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SECURITY COUNCIL

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THIRTY-THIRD YEAR

SUPPLEMENT FOR JULY, AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1978

UNITED NATIONS

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/...) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

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S/12829/Rev.1 and Add.1				See <i>Supplement for October, November and December 1978</i>	
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DOCUMENT S/12762*

Letter dated 22 June 1978 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[3 July 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the two communications, dated 21 February [S/12575] and 12 April 1978 [S/12669], sent to you upon instructions from my Government, pertaining to very ominous and serious encroachments by the Israeli occupation authorities upon historic, religious, cultural and residential areas adjacent to the Western Wall of the Haram Esh-Sharif Holy Sanctuary.

The two notes verbales were accompanied by two communications which had detailed the specific violations which the Israeli occupation authorities were committing along the north-western part of the Wall, as well as serious encroachments upon the Abu-Median al-Ghouth sanctuary and contiguous mosque adjacent to the Al Aqsa Mosque.

Although the information contained in the two attached communications is thoroughly authentic, the Government of Jordan had requested that an "on-the-spot inspection" should be carried out by the competent organs of the United Nations to verify the accuracy of Jordan's complaint.

It is with deep regret that, in spite of the passage of months, the Jordan Mission has received no intimation that the requested inspection has been carried out by the United Nations, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 298 (1971), paragraph 4 of which states:

"Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace."

It is to be deplored that, instead of abiding by the letter and spirit of the said Security Council resolution, the Ambassador of Israel to the United Nations chose to send a letter dated 31 May 1978 to the Secretary-General [S/12725] which is not only a non-answer to Jordan's specific charges of serious violations of the Council resolutions and numerous other resolutions adopted by competent organs of the United Nations, but is primarily a repetition of distorted, false and abusive references to the record of the Government of Jordan during the unity of the two banks of the Jordan between 1948 and 1967.

The Jordanian Mission had categorically refuted those

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/164-S/12762.

Israeli allegations on many occasions before the Security Council and the General Assembly, and particularly in the letter of 20 January 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General [S/10517] in response to similar allegations presented in a letter dated 15 November 1971 by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban [see S/10392, annex].

Since then, Israeli encroachments on the inviolability of the status of occupied Arab Jerusalem, including encroachments on historic and religious sites, have accelerated into massive proportions.

Suffice it here to state that by sequestration and forcible Israeli colonization, occupied Arab Jerusalem has been expanded fifteen-fold and at present comprises one fifth of the entire West Bank.

In view of the aforementioned, I feel impelled to reiterate that the Jordanian Mission will take every possible step to alert the United Nations to its solemn commitments and to request it to shoulder its responsibilities towards undoing all steps which the Israeli occupation authorities have taken and continue to take in occupied Arab Jerusalem because they are null and void.

Inasmuch as the letter of the Ambassador of Israel of 31 May 1978 resuscitates previous allegations against the Government of Jordan and fails to answer in a substantive, responsible and specific manner the Jordanian Mission's complaints of 21 February and 12 April 1978, I request that this letter, as well as the attached letter addressed to you on 20 January 1972, should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hazem NUSEIBEH
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Letter dated 20 January 1972 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General in response to some of the slanderous attacks levelled against Jordan, which served the Holy Places between 1948 and 1967, and also concerning the status of Jerusalem and the accomplishments of the Government of Jordan during the said period

[For the text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1972, document S/10517]

DOCUMENT S/12763*

Note by the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[5 July 1978]

The attached note verbale, dated 22 June 1978, has been addressed to the Secretary-General by the Office for International Relations of Liechtenstein.

*Incorporating document S/12763/Corr.1 of 6 July 1978.

TEXT OF THE NOTE

The Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his notes of 10 November 1977 and 3

April 1978 addressed to the head of Government of Liechtenstein concerning resolutions 418 (1977) and 421 (1977) adopted on 4 November and 9 December 1977 respectively by the Security Council on the question of South Africa.

Liechtenstein, a State not a Member of the United Nations, concluded in 1923 a customs treaty with Switzerland. Under that agreement, there is in the two countries a complete identity of legal provisions relating to the import and

export of all goods. All laws and regulations in that field are accordingly identical for the two States. This also applies, *inter alia*, to the general embargo on Swiss exports of arms to the Republic of South Africa, which was imposed as long ago as 6 December 1963. That measure was confirmed and strengthened in 1973 under the new federal law concerning military *matériel*. The export ban covers arms, ammunition, explosives and other equipment and spare parts that could be used for combat purposes.

DOCUMENT S/12764*

Letter dated 4 July 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[5 July 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the decision of the President of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, to visit during this month the Greek Cypriot citizens of the Republic in the occupied area of the Karpas. This decision, together with a request that the necessary facilities should be provided by the United Nations, was communicated yesterday to your Special Representative, Ambassador Galindo Pohl, who undertook to communicate with the Secretary-General on the subject. Subsequently, Ambassador Pohl informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Mr. Denktas placed conditions on such a visit, to the effect that a letter from the President of the Republic should be addressed to him as President of the so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" or that a meeting between them should be arranged to discuss the matter.

The President has a legitimate and fundamental right to visit citizens of the Republic in any part of the territory, particularly when, as in this case, the visit is motivated purely by humanitarian reasons, having regard to the situation of the Greek Cypriot citizens in the Karpas.

The arbitrariness of Mr. Denktas in arrogating to himself the right to impose unacceptable conditions is obviously calculated to obtain recognition, by methods of blackmail, of the so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". It also indicates that he purports to act as the instrument of Turkey, namely the power whose military forces are in control of the invaded area. By so acting, Mr. Denktas impairs his claim to the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot people. Their true interests could hardly coincide with the Ankara régime's policy of massively transporting to the occupied areas an alien population from the interior of Turkey. By their presence, as graphically described by a prominent Turkish Cypriot leader, "this paradise island has been turned into

hell". Indeed, even beyond questions of the security of the Turkish Cypriot people, their distinct civilization and their very identity as a people are being indifferently submerged and alienated under the ominous influx of population from Turkey.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest against the arbitrary action of Mr. Denktas and the over-all oppressiveness exercised on the people of Cyprus as a whole by the Ankara régime, which still continues its aggressive occupation of the territory of the Republic in violation of international law and the relevant United Nations resolutions.

The recent moves by the President of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, for the total demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic and his proposed visit to the north are genuinely intended to promote a peaceful solution through understanding, conciliation and co-operation. The "eagerness for conciliation" among the rank and file of the Cypriot people, Greek and Turkish alike, has been authoritatively noted on several occasions. It will positively emerge when it is no longer suppressed by outside partitionist interference and is relieved of the presence of a foreign army of occupation in the island.

This should be the aim of all who wish to see a just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus within the framework of the unanimously adopted United Nations resolutions.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/168-S/12764.

DOCUMENT S/12765*

Note verbale dated 4 July 1978 from the Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[5 July 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his notes dated 18 May 1978 concerning the arms embargo against South Africa.

In this reply, the Permanent Mission would like to refer to its note of 5 December 1977 [S/12473] addressed to the Secretary-General, which sets out the position of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic with regard to the embargo on arms shipments to

*Incorporating document S/12765/Corr.1 of 6 July 1978.

the racist régime of South Africa. The Permanent Mission wishes to reaffirm that the Byelorussian SSR unreservedly supports the decision of the Security Council contained in resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977.

The Byelorussian SSR has never had, does not have and will not have relations or links of any kind with the racist Pretoria régime and does not supply it with any arms or military matériel.

The Permanent Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic requests that this note should be circulated as a Security Council document.

*Incorporating document S/12765/Corr.1 of 6 July 1978.

DOCUMENT S/12766*

Letter dated 7 July 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[7 July 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 7 July 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İtler TÜRKMEN
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1978 FROM MR.
NAIL ATALAY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have been instructed by the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, to refer to the letter dated 4 July 1978 [S/12764] addressed to you by Mr. Zenon Rossides, the so-called Ambassador of the Greek Cypriot Administration to the United Nations.

The following is the text of the statement of the spokesman of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in connexion with Mr. Kyprianou's recent request to UNFICYP to escort him, in his capacity as the "President of the Republic of Cyprus", to the Karpas area in the north in order to pay a visit to what he calls the "enclaved Greek Cypriots":

"Entry into the territory of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus is regulated by the legislation and decrees of the Government of the Turkish Federated State in the north.

"Since the December 1963 onslaught on the Turkish Cypriots, the unconstitutional and illegal writ of the Greek Cypriot leadership has not run in Turkish Cypriot areas or over the Turkish Cypriots. Mr. Kyprianou is now requesting UNFICYP to help him carry his unconstitutional and illegal writ to the territory of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. This was never within the mandate of UNFICYP, as the late Secretary-General U Thant stated in his report of 10 September 1964. The relevant paragraph of the report states that 'UNFICYP was not established by the Security Council as an arm of the Government of Cyprus, and it has not been permitted to fall into such a course' [S/5950, para.220].

"It is even much less so after the radical evolution which has taken place on the island following the Greek coup d'état of 15 July 1974.

"Mr. Kyprianou's new policy of asserting his assumed authority of the 'President of Cyprus' as entitling him to speak for the Turkish Cypriots and to have a say over the territory of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus is not

compatible with the attempts sincerely made to solve the Cyprus problem through the intercommunal talks on the basis of the agreed guidelines between the two leaders of the two communities, the late Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş

"This new move by Mr. Kyprianou is an attempt to force his non-existent authority on the Turkish Cypriots via UNFICYP. We do not believe that UNFICYP will fall into this obviously funny trap.

"Furthermore, we should like to point out that there are no enclaved Greek Cypriots in the territory of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. There are Greek Cypriots living in our territory as equal members of the population. None of them has so far indicated a desire to see Mr. Kyprianou."

Replying to a question asked by journalists, the spokesman said:

"It is true that Mr. Denktaş and Mr. Clerides took each other to see their people respectively in the past. Then, the Turkish Cypriots in the south, in places like Ktima and Polis, were truly enclaved, suffering innumerable hardships and clamouring for help and for permission to come to the north. There were Greek Cypriots in the north who wanted to go south. The two leaders were in sincere dialogue in order to avert human suffering. Mr. Clerides did not visit his people in the north in an assumed role of 'President of Cyprus' claiming to have jurisdiction over the Turkish Cypriots. The two men acted as leaders interested in the well-being of their communities and trying to do the best they could for the people of Cyprus by accommodating each other in a genuine, friendly way and in meaningful dialogue.

"It is odd that Mr. Kyprianou, who rejected all contacts with the Turkish Cypriot leaders and who falsely and maliciously assumes the right to speak for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, should see the right in himself coming anywhere in the north for any reason whatsoever by using the services of UNFICYP. This attempt by Mr. Kyprianou indicates utter lack of responsibility and lack of realism."

Furthermore, Mr. Rossides repeats the same unfounded allegations regarding the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and its duly elected officials. Nothing that Mr. Rossides says will affect the reality of the actual situation in Cyprus nor the fact that Mr. Kyprianou cannot legally, politically or morally be considered "President of Cyprus".

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/172-S/12766.

Note verbale dated 5 July 1978 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic/English]
[11 July 1978]

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations has the honour to bring to the attention of the Secretary-General the text of a communication pertaining to further Israeli action designed to put more restrictions on the movements of the people of the occupied West Bank of the Jordan.

The Israeli military authority requested local West Bank leaders to provide it with names and information concerning professionals residing in and outside the West Bank, including government employees, soldiers, officers, teachers, engineers, physicians and people of other skills and trades.

The Government of Jordan wishes to express its deep concern over this move by the Israeli occupation authority, for such a move is regarded as leading in the future towards prevention of these persons from reaching the West Bank by denying the issuance of visiting permits or family reunion permits and depriving them of their legitimate rights.

It is the earnest hope of the Permanent Mission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that the Secretary-General will take prompt action to ensure the cessation of the new Israeli encroachment upon the rights of the people of the aforementioned area.

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/175-S/12767.

On account of the seriousness with which the Jordanian Government views these unfolding developments, the Permanent Mission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan further requests that this note and the communication from the Government of Jordan should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

ANNEX

Communication dated 31 May 1978 from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to all Jordanian Embassies accredited abroad

[Original: Arabic]

The Israeli military authorities on the West Bank have requested all mayors of villages and camps on the West Bank to fill in statistical forms giving full details of office holders and professional people on the West Bank or abroad, including government employees, soldiers, officers, teachers, engineers, physicians and other professionals not mentioned in the lists sent to the mayors. The authorities have requested that these reports should be returned within 10 days and have placed on the mayors the responsibility for non-registration of the names of any village residents, particularly those currently away from the West Bank, inasmuch as that will lead in the future to their being denied access to the West Bank on visiting or family reunion permits and to their being deprived of all their rights.

