matériel* sold were cancelled upon the adoption of resolution 418 (1977).

The granting of licences, which also requires authorization, is, of course, also covered by the general prohibition imposed by the French Government upon the adoption of resolution 418 (1977). With regard to licences granted in the past, it should be noted that they relate to relatively old transactions, and that the recipients have by no means made use of them all. The French Government has called on industry to take practical measures to terminate their co-operation. Any application for the renewal or extension of such licences would, of course, be refused, as would be the case for the granting of new licences.

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations requests the Secretary-General to have the text of this note circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12911

**Letter dated 1 November 1978 from the representative of the
United States of America to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original: English]
[1 November 1978]*

My Government has spoken forcefully and in detail on a number of occasions regarding the massive abuse of human rights in Kampuchea.

More recently, my Government has viewed with great concern the continuing conflict between the armed forces of Kampuchea and Viet Nam, and the possibility of its escalation during the approaching dry season. The clashes and increasing tensions between those two countries threaten the peace and stability of the region as a whole, as well as further endangering the welfare of the people of Kampuchea and Viet Nam.

In our view, the situation is such that it is incumbent upon members of the Council, who are especially responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, to consider how appropriately to deal with it.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) James F. LEONARD
Acting Permanent Representative
of the United States of America
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/12912*

Letter dated 31 October 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[1 November 1978]

I have the honour to enclose a letter dated 31 October 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 31 October 1978 from
Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to a letter dated 26 October 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Zenon Rossides, the representative of the Greek Cypriot Administration [S/12907].

It is most significant that it is only in New York that Mr. Rossides has chosen to deny the statement made by his leader Mr. Kyprianou, as set out in my letter of 9 October [S/12890], to the effect that the struggle would continue "until the Greek flag is once again hoisted and flying on the bastions of Famagusta, Kyrenia, Morphou and the Karpas". In Cyprus, this widely circulated press report was not denied by Mr. Kyprianou at all.

In his attempt to hoodwink the members of the General Assembly on the question of who uses the Cyprus flag and where, Mr. Rossides has in fact confirmed that the Cyprus flag is only used as a matter of show at some "government buildings", thus admitting that elsewhere and in all Greek Cypriot military camps, as well as in all Greek posts on the boundary facing the Turkish Cypriot lines, it is the Greek flag which has been confronting the Turkish Cypriots since 1963. Mr. Rossides further conceals the fact that there has been a continuous deception of all countries in so far as the "national anthem of Cyprus" is concerned. The Greek Cypriot leaders have passed off the national anthem of Greece as the national anthem of

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/353-S/12912.

Cyprus, in complete disregard of the protestations of the Turkish Cypriot co-founder partner community in this connexion, and till this day the national anthem of Greece is being used by the Greek Cypriot leaders in all countries as "the national anthem of Cyprus".

It is odd that Mr. Rossides has found it necessary to deny the efforts of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives to legalize the illegal militia forces in the south. If this denial is an indication that these efforts have now ceased, then the purpose of our letter has been fully served.

In this connexion, the following extract from a statement by Mr. Kyprianou delivered on 17 July 1966 at Ayios Phylaxia in Cyprus suffices to prove what the Greek Cypriot flag symbolizes in Cyprus and what the true problem is in Cyprus:

"The national leadership which voices the wish of all the people is not prepared to accept any compromise solution adulterating the people's national restoration. The Cyprus people want union of the whole of Cyprus with Greece. The Greek Cypriot people will continue to struggle having as their standard the Greek flag, the Greek virtue and the Greek ideals."

Later, in 1971, on the Independence Day of Greece, this is how Mr. Kyprianou described the Cyprus problem, which is hardly what the non-aligned countries regard the problem to be:

"The struggle of Cyprus is the struggle of all Hellenism. Another basic prerequisite for the success of the struggle is complete unity between Greece and Cyprus. . . . They both have full knowledge of their responsibilities towards history and Hellenism. . . . The responsibility of our generation is very great. Cyprus, where the Greek virtue is being tested, is today the place where the Greek history and Greek struggle are continuing. . . . It is here that Hellenism will continue its glorious march. It is here that Hellenism is being tested. It is here that it must now be glorified and achieve things. . . . They should not ask of us to abandon the inalienable rights of the Greek Cypriot people. We shall not betray our ideals and we shall not renounce our origin and national obligations."

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12913

Letter dated 2 November 1978 from the representative of Czechoslovakia
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[2 November 1978]

I have the honour to request that the text of the attached telegram dated 23 October 1978 from Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization, addressed to the Secretary-General should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ilja HULINSKÝ
Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Telegram dated 23 October 1978 from Mr. Sam Nujoma,
President of the South West Africa People's Organization,
addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to comment on the communiqué issued jointly by the Foreign Ministers of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, The United Kingdom and the United States

with the minority white South African régime in Pretoria [S/12900, annex II], which in the view of SWAPO is a betrayal of the struggle of the Namibian people for genuine freedom and independence which they have suffered, sacrificed and died for. This communiqué is unacceptable and rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Namibian people. The whole exercise is a manoeuvre by the South African racist régime aimed at maintaining its colonial interest in Namibia and imposing on our people its evil intention of creating homelands and bantustans through a neo-colonial settlement, against the popular political aspirations and demands of the Namibian people for self-determination and national liberation. It is clear in the mind of every Namibian patriot that the Pretoria régime intends to create a puppet régime in Namibia through bogus elections in December; such a régime will certainly be manipulated and controlled from Pretoria. There is no doubt that such a puppet régime would ask South Africa to maintain in Namibia its repressive armed forces to continue to suppress the Namibian people's resistance against oppression, foreign domination and

exploitation. The communiqué does not ensure the implementation of the report of the Secretary-General adopted by the Security Council in its resolution 435 (1978). The United Nations should not allow itself to be used by the Pretoria racist régime to legitimize its evil intentions and illegal acts to impose a neo-colonial solution against the interests of the Namibian people.

Certainly, there is no basis emanating from the joint communiqué for the United Nations Special Representative to go now to Namibia, except within the framework of resolution 435 (1978) and the report of the Secretary-General that have been rejected by the Pretoria racists.

In the view of SWAPO, the presence of the Special Representative's technical staff in Namibia will be interpreted by South Africa to mean that the United Nations has consented to and approved the holding of the so-called elections in December; it is therefore necessary that the Secretary-General should withdraw the remaining technical staff of the Special Representative from Namibia.

SWAPO therefore demands that the Security Council should invoke Chapter VII of the Charter and impose comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against the South African racist régime to oblige it to accept implementation of the United Nations resolutions and in particular resolution 435 (1978).

DOCUMENT S/12914*

Letter dated 2 November 1978 from the representative of Sri Lanka to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[2 November 1978]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a communiqué issued today by the Group of Non-Aligned Countries in New York.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the communiqué circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) B. J. FERNANDO
Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Communiqué issued on 2 November 1978 by the Group of Non-Aligned Countries

1. The Group of Non-Aligned Countries meeting in New York on 2 November 1978 has noted with deep concern the worsening of the situation in southern Africa, especially with regard to the process of decolonization in Namibia and Zimbabwe.

2. In this connexion, the Group of Non-Aligned Countries recalls the Declaration of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries at Belgrade in July 1978, which stated that the "illegal occupation of Namibia by racist South Africa constitutes aggression not only against the people of Namibia but against all the peoples and countries of free Africa"^a and, consequently, constitutes a threat to international peace and security and poses a challenge to the United Nations. The Declaration further condemns "the racist régime of South Africa for its savage repression of the Namibian people and for its campaign of terror against their liberation movement, SWAPO".^b

3. The Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries also reaffirmed the decision of the Khartoum summit of the Organization of African Unity regarding Zim-

babwe^c which rejected and condemned the so-called internal settlement in Southern Rhodesia as "a sham, fraudulent and treacherous attempt to consolidate racist minority military, economic and political power and give some political status to the unrepresentative and opportunistic elements that were party to it".^d

4. Actions such as the issuance of a visa to Ian Smith by the United States of America constitute a violation of Security Council resolutions 253 (1968) and 423 (1978) and therefore deserve international repudiation.

5. True to its principles of solidarity and non-alignment, the non-aligned movement has always extended support to the cause of liberation everywhere, and especially in Africa. In the face of the present dangerous developments, the non-aligned countries reiterate their condemnation of the attempts by the racist régimes at Pretoria and Salisbury to perpetuate colonialist rule in southern Africa.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned Countries also demands that all States engaged in economic, trade, military and other relations which strengthen the racist régimes of southern Africa should comply with the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which call for an end to such ties and, in this respect, support the decision of the African States which have called for the application of the sanctions envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to the racist régime of South Africa.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned Countries reaffirms its support for a peaceful solution in southern Africa under the terms of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and reiterates the commitment of the non-aligned countries to support firmly the just struggle of the peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe for self-determination and independence.

8. The non-aligned countries categorically reject the manoeuvres of South Africa aimed at sabotaging and circumventing the plan of the United Nations for the transfer of power to genuine representatives of the Namibian people.

9. These manoeuvres, especially the illegal elections scheduled for 2 December 1978, are designed to entrench neo-colonial and racist domination of southern Africa.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/355-S/12914.

^a A/33/206, annex I, para. 102.

^b *Ibid.*, para. 106.

^c A/33/235, resolution CM/Res. 680 (XXXI).

^d A/33/206, annex I, para. 109.

DOCUMENT S/12915*

Letter dated 3 November 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[4 November 1978]

I have the honour to refer to a letter from the representative of Turkey of 9 October 1978 [S/12892], attaching as annex a letter signed by Mr. Rauf Denktaş, "President" of the so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus".

In my previous letters, and more recently in that of 17 October 1978 [S/12895], it has been conclusively shown that the so-called "State" is but a fictitious set-up by Ankara in an attempt to cover up its invasion and continuing aggressive occupation of 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus in violation of the unanimous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the subject.

In his said letter, Mr. Denktaş strongly remonstrates that President Kyprianou spoke in the General Assembly as though representing also the Turkish Cypriot community. The President of Cyprus, however, has a right and a duty to speak on behalf of the whole people of Cyprus and was justified in expressing concern over the fate also of the Turkish Cypriot community, whose basic rights and vital interests have been trampled upon by the army of occupation and by the massively transported alien population from Anatolia, Turkey.

This flooding colonization from Turkey furthermore endangers the very survival of the distinct identity of the Turkish Cypriot community as a people, as well as their standards of civilization and culture. Thus, by the conditions of forced separation from their ancestral homes and properties in the south, imposed on them by the partitionist policy of Ankara, the large majority of the Turkish Cypriots live in a climate of distress and misery under the oppressiveness of the army of occupation and of the imported colonizers from Turkey. The stark reality of this situation and its consequences on the Turkish Cypriots, causing genuine concern to all Cypriots, are common knowledge and cannot be concealed through any pretence by the instruments of Ankara.

Mr. Denktaş simulates wonder why President Kyprianou in his address did not touch upon the accord between the late Archbishop Makarios and himself of February 1977, and its guidelines. He knows, or ought to know, however, that the Turkish proposals prepared at Ankara and presented to the Secretary-General in April 1978 are in no sense for a federation but for two completely separate States in an express division of sovereignty, totally incompatible with any concept of unity of the State, as has been generally admitted and recognized. Thus they provide for separate and distinct passports, for separate defence forces without a joint command, separate currencies, separate central banks and separate rights to negotiate international treaties. They run counter, therefore, to the agreed basis of preserving the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the island.

The effect of these partitionist proposals is to violate, transgress and negate the aforesaid accord. In consequence, the two sides are now shown to be at cross purposes and the end result of any negotiation unattainable. The uselessness of negotiations in the present circum-

stances is recognized also by the Secretary-General. Particularly so, as Mr. Denktaş in his said letter reasserts that he stands by those partitionist proposals, thereby making it obvious that there is in reality no common basis for a federal constitution in an undivided State.

The rest of the letter is but a systematized repetition of unsubstantiated charges to the effect that the Turkish Cypriots since December 1963 were the victims of an "onslaught" by the Greek Cypriots and were for 11 years, until 1974, harassed and compelled to be secluded in enclaves, deprived of their homes and their freedom of movement. These irresponsible allegations made in various forums at different times were refuted by reference to the concrete and authoritative evidence contained in the official six-monthly reports of the Secretary-General, covering the whole 11-year period in question. Extracts from these reports were quoted in our statements at the United Nations on more than one occasion, namely in the Security Council on 30 August 1974 [1795th meeting], in the Special Political Committee on 29 October 1974,²⁶ in the General Assembly on 8 October 1975²⁷ and, more recently, in our letter to the Secretary-General of 30 March 1978 [S/12626]. Yet the Turkish side seems undeterred from reverting after a time to those same untrue assertions. The relevant facts, therefore, and the conclusive evidence on them have to be recalled. They are given in an over-all picture of the situation in annex I. Extracts from the reports of the Secretary-General appear in annex II.

Mr. Denktaş's further allegation of an agreement on 2 August 1975 for an "exchange of population" is directly contradicted by the report of the Secretary-General [S/11789 of 5 August 1975], which shows the very reverse, namely, that the remaining Greek Cypriots in the north (15,000) would be free to stay and enjoy security of life, freedom of movement and other facilities, and that all relatives and others in the south would be allowed to rejoin them in the north.

It is in a persistent effort to cover up the international crimes committed against Cyprus with the design of changing its demographic structure that such propaganda of systematic misrepresentations was lodged and still continues. We believe, however, that the policy of the "big lie" cannot for long stand up against truth, which eventually always prevails.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

ANNEX I

Over-all picture of the situation in Cyprus

Since the day of the establishment of the Republic in 1960, under the Zurich and London agreements, the Turkish Cypriot leadership prompted by Ankara—and assisted by the under-

²⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Special Political Committee, 923rd meeting.

²⁷ Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2380th meeting.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/359-S/12915.

ground organization TMT manned by officers from Turkey—has been continuously obstructing the functioning of the State with a view to promoting divisiveness, friction and conflict. It was this policy, well under way by 1961, that led the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives to abuse their rights under the Constitution for a separate majority, by preventing the passage of an admittedly normal and unobjectionable income tax bill. The result was a serious financial crisis and trouble. They next insisted on a house-by-house division of the towns, a proposition which was predictably impractical and proved unworkable.

This persistent obstructionism made it necessary for the President of Cyprus to address a letter to the Turkish Vice-President in November 1963, proposing amendments which would modify the excessively divisive and unworkable elements in the Constitution and, in exchange, increase the authority of the Turkish Vice-Presidents of the Republic and of the House of Representatives. Before the Turkish Cypriots had time to consider the proposals, the negative response, openly directed from Ankara, was an outright rejection, coupled with the provocative appearance of Turkish Cypriot fighters who showed themselves fully armed and ready for combat.

It should be recalled that, already in October 1959, even as the Zurich and London agreements were being drawn up, Turkey was secretly shipping arms and ammunition to Cyprus in preparation for armed uprising. The vessel *Denis* was at that time actually caught by the British authorities in the very act of unloading an arsenal of weapons at the north of Cyprus. At the same time, a special invasion force was being prepared in the Mersin area, opposite the coast of Cyprus.

The armed clashes of December 1963 were thus the culmination of continued and provocative hampering of the machinery of government by the Turkish Cypriot leadership at the bidding of Ankara.

No sooner had the clashes begun, than the underlying purpose for them became apparent by Turkey's attempt to invade Cyprus on 27 December 1963. Recourse to the Security Council halted the attempt. Vice-President Küçük, however, encouraged from outside, continued to give the signal of rebellion by declaring publicly that he was "no longer a Vice-President and that the Constitution is dead", and that "partition is the best solution". He went so far as to propose the thirty-fifth parallel as "an ideal demarcation line", as reported in *The New York Times* of 4 and 11 January, as well as in *The Herald Tribune* of 9 January 1964.

It was at the bidding of Mr. Küçük that the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives resigned from the House. At the same time, all Turkish officials and employees in the civil service by orders of their leadership ceased functioning and withdrew from the public service.

These proved facts fully counter the Turkish pretences of an allegedly persecuted Turkish Cypriot minority, deprived of their rights and their share in the administration.

Furthermore, the allegation that the Turkish Cypriots were a defenceless community under siege and terror by the Greeks is flatly contradicted even by Turkish evidence, which at the same time reveals that the clashes were provoked and pursued by the Turkish side under the banner of partition.

The Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Halkın Sesi*, the mouthpiece of the then Vice-President Küçük, in its issue of 29 February 1964, writes: "The Greeks are in a state of distress in the full sense of the word. Starting from Nicosia in all clashes the Greeks suffered great losses, but they do not give the casualty figure." The paper continues: "The Turkish fighters have pledged to fight on until the realization of partition". Thus, the attitude of the Turkish minority has been admittedly one of provoking division and instigating armed conflict with the aim of partition.

In yet another issue of *Halkın Sesi*, it is made clear that the avowed aim of partition is actually for annexation. In its issue of 9 August 1965, it writes:

"Cyprus is another Alexandretta in the history of Turkey. The power of Turkey will ensure an honourable life for the Turkish Cypriots in the same way as it did in Alexandretta by annexing it and bringing it under Turkish domination. The road in this direction has been opened by the Turkish fighters at Kokkina who are now fighting in every corner of Cyprus."

In June 1964, Mr. Erkin, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, offered another clear insight when he said in a newspaper interview in Athens: "The radical solution would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closest to the Turkish Asiatic coast, to Turkey".

Further evidence that the partitionist motivation of clashes came from Ankara appears in Prime Minister İnönü's words to the National Assembly of Turkey in October 1974: "Officially, we promote the federation concept rather than the partition thesis so as to appear as though within the provisions of the Treaty".

It is these designs of Ankara for partition and ultimate annexation which over the years have assiduously cultivated and nurtured a climate of friction and enmity between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The task of breaking the long-existing good relations between the two communities was known to be a difficult one; so much so that it had to be furthered through violence. An underground terrorist organization—TMT—, set up and manned by officers from Turkey, began in 1958 systematically forcing the Turkish Cypriots, through threats of heavy punishment, into discontinuing any friendly contacts and associations with their Greek Cypriot compatriots in a sustained effort to keep them apart as enemies.

In that effort, all human rights of the Turkish Cypriots were denied them by their own leadership, imposed from Ankara. Their right of freedom of movement, freedom of residence—and even to life—was violated by the Turkish Cypriot leaders working in league with TMT, which terrorized the rank and file of the Turkish Cypriot community into complete submissiveness to its orders.

A considerable part of the Turkish Cypriot people had thus been compelled by their leadership in conjunction with TMT to abandon their homes and properties, even in areas far removed from the site of conflict, and to be segregated in enclaves so as to create the nucleus of a geographic division and promote the objective of partition. From those enclaves they were forbidden by order of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and TMT from getting out, although longing to return to their homes. They could not leave the enclaves without a special permit and had to be back at a specific time. Those who tried to escape were shot on the spot. Many instances were quoted in our letters to the Secretary-General at that time.

In his report of 15 June 1964, the Secretary-General states:

"However, the lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose, namely, to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation." [S/5764, para. 113.]

In his report of 10 June 1965, he states:

"The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together, or which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of Government agents. Indeed, since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy. The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots." [S/6426, para. 106.]

The Government's contention is thus borne out that:

"the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file" [*ibid.*].

During the intercommunal clashes in the period 1963-1974, there were no doubt occasions of regrettable acts of violence from which both sides suffered. But how can these sporadic instances of irresponsible violence compare with the systematic violation of human rights by the army of invasion through verified mass executions of innocent civilians by the thousands in a genocidal expulsion of over 200,000 Greek Cypriots? In their usurped homes and properties, alien population, imported from Turkey,

is being implanted in a pre-planned design to change by force the demographic composition of Cyprus. A horrifying account of the atrocities involved in this sinister operation is contained in the studied report of the European Commission of Human Rights, partly published in *The Sunday Times* of 23 January 1977.

Yet the rank and file of the Cypriot people—Greek and Turkish alike—yearn for conciliation and the resumption of their former amicable relations. They are forcibly prevented, however, by outside interference in a divisive policy for purposes alien to the interest of the people of Cyprus as a whole.

ANNEX II

Extracts from reports of the Secretary-General during the 11-year period in question (1963-1974)

A. Turkish Cypriots in enclaves forcibly prevented by their leadership from returning to their homes and properties

8 December 1966

"the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of refugees to their homes and deters them from going back to their villages" [S/7611, para. 139].

8 December 1967

"For a considerable time, the Government has urged the refugees to return to their homes . . . it has repaired or rebuilt abandoned Turkish Cypriot houses . . . It is known that the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of the refugees to their former homes located in Government-controlled areas at present. To justify this position, the Turkish Cypriot leadership stresses considerations of security and safety of the refugees, although there can be little doubt that one of the major reasons for its attitude is a political one . . . , the maximum possible number of Turkish Cypriots must remain outside the Government's authority." [S/8286, para. 127.]

B. All Greek Cypriots forcibly denied by Turkish Cypriot leadership entry into all areas under Turkish Cypriot control and even use of a number of main communication roads

8 December 1966

"Except in rare and special cases, the Turkish Cypriot leadership denies entry into areas under its control to all Greek Cypriots, whether government officials or private individuals.

This ban appears to be enforced as a matter of political principle with little attempt at justification on practical grounds . . . even where Greek Cypriots would be escorted by UNFICYP personnel and security factors could not possibly be at stake." [S/7611, para. 109.]

3 June 1969

"Whereas Turkish Cypriots may move freely throughout the island except in a few militarily restricted areas, access to Turkish Cypriot enclaves, a number of Turkish Cypriot villages and certain roads continues to be denied to Greek Cypriots. Of particular concern is the lack of free access to the following public trunk roads:

"(a) Nicosia-Kyrenia;

"(b) Famagusta-Chatos-Nicosia;

" . . .

This abnormal situation, if not remedied, could mar the present favourable atmosphere, because there is growing impatience and discontent among Greek Cypriots, now that the Turkish Cypriots have enjoyed full freedom of movement over the whole island for some time, whilst the Greek Cypriots are still prevented from using some of the Republic's main roads." [S/9233, para. 55.]

3 December 1969

"In the matter of freedom of movement there has regrettably been no major change. The Government has continued to express serious concern at the lack of free access by Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. Besides the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, a number of Turkish Cypriot villages and public trunk roads remain closed to Greek Cypriots although Turkish Cypriots have been moving freely throughout the island for nearly two years except in militarily restricted areas." [S/9521, para. 54.]

20 May 1971

"Again it is regretted that there has been no improvement on the problem of freedom of movement. The Government has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership in denying to Greek Cypriots the use of a number of major public roads. Complaints are also still being received from areas where Greek Cypriot farmers are being denied access to fields which lie in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, particularly in the Chatos/Lefkoniko region." [S/10199, para. 57.]

DOCUMENT S/12916

Letter dated 7 November 1978 from the representative of Mongolia to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[7 November 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic dated 4 November 1978.

I should be grateful if this statement could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) B. DASHTSEREN
Permanent Representative of
the Mongolian People's Republic
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement dated 4 November 1978 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia

Remnants of colonialism and racist régimes continue to exist in Africa solely because of the military and political support of the United States and other NATO States. The major Western Powers, in collusion with the racist régimes, are attempting to

perpetuate the colonial racist order in southern Africa, to maintain their shaky position and protect their multi-billion capital investments in that strategically important part of the globe. The political manoeuvres of the NATO countries in connexion with the problem of Namibia, which have been increasingly active in recent times, are all part of these neo-colonialist efforts.

As a result of the intrigues of the forces of imperialism and reaction, a tense situation continues to prevail and is even growing more serious in this area and in the whole of southern Africa. In spite of the decisions of the United Nations terminating South Africa's Mandate to administer Namibia as long ago as 1966, the South African racists are continuing to occupy that country and are intensifying their policy of terror and repression against the Namibian people, trying to liquidate their sole legitimate representative, SWAPO. On the other hand the South African authorities and their supporters are resorting to a variety of machinations under the specious pretence of seeking a "peaceful solution".

The unlawful activities of the South African colonizers and racists are clearly designed to prevent the liberation of Namibia altogether and, if that plan fails, to preserve, by means of partial

"changes", the present colonial and racist order through the creation of a puppet régime, and to extend the inhuman system of *apartheid* to Namibia. These are the real purposes underlying the plans for a settlement of the Namibia problem, now proposed by the five Western Powers.

The so-called mediation activities are not merely un conducive to the achievement of a truly just solution of the Namibian question but are actually contrary to the interests of the struggle of the peoples of southern Africa and the consolidation of the unity of the African peoples, and of their solidarity with the socialist community and with all peace-loving, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial forces in the world.

The Mongolian people resolutely condemn the manoeuvres of the Western countries in connexion with the problem of Namibia, which go against the vital interests of its people. The Mon-

golian People's Republic strongly advocates the further strict application of sanctions against the Pretoria régime and also the adoption of effective measures to isolate South Africa internationally.

The Government and people of the Mongolian People's Republic demand the complete cessation of the illegal occupation of Namibia and the unconditional granting of national independence to the Namibian people and also the immediate withdrawal of occupation troops, police forces and mercenaries from that territory and the discontinuance of all support for and assistance to the *apartheid* régime.

The working people of the Mongolian People's Republic express their full support for the Namibian people in their struggle for the realization of their inalienable right to freedom, self-determination and national independence.

DOCUMENT S/12917

Letter dated 7 November 1978 from the representative of Angola to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[7 November 1978]

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to attach herewith the text of a communiqué issued by the Ministry of Defence of the People's Republic of Angola on 7 November 1978.

I should be grateful if the communiqué could be issued as a document of the Security Council in connexion with the question of South African aggression against the People's Republic of Angola.

(Signed) ELISIO DE FIGUEIREDO
Permanent Representative of Angola
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Communiqué issued by the Ministry of Defense of Angola on 7 November 1978

To the Angolan people, militants of the MPLA-Workers' Party and fighters of FAPLA (Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola):

The Angolan fatherland is again threatened. The racist forces of South Africa, at the services of international imperialism, have planned and are in the process of executing a large-scale attack against the threatened territory of our nation. At the precise moment Angola and Zaire are taking firm steps towards the normalization of relations sought by all, with the opening of the Luau bridge, which will open a new international railroad so important for this part of Africa, dark clouds hover once again over our country.

Under the pretext of neutralizing the just and liberation-seeking actions of the SWAPO fighters, the Fascist leadership of Pretoria has conceived a plan of attack against several sites in our country. However, the true objective is the destruction of the important and hard-fought achievements won by our people and the destabilization of the People's Republic of Angola.

Continually carrying out their aggression with impunity, the South African racists, strengthened by the support they have always received from the imperialist countries, are preparing to

attack our populace, destroy the wealth of our people and mow down innocent lives.

In recent weeks, the South African air force has carried out repeated violations of our air space, conducting military reconnaissance in preparation for the planned new attacks.

On several occasions, we have denounced these provocative actions, with no results.

Angolan people, our cities of Lubango, Mocamedes, Menongue, Ongiva, the villages of Matala, Kahama, Calueque, Porto Alexandre, Umbi, Chibemba, Chibema, Omkwabwawwemo, Amime, Muongo, Mulemba, Chivale, Ejito, Chitumbo, Chiede, Capinde are all directly threatened.

Lobito, Benguela, Huambo and even Luanda are also endangered.

Working masses, Angolan people, soldiers and officers of FAPLA: We must immediately prepare the defence of our cities and villages.

We must demonstrate today, once again, the truth of the orders of our Comrade President that "every citizen is and must see himself as a soldier".

We must meet the defence objectives set by the constituted authorities to this end. We must fortify ourselves and defend the land and wealth of our people by whatever means. We shall defend our people.

Angolan people, by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President of the MPLA-Workers' Party and President of the People's Republic of Angola, Comrade Agostinho Neto, obligatory curfew shall be put into effect immediately in the endangered areas.

All the nation's resources shall be mobilized wherever necessary for the defence of the People's Republic of Angola against the armed aggression being prepared by the racist Republic of South Africa.

We further appeal to the international community to take action against this threat from the racist Pretoria régime, which seeks not only to attack the national and territorial sovereignty of the People's Republic of Angola but also to deliberately aggravate the worsening situation in southern Africa.

DOCUMENT S/12918

**Letter dated 7 November 1978 from the representative of Cyprus
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]
[8 November 1978]

I have the honour hereby to confirm my earlier oral request for the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council on 13 November 1978 on the question of Cyprus.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12919

**Letter dated 7 November 1978 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: French]
[8 November 1978]

Referring to document S/12911, the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea wishes to reaffirm the position of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea in the following terms:

I

As the Government of Democratic Kampuchea has pointed out on a number of occasions, the Government of the United States of America was responsible, in the course of its aggressive war of more than five years' duration against Kampuchea, for massacring more than 1 million inhabitants of Kampuchea and destroying 80 per cent of the country. The Government of the United States is therefore not entitled to raise the so-called question of human rights in Kampuchea. The Government of Democratic Kampuchea is strongly opposed to any interference in the internal affairs of its country.

II

1. If the problem created by the acts of aggression and annexation committed by Viet Nam against Democratic Kampuchea has not yet been solved, it is not for lack of negotiations, of an intermediary or of intervention by international organizations. Kampuchea, inspired by an earnest desire to solve problems with Viet Nam by peaceful means, has in the past entered into negotiations with that country on some hundred occasions. In June 1975, it proposed to Viet Nam the signing of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression. On 27 September 1978, Kampuchea repeated to Viet Nam its proposal for such a treaty. However, Viet Nam has rejected this reasonable proposal in each instance. If the conflict between Kampuchea and Viet Nam is to be resolved, the roots of that conflict must be removed.

2. The roots of the conflict between Kampuchea and Viet Nam lie in Viet Nam's ambition to swallow up Kampuchea. As part of its "Indo-Chinese federation" strategy, Viet Nam would like to seize control of Kampuchea in order to use it as a springboard for its expansion in South-East Asia. This regional expansionist ambition is in keeping with the global expansionist ambition of the great expansionist Power. That is why Viet-

namese aggression against Democratic Kampuchea is a threat to security. The conflict between Kampuchea and Viet Nam cannot be resolved and peace and stability in the South-East Asian region cannot be ensured until Viet Nam completely and finally abandons its ambition to swallow up Kampuchea, its "Indo-Chinese federation" strategy and its regional expansionist ambition.

3. If Viet Nam now halts its aggression against Kampuchea and respects Kampuchea's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity by concrete deeds, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea will once again raise the question of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Viet Nam.

4. However, Viet Nam and the great expansionist Power are persisting in their strategy of expansion. The recent treaty of friendship and co-operation between them clearly demonstrates their determination to intensify their policy of aggression and annexation against Democratic Kampuchea, their strategy of regional and world-wide domination and their threat to the independence and peace of the countries of South-East Asia, Asia as a whole and the world in general.

In the face of this situation, it is the duty of the people and the revolutionary army of Kampuchea to maintain a high level of vigilance at all times. They are determined to fight to defend and safeguard Democratic Kampuchea for ever as an independent, neutral, non-aligned country, believing that in doing so they are also contributing to the cause of defending independence and peace in South-East Asia, in Asia as a whole and throughout the world.

The peoples and countries of South-East Asia and of Asia as a whole are well aware of the fact that Viet Nam and the great expansionist Power are committing aggression against Democratic Kampuchea. They are disturbed by the threat which this aggression poses to them, and they demand that the conflict be settled through the cessation of this aggression.

Thus, the only solution to the conflict between Kampuchea and Viet Nam is the immediate cessation of the aggression being committed by Viet Nam and the great expansionist Power against Democratic Kampuchea.

The delegation of Democratic Kampuchea would be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

For the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea:
(Signed) IN NATH
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

DOCUMENT S/12920*

Letter dated 7 November 1978 from the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/Russian]
[8 November 1978]

We have the honour to transmit herewith the text in Russian and in English of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

We request that the above-mentioned text should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Oleg Aleksandrovich TROYANOVSKY
Permanent Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the United Nations

(Signed) HA VAN LAU
Permanent Representative of the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Proceeding from the close co-operation in all fields in a fraternal spirit, from the unshakable friendship and solidarity between the two countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism,

Firmly convinced that the endeavour to consolidate the solidarity and friendship between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is in conformity with the basic interests of the two peoples and in the interests of the consolidation of the fraternal friendship and one-mindedness among the countries in the socialist community,

In keeping with the principles and objectives of the socialist foreign policy and the desire to ensure the most favourable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism,

Confirming that the signatories to the Treaty acknowledge their international obligation to assist each other in the consolidation and preservation of the socialist achievements recorded by the two peoples through their heroic efforts and selfless labour,

Determined to work for the unity of all forces struggling for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress,

Expressing their iron-like determination to contribute to the consolidation of peace in Asia and throughout the world, and to the development of good relations and mutually beneficial co-operation among countries with different social systems,

Hoping further to develop and perfect the all-round co-operation between the two countries,

Attaching importance to the continued development and consolidation of the juridical basis of the bilateral relations,

In keeping with the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have resolved to sign this Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation and have agreed as follows:

Article 1

In keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism, the two parties signatory to the present Treaty shall continue to consolidate the unshakable friendship and solidarity and assist each other in a fraternal spirit. The two parties shall unceasingly develop political relations and co-operation in all fields and endeavour to assist each other on the basis of respect for each other's national independence and sovereignty, equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 2

The two parties signatory to the present Treaty shall join efforts to consolidate and broaden the mutually beneficial co-operation in the economic and scientific-technological fields in order to push forward the building of socialism and communism and constantly to raise the material and cultural standards of the two peoples. The two parties shall continue to co-ordinate their long-term national economic plans, agree upon long-term measures aimed at developing the most important sectors of the economy, science and technology, and exchange knowledge and experience accumulated in the building of socialism and communism.

Article 3

The two parties signatory to the Treaty shall promote co-operation between their State bodies and mass organizations, and develop broad relations in the fields of science and culture, education, literature and art, press, broadcasting and television, health service, environmental protection, tourism, sports and physical training and others. The two parties shall encourage the development of contacts between the working people of the two countries.

Article 4

The two parties signatory to the Treaty shall consistently strive further to consolidate their fraternal relations, and to strengthen the solidarity and one-mindedness among the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

The two parties shall do their utmost to consolidate the world socialist system and actively contribute to the development and defence of the socialist gains.

Article 5

The two parties signatory to the Treaty shall continue doing their utmost to contribute to defending world peace and the security of all nations. They shall actively oppose all schemes and manoeuvres of imperialism and reactionary forces, support the just struggle for the complete eradication of all forms and colours of colonialism and racism, support the struggle waged by non-aligned countries and the peoples of Asian, African and Latin American countries against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, for the consolidation of independence and the defence of sovereignty, for mastery over their natural resources, and for the establishment of a new world economic order with

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/362-S/12920.

no inequity, oppression or exploitation, and support the aspirations of the South-east Asian peoples for peace, independence and co-operation among countries in this region.

The two parties shall strive to develop the relations between countries with different social systems on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, for the purpose of broadening and consolidating the process of easing tension in international relations and radically eliminating aggressions and wars of aggression from the life of all nations, for the sake of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

Article 6

The two parties signatory to the Treaty shall exchange views on all important international questions relating to the interests of the two countries. In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the Treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries.

Article 7

The present Treaty does not concern the two parties' rights and obligations stemming from the bilateral or multilateral

agreements to which they are signatories and is not intended to oppose any third country.

Article 8

The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Ha Noi as early as possible.

Article 9

The present Treaty shall remain in force for 25 years and thereafter shall be automatically extended for periods of 10 years if neither signatory party declares its desire to terminate the present Treaty by informing the other party 12 months before the Treaty expires.

DONE in duplicate in the Vietnamese and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic, in Moscow, this third day of November 1978.

For
the Socialist Republic
of Viet Nam:

(Signed) LE DUAN
PHAM VAN DONG

For
the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

(Signed) L. I. BREZHNEV
A. N. KOSYGIN

DOCUMENT S/12921

Letter dated 9 November 1978 from the representative of Zambia to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[9 November 1978]

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to bring to your attention and that of the Security Council the following information concerning the act of aggression committed against my country by the illegal racist minority régime in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia on Thursday, 19 October 1978, at 0830 hours, Zambian time.

The aggression, committed with the use of jet bombers and helicopter gunships, was aimed at the camps of the ZAPU wing of the Patriotic Front. The rebel Southern Rhodesian forces attacked the Chikumbi refugee camp 20 kilometres outside Lusaka where 1,900 non-combatant refugees resided. They used four jet bombers directly on the camp, while four other jet military aircraft orbited the Lusaka area and took complete control of Zambian air space for the duration of the attack.

The orbiting jets threatened to bomb any aircraft that dared to take off in the Lusaka area at that time and directed the control tower at Lusaka International Airport to obey all their instructions, making it clear that the orbiting rebel aircraft were under orders to shoot down any Zambian aircraft—civil or military—which failed to obey. They emphasized that they had come to attack "terrorist" camps.

The bombardment of the Chikumbi refugee camp lasted 32 minutes and left 226 people dead and 629 injured. The death toll from the camp has now risen to 337, including the injured who have since died in hospital.

I have to emphasize that this camp was not a camp for combatants but a settlement for ordinary refugees who have fled to Zambia from the horrors inside Southern Rhodesia itself.

From Chikumbi, the rebel Southern Rhodesian forces attacked the Lunsemfwa girls' camp further to the north.

Again this is not a camp for combatants but a training centre, where capable young Rhodesian girls who arrive in Zambia as refugees are taken to learn civil skills which they can put to good use in future on their return home when Zimbabwe is free. It is not a camp for fighters.

At the time of the attack, there were 1,600 refugee girls learning at the camp. More than half of this number are now either missing, injured or dead.

Among the dead, about 50 were killed in the most callous, barbaric and savage manner. After bombarding the place, the helicopters landed some rebel soldiers to seek out the hiding girls. Apparently they knew the girl in charge of the camp by name. They shouted out, calling her. Eventually she came out. They asked her to get her whistle and blow it so that other girls would come out from hiding. She blew the whistle and called. Finally about 50 girls came out to line up with her before the rebel troops. The head girl was given a gun and ordered to shoot down all her friends. She refused. Upon that, the rebel soldiers shot her dead in front of all the girls. Then they gunned down the rest of the girls.

From the girls' camp, the rebels turned to bombard the Rufunsa camp, lying to the east and nearer the Rhodesian border. There they met with stiff opposition from the freedom fighters. This was the only camp of combatants they dared to attack, and seven of the attacking rebel military aircraft were shot down.

There were no dead fighters on the side of the Patriotic Front forces at this camp of combatants, although eight were injured. Of these, only four were serious enough to be brought for admission to hospital for treatment.

During these attacks, Zambia lost 31 members of her security forces. When it was learned that the rebel forces were attacking the defenceless girls at the Lunsemfwa

refugee training centre, Zambian security forces were rushed to the area to repel the rebels. It was in the ensuing action that the 31 men lost their lives.

Apart from the members of the security forces, at least half a dozen Zambian civilians who were travelling near this area at the time were murdered by the Southern Rhodesian rebels. They were ambushed, attacked, killed and burnt inside their own vehicles by the Southern Rhodesian rebels in the area of the Lunsemfwa camp.

It will be noted from the above brief account that the rebel forces were most careful in directing their attack against soft targets of the Patriotic Front. These are camps settled by unarmed and non-combatant men and women. When they finally attacked one camp of combatants, they received stiff opposition and lost some of their fighter planes, as explained above.

The rebel Rhodesian forces succeeded in breaking through Zambian air defences because of a combination of bad factors during that particular period which included:

(a) Zambia's inadequate radar coverage over its long frontiers with Rhodesia;

(b) The break-down of the civilian radar system for some weeks prior to the attack;

(c) The breaking by the rebels of the secret code name of our air force reconnaissance jets along the border at the time and their use of that code to camouflage themselves as they broke through Zambian air space to take complete control of it to facilitate their bombing mission.

These dastardly attacks by the rebels will not in any way deter Zambia's commitment to the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. Zambia will continue to act as a reliable rear base for the Patriotic Front and will not consider any price too high to pay for the freedom of the still oppressed people of this region.

Zambia supports the struggle for the freedom of Zimbabwe on principle, and nothing can alter that principle. Ian Smith and his rebel authority are the enemy. The Patriotic Front are our allies. Zambia will continue to do everything in its power to support its allies to the best of its ability.

However, apart from the destruction of life and property, the invasion has left behind immense problems of caring for the sick and wounded, clothes, food etc. for the survivors. Much food grown by these refugees

was destroyed. There is, of course, the most urgent need for medicine. Without the invasion, our hospitals are already overfilled with patients, and our medicines are in short supply. As a result of the invasion, one third of the capacities of the hospitals at Lusaka and Kabwe have already been taken up by the casualties of the last attacks. More attacks are expected in the coming weeks, especially in the rainy season—December to March—when the liberation war will intensify.

These attacks are merely the beginnings of the holocaust in southern Africa which has been spoken of so often not only by us in Zambia but by many others who understand the situation. Under the current developments, this eventuality is now inevitable, as it is clearly irreversible. All progressive forces must prepare themselves for this outcome.

You will appreciate that, except for the great presence of mind and restraint on the part of Zambia, the holocaust would have come to southern Africa on the morning of Thursday 19 October, with the arrival of the rebel Southern Rhodesian jet bombers over Lusaka, killing or injuring almost 1,000 defenceless people in less than half an hour. Zambia has only temporarily saved southern Africa, the continent and the world from witnessing a terrible and enlarged war.

At present, events in southern Africa are taking an ugly and irreversible turn. Peace will be overtaken in southern Africa at any time. I wish to emphasize that my Government takes a very serious view of the escalating conflict in southern Africa. The continued existence of racist minority régimes in the region clearly constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security which the Security Council must not ignore in view of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. The Security Council and the international community as a whole have an inescapable and urgent duty to remove the root cause of conflict in southern Africa and to provide concrete and substantial material and other forms of assistance to those of us in the region who continue to make tremendous sacrifices in the struggle for freedom and justice, which, needless to say, are United Nations ideals.

I should be grateful if this communication could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gwendoline C. KONIE
Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Zambia to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12923*

Letter dated 10 November 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[13 November 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 10 November 1978 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 10 November 1978 from Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the recent debate on the question of Cyprus and to inform you that it was with great astonishment that I heard Mr. Rolandis categorically deny, yesterday,^a that Archbishop Makarios had made the statement (on 6 September 1962 at Panaghia village) which Mr. Orhan Eralp, the representative of Turkey, had mentioned in his address to the General Assembly, viz:

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/370-S/12923.

^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 49th meeting, para. 129.

"Unless this small [Turkish] community forming part of the Turkish race, which has been the terrible enemy of the Hellenism, is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated."^b

At the same time, this statement had caused great anger and anxiety amongst the Turkish Cypriots. Accordingly, I wrote Archbishop Makarios the following letter on 15 September 1962:

"I regret, once again, to be obliged to put on record my community's deep regrets on your speech at Panaghia village some days ago. It was my ardent hope that this statement would be denied by your side the moment it was brought to your notice. No such denial has come forth. We have decided to ask Vice-President F. Küçük to raise this point with you at your next meeting. This may give you the opportunity needed for such denial.

"You will recollect my appeal to you earlier to deny or correct another statement relating to 'Cyprus having acquired for the first time in eight centuries a Greek Government' and I had pointed out that such a correction would help all of us to begin the bi-communal administrative and political life in the right direction. The present appeal to you is made in the

^b *Ibid.*, 48th meeting, para. 112.

same spirit of goodwill and I hope that you will not hesitate to take appropriate action in the matter."

As usual, there was no reply from the Archbishop. Not answering letters sent to him by Turkish Cypriot leaders was his way of dealing with the Turkish Cypriot complaints. In fact, within three months the secret armies which the Greek Cypriots had prepared were to launch the preplanned attacks on the Turkish Cypriot community.

The treatment of the Turkish Cypriot community as an enemy or undesirable alien in Cyprus was not the monopoly of the Archbishop. Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, on 18 August 1965 at the Pan-Cyprian Greek Student Congress and later in a speech at the Ledra Palace on 31 May 1966, made it a special point to underline to his audience that the Turkish Cypriot community was "the remnant of the occupying Power" and, as such, had no right to prevent the Greek Cypriots from proceeding to enosis.

Unfortunately, the statements made by Mr. Rolandis before the General Assembly have but emphasized this mental attitude of the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriots.

This letter should also be a sufficient reply to the letter of Mr. Rossides dated 3 November 1978 [S/12915], which treats the problem of Cyprus as a Greek Cypriot problem.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12927

Cyprus: draft resolution

[Original: English]
[15 November 1978]

The Security Council,

Having considered the question of Cyprus,

Recalling its resolutions 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975 and its subsequent resolutions,

Deeply regretting that its resolutions have remained unimplemented,

Noting General Assembly resolution 33/15 of 9 November 1978,

1. *Reaffirms once again* its resolution 365 (1974), by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974, and also its resolution 367 (1975) and subsequent resolutions;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to comply with these resolutions without further delay and, in any case, not later than six months from now;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to monitor the progress of implementation of these resolutions in all their aspects and to report thereon as and when developments warrant it and, in any case, not later than six months from now;

4. *Decides* to keep the question of Cyprus under constant review and, at the expiration of the period referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution, to consider and adopt, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations in order to ensure the full implementation of its resolutions on Cyprus.

DOCUMENT S/12928

Letter dated 10 November 1978 from the Secretary-General to Governments of all States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies containing a further appeal for voluntary contributions for the financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

[Original: English/French/Spanish]
[16 November 1978]

I should be most grateful if you would bring to the urgent attention of your Government this further appeal which I am addressing to all States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies in order to obtain additional voluntary contributions for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

The importance of UNFICYP has been emphasized

time and again by the Security Council, and the stationing of the Force in the island has been repeatedly extended by it. Most recently, in its resolution 430 (1978) of 16 June 1978, the Council noted my report of 31 May 1978 [S/12723] and decided to extend the stationing of the Force in Cyprus for a further period ending 15 December 1978. In the report, I had pointed out that in the light of the situation on the ground and

of political developments, the continued presence of UNFICYP remained indispensable and that in helping to maintain calm in the island UNFICYP also facilitated the search for a peaceful settlement.

This decision has to be viewed in the context of my continuing efforts, pursuant to the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council, to clear the way to meaningful negotiations between the two communities in order to achieve an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem. In my view, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in Cyprus is an essential requirement for overcoming the difficulties that have been encountered in activating an effective negotiating process.

In this connexion, I am obliged to draw attention to the difficulties I face in maintaining the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, owing to the continuing deficit in the UNFICYP budget. The United Nations operation in Cyprus is financed in part by the troop-contributing Governments and in part by Governments making voluntary contributions. But the voluntary contributions received have consistently fallen short of needs, resulting in an accumulated deficit for the periods ending 15 June 1978 of more than \$52 million. Additionally, \$11.4 million, of which \$2.2 million has been received, are required to meet that portion of the total cost of UNFICYP for the current six-month period ending 15 December 1978 that is normally financed by such contributions. This would leave costs of approximately \$17.7 million, based on past practice, to be met by the troop-contributing countries, a figure that includes both certain reimbursable extra costs and the non-reimbursable regular costs incurred by them which these countries finance at their own expense (see annex). The Governments concerned have conveyed to me their growing and very serious concern over the disproportionate financial burden they have been carrying which has obliged some of them to review their commitments relating to their participation in UNFICYP. I am equally concerned at the inability of UNFICYP to meet its financial commitments in full and at the implications of this situation in regard to the continued functioning of this peace-keeping operation.

I consider it essential to rectify the serious financial situation confronting UNFICYP. Under existing arrangements, this can only be done by obtaining additional voluntary contributions to replenish the UNFICYP Special Account. I therefore urgently request Governments to consider increasing their contributions or to begin making voluntary contributions, if not made before. I also wish to express the hope that regular financial contributors to the UNFICYP Account will find it possible at least to maintain the level of their contributions. I now appeal to your Government to respond promptly and generously with a voluntary contribution to enable UNFICYP to carry out its important function.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

ANNEX

Financial position of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

Since 1964, 65 countries have made payments or pledges of voluntary contributions to support the United Nations operation in Cyprus. Contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account since the beginning of the operation, as well as the pledges and payments received so far for the period from 16 December 1977 to 15 June 1978, are listed in the attached table.

In order to provide contingents for UNFICYP, the troop-contributing Governments divert from national duty troops and other resources at an ongoing cost to them of some \$17.7 million for each six-month period. This figure includes: *a* the troops' regular pay and allowances and normal *matériel* expenses for which, under existing arrangements, the United Nations is not required by the troop contributors to reimburse them; these therefore constitute costs of maintaining the Force which are being financed directly by the troop-contributing Governments; *b* certain extra and extraordinary costs that they incur in respect of UNFICYP for which, under existing arrangements, the troop contributors would be entitled to claim reimbursement from the United Nations, but which they have agreed to finance at their own expense as a further contribution to the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

Including the above two elements of costs, the actual cost of financing the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the six-month period ending 15 December 1978 would total approximately \$29.1 million, estimated as follows:

	\$ (millions)
1. (a) Regular troops' pay and allowances and normal <i>matériel</i> costs, and	
(b) Certain extra and extraordinary costs of the troop-contributing Governments that are financed directly by them	17.7
2. Direct costs to the United Nations which the Organization is required to meet (including the extra and extraordinary costs of Governments providing contingents for which they seek to be reimbursed), financed through voluntary contributions	11.4
TOTAL	29.1

Voluntary contributions from Governments are required to finance the second of these cost elements, as indicated in the cost estimates included in my report of 31 May 1978 [S/12723, sect. VI].

The voluntary contributions received from Governments have not been sufficient to cover these costs. The accumulated deficit from the inception of the operation through 15 June 1978 now stands at \$52.3 million, as compared to the deficit of \$50.2 million about eight months ago, as indicated in my letter to you of 23 March 1978 [S/12624]. Ten payments and two pledges, amounting to \$2,184,339, have been received so far towards that portion of the costs of maintaining the operation during the current six-month period ending 15 December 1978 (that is, \$11.4 million) that are to be financed by voluntary contributions.

As a result of the deficit, the bills presented by the troop-contributing Governments to the United Nations for reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs have been met only to July 1975. The practical effect of this situation has been that, as indicated above, these Governments have continued to shoulder a disproportionate burden in providing contingents for this United Nations peace-keeping operation.

PLEDGES AND PAYMENTS TO THE UNFICYP SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR THE PERIOD 27 MARCH 1964-15 JUNE 1978 AS AT 6 NOVEMBER 1978

(In United States dollar equivalent)

Country	33rd period (16 December 1977- 15 June 1978)	Total pledges	Payments received
Australia	50 000	2 169 875	2 169 875 ^{a b}
Austria	—	2 440 000	2 440 000 ^{a c}
Belgium	—	2 771 799	2 771 799
Botswana	—	500	500
Canada	—	—	— ^a
Cyprus	150 000	1 966 359	1 966 359 ^b

Country	33rd period (16 December 1977- 15 June 1978)	Total pledges	Payments received
Democratic Kampuchea	—	600	600 ^d
Denmark	120 000	3 525 000	3 525 000 ^{a c}
Finland	—	900 000	900 000 ^c
Germany, Federal Republic of	500 000	17 000 000	17 000 000 ^b
Ghana	11 310	76 897	76 897
Greece	400 000	15 350 000	15 350 000
Guyana	—	11 812	11 812
Iceland	2 750	44 407	44 407 ^b
India	—	20 000	20 000
Iran	5 500	94 500	94 500 ^b
Iraq	5 000	25 000	25 000 ^b
Ireland	—	50 000	50 000
Israel	—	26 500	26 500
Italy	—	5 581 645	5 547 128
Ivory Coast	—	60 000	60 000
Jamaica	—	29 137	29 137
Japan	200 000	2 240 000	2 240 000 ^b
Kuwait	20 000	40 000	40 000
Lao People's Democratic Republic	—	1 500	1 500 ^e
Lebanon	—	3 194	3 194
Liberia	—	13 321	11 821
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	—	50 000	50 000
Luxembourg	4 509	75 630	75 630 ^b
Malawi	—	5 590	5 590
Malaysia	—	7 500	7 500
Malta	—	1 820	1 820
Mauritania	—	4 370	4 370
Morocco	—	20 000	20 000
Nepal	—	800	800
Netherlands	219 901	2 298 524	2 298 524 ^b
New Zealand	—	51 697	51 697
Niger	—	2 041	2 041
Nigeria	—	10 800	10 800
Norway	299 539	4 930 280	4 930 280 ^b
Oman	—	8 000	8 000
Pakistan	—	35 791	35 791
Philippines	1 000	11 000	10 000
Qatar	7 000	21 000	21 000
Republic of Korea	—	16 000	16 000
Senegal	—	4 000	—
Sierra Leone	—	46 425	46 425
Singapore	500	7 500	7 500
Somalia	—	1 000	1 000
Sweden	200 000	5 520 000	5 520 000 ^{a c}
Switzerland	274 193	3 803 602	3 803 602 ^b
Thailand	—	2 500	2 500
Togo	—	1 020	—
Trinidad and Tobago	—	2 400	2 400
Turkey	—	1 839 253	1 839 253
United Arab Emirates	—	10 000	10 000
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	918 383	48 510 365 ^f	48 510 365 ^{a c}
United Republic of Cameroon	3 460	13 567	13 567
United Republic of Tanzania	—	7 000	7 000
United States of America	4 550 000	109 200 000 ^g	106 021 177
Uruguay	—	2 500	2 500
Venezuela	—	3 000	3 000
Viet Nam	—	4 000	4 000 ^h
Yugoslavia	—	40 000	40 000
Zaire	—	30 000	30 000
Zambia	—	38 000	28 000
TOTAL	7 943 045	231 079 021	227 848 161

^a Indicative figures over a six-month period of the costs absorbed by Governments providing contingents (see first column of table) are as follows: Australia \$0.3 million, Austria \$1.1 million, Canada \$5.2 million, Denmark \$0.4 million, Sweden \$2.6 million and the United Kingdom \$8.1 million.

^b In addition, the following payments and pledges have been received for the period from 16 June to 15 December 1978: Australia \$50,000; Cyprus \$150,000; Germany, Federal Republic of, \$500,000; Greece \$400,000; Iceland \$2,750; Iran \$50,000; Iraq \$5,000; Japan \$200,000; Luxembourg \$4,509; Netherlands \$219,901; Norway \$327,985; Switzerland \$274,194.

^c Payment has been made or will be made by means of an offset against the Government's claims for reimbursement of its costs.

^d Contributions received in 1964.

^e Contributions received in 1967.

^f Maximum amount pledged.

^g Maximum amount pledged. The ultimate contribution will be dependent on contributions of other Governments.

^h Contributions received in 1964-1966.

**Interim report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 434 (1978)
concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

[Original: English]
[18 November 1978]

1. In deciding in its resolution 434 (1978) of 18 September 1978 to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of four months, the Security Council also called upon Israel, Lebanon and all others concerned to co-operate fully and urgently with the United Nations in the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council in two months on the implementation of resolution 434 (1978) in order to allow it to assess the situation and to examine what further measures should be taken, and to report again at the end of the four-month period.

2. The present report is submitted in pursuance of this request and contains an account of developments relating to the functioning of UNIFIL during the past two months.

3. During the period under review, the Secretary-General, the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East and the Force Commander maintained constant contact with the Lebanese authorities as well as the Israeli authorities concerned regarding the steps to be taken to further the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 434 (1978). UNIFIL maintained its contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) throughout this period. It also dealt on an *ad hoc* basis with the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups in Southern Lebanon as occasion required.

4. UNIFIL has continued to use its best efforts to ensure that its area of operation will not be used for hostile activities of any kind. In the area where UNIFIL exercises full control, effective action continues to be taken to prevent entry of armed personnel, and a progressive normalization of life is observed.

5. On the other hand, there has been no significant improvement in the deployment of the Force since the last report of the Secretary-General [S/12845 of 13 September 1978]. Through the Israeli authorities, contacts with the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups under Major Haddad were initiated on an urgent basis immediately after the adoption of resolution 434 (1978) with a view to securing UNIFIL's full deployment and control in the area handed over by Israel to the *de facto* armed groups in June 1978. But, despite the efforts of UNIFIL, little progress has been achieved.

6. During the period from 11 to 22 September, there were heavy exchanges of artillery fire between the armed elements north of the Litani River and the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups in the Marjayoun area, which were mostly initiated by the latter. It was estimated that the *de facto* armed groups fired some 1,250 shells against 300 from the armed elements. In each case, UNIFIL intervened to restore the cease-fire. Since that time, there were no heavy exchanges of fire between the two groups, but UNIFIL has observed isolated cases of firing, mostly from the Marjayoun area.

7. Shortly after the intensification of the fighting at Beirut in late September, the attitude of the *de facto*

armed groups markedly hardened, and tension in and near the UNIFIL area of operation increased.

8. In the area under the control of the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups, UNIFIL, which had previously secured limited freedom of movement there, was subject to periodic harassment. On 13 October, for example, these armed groups fired at a land-rover of the Irish battalion near Bent Jbail, although clearance had been obtained from them for the vehicle to pass through their area. On 18 October, Major Haddad barred all French personnel from the area controlled by the *de facto* armed groups. These and other incidents were strongly protested against and, in the latter case, the restrictions were subsequently eased.

9. UNIFIL installations were also harassed by the *de facto* armed groups. On 16 October, a group of some 300 people led by Major Haddad and including armed personnel together with women and children held a demonstration at UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura in protest against the situation at Beirut. UNIFIL officers identified three personnel of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in plain clothes on the scene. A group of demonstrators forced their way into the premises of UNIFIL, severely damaged a Lebanese army helicopter used by the Lebanese liaison team and abducted four Lebanese liaison personnel. Strong protests were lodged both locally and at United Nations Headquarters. The Israeli authorities disclaimed all responsibility for this demonstration. The four Lebanese liaison personnel were eventually released with IDF assistance. In another incident, on 25 October, three *de facto* armed personnel forcibly entered OP Ras and wounded a soldier of the Irish battalion with a knife. In this connexion, it should be mentioned that, under a temporary practical arrangement reached with the *de facto* armed groups, OP Ras, which is located inside the area controlled by them, was manned by two unarmed UNIFIL personnel. Since the above incident and as a result of new negotiations, the UNIFIL personnel manning the OP have been increased and provided with defensive arms.

10. The Lebanese *de facto* armed groups have also harassed civilians in the UNIFIL area of operation. For example, mortar shells were fired at the village of Brashit on 30 October and at Haddatah on 3 November. The firing at Brashit resulted in the death of one woman.

11. During the period under review, there were a limited number of incidents involving Palestinian armed elements within and outside the UNIFIL area of operation. These incidents were mainly attempts at infiltration of armed personnel into the area. In each case, the armed personnel involved were escorted out of the area. There were also a few firing incidents. The most serious of these occurred at Wadi Jilu (some 12 kilometres east of Tyre) on 23 October when a Palestinian fired at a vehicle of the French battalion and wounded its driver. A strong protest was lodged with PLO in this connexion. These incidents were isolated cases, and it was possible to resolve problems arising from them by negotiation.

12. UNIFIL has observed the presence of IDF personnel in Southern Lebanon on a number of occasions.

In particular, on 13 and 14 November, a group of about 30 IDF personnel were seen laying mines some 300 metres inside Lebanon in the area of OP Mar. This matter has been brought to the attention of the Israeli authorities with the request that such incursions should cease.

Observations

13. Since 18 September, when the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNIFIL for four months, continuous efforts have been made, both in the field and at United Nations Headquarters, to make progress in the further implementation by UNIFIL of its mandate under resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 434 (1978), particularly as regards the full deployment of the Force and the progressive restoration of the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese Government in the area of operation. To my regret I have to report that, in spite of these efforts, little progress has been made.

14. Inevitably, the tragic developments at Beirut, which escalated towards the end of September, had their effect on the situation in Southern Lebanon which, as I noted in my last report, is closely linked to the situation in Lebanon as a whole. It is my hope that, in the relative calm which now prevails at Beirut, efforts to rebuild the Lebanese Army will be able to go forward. Progress in this field would certainly facilitate the fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL.

15. An essential pre-condition for UNIFIL's success is the co-operation of all concerned, especially those armed elements and groups in and around its area of operation. In the present circumstances, this particularly applies to the Lebanese *de facto* forces in the area and to the Government of Israel. I regret to have to inform the Council that at the present time the necessary co-operation is still lacking in these quarters, and the complete deployment of UNIFIL and the progressive re-establishment of Lebanese authority in the area is therefore blocked. The Commander of UNIFIL and his officers, the Chief Co-ordinator, and I and my colleagues at Headquarters, have made constant efforts to secure an improvement in this situation, so far to little avail. In fact, at the time of writing we are awaiting a response to certain detailed suggestions for further deployment of UNIFIL which would greatly improve its control in its area of operation and its capacity to protect all elements of the civilian population.

16. In this connexion, the fact that in some parts of the UNIFIL area of operation the *de facto* forces remain free to intimidate various elements of the civilian population is a cause for the most serious concern. Such a situation may well lead to an escalation of conflict as well as to a loss of confidence in UNIFIL. Particular attention is therefore being given to efforts to improve the capacity of UNIFIL to give protection to all elements of the civilian population. There can be no valid argument for obstructing this objective, which is in the interests of peace and normality in the whole area of operation.

17. The relationship between the Israel Defence Forces and the Lebanese *de facto* forces is a major factor in the present situation. UNIFIL has from time to time requested the Israeli authorities to use their good offices and influence in efforts to control or moderate the actions of Major Haddad and his militia. The Israeli au-

thorities have indicated that they do not control the Lebanese *de facto* forces. However, it has not been denied that they provide them with logistic and other forms of support. During the period under review, IDF personnel were also observed on several occasions in Southern Lebanon.

18. Relations with other armed elements in the area have not created major problems. Although there have been occasional clashes with armed personnel attempting to enter UNIFIL's area of operation from the north, these incidents have invariably ended with the negotiated withdrawal of the armed elements and with a re-establishment of the *status quo* with the assistance of the PLO liaison officers. I very much hope that this respect for the authority and functioning of UNIFIL will be maintained in the future.

19. In spite of the unsatisfactory and sometimes dangerous conditions outlined above, the officers and men of UNIFIL have maintained a disciplined and dignified attitude of restraint and have refused to be provoked into a degree of forceful reaction which would lead to a further escalation of fighting, with inevitable casualties among the civilian population, as well as military personnel. However, the indefinite continuation of such a situation is obviously unacceptable. Nor should UNIFIL's attitude of restraint be mistaken for lack of determination to carry out the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council.

20. It is therefore essential that the Lebanese *de facto* forces and those who support them should come to terms with certain realities. In the first place, the restoration of the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon is in the long run the only durable and reliable means by which normality and security for all can return to that strife-torn area. It is therefore vital that all concerned should co-operate to this end. Continued military resistance to this effort can only be regarded as a deliberate defiance both of the legitimate authority of the Lebanese Government and of the decisions of the Security Council. In the second place, UNIFIL is there to protect all groups of the population and is a threat to none. The fact that the Force has persisted, in the face of provocation and harassment, in seeking by peaceful means the constructive co-operation of all concerned, should be proof enough of its good faith. Thirdly, the present state of affairs, if continued, will inevitably lead to the erosion of UNIFIL. No one should be in any doubt as to the dangers of the situation that would then inevitably emerge. It is in the long-term interests of all concerned to avoid such a development.

21. In light of the above considerations, UNIFIL will continue to exert all possible efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, in the hope that all the parties concerned will find it possible to extend to it their full co-operation and assistance.

22. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to the Commander of UNIFIL, Major-General Erskine, his staff, both civilian and military, and the officers and men of the contingents of UNIFIL for their steadiness, courage and sense of responsibility in an extraordinarily difficult and volatile situation. I wish also to express my appreciation to the Governments which are providing contingents and other forms of support for UNIFIL.

DOCUMENT S/12930

Letter dated 17 November 1978 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[17 November 1978]

Further to document S/12919 of 8 November 1978, the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea has the honour to transmit to you a copy of a statement issued by the Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea on 7 November 1978, condemning the use of poison gas bombs by the Vietnamese forces of aggression in the territory of Democratic Kampuchea.

The delegation of Democratic Kampuchea requests you to arrange for the circulation of this letter and statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tim HOK
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary

ANNEX

Statement issued by the Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea at Phnom Penh on 7 November 1978

Viet Nam has suffered increasingly heavy defeats on the Kampuchea front and is struggling ever more frenziedly to pursue its aggression against Kampuchea.

Since their infantry has been defeated, the Vietnamese aggressors have resorted to using their air force. But the revolutionary army of Kampuchea has brought down the Vietnamese aircraft, which have proved to be ineffective, one after the other. Faced with a serious impasse, the Vietnamese aggressors have become ever more furious and are redoubling their cruelty. On

28 and 29 October and 1 and 2 November 1978, they used 105 mm guns to fire poison gas bombs at the territory of Kampuchea, at Au Yadao in the province of Ratanakiri.

The people of Kampuchea and the Government of Democratic Kampuchea denounce and strongly condemn this new crime by Viet Nam. The use of poison gas bombs by Viet Nam is a further proof, clearly demonstrating the serious situation of defeat and impasse currently faced by Viet Nam and its masters, the Soviet international expansionists, in their aggressive and expansionist acts aimed at the annexation of territory and the elimination of the Kampuchea nation. The peoples of the world see ever more clearly the barbarous and Fascist face, resembling that of Hitler, of the Vietnamese and their masters. The people of Kampuchea and the Government of Democratic Kampuchea appeal to public opinion in South-East Asia, Asia and the world to oppose these barbarous acts by Viet Nam and the great Soviet expansionist Power. The conflict between Kampuchea and Viet Nam is not an ordinary frontier conflict. It is an act of aggression aimed at the annexation of territory and the extermination of the Kampuchea nation. Once Viet Nam and the great Soviet expansionist Power have succeeded in taking possession of Kampuchea, they will use it as a springboard to pursue their expansion in South-East Asia.

The people of Kampuchea and the revolutionary army of Kampuchea, under the just and clear-sighted leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, are resolutely continuing the struggle to defend Democratic Kampuchea and the Kampuchea nation and to ensure their continued existence, thus making their contribution to the just cause of the defence of national independence and peace in South-East Asia, Asia and the world. The Vietnamese aggressors have suffered successive heavy defeats. They will assuredly suffer even heavier defeats.

DOCUMENT S/12931*

Letter dated 20 November 1978 from the President of the United Nations
Council for Namibia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[21 November 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you a statement approved by the Steering Committee of the United Nations Council for Namibia regarding invitations issued by the Government of South Africa to journalists and other individuals and institutions to follow the arrangements which South Africa has called "elections" to be held in Namibia in December 1978.

I request that the statement should be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gwendoline C. KONIE
President of the
United Nations Council for Namibia

ANNEX

Statement of the United Nations Council for Namibia
on South African manoeuvres in Namibia

[For the text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 24 and corrigendum, vol. II, para. 52, item 1.]

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/384-S/12931.

DOCUMENT S/12932

Note verbale dated 8 November 1978 from the Mission of Belgium to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[22 November 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations has the honour, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 18 May 1978 concerning implementation of the provisions of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), to inform him of the following.

Belgium has formally undertaken to comply with the mandatory provisions of resolution 418 (1977). This undertaking, which was confirmed to the Secretary-General by note of 16 December 1977 [S/12498], is in line with the measures which Belgium has for long been applying on a voluntary basis with respect to the embargo on deliveries of arms to South Africa.

With regard to paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977), there are no longer any contractual arrangements or licences in force between Belgium and South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of any type or military equipment and vehicles.

Inasmuch as Belgium has on several occasions been impugned in documents emanating either from the Special Committee or from the Centre against *Apartheid*, it should be noted that South Africa has for a long time been manufacturing the FAL automatic rifle and the FN/UZI light machine-gun. The FAL was the subject of note S/12860 of 21 September 1978. The FN/UZI was invented in Israel in 1950 and the licence to manu-

facture it was sold in 1958 to a Belgian company, which entered into a sublicensing agreement with a South African company on 23 May 1961 *in tempore non suspecto*.

In accordance with the Belgian Act of 24 May 1854, which stipulates that "the term of a patent shall be 20 years", the FN/UZI patent expired in 1970 and the product is now in the public domain. Technological collaboration between the Belgian and South African companies ceased and the agreement they had entered into, being no longer applicable, lapsed in 1970. The Belgian company which owned the licence to manufacture the FN/UZI had itself completely discontinued production of the light machine-gun in 1968.

It is common knowledge that, since the FN/UZI light machine-gun entered the public domain upon the expiry of the patent, it has been freely copied by a number of countries, both developed and developing, without any technological co-operation with Belgian companies, whether by contractual arrangement or otherwise.

In conclusion, Belgium declares that it is scrupulously observing the provisions of resolution 418 (1977), including those of paragraph 3.

The Permanent Mission of Belgium requests the Secretary-General to have the text of this note circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12933 *

Letter dated 22 November 1978 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[22 November 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 8 September 1978 addressed to you by the representative of Jordan [S/12844].

In that letter the representative of Jordan again reverted to the time-worn clichés of Arab propaganda in his attempt to rewrite the well-known historical facts of the Arab-Israel conflict and to distort both the pertinent facts and the applicable law.

The Jordanian representative's letter boldly invokes General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947. In so doing, he has overlooked the fact that all the States members of the League of Arab States (including his own country, which in those days called itself Transjordan) categorically rejected that resolution. The Arab States formally announced on the record at the 128th plenary meeting of the General Assembly²⁸ that they reserved to themselves complete freedom of action and then set out to thwart the resolution by the illegal use of force from the moment of its adoption. Thus, at a meeting of the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of Arab League States held at Cairo between 8 and 17 December 1947, it was decided that the Arabs were "determined to enter battle against the United Nations decision" and

to take "decisive measures" to prevent the implementation of the General Assembly resolution.

The acts of violence perpetrated in Palestine with the active assistance of the neighbouring Arab States reached such proportions that on 16 February 1948 the United Nations Palestine Commission, in its first special report to the Security Council, bluntly notified the Council that:

"Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein." [A/AC.21/9, sect. I, para. 3c.]²⁹

Similarly, in its report dated 10 April 1948 to the General Assembly at its second special session, the same Commission advised the Assembly that:

"Arab opposition to the Plan of the Assembly has taken the form of organized efforts by strong Arab elements, both inside and outside of Palestine, to prevent its implementation and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including repeated armed incursions into Palestinian territory."³⁰

²⁸ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Special Supplement No. 2*, document S/676.

³⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Special Session, Supplement No. 1*, p. 10.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/386-S/12933.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Second Session, Plenary Meetings.

With the termination of the Mandate over Palestine on 14 May 1948, the armies of seven Arab States, including the Transjordan Arab Legion, illegally crossed the international boundaries in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The Arab Governments which dispatched them had the effrontery to make formal announcements of their illegal action to the Security Council. Their armed aggression was aimed at crushing the newly-established State of Israel. The fact that they failed in their armed aggression does not legitimize their violation of international law. At the same time, that armed aggression also precludes them from invoking in any form the benefits of a General Assembly resolution which they both rejected and set out to destroy.

When, in a letter dated 20 May 1948 addressed to the Security Council [S/760], Transjordan sought to evade a discussion of the illegal military intervention of its army beyond its borders, the representative of the United States stated that the position of the King of Transjordan was characterized

“by a certain contumacy towards the United Nations and the Security Council. He has sent us an answer to our questions. These were questions addressed to him, as a ruler who is occupying land outside his domain, by the Security Council, a body which is organized in the world to ask these questions of him . . .