DOCUMENT S/12768

Note verbale dated 22 June 1978 from the representative of Fiji to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 July 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Fiji to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note of 29 March 1978, has the honour to state that Fiji is consistently and firmly opposed to the *apartheid* system of South Africa and has no diplomatic, military or any arms relations whatsoever with South Africa. Fiji has never traded arms with South Africa and does not intend to do so. Fiji's position is therefore fully consistent with the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), to which it firmly adheres and which it supports.

DOCUMENT S/12769

Note verbale dated 26 June 1978 from the representative of Chad to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[11 July 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Chad to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note of 18 May 1978 concerning resolution 418 (1977) relating to the question of South Africa, adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977, has the honour to reaffirm that the Republic of Chad does not maintain any relations with South Africa.

The provisions of paragraph 3 of the aforementioned resolution do not apply to the Republic of Chad, which has concluded no contractual arrangements with South Africa nor granted any facilities for the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types or military equipment and vehicles.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Chad wishes to recall that, in its

communication of 9 May 1978 to the Secretary-General [S/12706], the Government of the Republic of Chad reaffirmed that it unreservedly supported resolution 418 (1977).

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Chad would be grateful if the Secretary-General would have this note circulated as a Security Council document.

DOCUMENT S/12770

Note by the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 July 1978]

The attached note verbale dated 3 July 1978 from the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations has been addressed to the Secretary-General.

TEXT OF THE NOTE

The Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his notes dated 18 May 1978 regarding information sought by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa.

The Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea wishes to reiterate the contents of his note of 7 November 1977

[S/12440] to the effect that the Republic of Korea fully supports resolution 418 (1977) and will act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.

The Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea also wishes to state that the Republic of Korea has not concluded any contractual agreements with or granted licences to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles.

The Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea would be grateful if the Secretary-General would have this note circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12771

Note verbale dated 29 June 1978 from the representative of Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[12 July 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note dated 18 May 1978, has the honour to inform him that the "Law Prohibiting the Maintenance and Establishment of Economic Relations with the Republic of South Africa" was enacted in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963 and that, consequently, there do not exist any contractual or other arrangements between the two countries.

DOCUMENT S/12772

Note verbale dated 6 July 1978 from the representative of Egypt to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[12 July 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his notes dated 18 May 1978 concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa.

In this connexion, the Permanent Representative would like to state once again that the Arab Republic of Egypt does not have and will not have relations of any kind with the racist régime of South Africa; nor does it have any contractual arrangements with, or licences granted to that racist régime relating to the manufacture, maintenance and delivery of arms, ammunition of all types, military equipment and vehicles. The Arab Republic of Egypt has no intention of departing from this policy in the future.

The Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt has the honour to request that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12773

Note verbale dated 11 July 1978 from the representative of New Zealand
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[13 July 1978]

The Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his note dated 18 May 1978 drawing attention to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), which called on all States to review existing contractual arrangements and licences granted to South Africa relating to arms, ammunition and equipment manufacture, with a view to terminating them.

The Permanent Representative of New Zealand wishes to advise that no such contractual or licensing arrangements are in existence between New Zealand and South Africa.

The Permanent Representative of New Zealand requests that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12774

Note verbale dated 11 July 1978 from the representative of Sweden to the
Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[14 July 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the latter's note dated 18 May 1978 concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), adopted on 4 November 1977, which established the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

The Swedish Government, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977), has made an investigation as to whether any Swedish company manufacturing arms and related *matériel* has contractual arrangements with or licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance within South Africa of arms and related *matériel* referred to in the resolution. The investigation, which was carried out by the competent authority within the Swedish Government, has proved that no Swedish company manufacturing arms and related *matériel* has any such contractual arrangements or licences.

The Swedish Government wishes in this context to recall the fact that export from Sweden of arms and related *matériel* is not permitted without the consent of the Government. Such permits for export from Sweden to South Africa have not been granted for many years.

DOCUMENT S/12775

Letter dated 14 July 1978 from the representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[14 July 1978]

On instructions from our Governments, we have the honour to transmit to you the text of the joint communiqué issued at Luanda on 12 July 1978 by the representatives of our five Governments and of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and to request that it should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) W. H. BARTON
Permanent Representative of Canada
to the United Nations

(Signed) Wolf Ulrich VON HASSEL,
Acting Permanent Representative of
the Federal Republic of Germany
to the United Nations

(Signed) Philippe HUSSON,
Acting Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations

(Signed) Ivor RICHARD,
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations

(Signed) James F. LOENARD,
Acting Permanent Representative of
the United States of America
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUÉ

The representatives of the five Western members of the Security Council, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland and the United States of America, met the representatives of SWAPO, led by its President, Mr. Sam Nujoma, on 11 and 12 July 1978 at Luanda. During two days of frank and cordial discussion, certain points in the proposal of the five Powers were clarified and the two delegations accordingly agreed to proceed to the Security Council thus opening the way to an early internationally acceptable settlement of the question of Namibia.

The two delegations expressed their appreciation for the constructive role and warm hospitality of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the assistance of the representatives of other front-line States in bringing the talks to a successful conclusion.

DOCUMENT S/12776

Note verbale dated 18 July 1978 from the Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[18 July 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his note of 18 May 1978 concerning further measures to ensure the strict observance of the arms embargo against the racists of South Africa, has the honour to state the following.

In accordance with its principled position on this question, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is strictly applying all the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977). The Soviet Union maintains no relations with South Africa in the economic, military or other fields and accordingly has no contractual or licensing arrangements with the Pretoria régime, including arrangements concerning the delivery of arms, ammunition and military equipment.

Bearing in mind that the Pretoria racist régime, which constitutes in itself a threat to international peace, is intensifying its efforts to build up its military might and is striving to obtain access to nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union remains of the opinion that there is a pressing need for the Security Council to adopt all necessary measures in the struggle against racism and *apartheid* in southern Africa.

The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requests that this note should be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12777*

Letter dated 17 July 1978 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[19 July 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the frivolous letter of 19 June 1978 sent to you by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Arab Group at the United Nations which, at his request, was circulated as a document both of the General Assembly and the Security Council [S/12752]. As you will recall, the representative of Qatar considered that the phrase "the Judaea and Samaria districts of the west bank" implied Israeli "annexation". He claimed that the United Nations had never recognized these geographical terms, and anxiously requested you and the Secretariat to prevent "such misuse by the Israeli representative of United Nations documents".

The somewhat hysterical reaction of the representative of Qatar to the terms "Judaea and Samaria" is understandable, given that he comes from a group of countries which are engaged in a struggle to arabicize the name of the gulf on which they are situated. But to understand is not to con-

done, for petty vindictiveness when compounded with sheer ignorance is inexcusable.

One fundamental misunderstanding must be put aside at the outset. The term "West Bank" has only been given currency in English since about 1950 when the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan illegally annexed the districts of Judaea and Samaria which it had acquired by force in the war of 1948. This annexation, incidentally, was challenged by the Arab League at the time, and was never recognized internationally, except by the United Kingdom and Pakistan. Under the British Mandate, historical Palestine was divided into two parts: Transjordan and Cisjordan. If the term "West Bank" means anything, it must refer to the whole of the area to the west of the River Jordan, i.e. Cisjordan. Consequently, in referring to the limited areas administered by Israel since 1967, it is necessary to define them precisely and call them what they have been called for thousands of years, namely Judaea and Samaria.

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/184-S/12777.

Indeed, as late as 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, when referring in its report to the east bank or what is today known as Jordan, called the area "the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine".¹ This description of the area is used also in volume II, article 25, of the report of the Committee.²

It is incredible that a letter circulated as an official United Nations document should reveal such a degree of ignorance as does the communication of the representative of Qatar. The area of the Jewish Kingdom of Judah was subsequently called Judaea by the Romans. Judaea was primarily a political geographical term, defining one of the three districts into which Roman Palestine was divided. The other two were Samaria in the centre and Galilee in the north.

These names have been retained over the ages. A principal author of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), Lord Caradon, served at one time in the British Mandatory Government as the District Commissioner of the District of Samaria. Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, adopted

¹Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. II, vol. I, chap. II, para. 70.

²Ibid., vol. II, annex 20.

by the General Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, when discussing boundaries, in part II Section A, states "the boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judaea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan".

Yet in the letter addressed to you and circulated as a United Nations document, we are advised that "the United Nations never recognized . . . the names given to them by the occupation authorities" and that the Arab Group "takes a very serious view of the misuse of official United Nations documents by the Israeli representative in giving Israeli names to Arab territories in total disregard of the terminology recognized and used by the United Nations and its organs". The abysmal ignorance of history and of United Nations documents as reflected in the Arab Group letter only highlights the frivolous nature of the document circulated in their name.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be distributed as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Chaim HERZOG
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12778*

Letter dated 18 July 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[19 July 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention new evidence, from inside information, of the methods used by the Ankara régime to import into Cyprus settlers from Turkey, including the falsification of identity papers showing the settlers as though they had been born in Cyprus, on a pre-planned design to change the demographic structure of Cyprus.

These methods are revealed by the first-hand account of a written statement by Yusuf Veli Akyuz, who fled to the free part of the island, in consequence of the ill-treatment and oppressiveness he had experienced from the armed forces in the occupied area.

His statement was voluntarily given, in his mother tongue, to the Cyprus authorities on 22 June 1978. Excerpts of it appear in the attached annex in English translation.

The criminality involved in the effort to change the demography of Cyprus and the whole unacceptable situation in the occupied north, still under the aggressive occupation of Turkey, are but the outcome of the lack of enforcement measures to give effect to the resolutions of the Security Council, as duly provided in the Charter of the United Nations.

Such enforcement measures daily become a more compelling need in the interest of solving international problems like that of Cyprus through establishing the conditions for international legal order and security.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/185-S/12778.

ANNEX

"I was born on 8 August 1957 in Turkey in the village of Kalyan Cayrlé in the district of Macka in the province of Trebizond. At the age of six, I went to the village school, where I studied for five years.

"After the invasion of Cyprus, Ecevit sent a notice to the Mukhtar of our village, Mahmoud Yiadirin, inviting those who wished to go to Cyprus as immigrants to make the necessary application. Seventy families applied, including mine.

"Among the 70 families who came to Cyprus from my village were the following: Ali Dek, Mehmet Dek, Hassan Dek, Yusuf Dek, Dursu Ali Yeslilyuz (and others).

"Subsequently another notice arrived, referring to what was to be given to the immigrants in Cyprus, and those wishing to go were told to sign the appropriate forms. They were to be given television, refrigerators, furniture, a house and at least 50 donums of land. The State would pay for transportation from the village to Cyprus.

"There were 150 families in my village, of whom 70 applied to come to Cyprus. We went from the village to Mersin by bus. We left the village on 6 January 1975. We stopped at Trebizond, where our passports were arranged so as to show that we were going to Cyprus as tourists, although we were really going to Cyprus as settlers.

"We reached Mersin on 18 January . . . We boarded the ship on 21 January—200 families altogether, that is, 70 from my village and the rest from other parts of Turkey, but I don't know which parts. On 22 January, we reached Famagusta, where we were met by the Turkish Cypriot Director of the housing department, who welcomed us.

...

"We were transferred to Vasilia, where they settled us. My family was given a lemon grove of five donums, a house, three donums of irrigable land and five donums for growing grain.

"The division of land was proportionate to the size of the family. They did not give us a television, refrigerator or household equipment, because we did not arrive in time for the looting. We came a little late. They only gave us beds, a table and a few chairs . . .

...

"There are also about 80 Turkish Cypriots in Vasilia. We had continual

quarrels with them in the village, because each interfered with the others' property. There was a big gunfight between Turkish Cypriots and settlers. There were no victims. The army and the police had to intervene.

"I learned later that other families that came with us settled in Ayia Triada, Trikomo and Dhavlos.

"Six or seven months after our arrival in Cyprus we were given TFSC citizenship. They gave us identity cards. My identity card states that I was born in Nicosia.

"There are settlers all over Cyprus from Famagusta to Morphou. Settlers are still coming from Turkey, that is, they come as tourists and stay in Cyprus as immigrants. Most settlers came from the district of Adana. The settlers are poor men and they are nearly all illiterate. There are some skilled workers, but the vast majority are farmers and thieves. Their attitude is 'You have. I don't have. I come and take'. When an owner leaves his house, it will certainly be visited by thieves.

"Papers referring to our army duty came through the Turkish Embassy. The Embassy gave the fact to the appropriate Turkish Cypriot authorities, who summoned all those concerned to Kyrenia on 6 February 1978. That day, 67 settlers from all over the district came to Kyrenia to enlist. The TFSC Minister of the Interior wanted to send us to Turkey for training. The Turkish Commanding Officer, Hassan Saglam, did not agree with the proposal of the Minister and ordered that we should be trained at Gulseran camp in Famagusta...