“The contumacy of that reply to the Security Council is the very best evidence of the illegal purpose of this Government in invading Palestine with armed forces and conducting the war which it is waging there. It is against the peace; it is not on behalf of the peace. It is an invasion with a definite purpose.

“ . . .
“Therefore, here we have the highest type of evidence of the international violation of the law: the admission by those who are committing this violation.”³¹

This view was also supported by the majority of the members of the Council.

The violation of the international boundaries of Pal-

³¹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 72, 302nd meeting, pp. 41-43.*

tine by the Arab armies constituted an act of aggression in breach of the Charter and of general international law. The consequent illegal occupation of any territory previously forming part of the mandated Territory of Palestine by any of the invading Arab armies, including that of Transjordan, cannot give rise to any legitimate claim. The purported “annexation” of Judaea and Samaria by Jordan in 1950 was in violation both of general international law and of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement of 1949. It is therefore not surprising that the outside world refused to recognize the validity of this illegal act based exclusively on Jordan’s unlawful invasion of Judaea and Samaria, and that even the Arab League threatened Jordan with expulsion from its ranks because of it.

The Jordanian representative attempted in his letter to conceal these fundamental flaws inherent in the Jordanian claims by relying on the “unconditional” admission of Jordan to the United Nations in 1955, despite the fact that Jordan at that time illegally occupied territories beyond its borders. As is well known, the admission of a State into the United Nations does not in itself imply a recognition of its boundaries. In fact, there exist numerous instances of territorial disputes in which both parties to the dispute are Members of the United Nations.

At best, the Jordanian representative’s reliance on the circumstances of his country’s admission to the United Nations would seem to be a rather belated and oblique acknowledgement of the fact that Israel did not vote against it, notwithstanding the fact that Jordan was occupying territories beyond its boundaries.

In his letter, the Jordanian representative also introduced the curious argument of “conditional” membership in the United Nations. As the Jordanian representative is undoubtedly aware, there is nothing in the Charter about “conditional” membership, and his contentions on this point do not merit serious consideration.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12934

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period 18 May to 24 November 1978

[Original: English]
[24 November 1978]

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ANNEX

Map. “UNDOF deployment as of November 1978” (see end of volume.)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report describes the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the period 18 May to 24 November 1978. Its purpose is to provide the Security Council with an account of the activities of UNDOF in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it by the Council in resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974 and extended by resolutions 363 (1974) of 29 November 1974, 369 (1975) of 28 May and 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975, 390 (1976) of 28 May and 398 (1976) of 30 November 1976, 408 (1977) of 26 May and 420 (1977) of 30 November 1977 and 429 (1978) of 31 May 1978.

2. During the period covered by the report, UNDOF continued to supervise the area of separation and to inspect the areas of limitation in armaments and forces, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974 and the Protocol thereto [S/11302/Add.1 and 2]. With the co-operation of both parties, the Force was able to contribute to the maintenance of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

A. COMPOSITION AND COMMAND

3. As of 24 November 1978, the composition of UNDOF was as follows:

Austria	535
Canada	169
Iran	390
Poland	101
United Nations military observers (detailed from UNTSO)	88
TOTAL	1,283

The average strength of UNDOF is about 1,250, all ranks. The present temporary over-strength is due to the fact that rotations involving all four contingents are now under way.

4. Command of UNDOF continues to be exercised by Major-General Hannes Philipp. Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo continues as the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East.

B. DEPLOYMENT

5. UNDOF personnel remain deployed within or close to the area of separation, with base camps and logistic support units located nearby. UNDOF headquarters is located at Damascus. The UNDOF deployment as of November 1978 is shown on the attached map.

6. Until 15 June 1978, the Austrian battalion manned 27 positions and 8 outposts and mounted 25 daily patrols in the area of separation, and the Iranian battalion manned 6 positions and 1 outpost and mounted 12 daily patrols in the southern sector of the area of separation.

7. Since the return of the Iranian company from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to UNDOF on 15 June 1978, the Austrian battalion mans 18 positions and 7 outposts and mounts 19 daily patrols in the area of separation north of the Damascus-Quneitra road, and the Iranian battalion mans 15 positions and 3 outposts and mounts 20 daily patrols in the area of separation south of that road.

8. The Austrian base camp is located near the Wadi

Faouar, 8 kilometres east of the area of separation. The Iranian base camp is near the village of Ziouani, west of the area of separation. The Austrian battalion continues to share its base camp with the Polish logistic unit, and the Iranian battalion continues to share its base camp with the Canadian logistic unit. The Canadian signals unit has detachments at the two base camps, as well as at Damascus, Quneitra and Tiberias.

C. ROTATION

9. The Austrian battalion carried out a partial rotation from 22 to 30 August; a further partial rotation of the battalion, which began on 20 November, is under way. A full rotation of the Iranian battalion began on 30 October and is near completion. The Canadian logistic unit rotates in small groups; a partial rotation is in progress. The Polish logistic unit carried out a full rotation in May-June; a further full rotation of the unit began on 15 November and is under way.

II. ACCOMMODATION AND LOGISTICS

A. ACCOMMODATION

10. During the period under review, construction of shelters at Camp Faouar (Austrian-Polish base) and Camp Ziouani (Iranian-Canadian base) was completed, except for some minor works. The forward UNDOF command headquarters at Quneitra is under construction and will be completed in the near future, as will contractual work to establish a petrol, oil and lubricants station at Camp Faouar and extended repair facilities at Camp Ziouani. Electric power has now been provided for Camp Ziouani. Electric power for Camp Faouar awaits the completion of a transformer building currently under construction.

11. In addition to minor ongoing renovation and winterization projects, work is under way to improve and extend living accommodation at positions within the area of separation. Six Austrian battalion positions have been completed and construction is continuing in the remaining positions. At Camp Ziouani, preliminary work has been completed on a new medical inspection room, as well as new hygienic facilities for the Iranian battalion, utilizing prefabricated structures.

12. Position 81 and one building at position 80 (see map) were completely destroyed by fire. The preliminary work for the reconstruction of position 81 has been completed. The building at position 80, currently being rebuilt by Iranian personnel, is nearing completion.

B. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

13. Logistic support to the Force continues to be provided by the Canadian and Polish logistic units, as outlined in my report of 27 November 1974 [S/11563, paras. 25-27]. Air support to UNDOF continues to be provided by the Canadian air transport unit controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which operates two Buffalo DHC-5 flights out of Ismailia to Tel Aviv and Damascus on a regular basis, with special flights as required.

14. The Canadian and Polish units have continued to provide second-line transport, including delivery of water, petrol, rations, *matériel* and mail, as well as equipment maintenance and vehicle repair.

15. During the period under review, the Polish mine-clearing teams cleared 18,200 metres of patrol paths and 1,250 metres of roads and trails, as well as 18,275 square metres of ground at positions within the area of

separation. In this process, 27 anti-personnel mines, 41 anti-tank mines and 18 artillery projectiles were destroyed. With the arrival of a heavy Polish bulldozer, road improvements have commenced within the area of separation.

16. To achieve greater efficiency in logistic support, warehousing and storage facilities were improved during the period under review. Together with revised arrangements for third-line supplies and services from UNEF, this will result in improved *matériel* management and speedier response to meet the needs of the Force.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. FUNCTIONS AND GUIDELINES

17. The functions and guidelines of UNDOF, as well as its tasks, remain as outlined in my report of 27 November 1974 [*ibid.*, paras. 8-10].

18. UNDOF has continued, with the co-operation of the parties, to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it. This has been facilitated by the close contact maintained by the Force Commander and his staff with the military liaison staffs of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo continues his functions in connexion with UNDOF and, as occasion requires, attends meetings with the Force Commander and military representatives of Israel or the Syrian Arab Republic.

B. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

19. The Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement provides for all contingents to operate with full freedom of movement. However, restrictions on the freedom of movement still exist, and efforts to correct the situation are being pursued.

C. PERSONNEL MATTERS

20. The general discipline, conduct and bearing of all members of UNDOF continue to be of a high order and to reflect credit on the soldiers and their commanders, as well as on the countries contributing contingents.

21. During the period under review, four Austrian soldiers and one Polish soldier died as a result of accidents or other causes.

D. MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

22. UNDOF continues to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. The cease-fire was maintained during the period under review. No complaints referring to the UNDOF area of operation were raised by either party in this regard.

E. SUPERVISION OF THE AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE AREAS OF SEPARATION AND LIMITATION

23. UNDOF continues to supervise the area of separation to make sure, in accordance with its mandate, that there are no military forces within it. This is carried out by means of static positions and observation posts which are manned 24 hours a day and by foot and mobile patrols operating at random intervals on predetermined routes. The return deployment of the Iranian company from UNIFIL to the UNDOF area of operation on 15 June 1978 has brought the Force back to its normal operational strength.

24. The safety of Syrian shepherds who graze their

flocks close to and west of the A line continues to be of concern to UNDOF. The establishment of new mine-cleared patrol paths and, from time to time, of standing patrols in these areas has helped to prevent major incidents.

25. UNDOF has continued to facilitate and supervise the fortnightly meetings of Druse families living on both sides of the A line. Twelve family meetings were held during the period under review and both parties have shown good co-operation in making these meetings possible.

26. The existence of mines within the area of separation continues to cause danger to members of UNDOF as well as to the civilian population. During the period under review, several civilians were seriously injured or killed by mine explosions.

27. In accordance with the terms of the Agreement on Disengagement, UNDOF continues to conduct bi-weekly inspections of the areas of limitation in armament and forces. The inspections are conducted with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties, who accompany the UNDOF inspection teams to their respective areas. UNDOF lends its assistance and good offices in cases where one of the parties raises questions concerning the observance of the agreed limitations of armament and forces. In carrying out these functions, UNDOF has continued to receive the co-operation of the parties, although restrictions of movement are sometimes placed upon UNDOF teams during inspections in certain areas on both sides of the area of separation. Efforts are being pursued by UNDOF to lift those restrictions of movement and guarantee freedom of access to all locations on both sides.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

28. As indicated in my report of 15 November 1978 to the General Assembly³² on the financing of UNEF and UNDOF, should the Security Council renew the mandate of UNDOF beyond 30 November 1978, the cost of the Force after that date would be of the order of \$1.7 million per month, assuming continuance of its existing strength and responsibilities.

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

29. In deciding, by its resolution 429 (1978), to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, the Security Council also called upon all the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit at the end of the extended period a report on the developments in the situation and the steps taken to implement that resolution.

30. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and, in particular, the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973) have been dealt with in the comprehensive report on the Middle East problem [S/12896] which the Secretary-General has submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 32/20 of 25 November 1977.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

31. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, which was established in May 1974 to supervise the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian

³² A/33/373 and Corr. 1, para. 16.

Forces of 31 May 1974, has continued to perform its functions effectively, with the co-operation of the parties. During the period under review, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector remained quiet, and there were no incidents of a serious nature.

32. Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. I continue to hope that determined efforts will be made by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

33. In the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council should extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 May 1979. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to

the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

34. In concluding this report, I wish once again to express my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those which provide UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force. I take this opportunity also to pay tribute to the Commander of UNDOF, Major-General Hannes Philipp, to the Chief of Staff, Colonel M. Ahmadi, who was Acting Force Commander during General Philipp's temporary absence on the United Nations survey mission to Namibia, to the officers and men of the Force and its civilian staff, as well as to the UNTSO military observers assigned to UNDOF. They have performed with exemplary efficiency and devotion to duty the important and difficult tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council.

ANNEX

[Map. "UNDOF deployment as of November 1978". See end of volume.]

DOCUMENT S/12935

Letter dated 24 November 1978 from the representative of Viet Nam to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[24 November 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the statement issued by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on 9 November 1978 rejecting the fabricated report of the Phnom Penh authorities on the so-called use by Viet Nam of poison gas shells.

I would like to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter and statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) HA VAN LAU
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement issued by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on 9 November 1978

On 7 November 1978 [see S/12930], the Propaganda and Press Department of the Foreign Ministry of Kampuchea issued a press communiqué on the so-called firing by Viet Nam of 105 mm poison gas shells at Au Yadao in Ratanakiri Province. The Hsinhua News Agency promptly repeated and commented on the report.

The Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam flatly rejects the above-mentioned fabricated report of the Kampuchean side.

This is an extremely brazen and odious slanderous allegation on the part of the Phnom Penh authorities aimed at defending themselves against world opinion, which is earnestly condemning their crimes against the Vietnamese people and their genocidal action against the Kampuchean people, and also at covering up the fact that the Peking authorities are increasingly supplying weapons of various kinds, sending more advisers and military personnel to Kampuchea in order to prepare with the Kampuchean authorities for new military adventures against Viet Nam and suppress the Kampuchean people.

DOCUMENT S/12936*

Letter dated 24 November 1978 from the representative of Sri Lanka to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[24 November 1978]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a communiqué issued today by the Bureau in New York.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the communiqué circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) B. J. FERNANDO
Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Communiqué issued in New York on 24 November 1978 by the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries

1. The Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries has noted, with a sense of urgency and with growing concern, the

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/390-S/12936.

alarming threat posed by the racist minority régime in South Africa to the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola. The racist forces of South Africa, at the service of and in collusion with the forces of imperialism and colonialism, have planned and are in the process of executing another large scale attack against Angola.

2. The Co-ordinating Bureau condemns the military build-up of South Africa in Namibia, on Angola's southern borders, and strongly condemns the racist Pretoria régime which seeks the destabilization of Angola as well as the undermining of the just liberation struggle in southern Africa.

3. The Co-ordinating Bureau further condemns the acts of aggression committed by the racist Pretoria régime against Angolan territory, as well as the violation of air space and military reconnaissance in preparation for the planned attack. The cities, villages, hamlets and people of the southern region of Angola are in danger of imminent attack by the South African military machine.

4. The Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries meeting at Belgrade in July 1978 agreed that "the enemy has continued

the policy of aggression, racial discrimination, *apartheid* and terror in southern Africa, which makes this region one of the most acute hotbeds of crises in the world, directly endangering the security and independence of all African countries, especially the 'front-line' countries".^a

5. In keeping with the founding principles of the non-aligned movement, the Co-ordinating Bureau extends all solidarity and support to the Government and people of Angola in defence of their national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Bureau strongly condemns South African manoeuvres aimed at increasing tensions in southern Africa and buying time for its nefarious designs. The Bureau further calls upon all the States members of the non-aligned movement to join in the condemnation of South Africa and its imperialist allies and to help defeat the imperialist strategy and tactics in southern Africa, the latest manifestation of which is the threatened attack on Angola.

^a A/33/206, annex I, para. 83.

DOCUMENT S/12937

Letter dated 24 November 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[24 November 1978]

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to bring to your notice the violations of the airspace of Cyprus on three occasions by Turkish fighter jets on 22 November 1978. They were as follows:

1. At 0907-0919 hours, two Phantom fighter jets flew over the area of Skillouras-Kontemenou villages.
2. At 1040 and 1113 hours, two F104 fighter planes flew over the same region.
3. At 1145-1204 hours, once more, two Phantom fighter jets flew over the same area.

In strongly protesting on behalf of my Government against these violations of the sovereignty of Cyprus by Turkey, I wish to point out that such aggressive actions once again take place during a delicate phase of the Cyprus problem.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12938

Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 439 (1978)

[Original: English]
[24 November 1978]

1. At its 2092nd and 2094th to 2098th meetings, held between 31 October and 13 November 1978, the Security Council considered my report submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 435 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia [S/12903].

2. At its 2098th meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution 439 (1978), the text of which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976, 431 (1978) and 432 (1978) of 27 July and 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978,

"Having considered the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 435 (1978) [S/12903],

"Taking note of the relevant communications addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council [S/12900 and S/12902],

"Having heard and considered the statement of the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia [2092nd meeting],

Taking note also of the communication dated 23 October 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization to the Secretary-General [S/12913],

"Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and its continued commitment to the implementation of resolution 385 (1976), in particular the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control.

"Reiterating the view that any unilateral measure taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of the above-mentioned resolutions and the present resolution, is null and void,

"Gravely concerned at the decision of the Government of South Africa to proceed with unilateral elections in Namibia in clear contravention of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978),

"1. Condemns the decision of the South African Government to proceed unilaterally with the holding of elections in the Territory from 4 to 8 December 1978 in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978);

"2. Considers that this decision constitutes a clear defiance of the United Nations and, in particular, the authority of the Security Council;

"3. Declares those elections and their results null and void and states that no recognition will be accorded either by the United Nations or any Member States to any representatives or organ established by that process;

"4. Calls upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections it has planned in Namibia in December 1978;

"5. Demands once again that South Africa cooperate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 435 (1978);

"6. Warns South Africa that its failure to do so would compel the Security Council to meet forthwith to initiate appropriate actions under the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII thereof, so as to ensure South Africa's compliance with the aforementioned resolutions;

"7. Calls upon the Secretary-General to report on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution by 25 November 1978."

3. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of the above resolution.

Communications with the Government of South Africa

4. Immediately following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 439 (1978), I communicated the text of the resolution to the Government of South Africa. At subsequent meetings with the Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa, I emphasized the need for the Foreign Minister of South Africa to meet me for discussions on issues concerning the submission of my report to the Security Council by 25 November. In reply, I was informed by the Deputy Permanent Representative that the Foreign Minister would be unable to proceed to New York before 26 November and that he would be prepared to have discussions with

me from 27 November. I again drew the attention of the Deputy Permanent Representative to the deadline of 25 November for the submission of my report. On that occasion, I suggested an earlier meeting with the Foreign Minister or, should that not be possible, with a high-ranking official of the Government of South Africa.

5. In response to the above suggestion, I received a message from the Foreign Minister, in which he agreed to send Mr. B. G. Fourie, South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to New York to be available for discussions on 24 November. After further consultations, I was informed that, in view of the deadline for the report to the Security Council, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would arrive in New York in the afternoon of 23 November and would be available for discussions from that very afternoon.

6. It may be relevant to observe here that, in my contacts with the South African Government, Foreign Minister Botha made it clear that it would not be possible to reach finality during the talks in New York. It was emphasized however that, in my discussions with them, both the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Minister would make every effort to clarify the more important points of interest to the Security Council.

Meetings with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of South Africa

7. I held meetings in New York with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of South Africa as scheduled on 23 and 24 November.

8. At our meetings, I drew the attention of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in particular, to paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 439 (1978), in which the Security Council called for his Government immediately to cancel the elections it had planned in Namibia in December 1978, and once again demanded that South Africa cooperate with the Council and the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 435 (1978). I informed him that my intention in initiating the meeting in the first place was to know the reaction of his Government on those basic issues and to seek its co-operation in the implementation of Council decisions on the question of Namibia.

9. I further informed him that, having regard to the concerns expressed about my report [S/12827] by the Government of South Africa, among others, I had issued an explanatory statement [S/12869] which took those concerns into account. I emphasized that my report was in conformity with the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation [S/12636] and that I had been assured by the five Western Governments that it was in line with their proposal. Further, I pointed out that resolution 435 (1978), in which, among other things, the Security Council approved my report, provided all concerned with an opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian situation. I expressed the hope that my explanatory statement had cleared the way for us to proceed to finalize arrangements for the implementation of my report.

10. I then proceeded to outline the basic framework of my report as adopted by the Security Council. I emphasized that the report maintained the successive stages and spacing of the various phases of the electoral process laid down in the steps outlined in the proposal for a settlement and in the annex to that document, that the timetable envisaged in the proposal was linked to the date of emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia and that, based

on the same timetable, an appropriate date for the elections would be approximately seven months after the emplacement of UNTAG. For the implementation of my report on the above lines, I recognized that the establishment of a cease-fire was an essential prerequisite which would be brought about following notification to the Secretary-General of an agreed cease-fire. I reiterated that document S/12636, which was reflected in my report, called for a comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts. I also reaffirmed the annex to that document which described provisions for the implementation of the cessation of all hostile acts, military arrangements concerning UNTAG, the withdrawal of South African forces and arrangements with respect to other organized forces in Namibia and with respect to the forces of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

11. Within the context of relevant Security Council decisions, which I outlined to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, I asked him for a clarification of the position of his Government on the following additional matters:

(a) Paragraph 5 of resolution 435 (1978) and paragraph 5 of resolution 439 (1978);

(b) Commencement of UNTAG activities in Namibia, effective from 1 January 1979, which I had proposed to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs during our discussions;

(c) Subject to subparagraph *b* above, the agreement of the Government of South Africa and the United Nations to establish provisional dates for the various stages and steps projected in the timetable annexed to document S/12636;

(d) Related to the above, establishment of a provisional date for the elections to be fixed approximately seven months from the date of commencement of UNTAG in Namibia;

(e) Having regard to my explanatory statement to the Security Council, confirmation that South Africa's concern over the United Nations civil police component has now been removed;

(f) Finalization prior to commencement of UNTAG in Namibia of agreement between the United Nations and the Government of South Africa on the status of UNTAG in Namibia;

(g) Practical arrangements for a cease-fire to be effected by South Africa and SWAPO, each addressing to me a written undertaking to discontinue all hostile acts. That would be in accordance with the proposal for a settlement and would come into force with the commencement of UNTAG on a specified date. These procedures would be finalized after acceptance of resolution 435 (1978) by South Africa.

12. I informed the Secretary for Foreign Affairs that those specific issues were of particular importance to the Security Council at the current stage in the light of Security Council resolution 439 (1978).

Reactions of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs

13. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated in reply that the Government of South Africa had extended its co-operation to the Security Council by agreeing to and negotiating the proposal for a settlement on the basis of resolution 385 (1976); it had further co-operated in the implementation of resolution 431 (1978) during the visit of my Special Representative to Namibia in August to conduct the survey for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement. As regards co-operation for the im-

plementation of resolution 435 (1978), he said the gap between the Security Council and his Government had been narrowed through subsequent talks; the remaining outstanding issues could be resolved through consultations as envisaged in the joint statement after the talks at Pretoria [S/12902, annex I]. He added that the sincerity of South Africa in this regard was illustrated by the willingness of the Foreign Minister of South Africa to arrive in New York on 27 November for discussions. In this connexion, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs also referred to his own arrival in New York at an earlier date for discussions with the Secretary-General. He stated that the South African Government was willing to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) but that there were a few points on which agreement must be reached, namely, a fixed date, as stipulated by South Africa, for elections, and further consultations on the composition and strength of the military component of UNTAG. The date for the emplacement of UNTAG would depend on reaching conclusions on those points.

14. On the question of a target date for elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs referred to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the joint statement of Pretoria which called for further consultations in Windhoek between the Administrator-General and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. He further reaffirmed the position of his Government that a firm date should be set for the elections rather than a provisional one [S/12900, annex III]. He emphasized that after establishing such a date it should not be possible for any party to delay the elections. The date should then be adhered to irrespective of whether there was a cessation of hostilities and a subsequent reduction of South African troops.

15. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs confirmed that, while the South African Government considered the number of civilian personnel envisaged for police monitoring to be excessive, the explanatory statement of the Secretary-General had removed its concern about the character and role of the United Nations police. The exact number could be determined by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Administrator-General on the ground.

16. He also stated that substantial progress had been made on the proposed draft agreement on the status of UNTAG. However, finality had still to be reached between the Government of South Africa and the United Nations on a limited number of issues concerning the agreement, but given understanding on both sides, this did not seem to be insurmountable.

17. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs reaffirmed the position of his Government on a cease-fire [S/12854] and added that the reduction of South African troops in Namibia would only commence if and when a comprehensive cessation of hostilities had been brought about.

18. In reply to earlier questions raised by the Secretary-General concerning the December elections, including the call for their immediate cancellation, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs reaffirmed that the elections would take place as scheduled by his Government and announced by the then Prime Minister of South Africa [S/12853, annex]. The elections would give an indication whether the elected representatives would represent the people of South West Africa. It was left to the Secretary-General and the five Western Governments to decide whether, after the elections in December, they would wish to continue to negotiate with the Government of South Africa. South Africa had never suggested that

they should not do so. In response to my question, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs confirmed that the elections to be held under United Nations supervision and control would, as provided in the proposal for a settlement, be for a constituent assembly.

19. I emphasized to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs that there were a number of important points re-

lating to the questions in paragraph 11 above on which the Security Council would certainly require more specific answers.

20. I wish to inform the Council that I shall be holding talks with the Foreign Minister of South Africa on Monday, 27 November. I shall not fail to inform the Council immediately of the outcome of these talks.

DOCUMENT S/12939*

Letter dated 24 November 1978 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[27 November 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you the Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held at Moscow on 23 November 1978.

I should be grateful if you would have the Declaration circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) O. TROYANOVSKY
Permanent Representative of the USSR
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held in Moscow on 23 November 1978

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Moscow on 22-23 November 1978, considered current questions concerning the development of the situation in Europe and exchanged views on some questions concerning the international situation as a whole.

The discussion centred around further steps in the struggle for the development of the process of détente and for disarmament.

The participants in the meeting pointed out that in recent years the determination of peoples and all progressive and peace-loving forces to put an end to the aggressive and oppressive policy of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism had become ever stronger and the struggle for peace, for détente, for an end to the arms race, for freedom and social progress, for peaceful international co-operation on equal terms, based on mutual respect for national independence and sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs, had developed even further. Notable successes have been attained in this struggle. A trend towards a relaxation of international tension, based on recognition of and respect for the equality of rights of all States, has emerged and begun making an impact on the general development of world affairs.

At the same time there has been greater activity on the part of the forces of imperialism and reaction, which are trying to bring independent States and peoples under their domination, stepping up the arms race and flagrantly intervening in the internal affairs of other States, a situation which creates a threat to the process of détente and runs counter to the aspiration of peoples for peace, freedom, independence and progress.

On the whole, developments have confirmed the assessment made by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty in their Declaration "For new horizons in international détente, for building

security and developing co-operation in Europe", adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held at Bucharest in 1976 [S/12255 of 16 December 1976, annex I].

The participants in the meeting paid particular attention to questions relating to the strengthening of security and the development of co-operation in Europe. They pointed out that significant favourable changes had taken place on the European continent. Those changes had been facilitated by the development of relations between the States of the continent in the spirit of the principles contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and by the general recognition of the existing frontiers between European States and of their inviolability, which is of fundamental importance for international security. The overcoming of substantial obstacles on the road to an improvement of the relations between the States of Europe has helped make those relations smoother, given them a richer and more varied content and promoted the expansion of mutual understanding between peoples.

In the time since the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe there has been useful work aimed at the implementation of the principles and agreements worked out at the Conference, for which a good beginning has been laid down. Developments have confirmed that the long-term programme of European security and co-operation embodied in the Final Act of the Conference correctly determines the main directions of positive actions in the interest of peace and provides reliable guidance for such actions.

In the course of implementing the Helsinki agreements, there have been increasingly frequent meetings between leaders of the States that participated in the Conference, which promotes the development of mutually advantageous international co-operation on equal terms, including co-operation on a long-term basis.

The fabric of political contacts between European States has become markedly stronger and their understanding of each other's positions, views and legitimate interests has been improved, a process in which the expansion of bilateral relations also plays a significant and useful role. New possibilities have been found for mutually advantageous economic, scientific and technical co-operation between European States, especially in the sphere of industrial co-operation, and definite practical steps for the realization of those possibilities have been outlined. Preparations are under way for the convocation of a European congress on environmental protection, and appropriate forums have begun considering the question of holding similar meetings on co-operation in transport, energy and a number of other fields. Cultural exchange has been expanded and has become richer and more varied in content and contacts in other humanitarian spheres have been developed.

It is significant that all of the participants in the European Conference reaffirmed at the Belgrade meeting their readiness to continue the process begun at the Conference, although no agreement was reached at the meeting on a number of essential constructive practical proposals, including those related to the military aspects of security. A useful contribution to the development of co-operation in Europe can be expected from multi-

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/392-S/12939.

lateral measures on specific questions, on which agreement was achieved at the Belgrade meeting: a meeting of experts to draw up a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes, a European scientific forum and a meeting of experts on economic, scientific-technical and cultural co-operation in the area of the Mediterranean. Of positive significance is the understanding on the convening at Madrid in 1980—within the framework of the multilateral process started by the European Conference—of the next meeting of representatives of the States which participated in the Conference. The peoples of the continent expect the Madrid meeting to be of practical assistance in advancing the cause of security and co-operation in Europe and, in particular, to contribute to progress in the field of military détente and disarmament. The socialist countries represented at the Conference express their determination to make their contribution to the success of the meeting.

However, it has been clear from the outset that steady progress along the path marked by the European Conference and the strengthening of peace all over the world can become a reality only if all States consistently act in that direction.

Regrettably, the trend of events has not been completely along that line. There are clear breaches of the generally recognized principles of relations between States and serious threats to peace and international security and to the freedom and independence of peoples. Attempts are being made to halt the process of improvement in international relations and even to reverse it. The build-up of troops and arms on the European continent has not been stopped and is continuing; no effective agreements in the field of military détente and disarmament have yet been reached, and this endangers the process of strengthening security in Europe. Obstacles in the way of economic and scientific-technical co-operation have not been removed and have even been increased in some areas. Hostile political campaigns are being waged against the socialist countries, the communist and workers' parties and other progressive democratic forces.

The aims of aggression, revanchism and hegemonism are being pursued by the imperialist and reactionary forces in their attack on the gains made by the world's peoples in the difficult struggle for a lasting peace and international security. The States represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee consider it necessary to draw the attention of all peace-loving forces to the fact that all of this seriously damages the cause of strengthening peace and security and the development of international co-operation.

The efforts of the imperialist and reactionary forces to complicate the international situation will inevitably meet with the firm opposition of all who cherish the interests of peace and the right of peoples to live and work in tranquillity and all who consider the elimination of the threat of war to be one of the most important objectives of the present day.

Convinced that the constantly strengthening forces of peace and progress are capable of new and important achievements in the struggle for peace and the freedom of peoples, the States participating in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee declare their determination, acting together with other peace-loving States, all progressive and democratic forces and the broad popular masses, to give fresh impetus to the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act as an integral whole and to reach agreement on specific measures and steps for the development of co-operation and the attainment of genuine security on the European continent and throughout the world. They are also ready to participate very actively and energetically in the resolution of the most important international problems.

The main danger to peace and international security, to the relaxation of international tension and to the independence of peoples and their economic and social development is the continuation and build-up of the arms race and the increase in its rapidity and scale.

An expression of the intensification of the arms race, responsibility for which rests with the most aggressive circles of imperialism, is the adoption by the Washington session of the NATO Council of the decision to increase military appropriations by many tens of billions of dollars above their already inflated military budgets, with new programmes, lasting several decades, to develop their armed forces and equip them with increasingly destructive types of weapons of mass annihilation. Those decisions, which are conducive to an increase in the

arms race, as well as other actions by NATO that are in the nature of military demonstrations, are aimed at bringing about the military supremacy of the NATO countries over the socialist and other countries of the world in order to impose their will on independent States and to suppress the struggle of peoples for national and social liberation.

Those measures run completely counter to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and create new obstacles in the way of mutual understanding and peaceful co-operation among the States and peoples of Europe. The interests of peace require that the NATO countries should renounce the decisions they have adopted and follow the road to disarmament and the creation of a climate of peace, mutual understanding and confidence among all the States that participated in the European Conference.

The socialist countries, Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, take a firm position against the policy of intensifying the arms race and against attempts at military blackmail. They reaffirm that they have never sought and do not seek military superiority; their military efforts are and always will be aimed exclusively at ensuring their defence capacity. Their basic belief is that military balance in Europe and the world should be maintained not by increasing arms but by reducing them and by a resolute transition to specific measures to achieve disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. The further intensification of the arms race, the expansion of its scale and the further improvement of weapons systems may have increasingly dangerous consequences for the world's peoples.

Accordingly, the States represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee believe that the most important task of international politics under present conditions is to bring about an early and decisive breakthrough in the talks on stopping the arms race and on disarmament. This must happen if the basic interests of the world's peoples, of all mankind and of civilization are to be served. They note with satisfaction that this viewpoint is now widely shared throughout the world. The political leaders of many countries, along with broad sectors of society and the common people, are speaking out with ever-greater insistence against new spiralling increases in the arms race, which jeopardize the peace and security of States, and in favour of effective disarmament measures.

The arms race holds back the economic and social progress of all countries and renders inter-State co-operation more difficult; it puts ever-greater obstacles in the way of efforts to close the gaps in economic development between countries and to solve other global problems on which mankind's future depends.

There can be no stable peace in conditions where the destructive potential in the arsenals of States is growing rapidly, a potential which even now is sufficient—if put to use—to call into question the very survival of man on earth. The arms race is causing increasingly serious damage to the process of relaxation of international tension.

Another reason why the arms race must be stopped without delay is that the rapid development of military technology, especially the possible emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, may further complicate the search for and the attainment of practical solutions on matters of disarmament.

What the peoples of the world need is not the development of new nuclear-missile systems, new ballistic-missile submarines or cruise missiles but the complete termination of the manufacture of nuclear weapons of all types and the conversion of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes.

The aspirations of mankind will be met not by the improvement of existing types of mass-destruction weapons and the development of new ones, including neutron weapons, but by the discontinuation of the manufacture and by the prohibition of all types of such weapons.

What the world's people need is not the further development and improvement of conventional armaments and the further enhancement of their destructive power but the reduction of existing armed forces and armaments without diminishing the security of any State and transition to effective measures to ease military tension and to effect disarmament.

The socialist countries represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee firmly maintain that it is

necessary to take effective measures along all these lines, measures that are capable of stopping the growth of the military potential of States—first of all that of the Powers which possess great military potential—and that can lead to actual disarmament.

Proposals on the entire range of problems related to stopping the arms race and effecting disarmament have been submitted at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in the summer of 1978, and at the current session of the General Assembly.

The foremost task in this respect is to begin talks on stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons of all types and on gradually reducing stockpiles of these weapons until they are completely liquidated. Parallel to this, it is necessary to bring about the prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons and the renunciation by all States of the use of force in relations with each other. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty support the proposals on this subject made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They consider it necessary to reach agreement without further delay on the beginning of talks on these questions, with the participation of all nuclear Powers and not only of those Powers. The sooner a specific date is fixed for such talks, the better.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty attach great importance to the attainment of agreement between the USSR and the United States on strategic arms limitation. Of tremendous importance, in their opinion, would be the early completion of Soviet-United States talks on the second agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons and a turn to the conclusion of new agreements on the reduction of such weapons, with the participation of other nuclear Powers.

The achievement of progress in the reduction of strategic offensive weapons would help reduce the level of military confrontation in the world and strengthen the course towards détente, peace and international security. The peoples of the world will welcome such a turn of events.

The States represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee favour the speedy conclusion of the current talks on other aspects of the limitation and termination of the arms race as well: the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; the strengthening of the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons so as to give all States, without discrimination, access to the use of nuclear energy and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under effective international control in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency standards; the banning of the development of new types and systems of mass-destruction weapons; the banning and liquidation of chemical weapons; the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean; the restriction of the sale and delivery of conventional weapons.

Each of these subjects has its own significance from the standpoint of strengthening peace and the security of the world's peoples. The talks on each of them have reached a more or less advanced stage, at which the discussion and the search for solutions relate not simply to general ideas but directly to questions of military hardware. The socialist States taking part in the talks in question have made and are continuing to make very constructive contributions towards their progress and have come forward with initiatives to help overcome the obstacles encountered on the way. They are prepared to continue acting in that spirit in order to make the talks succeed. But it should be absolutely clear that practical results can be achieved only if all participants in the talks take a constructive approach.

One of the most effective and practical ways to stop the arms race is to reduce military budgets, especially the budgets of States with great economic and military potential. The socialist countries are ready to reach agreement on the resolution of this weighty problem, on cutbacks in military budgets either by equal percentages or by magnitudes of the same order in absolute terms. Their proposals on this subject are being examined by the United Nations, including the proposal that military budgets should be frozen at their present level and their reduction begun immediately.

The implementation of this measure not only will set certain limits to the arms race but also will release vast resources for peaceful purposes—for the development of industry and agriculture, science, culture and education, for increasing aid to

the developing countries in the interests of accelerating their economic and social development, and for environmental protection. This would be a tangible gain for the cause of disarmament and for the well-being of all peoples.

As European States, the socialist States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty naturally attach special significance to questions of military détente and disarmament in Europe.

They reaffirm their determination to work for the implementation of the well-known provision of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the need to carry out effective measures which are aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament and which will complement political détente and strengthen security in Europe.

They are striving in every way possible to contribute to the success of the talks on mutual force and arms reductions in Central Europe and to that end they have repeatedly put forward during the talks constructive proposals on ways of resolving the basic issues under consideration. Their new major effort aimed at achieving decisive progress at the talks is the proposal of 8 June 1978 embracing the whole range of the problems under discussion and ensuring the quality of the armed forces of the two sides in the area subject to reductions, with a considerable decrease of force levels below the present levels. Progress will, however, be achieved only if the response of the other side is also imbued with a constructive spirit.

The participants in the meeting will also undertake efforts to have questions of military détente and the promotion of disarmament in Europe examined within the common framework of European security, with the participation of all States which signed the Helsinki Final Act.

The socialist States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are ready, whether it be at the European or the global level, with reference to separate areas or the whole world, to conduct talks on all aspects of the problem of ending the arms race, including those on which they have not been conducted so far. This applies, for example, to the question of limiting and reducing those components of the military potentials of both sides in Europe which are at present a source of concern for each of the sides.

There is no type of weapon that the socialist States represented at the meeting are not ready to limit or reduce on the basis of strict observance of the principle of undiminished security of each side. They are also ready to examine most attentively the proposals of other States on questions of military détente and disarmament.

Declaring their desire to undertake further efforts together with other States to arrive at the successful resolution of questions pertaining to the termination of the arms race and to disarmament, the States represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee consider it necessary to stress the significance of confidence in relations among States. They take a firm position in favour of the strict observance of the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force in relations among States and the settlement of all disputes solely by peaceful means, through negotiations.

Accordingly, the socialist States represented at the meeting favour the implementation of the following measures:

Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, which would place an obligation on all States to renounce the use of force or of the threat of force in all its forms and manifestations, including a ban on the use of nuclear weapons;

Strict observance by all States which participated in the European Conference of the obligation not to use force or the threat of force in their relations with each other;

Implementation of the proposal that every State which participated in the European Conference should commit itself never to be the first to use nuclear weapons against any other, that the NATO member States and the Warsaw Treaty member States should not enlarge the membership of their alliances, that the scale of military exercises by each side in Europe should be limited to the level of 50,000-60,000 men and that the measures of confidence on which agreement was reached at the European Conference should be extended to the area of the Mediterranean;

Measures for strengthening guarantees of the security of non-

nuclear States, including renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them in their territory, as well as renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of States where they are not to be found at present.

Non-nuclear States which do not have nuclear weapons in their territory have the right to receive guarantees that neither nuclear weapons nor any other weapons will be used against them, in accordance with the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force.

The States participating in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee oppose increases in forces and arms in the territories of other States. They have reaffirmed their consistent stand for the conclusion of agreements on force and arms cuts, for fresh efforts on an international scale to achieve the dismantling of military bases in the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States, and for the creation of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace in various areas, including Europe.

The participants in the meeting also reaffirm their readiness to disband the Warsaw Treaty Organization simultaneously with the disbandment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and, as a first step, they are prepared for the liquidation of the two military organizations, starting with a mutual reduction of their military activity. That would be a major advance in the building of lasting peace.

The socialist States know very well that the solution of problems relating to the ending of the arms race and to disarmament is a difficult matter calling for tremendous effort and purposeful will. They deem useful and important the broad discussion of practical measures aimed at ending the arms race and achieving disarmament that took place at the recent special session of the United Nations General Assembly, which also adopted decisions on improving the machinery for talks to that end. It is important now to begin practical work aimed at implementing the ideas and recommendations of the Final Document adopted at that session [resolution S-10/2] and to undertake even more persistent efforts at the international level to start the process of disarmament. The convocation at the earliest possible date of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all States could provide a strong impetus in moving the cause forward.

The States represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee are also aware that there are powerful adversaries of the cause of ending the arms race, primarily the imperialist circles and the monopolies that are interested in the constant expansion of the manufacture of arms and the increase of arms stockpiles as a means of gaining profits and dominating independent countries and peoples and imposing their will upon them. But the participants in the meeting are convinced that the resistance of those adversaries can be overcome if all the forces of our time interested in the maintenance and consolidation of peace are mobilized and united for that purpose.

Their confidence is based on the results already achieved, which have found expression in the system of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements limiting certain aspects of the arms race that has been built up in the past decade and a half. The vital interests of the world's peoples require that much more should be done now.

Decisive progress in ending the arms race is possible. Every effort must be exerted to make it a reality.

During an exchange of views on other international questions of common interest, the delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics deemed it necessary to emphasize that the imperialist policy directed against the peoples fighting for liberation from colonial and racist oppression, against neo-colonialism and for independence and social progress, also represents a threat to international détente.

They deem it necessary to state, above all, that the policy of imperialism still pursues the same ends, although it has become more refined of late. With increasing frequency the imperialists resort to such methods as provoking enmity and conflicts between the peoples of newly liberated States, dispatching arms and mercenaries to help their protégés, and putting together all kinds

of military alignments of countries where pro-imperialist régimes are in power. And the purpose of all this is to strengthen or, at least, to retain their domination, their position in the economies and policies of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Nor, as experience has shown, have influential circles of imperialist Powers and international monopolies abandoned their "traditional" means of keeping countries and peoples in submission—military intervention, flagrant interference in the internal affairs of independent States, infringement of their sovereign rights.

The socialist States have opposed and still oppose this policy, which runs counter to the objective requirements of mankind's historical development. They reaffirm their solidarity with the struggle of the peoples against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and against any form of domination and oppression. They have supported and will continue to support the forces fighting for national liberation and the peoples of the newly liberated countries in their hard struggle to uphold their independence and freedom, including their right freely to choose their path of social development and to safeguard the territorial integrity of their countries as well as their independence and sovereignty. They reaffirm the firm intention of their countries to continue to develop all-round co-operation and friendly interaction with young socialist-oriented States.

The socialist States vigorously support the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia in their selfless struggle for the early attainment of national independence. They are in sympathy with the just struggle of the people of South Africa for the abolition of *apartheid* and all forms of racial discrimination. They condemn the attempts to impose upon the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa neo-colonialist solutions which are alien to them and which could lead to the outbreak of new conflicts in that region.

They reaffirm their position of principle in favour of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East problem which must include the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, the exercise of the inalienable right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination, including the setting up of their own State, and the safeguarding of the independent existence and security of all States of that region, including Israel. They will continue to struggle together with the Arab States and peoples and with all progressive forces to achieve such a settlement, which can be achieved only with the participation of all interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The States represented at the meeting support the constructive initiatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea aimed at the realization of the national ideal of the Korean people: the independent, peaceful and democratic reunification of the country without any foreign interference.

In their relations with the newly liberated countries, the socialist States strictly adhere to the principles of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and mutually advantageous co-operation. In no area of the world are socialist countries seeking any privileges for themselves, pressing for military bases or hunting for concessions. Fundamentally opposed to the imperialist policy of creating spheres of influence, they themselves never take part in the struggle for such spheres.

Guided by their fundamental policy of strengthening universal peace and security, the socialist countries represented at the meeting consistently advocate the settlement by peaceful political means, by means of talks, of all disputes between newly liberated States and between all States in general.

The participants in the meeting stress the special importance for the progress of the whole of mankind of the struggle for the elimination of under-development, the restructuring of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis, the establishment of a new international economic order, the renunciation of all discrimination and the elimination of the exploitation of the natural and human resources of developing countries by imperialist monopolies. They regard this as a direct continuation of the struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

They also declare themselves in favour of the most active and equal participation of all States, irrespective of their social

system, geographical location, size and economic and military might, in the solution of pressing problems of world development.

The States represented at the meeting are convinced that their policy on questions relating to the struggle of the peoples for freedom, independence and social progress is a clear and fundamental policy which promotes the strengthening of peace and the success of the great cause of the freedom of the peoples.

Dangerous trends in the development of international affairs are also generated by the policies of imperialist circles which, on the one hand, encourage and support Fascist and other reactionary régimes in the perpetration of flagrant mass violations of human rights and, on the other hand, try to use the problem of human rights as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist and other States, and to attack the socialist social system.

In the course of the exchange of views on this question, the delegations proceeded from the premise that, in the Final Act, all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe recognized the universal importance of fundamental human rights and freedoms, respect for which is an important factor for the peace, justice and well-being which are essential to the development of friendly ties between them and between all States. In this connexion, they believe that it is their duty to stress that support for and encouragement of Fascist and racist policies, of acts of oppression, of flagrant mass violations of human rights, and of the dissemination of anti-humanitarian, militaristic, neo-Fascist and neo-Nazi views are directly contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the provisions of the Final Act adopted at Helsinki and other international instruments.

By supporting reactionary régimes in their struggle against the democratic liberation movement of the working masses, their violation of the rights of citizens and their barbarous crimes against their peoples, imperialism flagrantly interferes in the internal affairs of those countries. The socialist countries are resolutely opposed to any interference in the internal affairs of States and advocate strict respect for the right of all peoples freely to shape their own destiny.

The States participating in the meeting once again unanimously expressed the conviction that true democracy and true humanism were incompatible with the preservation of economic, social and political inequality and national and racial discrimination. It is only under socialism that respect for political, civil, economic, social, cultural and other rights is assured, as well as the free access of all members of society to employment, education, culture, science, and participation in the administration of the State. The very origin of the new social system is connected with the desire to realize the fundamental human right—the right to a dignified existence free from exploitation—and to create conditions for the all-round development of the individual. The banner of human rights and freedoms is the banner of socialism.

It is with an even greater sense of conviction that the socialist countries participating in the meeting reject the slander directed against them by the ruling classes of States whose peoples are experiencing all the calamities of mass unemployment, national and social inequality, racial discrimination, organized crime and moral degradation.

The Charter of the United Nations imposes an obligation on all States to promote respect for and implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, irrespective of race, sex, language and religion. In accordance with this and acting with initiative and consistency, the socialist countries have made an active contribution to the drafting and adoption of the most important international treaties and agreements in this field: the Covenants on Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and many others. They are implementing in practice all the provisions of these treaties and agreements.

The States participating in the meeting consider it necessary to intensify international efforts to solve crucial problems affecting the interests of all mankind, especially the younger generation, to strive to improve the living and working conditions of the popular masses, and to eradicate racism, *apartheid* and propaganda for war, violence, immorality and hatred of mankind.

International co-operation in the field of human rights has, however, nothing in common with efforts from outside to incite anti-socialist activities by individuals who have embarked on the path of violating their country's laws. Any attempts at such interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States constitute actions aimed at undermining international co-operation. Such interference is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the explicit commitment by the States participating in the European Conference, under the Final Act, to respect one another's right freely to choose and develop their political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as their right to enact their own laws and administrative rules.

The socialist countries represented at the meeting have not permitted and will not permit any interference in their internal affairs. Stating this with all determination, they stress that in this connexion, too, they are guided by concern for the further positive development of international relations so that the obstacles artificially complicating those relations can be removed.

The participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee discussed questions relating to the strengthening and development of all-round co-operation among the socialist countries represented at the meeting. They noted with great satisfaction that, after the Bucharest meeting of the Committee in 1976, this co-operation based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, on respect for equality, independence and national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual benefit, comradely mutual assistance and internationalist solidarity, has become even broader in scope and more comprehensive, covering an ever wider range of political, economic, scientific, technical, ideological and cultural activities. These relations do not, by their nature and aims, impede relations with other States in Europe or elsewhere in the world.

The States participating in the meeting declare their unwavering desire to broaden and perfect multilateral ties between them and to intensify co-operation in solving international problems of general interest. They also express their desire and determination to expand further the exchange of experience in socialist and communist construction and to increase contacts at all levels between parties and States as well as between trade-union, youth, women's and other mass public organizations.

The participants in the meeting also note that great possibilities and reserves exist for the further expansion and intensification of mutually advantageous economic relations, resting on a solid contractual basis, between the socialist countries they represent, both bilateral and multilateral, within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and in conformity with jointly approved principles, with a view to accelerating the process of equalizing levels of economic development, the progress of each socialist country and the raising of the levels of prosperity and development. They note the importance of the special programmes of multilateral co-operation for the period up to 1990 approved at the 32nd session of CMEA, at Bucharest, which are designed to assist in meeting the requirements of member countries in fuel, energy, raw materials, food, machinery, equipment and advanced technology. These programmes represent a further advance in developing and intensifying economic co-operation among the member countries of CMEA. They expand the possibilities for ever fuller utilization of the advantages of socialism as a social system.

The participants noted the successful development of bilateral and multilateral co-operation between the countries represented at the meeting in the spheres of science, culture, education, information, radio and television, contacts between people, and tourism. They reaffirmed their desire further to expand co-operation in all these spheres, and improve the publication of each other's achievements in socialist and communist construction and in activities to develop socialist democracy, improve the guidance of social and political life and raise the material and spiritual standards of living of the working people.

The meeting noted with satisfaction the significance of the flights of international crews of cosmonauts of socialist countries embodying friendship and fruitful co-operation in mankind's conquest of outer space for peaceful purposes. This co-operation will continue.

The participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee declare the unwavering determination of the parties and Governments of their countries constantly to strengthen

friendship and co-operation on the basis of equality between them and between all the socialist States and progressive forces of our time. They are convinced that, under present-day conditions, when imperialism continues to pursue a policy of domination, oppression and inequality, the affirmation of a new type of international relations and the consolidation of the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries acquire particular importance. It is precisely along this road that the interests of each people building a new society are safeguarded most successfully, that the authority of socialism in the world is constantly growing and that the role of the socialist countries in stimulating the renewal of international life, the intensification of détente and the strengthening of peace is being enhanced.

Proclaiming once again their determination to redouble their efforts to strengthen peace, safeguard security, develop the process of détente and expand international co-operation, the States represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee address the following appeal to all European States and all the States and peoples of the world:

1. Resolutely embark on the path of firm adherence to a policy of peace, détente, renunciation of the use of force or the threat of force in international relations, peaceful settlement of all disputes, unconditional condemnation of aggressive wars, complete elimination of wars between States from the life of mankind, cessation of the arms race and the final eradication of the vestiges of "cold war".

The dream of millions of people on all continents of a world without military conflicts is not a utopia. It can be attained and become a reality through joint efforts by all who are prepared to fight for it.

2. To press for early negotiations among the five nuclear Powers—the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China—for the purpose of removing nuclear weapons of all types from the arsenals of States and converting nuclear energy to exclusively peaceful uses.

Man's genius did not discover the greatest source of energy—the energy of the atomic nucleus—in order to destroy civilization with its aid. The highest wisdom today lies not in whipping up the arms race and increasing the danger of a nuclear catastrophe but in delivering mankind from the threat of a new war.

3. To insist firmly that countries possessing the greatest military and atomic potential, particularly the five permanent members of the Security Council, which bear special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should reach agreement without delay on the reduction of their military budgets by a certain percentage or by magnitudes of the same order, as a first step, for the next three years.

Nations cannot reconcile themselves to the ever-growing burden of unproductive expenditure on the manufacture of instruments of destruction. Everywhere in the world, people are waiting for more extensive resources to be allocated for the purpose of raising their living standards, developing health services, improving education and meeting their cultural needs. The developing countries are fully justified in calling for at least a portion of military expenditures to be converted to increased economic and technical assistance to them. This can and must be done.

4. To step up the efforts of States and Governments to conclude as quickly as possible the current negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the arms race in its main directions, to concert efforts among all States in the formulation and implementation of disarmament measures. Actively to set about realizing the ideas and recommendations which gained general approval at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Time does not wait. As regards the termination of the arms race, it can no longer be counted by years, much less decades. The States participating in the negotiations must take bold steps that can ensure success for the talks. Such success can be attained if the will of peoples is duly reflected in the policy of all Governments.

5. To advance resolutely the cause of military détente in Europe and to take effective steps to reduce the level of military confrontation on the European continent while ensuring an equal measure of security for all European States. To this we summon the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-

operation in Europe and the Vienna negotiations on armed forces and armaments reduction in Central Europe.

6. To eliminate as soon as possible the last remnants of colonialism and the policy of neo-colonialist exploitation which is the main source of underdevelopment and to root out national and racial oppression.

It is the inalienable right of the peoples of all continents to live in conditions of peace, independence and freedom, to exercise sovereignty over their national wealth so as to ensure the growth of their well-being and the dignity and happiness of all their citizens. No one has the right to interfere in matters of their internal life, which they and they alone must decide. The colonial and racist régimes in Africa and in any other part of the world should be condemned and boycotted by all as enemies of peace and mankind.

7. To strive steadfastly for a restructuring of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis and for the establishment of a new international economic order that will ensure swifter elimination of the economic backwardness of the developing countries and the dynamic advancement of all peoples and all mankind.

8. To take vigorous action to ensure the lasting affirmation in international relations of the norms of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force and the threat of force, respect for national independence and sovereignty, and the inalienable right of every people to choose freely its own road of development in accordance with its will and aspirations, to base inter-State relations on strict observance of the principles adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and to pursue undeviatingly a policy of peaceful co-existence. In this connexion, the States represented at the meeting reaffirm their determination to seek the establishment and development of broad relations and co-operation on the basis of equality among all countries of the world.

* * *

The States represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee will spare no effort in the struggle to attain these aims and to fulfil the just aspirations of peoples. For that purpose, they will co-operate even more closely and work together in international affairs while fully retaining the sovereign rights of each of them.

At the same time, the States represented at the meeting regard as necessary to the success of this struggle a joining of efforts by all States, irrespective of their social systems, political systems and participation or non-participation in military alliances. They intend to work actively to promote the further development of such co-operation on the basis of peaceful co-existence and express readiness to make their constructive contribution to that co-operation.

They are in favour of enhancing the role and effectiveness of the United Nations in accordance with the principles of the Charter, in the interests of strengthening peace and international security, deepening détente, finding a just solution for urgent international problems and promoting the cause of the freedom and progress of peoples.

In the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and for peace, security, the consolidation of international détente and the cessation of the arms race, the socialist countries represented at the meeting attach great importance to the development of co-operation and common action with the non-aligned countries. They regard the movement of non-aligned countries as a positive factor in international politics and note their increasing role in world affairs.

The Communist and Workers' Parties of the countries represented at the meeting will further develop fruitful comradely co-operation with fraternal parties in Europe and throughout the world. The socialist countries are prepared to conduct a constructive dialogue with Socialists and Social-Democrats, with Christian Democrats, with religious leaders and organizations and with all social movements that are in favour of ending the arms race, removing the threat of war and strengthening and deepening international détente.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, assembled for the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, are well aware of how vast in scope and difficult in its nature is the main problem—that of strengthening peace. However they are equally well

aware that the life, labour and better future of all people, regardless of their social system, the continent on which they live and their level of economic development, depend on the solution of this problem. They will do their utmost to ensure that this great problem will be solved and that mankind will enter the twenty-first century in conditions of lasting peace and broad international co-operation.

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

(Signed) Todor ZHIVKOV
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:

(Signed) Gustáv HUSÁK
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

For the German Democratic Republic:

(Signed) Erich HONECKER
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the

Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic

For the Hungarian People's Republic:

(Signed) János KÁDÁR
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

For the Polish People's Republic:

(Signed) Edward GIEREK
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party

For the Socialist Republic of Romania:

(Signed) Nicolae CEAUȘESCU
General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

(Signed) L. I. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

DOCUMENT S/12942*

Application of the Commonwealth of Dominica for admission to membership in the United Nations: note by the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[29 November 1978]

In accordance with rule 135 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate herewith the application of the Commonwealth of Dominica for admission to membership in the United Nations, contained in a letter dated 21 November 1978 from the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica to the Secretary-General.

ANNEX

Letter dated 21 November 1978 from the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and in my capacity as Prime Minister, I have the honour to inform you that the Commonwealth of Dominica, having attained independence on 3 November 1978, makes application for membership in the United Nations with all rights and responsibilities attached thereto.

Accordingly I shall be grateful if this application could be submitted to the Security Council at its next meeting. For this purpose a declaration made in pursuance of rule 58 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and rule 134 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly is set out hereunder.

DECLARATION

In connexion with the application by the Commonwealth of Dominica for membership in the United Nations, I have the honour, on behalf of the Commonwealth of Dominica and in my capacity as Prime Minister, to declare that the Commonwealth of Dominica accepts the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly undertakes to fulfil them.

(Signed) P. R. JOHN
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/404-S/12942.

DOCUMENT S/12944

Letter dated 30 November 1978 from the representative of Viet Nam to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[30 November 1978]

I have the honour to present to you the following. The fundamental cause of the border conflict between Kampuchea and Viet Nam lies in the Peking authorities' expansionist policy in South-East Asia. This expansionist policy is to occupy exclusively the East Sea, to pit the three Indo-Chinese countries against one another and to push countries in the Association of South-East Asian Nations into opposing Viet Nam and Laos. It is

the Peking policy to divide South-East Asian countries in an attempt to carry out Chinese hegemony in this region.

An independent and sovereign Viet Nam constitutes a major obstacle to the Peking expansionist policy. The Chinese authorities have used the Kampuchean ruling clique, given rise to the Viet Nam border war, sent Chinese troops to occupy the Paracels archipelago of

Viet Nam, incited the Hoa people to make troubles in Viet Nam, unilaterally abrogated the commitments on aid and co-operation with Viet Nam, carried out violations and territorial encroachments against Viet Nam along the Viet Nam-China border and done many other wrong actions against Viet Nam.

The Peking and Phnom Penh authorities' propagandistic allegations about the so-called "aggression of Kampuchea by Viet Nam" were designed solely to cover up their crimes against the Vietnamese people, against the Kampuchean people and to cover up the Peking expansionist scheme in South-East Asia.

In order to safeguard peace and stability in this region, the point is that the Peking authorities' expansionist policy in South-East Asia and their policy of opposing Viet Nam should be stopped. The border conflict between Kampuchea and Viet Nam is only a manifestation of the above-mentioned policy of Peking.

I would request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) HA VAN LAU
Permanent Representative of Viet Nam
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12945

Letter dated 1 December 1978 from the representative of the Congo to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[1 December 1978]

In view of the recent developments in Namibia, I have the honour to request, on behalf of the Group of African States at the United Nations, an urgent meeting of the Security Council, not later than Monday, 4 December 1978, to consider the situation in Namibia.

(Signed) Pascal GAYAMA
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission
of the People's Republic of the Congo
to the United Nations

DOCUMENTS S/12946 AND ADD.1

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 June to 30 November 1978

DOCUMENT S/12946

ANNEX

[Original: English]
[1 December 1978]

Map. "Deployment of UNFICYP, November 1978" (See end of volume.)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 June to 30 November 1978 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions including, most recently, resolution 430 (1978) of 16 June 1978.

2. The Security Council, in its resolution 430 (1978), requested me to continue the mission of good offices, entrusted to me in paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975) to keep the Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of resolution 430 (1978) by 30 November 1978. Developments on this subject are summarized in section V of this report.

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP

3. The table below shows the strength of UNFICYP as of 30 November 1978:

MILITARY PERSONNEL		
<i>Austria</i>		
HQ UNFICYP	5	
Infantry battalion UNAB 14	301	
Military police company	6	312
<i>Canada</i>		
HQ UNFICYP	8	
Infantry battalion—8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)	468	
Signals squadron	19	
Medical centre	7	
Military police company	13	515
<i>Denmark</i>		
HQ UNFICYP	5	
Infantry battalion UN XXX	342	
Military police company	13	360
<i>Finland</i>		
HQ UNFICYP	6	
Military police company	5	11
<i>Ireland</i>		
HQ UNFICYP	6	6
<i>Sweden</i>		
HQ UNFICYP	8	
Infantry battalion UN 70C	406	
Military police company	13	427
<i>United Kingdom</i>		
HQ UNFICYP	24	
HQ BRITCON	5	
Armoured reconnaissance squadron— B Squadron 3rd Royal Tank Regiment ...	119	
Infantry battalion—3rd Battalion The Light Infantry	342	
HQ support regiment	40	
Engineer detachment	8	
Signals squadron	53	
Army aviation flight	19	
Transport squadron	101	
Medical centre	6	
Ordnance detachment	15	
Workshop	39	
Military police company	8	
B Flight 84 helicopter squadron, RAF	38	817
	TOTAL	2 448
CIVILIAN POLICE		
Australia	20	
Sweden	14	
	TOTAL	34
	TOTAL UNFICYP	2 482

4. During the period under review, the Government of Austria withdrew the 20 additional engineers who were temporarily employed to carry out some urgent repairs at the Austrian contingent base camp at Fama-gusta [S/12723 of 31 May 1978, para. 6].

5. The Secretary-General is keeping the strength of the Force under constant review, bearing in mind the manning requirements for carrying out the operational commitment of UNFICYP under its mandate and financial limitations.

6. The current detailed deployment of UNFICYP is shown on the map attached to this report.

7. Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl continues to be my Special Representative in Cyprus, and the Force remains under the command of Major-General James Joseph Quinn.

II. UNFICYP OPERATIONS FROM 1 JUNE TO 30 NOVEMBER 1978

A. MANDATE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

8. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) in the following terms:

“in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”.

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, and between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 430 (1978). In connexion with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required UNFICYP to perform certain additional or modified functions.³³

9. In supervising the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and the Turkish forces and the area between those lines, UNFICYP continues to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting by persuading both parties to refrain from violations of the cease-fire by shooting, by forward movement or by construction of new defensive positions (see sect. D). Efforts also continue to provide security for farmers, shepherds and other civilians of both communities living or working in the area between the lines, as a normalization measure and in keeping with the established practice since the closing months of 1974 (see sect. E).

10. UNFICYP continues to use its best efforts to discharge its functions with regard to the security, welfare and well-being of the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island. UNFICYP access to that area remains restricted, but humanitarian work has been carried out on a reasonably satisfactory scale (see sects. C and G). There has been an increase in the transfer of Greek Cypriots from north to south since my last report [S/12723], a total of 150 having moved during the period under review. In addition, 70 Maronites moved to the south during the same period.

11. In addition to humanitarian measures implemented directly by them, UNFICYP military and civilian police contingents have continued to support and assist the relief operations co-ordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in co-operation with the World Food Programme (WFP).

12. The civilian police contingents of UNFICYP continue to discharge certain functions handed over to them by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the time of the withdrawal of its delegation from Cyprus on 30 June 1977 [see S/12342, para. 12, and S/12723, para. 11]. The third ICRC temporary

³³ These include resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354 (1974) of 23 July, 355 (1974) of 1 August, 357 (1974) of 14 August, 358 (1974) and 359 (1974) of 15 August, 360 (1974) of 16 August, 361 (1974) of 30 August, 364 (1974) and 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, 367 (1975) of 12 March, 370 (1975) of 13 June and 383 (1975) of 13 December 1975, 391 (1976) of 15 June and 401 (1976) of 14 December 1976, 410 (1977) of 15 June, 414 (1977) of 15 September and 422 (1977) of 15 December 1977 and 430 (1978) of 16 June 1978.

mission, consisting of two delegates of the Committee, visited the island in September 1978. The delegates travelled widely throughout Cyprus and conferred with officials of the Cyprus Government, the Turkish Cypriot community and UNFICYP.

13. UNFICYP has continued to visit on a regular basis Turkish Cypriots still residing in the south (see sect. H).

B. LIAISON AND CO-OPERATION

14. UNFICYP has continued to emphasize to both sides the essential requirement of full co-operation at all levels to enable it to carry out its role effectively. Liaison between UNFICYP and both the Turkish forces and the National Guard remains satisfactory. Meetings between the Commander of UNFICYP and the commanders of the National Guard and of the Turkish forces are arranged as required and, additionally, meetings at the Chief of Staff level are held with both sides at regular intervals. Similar meetings between UNFICYP Sector Commanders and their counterparts in the National Guard and Turkish forces continue to be held. A constructive atmosphere has prevailed at all these meetings.

C. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF UNFICYP

15. UNFICYP continues to have access to Greek Cypriot habitations in the north. Officers making liaison visits in performance of humanitarian tasks continue to have the opportunity to speak with Greek Cypriots there in privacy.

16. UNFICYP access from its installations situated in the north to installations between the lines continues to be limited. This restriction has an adverse effect on the operational effectiveness of the Force, particularly during hours of darkness. Furthermore, it imposes administrative difficulties, including lengthy supply routes and, in some cases, expensive resupply by air, with a resultant increase in the costs of the Force.

17. As of 1 August 1978, the Turkish Cypriot civilian authorities took over from the military authorities responsibility for controlling access to the north. In October, following the entry into force of the winter schedule for access to the north, negotiations were held with the Turkish Cypriot authorities and as a result the hours during which access routes were open were extended slightly beyond those in effect during the summer months and well beyond last winter's.

18. Access to the north has also been affected by the recent action of the Turkish Cypriot authorities denying entry to most privately owned motor vehicles that carry registration plates issued by the Cyprus Government. Discussions are under way in an effort to ease the problem of access to the north for recreational and related purposes.

D. MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

19. UNFICYP surveillance over the area between the cease-fire lines is based upon an established system of observation posts which ensure observation and reporting of cease-fire violations. The total number of observation locations is 135, of which 65 are permanently manned. The remaining locations permit occasional observation over specific areas at certain times of the day or night. Standing patrols are deployed as necessary on a temporary basis until such time as a cease-fire violation ceases. In addition to surveillance from fixed points, UNFICYP places emphasis on conducting frequent mobile patrols by day and night along established

routes throughout the length of the area between the lines.

20. As part of its role in regard to the maintenance of the cease-fire, UNFICYP keeps a careful daily check on all confirmed shooting incidents and movements forward. All such incidents are investigated and the results forwarded to the respective side on a daily and weekly basis. Both sides have co-operated by deploying their own liaison officers and establishing close contact with UNFICYP headquarters as and when required. During this period, UNFICYP recorded an approximate daily average of less than one shooting incident, none of them serious.

21. Violations by forward movement have been of a temporary nature, the personnel concerned withdrawing to their cease-fire lines shortly after entering the area between the lines and, in most cases, immediately after being informed by UNFICYP of the violation. Patrols sent by the Turkish forces between Pyla and Troulli Hill have ceased.

22. As the cease-fire lines are now almost completely stabilized, very few encroachments by construction of new positions forward of those lines were attempted in the period under review. However, improvements to existing positions and construction of new fortifications by the National Guard on or very close to the cease-fire lines continue to be a source of concern, as such works cause increased tension.

E. MAINTENANCE OF THE *status quo*

23. The cease-fire lines extend to a length of about 180 kilometres across the island, from Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to Dherinia near the east coast, south of Famagusta. The Turkish side has a common line of approximately 45 kilometres with the British Eastern Sovereign Base Area. The total area between the lines, the width of which ranges from 20 metres at some points in Nicosia to 7 kilometres in an area south-east of the city, covers about 3 per cent of the land area of the island. The deployment of UNFICYP in the area between the lines is based on the requirement to maintain the cease-fire as established over four years of UNFICYP practice [see S/12253 of 9 December 1976, para. 19].

24. Maintenance of the *status quo* in the confrontation area within urban Nicosia in particular is a matter of some concern to UNFICYP as, owing to the proximity and irregular configuration of the lines, the slightest change can lead to increased tension or retaliatory action by the opposing side.

25. In some areas different interpretations of the cease-fire lines still exist. Both sides have been provided with a trace of their respective cease-fire lines as recorded by UNFICYP. The Turkish forces have declined to review their cease-fire line with UNFICYP. Discussions with the National Guard to resolve remaining cease-fire line differences are continuing.

26. UNFICYP has endeavoured to facilitate normal farming activity, especially by providing escorts to enable farmers to work their fields and orchards in sensitive areas. Currently, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot farmers work some 115 different locations in the area between the lines.

27. Quantities of commercial commodities and other movable properties are still being taken from houses and other premises in the new town of Famagusta (Varosha). The Turkish Cypriot authorities have indicated that records are being kept and that certain properties

already taken will be accounted for in the event of a political agreement.

F. MINES

28. No additional mine fields were detected in the past year. No progress has been made in getting either side to release its mine-field records to UNFICYP.

29. A project is currently under way to improve the mine-field warning sign system to reduce further the potential danger to civilians and UNFICYP personnel.

G. HUMANITARIAN AND NORMALIZATION FUNCTIONS IN THE NORTH

30. UNFICYP continues to discharge humanitarian functions and to promote normalization of the living conditions of the Greek Cypriots remaining in the north. Since my last report, there have been limited improvements in their living conditions: temporary visits to the south for family reasons have been made possible on an *ad hoc* basis, both directly and through the good offices of UNFICYP. However, requests by Greek Cypriots returning to the island from abroad to visit their relatives in the north have not been granted. The Turkish Cypriot authorities maintain that Greek Cypriots coming from abroad and wishing to visit the Karpas area should arrive in Cyprus through ports of entry in the north.

31. The recent improvements in pension and social welfare benefits provided by the Cyprus Government have also benefited the Greek Cypriots in the north.

32. Permanent transfers increased during the period under review, the main reason being that, for lack of secondary school facilities, Greek Cypriot children in the north have had to move south to continue their education. Efforts aimed at setting up a class corresponding to the first year of gymnasium have not materialized. All transfers continue to be monitored by UNFICYP to make certain that they have been undertaken voluntarily. The Greek Cypriot population in the north is now 1,572.

33. Two Greek Cypriot primary schools are operating in the north. Both are in the Karpas area, one at Ayia Trias and the other at Rizokarpaso. The school at Ayia Trias, which has 58 pupils, still has only one teacher. Efforts to appoint a second teacher have so far not been successful. At Rizokarpaso there are five teachers and 164 pupils. Through the good offices of UNFICYP, permission was granted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities for 111 Greek Cypriot children who are attending schools in the south to spend the summer holidays in their homes in the Karpas; however, boys over 16 and girls over 18 were excluded.

34. The same opportunity was granted to Maronite children attending school in the south whose families live in the north. Furthermore, Maronite adults residing in the south visited their relatives in the north in significant numbers over the summer period. Maronites in the north may travel to markets in the larger urban centres, such as Kyrenia and Nicosia, for business and domestic purposes. Contacts between members of the Maronite group residing on opposite sides of the cease-fire lines are frequent.

35. Medical care available to Greek Cypriots in the north is as good as that provided to Turkish Cypriots in the same area. In a few cases, Greek Cypriots have obtained permission for temporary visits to the south in order to receive medical treatment after a Turkish Cypriot medical board had certified that such treatment was not available in the north.

36. In regard to agricultural activities, there are no major complaints about freedom of movement, Greek Cypriots continuing to have access also to fields at some distance from their villages.

37. As indicated in my last report, there appears to be no restriction on freedom of worship in the north wherever the services of a priest are available. During the period under review, UNFICYP received complaints that three churches at Trikomo had been razed, allegedly for urban development. UNFICYP humanitarian teams, which regularly visit some 22 Greek Cypriots still living at Trikomo, have confirmed the razing of two of the churches but could not establish when it happened.

H. TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN THE SOUTH

38. UNFICYP continues to take the responsibility of making periodic visits to some 200 Turkish Cypriots living in the south to assess any assistance they may need and to help maintain some contact with their relatives in the north. To date, these Turkish Cypriots have given UNFICYP to understand that they are satisfied with their living conditions. A check on their dwellings was carried out during the month of September and these were found to be equal to those of their counterparts in the Greek Cypriot community.