On 1 January 1978, another 115 settlers were enlisted. There will be another enlistment of settlers on 22 June. The 115 settlers who were enlisted on 2 January are also being trained at Gulseran.

"At about the beginning of March, the training of those enlisted on 1 January 1978 was completed...

"Our training consisted in drill and the use of small arms. They divided us into two platoons. In the first platoon, in which I am, we were trained in the use of A-4 machine-guns. The second division was trained in 60,81-kilometre mortars, recoilless PAO guns and anti-aircraft guns. They also showed us the four-barrelled anti-aircraft gun, which they brought from the next camp. This camp contained an anti-aircraft unit—I think about a company...

...
"On 6 March 1978, our training was completed and the 67 trainees were sent to units of the seventh regiment at Aheritou. The commander of the regiment is a Turkish Cypriot, Ozman Kemal.

"Before I enlisted in the army, there was a fight at a wedding in which my name became entangled. I was kept under arrest for one month. While under arrest, I was beaten and violently maltreated. I lost two teeth during the beating. This was one of the reasons why I decided to desert to the Greek side. Also because of the oppression and barbarism in the army, which was unbearable..."

DOCUMENT S/12779

Note verbale dated 25 May 1978 from the Mission of Benin to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[20 July 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Benin presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and with regard to his note of 18 May 1978, has the honour to refer to its note of 4 May 1978 [S/12708] concerning the steps taken by the People's Republic of Benin to implement resolution 418 (1977) concerning the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

In the light of the request of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977), the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Benin attaches paramount importance to the strict implementation of paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977), which is addressed primarily to the Western allies and supporters of the racist régime of South Africa.

The Western countries which have significant contacts and licensing arrangements relating to the manufacture of arms have a duty to honour their commitments, since they all voted in favour of resolution 418 (1977).

The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Benin requests that the present note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12780

Note verbale dated 12 July 1978 from the Mission of India to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[20 July 1978]

The Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his communication dated 18 May 1978 calling on all States to review all existing contractual arrangements with and licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles, with a view to terminating them, has the honour to communicate that the Government of India's policy of boycott of South Africa has been complete in all fields and that India has never supplied arms etc. to the South African Government. The Government of India therefore has no existing contractual arrangements with or licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunitions of all types and military equipment and vehicles.

Letter dated 19 July 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[20 July 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 19 July 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İLTER TÜRKMEN
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 19 JULY 1978 FROM MR.
NAIL ATALAY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have been instructed by the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, to refer to the statement of Mr. Rossides, the representative of the Greek Cypriot Administration, in connexion with the demilitarization of Cyprus.³

Mr. Rossides, in his above-mentioned statement, confirms once more that demilitarization is confined only to the Republic of Cyprus and not the whole island of Cyprus.

The approach and method used by the Greek Cypriot leadership even in this respect, unfortunately, is misleading and full of propaganda. If Mr. Kyprianou and his representative, Mr. Rossides, were sincere in their proposal regarding the demilitarization and disarmament of Cyprus—in order to have any significance on a regional and/or global basis—they should have included the foreign military bases on the island and not use the expression “the Republic of Cyprus”.

My President, Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, clearly stated the

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/186-S/12781.

³Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings 27th meeting.

position of the Turkish Cypriot community during the deliberations of the Security Council on this issue on 16 July 1978 when he said:

“The point was made here that in the special session devoted to disarmament, Mr. Kyprianou had said that I was ready to have Cyprus disarmed. Our view has been sought. It is this: When we had a dialogue with the Greek Cypriot leader, the late Archbishop Makarios, there were certain factors in the four guidelines on which we agreed to have the future of Cyprus settled. One of them was the non-alignment of Cyprus. If Cyprus as a whole is to be disarmed, naturally, when the Greek Cypriot leader meets us and we discuss and dialogue begins, and when he brings this question before us, I can assure him that the Turkish co-founder community of Cyprus, the co-founder of the Republic of Cyprus, the co-founder of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus will not hesitate to agree with the Greek Cypriots if the question is put fairly and reasonably to us. It is a question which the future Republic of Cyprus, when it is constituted in its bi-communal form, will take up and decide. We might even decide it before, if the dialogue between the two leaders stands. But Mr. Kyprianou cannot decide on his own for the whole of Cyprus.” [2081st meeting, para. 248.]

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

The Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus have taken up the question of demilitarization of Cyprus during the intercommunal talks and, until we agree on this issue under no circumstances can the Greek Cypriot leadership speak for and on behalf of the bi-communal State of Cyprus as a whole and it can in no way represent the Turkish Cypriot viewpoint.

DOCUMENT S/12782*

Letter dated 20 July 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 20 July 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İLTER TÜRKMEN
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 20 JULY 1978 FROM MR.
NAIL ATALAY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the “open message” from the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, to the Greek Cypriot leadership, repeating his invitation to resume the intercommunal talks and proposing an interim

administration for Maraş (Varosha) under the aegis of the United Nations, to enable the resettlement of 35,000 Greek Cypriots. I should be grateful if this message could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

Open message dated 20 July 1978 to the Greek Cypriot leadership from the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş

This morning the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, at a press conference, repeated his invitation to the Greek Cypriot side to resume the intercommunal talks and made public the following “open message” in proof of the earnestness of the Turkish Cypriot side:

“Over the past month, the Turkish Cypriot community which it is my honour to represent, has been sincerely trying to reopen the intercommunal dialogue under the aegis of Secretary-General Waldheim so that we might

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/187-S/12782.

move together to resolve the problems of our island. It was in this spirit that we made our proposals in April and elaborated upon them in May. It has been a cause for profound regret that the Greek Cypriot leadership have not co-operated in reopening the dialogue.

"In a spirit of reconciliation and as a gesture which might help overcome any mistrust, I am sending you this public message and proposing that you accept our offer to resume negotiations on all the problems dividing us.

"As an earnest proof of our good faith, I wish to make a proposal concerning Varosha. This idea is based, in part, on Secretary-General Waldheim's recent report, in which he observed that

'the time may be ripe for a concrete attempt to deal with some important aspects of the existing stalemate on the ground, thus creating an opening for further significant steps ... The status of Varosha, which obviously should not be kept in its present empty and decaying condition, may provide an opportunity of this kind. Since Varosha is situated in the immediate vicinity of the buffer zone and is patrolled by UN-FICYP troops, it would seem natural to envisage United Nations assistance in this connexion.' [S/12723, para. 78].

"We indicated previously that Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Varosha would be able to begin returning to their homes and properties in the area as soon as the intercommunal talks were reconvened. We have specified that as many as 35,000 Greek Cypriots can thus be resettled commencing shortly after the resumption of the inter-

communal negotiations. For our part, all we require is that, in defining the area of resettlement, the legitimate security concerns of our community be taken into account. We wish to reaffirm our earlier assurances that the future political status of Varosha is fully open to negotiation

"With the above in mind, I want to make the following proposals to you:

"I am prepared to discuss, in order to dispel any unfounded doubts about our desire to facilitate a final solution to the Cyprus issue, an interim administration to be promptly set up in Varosha without any prejudice to the existing or to the final political status of the area.

"We may enter into discussions promptly to plan for the development of the interim administration's structure which may be established under the aegis of the United Nations simultaneously with the resumption of the intercommunal talks on the basis of my agreement of 12 February 1977 with Makarios.

"The interim administration's organs and functions would include the supervision of essential municipal services and the exercise of normal police functions.

"The resettlement of Varosha shall proceed by stages, commencing as soon as feasible with the resumption of the intercommunal negotiations. The United Nations would provide such technical assistance as might be necessary to survey and rehabilitate the city's infrastructure and buildings and to facilitate the process of resettlement.

"I hope you will accept this offer in a spirit of reconciliation."

DOCUMENT S/12783

Letter dated 21 July 1978 from the representative of Angola to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[21 July 1978]

I have the honour, on behalf of the Group of African States at the United Nations, to request you to circulate as a document of the Security Council the attached statement by the African Group, which was issued after its meeting of 19 July 1978.

(Signed) ELISIO DE FIGUEIREDO
Permanent Representative of Angola
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE STATEMENT

The Group of African States at the United Nations held an urgent meeting today to discuss the proposed lifting of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, on the basis of an amendment proposed by Senator Helms.

The African Group views with great concern the proposed amendment by Senator Jesse Helms, which, if passed, will lift all sanctions against the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia and cut off aid to those States that provide bases for the Patriotic Front. It would mean the resumption of all trade, including the supply of arms, and amount to a *de facto* recognition of the so-called interim government, thereby encouraging its intransigence.

The African Group condemns the proposed Helms amendment which could be construed as active support for

the continuation of minority rule in Salisbury, and categorically rejects the premises on which the proposed amendment is based, i.e. that there has been a genuine transfer of power in Southern Rhodesia and that the war has ended. The African Group reiterates its continued support for economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia until a genuine transfer of power to the majority in Zimbabwe has taken place.

The African Group views the proposed action by the United States Senate as counterproductive, especially at a time when the United Kingdom and the United States are searching for a peaceful solution of the Rhodesian problem by proposing an all-party conference. Both the Organization of African Unity and the Patriotic Front have accepted the Anglo-American plan as a basis for further negotiations, and have also accepted the idea of an all-party conference. In fact, it is Smith and his collaborators who have rejected the above.

Further, any lifting of sanctions by the United States Congress will be in direct violation of the resolution of the Security Council which imposed mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in the first place. In fact, such action would seriously hurt United States chances to continue to play an important and constructive role in the resolution of the conflict.

DOCUMENT S/12785

Note verbale dated 17 July 1978 from the representative of Spain
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]
[24 July 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to state, with reference to the Secretary-General's communication of 18 May 1977 concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa, that Spain has prohibited the export of arms and munitions to South Africa as well as the granting of licences to that country for the production and maintenance of war *matériel*.

The Permanent Representative of Spain requests the Secretary-General to have this note circulated as a Security Council document.

DOCUMENT S/12786*

Letter dated 24 July 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[25 July 1978]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to a letter dated 20 July 1978 [S/12782] from the representative of Turkey, to which was attached a document entitled an "open message" by Mr. Rauf Denktaş, regarding the new town of Famagusta, Varosha.

The purported proposals of the Turkish Cypriot leader, having regard to their time of submission and their content, show that they are patently devoid of good faith and earnestness. More particularly, the proposal regarding the opening of Varosha, hitherto a sealed-off city, is made with the single objective in mind of deceiving world opinion and in particular the United States Congress, in light of the consideration by the United States Senate of the lifting of the arms embargo placed on Turkey in 1974.

Behind the shield of the so-called "security of the Turkish Cypriots", Mr. Denktaş's proposal makes it abundantly clear that not all the rightful residents of Varosha would be allowed to return to their homes and properties, and that a substantial part of the city would be retained under the Turkish occupation. Security for all the people of Cyprus can only be secured if the proposal by President Spyros Kyprianou for complete demilitarization under the supervision of the United Nations is accepted.

Furthermore, the Turkish proposal makes it clear that any measures to be taken to set up an "interim administration" will not affect the present status of Varosha. In other words, the town will remain under Turkish control. If the Turkish proposal is accepted, it would mean that the Government of Cyprus accepts the occupation of Cyprus territory by Turkey. The Government of Cyprus is invited to participate in the "Turkish administration" of this occupied territory, in a restricted way, since such an interim administration will only deal with municipalities and the police.

The whole Turkish exercise could only be akin to the proverbial mouse from the labour of a mountain, having regard to the well-staged public relations campaign during the last few months. The fraudulent character of the Turkish proposal on Famagusta is clearly shown in the relevant explanatory note attached hereto.

Not long ago, Mr. Denktaş missed no opportunity to state that Varosha, or "Maras" as the town was unlawfully re-

named, would remain for ever Turkish, and Mr. Ecevit himself ordered the colonization of the town during the short time he served as interim Prime Minister in June 1977.

It is, therefore, clear that this remains the intrinsic policy of the Turkish side, otherwise, how could one explain Turkey's unprecedented efforts towards the lifting of the embargo, ranging from blackmail, as Senator Charles Percy said in a speech in the United States Senate on the 21st of this month, to pretence of flexibility, and its failure to come up with a convincing gesture, despite the counsel of the Carter Administration?

The continuing Turkish intransigence is so thinly veiled that *The New York Times* in a leader entitled "Cyprus and the Senate", in its issue of 22 July 1978, describes the offer as "vague" and "scarcely sufficient" and goes on to admonish that "because ending Turkey's occupation remains an essential first step toward creating an atmosphere of trust, Congress should not yet relax the restrictions on arms sales."

The New York Times description of the Turkish offer on Varosha and the call on the Senate to uphold the embargo until Turkey terminates the occupation of 40 per cent of Cyprus expose the Turkish ploy on the eve of the debate in Congress on the embargo and reveal Turkey's policy of wanting to have its cake and eat it too.