III. LAW AND ORDER—THE CIVILIAN POLICE ELEMENT OF THE FORCE (UNCIVPOL)

39. UNCIVPOL continues to be deployed in support of military units and operates in close liaison with the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police.

40. UNCIVPOL contributes to the maintenance of law and order in the area between the lines and to the protection of the civilian population, particularly in areas where intercommunal problems exist. It assists in the control of the movement of civilians in the area between the cease-fire lines, escorts persons transferring from the north to the south, inquires into complaints of criminal activity with intercommunal content and, in the north, contributes social welfare payments to Greek Cypriots in their habitations, in addition to monitoring their welfare. UNCIVPOL also assisted the Turkish Cypriot authorities in returning to the south several Greek Cypriots who had strayed into the north.

41. UNCIVPOL continues to maintain a missing persons bureau at UNFICYP headquarters. As will be recalled, agreement in principle was reached at the high-level meeting of 12 February 1977 to set up an investigatory body for tracing missing persons of both communities. Despite intensive consultations since that time, it has still not been possible to reach agreement on the terms of reference of that body, particularly on the precise role and identity of its third member.

42. Following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 32/128 on 16 December 1977, both sides had publicly reiterated their support for such a joint body with the participation of ICRC. With regard to procedure, the Greek Cypriots took the position that, in the event of disagreement between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of the missing persons committee, the ICRC representative should undertake to form an independent opinion, which should be implemented by the committee. The Turkish Cypriots wanted all decisions to be adopted on a "no objection" basis. However, when I visited him at Nicosia on 19 April 1978, Mr. Denktas indicated that the opinion of the ICRC representative would be given weight and would not be disregarded.

43. ICRC, though willing to take on functions con-

ferred upon it by agreement of both sides, was not prepared to be placed in the midst of political controversy. President Kyprianou thereupon proposed that the committee should be presided over by a representative of the Secretary-General. This has not so far proved acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. Mr. Denktaş has proposed to meet with Mr. Kyprianou to discuss the problem. Consultations are continuing, both at Nicosia and in New York. Meanwhile, the matter will come before the Third Committee of the General Assembly at its current session under agenda item 12.

IV. HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

44. Since my report of 31 May 1978 [S/12723], the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has continued, at my request, to assist the displaced and needy population in the island in his capacity as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus.

45. Contributions in cash and kind from Governments, non-governmental organizations and voluntary agencies enabled the Co-ordinator to complete a variety of projects during the period under review, and several additional projects are scheduled for completion during the coming months. The 1978 programme provided \$15,076,981 for the financing of 54 projects currently being carried out. The 1979 programme is expected to provide about \$16,000,000 for some 26 projects.

46. With the support of other United Nations agencies, the Co-ordinator has been in a position to ensure an adequate basic nutritional diet for the displaced and needy population of Cyprus by procuring food commodities and to meet more specific priority requirements resulting from the 1974 events in Cyprus.

47. The Co-ordinator's programme continues to concentrate on the provision of temporary accommodation, health centres and equipment, schools, community centres and facilities for children. Funds have also been made available towards the financing of basic agricultural and reforestation projects, including procurement of specialized vehicles, and for the provision of medicaments, medical equipment, educational materials, insecticides and pesticides.

48. Though the general situation of the displaced persons has improved, a total of 182,150 Greek Cypriots living in the south are still officially listed as displaced. Of these, 145,622 persons are supported by the Government of Cyprus, receiving food rations, allowances and other material assistance.

49. According to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, there are at present 37,407 displaced and needy Turkish Cypriots in the north whose condition is attributable to the events of 1974. They are being provided with food and other basic supplies, mainly channelled through the United Nations assistance programme. The 1,572 Greek Cypriots and some 610 Maronites in the north who are in need of assistance receive food rations and allowances delivered on a regular basis by UNFICYP through the distribution centres.

50. UNFICYP has continued to support the Co-ordinator's relief programme by delivering food supplies and other items. A total of 2,142 tons of relief supplies was distributed or delivered during the period under review through UNFICYP facilities. This included 567 tons, representing 298 truck-loads, of foodstuffs, clothing, petrol and diesel oil delivered to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north. In addition, 986 tons from UNHCR/WFP sources were provided directly to the

Greek Cypriot authorities in the south. Supplies provided under the aegis of UNHCR/WFP to the Turkish Cypriot community in the north totalled 1,566 tons, i.e., 199 truck-loads. Included in this total were medicines, medical equipment and building materials (approximately 562 tons) consigned to the new hospital in north Nicosia. Supplies transported to the Turkish Cypriot welfare stores in the north comprised wheat grain and wheat flour, rice, cooking oil and tinned foodstuffs. Since August 1974, a total of 17,429 tons of relief supplies have been provided to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north and 17,276 tons to Turkish Cypriots. Deliveries to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north usually have to be channelled through a representative of their community.

51. During the period under review, UNCIYPOL distributed social welfare payments to the Greek Cypriots in the north amounting to £C 78,628. The total amount disbursed since 1975 is £C 1,136,410.

52. In the medical field, UNFICYP provides emergency medical services, including medical evacuation by ambulance or helicopter. Delivery of medicines to the Turkish Cypriot community is made on a regular basis, and emergency requests for medicines are met immediately.

53. As part of its involvement in economic affairs, UNFICYP continues to provide escorts for work parties, inspection teams, farmers and anti-malaria spraying teams in the area between the lines. Other economic functions include the delivery of mail and postal parcels, as well as delivery of spare parts and equipment for water supply and electricity installations, and rendering assistance in the recovery of movable property.

54. An agreement was reached in late September between representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in connexion with a sewerage project at Nicosia. That agreement followed a series of meetings between the two communities held since July 1977 under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme and with the participation of representatives of the World Bank and of UNFICYP. The project is a joint venture aimed at an integrated sewerage system extending to both communities at Nicosia. It is expected that work will commence within three months. UNFICYP will provide liaison and surveillance, in particular during the construction phase. Agreement on this major joint project, which on completion will benefit both communities, is a gratifying development, and it is hoped that it will be followed by others in the future.

V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

55. I have pursued the mission of good offices entrusted to me in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 367 (1975) and continued by paragraph 2 of resolution 430 (1978). In my last report to the Council, I gave an account of developments in this regard up to 31 May 1978 [*ibid.*, sect. V]. I brought that account up to date in my report of 2 November 1978³⁴ submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to its resolution 32/15 of 9 November 1977. In order to avoid duplication, the substance of that report is not reproduced here. In it, I referred, in particular, to the proposals put forward by the Turkish Cypriots on 20 July [S/12782] and by the Cyprus Government on 25 July [S/12789] for the resettlement of Varosha with United Nations assistance and for the resumption of intercommunal negotiations.

56. Following the opening of the thirty-third session

³⁴ A/33/348, paras. 4-13.

of the General Assembly, I held discussions on the same general subject in New York with President Kyprianou and Foreign Minister Rolandis of Cyprus, with Mr. Denktaş, with Foreign Minister Ökçün of Turkey and with Foreign Minister Rallis and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Zaimis of Greece.

57. The problem of Cyprus also came up in the course of my talks with various representatives of other interested Governments who were present in New York for the General Assembly. It was generally considered that the resumption of the intercommunal negotiations was essential but that a meaningful and effective negotiating process could only develop if some of the practical problems mentioned in my last report to the Assembly³⁵ were resolved. A number of ideas and suggestions were explored, with a view to developing a new and constructive basis for negotiations. Certain specific suggestions, based on the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 12 February 1977 and on elements of the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, bearing in mind United Nations resolutions, and incorporating my earlier suggestions concerning Varosha, were submitted to the parties and to myself on 10 November. The hope was expressed that the suggestions would contribute to the prospect of a resumption of the intercommunal negotiating process within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council. I understand that the parties in Cyprus, as well as the Governments of Greece and Turkey, are considering the suggestions and will inform me of their reactions in due course.

58. At its 5th plenary meeting on 22 September 1978, the General Assembly decided to include the item "Question of Cyprus" in its agenda and to consider it directly in plenary meeting, on the understanding that the Assembly would, when considering the item, invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to take the floor in the Committee in order to express their views. Accordingly, the Special Political Committee held two meetings on 7 November³⁶ in the course of which it heard statements by Mr. Denktaş, representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, and Mr. Michaelides, representative of the Greek Cypriot community. The Assembly held five plenary meetings on the item³⁷ and, on 9 November, adopted resolution 33/15.

59. By a letter dated 7 November 1978 [S/12918], the representative of Cyprus requested the Security Council to hold an urgent meeting to discuss the question of Cyprus. The Council considered the matter at its 2099th and 2100th meetings on 15 and 27 November. On the latter date, it adopted resolution 440 (1978).

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

60. Voluntary contributions in the amount of approximately \$230 million have been paid to the UNFICYP Special Account by 64 Member States and one non-member Government in respect of the periods from the inception of the Force, on 27 March 1964, to 15 December 1978. In addition, voluntary contributions from public sources, interest earned on investment of temporarily undischarged funds and other miscellaneous

income received by the Account have totalled about \$6 million. Accordingly, some \$236 million have so far been made available to the UNFICYP Special Account towards meeting the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations for the periods through 15 December 1978.

61. The costs to be borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP for the periods from the inception of the Force to 15 December 1978 are estimated at \$297.5 million. This figure includes the direct cost to the United Nations of maintaining the Force in Cyprus, as well as the amounts to be paid to Governments providing contingents in respect of their extra and extraordinary costs for which they seek to be reimbursed by the United Nations.

62. The amount of \$236 million so far received by the UNFICYP Special Account falls short of the requirement of \$297.5 million indicated above by approximately \$61.5 million. However, in addition to the voluntary contributions that have already been paid to the Account, some \$100,000 are expected to be received in due course against pledges made by Governments but not yet paid by them.

63. If to the amount of \$236 million so far received the amount of \$100,000 of anticipated receipts is added, the receipts of the UNFICYP Special Account since March 1964 can then be expected to total approximately \$236.1 million. The difference between this figure and the costs of approximately \$297.5 million to be met becomes \$61.4 million. Accordingly, unless additional contributions from existing or new pledges are received before 15 December 1978, the UNFICYP Special Account deficit as of that date will be \$61.4 million.

64. If the Security Council should decide to extend for six months beyond 15 December 1978 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization for the Force at approximately its present strength, assuming continuance of present reimbursement commitments, would amount to approximately \$11.8 million, as detailed below.

UNFICYP COST ESTIMATE BY MAJOR CATEGORY OF EXPENSE (in thousands of United States dollars)

I. <i>Operational costs incurred by the United Nations</i>		
Movement of contingents	168	
Operational expenses	999	
Rental of premises	380	
Rations	797	
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel etc.	1 324	
Miscellaneous and contingencies	200	
	TOTAL	3 868
II. <i>Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents</i>		
Pay and allowances	7 100	
Contingent-owned equipment	700	
Death and disability awards	100	
	TOTAL	7 900
	GRAND TOTAL	11 768

65. The above costs of UNFICYP for the next six-month period, which will have to be covered by voluntary contributions, do not reflect the full cost of this operation to Member and non-member States. In fact they exclude the regular cost that would be incurred by the troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal *matériel* costs), as well as such extra and extraordinary costs as the troop contributors have agreed to absorb at no

³⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 22 and 23.

³⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Special Political Committee, 24th and 25th meetings, and Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 45th-49th meetings.*

cost to the United Nations. The troop-contributing Governments have informed me that the costs of UNFICYP absorbed by them are of the order of \$17.7 million for each six-month mandate period. Accordingly, the full costs of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States for the next six-month period are estimated at approximately \$29.5 million.

66. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 December 1978 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary to receive voluntary contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account totalling \$73.2 million.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

67. During the period under review, peace-keeping in Cyprus continued to function well. The situation along the cease-fire lines has remained quiet, owing in great part to the vigilance of the United Nations Force and to the co-operation of the parties. In the buffer zone between the lines, which amounts to about 3 per cent of the area of the island and is under exclusive UNFICYP control, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot farmers now cultivate some 115 different locations. Especially in the more sensitive sections, civilian activities of this kind depend on the provision by UNFICYP of the necessary escorts.

68. I and my Special Representative have pursued our efforts towards the establishment of an investigating body for the tracing of and accounting for missing persons of both communities. This tragic problem, which continues to poison relations between the two communities, has been on the verge of solution for much too long. It would seem natural to endeavour to bridge the gap concerning the third member of the missing persons committee by providing for an eminent independent personality who could be jointly appointed by the Secretary-General and the President of ICRC. It could be further understood that the views of this personality would be given weight and would not be disregarded by the Committee.

69. In pursuance of the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council, I have endeavoured to initiate an effective negotiating process in order to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem based on the independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and on the legitimate rights of the two communities. However, a basis of negotiations for this purpose acceptable to the two sides is still lacking. I have adhered to the position that, while intercommunal talks are essential, another round can only be convened in consultation with both parties and with their consent. The task at hand, therefore, is to develop the basis for moving from the parties' statements of conflicting positions to the stage of meaningful negotiations, mutual concessions and compromise solutions.

70. In order to promote the development of a more productive negotiating basis, I and my Special Representative in Cyprus have, over the past months, undertaken intensive consultations with all concerned. In the course of these consultations, both parties stressed that they continued to accept the existing intercommunal negotiating arrangements. Both voiced their continued support of the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines, and their acceptance of my suggestion that the resettlement of Varosha should be envisaged as a concrete first step, to

be linked to the commencement of intercommunal talks.

71. There remains the practical problem of finding certain mutually acceptable negotiable concepts on the basis of which meaningful talks could be held and which would provide the parties with a common vehicle for amendments and discussions. As indicated in paragraph 57 above, certain specific suggestions along these lines have been submitted to the parties and to me. These are now under consideration. I am at present in contact with the parties in an effort to fix an early date for the resumption of intercommunal talks.

72. In the light of the situation on the ground and of political developments, I have concluded once again that the continued presence of UNFICYP remains indispensable. In helping to maintain calm in the island, the Force also facilitates the search for a peaceful settlement. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it should extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this subject with the parties concerned and shall report to the Council on these consultations as soon as possible.

73. The financial situation of UNFICYP continued to be a cause for concern during the period under review. The deficit of the UNFICYP Account, including the current period, is now of the order of \$61.4 million. The claims of the troop-contributing Governments in respect of extra and extraordinary costs incurred by them for which they seek to be reimbursed have been paid only until July 1975. As indicated in paragraph 65 above, the "extra and extraordinary costs" for which these Governments bill the United Nations represent in some cases only a fraction of the actual costs incurred by them in maintaining their contingents. The Governments concerned have conveyed to me their growing and very serious concern over the disproportionate financial burden they have been carrying. In these circumstances, I earnestly hope that the response to my last appeal for voluntary contributions, dated 10 November [S/12928], will be more satisfactory than has been the case in the past; that Governments making financial contributions to UNFICYP will find it possible at least to maintain the level of their contributions and that Member States which have not contributed will now agree to reconsider their position in this important matter.

74. The United Nations owes a special debt of gratitude to the countries contributing contingents to UNFICYP, both for the excellence of the troops and for the disproportionate financial burden the Governments are bearing in making it possible to maintain this peace-keeping operation established and repeatedly extended by the Security Council. I also wish to place on record my appreciation for the generous support extended to UNFICYP by those Governments which have been making voluntary financial contributions.

75. In concluding this report, I wish to express my warm thanks to my Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, to the Commander of the Force, Major-General James J. Quinn, and to the officers and men of UNFICYP and its civilian staff. They have continued to carry out with exemplary efficiency and devotion the important and difficult task entrusted to them by the Security Council.

ANNEX

[Map. "Deployment of UNFICYP, November 1978". See end of volume.]

DOCUMENT S/12946/ADD.1

[Original: English]
[14 December 1978]

In my report of 1 December 1978 [S/12946, para. 72] I recommended that the Security Council should ex-

tend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months, and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on this subject as soon as possible. I am now in a position to inform the Council that the parties concerned have signified their concurrence in the proposed extension.

DOCUMENT S/12947

Note verbale dated 18 November 1978 from the representative of the Netherlands to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[1 December 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note of 18 May 1978 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to communicate the following.

The Netherlands has always attached the greatest importance to a strict implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. This is apparent from the fact that since the call for a voluntary arms embargo in 1963 by the Security Council, the Netherlands has faithfully applied the relevant Council resolutions. The adoption of resolution 418 (1977) concerning a mandatory arms embargo is, therefore, entirely in line with the position adopted by the Netherlands and does not require any changes in respect of government policy.

As for paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977), the Netherlands Government is not aware of the existence of any licensing agreement or any other contractual arrangement between the Netherlands and South Africa in the field covered by the resolution.

The Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has the honour to request that this note verbale should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12948

Note verbale dated 1 December 1978 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[1 December 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the latter's note of 18 May 1978 concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977), on the question of South Africa.

Israel wishes to reconfirm its undertaking of 7 December 1977 [S/12475] and of 3 April 1978 [S/12475/Add.1] that it will comply with resolution 418 (1977).

Accordingly, with regard to licences granted in the past relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition, the Government of Israel has called on industry to take measures to terminate such licences, and the Government will not approve any application for renewal or extension of such a licence.

With regard to the grant of such licences in the future, the Government of Israel will comply with resolution 418 (1977).

The Permanent Representative of Israel requests that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12949

Note verbale dated 20 November 1978 from the representative of the Bahamas to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[1 December 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the request contained in his note of 18 May 1978 concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977), which deals with the question of South Africa.

In this connexion, the Permanent Representative of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas wishes to advise the Secretary-General that the Bahamas Government is not aware of any violations of the provisions of resolution 418 (1977) by persons or institutions within its jurisdiction.

The Permanent Representative of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas has the honour to request that this note verbale should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12950

Supplementary report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 439 (1978)

[Original: English]
[2 December 1978]

1. I held meetings with Mr. R. F. Botha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, from 27 to 29 November 1978 to follow up the discussions I had initiated on 23 November with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs described in my report of 24 November [S/12938]. At the opening meeting I referred the Minister in particular to those subparagraphs of paragraph 11 of my report which follow:

"11. Within the context of relevant Security Council decisions, which I outlined to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, I asked him for a clarification of the position of his Government on the following additional matters:

"(a) Paragraph 5 of resolution 435 (1978) and paragraph 5 of resolution 439 (1978);

"(b) Commencement of UNTAG activities in Namibia, effective from 1 January 1979, which I had proposed to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs during our discussions;

"(c) Subject to subparagraph *b* above, the agreement of the Government of South Africa and the United Nations to establish provisional dates for the various stages and steps projected in the timetable annexed to document S/12636;

"(d) Related to the above, establishment of a provisional date for the elections to be fixed approximately seven months from the date of commencement of UNTAG in Namibia;

"...

"(g) Practical arrangements for a cease-fire to be effected by South Africa and SWAPO, each addressing to me a written undertaking to discontinue all hostile acts. That would be in accordance with the proposal for a settlement and would come into force with the commencement of UNTAG on a specified date. These procedures would be finalized after acceptance of resolution 435 (1978) by South Africa."

I informed the Foreign Minister that I would appreciate any further clarifications he might wish to give, in addition to the answers given by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs [*ibid.*, paras. 13-18], on matters raised therein for the information of the Security Council. I emphasized to the Minister the urgency of clarifications on the above issues in connexion with the establishment of an operational calendar for the emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.

2. In reply, the Foreign Minister first gave an account of discussions with the five Western Governments during negotiations for the proposal of a settlement, as reflected in documents S/12836 and S/12853. He said that he wished to focus on those discussions in order to show the context of South Africa's agreement to the proposal for a settlement and thus to seek to remove any doubts about his Government's intentions in regard to it. In particular, he referred to the strength of the military component of UNTAG and to the South African decision to hold elections in the Territory in December 1978. He stated that South Africa had, during the discussions prior to the conclusion of the proposal for a settlement, made certain commitments to the parties concerned in the Territory relating to such matters. South Africa therefore desired to have consultations on the strength and composition of the military component of UNTAG.

3. In reply, I informed the Foreign Minister that as the United Nations had not participated in the negotiation of the proposal for a settlement I was not in a position to comment on the account he had given. In regard to the strength and composition of the military component, I invited his further attention to the relevant part of my explanatory statement of 28 September 1978 [S/12869] adopted by the Security Council in its resolution 435 (1978). I then once again recalled the terms of paragraph 11 of my report and asked him if he was

prepared to offer further clarifications on the issues raised therein.

4. The Foreign Minister stated that he was authorized to give the following clarification at that stage:

(a) With reference to paragraph 13 of the report, the South African Government is willing in the course of the coming month also strongly to recommend to the parties concerned that resolution 435 (1978) should be implemented. In the meantime, consultations on the few outstanding points will be continued in an effort to resolve them.

(b) With regard to paragraph 14 of the report, the South African Government would be prepared to recommend to the parties concerned that a date should be set for the elections seven months after the commencement of the emplacement of UNTAG.

5. In subsequent discussions, I impressed on Mr. Botha that his reply did not clarify South Africa's position in regard to the basic issues described in paragraph 11 of my report. I emphasized that these were crucial matters on which the Security Council would need to be satisfied as to the willingness of South Africa to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). I said that while I had noted in my report [S/12938, para. 6] that he had previously made it clear that it would not be possible for him to reach finality during our talks in New York it was necessary to provide in the immediate future more substantial clarifications than he had hitherto given.

6. In this connexion I requested further clarifications in respect of paragraph 4 *a* and *b* above from the Foreign Minister, taking into account South Africa's

refusal to cancel the December elections. These points covered South Africa's willingness to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), a time-limit for the consultations deemed necessary by South Africa and for the communication of its final position on the implementation of the resolution to the Secretary-General, the continuation of the exercise of South Africa's authority in Namibia pending the full implementation of the proposal for a settlement, and the resolution of some outstanding points on which further consultations were considered necessary by the Government of South Africa.

7. I urgently requested the Foreign Minister to give me an answer by the end of the week. He stated that, after talks in Washington, he would return to South Africa for consultations and would communicate with me over the week-end of 2/3 December.

8. In the light of the discussions described above, the Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa conveyed to me, on 2 December, the approval of his Government on the following:

South Africa reiterates its willingness to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

South Africa is willing, during the month of December, to conclude consultations with the parties concerned on the principles of resolution 435 (1978) and to communicate the results to the Secretary-General.

South Africa reaffirms that it will retain authority in Namibia pending the implementation of the proposal.

Consultations on the outstanding points will continue in an effort to resolve them.

DOCUMENT S/12951

Letter dated 1 December 1978 from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[4 December 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the request of the Chairman of the African Group [S/12945] that you should convene a meeting of the Security Council on Monday, 4 December 1978, to consider the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 439 (1978) [S/12938], on the question of Namibia.

In my capacity as President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, I should like to support strongly the request of the Chairman of the African Group, in the light of the frontal challenge of South Africa to Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978), 435

(1978) and 439 (1978), which have established the framework for an internationally acceptable settlement of the question of Namibia.

The gravity of the situation resulting from the decision of the Government of South Africa to carry out the bogus arrangements under the pretense of electing representatives of the Namibian people makes it imperative that the Security Council should meet on Monday, 4 December 1978.

(Signed) Gwendoline C. KONIE
President
United Nations Council for Namibia

DOCUMENT S/12952

**Letter dated 4 December 1978 from the representatives of Gabon,
Mauritius and Nigeria to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]
[4 December 1978]

We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, Permanent Observer of the South West Africa People's Organization to the United Nations, when it takes up the question of the situation in Namibia.

*Signed by the representatives of the following
States members of the Security Council:*

Gabon
Mauritius
Nigeria

DOCUMENT S/12953

**Letter dated 4 December 1978 from the representative of Angola
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]
[4 December 1978]

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to send you the attached and to request that it should be circulated as a document of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in Namibia.

*(Signed) Elisio DE FIGUEIREDO
Permanent Representative of Angola
to the United Nations*

ANNEX

On behalf of the Government and people of the People's Republic of Angola, the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Angola to the United Nations strongly condemns the so-called internal elections being held inside Namibia for the sole purpose of installing a rubber-stamp group which will continue to obey the imperialist and racist commands of the minority Government in South Africa.

In this connexion, we also strongly denounce the mass arrest of SWAPO leaders who are inside their country, coinciding with the South African response to the United Nations. These arrests are merely one of the tactics being employed by the racist Pretoria Government to deny to the people of Namibia their inalienable right to self-determination and genuine independence. In fact, these so-called elections are being held to suppress and sabotage SWAPO, the legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, and deny it its rightful place in a free Namibia.

The international community should once more show its solidarity with the Namibian people and with SWAPO by categorically condemning the tactics being employed by South Africa and by ensuring that this imperialist manoeuvre will not succeed. The international community should also do its utmost to prevent the legitimization of these "elections" by being party neither to the process nor to the outcome.

DOCUMENT S/12954*

Letter dated 4 December 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[4 December 1978]

I have the honour to draw your attention to the statement made on 28 November 1978 at a press conference by Mr. Denktas, who, in rejecting for the Turkish Cypriot community the recent resolution of the Security Council, declared as his belief that "the time has come for the establishment of a separate State".

Such manifestations by Mr. Denktas of his brazen contempt for the unanimous Security Council decisions, and particularly his eagerness for the partition of the island, are concrete facts of serious concern. They cannot be ignored in assessing the needed good faith in any intercommunal talks on the future constitutional arrangements for the Republic of Cyprus in terms of one

undivided and independent State, when declarations by the prospective interlocutors from the other side are so revealing of their partitionist objective and lack of good faith as to run counter to the very purpose of the negotiations.

By way of confirmation of the absence of good faith comes the second part of Mr. Denktas's statement, in which he again tries to distort the proved agreement by which he undertook, in the presence of the Secretary-General, as appears in the official report, that the remaining 15,000 Greek Cypriots in the north would be "free to stay and that they will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/420-S/12954.

north" [S/11789 of 5 August 1975, annex, para. 2].

This agreement was in its entirety reneged and violated by the Turkish occupation forces and their accessories, who proceeded through intensified harassment and threats to life to expel the remaining Greek Cypriots from the north, with the result that the 15,000 have been reduced to 1,700. This is what Mr. Denktaş is daring enough to call "exchange of population".

The fact that it was the Turkish army, and not the Turkish Cypriots, that actually violated the agreement by force could not provide a possible excuse. It simply

proves that meaningful intercommunal negotiations are totally incompatible with the continued presence and activities of the Turkish forces of occupation. This was envisaged in the order of sequence of the United Nations resolutions in Cyprus.

I would be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12955

Letter dated 9 November 1978 from the Assistant Secretary-General of the Organization of American States to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/French/Spanish]
[5 December 1978]

In conformity with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies in Spanish, English and French of resolution CP/RES.255 (349/78), which was adopted by the Permanent Council on 16 October 1978 and brought to your notice by a telegram dated 17 October. The resolution refers to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Commission of Observers set up by the Permanent Council to ascertain the facts concerning the events which have occurred in Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

(Signed) Jorge L. ZELAYA
Assistant Secretary-General and Secretary
of the Permanent Council of the
Organization of American States

ANNEX

Report of the *Ad Hoc* Commission of Observers of the Permanent Council formed to verify the events that occurred in Costa Rica and Nicaragua

The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,

Considering:

That the Permanent Council of the Organization, at the special meeting it held on 15 September 1978, formed an *Ad Hoc* Commission to verify the events that were brought to its attention by the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, in order to inform the Permanent Council on this matter,

The good will evidenced by the member States of the Organization in the peaceful settlement of disputes and in the principles contained in articles 2 and 20 of the Charter, and the repeated confidence in the Permanent Council shown by the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which invoked the provisions of article 82 of the Charter and brought to the Council's attention the events that occurred on 12 and 13 September in their border area, and

Having seen the report submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Commission

to the Permanent Council at the special meeting held on Tuesday, 26 September 1978 (CP/DOC.880/78), based on the conclusions reached by the *Ad Hoc* Commission, and taking into account the various statements made at the special meeting held on this date by the Permanent Council,

Resolves:

1. To reiterate to the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua the respectful appeal made by this Council through resolution CP/RES.226 (304/77), to the effect that they continue to abide strictly by the international treaties and especially the bilateral agreements that their Governments have signed;

2. To state its profound and continuing concern over the recurrence of acts of conflict in the border area, and to urge the two Governments to take the necessary steps to ensure peace and territorial integrity on the border;

3. To censure and deplore the knowing penetration of the air space of Costa Rica and the acts committed by members of the Nicaraguan Air Force on 12 and 13 September in bombing and machine-gunning Costa Rican civilians in Costa Rican territory;

4. To note that, as the report of the *Ad Hoc* Commission points out, the two Governments have indicated their desire and will to overcome this situation of conflict and tension between them, and to repeat the offer of good offices of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, should they consider it advisable, to encourage a friendly settlement of their differences;

5. To express its appreciation to the *Ad Hoc* Commission made up of Ambassador Kémil Dipp-Gómez of the Dominican Republic, Ambassador José Joaquín Gori of Colombia, and Ambassador Oliver Jackman of Barbados, for the efficient work accomplished. To express its appreciation also to the advisers and to the staff members of the General Secretariat who accompanied the Commission to Costa Rica and Nicaragua;

6. To thank also the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua for their valued co-operation and for the facilities offered at all times to the *Ad Hoc* Commission during its visits to those countries.

DOCUMENT S/12956

Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of the Commonwealth of Dominica for admission to membership in the United Nations

[Original: Chinese/English/French/Russian/Spanish]
[5 December 1978]

1. At the 2104th meeting on 5 December 1978, the Security Council had before it the application of the Commonwealth of Dominica for admission to membership in the United Nations [S/12942]. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report. The Council agreed to waive the deadline for reporting set out in the last sentence of rule 59.

2. At its 63rd meeting, held the same day, the Committee considered the application of the Commonwealth of Dominica and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Council that it should have recourse to the provisions of the last paragraph of rule 60 of the provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of the Commonwealth of Dominica for admission to the United Nations (S/12942),

Recommends to the General Assembly that the Commonwealth of Dominica be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

DOCUMENT S/12957

Letter dated 7 December 1978 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[7 December 1978]

With reference to the letter dated 7 November 1978 from the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea [S/12919], my delegation has the honour to transmit to you the following additional information which demonstrates Viet Nam's determination to continue its savage acts of aggression and annexation against Democratic Kampuchea:

1. As had been expected since the beginning of the present dry season, during November and early in this month of December 1978, several divisions of the Vietnamese army intensified their acts of aggression and invasion against the territory of Democratic Kampuchea, along the frontiers from the "Naga's tail" region, at the north-eastern end, to the coast in the south. Specifically, Vietnamese forces have attacked at the following three points:

Along national highway No. 19, in Ratanakiri province;

In the Snuol region of Kratié province;

On national highway No. 7, near the Mémot district in the eastern part of the province of Kompong Cham.

The Vietnamese forces of aggression have utilized many tanks and armoured vehicles, aircraft bombardment and poison chemical gases, and caused a number of casualties among the civilian population.

2. Concurrently with these acts of aggression and invasion, Viet Nam is continuing to send its agents to infiltrate Kampuchea with a view to trying to incite the people to revolt. The Hanoi administration has fabricated lies about so-called uprisings against the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and has directly and repeatedly called for a revolt to overthrow the Govern-

ment of Democratic Kampuchea. Moreover, as it has already done for several decades, Viet Nam has created a new puppet organization which it is employing to serve its annexationist aims. By all these activities, it is hoping to camouflage its acts of aggression and brazenly to deceive world opinion by making it believe that Viet Nam is not attacking Kampuchea and that what is going on is merely an internal matter in Kampuchea. In reality, all these criminal acts of Viet Nam flagrantly violate the most elementary principles of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Just as in late 1977 and during 1978, all these Vietnamese acts of aggression and invasion against Democratic Kampuchea have been crushed by the people of Kampuchea and its revolutionary army. The Vietnamese plan for an Indo-Chinese federation has suffered a strategic defeat. The plan of Viet Nam and of the expansionist Soviet super-Power for expansion into South-East Asia has been foiled. These severe defeats have plunged Viet Nam into growing and inextricable internal difficulties and have forced it into complete isolation at the international level. That is the reason why the Vietnamese administration is desperately endeavouring to cause a diversion in its hopeless attempt, on the one hand, to attribute the ignominious defeats inflicted on it by the resolute struggle of the people and revolutionary army of Kampuchea to other third-party forces—because it habitually goes overboard in boasting about its powerful army—and, on the other hand, to conceal from international opinion the real cause of Viet Nam's aggression against Democratic Kampuchea and to cover up the expansionist aims of Viet Nam and the Soviet Union in South-East Asia, at a time when

the whole world is denouncing and harshly condemning them.

4. At the same time as Viet Nam is intensifying its acts of aggression and invasion against Democratic Kampuchea, the Soviet Union has been sending to Viet Nam more and more military advisers and increasingly large quantities of military equipment. It is also strengthening its missile bases and naval bases in Viet Nam. The expansionist objectives of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Viet Nam and the Soviet Union of 3 November 1978 [see S/12920] are obvious. The lying and hypocritical propaganda of Viet Nam cannot conceal that fact.

It is the duty of the people and the revolutionary army of Kampuchea always to maintain their keen vigilance and remain masters of the situation at all times so as to defend and safeguard Democratic Kampuchea for all

time as an independent, neutral and non-aligned State and to contribute to the defence and safeguarding of national independence and peace in South-East Asia and in the rest of Asia and the world. The conflict between Kampuchea and Viet Nam will not be settled until the Hanoi administration stops its aggression against Kampuchea, abandons its ambition to engulf Kampuchea in accordance with its plan for an Indo-Chinese Federation, and its regional expansionist designs and takes practical steps to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Democratic Kampuchea and the right of the people of Kampuchea to decide their own destiny.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for this letter to be issued as a Security Council document.

For the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea:
(Signed) IN NATH
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

DOCUMENT S/12959*

Letter dated 8 December 1978 from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[8 December 1978]

I have the honour to enclose a statement by a Namibian citizen who has witnessed in recent weeks the acts of intimidation, harassment and manipulation of the Namibian people with regard to the arrangements which the illegal South African administration in Namibia pretends to call elections.

This information is highly relevant to the current discussion in the General Assembly of the question of Namibia.

I request, therefore, that this document should be urgently circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gwendoline C. KONIE
President
United Nations Council for Namibia

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 8 December 1978 from Mr. Justin Ellis to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia

As a citizen of Namibia, I have had the opportunity to follow in recent weeks the arbitrary acts and the harassment carried out by South African authorities in connexion with the so-called elections which the illegal South African administration is imposing on the Namibian people.

I am enclosing a statement on these developments which you may use as you see fit.

REPORT ON THE REGISTRATION AND ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN NAMIBIA, 1978, PUBLISHED BY THE CHRISTIAN CENTRE IN NAMIBIA ON 28 NOVEMBER 1978

INTRODUCTION

During the past two years several major Namibian churches have given their support to efforts of the five Western countries at present on the United Nations Security Council to negotiate a generally acceptable plan for the holding of free and fair elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision. The compromise plan eventually adopted by the Council on 29 September

1978 still enjoys the whole-hearted support of the Lutheran, Catholic, Anglican, Congregational and African Methodist Episcopal Churches.

There can be little doubt, therefore, that the decision of the South African Government, announced on 20 September 1978, to hold its own elections in Namibia from 4 to 8 December, came as a severe disappointment to the churches, who have consistently worked for reconciliation and peace in Namibia.

After careful deliberation, a conference of 30 representatives from six churches wrote an open letter on 4 October 1978 to the new Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. P. W. Botha. After warning Mr. Botha that such action as that envisaged by his Government could lead to an escalation of hostilities in Namibia, the church leaders stated the following:

"During our conference we heard reports of extensive intimidation and deception in the campaign to register voters. We are also aware of irregularities such as the registration of Angolan refugees. This process has caused widespread fear and loss of confidence in your Government's intentions. As the registration has not been fair and free the elections cannot be fair and free."