It is encouraging that, besides the Cypriot people, a growing sector of international public opinion understands the fine print in the offer.

As regards the commencement of intercommunal talks, the Cyprus Government's position is that, in order that a meaningful and productive dialogue may become possible, the Turkish side should:

(a) Abandon its partitionist policy and withdraw its proposals based on dividing the island territorially and politically;

(b) Show respect for internationally accepted democratic principles in the constitutional structure of the State;

(c) Conform with the principle of establishing a true federal republic within the strict legal meaning of the term and not talk about federation while proposing partition.

If Mr. Denktaş's proposal was not intended to mislead the members of the American Congress, in view of the discus-

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/189-S/12786.

sion of the Turkish arms embargo this week, and the Turkish side sincerely wishes to find a just and viable solution to the problem of Cyprus, safeguarding the true interests of the people of Cyprus, Greeks and Turks alike, it should, as President Kyprianou said, submit a concrete proposal to the Secretary-General for the return of Famagusta to the Government, along with new proposals of genuine federation safeguarding the principles of free movement, freedom of settlement, right of property and the withdrawal of the foreign troops. The Secretary-General would then be able to call for the resumption of the intercommunal negotiations in keeping with the agreement reached with him during his last visit to Cyprus.

In concluding, I wish to reiterate once again that my Government remains firmly attached to the procedure of intercommunal talks provided that there are the prerequisites necessary for their probable success. It is generally accepted that the Turkish proposals of 13 April 1978 did not offer the basis for the resumption of negotiations and, therefore, any new Turkish proposals should offer common ground for a meaningful and constructive dialogue.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Angelos M. ANGELIDES
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Explanatory note concerning the Turkish proposals on Famagusta

The area of the city of Famagusta proposed to be under interim United Nations authority can house about 5,000 Greek Cypriots since it consists of one seventh of the area previously under the authority of the Famagusta Municipality. This fraction would, itself, be an enclave entirely within the Turkish occupied zone.

When the Turks talk of the return of 30,000 to 35,000 Greek Cypriots, they obviously mean that the refugees will be returned to the hotels and high-rise apartment buildings, and not to their own homes and neighbourhood which would remain under Turkish occupation.

It should be emphasized, though, that even if all the hotels and apartment buildings for touristic purposes are used to house the returnees, in no way can they accommodate the 30,000 to 35,000 refugees.

In late April 1978, the Secretary of the Famagusta Municipal Authority, Mr. N. Nikiforos, and the Cyprus Tourist Organization analysed the proposals submitted by Turkey to United Nations Secretary-General Waldheim in Vienna earlier that month. Following is the summary of their analysis:

(a) What the Turks want to keep:

- Sixteen hotels with a capacity of 2,505 beds
- The only hospital

- The police headquarters and only police station
- The government offices
- Telecommunications building
- Electricity-Authority building
- Main banks
- Commercial centre of the city
- The municipal markets
- The court-house
- Municipality building
- The harbour of Famagusta
- The marina
- Both stadiums
- Both municipal tennis courts
- Seven churches
- Seven public and private high schools (gymnasiums for classic and economic studies, lyceums for commercial studies and foreign languages, as well as for hotel business)

—Eleven elementary schools.

Over and above all this, the Turks want to keep thousands of houses, complexes and high-rise buildings.

(b) What do they "offer" to the Greeks in the new enclave they are planning to establish?

- Thirty hotels with a capacity of 4,699 beds
- No hospital
- No police station
- No government offices
- No court-house
- No municipality building
- No harbour
- No stadiums
- Three churches
- One high school (gymnasium)
- Four elementary schools
- Houses for about 5,000 and high-rise buildings designed for tourist use situated in the one-seventh section of the city.

In a recent statement, the Mayor of Famagusta, Mr. A. Pougouros, strongly protested against the Turkish proposals with the following statement:

"The Turkish proposals for Famagusta constitute an unprecedented fraud. The Turks say they are ready to allow for a number of persons—always at their discretion—to return to a small territory in order to reactivate the hotels and the other tourist enterprises of the area.

"Most of the hotels and the tourist enterprises are situated in this area and it is obvious that their target is first to let the Greeks reactivate the hotels to work and gain the tourists. Once this is done, the second step is to force the Greeks out, using the same methods and tactics they used in the Karpas in the north.

"If the Turks mean to allow the return of people related to the hotel industry, this affects some 200 to 300 people. If they mean to allow the return of Greek Cypriots to the one seventh of the city, then they really mean that up to 5,000 persons can return to their homes."

DOCUMENT S/12787

Letter dated 24 July 1978 from the representative of Angola to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[24 July 1978]

I have the honour, on behalf of the Group of African States at the United Nations, to request you to circulate as a document of the Security Council the attached resolution on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its meeting at Khartoum, Democratic Republic of the Sudan, from 18 to 22 July 1978.

(Signed) ELISIO DE FIGUEIREDO
Permanent Representative of Angola
to the United Nations

RESOLUTION ON SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Fifteenth

Ordinary Session at Khartoum, Democratic Republic of the Sudan, from 18 to 22 July 1978,

Reaffirming its unequivocal commitment to support the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe until complete and genuine freedom and independence of the Territory is achieved.

Recalling the United Nations Security Council resolution which rejected the so-called internal settlement in Zimbabwe,

Affirming its conviction that the so-called internal settlement constitutes yet another manoeuvre of the illegal racist minority régime to maintain its domination and oppression of the African people of Zimbabwe,

Conscious of the imperative need to maintain and intensify the isolation of the Smith racist minority régime,

Conscious also of the fact that mandatory sanctions against the Rhodesian régime constitute an important element in the isolation of that régime and in support of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle,

Having been informed of the current moves in the United States of America to lift sanctions against the Smith régime in violation of international law,

Bearing in mind the responsibility of all States scrupulously to apply sanctions in accordance with the decisions of the Security Council,

1. *Reaffirms* its prior support for the armed struggle waged by the people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of the Patriotic Front;

2. *Condemns* all manoeuvres of the racist minority régime including the so-called internal settlement calculated to perpetuate colonial and racist domination of Zimbabwe;

3. *Calls upon* all States to continue to support the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and in particular to adhere strictly to the existing mandatory sanctions against the racist minority régime;

4. *Declares* that it is particularly incumbent upon all those states which are permanent members of the Security Council to comply with the decisions of the Council by strictly enforcing sanctions;

5. *Declares also* that any breach of sanctions by any of these States constitutes a particular affront to the dignity and aspirations of the African peoples;

6. *Considers* that such an action constitutes an unfriendly act to Africa and a serious impediment to any genuine effort towards a negotiated settlement;

7. *Requests* the Security Council to adopt further measures provided for under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DOCUMENT S/12788

Letter dated 20 July 1978 from the representative of Argentina to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Spanish]
[25 July 1978]

On express instructions from my Government, I have the honour to address myself to you with reference to the situation in Lebanon, the development of which is causing grave concern to the international community.

Because of the close ties between the Argentine Republic and Lebanon, I wish to make it clear once again that my Government and the Argentine people fully share these feelings and associate themselves with the efforts being made by the United Nations, and particularly by the Security Council, to find a solution which will spare the Lebanese nation further suffering. I should like to add, in this connexion, that large segments of the Argentine population view with disquiet the continuing loss of innocent civilian lives and destruction of property, which together are inflicting damage on the most precious heritage of a

country whose preservation is the urgent responsibility of the United Nations and the international community.

The prolongation of this situation in disregard of humanitarian responsibilities and of obligations deriving from the Charter and from international law will lead to greater tension in a part of the world with which Argentina considers itself united by very close ties of blood and culture, thus jeopardizing the efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) GUSTAVO FIGUEROA
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Argentina
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12789*

Letter dated 25 July 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[25 July 1978]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention and that of the members of the Security Council to the recent "open message" of Mr. Denktas [see S/12782] concerning Famagusta in relation to the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

In this respect, I wish to reiterate my Government's stand on that message—that its contents cannot constitute a basis

for the resumption of meaningful and constructive negotiations or a goodwill gesture of conciliation, as Mr. Denktas tried to present it. It is another manifestation of Turkish deviousness to cover up its intransigence, as well as an attempt to create false impressions to mislead international public opinion and particularly the United States Congress.

At the same time, I wish to reaffirm my Government's readiness and willingness to take part in negotiations under

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/190-S/12789.

Waldheim, in search for a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem in accordance with relevant resolutions of the United Nations. As is well known, numerous rounds of intercommunal talks have produced no results owing to the Turkish intransigence and insistence on a partitionist solution, culminating with the recent totally unacceptable proposals, which made the resumption of the talks impossible.

In the earnest desire to seek a prompt, just and lasting solution, I wish to convey the following proposal put forward by my Government:

1. All Turkish troops are to withdraw from Famagusta and the town is to be free from Turkish occupation so that all the inhabitants of Famagusta can return to their homes and properties. The town of Famagusta will be under the policing and security control of the United Nations for a period of time.

2. As soon as this proposal is accepted by the Turkish side and the town is free and put under the policing and

the lawful inhabitants of Famagusta begin to return to their homes, the Greek Cypriot side will be immediately ready for negotiations with an open agenda, under the aegis and guidance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a view to seeking a solution conforming with the resolutions of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights.

It is hoped that the Turkish side will respond to this proposal in a positive way.

I would be grateful if this letter were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Angelos M. ANGELIDES
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12790

Letter dated 25 July 1978 from the representative of the German Democratic Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[26 July 1978]

With reference to your note of 18 May 1978, I have the honour to send you the enclosed information on measures taken by the Government of the German Democratic Republic to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

(Signed) Peter FLORIN
Permanent Representative of
the German Democratic Republic
to the United Nations

ANNEX

As a socialist State, the German Democratic Republic has always advocated the elimination of all remnants of colonialism, racism and *apartheid*. It firmly stands by the side of the African States and peoples who are fighting for their national and social liberation and are resisting imperialist aggression. The solidarity support of the German Democratic Republic belongs to the peoples in southern Africa and their national liberation movements in their legitimate struggle against colonialist and racist oppression and exploitation, against imperialist manoeuvres of neo-colonialist pattern.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic has reiterated in his letter of 13 December 1977 to the Secretary-General [S/12487] that the German Democratic Republic strictly abides by the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977). It does not maintain any relations whatsoever of political, economic, military or any other nature with the *apartheid* régime in the Republic of South Africa and there do not exist any contractual arrangements with or licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition and military equipment and vehicles.

The terrorist and aggressive policy of the *apartheid* régime constitutes a gross violation of human rights and a permanent threat to peace and international security. The aggressions of South Africa against neighbouring sovereign States underline the urgency for further coercive measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Resolute measures on the termination of all collaboration with the racists are required particularly in the International Anti-*Apartheid* Year. The German Democratic Republic therefore supports the just demands of the peace-loving peoples and States to implement strictly the arms embargo, to complement it by sanctions in the economic field and to prevent South Africa once and for all from getting hold of nuclear weapons. The German Democratic Republic is prepared to co-operate closely with the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa.

DOCUMENT S/12791

Letter dated 27 July 1978 from the representative of Sri Lanka to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[27 July 1978]

I have the honour, in my capacity as Acting Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, to refer to the telegram sent to you on 25 July 1978, in connexion with the consideration of the situation in Namibia by the Security Council, by the Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries meeting at Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the text of this telegram circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) John H. N. GOONERATNE
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka
to the United Nations

TELEGRAM DATED 25 JULY 1978 FROM THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In connexion with the consideration of the situation in Namibia by the Security Council, the Foreign Ministers of

non-aligned countries meeting at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, uphold the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to freedom, national independence and territorial integrity and strongly support its legitimate struggle by every means for the liquidation of the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. The Conference extends full support to the national liberation movement of Namibia—the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)—as the sole authentic and legitimate representative of the people of Namibia. The Ministers reiterate the position of the non-

aligned movement that negotiations on independence should be conducted with the national liberation movement of Namibia, under the auspices of the United Nations, and for the sole purpose of determining modalities for the transfer of power to the people of Namibia. They demand the unconditional withdrawal of all South Africa's military forces from all parts of Namibia, including Walvis Bay which is an integral and inseparable part of Namibia, and the eradication of its entire colonial presence from Namibia.

DOCUMENT S/12794

Letter dated 27 July 1978 from the representatives of Gabon, Mauritius and Nigeria to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[27 July 1978]

We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that, during its consideration of the situation in Namibia, the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

*Signed by the representatives of the following States
members of the Security Council:*

Gabon
Mauritius
Nigeria

DOCUMENT S/12795

Letter dated 21 July 1978 from the representative of Ecuador to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]
[28 July 1978]

I have the honour to refer to your notes of 3 April and 18 May 1978 in which you request the Government of Ecuador to provide information on measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977.

I should like to inform you in this regard that Ecuador, faithful to its traditional international policy and guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, has been strictly complying with the provisions of the above-mentioned resolution and will continue to do so.

I should be grateful if you would have this communication brought to the attention of Missions accredited to the United Nations.

*(Signed) Miguel ALBORNOZ
Permanent Representative of Ecuador
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/12796

Note verbale dated 26 July 1978 from the representative of Brazil to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[28 July 1978]

The Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, Chargé d'Affaires a.i., presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, further to his note of 1 May 1978 [S/12676/Rev.1] in reply to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977, has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that the Brazilian Government has adopted the necessary internal administrative measures for the strict compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

The Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil requests that this information should be brought to the attention of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) and that this communication should be circulated as a document of the Council.

DOCUMENT S/12797

Letter dated 31 July 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[31 July 1978]

I have the honour to attach the text of a letter addressed to you on 31 July 1978 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the Honourable R. F. Botha, on the question of South West Africa.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. Adriaan EKSTEEN
Chargé d'Affaires
of the Permanent Mission of South Africa
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 31 JULY 1978 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to my statement in the Security Council on 27 July 1978 [2082nd meeting], in which I set out my Government's point of view in respect of Security Council resolutions 431 (1978) and 432 (1978). I wish to reiterate that the South African Government completely rejects resolution 432 (1978) and considers it to be devoid of any legal or factual basis. I also wish to reaffirm, on behalf of my Government, that we will not be prepared to negotiate with anybody on the basis of that resolution.

I also wish to bring to your attention the text of a statement made by the South African Prime Minister on 28 July 1978:

"Walvis Bay is South African territory and no decision by the United Nations or any other body can deprive South Africa of it. In fact, only a decision by the South African Parliament can bring about change to the status and position of the territory of Walvis Bay.

"The decision by the Security Council thus has no force of law and the Government cannot allow that it be dictated to as to what it should do with its property or how it should be controlled or administered.

"To have negotiations with a friendly Government in South West Africa about the harbour and its use is one matter which speaks for itself, but to make demands and to link these demands to a settlement in South West Africa is another matter which the Government rejects unconditionally."

The action of the Five Western Powers in the Security Council in supporting the resolution in question has shocked my Government. In this regard, I wish to draw your attention once more to that part of my statement setting out the understanding reached between my Government and the five Western Powers on Walvis Bay. Throughout the negotiations leading to my Government's acceptance of the Western proposal, the Five acknowledged that Walvis Bay was not part of South West Africa. They alluded merely to the possibility that a controversy might arise about the issue at some future stage. They acknowledged that they were not arguing at all about the political and legal situation in respect of Walvis Bay. They were not addressing the merits of the case. On various occasions my Prime Minister also

informed the representatives of the Five that the introduction of the Walvis Bay issue into the proposal would lead to the immediate termination of the negotiations. The Five more than once gave assurances that it was not their intention to address themselves to the political or legal aspects of the matter. This was reaffirmed by their abstention on General Assembly resolution 32/9 D of 4 November 1977, declaring that Walvis Bay is an integral part of South West Africa.

During the talks in New York in February of this year, it was proposed to dispose of the question of Walvis Bay in a paragraph stating that acceptance of the proposal would in no way prejudice the territorial claim of any party. At my insistence, it was agreed to delete even this implied reference to the question of Walvis Bay.

The five Western Governments again stated their position, both in the General Assembly on 25 April 1978⁴ and to us, as follows:

"All aspects of the question of Walvis Bay must be subject to discussion between the South African Government and the elected Government of Namibia".

There is no room for any doubt. The language is clear.

In the event, the final proposal contained no reference at all to Walvis Bay; nor, I may add, did Security Council resolution 385 (1976), which has throughout formed the basis of our negotiations and the final proposal.

My Government has carefully studied and considered the explanation of vote in the Security Council on 27 July 1978 [*ibid.*] by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, on behalf of the five Western Powers, as well as communications received from them on the issue of Walvis Bay.

While we cannot agree with their justifications for introducing the Walvis Bay issue at all, my Government has taken note of certain clarifications, *inter alia*, that they do not regard this subject as part of their settlement proposal and they emphasize that the resolution does not address itself to the legal status of Walvis Bay, nor does it, in any way, prejudice South Africa's legal position.

According to the Five, the "steps necessary" referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 432 (1978) means negotiation and does not seek to coerce any party. Furthermore, it is stressed, the treatment of Walvis Bay is in a future context and there is no timetable—the future of Walvis Bay can only be determined in discussion between the South African Government and the future Government of South West Africa.

In light of what has happened, two aspects have taken on special significance in the deliberations of the South African Government, namely (a) the issue of Walvis Bay, and (b) the implementation of the proposal.

I have already set out the South African Government's

⁴*Ibid.*, Ninth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 3rd meeting, para. 101.

position on Walvis Bay. Bearing in mind the manner in which this issue has been dragged into the ambit of the proposal, the South African Government is deeply concerned that the letter and spirit of the proposal would not be observed and implemented by some of the parties. Accordingly, the South African Government would wish to satisfy itself that the letter and spirit of the proposal will indeed be honoured, such as those provisions concerning the maintenance of law and order, the presence of South African forces and the functions, deployment, size and composition of United Nations military personnel and observers, as well as the commitment that the elections would be held before the end of 1978.

In spite of our misgivings flowing from the circum-

stances set out above, the South African Government, as well as the Administrator-General of South West Africa, would be willing to receive your Special Representative and to await his subsequent report on the manner in which he, in his capacity as your Special Representative, envisages the implementation of the proposal, which we on our part accepted in good faith on 25 April last. On receipt of his report the South African Government will decide whether his recommendations are indeed in accordance with the proposal.

(Signed) R. F. BOTHA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of South Africa

DOCUMENT S/12798

Note verbale dated 26 July 1978 from the representative of Argentina to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]
[1 August 1978]

The Deputy Permanent Representative of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his note of 18 May 1978 concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

In this connexion, the Government of Argentina wishes to reaffirm the statement in its communication of 30 January 1978 [S/12551] and accordingly to reiterate that it has no contractual arrangements with South Africa for the supply of arms nor has it granted that country licences for the manufacture and maintenance of arms, munitions of any type, equipment or military vehicles.

DOCUMENT S/12799

Note verbale dated 14 July 1978 from the Mission of Greece to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[2 August 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's notes of 18 May 1978 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

In this regard, it should be stressed that Greece, having consistently condemned the policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination, has never entered into any contractual arrangements for the provision to South Africa of arms or related *matériel*.

DOCUMENT S/12800

Letter dated 3 August 1978 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[7 August 1978]

I take pleasure in addressing you in response to the request of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa with reference to paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977).

The Mission of which I am in charge confirms that Jordan has not maintained and will not maintain relations of any kind with the racist régime of South Africa and will continue to comply with all the decisions taken by the United Nations against that régime. Therefore, it does not have to review any contract or licence relating to the manufacture of military equipment, as mentioned in paragraph 3.

I should be grateful if this note could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sami I. GAMMOH
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Jordan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12801*

Application of Solomon Islands for admission to membership in the United Nations: note by the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[7 August 1978]

In accordance with rule 135 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate herewith the application of Solomon Islands for admission to membership in the United Nations, contained in a letter dated 24 July 1978 from the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands to the Secretary-General.

LETTER DATED 24 JULY 1978 FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOLOMON ISLANDS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour, as the Prime Minister of the youngest nation in the world, newly born on 7 July 1978, and on behalf of the Government of Solomon Islands, hereby to make this application for membership in the United Nations with all the rights and responsibilities attached thereto.

It is my country's earnest wish that this application should

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/202-S/12801.

be considered by the Security Council at its next meeting and by the General Assembly during its thirty-third session. To this end, a declaration made in pursuance of rule 58 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and rule 134 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly is set out hereunder.

Declaration

In connexion with the application by Solomon Islands for membership in the United Nations, I have the honour, on behalf of Solomon Islands and in my capacity as Prime Minister, to declare that Solomon Islands accepts the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly undertakes to fulfil them.

(Signed) Peter Kauona Keninaraisoona KENILOREA
Prime Minister of
Solomon Islands

DOCUMENT S/12802

Note verbale dated 27 July 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[8 August 1978]

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the latter's note dated 18 May 1978 regarding paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa, adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977.

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. wishes to state that Cyprus does not have any arms or munitions industry and that the Government of Cyprus complies with and fully implements all United Nations resolutions establishing sanctions against South Africa.

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. has the honour to request that this note verbale should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12803

Note verbale dated 2 August 1978 from the representative of Barbados to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[8 August 1978]

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Barbados to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 18 May 1978 concerning resolution 418 (1977) relating to the question of South Africa, adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November

1977, has the honour to reaffirm that the Government of Barbados does not maintain any relations with South Africa.

The provisions of paragraph 3 of the aforementioned resolution do not apply to the Government of Barbados, which has concluded no contractual arrangements with South Africa nor granted any facilities for the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles.

The Government of Barbados is in compliance with the provisions of resolution 418 (1977) concerning the mandatory arms embargo against the Republic of South Africa and does not export arms or related *matériel* to the Republic of South Africa.

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. would be grateful if the Secretary-General would have the text of this note circulated as a Security Council document.

DOCUMENT S/12804

Letter dated 9 August 1978 from the representative of Angola to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[10 August 1978]

I have the honour to refer to your note of 18 May 1978 and to reaffirm that the People's Republic of Angola does not have any relations, whether political, economic, commercial or otherwise, with the illegal racist minority régime of South Africa.

The provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977) do not apply to the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, since it has never had any contractual relations with South Africa, either in the field of armaments or otherwise; nor has the Government of the People's Republic of Angola ever granted to South Africa any co-operation or facilities for the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles.

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola considers it a foremost duty to observe the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and does not engage in the export of arms or related *matériel* to the *apartheid* régime in South Africa.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) ELISIO DE FIGUEIREDO
Permanent Representative of Angola
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12805*

Letter dated 7 August 1978 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 August 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the communication addressed to you on 5 July 1978 by the Chargé d'Affaires of Jordan [S/12767] and to state the following.

The allegations contained in the above-mentioned note are misconceived and designed to mislead.

The facts are that, in 1977, a suggestion made on a personal initiative was presented to the Military Administration of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza recommending the registration of all inhabitants of these areas who had left and remained abroad. Ostensibly, this would facilitate the procedures for arranging family visits or reunions. The suggestion, however, was never implemented nor even endorsed. The regulations and practice stand: families applying for permits for relatives to visit or to be reunited with them are required to provide the appropriate data only upon actually submitting the application.

It should be noted in this connexion that, except for rare cases, there are no restrictions on the movement of incoming and outgoing visitors and goods between Judaea, Samaria and Gaza and different Arab countries. During 1977-1978, nearly 1 million persons and well over \$160 million worth of goods crossed the Jordan River in both directions. This movement continues in full during the current summer.

It should be recalled that Israel is assuming considerable risks and acts solely out of goodwill in allowing such an interchange of persons and goods with countries not at peace with Israel.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) SHAMAY CAHANA
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Israel
to the United Nations

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/203-S/12805.

DOCUMENT S/12806*

Letter dated 9 August 1978 from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 August 1978]

On behalf of the Arab Group at the United Nations, I have the honour to refer to the letter of 17 July 1978 sent to you by the representative of Israel [S/12777] and to state the following.

That letter evades the central issue, which is the persistent policy of the Government of Israel to destroy the identity of the Palestinian people, deny them their inalienable rights and annex the occupied Arab lands in Palestine and elsewhere by all means, including the alteration of the names of some of these territories. In this connexion, it is relevant to recall several General Assembly resolutions condemning the continued illegal occupation by Israel of Palestine and other Arab lands and the continued violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hammoud EL-CHOUFI
Permanent Representative
of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/204-S/12806.

DOCUMENT S/12809

Note verbale dated 9 August 1978 from the Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[14 August 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his notes of 18 May 1978 concerning compliance with the Security Council resolutions relating to an embargo on the supplying of weapons to the racist régime in South Africa, has the honour to state the following.

In accordance with its position of principle on this question, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is strictly and fully applying the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) and has no political, economic, military or other relations of any kind with the racist *apartheid* régime. In particular, the Ukrainian SSR does not have and does not intend to conclude any licensing arrangements with South

Africa for the sale or delivery to the South African racists of military equipment, arms, ammunition, military supplies or other such *matériel*.

In view of the Pretoria régime's ceaseless military build-up and considering its plans to obtain access to nuclear weapons, together with its persistent acts of aggression against neighbouring independent African States, the Ukrainian SSR believes it is essential for the Security Council to take further effective action to combat racism and *apartheid* in southern Africa.

The Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic requests that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12810

Note verbale dated 14 July 1978 from the representative of Hungary to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[14 August 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's notes of 18 May 1978, has the honour to communicate the following.