The allegation of irregularities attracted widespread attention. A number of people, however, sought to challenge the truth of what the church leaders had stated.

The Prime Minister of South Africa himself said the following:

"In case there has been any irregularity in connexion with the registration of voters, anyone who has any evidence is free to bring it to the attention of the Administrator-General. It is noticeable, however, that such has to date not yet been brought to the attention of the Administrator-General."

In a letter to the *Windhoek Advertiser* (8 November 1978), P. A. du Toit, in his ignorance of the law, went so far as to say the following:

"Legislation has been created to make it possible for complainants with just proof to deliver the guilty up for punishment. Why is this not contained in the allegation? Allegations can be counted as lies if they are not supported with proof . . . We hope that these churches will come with proof so that they may not lose their integrity."

It should therefore be noted here that while in terms of the Registration Proclamation—AG 37—it is an offence to dissuade or intimidate or prevent people from registering, it is not at all an offence to use such means to get people to register. While

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/458-S/12959.

there is no objection to informing the Administrator-General, he would be under no obligation to do anything about such irregularities.

AG 37 does make provision for objections to be raised to the registration of a particular person, for instance an Angolan refugee. Such objection must, however, be lodged by a person who has himself registered as a voter. A party not taking part in the election would therefore be powerless to raise objections, and even a party taking part in the elections would need an enormous and highly efficient staff concentrating on this task only if it were to make any headway. Furthermore, a person may register at any magistrate's court within Namibia and need not do so in his/her own district. This makes the task of tracking down malpractices even more difficult.

It should also be noted here that in 1975 the churches alleged that there had been extensive intimidation in the Owambo elections of that year. Four hundred and one statements were collected and a writ to have the elections declared void in the Windhoek Supreme Court was in preparation. However, government officials in the north so restricted a team of lawyers appointed to formalize the statements that the application had to be abandoned.

In these circumstances, it was decided that the best course of action in regard to the present registration and election campaign would be to publish a simple factual report. Contacts were therefore made with a number of reliable church sources. At this stage it has not yet been possible to gather reports from all these sources, but sufficient information has been forthcoming for us to give an indication of what has been happening in Namibia recently.

We have therefore decided to make available the information which has been collated to date for the following reasons:

(a) It seems that the Administrator-General's recent actions against the Church could in large part have been motivated by a fear that such information might be brought to light.

(b) The Administrator-General and the South African Government are apparently about to begin a massive international campaign to sell the elected constituent assembly as the true representatives of the people of Namibia.

(c) With the level of coercion which is continuously operative in Namibia, it is to be anticipated that there could be a high percentage poll in the coming elections. In circumstances such as those outlined below it can be said that the number of votes cast, as well as the number of votes cast for any particular party, must be considered a false indicator of public opinion in Namibia.

A. *Practices and intimidation experienced during the registration of voters and during the pre-election period in Owambo and Kavango*

1. Over the whole area people said they registered because of fear. When asked for particulars, one of the main reasons given for the fear was past experience with identity cards, DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance] membership cards and the 1975 Owambo election:

(a) A few years ago identity cards were issued. Many people did not want to have homeland identity cards and pressure and intimidation were used to force people to apply for the cards. These must be carried at all times (in addition to the tribal tax receipts) on the body, otherwise difficulties are experienced if the person is caught by the police or army.

(b) DTA membership cards were issued in April-June 1978, just before the registration of voters started. Almost all people received such cards. Word was spread that everybody must be in possession of this card in addition to the identity card and tax receipt.

Very soon it was evident that these cards were really compulsory. Example: On 24 April 1978, at Onamgolo in eastern Ondonga, a group of white and black soldiers went from house to house asking for the "papers". Namindo Kauluma, 42, showed the soldiers his identity card and tax receipt. The soldiers then asked for his "Turnhalle" card. As he did not have it, the whites ordered a black soldier to beat him and tell him to get the Turnhalle card. The same happened to Jonas Kaufipa, 60, Johannes Kashiukile and Petrus Shimhulu. All the people in this area then went to Oshigambo to fetch their DTA cards. Similar

reports were received from other districts. Some reports even said soldiers and Owambo Home Guard members tore up the identity cards and said the DTA card was sufficient.

Word was spread that persons without the DTA card would not receive medical treatment. DTA teams then went to hospitals or stood outside hospitals and issued cards to those coming for treatment. This was done at several places; as an example can be mentioned Onandjokwe Hospital where the DTA team first came onto the hospital premises, and when told to leave stayed just at the gate, during the last week of April and first week of May.

Intimidation also occurred in more public places, for example, through the loudspeakers of a white Toyota Hi-Ace bus in passenger transport service between Oshakati and Onandjokwe, owned by a DTA organizer.

(c) Intimidation was widely experienced during the 1975 Owambo elections, e.g. in Uukwaluudhi the chief told his people that they would lose their ploughing rights and shop licences if they did not vote. The labour bureaux did not give labour contracts to people who did not have their identity cards marked after voting.

People now said that they registered only in order to safeguard themselves from similar difficulties, not because they wanted to. This was verified in many districts.

2. When the registration started, it was claimed to be in accordance with the Western proposals. This was said publicly over the radio. Many people said they registered in the belief that they would thus be able to vote in United Nations-controlled elections which were part of the proposals, but that they were soon disappointed when they heard Minister Ndjoba and others claim that the high registration figures were seen as evidence of the trust people had in the Government and in the DTA.

3. Throughout the registration period, Radio Owambo and Radio Kavango told people to register. DTA meetings were extensively covered and DTA speakers quoted daily. The speeches contained hidden and sometimes even direct threats: "Steps will be taken against those who do not vote", "There is no place in this country for you if you do not register and vote". Several homeland ministers used these words, for example, Thomas Akwenya Shikongo on Radio Owambo on 8 October 1978 at about 1400 hours.

4. Homeland ministers told chiefs and headmen that they must see to it that all people registered—this was also done with regard to the DTA membership registration. All over there is evidence that people were told by their headmen to register. Some headmen only told their people in a general manner that they should register, some added "in order to avoid trouble", some added "or steps might be taken against you". Some headmen went from house to house:

5. DTA leaders and organizers have on many occasions told people to register and also threatened them. Examples:

(a) DTA organizer Nghihulifwa came upon a group of women attending a religious meeting at Okambebe in Uukwanyama and told them that those who had not registered would be told to leave the country.

(b) Minister Thomas Shikongo of Ongandjera, on 7 July 1978 at a funeral in Olutoyi said in his speech, "Now is the time to register. Register yourself, register, register! Something will happen to you if you do not register."

(c) Minister, Chief Josia Taapopi Shikongo of Uukwaluudhi, who already in 1975 was known for intimidatory tactics, has been threatening his people to the extent that they really fear for their lives and claim they do not dare to speak about the election if there are two or more people present. Teachers and nurses have been told that those who do not vote are for SWAPO and will be punished, and will lose their jobs and will have to look for work with SWAPO: "When you vote, vote for DTA".

6. The defence force and police combat units have been checking whether people have registered or not. In the beginning of the registration period it was said that the registration cards should be left at home until the elections, but people soon realized that they must carry these cards as well, in addition to the other "human rights documents": the identity card, the tax receipt and the DTA card. Some examples:

(a) At a road blockade on 11 October 1978 on the bridge between the black and the white townships at Oshakati, people on foot and in cars were asked for their registration cards as well and told to register soon if they had not done so yet.

(b) At Okakwiyu, near Ondangwa, a teacher was also asked for his registration card at a road blockade and, as he did not have such a card, was told to get one soon.

(c) On 14 November 1978, between 9 and 11 a.m., immediately south of Engela, soldiers travelling with four armoured cars asked travellers, shopowners and shoppers for their registration cards. One man from a nearby house was forced at gunpoint to fetch his card from his home.

(d) Also on 14 November, at a road blockade between Omafo and Odibo, travellers were requested to produce their registration cards. A priest and a teacher who did not have such cards were taken to a captain by a Lieutenant Visagie, who released them when he heard the radio had told people to keep their cards safely in their home.

(e) In the Ondobe area, at Iilyateko ya Shapopi and Odjofima, people were rounded up during the first half of November and asked for registration cards by police and Owambo home guard units. Some people were beaten up, and one man was taken to the Oshigambo camp because he could not produce this card, according to witnesses.

7. Army units have been distributing information material for the election, and in this connexion also have threatened people. Example:

At Ongwediva church centre, on 25 October 1978 at 3 p.m., army Unimog R 9117 stopped at the gate and distributed pamphlets, and a black soldier explained to the people who gathered there that those who had not registered and who did not vote would among other things not get petrol any more, would not get medical treatment except perhaps at "Finnish" hospitals, but as the Finns would soon have to leave also those services would later cease.

8. The army is supposed to be impartial with regard to party politics. However, in the Kavango, soldiers have been seen by many people greeting with the DTA sign. At Nkurenkuru an army Land Rover R 43024 was driving around for several weeks in October and November 1978 with a DTA sticker under the front windscreen.

9. Representatives of DTA and Aktur have requested to see people's registration cards. On Sunday, 19 November 1978, an Aktur organizer came to Mbeyo, 60 kilometres south of Rundu, and went from house to house requesting to see the DTA cards and registration cards of all the people in the village, then thereafter issued Aktur membership cards and handed all the other cards back to the people.

10. At Onawa in the Ombalantu area, old people gathered on 4 July 1978 to receive their old age pensions. The officials paying the pensions came there together with a registration team and an army escort. People then first had to register and then received their pensions. According to the local pastor one person was turned away by the pension officials as he had declined to register.

11. Oshakati post office employees were on 18 September 1978 shown a cable stating that all post office employees must register. On that very day all employees of that post office went in turns to register.

12. Several children under the age of 18 have registered. One girl of 16, daughter of an ELOC pastor, said the registration team came to the school and pupils who looked big enough were told to register.

13. At Okahao hospital nurses were surprised when people coming for medical treatment produced their registration cards. The patients were in turn very surprised when they heard that the cards need not be produced, as they had previously heard that they would not get medical treatment if they had not registered.

14. Refugees from Angola have registered in great numbers in the Kavango area. The names of registered refugees will not be mentioned here for fear of incriminating people who acted out of fear, feeling that they had no choice. If a judicial commission is appointed to look into this matter, these names will be produced. In the beginning the registration officials asked people where they were born and how long they had stayed in

the country, but soon all people were registered without discrimination. The Kavango population has almost doubled since 1975. All people who earlier stayed on the northern bank of the border river are now on the southern side. Some of these were born on the SWA/Namibia side, some had been working here. It was also very common for people in the border areas to pay tax on both sides of the border. However, there are also refugees from central Angola now on the SWA/Namibia side.

(a) All people in Kavango have registered, with a few exceptions.

(b) Information received in various villages show that among those who have registered there are many who were not born in Namibia, or who have not stayed here for the required four years (refugees started coming in 1976). Many of the people who have registered have names like Domingue, Antonio, de Moura, Mario, Jao, Francincico, Armando, Diniz etc.

(c) Some refugees apparently gave wrong information but in most cases people said they were never asked. An example: On 27 July 1978 the registration team came to Rupara Hospital. The staff and all patients were registered without discrimination. Among the patients there were several who according to law should not have been entitled to register, but nobody asked them.

(d) On the basis of information received from various villages, and on the basis of population figure estimates before 1975 and in 1978, it can be estimated that more than one third of all the people who registered in Kavango came from Angola. Even if some of them were born here and some have been working here, it is estimated that at least one quarter of all people who have registered in that area were not according to law entitled to do so. This is confirmed by the high registration participation in the Kavango, which was already at an early stage of the registration process much in excess of the estimates, which were also set quite high.

(e) In Owambo, some refugees did also register, including three men who came as late as in August 1978. However, in Owambo it seems the authorities turned away most of the refugees from the registration centres, and headmen in many villages told the refugees that they might not register.

15. Transport was arranged, for example, in the Ongandjera area, for people to register. Trucks just drove up to shops and people who had not registered were told to climb onto the trucks and proceed to registration.

16. Enclosed are photocopies of two anonymous letters distributed to pastors in Owambo. One of the letters "Aasita nopolotika" (Pastors and politics) states:

"The registration by many people shows that the people of SWA/Namibia want to choose their own people."

"You pastors who oppose the election and want to forbid it, where will you stay once the election is behind and freedom is there?"

It should be noted that these letters are written on a particularly expensive typewriter.

Note. All the above information has been checked with various sources. Pastors, church leaders and secretaries have the names of many witnesses, and can still report about more incidents. Most people are afraid of giving their names as they fear they will get into trouble.

B. Non "homeland" areas

1. Scant information has so far been received about the urban areas and white farming areas of Namibia. Present indications are that employers in both the public and private sectors played a crucial role in getting black people to register. There is no documentary evidence as yet that farmers' associations or other interest groups were involved, but hearsay evidence indicates that this may have occurred.

2. The following incident was witnessed by Pastor K. Dumeni in Otjiwarongo on 18 October 1978:

A white man came into a Portuguese fruitshop (opposite the post office), consulted a notebook and told the shopkeeper's wife that she had not yet registered and that she had only a few days left in which to do so. If she failed to register she would be considered a SWAPO supporter, and might later face difficulties. The man then went to a nearby fish-and-chips shop. There he spoke to another Portuguese woman, but their conversation was

inaudible. This woman informed Pastor Dumeni that the man concerned worked for a business which served farmers. On 25 October the incident was reported to Mr. Viall of the Administrator-General's office.

3. A worker in Walvis Bay gave the following statement:

"On 11 September 1978 my boss approached me and asked which party I belonged to. I answered evasively. It then emerged that he is a staunch DTA supporter. The next morning my boss insisted that I must register. I made it clear that I did not want to register, saying that I was born in Walvis Bay. (Note: According to the South African understanding, Walvis Bay is part of South Africa, and people born there are not allowed to register for the elections, unless they have lived for four years in Namibia outside Walvis Bay.)

"I insisted that I would bring him my birth certificate so that he could see for himself. The next morning I pretended that I had forgotten my birth certificate at home, as I was actually born in Windhoek. When the truth emerged he said that I should go to the registration office in Swakopmund and register. I said I was not interested in registering. He then sent me home and said that I should report the next day and tell him whether I had registered and wanted to stay or whether I wanted to leave his services. As I have three dependents I decided to register, but now I fear that the same thing will happen when the elections come."

4. At the end of November, the DTA sent a letter out to all holders of private postal boxes in Namibia. (There are a considerable number of these as there are no street deliveries in Namibia.) The letter is written in Afrikaans and signed by the President, Vice-President, Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the DTA. The first two paragraphs read as follows:

"There are various reasons why your participation in the coming December election is of the utmost importance.

"In the first place you will thus show to the world that you totally reject SWAPO, its communist policy and its murder of peace-loving citizens. Should you therefore not vote, it could mean that you support SWAPO."

5. A pastor of the Lutheran Church found that pensioners were queueing up at the post office in Okahandja with both their registration cards and their identification papers. On inquiry, the pensioners told the pastor that they had been told that they would not get their pensions unless they had registered.

6. In Okahandja, a woman who went to register her baby was first herself registered as a voter, against her will and intention.

7. At the CDM mine in Oranjemund, where political organization is freely permitted amongst the workers, there was an almost total boycott of the registration by the black workers.

8. Leaders of the three major political parties not taking part in the election have confirmed that reports of intimidation during the election campaign preceding the election have been brought to their attention. Practices include:

- (a) Subjections to threats of varied nature;
- (b) Threats to workers by employers of loss of employment;
- (c) Threats to old people of deprivation of their rightful pensions;
- (d) Threats of arrest at some later date.

One of the political leaders involved has stated that, as unemployment is rife in Namibia at present, the danger of losing one's job is a very real threat to many people. Another of the political leaders quoted said that often the reports of intimidation he had received took the form of allegations, as most people were afraid to state their case publicly for fear of losing their employment. (*Windhoek Observer*, 25 November 1978.)

DOCUMENT S/12960*

Letter dated 8 December 1978 from the representative of Angola to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[8 December 1978]

I have the honour to send you the attached statement on the situation in Namibia with the request that it should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) ELISIO DE FIGUEIREDO
Permanent Representative of Angola
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement on the situation in Namibia

1. Despite the seeming hiatus, we are at a critical point in the history of southern Africa. The most organized campaign for the achievement of independence by the people of Namibia has been under way for some time now, within the United Nations system as well as in multilateral negotiations. So far, despite this activity, we are prepared to accept only the reality of the situation, which is that South Africa still rules Namibia, that the Namibians are denied the right to genuine independence, that their sole representative, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), is still facing the military might of South Africa in its struggle to liberate the Namibian homeland, and that the People's Republic of Angola has often been attacked and continues to be faced with the constant danger of attack by the racist minority régime that rules at Pretoria.

2. In our capacity as one of the front-line States, and because of our revolutionary ideology which is committed to the total liberation of southern Africa, we are one of the rearguards of the Namibian liberation movement. And it is this revolution-

ary commitment that places us in the line of attack by South Africa's racist troops.

3. True to the revolutionary principles on which the People's Republic of Angola was founded, true to the lessons we have learnt from our colonial past, aware of the danger we all face unless we remain vigilant, aware of the threat of annihilation that lurks ahead unless we deal with it today, we feel bound by our own moral, social and political conscience to extend our commitment and our support to SWAPO in its fight against imperialism and colonialism, not the least virulent of which is settler colonialism. We know that we will not be totally free until every nation in Africa, and indeed in the entire third world, is free of the fetters of colonialism. It is in this spirit that we have been expressing our solidarity with SWAPO, the national liberation movement of Namibia. In this we have been further guided by the principles and the resolutions of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the movement of non-aligned countries. Decolonization is a sacred task of these organizations, and we feel privileged to be playing a part.

4. On Monday, 4 December 1978, the Security Council held a meeting on the situation in Namibia, at which we condemned the sham elections at present being held in Namibia. The international community is aware of the illegality not only of the election itself, but also of the methods adopted by the racist South African Government and its favoured puppets in the Territory.

5. The full extent of the irregularities is only now beginning to be known, although others, such as the forced registration of voters and the illegal registration of non-Namibians, are no secret.

6. The South African racists have employed countless tactics to terrorize the Namibian people and to rig the elections. The

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/464-S/12960.

black population of Namibia is forced to carry homeland identity cards in addition to tribal tax receipts. DTA [*Democratic Turnhalle Alliance*] membership cards were issued from April to June 1978, just before the registration of voters started. Blacks were intimidated into carrying these DTA cards as well as their identity cards and tribal tax receipts at all times. Racist troops have been stopping blacks and asking for their "papers", including "the Turnhalle card". It was made known that blacks without the DTA card would not receive medical treatment. DTA teams stood outside hospitals and issued cards to those arriving for treatment. This intimidation is not new. For example, even during the 1975 elections, puppet chiefs told their people that they would lose their ploughing rights and shop licences if they did not vote. And the labour bureaus did not give labour contracts to people who did not have their identity cards marked after voting. This time again people say that they registered to avoid a repetition of the earlier difficulties.

7. It was also announced, over the radio, that the registration was in accordance with the Western proposals. Thus, many people registered in the belief that this would enable them to vote in the United Nations-supervised elections. Many speeches broadcast by puppet ministers used threats. DTA organizers told a group of women at a religious meeting that those who had not registered would be told to leave the country. Troops of the racist junta have been greeting people with the DTA sign, and army vehicles drive around with DTA stickers under the windshield. On many occasions, old age pensioners had to register before they received payment, while many employees have done so under threat of dismissal. Vast numbers of non-Namibians have been registered illegally.

8. Recent news dispatches from Namibia quote the so-called Administrator-General of Namibia as saying that so far almost 62 per cent of the registered people have voted. There is no doubt as to which party is being favoured by the rigging. We know how the DTA has been assured success. We also know why the DTA is being brought to power.

9. South Africa has never had any intentions of relinquishing its hold over Namibia. Why should it give up a lucrative imperialist monopoly? However, since the racist junta at Pretoria cannot continue overtly to govern Namibia as its fifth province, it conceived the idea of installing a group of puppets which would allow South Africa to retain the colonial privileges it has employed all these decades. At the same time, Pretoria has undertaken every manoeuvre to suppress the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people, SWAPO, and thwart its activists. Its most recent action has been the mass arrest of the SWAPO leadership in Namibia.

10. The racist minority régime at Pretoria has attempted to

give the impression of negotiation while stalling for time. Its latest move is also as devious as its past tactics have been. Pretoria has informed the United Nations merely that it will give a final reply by the end of the present month. It has not categorically stated that it will comply with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) but only that it will "co-operate" with it. It has refused to give a firm date for the emplacement of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG); it has still left unanswered those points that it had previously refused to clarify, such as the military component of UNTAG and the modalities of a cease-fire. Finally, it has also not given a firm commitment to implement resolution 435 (1978) by the puppet group that will be returned in these sham elections. All it has done is to state that it will retain authority in Namibia, and make vague references to consultations "with the parties concerned".

11. The scenario we feel is unfolding before us is one of time-honoured imperialist tactics: Pretoria, instead of issuing commands from Pretoria, will issue them through the DTA. It may make demands that no genuine nationalist can possibly accept and that the international community should not either. The situation brought about by this Hobson's choice could then be used as the occasion to declare that since "negotiations" have failed, and/or that since the DTA, the elected group, does not accept this or that point, therefore Pretoria has no choice but to let DTA go ahead and act as the constituent assembly and the government. In fact, Judge Steyn is reported to have declared that the 50-man constituent assembly will meet before the end of the month. We on our part are prepared for any eventuality that might occur in attempts to destabilize the area.

12. It is against this background, against the known unreliability of the South African junta, and against the covert machinations of foreign imperialist interests that the international community needs to ponder its next step. While the front-line States have a mandate to aid the liberation struggle in southern Africa, the United Nations has a broader mandate and a heavier responsibility. And it is in the very nature of things that those who started the quest for overseas empires, those who arrogated to themselves the leadership of the world, those who have seen fit to derive economic advantages from their unequal relationships with the third world are the ones on whom lies the heaviest responsibility to successfully decolonize Namibia.

13. The racist minority régime at Pretoria knows that, with a progressive government at Windhoek, the South African system of *apartheid*, racism, racial discrimination and its imperialist links are all in danger. What it perhaps refuses to acknowledge is that true freedom for the people of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa is the irreversible wave of the future. It is only a question of time.

DOCUMENT S/12961

Letter dated 11 December 1978 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English/French]
[11 December 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the press statement of the spokesman of the Ministry of Propaganda and Information of Democratic Kampuchea, dated 9 December 1978, on the new Vietnamese manoeuvre consisting in the establishment of a Vietnamese organization with a Khmer name.

I should be very grateful if you would have this document circulated as a Security Council document.

For the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea:

(Signed) IN Nath

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

ANNEX

Text of the statement

1. Recently the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique has set up a Vietnamese political organization with a Khmer name. This organization is established at Saigon. Those in charge in this organization are all Vietnamese. They are Le Duc Tho, Pham Hung, Tran Nam Trung and many other Vietnamese who are carrying out all kinds of work. This organization is a play entirely created, staged and performed by the Vietnamese. The political substance, words and style are Vietnamese with all their stench.

2. The fact that Viet Nam has set up such an organization in order to serve its strategy of aggression, expansion, annexation, and extermination of the nation of Kampuchea is not a new one. It is a worn-out play that Viet Nam has been performing for dozens of years and which has suffered successively bitter defeats. In order to achieve its strategic aim of swallowing Kampuchea, Viet Nam has successively carried out for 50 years all forms of manoeuvres, secret or open, savage or gentle. Its plan of "one party, one people, one country within the Indo-Chinese federation, puppet of Viet Nam" was defeated. Thereupon Viet Nam used seduction and deceit in the shape of "special friendship, special solidarity", and was defeated again. Its manoeuvres of exerting pressures, nibbling at the territories along the borders and infiltrating spies and commandos for sabotage have been also defeated. Its attempts at coups d'état to overthrow Democratic Kampuchea and eliminate the leadership of Kampuchea have suffered the same fate. It has also suffered defeats in using the secret networks it set up inside the ranks of the Kampuchea revolution for dozens of years and on which it set much hope. Its large-scale and unexpected attacks of aggression and invasion were successively crushed and broken from the dry season to the end of the rainy season of 1978. At present, the new manoeuvre of setting up a Vietnamese organization with a Khmer name and of using it for concealment has been immediately defeated and the sinister and hated face of the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique has been unmasked.

3. The reasons for which Viet Nam has made such efforts to carry out this manoeuvre are as follows:

First, Viet Nam has suffered very heavy defeats and been brought to bay in a situation of strategic defeat in all fields. In the military field, it has lost hundreds of thousands. The morale of its troops is at the lowest level. The Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique cannot succeed in enlisting enough men for its army. Many of its soldiers are deserting and refuse to fight on the Kampuchea front. In the political field, the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique is extremely isolated from the Vietnamese people, who are rising up and putting up a powerful struggle against it in the whole country. The Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique is riddled with dissension and corruption from the top to the bottom. Every day, many thousands of Vietnamese people are forsaking it and fleeing from their country. In the economic field, many millions of Vietnamese people have not enough to

eat and thousands starve to death. The Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique is going around begging for alms, but receives only curses. Especially in the international arena, the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique is very isolated. The peoples the world over and particularly the peoples of South-East Asia and Asia have denounced and condemned it as the aggressor of Kampuchea and the expansionist in South-East Asia.

Thus the clique needs to set up a Vietnamese organization with a Khmer name and use it for concealing its war of aggression and annexation against Democratic Kampuchea. It has set up this organization in the most shameful way.

Secondly, the Soviet international expansionists who are mobilizing their supporters in the Warsaw military alliance in order to extend the war of aggression in Kampuchea to South-East Asia and Asia also need such an organization. So they have forced Viet Nam, their satellite, to set one up to be used as a screen. This is a most impudent and arrogant violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of non-alignment.

4. Right after its formation, this organization was vigorously denounced and condemned by world public opinion. This new Vietnamese manoeuvre was thus unmasked and suffered immediate defeat, which shows clearly that this perfidious Vietnamese activity served but to enlighten world public opinion on the true nature of the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique and its cruel, savage, hypocritical and false nature.

The people and Government of Democratic Kampuchea are firmly convinced that the peace and justice-loving peoples and countries of the world which have been aware of the sinister strategy of Viet Nam and its masters, the Soviet international expansionists, will take appropriate measures to oppose and prevent the success of this new manoeuvre of Viet Nam and the Soviet expansionists aimed at continuing and extending their aggression against Kampuchea, South-East Asia and Asia.

5. If Viet Nam and its allies, who are suffering heavy defeats in all fields, at home and abroad, in military, political, economic, financial and diplomatic fields and are extremely isolated, still persist in carrying on their strategy of aggression against Kampuchea, South-East Asia and Asia, they will surely meet with the destiny of any aggressor, that is, annihilation.

DOCUMENT S/12962

Letter dated 11 December 1978 from the representative of China to the President of the Security Council

*[Original: Chinese/English]
[11 December 1978]*

In his letter to the President of the Security Council dated 30 November 1978 [S/12944] the representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam virulently slandered China on the question of the Viet Nam-Kampuchea conflict in an attempt to confuse the public and use sophistry to justify his country's aggression and subversive acts against Democratic Kampuchea. I deem it necessary to state the facts as follows.

The armed conflict between Viet Nam and Kampuchea was provoked solely by the Vietnamese authorities, who went back on their previous commitment to recognize and respect the territorial integrity of Cambodia within its existing frontiers. In 1975 they sent armed forces to invade and occupy Kampuchea's Wei Island and have since then made incessant encroachments upon its territory. By the end of 1977, they brazenly launched a large-scale war of aggression against Kampuchea. The root cause of the Viet Nam-Kampuchea conflict lies in the Vietnamese authorities' attempt to annex Kampuchea, control the whole of Indo-China and establish an "Indo-Chinese federation" with Viet Nam at

its head. Motivated by the needs of its global hegemonist strategy, the Soviet Union is doing its utmost to support and abet Viet Nam in its acts of regional hegemonism, and this has led to further complexity and gravity of the situation in Indo-China and South-East Asia. Massing a huge number of troops and flaunting the banner of so-called "Kampuchean insurgents", Viet Nam is launching a large-scale renewed invasion of Kampuchea, flagrantly encroaching upon its independence and sovereignty and interfering in its internal affairs. This constitutes a gross trampling on international law and the Charter of the United Nations. These acts have been strongly condemned by all countries and people that uphold justice.

The Chinese Government has always stood for the settlement of international disputes through friendly consultation or negotiations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and is opposed to any armed aggression or resort to the threat of force. On the question of the dispute between Viet Nam and Kampuchea, it is only natural for China not to give sympathy

and support to Viet Nam's policies of aggression and expansion. It is unwarranted for the Vietnamese authorities to vent their anger and animosity towards China on that account. It is also utterly futile for them to try to alter their image of an aggressor by wilfully attacking and vilifying China with all sorts of lies and calumnies.

The Chinese Government has always supported the people of various countries in their cause to win national independence and develop their national economy. Since the founding of new China, we have made tremendous efforts over a long period to support and assist the Vietnamese people in their just struggle and endeavour for reconstruction. Prompted by their domestic and external needs, the Vietnamese authorities have in recent years resorted to a variety of despicable means in pursuance of a series of anti-China policies, which have led to the continued deterioration of the relations between the two countries. The Vietnamese authorities have created tension along the borders between China and Viet Nam by ceaselessly provoking incidents, infringing upon Chinese territory and killing or wounding Chinese border inhabitants. These provocative incidents, which are still on the increase, have reached intolerable proportions. Fur-

thermore, the Vietnamese authorities have brutally persecuted and expelled on a large scale Chinese nationals and people of Chinese descent residing in Viet Nam. To date, the number of those expelled has reached no less than 170,000.

In a word, the facts show that the Vietnamese authorities are pursuing regional hegemonism in Indo-China and South-East Asia in close co-ordination with the strategy for aggression and expansion pursued by Soviet social-imperialism in Asia and the rest of the world. In the interests of maintaining peace and stability in South-East Asia and the whole of Asia, the pressing need is to stop the wanton aggression and subversion being committed by the Vietnamese authorities against Kampuchea and to oppose the acts of Soviet social-imperialism and Vietnamese expansionism in seeking hegemony in this region.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) CHEN Chu
Permanent Representative of the
People's Republic of China
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12963

Letter dated 11 December 1978 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[11 December 1978]

I am writing to express once more my Government's profound appreciation for your superb leadership of the Security Council in the course of the discussion on the question of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and on the report of the Secretary-General [S/12929], both during the public debate [2106th meeting] and in the private consultations. We also know what efforts you have personally deployed to create a consensus around a President's statement that was so balanced and therefore so difficult to write.

I would add a final word of thanks for the support which my country, Lebanon, found so forcefully expressed in your statement to the Council as representative of the Federal Republic of Germany [*ibid.*]. Your reiteration of the policy of the European Community as stated at the United Nations by H. E. Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher,³⁸ your Minister for Foreign Affairs, was a significant contribution to the debate.

My delegation would also ask you to transmit Lebanon's gratitude to the Council as a whole, and particularly to the distinguished representatives who found it possible to speak for the full implementation of resolution 434 (1978) in support of the efforts deployed by the Secretary-General, the members of the Secretariat and the Commanders and men of UNIFIL.

My Government feels further assured that the statement of 8 December 1978 [*ibid.*, para. 9] will weigh considerably, both diplomatically and in the field. We feel confident that "all those not fully co-operating with UNIFIL, particularly Israel," will take very seriously the Council's call upon them to "desist forthwith from interfering . . . and comply fully without any delay with the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978)".

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 8th meeting.

Indeed, a continued "defiance" of the Council's authority will have, and should have, the most serious consequences.

We also feel that Israel and all concerned will as well take very seriously the Council's call "upon Member States that are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear on those concerned, so that UNIFIL may discharge its responsibilities unimpeded".

The Government of Lebanon hopes that this letter will be interpreted as an invitation to all that no effort should be spared—over and above what has been and is being done—to obtain substantial changes in the area of operation of UNIFIL before the end of the present mandate and further deterioration of the situation and erosion of United Nations credibility.

In this respect, my delegation feels that particular attention must be drawn to paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report, where reference is made to a "response" being awaited concerning "detailed suggestions for further deployment of UNIFIL which would greatly improve its control in its area of operation and its capacity to protect all elements of the civilian population".

I presume that the distinguished representative of Kuwait, Ambassador Abdalla Bishara, was referring to this specific point, as well as to the over-all Israeli withdrawal, when he asked for the floor in exercise of his right of reply and addressed specific questions to the Israeli representative [2106th meeting].

My delegation feels that it has to bring it to the attention of the Council and its members that the Kuwaiti representative's questions remained unanswered. Instead, the Israeli representative chose to sidetrack the issue and pursue a debate which was totally irrelevant and where I chose not to follow him, for reasons that, I believe, are clear to the Council.

May I note with satisfaction that we thought that the Council was indeed very helpful when no members allowed that we lose our point of focus.

As the Council undoubtedly remembers, the cease-fire at Beirut had already been dealt with through resolution 436 (1978) of 6 October 1978, which also called for "national reconciliation", and the "preservation of Lebanese unity, territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty". Our determination to do so—I thought—was sufficiently emphasized in my statement to the Council, and no debating of this, there and then, would have served the cause of peace or fostered UNIFIL's ability to implement resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

In the light of the above-mentioned points, my delegation felt that your, the Council's and the members' individual attention must be drawn to the negative attitude of the Israeli representative, that particular notice must be taken of this and that action should therefore be initiated to obtain the proper "response" that the Secretary-General is asking for.

I will not permit myself to pretend to indicate what that action should be. But some expression of support for the Kuwaiti representative's question might indeed be relevant and most effective. I am sure that the Council would, in due course, want to be informed of the answer.

In so far as Lebanon is concerned, I would, if this can be helpful in any way, reiterate my Government's

commitments as stated in my address to the Council and ask that they should be taken into consideration within the framework of any action that may be contemplated by yourself, the Secretary-General or those members who have, so far, done so much in trying to facilitate the deployment of UNIFIL and give the Force their political support.

I feel that my letter will be incomplete if I do not make specific mention of the continued efforts of the United States Government, which has continued to feel particularly responsible for the implementation of resolution 425 (1978), which it initially sponsored.

Special mention must also be made of the diplomatic efforts of the troop-contributing Governments, under the leadership of France.

These efforts acquire now, we think, after the President's statement of 8 December, a further dimension and greater leverage.

I would, in conclusion, reiterate my deepest thanks to you and all the members and ask you to please inform the Council of this letter by circulating it as a document, since the Council has decided to remain seized of the question and expressed its desire to be constantly informed of all developments before 19 January 1979.

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12964

Letter dated 11 December 1978 from the representative of Mozambique to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 December 1978]

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to submit herewith the text of a communiqué issued at Maputo on 10 December 1978 by the Ministry of National Defence of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The communiqué reports on the latest wave of aggressive air raids recently perpetrated by the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith and his puppets against the People's Republic of Mozambique.

This continuing violation of the territory of a sovereign State and Member of the United Nations by Ian Smith's air force, using fighter jet aircraft and napalm bombs barbarically to massacre defenceless civilians, as accounted by the communiqué, vividly shows the growing deterioration of the situation in our part of Africa.

Aside from the recurring character of these acts of aggression, the communiqué particularly reports a shift in the nature of means employed by the enemy and the peculiarity of their new tactics, making even worse destruction and indiscriminate killings than ever before. This time air bombing of main town centres situated in Mozambique's economic productive zones seems to be the new strategy of the enemy. Such towns as Dondo and Chingdozi mentioned by the communiqué are within a few miles of the provincial capitals of the provinces of Sofala and Tete.

In pursuance of the illegal régime's intention to internationalize further the conflict in Zimbabwe, Ian Smith has once again repeated the same air raids he undertook

in Zambia, another front-line State, where he massacred thousands of schoolchildren and refugees.