In reply to the Secretary-General's note concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977), the Permanent Mission of the Hungarian People's Republic, in its note of 13 De-

ember 1977 [S/12485], stated that the Hungarian Government, in conformity with its socialist foreign policy and with earlier resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, had terminated all relations with the racist régime of the Republic of South Africa. On this occasion, the Permanent Representative wishes to reaffirm the Hungarian Government's decision made in 1963 in this regard.

In pursuance of the decision referred to above, the Hun-

garian Government has never shipped any kind of weapons to South Africa and has not entered into any contractual arrangements with it promoting the manufacture of military equipment. The Hungarian Government's position of principle in these matters will consistently be maintained in the future too.

The Permanent Representative has the honour to request that this note verbale should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12811*

Letter dated 14 August 1978 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[14 August 1978]

I am sending you herewith the text of a statement of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations.

I request you to have this statement circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. FOKINE
Acting Permanent Representative
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the statement

The Soviet Union has already drawn the attention of the States Members of the United Nations to the unlawful actions of the United States in relation to the strategic Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), which is leading to the dismemberment and annexation of the Territory.

In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Trusteeship Agreement of 1947 between the Security Council and the United States [see resolution 21 (1947)], and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the United States has the obligation to promote the political, economic and social development of Micronesia and the realization by its people of the right to self-determination and independence.

However, the way in which the United States has been carrying out its functions as Administering Authority for the Territory of the Pacific Islands during more than 30 years has made it abundantly clear that the United States, disregarding the lawful rights, interests and will of the people of Micronesia, has been pursuing a policy aimed at perpetuating its rule over that Territory and at turning it into a colonial appendage of the United States.

As a result of that policy, the population of the Trust Territory of Micronesia has been deprived of the opportunity to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination and independence as confirmed in the Charter. Its economic and social situation not only has not improved but, according to the testimony of the Micronesians themselves, has in many ways become worse than it was when the United States assumed the obligations of the Administering Authority.

Applying the "divide and rule" principle, the United States is flagrantly disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of Micronesia and is pursuing a

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/205-S/12811.

policy of dismembering it and annexing it piecemeal. A different status is being imposed on the component parts of Micronesia under the false guise of "political union" for one part of Micronesia and "free association" for the other part.

These actions of the United States are in glaring contradiction to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the many decisions of the United Nations unequivocally condemning "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of colonial Territories".

Everyone remembers the facts of the extensive use by the United States of the Territory of Micronesia as a proving ground for testing atomic and hydrogen weapons, which claimed many victims and caused irreparable harm to the health of the indigenous inhabitants and to the environment in a vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean. The United States press was repeatedly obliged to acknowledge the harmful consequences of nuclear weapon tests in the Pacific Islands.

All of this is evidence that the United States is flagrantly trampling underfoot the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Micronesians.

It has now become quite clear that the United States, pursuing an expansionist policy in respect of Micronesia, is seeking to retain and consolidate its control over vast areas of the Pacific Ocean and strengthen its military-strategic positions in that part of the world.

This policy of the United States constitutes a serious threat to the security of the peoples not only of Micronesia but also of the countries of Asia and Oceania which are part of that area.

The question of the fate of Micronesia is an inseparable component part of the problem of decolonization and of securing for the colonial countries and peoples their right to self-determination and independence. It cannot and must not be decided by the United States arbitrarily and unilaterally, in circumvention of the United Nations and its Security Council. Under the Charter, any change in the status of a strategic Trust Territory must be carried out only by decision of the Security Council, and consequently the unilateral actions of the United States in respect of Micronesia cannot be recognized as lawful and as having legal force.

Acting in accordance with the Charter, with the interests of strengthening international peace and security and with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the United Nations and its competent organs should take the necessary steps to enable the people of Micronesia freely to exercise their lawful right to genuine freedom and independence, including the formation of an independent State.

It is the duty of all States which support the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples resolutely to defend the just cause of the people of Micronesia, who have been fighting for many years to rid themselves of colonial dependence.

DOCUMENT S/12812

Letter dated 14 August 1978 from the representative of Ethiopia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[15 August 1978]

I have the honour to refer to your note of 18 May 1978 and to inform you that the Government of Socialist Ethiopia maintains no relations whatsoever with the racist minority

illegal régime of South Africa, whether in the political, economic, commercial or other fields.

Consequently, the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution

418 (1977) do not apply to the Government of Socialist Ethiopia since it has never had any contractual relations with South Africa, either in the field of armaments or otherwise; nor has the Government of Socialist Ethiopia ever granted to racist South Africa any co-operation or facilities for the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles.

The Government of Socialist Ethiopia deems it of the utmost importance, in this regard, that the mandatory arms embargo be strictly observed by all and wishes to reiterate its conviction that the arms embargo now in force is insuffi-

cient and that a mandatory comprehensive economic sanction under Chapter VII of the Charter is needed to force the racist régime of Pretoria to abandon its abhorrent policy of *apartheid*.

I should be grateful if this communication could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed Hamid IBRAHIM
Permanent Representative of Ethiopia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12813

Letter dated 9 August 1978 from the representative of Colombia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[15 August 1978]

I have the honour to refer to your note dated 18 May 1978 regarding paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa, adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977.

I wish to state that Colombia does not have any arms or munitions industry for export purposes and that the Government of Colombia complies with all United Nations resolutions establishing sanctions against South Africa because of its *apartheid* policy.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) ALVARO BONILLA-ARAGÓN
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Colombia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12814

Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of Solomon Islands for admission to membership in the United Nations

[Original: Chinese/English/French/Russian/Spanish]
[16 August 1978]

1. At its 2083rd meeting on 16 August 1978, the Security Council had before it the application of Solomon Islands for admission to membership in the United Nations [S/12801]. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report. The Council agreed to waive the deadline for reporting set out in the last sentence of rule 59.

2. At its 62nd meeting, held the same day, the Committee considered the application of Solomon Islands and unan-

imously decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of Solomon Islands for admission to the United Nations (S/12801),

"Recommends to the General Assembly that Solomon Islands be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

DOCUMENT S/12815

Note verbale dated 16 August 1978 from the Mission of Madagascar to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[16 August 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Madagascar to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the note of 10 November 1977 in which the Secretary-General asked Member States for infor-

mation on the measures taken pursuant to Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

In this connexion, the Mission is authorized to reiterate the firm and unequivocal opposition of the Malagasy Gov-

Republic of the Sudan. Our delegation and we ourselves greatly appreciate the traditional hospitality of the Sudanese people.

Mr. President,

We are all aware of the tireless, admirable effort made by the hard-working Sudanese people under your exalted, wise leadership to strengthen African unity and make the fifteenth summit conference of our continental organization, OAU, a truly historic summit of understanding, harmony and co-operation among all African States devoted to freedom, justice, peace, dignity and social progress.

That is why we regard the holding of this fifteenth summit conference of OAU at Khartoum as a well-deserved tribute to you, Mr. President, to your Government and to the courageous Sudanese people.

Mr. President,

Your view and your analyses of the problems which here and there afflict our African continent, your vigorous, decisive action in the Middle East conflict and your avowed opposition to the annexationist and expansionist designs of certain States demonstrate that the Sudanese people, under your enlightened leadership, are making a decisive contribution towards creating conditions conducive to a solution of the problems which pit some States members of our continental organization against others and towards finding the most effective ways and means of establishing peace, solidarity and genuine co-operation among all African States. If these objectives are to be attained, however, the peoples and States of Africa must at all costs join in resolutely opposing all the subversive machinations, divisive manoeuvres and acts of armed aggression by international imperialism, which is more determined than ever to destabilize certain independent African States and reconquer our great and beautiful African continent in its avid desire to continue the shameless plunder of our natural resources and wealth.

We therefore consider it essential today to draw the most particular attention of Your Excellencies, the heads of State and Government, members of OAU, and of the peoples of Africa as well as other peoples throughout the world devoted to freedom, justice, dignity and peace, to an international situation characterized by the sharpening of contradictions between the camp of the forces of liberation and progress and the camp of the forces of reaction, oppression and exploitation of man by man. The rapid strides being made by the national liberation struggles, the challenging of the established colonial and neo-colonial order on many fighting fronts by virtually all the peoples of Africa and the third world and the rejection by the oppressed and exploited African peoples of the unjust, devious solutions imposed by international imperialism in the various fratricidal conflicts which are convulsing the African continent have caused the imperialist countries to throw off the mask of non-interference and assume the role of "policeman" by intervening directly with their regular and mercenary armies in order to protect their sordid, selfish interests. Thus, on our African continent, international imperialism has also, because of the broad expansion and intensity of the peoples' liberation struggle, cynically conceived a new global strategy for colonial reconquest, the protection and defence of its so-called spheres of influence and the plunder of our vast natural resources.

Our great African continent is thus today the focal point of the national liberation struggles and a veritable symbol of the heroic courage of the peoples of the third world as they face international imperialism, a powerfully armed enemy which persists in believing that the African continent must remain forever its privileged area, its hunting preserve, its sphere of influence, oppression and exploitation, and, above all, its inexhaustible source of raw materials and testing ground for sophisticated weapons.

From Western Sahara to Namibia, from South Africa to the Middle East and in Zimbabwe, imperialism is on a rampage, killing and looting in order to maintain itself and ensure its control of convenient strategic, political and economic positions. Thus, added to the many concerns of decolonization and national liberation facing the peoples and States of Africa, are the equally important problems arising from the hateful system of *apartheid* maintained by the racist and Fascist régimes in southern Africa, which make the situation extremely complex and dangerous to world peace.

Mr. President, heads of State and Government, distinguished delegates,

The new global strategy developed by international imperialism for the purposes of colonial reconquest, enslavement of the peoples of Africa and exploitation of our vast natural resources has a number of different aspects, the most important of which can be summed up in a few words.

The first of these is the delaying tactics of the imperialist countries or their categorical refusal to take seriously and consider in a responsible manner the many problems of decolonization arising in the part of our continent that is still under foreign and racist domination.

In response to an aroused world public, to the genocide being systematically practised against the black populations by the racist, Fascist

régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, and to the support being received by the national liberation movements of southern Africa from all countries devoted to freedom, justice, dignity and peace, the United Nations has adopted a number of resolutions on the matter whose consistent implementation would have permitted a start to be made in solving the many problems presented by the occupation of the southern part of our continent. These just resolutions, which call for a complete embargo on aid of any kind to the racist, Fascist régimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, have always been flouted and openly circumvented by certain imperialist countries, which are not only continuing to provide significant economic aid to the hateful *apartheid* system but are also shamelessly sending massive shipments of the most sophisticated weapons to the racist, Fascist régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia for the purpose of opposing the national liberation movements and slaughtering the children, youth, old people and patriots of the black majority who are steadfastly determined to win by force their freedom, their independence and their national sovereignty. Under these inhuman, anti-social conditions characterized by disregard for human rights, it is obvious that the insolent, barbarous conduct displayed by all the racist, Fascist régimes stems from the fact that their imperialist allies have given them iron-clad guarantees of steadfast, powerful support in all fields and by all possible means despite the wrath and indignation of the international community so as to keep the vast wealth of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa under the control of international capitalism. The delaying tactics of international imperialism are thus clear to all, for it agrees under the pressure of world opinion to proposals aimed at completely decolonizing the southern part of our continent while at the same time, where deeds are concerned, cynically initiating, for the purpose of blocking this widely touted decolonization, a set of diabolical manoeuvres which, based on obfuscation and subterfuge, are as crude as they are inexplicable.

The second aspect of the global strategy of colonial reconquest, enslavement of the African peoples and exploitation of their resources by international imperialism is the determination deliberately to disregard at all costs the fact that the problem of Western Sahara is a problem of decolonization and self-determination and that in backing and openly supporting by direct armed intervention the dismemberment of Western Sahara and its division between Morocco and Mauritania, both of them members of our international and continental organization, imperialism is, in the last analysis, simply seeking to divide the African States members of OAU and set them against each other. This deplorable anachronistic situation, which is a source of great concern for all of Africa, is well understood by all the African peoples and by the valiant and invincible Saharan people who, armed with manly courage and an unshakable determination and acting under the revolutionary leadership of the POLISARIO Front, are daily and heroically beating back the repeated assaults of African expansionist and annexationist foreign troops and the interventionist troops of the colonialist and neo-colonialist Powers of Western Europe.