Certainly, the international community should now become more responsive to these worsening realities of southern Africa and should henceforth act more urgently and apply appropriate measures with a view effectively to implement the decisions contained in Security Council resolution 411 (1977), which, *inter alia*, called for assistance to increase the defensive capability of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

We hope that the international community, in the face of the mounting human and material losses caused by these criminal acts of Ian Smith's régime, will now concentrate more than ever in assisting the People's Republic of Mozambique with the necessary means with which she can cope with this grave situation confronting her so that peace, security and justice in southern Africa will become a reality.

The communiqué reflects the deteriorating situation caused by the intransigence of the racist illegal and minority régime in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia and demands an immediate and just solution which falls upon the responsibility of the entire international community.

I should therefore be very grateful if the attached communiqué could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) José Carlos LOBO
Permanent Representative of Mozambique
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Communiqué dated 10 December 1978 issued at Maputo by the Ministry of National Defence of the People's Republic of Mozambique concerning another series of acts of aggression against the Republic

The criminal régime of Ian Smith and his puppets, desperate because of the intensification and escalation of the just struggle for the liberation of the people of Zimbabwe, unleashed a series of barbaric acts of aggression against the territory of the People's Republic of Mozambique in an attempt to spread the war into our territory.

On 29 November the enemy undertook an air incursion through the use of jet airplanes against Chicualacuala, Mapai and Mabalane in Gaza province, bombing civilian and military targets; it resulted in human losses and the destruction of four houses.

On 4 December the enemy again launched an air attack against Chicualacuala.

On 8 December the enemy launched another air attack, this time in Tete province, against the garrison of Chingdozi, where human lives were likewise lost and two airplane hangars were destroyed. In this particular attack the enemy utilized napalm bombs.

On 9 December the enemy bombed the Political and Military Training Center of Dondo in Sofala province; more people were either killed or injured and property destroyed.

As a consequence of the above-mentioned bombings, the casualty list totals 26 dead and 73 wounded, which includes civilian population.

Our forces repulsed these attacks, shooting down two jet fighter bombers in the Chicualacuala zone which crashed in

Rhodesian territory.

The increase in these bombing flight operations over our territory by the enemy is aimed at affecting our economic productive zones in order to impair our economy's development.

These actions carry the objective of destabilizing our republic in order to hinder the people of Mozambique from enjoying the benefits derived from the gains of our national independence and the achievements of their work.

The People's Republic of Mozambique, faithful in its obligation as a member of the international community and conscious of the responsibilities which are bestowed upon it as a front-line State, has been fulfilling its duty.

The Mozambican people, under the leadership of FRELIMO, have been willing to sacrifice so that the people of Zimbabwe can be free.

In accordance with this commitment, the People's Republic of Mozambique has integrally applied the sanctions imposed by the international community against the régime of Ian Smith.

Still along the lines of this commitment, our Government has appealed to all States members of the international community to reinforce the defensive capacity of the People's Republic of Mozambique in order to enable it to repel any violation of its territorial integrity.

The enemy can exert every effort in multiplying its barbaric acts of aggression but the Mozambican people will not be intimidated. No amount of massacres, nor crimes, no matter how odious they might be, will be able to shatter the determination of the Mozambican people in their assurance of the victory of the just struggle of the Zimbabwean people for their independence and liberty.

A luta continua.

DOCUMENT S/12965*

Letter dated 8 December 1978 from the representative of Mongolia to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[12 December 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you a statement by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic dated 4 December 1978 concerning the results of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Moscow on 22 and 23 November 1978.

I should be grateful if you would have the statement circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) B. DASHTSEREN
Permanent Representative of the
Mongolian People's Republic
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic dated 4 December 1978 concerning the results of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty

The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Moscow on 22 and 23 November 1978 was an event of great international significance. It constitutes a new and clear expression of the peace-loving foreign policy of the countries of the socialist community and their enterprising and persistent efforts to intensify the process of détente and ensure lasting peace and the security of peoples.

The Government of the Mongolian Peoples Republic and the entire Mongolian people welcome with deep satisfaction and warmly approve the results of the Moscow forum of fraternal socialist States, believing that they constitute a major contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and developing international co-operation on a basis of equality.

The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held during a crucial period of global development, unanimously adopted an extremely important political document, a Declaration which gave a comprehensive analysis in depth of the present international situation. In that Declaration, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty presented new realistic ideas and major initiatives which will undoubtedly provide a constructive basis for the solution of urgent international problems.

The Declaration clearly reflects the peace-loving nature of the Leninist foreign policy of socialism and is aimed at the solution of the most important and timely problems affecting the fate of all mankind. The Mongolian public regards the Declaration as a broad international programme of action for the development and deepening of the process of détente, for the ending of the arms race and for disarmament, for support of the struggle of peoples for national liberation, against imperialism, colonialism and racism, and for the further strengthening of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty emphasized the fundamental significance of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the necessity of its consistent implementation as a unified whole. They reaffirmed their determination to give new impetus to the realization of the Helsinki accords and their readiness to enter into agreements concerning specific measures and steps for the development of

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/483-S/12965.

co-operation and the achievement of genuine security in the European continent and throughout the world.

This principled position of the States represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee takes on a special timeliness in the light of stepped-up action by the imperialist and reactionary forces that are pursuing objectives of aggression, war and hegemonism, which complicates the world situation and seriously harms the cause of strengthening peace, general security and the development of international co-operation.

The leaders of the fraternal countries, with a sense of profound responsibility for the fate of their peoples and the peoples of other countries, made a strong appeal for the adoption of effective measures to end the arms race and bring about disarmament, to ensure an early break-through in the talks on those questions, in order to make peace more stable and lasting. An important political initiative to that end was constituted by the complex of proposals presented in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the adoption of which would do much to facilitate the total and definitive liquidation of the material base for war preparations and the closing of all channels of the nuclear-weapons race. This initiative is inspired by the sincere desire of the socialist countries to avert the threat of nuclear war and advance the cause of general and complete disarmament, which fully meets the age-old aspirations of peoples to live in peace and friendship.

In their Declaration, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty emphasized the urgent need for the early elimination of the existing hotbeds of tension and war, such as those in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula, and the eradication of the remnants of colonialism and racial discrimination.

Of great importance is the statement by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty concerning the nature of the relations between the socialist countries and the young States which have recently gained independence. Socialism has proved not by words but by deeds that it is the historic ally of countries and peoples struggling for national and social liberation, against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. As was clearly stated in the Declaration, any selfish attempt to secure privileges, concessions or spheres of influence is alien to socialist foreign policy.

The Declaration firmly rebuffs the attempts of imperialist circles to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist and other sovereign States, in flagrant violation of the universally recognized norms of international relations. The attacks made against genuine socialism on the pretext of protecting human rights cannot be regarded otherwise than as attempts to break down

the socialist system and weaken the attractive force of socialist democracy. Flagrant interference in the internal affairs of States only poisons the international atmosphere and prevents the development of peaceful co-operation between States. The participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee emphatically declared that they would not permit any outside interference in their internal affairs.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty expressed their unswerving determination constantly to deepen and broaden the friendship and comprehensive co-operation among them, to intensify international efforts and interaction for the solution of problems involving peace and the security of peoples. The strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries and the deepening of comprehensive co-operation among them are extremely important in the present circumstances of intensified action by imperialistic and reactionary forces. For the socialist countries, which constitute the leading factor in the world-wide revolutionary process and the principal force against imperialism, are in the vanguard of the struggle of peoples for the triumph of the ideals of peace, democracy and social progress.

The Mongolian People's Republic, as an inseparable and integral part of the community of socialist countries, is consistently following the foreign-policy line it shares with its fraternal States on all the fundamental questions referred to in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty. In alliance with the fraternal socialist countries, it supports the further strengthening of international détente and its extension to all the regions of the world, including the vast Asian continent, and it calls for the solution without delay of the vital problems of cessation of the arms race and disarmament in the interests of strengthening peace and the security of peoples.

The Government and people of the Mongolian People's Republic fully approve the constructive and realistic proposals of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty aimed at the deepening of international détente, the adoption of genuine measures for ending the arms race and for disarmament, the removal of the threat of nuclear war, the reduction of military confrontation in Europe and the strengthening of peace throughout the world.

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic declares that, guided by the purposes and principles of its foreign policy, it will, in close co-operation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, contribute in every possible way to the implementation of the ideas and initiatives presented in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

DOCUMENT S/12966*

Letter dated 12 December 1978 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[13 December 1978]

Recently certain quarters, including States Members of the United Nations, have attempted to invoke General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947. Their aim is not only to try to justify their present-day positions, but also to make a belated claim to the legal benefits deriving from the resolution in question.

They proceed on the assumption that after 31 years memories have dimmed, both as regards the historical circumstances of the resolution and the reactions of the Arabs to the resolution after its adoption. They wilfully ignore the fact that as a result of those reactions that resolution was overtaken by the events of 1947-1948 and effectively frustrated by the Arabs at that time.

The fact is that in 1947 all the States members of the Arab League categorically rejected resolution 181 (II). Those States formally reserved their complete freedom of action and then set out to destroy that resolution by

the illegal use of force from the moment of its adoption. On 5 March, on 1 April and again on 17 April 1948, the Security Council appealed for an end to the acts of violence in Palestine [resolutions 42 (1948), 43 (1948) and 46 (1948)]. The Arabs, within and without Palestine, openly defied those resolutions.

With the termination of the British Mandate over Palestine on 14 May 1948, the armies of seven Arab States illegally crossed the international boundaries of Mandated Palestine in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and in breach of general international law. Thereafter, the Arab States refused to comply with subsequent cease-fire resolutions and appeals of the Security Council and the United Nations Mediator. In the face of this unabating Arab defiance, the Council, in its resolution 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948, taking into consideration that Israel expressed its readiness to prolong the truce, and that "the States members of the Arab

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/488-S/12966.

League [had] rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948", determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter, ordered the Governments and authorities concerned to desist from further military action, and declared that failure to comply would require immediate consideration by the Council "with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council".

None the less, Arab violence against the fledgling State of Israel persisted. While this aggression was successful in destroying resolution 181 (II), it failed in its other avowed purpose, namely, that of crushing the Jewish State. The fact that the Arab States failed in their armed aggression aimed at destroying Israel does not legitimize their violation of international law. At the same time, that armed aggression precludes them from invoking in any form the benefits of a General Assembly resolution which they both rejected and destroyed by force of arms.

The United Nations documentation of these historical events is unequivocal. I attach a brief survey of that documentation, and have the honour to request that it, under cover of this letter, should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Documentation on Arab rejection and defiance of General Assembly resolution 181 (II)

1. Arab statements in rejection of resolution 181 (II)

Saudi Arabia

"... the Government of Saudi Arabia registers, on this historic occasion, the fact that it does not consider itself bound by the resolution adopted today by the General Assembly. Furthermore, it reserves to itself the full right to act freely in whatever way it deems fit, in accordance with the principles of right and justice." [29 November 1947.]^a

Iraq

"... in the name of my Government, I wish to put on record that Iraq does not recognize the validity of this decision, will reserve freedom of action towards its implementation, and holds those who were influential in passing it against the free conscience of mankind responsible for the consequences." [29 November 1947.]^b

Syria

"My country will never recognize such a decision. It will never agree to be responsible for it. Let the consequences be on the heads of others, not on ours." [29 November 1947.]^b

Yemen

"... the Government of Yemen does not consider itself bound by such a decision for it is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter. The Government of Yemen will reserve its freedom of action towards the implementation of this decision." [29 November 1947.]^b

Egypt

"We do not choose to comply with the General Assembly's resolution on Palestine." [25 February 1948.]^c

^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, vol. II, p. 1425.

^b Ibid., p. 1427.

^c Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Nos. 16-35, p. 299.

Palestine Arab Higher Committee

"The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not attackers, not aggressors; that the Arabs had begun the fight and that once the Arabs stopped shooting, they would stop shooting also. As a matter of fact, we do not deny this fact." [16 April 1948.]^d

2. The Arabs engage in hostilities to prevent the implementation of resolution 181 (II)

"Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein." [United Nations Palestine Commission: First Special Report to the Security Council (A/AC.21/9)—16 February 1948.]^e

"1. The High Commissioner for Palestine reported on 27 January that the security position had become more serious during the preceding week with the entry into Palestine of large parties of trained guerrillas from adjacent territory. A band of some 300 men had established itself in the Safad area of Galilee, and it was probably this band or part of it which carried out an intensive attack during that week on Yechiam settlement, using mortars and heavy automatics as well as rifles.

"2. On the same date, the High Commissioner further reported that a second large band of some 700 Syrians had entered Palestine via Trans-Jordan during the night of 20-21 January. This band had its own mechanized transport; its members were well-equipped and provisioned, and wore battle dress. The party appears to have entered Trans-Jordan from Syria and then crossed into Palestine at a point at which the entry of Syrians was not expected."^f

"Organized efforts are being made by strong Arab elements inside and outside Palestine to prevent the implementation of the Assembly's plan of partition and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including armed incursions into Palestinian territory."^g

"... This Commission now finds itself confronted with an attempt to defeat its purposes, and to nullify the resolution of the General Assembly."^h

3. The Arabs openly defy calls by the Security Council to cease hostilities

These calls were contained in Security Council resolutions 42 (1948) of 5 March, 43 (1948) of 1 April, and 46 (1948) of 17 April 1948.

Arab defiance was confirmed by the representative of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee in the Security Council:

"... The Arabs did not want to submit to a truce which would have brought shame upon them, as they rather preferred to abandon their homes, their belongings, and everything they possessed in this world, and leave the town [Haifa]. This is in fact what they did.

"...

"We have never concealed the fact that we began the fighting."—[23 April 1948.]ⁱ

4. The Arab armies launch armed aggression against the State of Israel

The State of Israel was founded on 14 May 1948.

To a questionnaire addressed by the Security Council on 18 May 1948, asking Arab States whether their armies were operating in Palestine, the replies were as follows:

Egypt

"On the termination of the British Mandate in Palestine, instructions were given to forces of the Egyptian Army to

^d Ibid., No. 58, p. 19.

^e Ibid., Third Year, Special Supplement No. 2, document S/676, sect. I, para. 3c.

^f Ibid., sect. II, para. 7.

^g Ibid., para. 9a.

^h Ibid., sect. VIII, para. 1.

ⁱ Ibid., Third Year, No. 62, p. 14.

enter Palestine . . . The Egyptian regular forces are proceeding with their operations." [22 May 1948.]^j

Syria

"Yes."^k

Iraq

"Yes."^l

Lebanon

"Armed forces of Lebanon are operating in Palestine."^m

Saudi Arabia

"Yes." [See S/772 of May 1948.]

Jordan—Evaded the question:

" . . . my Government does not feel that there is room for reply to the questions addressed to it." [See S/760 of May 1948.]

5. Reactions of members of the Security Council to Arab aggression

Mr. Austin (United States of America)

" . . . Probably the most important and the best evidence we have on that subject is contained in the admissions of the countries whose five armies have invaded Palestine that they are carrying on a war.

"Their statements are the best evidence we have of the international character of this aggression. There is nothing in the resolution about aggression; it is a word which is not included in the text but which has been mentioned in the statements of these aggressors. They tell us quite frankly that their business in Palestine is political and that they are there to establish a unitary State. Of course, the statement that they are there to make peace is rather remarkable in view of the fact that they are waging war. We find that this is characterized on the part of King Abdullah by a certain contumacy towards the United Nations and the Security Council. He has sent us an answer to our questions. These were questions addressed to him, as a ruler who is occupying land outside his domain, by the Security Council, a body which is organized in the world to ask these questions of him. As will be seen from page 2 of document S/760—the first page of which contains the actual questions—in a reply addressed to the President of the Security Council he answers the questions addressed to him by that body . . .

" . . .
"The contumacy of that reply to the Security Council is the very best evidence of the illegal purpose of this Government in invading Palestine with armed forces and conducting the war which it is waging there. It is against the peace; it is not on behalf of the peace. It is an invasion with a definite purpose.

" . . .
"Therefore, here we have the highest type of evidence of the international violation of the law: the admission by those who are committing this violation."ⁿ

Mr. Parodi (France)

" . . . the moment the regular forces of several countries crossed their frontiers and entered a territory which, whatever its status, was not their own, the moment fighting continued in these conditions and became more serious, we clearly had to deal with the question of international peace within the meaning of the Charter." [20 May 1948.]^o

Mr. Gromyko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

"The USSR delegation cannot but express surprise at the position adopted by the Arab States in the Palestine question, and particularly at the fact that those States—or some of them, at least—have resorted to such action as sending their troops into Palestine and carrying out military operations aimed at

the suppression of the national liberation movement in Palestine." [21 May 1948.]^p

Mr. Tarasenko (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic)

"We are concerned with the plain fact that a number of Palestine's neighbour States have sent their troops into Palestine. Our knowledge of that fact is not based on rumours, or on newspaper reports, but on official documents signed by the Governments of those States informing the Security Council that their troops have entered Palestine. I refer, in particular, to the documents signed and sent by the Governments of Egypt [S/743] and Trans-Jordan [S/748].

"Nor can there be any doubt of the purpose for which those forces have entered Palestine. We may be sure they have not gone there for a summer camp vacation or for exercises. Those forces have a definite military and political purpose.

" . . .
"In these circumstances it is difficult to deny that we are faced with a situation involving a breach of the peace." [20 May 1948.]^q

" . . . We have recently heard one of the parties state repeatedly that it considers it has an imprescriptible right to carry out armed intervention in the internal affairs of Palestine, to destroy the State of Israel by force of arms and to bombard the peaceful cities of Israel under the pretext of restoring order." [28 May 1948.]^r

Mr. López (Colombia)

" . . . We have now what seems to me a rather extraordinary case. For some time past, nations have gone to war without previous notification to the other party. It has been claimed that it was not in conformity with international law to do so, but nevertheless that is the way it has been done. If previous notice was given, it was given at such a time and in such a way as not to give the other party time to make any preparations to protect itself.

"But in this case we are returning to the old practice. When Egypt decided to intervene actively in Palestine, it duly notified the Security Council [S/743]. It cabled directly to the President of the Security Council, saying: 'We are going into Palestine with our army.' When King Abdullah decided to go into Palestine, he duly notified the Security Council that he was moving his army into Palestine [S/748]. That has all been done in accordance with the best etiquette of war. There has been no sin of omission, nothing that is not in conformity with the niceties of international practice." [20 May 1948.]^s

6. The Arab States refuse to comply with Security Council cease-fire resolutions and appeals issued by the United Nations Mediator

On 22 May 1948, the Security Council adopted resolution 49 (1948), calling for a cease-fire to go into effect 36 hours after midnight that day New York standard time.

The Arabs were unwilling to comply.

Iraq

" . . . your telegram on this resolution was delayed on reception at Baghdad through *force majeure*. The time left is unfortunately too short for my Government to be able to reach a decision on such an important question, and I am sure you will understand that we must consult with the Governments of the other Arab States." [24 May 1948.]^t

Syria

" . . . as the matter concerns the seven States of the Arab League, which are distant from each other, and since communication is not very easy in present circumstances, they will have to hold a meeting to discuss the question and they will submit their reply as soon as it is ready.

"Here is another cable which came from the Secretary-General of the Arab League:

"I have convoked a meeting of the Political Committee

^j *Ibid.*, No. 72, p. 6.

^k *Ibid.*, p. 11.

^l *Ibid.*, p. 13.

^m *Ibid.*, p. 15.

ⁿ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-43.

^o *Ibid.*, No. 70, pp. 17-18.

^p *Ibid.*, No. 71, p. 7.

^q *Ibid.*, No. 70, pp. 4-5.

^r *Ibid.*, No. 76, p. 13.

^s *Ibid.*, No. 70, p. 28.

^t *Ibid.*, No. 73, p. 37.

of the Arab League consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the States to consider the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council. Please inform Security Council that there will not be time for a meeting and reasonable consideration within the time limit, and that they are requesting the Security Council to give them a delay sufficient for the States to consult and exchange views at a meeting which will be held tomorrow morning at Amman."^u

The Arabs were granted their request for a grace period of 48 hours. Their reply, when it came, was a refusal to accept the Security Council's call.

Syria

"If the new resolution of the General Assembly in regard to the cease-fire order is meant to imply an unconditional cease-fire, certainly the Arabs could not accept it." [27 May 1948.]^v

Palestine Arab Higher Committee

"This discrepancy in the position of the two sides under the cease-fire makes it mere nonsense for any Arab to accept it unconditionally . . . The Arabs would not betray themselves, and so they refused to accept it."^w

The Arabs asked for another 48 hours grace, and elicited the following comment from the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic:

"We are faced with a very peculiar situation: it is not the Security Council which dictates a line of conduct to the States which have unlawfully invaded the territory of another State with their armed forces, nor is it the Security Council which dictates the terms with regard to the time of the cease-fire, but it is the invading States which impose that line of conduct and those terms upon us. First they demanded a time-limit of forty-eight hours. Yesterday we received another note asking for another forty-eight hours. In all probability, these requests for forty-eight hours will be repeated time after time.

"Obviously there is a game going on. Concealed behind this striving for delays, which are invariably obtained with success, there are military and political schemes which are using the time factor as a screen in order to achieve certain military and political aims."^x

Meanwhile, the Arabs' attempts to crush Israel persisted, but without success. Only then did they accept Security Council resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948, calling for a four weeks' truce, and explicitly mentioning possible action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Towards the end of the period, the United Nations Mediator tried to gain agreement to prolong the truce. The Arab League's reply was a rejection of the proposal:

" . . . Unfortunately, solution proposed by Mediator based as it is on continuation of *status quo* aiming at partition and creating of Jewish state has been most disappointing to Arabs . . .

^u *Ibid.*, p. 38.

^v *Ibid.*, No. 75, p. 6.

^w *Ibid.*, p. 13.

^x *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

"The Mediator fully realizes that partition and establishment of Jewish State in country lies at root of present dispute . . .

" . . .

"His Excellency [the Mediator] therein declares he is fully convinced there is no possibility of persuading Jews to give up present separate cultural, political existence and accept merging in unitary State. It is not reasonable, therefore, particularly after expression of such conviction to expect that prolongation of truce would lead to desired peaceful settlement . . .

" . . .

"Nothing is more welcome to Arabs who are staunch supporters of peace than avoidance of bloodshed and solution of problems by peaceful means, but impossibility of persuading Jewish minority to abandon political ambitions . . . make it imperative for Arab States not to agree to prolongation of truce under present conditions and to take all measures necessary to bring these conditions to end." [See S/876 of 9 July 1948.]

7. The Security Council determines that the armed aggression by the Arab States is a threat to international peace and security

The United Nations Mediator made another appeal [S/878 of 9 July 1948], which the Arabs ignored, preferring to continue with their attempts to crush Israel by the illegal use of force.

Faced with this situation, the Security Council adopted resolution 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948. Its preamble and first three paragraphs were as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948, for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine,

"1. *Determines* that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations;

"2. *Orders* the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, to desist from further military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to their military and paramilitary forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution;

"3. *Declares* that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council".

DOCUMENT S/12967*

Letter dated 13 December 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[13 December 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 13 December 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 13 December 1978 from
Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

As you will recall, the General Assembly, with a view to resolving the question of missing persons in Cyprus, adopted resolution 32/128 on 16 December 1977, envisaging the establishment of an investigatory body with the participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be in a position to function impartially, effectively and speedily. At the time of its adoption and on several occasions thereafter, the Turkish Cypriot side, which has been suffering the agony of missing persons since 1963, announced that it supported the provisions of the resolution and was ready and willing to set up

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/499-S/12967.

immediately the investigatory body, with the participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is the only competent organ having the expertise and the experience in the field of missing persons.

While the framework provided by resolution 32/128, adopted with the consent of the parties directly concerned, remains still intact, the new recourse by the Greek Cypriot Administration to the General Assembly, seeking a new resolution on the subject, in complete disregard for agreements previously reached and with the exclusion of the International Committee of the Red Cross from the investigatory body, is a clear demonstration of the lack of goodwill and a betrayal of the real motives in bringing "the question" before the United Nations in the first instance. This is an attitude hardly compatible with the current efforts to bring about intercommunal reconciliation and serves no purpose other than anti-Turkish propaganda.

For this reason and upon instructions from my President, Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, I regret to inform you that the draft resolution adopted by the Third Committee on 12 December 1978* will in no way be acceptable to us and that the Turkish Cypriot side will not consider itself bound by its provisions.

Nevertheless, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, motivated by humanitarian concerns, continues to be ready to co-operate in the establishment of the investigatory body as provided by resolution 32/128.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

* Subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 33/172.

DOCUMENT S/12969*

Letter dated 15 December 1978 from the representative of Sweden to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[15 December 1978]

I have the honour, on behalf of the Permanent Representatives of the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, to transmit to you the enclosed statement on Namibia, issued on 15 December 1978 by the five Nordic Governments.

I should be grateful if you would have this statement circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anders THUNBORG
Permanent Representative of Sweden
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement on Namibia issued on 15 December 1978 by
the five Nordic Governments

1. The Nordic countries categorically reject the internal elections that South Africa has carried out unilaterally in

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/518-S/12969.

Namibia in defiance of the United Nations and world opinion. They regret that the efforts made by the Secretary-General, the five Western members of the Security Council, African States and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to create a basis for a peaceful and internationally accepted transition to an independent Namibia have so far not been successful.

2. The Nordic countries demand that South Africa should, without further obstruction, comply with the resolutions of the Security Council on Namibia. South Africa must fully contribute to the implementation, under United Nations supervision and control, of free and democratic elections, in which all political parties, including SWAPO, can participate on an equal footing.

3. The Nordic countries reaffirm their readiness to assist the United Nations in this task. Should South Africa continue to refuse to co-operate with the United Nations, the Security Council must use all necessary means, in accordance with the Charter, including effective international sanctions, to compel South Africa to accept the United Nations plan for Namibia. Increased international pressure against South Africa is the logical response to its continued refusal to co-operate with the United Nations.

DOCUMENT S/12970

Letter dated 15 December 1978 from the representative of Argentina
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Spanish]
[15 December 1978]

I have the honour to address myself to you on express instructions from my Government, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in order to bring to the attention of the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the tense situation existing between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile.

This tense situation has been brought about by the failure of the Chilean Government to respond in an appropriate manner to the numerous efforts by the Argentine Government to resolve through negotiations the dispute concerning the definitive delimitation of the jurisdiction of each country in the southern part of the American continent, which is a region of vital importance to maritime communications between two large oceans and to international security. This attitude towards negotiations has coincided with a series of unilateral measures and acts by the Chilean Government which have also contributed to the present state of affairs.

One of the numerous efforts by the Argentine Government referred to above culminated, on 20 February 1978, in the conclusion of an international agreement signed by the Presidents of the two countries at the city of Puerto Montt. This treaty establishes a system of bilateral negotiations by stages, the application of which made it possible to formulate certain principles for agreement regarding the dispute on the delimitation of jurisdiction. These principles could not be given formal effect because of the negative attitude taken by Chile.

Nevertheless, on 17 November last, in another demonstration of its continued willingness to negotiate, the Argentine Government formally invited the Chilean Government to set up a working group to continue to apply the system of negotiations agreed upon by the two countries on 20 February 1978. The Government of Chile also rejected this proposal.

Also within the framework of the treaty signed at Puerto Montt, a meeting between the Ministers for External Relations of Argentina and Chile took place at Buenos Aires on 12 December last during which my Government proposed to the Government of Chile that it should accept assistance in the negotiations from the Holy See as a mediator. Although the Government of Chile agreed to this proposal, it adopted positions at the same meeting regarding the scope of the mediation which, since they deviated from the framework established in notes previously exchanged by the Presidents and Ministers for External Relations of the two countries, prevented the necessary agreement from being reached to enable the mediator to begin his work.

In spite of the foreseeable exacerbation of tensions between the two States, deriving from this new negative stand by Chile, the Argentine Government, true to its historical tradition of seeking an adequate solution to the dispute, and wishing to find formulae that would enable the agreed machinery to be set in motion, issued the following communiqué on 13 December 1978:

"Yesterday, 12 December 1978, a meeting was held at Buenos Aires between the Ministers for External Relations of Argentina and Chile, in response to an invitation extended by our country.

"During the meeting, Chile accepted a proposal by Argentina that the mediator should be the Holy See. There was also a measure of agreement on the modalities for such mediation, and the continued existence of the system originating with the Puerto Montt Act was recognized.

"However, during the conversations it was not possible to reach agreement on the scope of the mediation to be requested, because on this point the Government of Chile maintained positions that departed from the framework established by both countries in the notes exchanged as of 2 November and within which yesterday's meeting was to be conducted.

"This does not mean that the procedures aimed at instituting the mediation process have ended. The Argentine Government, in a further demonstration of its willingness to solve the question now pending, trusts that both countries will find formulae which will enable the machinery agreed upon to be set in motion."

I consider it necessary to point out once again that the above-mentioned negotiating process has also been adversely affected by a series of unilateral measures and acts by the Chilean Government and that all these circumstances have created a situation of tension, the continuance of which could ultimately endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Argentine Government believes that the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, must be fully informed of developments in this situation. It is on this understanding that I have been instructed to transmit this letter; I should appreciate its being issued, as a matter of urgency, as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Enrique J. Ros
Permanent Representative of Argentina
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12972

Letter dated 19 December 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[20 December 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 19 December 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 19 December 1978 from
Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed by the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Mr. Rauf R. Denktas, to refer to the letter of 24 November 1978 from Mr. Zenon Rossides, the rep-

resentative of the Greek Cypriot Administration [S/12937].

The allegations of Mr. Rossides concerning the violation of the air space of Cyprus on 22 November hardly deserve any reply, since those areas are under the full control and sovereignty of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

In view of the above facts, the Turkish peace force, which is in Cyprus under international treaties to prevent the massacre of the Turkish Cypriot community and to defend the island's independence by preventing enosis, held a military exercise in the area of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on 22 November with the prior knowledge of the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus.

I categorically state, therefore, that this is not a matter of concern for the Greek Cypriot Administration, which has no authority and no right of sovereignty over the territory of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12973

Letter dated 19 December 1978 from the representative of Kuwait
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[19 December 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter from the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the President of the Security Council. This letter is in connexion with the dastardly actions of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories. I would request you to arrange for the distribution of the letter as a document of the Council so as to let the world know the true nature of the modern predators of Palestinian land.

(Signed) Abdalla Yaccoub BISHARA
Permanent Representative of Kuwait
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Letter dated 19 December 1978 from the observer of the
Palestine Liberation Organization to the President of the
Security Council

On instructions from the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, I wish to call to your attention the seriously aggravating situation in the occupied Palestinian territories as a result of the prolonged, illegal Israeli occupation and the persistent policy and practices of Israel in violation of the

principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions and the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly.

Early in December 1978, the University of Bir Zeit was subjected to a wave of harassment and repression. A number of students were arbitrarily arrested and detained. On 4 December, Arab houses in the villages of Silwad and Kafr Qallil were demolished. Curfew was imposed on the village of Silwad.

On 11 December, Israeli forces of occupation ordered the fencing-off of around 1,200 dunums of built-up land in the municipality of Beit Sahour (Shepherds' Fields). On 16 December, curfew was imposed on the town of Halhoul in the district of Hebron.

These atrocious practices can only provoke the aggravation of an already explosive and serious situation.

I am further instructed to ask you to take adequate measures to bring to an end such provocations by eliminating their root causes.

(Signed) Zehdi Labib TERZI
Permanent Observer
of the Palestine Liberation Organization
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12974

Letter dated 21 December 1978 from the representative of Argentina
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Spanish]
[21 December 1978]

I have the honour to address myself to you for the purpose of keeping the Security Council informed of the development of the situation of tension in the southern

part of the American continent to which I referred in my letter of 15 December 1978 [S/12970].

As I noted in that letter, the Argentine Government

has made many efforts to solve through negotiations the dispute between it and the Chilean Government concerning the definitive delimitation of the jurisdiction of each country in the southern part of the continent. While these efforts were being made, the Republic of Chile carried out a series of illegal acts which change the *status quo* of the area whose delimitation is still to be determined and which upset the balance of security in the part of the continent that is in dispute.

My Government has expressly instructed me to draw to the attention of the Security Council some of these illegal Chilean measures which, because of their military character, constitute a renewed threat to international peace and security. I refer specifically to the stationing of Chilean military detachments equipped with artillery on some of the following islands: Freycinet, Herschel, Wollaston, Hornos, Deceit, Picton, Lennox and Nueva. The establishment of these military detachments and their continuous reinforcement with troops and equipment which has been taking place recently create a military imbalance in the area in dispute which the Argentine Government has not failed to notice and which should be a cause of concern to the international community.

These measures taken by the Chilean Government are entirely illegal and give rise to the presumption that it intends to create *de facto* situations which will be detrimental to the progress of the direct negotiations and will prejudice their results. I also deem it essential to stress that if the Argentine Republic has refrained from taking similar measures it is because of its respect for the process of negotiation which has been under way.

The Argentine Government remains willing to continue the bilateral efforts aimed at making it possible, under mutually acceptable conditions, for the mediator proposed by Argentina and accepted by Chile to begin his tasks.

Nevertheless, it feels that it has the duty to make fully known to the Security Council the circumstances of the case, entirely in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

I request that this letter should be circulated urgently as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Enrique J. Ros
Permanent Representative of Argentina
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12975*

Letter dated 21 December 1978 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[21 December 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the latest acts of aggression perpetrated by Israel against Lebanon.

On 20 December 1978, at 1600 hours, eight Israeli aircraft raided positions inside Lebanon extending from Adloun in the north to Bourj esh-Shimaly in the south. The attack continued for half an hour during which the planes dropped cluster bombs, rockets and strafed the area with heavy machine-guns. At the same time, Israeli vessels were sighted off the Tyrian coastline. The vessels withdrew as soon as the air attack was terminated. As a result of this raid, 3 persons were killed, 16 wounded and some houses were destroyed or damaged.

On 21 December, at 0800 hours, Israeli artillery shelled the Lebanese army unit stationed at Kaoukaba. It also shelled the Hasbani river basin and the surrounding areas. As a result of this shelling, 1 person was killed and 4 were wounded, all Lebanese civilians.

At 1100 hours, the sector of "Koley'a-Zoley'a-Arnoun-Nabatiyeh" was being shelled and Israeli aircraft were overflying the area. The extent of the damage was not immediately available.

The Lebanese Government wishes to lodge a vigorous

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/542-S/12975.

protest against these unprovoked and unwarranted attacks on Lebanon. They constitute a flagrant violation of Lebanon's sovereignty, international law and the Armistice Agreement of 1949 between Lebanon and Israel.

We also deplore that this attack should have been launched while the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon are all engaged in stabilizing the situation in Southern Lebanon with a view to fully implementing resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) aimed at establishing a zone of peace in the area.

The unwarranted attacks by Israel, viewed in this perspective, and in the light of the Security Council's debates on 8 December [2106th meeting], can only be understood as a further attempt at obstructing the efforts for peace which the United Nations is engaged in pursuing.

The Lebanese Government reserves the right to call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council should that become necessary.

You are requested kindly to have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNT
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12976

Letter dated 21 December 1978 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[21 December 1978]

[Same text as document S/12975 above.]

DOCUMENT S/12977

Letter dated 21 December 1978 from the representative of Kuwait
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[21 December 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter from the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization in connexion with the criminal attacks of Israel on the defenceless Palestinian refugee camps.

I would request you to arrange for the distribution of the above-mentioned letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdalla Yaccoub BISHARA
Permanent Representative of Kuwait
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Letter dated 21 December 1978 from the observer of the
Palestine Liberation Organization to the President of the
Security Council

On the instructions of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, I wish to inform you of the following atrocities committed by Israel.

At 1514 hours on 20 December 1978, eight Israeli warplanes fired rockets on the refugee camp of Bourj esh-Shimaly east of Tyre, resulting in the destruction of a number of dwellings. Five persons suffered injuries as a result of the raid.

At 1600 hours, Zahr al Burj was raided. Two houses were destroyed; one innocent civilian was killed and three others, including an infant, were wounded.

At 1615 hours, the refugee camp al Wasta in Qasmiyah was raided, resulting in the death of a woman, serious injuries to three others, and the destruction of a number of houses. The raids were directed against civilians in the refugee camps.

I am instructed to call your attention to the above atrocities and to request you kindly to take the necessary measures to condemn the perpetrators of these crimes and also to put an end to such atrocities, which will definitely aggravate the situation in the area and constitute a threat to peace and security.

(Signed) Zehdi Labib TERZI
Permanent Observer
of the Palestine Liberation Organization
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12978

Letter dated 21 December 1978 from the representative of Israel
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[21 December 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to three bomb outrages which took place at Jerusalem this week, leading to the injury of 29 men, women and children.

The first of these incidents, in which 20 persons were injured, involved the blowing up of a public bus which was on its regular run in a residential section of the city on Sunday, 17 December 1978. The following day, the terrorist organization known as the "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine", which operates under the umbrella of the so-called PLO, took responsibility in Beirut for this atrocity and issued an announcement to that effect.

This is the second time this year that an incident of this kind has been perpetrated on the same bus route at Jerusalem. On 2 June a similar explosion occurred on a bus, which led to the death of five Israeli children and a young visitor from abroad. The representative of Israel sent a letter about that incident to the President of the Security Council on 6 June 1978 [S/12730].

The other outrages this week took place on Wednesday, 20 December. In the first of them, an explosive device went off at the entrance to a restaurant and a shop in the Old City of Jerusalem, injuring six persons, four of them Arabs. In the second incident, a hand grenade was thrown from the wall of the Old City at people who were standing near Herod's Gate outside the

wall. In the explosion, two Israelis and one tourist were injured.

These are but the latest incidents in the long catalogue of crimes perpetrated by the PLO, a terrorist organization masquerading under the banner of a national liberation movement. Between 1 November and 20 December of this year, there have been some 14 outrages (including attempts) of the kind described above which have caused the deaths of 4 people and the wounding of 67 others. In my letter of 23 November 1978 to the Secretary-General,³⁹ details were given of the blowing up of a public bus on the Jerusalem-Jericho highway on 19 November, which led to the deaths of 4 people, 3 from Israel and 1 from abroad, as well as to the injury of 36 others, 4 of them seriously.

The criminal record of the PLO and its terrorist methods indiscriminately aimed against civilian populations, both Jewish and Arab, are common knowledge. The Government of Israel is therefore duty bound to take all measures necessary to protect the lives and safety of its citizens.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

³⁹ A/33/388.

DOCUMENT S/12979

Letter dated 21 December 1978 from the representative of Israel
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[21 December 1978]

Further to my letter of this afternoon [S/12978], I wish, on instructions from my Government, to inform you of the brutal rocket attack on the town of Kiryat Shmona in the north of Israel which took place early this morning and resulted in the death of an elderly man and the wounding of five persons, including a child of ten who was seriously injured.

The attack was launched from across the Lebanese border with Soviet-made Katyusha rockets. At least six shells were fired. However, because of the town's long history of attacks and bombardment by terrorist groups operating across Israel's northern border, many residents were sleeping in shelters and thus escaped injury in this morning's rocket attack.

In the course of the day a spokesman for the terrorist organization calling itself the PLO took responsibility for this outrage. Moreover, a spokesman for the so-called Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is a constituent of the PLO, said that terrorist operations which have increased over the last few months will continue.

In my earlier letter to you today, I indicated that, since the beginning of November of this year, the terrorist PLO had perpetrated 14 outrages and attempted outrages. Besides this morning's atrocity in Kiryat Shmona, the details are as follows:

- (a) 5 November, an explosive device blew up in a Tel Aviv bus station.
- (b) 14 November, an explosive device blew up in the East Talpiot residential district of Jerusalem.
- (c) 19 November, an explosive device blew up at Jaffa.

(d) 19 November, another such device exploded in a bus on the Jerusalem-Jericho highway killing 4 and wounding 28.

(e) 19 November, an explosive device was found and dismantled in the centre of Jerusalem.

(f) 28 November, an explosive device was found and dismantled at Jerusalem.

(g) 3 December, an explosive device was discovered and dismantled at a gas station at Netanya.

(h) 10 December, a rocket-launcher was discovered at Jerusalem.

(i) 17 December, an explosive device blew up a bus at Jerusalem, wounding 20.

(j) 18 December, an explosive device exploded in the Ramot district of Jerusalem.

(k) 19 December, an explosive device was discovered on a bus in the Gaza Strip.

(l) 20 December, an explosive device blew up in the Old City of Jerusalem, wounding 6.

(m) 20 December, an explosive device exploded outside Herod's Gate, wounding 3.

I wish to reiterate that, in the light of the terrorist PLO's murderous record, the Government of Israel is duty bound to take all measures necessary to protect the lives and safety of its citizens.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12980

Letter dated 21 December 1978 from the representative of Chile
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Spanish]
[22 December 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to a letter dated 15 December 1978 addressed to you by the representative of Argentina [S/12970]. The purpose of that letter was to draw the attention of the Security Council to what it describes as "the tense situation existing between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile".

Although this tension exists, my Government considers that the form in which it is presented in the aforementioned letter and the accusations formulated therein constitute an incomplete and distorted version of the truth. The purpose of this letter is to fill out the statement of the facts and to rectify the most obvious errors contained in the Argentine letter.

The Argentine Government states that the aforementioned tense situation "has been brought about by the

failure of the Chilean Government to respond in an appropriate manner to the numerous efforts by the Argentine Government to resolve through negotiations the dispute concerning the definitive delimitation of the jurisdiction of each country in the southern part of the American continent". It adds that "this attitude towards negotiations has coincided with a series of unilateral measures and acts by the Chilean Government which have also contributed to the present state of affairs".

These statements must not be left unanswered.

Argentina fails to mention the two basic facts which have given rise to the present situation:

- (a) Argentina's disregard of the arbitral award delivered by Her Britannic Majesty's Government on 18 April 1977 regarding the Beagle Channel controversy;

(b) The territorial claims advanced by Argentina which are manifestly contrary to the Boundary Treaty between Chile and Argentina of 23 July 1881.

I shall refer to both matters separately.

(a) *Beagle Channel controversy and award*

The old question known as the "Beagle Channel controversy" was for several decades the subject of prolonged discussions between the two Governments until, in 1971, the arbitration of Her Britannic Majesty's Government was set in motion in accordance with the General Treaty of Arbitration of 28 May 1902. All that was confirmed in an Agreement for Arbitration (*Compromiso*) of 22 July 1971, which bears the signatures of representatives of the Arbitrator and the Plenipotentiaries of Chile and Argentina. In accordance with that Treaty and the "*Compromiso*", an exemplary process of arbitration took place between 1971 and 1977 in which both parties put before the Court of Arbitration all the factual and legal background material which they deemed necessary.

The Court of Arbitration was composed of the following five eminent jurists, members of the International Court of Justice: Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom), Mr. Hardy C. Dillard (United States of America), Mr. André Gros (France), Mr. Sture Petré (Sweden), Mr. Charles D. Onyeama (Nigeria). After a detailed study of all the historical, geographical, diplomatic and legal facts of the case, the Court unanimously decided that Picton, Nueva and Lennox Islands belonged to the Republic of Chile. At the same time, the Court drew on a chart a line indicating the boundary between the territorial and maritime jurisdictions of the Republics of Argentina and Chile in the area under arbitration.

The decision of the Court of Arbitration was communicated to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty which, pursuant to the instruments providing for the arbitration, ratified the Court's decision on 18 April 1977 and declared that it constituted the judgement in accordance with those instruments, and the two parties were notified of the judgement.

That judgement has unquestionably settled once and for all the old Beagle Channel controversy, since, in accordance with the international instruments providing for the arbitration, it is "not subject to appeal" and is "legally binding on both parties". Furthermore, according to article XIII of the aforementioned 1902 General Treaty of Arbitration, compliance with the judgement was left "to the honour of the nations who have signed this Agreement".

Chile complied fully with the Award and duly informed the Tribunal that it had done so. The Argentine Government, for its part, took the unusual decision, on its own and before itself alone, of declaring it "irremediably null and void".

Argentina thus sought to evade an international judgement. The Court of Arbitration itself has stated that this unilateral Argentine action lacks any validity. The Arbitrator, for his part, has declared that the Award delivered is of a "definitive and binding" character.

It is obvious, therefore, that it is not the Government of Chile that should be held responsible for the tension existing in the area, since all it has done is to conform to the Award of Her Britannic Majesty.

That responsibility falls entirely upon the Argentine Government, which has not complied with the Award it had solemnly committed itself to respect, has reverted to claims which the Arbitrator rejected in his judgement and has committed numerous violations of the air, sea

and land territory which, according to the treaties in force and to the judgement in question, belong to the Republic of Chile.

(b) *Territorial claims made by Argentina in contravention of the Treaty of 1881*

The 1881 Treaty assigned to Chile "all the islands south of Beagle Channel down to Cape Horn" (art. III). In addition to Picton, Nueva and Lennox Islands, which the arbitral Award recognized as belonging to Chile, there are other Chilean islands situated south of the Beagle Channel. The Government of Argentina is now claiming sovereignty over some of these islands.

These claims are entirely unjustified. As has been stated, all the islands south of the Beagle Channel down to Cape Horn are Chilean by virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty.

Moreover, Picton, Nueva and Lennox Islands, recognized as belonging to Chile in the Award, and those other islands situated farther south have always been and are under the uninterrupted and effective sovereignty of the Republic of Chile.

The situation in the area south of Tierra del Fuego may be summarized as follows:

"Chile is abiding by the treaties in force, is complying with the award delivered by Her Britannic Majesty and is limiting itself to safeguarding its rights.

"The Argentine Republic is attempting to alter the treaties in question, is disregarding a judgement which it solemnly undertook to respect and is trying to change the status of territories which have long been under the peaceful and effective sovereignty of Chile."

Desiring to avoid sterile polemics, the Government of Chile will not address itself to the other points raised in the Argentine letter. It should, however, be observed that the efforts made to resolve the difficulties which have been created by the attitude of Argentina have been undertaken at the initiative of Chile or, at the very least, have had its full participation.

There is another aspect of the situation which is not mentioned in the Argentine letter. I refer to the constant willingness of the Government of Chile to submit the aforementioned difficulties to judicial settlement. Since 10 January 1978, confronted with the failure of direct negotiations, the Government of Chile has repeatedly invited the Government of the Argentine Republic to join with it in having recourse to the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, so that this high Tribunal might resolve the difficulties. The General Treaty of 1972 on the Judicial Settlement of Disputes between Argentina and Chile stipulates that both parties have an obligation to make use of this means of peaceful settlement.

All these invitations have so far met with no response.

In the light of the foregoing it is sufficiently clear that it is not the Government of Chile which is responsible for the tension in the southern part of the continent, nor is it that Government which has sought to evade international justice.

Neither has my Government created a military threat which has obstructed the bilateral negotiations conducted with a view to solving the dispute. On the contrary, the existing threat would seem to be aimed at obliging Chile to yield to unacceptable territorial claims.

My Government is convinced that the present situation should be resolved through the implementation of the provisions of the treaties in force and the rules of international law.

Further evidence to corroborate the firm willingness of the Government of Chile to find a solution to the dispute by peaceful means is the invitation it issued to the Argentine Government, by a note dated 2 November 1978, to have recourse to mediation by a friendly country, designated by mutual agreement, with the express reservation by Chile that recourse could be had to judicial settlement if mediation also failed to produce results.

The Argentine Government welcomed that proposal and the Ministers for External Relations of the two countries reached agreement on 12 December to request the Holy See to assume the role of mediator. At the same time, they agreed on the basic terms of the mediation.

Unfortunately, despite these substantial points of agreement, it was not possible, owing to subsequent demands by Argentina, to make formal arrangements for mediation at that time.

The Government of Chile informs the international community that, by a letter of 20 December [*annex I*], it has invited the Argentine Government to pursue efforts with a view to the acceptance by the Holy See of the mission of mediator, so that it can assist the parties in their search for a just solution of the dispute within the framework already agreed upon.

Finally, the Government of Chile declares that the principles of peace and security proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations would be seriously undermined if it were accepted that a Member State could be threatened solely for having obtained a favourable arbitral judgement, for refusing to accede to the demand to change a boundary treaty, for safeguarding its territorial sovereignty or for maintaining that, failing direct agreement, the dispute should be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with a treaty binding on both parties.

I should be grateful if this communication could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

I wish to inform you that my Government has today submitted information on this matter to the Chairman of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States.

(Signed) Sergio DIEZ
Permanent Representative of Chile
to the United Nations

ANNEX I

Letter dated 20 December 1978 from the Minister for External Relations of Chile to the Minister for External Relations of Argentina

Christmas, which is of such deep spiritual significance to the whole world, intensifies the desire of the peoples of Chile and Argentina to live in peace, brotherhood and hope, free from danger and tensions, in their common Christian spirit. Both peoples aspire only to devote their energy to the greatness of their respective nations in a climate of tranquillity and solidarity.

These feelings, which are shared by all Chileans, prompted my Government, with a view to seeking a solution to the current dispute concerning the south, to renew in a note of 2 November 1978 the invitation extended to your Government to have recourse, by mutual agreement, to the International Court of Justice, in accordance with the 1972 General Treaty on the Judicial Settlement of Disputes. In the same note my Government invited the Argentine Republic to request mediation by a friendly Government chosen by mutual agreement. Your Government chose the proposed course of mediation.

At the meetings we held at Buenos Aires on 12 December, basic progress was made: it was agreed that the Holy See should be requested to accept the role of mediator, and that the mediation would be conducted within the framework of the Puerto Montt Act.

Despite these substantive points and agreements, the mediation was not formally arranged on that occasion.

The climate of tension prevailing between our two countries, with the risks which it entails for both, imposes upon us the inescapable duty to persevere in our joint efforts to re-establish the fraternal coexistence which characterizes our relations.

Consequently, the Government of Chile, prompted by these considerations, invites your Government to express once more to the Holy See our full confidence in it as a mediator and to request it to accept that task.

The Government of Chile also proposes to you that, as an expression of that confidence, each Government should provide the Holy See with all the background material relating to the case so that it may help us to seek a just solution to the dispute within the framework for mediation upon which agreement has already been reached.

(Signed) Hernán CUBILLOS SALLATO
Minister for External Relations

ANNEX II

Letter dated 21 December 1978 from the Minister for External Relations of Argentina to the Minister for External Relations of Chile

I have received your letter of 20 December in which, invoking the significance of the forthcoming feast of Christmas, you speak of the desire of the Chilean and Argentine peoples to live in peace, brotherhood and hope.

I fully concur in these sentiments, firmly convinced—as I have always been—of the common aspiration of Argentines and Chileans to prosper in harmony and brotherhood.

However, it is not easy to understand how the wishes and aspirations expressed in your letter can be reconciled with the proposals put forward in that same communication. These do not change in any way the situation in which we found ourselves on 12 December, which caused the breaking off of our conversations.

From the correspondence exchanged between our Governments beginning on 2 November it appears that the framework within which it had been agreed that this phase of the negotiations should be conducted required that the scope and modalities of the assistance of a friendly Government must first be determined.

The attitude now taken by Chile, expressed in your letter, continues to depart from that agreement and thus makes it impossible to specify the aspects which I have just mentioned and which for Argentina are basic conditions. Without those conditions the agreed procedure would not be conducive to applying the definitive formula which, while safeguarding peace and the essential rights of our peoples, would at the same time provide a just and equitable solution to the dispute between us.

The Argentine Government has repeatedly demonstrated that its conduct is in accordance with its firm desire to find a solution such as that which I have just described. It has therefore consistently refrained from carrying out in the area in dispute any actions or measures which would be prejudicial to the effort to settle the dispute. Unfortunately, this has not been the attitude of Chile, which, from the beginning and despite the repeated invitations extended by my country, has engaged in conduct which has altered the *de facto* situation in the area in dispute and laid down norms manifestly contrary to law on the basis of which it intends to put forward claims to insular and maritime territory which is under Argentine sovereignty.

Despite this situation, the Argentine Government, demonstrating its firm willingness to negotiate, continued the search for agreements which would be reasonable and in accordance with the interests of both countries.

As you will recall, the Argentine Government, after seeing the persistent efforts to reach agreement which it had made in the course of arduous negotiations in the Second Committee frustrated, sought to settle the controversy bilaterally—with the aid of a friendly Government—for it was aware of the urgent and imperative need to secure for the peoples of Argentina and Chile a just and lasting solution.

It was in that spirit that my Government, responding to the

proposal for a meeting of Ministers for External Relations, decided to invite you to come to Buenos Aires. In the ensuing interview, Argentina proposed that the assistance of the Holy See should be sought. That initiative, which was accepted by you, implicitly signified our country's full and continuing confidence in and respect for the Holy Father.

Precisely for this reason, my Government likewise tried to define the scope and modalities of the process of mediation so as to ensure that His Holiness would not be confronted with a persistent disagreement between the parties. Chile's intransigence

and inflexibility again prevented those efforts from producing any positive results.

My Government regrets the hoped for response was not forthcoming.

Your letter, showing that the Chilean Government persists in the attitude which it has taken, does not offer any possibility of finding appropriate formulas which will guarantee the success of the negotiating process.

(Signature)

DOCUMENT S/12981

Letter dated 22 December 1978 from the representative of Chile to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Spanish]
[22 December 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you for your information and that of the members of the Security Council the letter which the Minister for External Relations of Chile addressed on 21 December 1978 to the Chairman of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States:

"In a note of today's date I informed you and, through you, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States of the main elements of the background to the controversy which has arisen between the Argentine Republic and Chile in the southern part of the continent. In paragraph 21 of that note I referred to the letter dated 20 December 1978 [S/12980, annex I] which I addressed to the Argentine Minister for External Relations, inviting him to continue his efforts to secure the mediation of His Holiness.

"On today's date the Argentine Republic replied [*ibid.*, annex II] rejecting Chile's invitation. In addition to this, it is a matter of public knowledge that the Argentine Government has taken military measures to increase pressure along the frontier with Chile.

"My Government is seriously concerned over this state of affairs, which may unleash an armed conflict. That this concern is justified is confirmed by the fact that many Governments, realizing that the peace of America is endangered, have issued statements to this same effect.

"Therefore, invoking article 28 of the Charter of the Organization of American States and article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, I

urgently request the meeting for consultations provided for in that Treaty, so that the necessary measures may be taken for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent.

"For your information I am attaching copies of the notes exchanged with Argentina dated 20 and 21 December 1978.

(Signed) Hernán CUBILLOS SALLATO
Minister for External Relations

I should like also to inform you that His Holiness John Paul II has informed my Government, through the Ambassador of Chile to the Holy See, of his willingness to send a mission of peace to Chile and Argentina. The Government of Chile immediately accepted, again without any reservation, this noble gesture on the part of His Holiness, for which it is profoundly grateful.

Despite the foregoing, and as long as the situation referred to in the note from the Minister for External Relations of Chile transcribed above continues, my Government will have recourse to the procedures for the maintenance of peace which it is authorized to apply by virtue of the international undertakings to which it is a party.

I should be most grateful if you would have this letter circulated to the representatives of the States members of the Security Council as an official document of the Council.

(Signed) Sergio DIEZ
Permanent Representative of Chile
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12982

Letter dated 22 December 1978 from the representative of Argentina to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Spanish]
[22 December 1978]

I have the honour to address myself to you in order to inform the Security Council of the press release issued by the Argentine Government at Buenos Aires this morning, 22 December 1978, which reads as follows:

"The National Government announces to the public

that the Secretary of Public Affairs of the Vatican, Monsignor Agostino Casaroli, yesterday invited the Argentine Ambassador to the Holy See to visit him at his office in the Apostolic Palace.

"On that occasion, Monsignor Casaroli expressed

to the representative of our country the concern of His Holiness John Paul II regarding the existing situation of tension between Argentina and Chile and the desire of the Holy Father that an early and peaceful solution to the conflict should be found.

"As an indication of his personal concern and goodwill, His Holiness offered to dispatch a high-ranking representative immediately.

"The mission of the Pontiff's delegate will be public and urgent owing to the acuteness of the situation prevailing between the two countries.

"The papal envoy, on special mission, will contact the Governments of Argentina and Chile to channel the negotiations towards a peaceful solution.

"The papal decision was accepted by the Argentine Government with approval and gratitude, since the wishes of His Holiness coincide with Argentina's consistent willingness to solve the pending question, as already expressed in the message addressed by the President of the nation to the Holy Father on 16 December 1978.

"It was also learned that Monsignor Casaroli had transmitted an identical offer to the Chilean Ambassador to the Holy See even though the Government

of Chile had not yet replied at the time—2010 hours—when the Argentine acceptance was transmitted to the Vatican.

"In accepting this offer, the Argentine Government trusts that the profound wisdom of the Holy Father will make it possible to find the definitive solution which, while preserving the essential rights of both peoples, will secure peace."

The initiative of His Holiness referred to in the above press release has also been accepted by the Chilean Government. Therefore, the special mission of the papal envoy is now under way.

The Argentine Republic continues to believe that the Security Council, which bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, must be kept fully informed of the developments in this situation. It is with this conviction that my Government has instructed me to send this letter to the organ of which you are President.

I request that this letter should be urgently circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Enrique J. ROS
Permanent Representative of Argentina
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12983

Letter dated 22 December 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[23 December 1978]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the Honourable R. F. Botha, has today requested me to convey the two enclosed letters to you.

I should appreciate it if both letters could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) D. W. STEWARD
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of South Africa
to the United Nations

ANNEX I

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the Secretary-General

The Prime Minister of South Africa and I met the duly elected leaders of South West Africa on 21 December 1978 at Windhoek. Pursuant to our undertaking in the joint statement of the South African Government and the five Foreign Ministers of 19 October 1978 [S/12900, annex II], the Prime Minister and I used our best efforts to persuade them seriously to consider ways and means of achieving international recognition through the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Administrator-General.

I have the honour to inform you that the leaders of South West Africa expressed their support for an internationally acceptable settlement with a view to achieving international recognition of South West Africa's independence and the peaceful coexistence of the nations of southern Africa, as well as support for the initiative of the five Western Powers.

The South African Government thus having complied with its commitment to conclude its consultations with the leaders of South West Africa during the month of December 1978, has decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). From this it follows, *inter alia*, that

(a) There shall be no reduction of the South African troop

strength in the Territory until there has been a comprehensive cessation of violence and hostilities;

(b) A date for an election will be determined in consultation between the Special Representative and the Administrator-General on the understanding that the election will take place not later than 30 September 1979;

(c) Questions on which there should be further consultations, such as the size and composition of the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), and other matters which have already been brought to the attention of the Western Powers, will be resolved satisfactorily with the Administrator-General; special reference is made to paragraph 12 of the settlement plan [S/12636] accepted by the South African Government on 25 April 1978, with a view to monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighbouring States;

(d) The maintenance of law and order in South West Africa/Namibia remains the primary responsibility of the existing police forces;

(e) The Administrator-General shall exercise the legislative and administrative authority in South West Africa/Namibia during the transitional period until independence.

In view of the South African Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of resolution 435 (1978), it would be appreciated if you would arrange for Mr. Ahtisaari to proceed to South Africa and South West Africa as soon as possible for the purpose of completing the envisaged consultations on the outstanding issues such as the size, composition and location of UNTAG, the finalization of the UNTAG status agreement and other practical matters.

Bearing in mind the people's demand for early independence, it is imperative that these consultations be concluded during the month of January 1979.

I wish you and your staff a joyous Christmas and a peaceful New Year.

(Signed) R. F. BOTHA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of South Africa

ANNEX II

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the Secretary-General

With reference to my letter of today's date, I have to inform you that the leaders of South West Africa have also focused attention on the following serious matters:

(a) The recognition by the United Nations of SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the inhabitants of South West Africa/Namibia;

(b) The financial and other assistance which SWAPO receives from the United Nations;

(c) The encouragement which SWAPO receives directly and indirectly from the United Nations to persist with its violent activities against the people of South West Africa/Namibia;

(d) The making available by some countries of their territory to SWAPO for bases for the perpetration of violence against the people of South West Africa/Namibia.

They further requested that:

(a) Impartiality towards all political parties in the Territory should be strictly maintained by the United Nations and, in the event that the United Nations or individual States directly

should continue with their support of SWAPO, all friendly Governments should lend their support to the democratic parties of South West Africa/Namibia;

(b) All parties participating in the political process should declare in advance that they would participate peacefully and renounce violence and intimidation;

(c) All political prisoners and detainees should be released on a reciprocal basis;

(d) The United Nations should publicly dissociate itself from the forces of anarchy and terror by indicating that any existing association with SWAPO would be terminated in the event that SWAPO did not cease and desist from violence as the basis for its activities.

In conclusion they insist that the Security Council should express its final decision on the expeditious implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) to all interested parties or on before 28 January 1979.

The South African Government would be grateful if these matters could urgently receive serious attention.

(Signed) R. F. BOTHA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of South Africa

DOCUMENT S/12984

Letter dated 23 December 1978 from the representative of Egypt to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[23 December 1978]

Upon instruction of my Government, I enclose herewith the text of the statement issued by the spokesman of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 22 December 1978 regarding the latest Israeli aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

I request that this statement should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. Esmat ABDEL MEGUID
Permanent Representative
of the Arab Republic of Egypt

TEXT OF THE STATEMENT

Yesterday, Egypt together with the international community deplored Israel's aggression against Lebanon.

Notwithstanding such wide condemnation, Israel, today, has once again resorted to committing an act of aggression against Lebanon by shelling Lebanese territory by means of long-range artillery.

This new act of aggression confirms Israel's consistent policy of violating the basic norms and principles of international law as well as endangering international peace and security. Further, such irresponsible action has gravely imperiled the lives of Lebanese civilians and those of the United Nations Interim Force.

Such action is without doubt a flagrant defiance of the efforts undertaken by the United States, in co-operation with Egypt, towards the elimination of the obstacles placed by Israel to hinder the process of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

DOCUMENT S/12985

Note verbale dated 22 December 1978 from the Mission of Algeria to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[27 December 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to the United Nations has the honour to transmit to the Secretary-General a message addressed to him by His Excellency Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Minister for Foreign Affairs and member of the Council of the Revolution of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria.

The Permanent Mission of Algeria would be most grateful if the Secretary-General would arrange for the above-mentioned message to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

ANNEX

Message dated 21 December 1978 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that on 10 December 1978 at 2230 hours a foreign aircraft flying at a low altitude over the sea dropped a large quantity of arms, ammunition and explosives one and a half kilometres from the Algerian coast, directly south of Cap Sigli, about 150 kilometres east of the capital.

The security services were immediately alerted by the population and recovered all the above *matériel*. The inquiry made

by the security services helped to establish with certainty and beyond any doubt the identity of the aircraft, which was a Moroccan military aircraft type Hercules C-130.

The parachute drop was organized and carried out from Morocco by the services of the General Directorate of Studies and Documentation under the direction of Colonel Dlimi. Colonel Harchi, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel Hosni Mostefa and Captain Hassen, all of whom are from the General Directorate of Studies and Documentation, was in charge of the operation.

The Hercules C-130 aircraft with its cargo left the base at Kenitra on Sunday, 10 December at 1945 hours and passed directly over Cap Sigli at 2230 hours.

This premeditated act of aggression carried out by the Moroccan authorities constitutes a serious infringement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country and a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It represents a serious threat to the security of the region and a danger to international peace and security.

The Algerian Government, legitimately concerned at this conspicuous encroachment on its territory and this breach of its national security, strongly denounces the above-mentioned act of aggression and registers a most vigorous protest.

Algeria wishes to draw the attention of the international community to the serious consequences that may flow from such

acts, which, moreover, follow in the wake of repeated threats of frontier violations by Morocco. What is more, Morocco, in contempt of international morality, ceaselessly opposes by force the legitimate right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence, a right which only recently was solemnly confirmed by the General Assembly.

Thus, Morocco, consistently obstructing the efforts of all to bring about pacification and find a just and lasting solution to this problem, which the peoples of the region and the entire international community desire, is today embarking on a new venture, doubtless thinking that the circumstances in which the Algerian people find themselves at this time will enable it to infringe Algeria's sovereignty and threaten the achievements of the Algerian revolution with impunity.

In denouncing today with the utmost vigour the attitude of the Moroccan Government, Algeria appeals to you to ensure that the United Nations will be informed of these events, the circumstances in which they took place and the dangerous consequences to which they may give rise. We reiterate our confidence in any suitable measures that you may see fit to take in order to assist in safeguarding peace and stability in the region.

(Signed) A. BOUTEFLIKA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Member of the Council of the Revolution

DOCUMENT S/12986*

Letter dated 26 December 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[27 December 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed statement made by the Turkish Government regarding the recent elections held in Namibia.

I should be grateful if you would have this statement circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement of the Turkish Government on the elections held in Namibia

The Turkish Government rejects categorically the so-called

* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/549-S/12986.

elections held unilaterally by South Africa in Namibia from 4 to 8 December 1978 in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) and considers their result null and void.

The Turkish Government is convinced that only fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations can constitute a basis for Namibian independence and demands that South Africa fully co-operate, without further obstruction, in the implementation of these elections in which all political parties, including the South West Africa People's Organization, can participate on an equal footing.

The Turkish Government views with the greatest concern the recent developments in Namibia and demands that all appropriate action be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, including effective international sanctions, in case of South Africa's refusal to co-operate with the United Nations.

DOCUMENT S/12987*

Letter dated 29 December 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[29 December 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the latest events in the part of the territory of Cyprus still under the aggressive occupation of Turkey's invasion army, in flagrant violation of the unanimous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

As is already well known, the people of the Greek

Cypriot majority in the invaded area have been genocidally expelled therefrom because of their ethnic origin, in the most abhorrent practice of racial discrimination. Thereafter, an alien population, illegally transported from Anatolia, Turkey, is being massively implanted in the usurped homes and properties of the uprooted Greek Cypriots, in a preplanned design to change by force the demographic structure of Cyprus.

These imported settlers, whose record of criminality

* Circulated under the double symbol A/34/51-S/12987.

has become notorious in the said area, have been emboldened enough by the attitude of Ankara as to form a regular political party in the occupied north under the leadership of Colonel Ismael Tezer, a retired Turkish Air Force officer. At a press conference on 22 December 1978, Colonel Tezer declared the party's policy to be the "partition of Cyprus" and its eventual "integration with the motherland" (Turkey). This party has been promptly registered under the name of the "Turkish Unity Party" by the so-called "Turkish Cypriot authorities". Colonel Tezer's further expression, at a press conference on 26 December, of "unreserved support for President Denktas" would imply an affinity of policy.

These developments make still more manifest the unchanging pattern of partition that dominates Ankara's policy over Cyprus and is reflected in its instruments, the ruling "Turkish Cypriot leadership", imposed by Ankara upon the rank and file of the Turkish Cypriots irrespective of the latter's wishes and true interests.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12989

Letter dated 30 December 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[30 December 1978]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the Honourable R. F. Botha, has today requested me to convey to you the text of the enclosed letter.

I should appreciate it if the letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) D. W. STEWARD
Chargé d'Affaires
of the Permanent Mission of South Africa
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the Secretary-General

I have to inform you that a bomb explosion took place in Swakopmund this morning on business premises frequented by the public. According to initial reports, at least 30 persons were injured, some of them seriously. Extensive damage was caused to property and equipment.

Mr. Nujoma's statement at Dar es Salaam on 28 December 1978 to the effect that SWAPO would intensify its acts of violence, coupled with the methods employed and the circumstances

under which this latest act of terrorism was committed, indicate SWAPO involvement.


Nothing which SWAPO says or does can assist it in escaping the only alternatives open to it: either SWAPO participates peacefully in the elections or it does not participate in the elections at all.

A third choice that SWAPO can participate in the elections while at the same time continuing its intimidation and violence against the people of South West Africa does not exist.

The South African Government has in good faith undertaken to proceed with the expeditious implementation of the settlement proposal. If SWAPO persists with its brutal acts of intimidation, implementation of the settlement proposal will not be possible. By insisting on violent means of resolving the South West Africa issue, SWAPO rejects the settlement proposal in the clearest possible manner.

The South African Government would be grateful to learn, urgently, whether you believe that SWAPO has indeed accepted the terms of the settlement proposal and, if so, how Mr. Nujoma's statement corresponds with such acceptance.



(Signed) R. F. BOTHA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of South Africa




一九七八年十月紧急部队部署情况
 UNEF DEPLOYMENT AS OF OCTOBER 1978
 DÉPLOIEMENT DES CONTINGENTS DE LA FUNU, OCTOBRE 1978
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ЧВС ООН ПО ПОЛОЖЕНИЮ НА ОКТЯБРЬ 1978 ГОДА
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA FENU, OCTUBRE DE 1978

图例
 LEGEND
 LÉGENDE
 ЛЕГЕНДА
 LEYENDA


- | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| △ 观察所 | ⊙ 检查站 | ⊕ 驻有停火监督组织人员 |
| Observation post | Check point | UNTSO manned |
| Poste d'observation | Point de contrôle | Occupé par l'ONUST |
| Наблюдательный пункт | Контрольный пункт | Расположение персонала ОНВУП |
| Puesto de observación | Punto de control | Guarnición del ONUVT |





PALESTINE BELT GRID


SCALE: 1:150 000



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一九七八年十一月观察员部队的部署状况
 UNDOF DEPLOYMENT AS OF NOVEMBER 1978
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FNUOD AU MOIS DE NOVEMBRE 1978
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ СООННР ПО ПОЛОЖЕНИЮ НА НОЯБРЬ 1978 ГОДА
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA FNUOS EN NOVEMBRE DE 1978

- | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| △ 联合国观察所 | ○ 联合国部队的位置 | — 巡逻线 |
| United Nations observation post | United Nations position | Patrol routes |
| Poste d'observation de l'ONU | Position de l'ONU | Parcours des patrouilles |
| Наблюдательный пункт ООН | Позиция ООН | Маршруты патрулей |
| Puesto de observación de las Naciones Unidas | Posición de las Naciones Unidas | Rutas de patrulla |



塞浦路斯 • CYPRUS • CHYPRE • КИПР • ЧИПРЕ

- - - - - 区界
 District boundary
 Limite de district
 Граница округов
 Limite de distrito
 [Symbol] 机场, 简易机场
 Airfield, airstrip
 [Symbol] 机场, terrain d'atterrissage
 Aeroport, terrain d'atterrissage
 [Symbol] 机场, вале-опосадоочная полоса
 Аэродром вале-опосадоочная полоса
 [Symbol] 机场, pista de aterrizaje
 Aeroport, pista de aterrizaje

HQ UNFICYP
 HQ BRITCON
 HQ CANCON
 Force Reserve Sqn (-)
 UNFICYP Support Regt
 Engineer Det
 Signal Sqn
 Aviation Flight
 Transport Sqn
 Medical Centre
 Ordnance Det
 Workshop
 Canadian Logistics Coy
 UN MP Coy (-)
 RAF Helicopter Sqn Det

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

一九七八年十一月联合国部队的部署
 DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP, NOVEMBER 1978
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE NOVEMBRE 1978
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА НОЯБРЬ 1978 ГОДА
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN NOVEMBRE DE 1978

- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
土耳其部队停火线	塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线	联合国部队行动分界线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces	Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard	UNFICYP operational boundaries
Lignes de cessez-le-feu des forces turques	Lignes de cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote	Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск	Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра	Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Lineas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas	Lineas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre	Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza

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