We must ask ourselves here and now if there is still on our continent of Africa, and more specifically in this imposing chamber of the majestic Hall of Friendship and Solidarity of the African Peoples, a single African head of State and Government, representing a member of our continental organization which has signed the Charter of this organization and is consequently guided by the noble ideals of OAU, who would still dare to continue denying to the heroic martyred people of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic the right to existence, the right to freedom, the right to dignity, the right to independence and the right to national sovereignty. We say no and we do so because of the very nature of the Charter of OAU and the Charter of the United Nations. The fact is that the peoples and States members of OAU became aware at a very early stage of the profound tragedy inherent in the alarming and deplorable situation faced by the martyred Saharan people. Hence the summit conference of our organization held in Mauritius in 1976 decided to hold a special summit conference of OAU devoted to the problem of Western Sahara. But the firm determination of our continental organization to find a just solution to this historic problem of decolonization and self-determination of the Saharan people has inspired fear in international imperialism, which, by culpable acts of complicity in Africa itself and by inexplicable delaying tactics at all levels, has so far prevented the convening of that special summit conference of OAU.

Through us, the militant people of the People's Republic of Benin, their Revolutionary Military Government, their vanguard Party, the Party of the People's Revolution of Benin, exhort all peoples, all heads of State and Government of our continental organization, not to yield any longer to the tactics of division cleverly orchestrated by international imperialism with respect to the problem of Western Sahara and to do everything in their power to ensure that the sun of freedom, justice, dignity, independence and national sovereignty will finally rise over the whole of the territory of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic—in short, that this martyred Saharan

territory will finally see the dawn of independence, the basis of true African co-operation, of which ECOWAS is the first link whose forging was so eagerly awaited by all the peoples and all the States of West Africa.

At this time when the peoples and all the States members of OAU are unanimously agreed that the front-line countries and States should give active military assistance to the liberation movements of southern Africa, can there still be even one among us who would dare to take arms against another African national liberation movement, in Africa and in the world? We are convinced that at this fifteenth summit conference a firm and historic decision will be taken unanimously by all the heads of State and Government present so that a just solution will be found for the problem of the heroic Saharan people which will be a credit to and will enhance the greatness of both our organization and our continent, a continent which is today more than ever the target of the limitless greed of international capitalism whose grip is again cruelly making itself felt in all parts of the world where natural resources and immense riches can be exploited for its sole profit.

Similarly Palestine, because of its strategic position, is unceasingly the scene of all the disorders and terror caused by imperialism in the Middle East. The repeated instances of armed aggression which have occurred in that region have been prepared and guided by remote control from the great capitals of the imperialist countries. Here too our organization should unequivocally affirm the right of the Palestinian people to life, to freedom, to dignity, to independence and to national sovereignty. Our continental organization, OAU, by reason of its vocation, by reason of the great potential of our continent, has a great historic role to play and it should play this role fully and effectively so that peace may be restored in the Middle East, in Western Sahara, in southern Africa and everywhere else in the world.

The third aspect of the global strategy of colonial reconquest and enslavement of the African peoples by international imperialism is the destabilization of the progressive countries of Africa.

Since their victories over the Portuguese imperialist troops and over the mercenary hordes, the People's Republic of Angola and the People's Republic of Mozambique, in common with all the front-line States, have been continually harassed, bombed and attacked from the territories in southern Africa illegally occupied by racist and Fascist régimes. This affords further proof of the fact that international imperialism has never forgiven and will never forgive a people for freely choosing national dignity, independence and sovereignty. This was the case with the valiant people of the sister Republic of Guinea, which was the victim, on 22 November 1970, of a criminal imperialist Portuguese armed attack carried out by a band of mercenaries, who landed at Conakry, in an attempt to force the heroic and invincible Guinean people to their knees. It also happened to the brave people of Benin when, on Sunday, 16 January 1977, a horde of drugged mercenaries armed to the teeth, launched a cowardly attack on our country, the People's Republic of Benin, for the despicable purpose of liquidating the Beninese revolution and recolonizing our militant and hard-working people.

Each of these attempts at colonial reconquest was invariably met on the part of all peoples of Africa who care for freedom, justice, dignity and peace to the best of their ability, by an immediate and popular retaliation which, in each case, succeeded in routing the aggressive mercenary troops who are motivated only by the enticement of easy gain and a taste for massacring the African popular masses.

The fourth aspect of the global strategy of colonial reconquest and enslavement of the African peoples is the vain hope of stifling, by all possible despicable and criminal means, the unshakeable determination of the peoples under colonial and neo-colonial domination to rid themselves once and for all of foreign domination and of the exploitation of man by man.

The recrudescence of armed attacks by mercenaries and the direct intervention by the regular armies of the imperialist countries in certain countries of Africa constitute an unprecedented illustration of this design and a flagrant violation of the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and of the United Nations.

Lastly, the fifth aspect of the global strategy of colonial reconquest and enslavement of the African peoples is to be seen in the indefatigable efforts of international imperialism to sow discord among and divide the members of our organization. Thus, when we achieve unanimity on certain burning issues affecting our continent, such as the problem of Western Sahara, and when we achieve success or reach an understanding in the interests of our peoples and of our States, these developments automatically become a matter of alarm and concern to international imperialism, which is afraid that we may take effective concerted action against its sordid and selfish interests which are centred mainly on the plundering of our vast and as yet untapped natural resources.

In the face of this ignoble and criminal global strategy of colonial recon-

quest on the part of international imperialism, the heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and all African peoples must remain clear-headed, far-sighted and vigilant.

Indeed, no people on the African continent can allow international imperialism to seize its riches. No people on the African continent can allow direct or indirect domination by international imperialism, whether that domination is overtly racist or Fascist, as in southern Africa, or underhand and neo-colonialist as in many other countries of Africa and the third world. No people on the African continent can let themselves be recolonized by international imperialism. Therefore those who, in Africa or elsewhere, consider that the survival of their peoples and their States depends on international co-operation without discrimination of any kind must do all in their power to ensure that this international co-operation will be carried out in a context of strict respect for non-alignment, equality, territorial integrity, mutual advantage and national dignity. Those who, on the other hand, in Africa or elsewhere, believe that the survival of their peoples and the economic development of their States is contingent on a symbiotic co-operation with monopolist capitalism, must be extremely careful, or they eventually may have to answer to history for the recolonization of their countries by the oppressor and exploiter which is international imperialism.

In any case and as far as our country, the People's Republic of Benin, is concerned, our hard-working and militant people are quite well aware that it is because, after our great revolutionary movement of national liberation began on 26 October 1972, they responsibly and knowingly chose the course of freedom, dignity, independence and national sovereignty, in short, the course of consistent anti-imperialist struggle, that they were subjected to a cowardly attack on Sunday, 16 January 1977.

Early in the morning of that Sunday, 16 January 1977, a pirate DC-7 aircraft from Franceville in Gabon made a secret landing at Cotonou international airport, carrying a horde of mercenaries recruited and paid by international imperialism and equipped and trained at the Benguerir military base in Morocco.

These international outlaws, heavily armed and drugged, had no sooner landed than they launched a bloody attack against our country and against our peaceful revolutionary people.

The first objective of this horde of mercenaries was to attack and take by surprise the main strategic points in our economic capital, Cotonou. Their second objective was to seize the leaders of the Beninese revolution and liquidate them, and their third objective was to set up, by means of terror and bloodshed, a puppet Government entirely dedicated to the sordid and selfish interests of the oppressor and exploiter that is international imperialism. Lastly, their fourth objective was to disband the national armed forces and proceed to form a colonial and neo-colonial Fascist army for the repression of the popular masses in our towns and country areas.

In the circumstances, it is clear that the action and movement of this band of perfidious and lawless invaders had but one purpose, namely, purely and simply, the reconquest of our country, the People's Republic of Benin.

However, the revolutionary people of the People's Republic of Benin, which has never accepted and never will accept foreign domination, inflicted an overwhelming historic defeat on these specialists in mass crime, these international outlaws financed, armed, trained and transported, alas, with the shameful and actual criminal participation of certain heads of States members of the Organization of African Unity. What more need be said?

At all events, as far as we are concerned, we would beg all the eminent heads of State and Government and all the distinguished delegates present here to remember that, in their hasty flight, the head of the mercenaries, that international scoundrel, Colonel Gilbert Bourgeaud, alias Colonel Maurin, alias Bob Denard, current Chief of Staff of the National Armed Forces of the Comorian State, abandoned on the battlefield a sizeable stock of war *matériel*, arms and munitions of French, American, Belgian, South African and Moroccan origin, as well as a considerable batch of documents particularly edifying and damning for certain heads of State of the Organization of African Unity.

We have proof to support our statements. We have not used scurrilous language. In the normal course of events, the persons responsible should subject themselves to criticism and self-criticism if they wish to save Africa and the African peoples. But we must recognize today that the Beninese people, who emerged victorious from this armed confrontation, paid very dearly for the defeat inflicted on the invaders, through the cruel loss of some of their worthy sons, who fell, arms in hand, on the field of honour, through the large-scale destruction caused to public and private buildings and through all the other damage caused to our national activities.

The People's Republic of Benin is not at war with any country. It is not

Republic of the Sudan. Our delegation and we ourselves greatly appreciate the traditional hospitality of the Sudanese people.

Mr. President,

We are all aware of the tireless, admirable effort made by the hard-working Sudanese people under your exalted, wise leadership to strengthen African unity and make the fifteenth summit conference of our continental organization, OAU, a truly historic summit of understanding, harmony and co-operation among all African States devoted to freedom, justice, peace, dignity and social progress.

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Mr. President, heads of State and Government, distinguished delegates,

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The first of these is the delaying tactics of the imperialist countries or their categorical refusal to take seriously and consider in a responsible manner the many problems of decolonization arising in the part of our continent that is still under foreign and racist domination.

In response to an aroused world public, to the genocide being systematically practised against the black populations by the racist, Fascist

régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, and to the support being received by the national liberation movements of southern Africa from all countries devoted to freedom, justice, dignity and peace, the United Nations has adopted a number of resolutions on the matter whose consistent implementation would have permitted a start to be made in solving the many problems presented by the occupation of the southern part of our continent. These just resolutions, which call for a complete embargo on aid of any kind to the racist, Fascist régimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, have always been flouted and openly circumvented by certain imperialist countries, which are not only continuing to provide significant economic aid to the hateful *apartheid* system but are also shamelessly sending massive shipments of the most sophisticated weapons to the racist, Fascist régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia for the purpose of opposing the national liberation movements and slaughtering the children, youth, old people and patriots of the black majority who are steadfastly determined to win by force their freedom, their independence and their national sovereignty. Under these inhuman, anti-social conditions characterized by disregard for human rights, it is obvious that the insolent, barbarous conduct displayed by all the racist, Fascist régimes stems from the fact that their imperialist allies have given them iron-clad guarantees of steadfast, powerful support in all fields and by all possible means despite the wrath and indignation of the international community so as to keep the vast wealth of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa under the control of international capitalism. The delaying tactics of international imperialism are thus clear to all, for it agrees under the pressure of world opinion to proposals aimed at completely decolonizing the southern part of our continent while at the same time, where deeds are concerned, cynically initiating, for the purpose of blocking this widely touted decolonization, a set of diabolical manoeuvres which, based on obfuscation and subterfuge, are as crude as they are inexplicable.

The second aspect of the global strategy of colonial reconquest, enslavement of the African peoples and exploitation of their resources by international imperialism is the determination deliberately to disregard at all costs the fact that the problem of Western Sahara is a problem of decolonization and self-determination and that in backing and openly supporting by direct armed intervention the dismemberment of Western Sahara and its division between Morocco and Mauritania, both of them members of our international and continental organization, imperialism is, in the last analysis, simply seeking to divide the African States members of OAU and set them against each other. This deplorable anachronistic situation, which is a source of great concern for all of Africa, is well understood by all the African peoples and by the valiant and invincible Saharan people who, armed with manly courage and an unshakable determination and acting under the revolutionary leadership of the POLISARIO Front, are daily and heroically beating back the repeated assaults of African expansionist and annexationist foreign troops and the interventionist troops of the colonialist and neo-colonialist Powers of Western Europe.

We must ask ourselves here and now if there is still on our continent of Africa, and more specifically in this imposing chamber of the majestic Hall of Friendship and Solidarity of the African Peoples, a single African head of State and Government, representing a member of our continental organization which has signed the Charter of this organization and is consequently guided by the noble ideals of OAU, who would still dare to continue denying to the heroic martyred people of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic the right to existence, the right to freedom, the right to dignity, the right to independence and the right to national sovereignty. We say no and we do so because of the very nature of the Charter of OAU and the Charter of the United Nations. The fact is that the peoples and States members of OAU became aware at a very early stage of the profound tragedy inherent in the alarming and deplorable situation faced by the martyred Saharan people. Hence the summit conference of our organization held in Mauritius in 1976 decided to hold a special summit conference of OAU devoted to the problem of Western Sahara. But the firm determination of our continental organization to find a just solution to this historic problem of decolonization and self-determination of the Saharan people has inspired fear in international imperialism, which, by culpable acts of complicity in Africa itself and by inexplicable delaying tactics at all levels, has so far prevented the convening of that special summit conference of OAU.

Through us, the militant people of the People's Republic of Benin, their Revolutionary Military Government, their vanguard Party, the Party of the People's Revolution of Benin, exhort all peoples, all heads of State and Government of our continental organization, not to yield any longer to the tactics of division cleverly orchestrated by international imperialism with respect to the problem of Western Sahara and to do everything in their power to ensure that the sun of freedom, justice, dignity, independence and national sovereignty will finally rise over the whole of the territory of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic—in short, that this martyred Saharan

territory will finally see the dawn of independence, the basis of true African co-operation, of which ECOWAS is the first link whose forging was so eagerly awaited by all the peoples and all the States of West Africa.

At this time when the peoples and all the States members of OAU are unanimously agreed that the front-line countries and States should give active military assistance to the liberation movements of southern Africa, can there still be even one among us who would dare to take arms against another African national liberation movement, in Africa and in the world? We are convinced that at this fifteenth summit conference a firm and historic decision will be taken unanimously by all the heads of State and Government present so that a just solution will be found for the problem of the heroic Saharan people which will be a credit to and will enhance the greatness of both our organization and our continent, a continent which is today more than ever the target of the limitless greed of international capitalism whose grip is again cruelly making itself felt in all parts of the world where natural resources and immense riches can be exploited for its sole profit.

Similarly Palestine, because of its strategic position, is unceasingly the scene of all the disorders and terror caused by imperialism in the Middle East. The repeated instances of armed aggression which have occurred in that region have been prepared and guided by remote control from the great capitals of the imperialist countries. Here too our organization should unequivocally affirm the right of the Palestinian people to life, to freedom, to dignity, to independence and to national sovereignty. Our continental organization, OAU, by reason of its vocation, by reason of the great potential of our continent, has a great historic role to play and it should play this role fully and effectively so that peace may be restored in the Middle East, in Western Sahara, in southern Africa and everywhere else in the world.

The third aspect of the global strategy of colonial reconquest and enslavement of the African peoples by international imperialism is the destabilization of the progressive countries of Africa.

Since their victories over the Portuguese imperialist troops and over the mercenary hordes, the People's Republic of Angola and the People's Republic of Mozambique, in common with all the front-line States, have been continually harassed, bombed and attacked from the territories in southern Africa illegally occupied by racist and Fascist régimes. This affords further proof of the fact that international imperialism has never forgiven and will never forgive a people for freely choosing national dignity, independence and sovereignty. This was the case with the valiant people of the sister Republic of Guinea, which was the victim, on 22 November 1970, of a criminal imperialist Portuguese armed attack carried out by a band of mercenaries, who landed at Conakry, in an attempt to force the heroic and invincible Guinean people to their knees. It also happened to the brave people of Benin when, on Sunday, 16 January 1977, a horde of drugged mercenaries armed to the teeth, launched a cowardly attack on our country, the People's Republic of Benin, for the despicable purpose of liquidating the Beninese revolution and recolonizing our militant and hard-working people.

Each of these attempts at colonial reconquest was invariably met on the part of all peoples of Africa who care for freedom, justice, dignity and peace to the best of their ability, by an immediate and popular retaliation which, in each case, succeeded in routing the aggressive mercenary troops who are motivated only by the enticement of easy gain and a taste for massacring the African popular masses.

The fourth aspect of the global strategy of colonial reconquest and enslavement of the African peoples is the vain hope of stifling, by all possible despicable and criminal means, the unshakable determination of the peoples under colonial and neo-colonial domination to rid themselves once and for all of foreign domination and of the exploitation of man by man.

The recrudescence of armed attacks by mercenaries and the direct intervention by the regular armies of the imperialist countries in certain countries of Africa constitute an unprecedented illustration of this design and a flagrant violation of the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and of the United Nations.

Lastly, the fifth aspect of the global strategy of colonial reconquest and enslavement of the African peoples is to be seen in the indefatigable efforts of international imperialism to sow discord among and divide the members of our organization. Thus, when we achieve unanimity on certain burning issues affecting our continent, such as the problem of Western Sahara, and when we achieve success or reach an understanding in the interests of our peoples and of our States, these developments automatically become a matter of alarm and concern to international imperialism, which is afraid that we may take effective concerted action against its sordid and selfish interests which are centred mainly on the plundering of our vast and as yet untapped natural resources.

In the face of this ignoble and criminal global strategy of colonial recon-

quest on the part of international imperialism, the heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and all African peoples must remain clear-headed, far-sighted and vigilant.

Indeed, no people on the African continent can allow international imperialism to seize its riches. No people on the African continent can allow direct or indirect domination by international imperialism, whether that domination is overtly racist or Fascist, as in southern Africa, or underhand and neo-colonialist as in many other countries of Africa and the third world. No people on the African continent can let themselves be recolonized by international imperialism. Therefore those who, in Africa or elsewhere, consider that the survival of their peoples and their States depends on international co-operation without discrimination of any kind must do all in their power to ensure that this international co-operation will be carried out in a context of strict respect for non-alignment, equality, territorial integrity, mutual advantage and national dignity. Those who, on the other hand, in Africa or elsewhere, believe that the survival of their peoples and the economic development of their States is contingent on a symbiotic co-operation with monopolist capitalism, must be extremely careful, or they eventually may have to answer to history for the recolonization of their countries by the oppressor and exploiter which is international imperialism.

In any case and as far as our country, the People's Republic of Benin, is concerned, our hard-working and militant people are quite well aware that it is because, after our great revolutionary movement of national liberation began on 26 October 1972, they responsibly and knowingly chose the course of freedom, dignity, independence and national sovereignty, in short, the course of consistent anti-imperialist struggle, that they were subjected to a cowardly attack on Sunday, 16 January 1977.

Early in the morning of that Sunday, 16 January 1977, a pirate DC-7 aircraft from Franceville in Gabon made a secret landing at Cotonou international airport, carrying a horde of mercenaries recruited and paid by international imperialism and equipped and trained at the Benguerir military base in Morocco.

These international outlaws, heavily armed and drugged, had no sooner landed than they launched a bloody attack against our country and against our peaceful revolutionary people.

The first objective of this horde of mercenaries was to attack and take by surprise the main strategic points in our economic capital, Cotonou. Their second objective was to seize the leaders of the Beninese revolution and liquidate them, and their third objective was to set up, by means of terror and bloodshed, a puppet Government entirely dedicated to the sordid and selfish interests of the oppressor and exploiter that is international imperialism. Lastly, their fourth objective was to disband the national armed forces and proceed to form a colonial and neo-colonial Fascist army for the repression of the popular masses in our towns and country areas.

In the circumstances, it is clear that the action and movement of this band of perfidious and lawless invaders had but one purpose, namely, purely and simply, the reconquest of our country, the People's Republic of Benin.

However, the revolutionary people of the People's Republic of Benin, which has never accepted and never will accept foreign domination, inflicted an overwhelming historic defeat on these specialists in mass crime, these international outlaws financed, armed, trained and transported, alas, with the shameful and actual criminal participation of certain heads of States members of the Organization of African Unity. What more need be said?

At all events, as far as we are concerned, we would beg all the eminent heads of State and Government and all the distinguished delegates present here to remember that, in their hasty flight, the head of the mercenaries, that international scoundrel, Colonel Gilbert Bourgeaud, alias Colonel Maurin, alias Bob Denard, current Chief of Staff of the National Armed Forces of the Comorian State, abandoned on the battlefield a sizeable stock of war *matériel*, arms and munitions of French, American, Belgian, South African and Moroccan origin, as well as a considerable batch of documents particularly edifying and damning for certain heads of State of the Organization of African Unity.

We have proof to support our statements. We have not used scurrilous language. In the normal course of events, the persons responsible should subject themselves to criticism and self-criticism if they wish to save Africa and the African peoples. But we must recognize today that the Beninese people, who emerged victorious from this armed confrontation, paid very dearly for the defeat inflicted on the invaders, through the cruel loss of some of their worthy sons, who fell, arms in hand, on the field of honour, through the large-scale destruction caused to public and private buildings and through all the other damage caused to our national activities.

The People's Republic of Benin is not at war with any country. It is not

normal that certain heads of State who pay lip-service to African unity should finance mercenaries and try to liquidate other peoples. That is high treason. And they should no longer be members of the Organization of African Unity.

We therefore reaffirm once again, solemnly today, from the podium of the fifteenth summit conference of heads of State and Government of OAU at Khartoum, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, that the imperialist armed aggression of Sunday, 16 January 1977, against the People's Republic of Benin thus clearly falls within the imperialist global strategy of colonial reconquest, enslavement of the African peoples and the exploitation of man by man through the destabilization of the progressive revolutionary régimes of Africa, as has been proved to us by all the international commissions of inquiry which have agreed to come and work on this case-file of aggression against the People's Republic of Benin.

It is for that reason today, faced with the failure of the policy of colonial reconquest, that international imperialism, by using mercenaries, thinks that it can deceive the vigilance of the African peoples and States by proposing to them a new reactionary strategy consisting of grouping under an imperialist operational command units of the national armed forces of certain African States. The sole purpose of this new imperialist strategy is thus to establish pan-African forces of intervention guided by remote control from outside with the mission of upholding the reactionary régimes and the anti-popular régimes and subduing wherever they can the African peoples who dare to fight bravely for their true liberation. This is the resurrection of an old and sinister dream of international imperialism, namely to divide and rule, to pit Africans against Africans in fratricidal wars and to wait until the weakened Africans have buried their dead in order to intervene finally as the supreme arbiter with blood-stained hands to dominate and pillage further their natural resources.

There, in the final analysis, Mr. President, is the true face of the notorious pan-African intervention and security force, whose creation was mooted outside our continent of Africa and against the peoples of the African States in May 1978.

However, confronted with this new manoeuvre of procrastination, the fifteenth summit conference of our continental organization must unequivocally reaffirm its categorical rejection and firm condemnation of the so-called inter-African intervention and security force, the sole purpose of which is to serve as the despicable instrument of international imperialism so that it can enslave the African peoples and States, keep them under its domination and have its hands free the better to organize the shameless pillaging of their natural resources.

Thus faced with this whole new global strategy of domination and reconquest of our continent by international imperialism, the African peoples and the forces of progress ought to become more aware of it, instead of confining themselves to words, in order to oppose it with due resolute resistance. For, in the course of the process of the development of the struggle, in which the interests of the African peoples and States are at stake, the solidarity of all the African peoples and States and of the forces of progress will be decisive in future victories. Only action based on even greater true solidarity in the struggle of the progressive forces and the African peoples and States will inevitably ensure the triumph of the noble ideals of OAU and human rights.

It is not by the liberation of the popular masses that human rights are trampled underfoot; it is through the recruitment and financing of mercenaries that human rights are flouted because these mercenaries are intended to massacre the popular masses.

Thus, in view of the regrouping of the retrograde Fascist forces, the need to strengthen united action within OAU is an imperative task for all the African peoples and States. It is an obvious consequence of the active solidarity which must today characterize the forces of progress. Only responsible, effective and concerted action in anti-imperialist unity can make it possible to oppose effectively the deployment of the forces of imperialist reaction. Only unity of action based on the effective and total commitment of all African nationalist forces side by side with the armies of national liberation can enable our great, beautiful and rich continent of Africa to become a truly free, independent, sovereign and prosperous continent.

We cannot conclude our statement without renewing our gratitude to His Excellency President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, his Government and the whole Sudanese people for the great services which they have rendered to the other African peoples and States by voluntarily agreeing to host the meetings of the fifteenth summit conference of our continental organization, OAU, and without paying tribute to the actual presence of so many African heads of State and Government at this summit conference, now and henceforward called the historic summit conference of Khartoum.

Long live the Organization of African Unity!

Long live free, independent, sovereign and prosperous Africa!

Long live international co-operation based on non-alignment, mutual respect for equality, mutual advantage and national dignity!

Ready for revolution!

Ready for production!

The struggle continues.

ANNEX III

Statement by Comrade Michel Alladaye, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the People's Republic of Benin, opposing participation by the representatives of the puppet régime of the Comoros in the meetings of OAU at Khartoum

Mr. President, dear colleagues, distinguished representatives,

It is a crucial and urgent matter which my delegation would like to raise at this point in our proceedings. I say it is a crucial and urgent matter because we in the People's Republic of Benin feel that the value of our work here and how seriously it is taken by the world at large will depend basically on the way the Assembly deals with this matter. My delegation has decided to raise this crucial and urgent matter here and now because it is of such importance that, if not settled satisfactorily, it threatens not only to bring the current Assembly into irreparable disrepute but also to cast a lasting shadow of doubt over the commitment of all the member States of our Organization, setting a serious precedent in OAU history.

Mr. President, almost one and a half years ago, my country, the People's Republic of Benin, was attacked in a cowardly and savage manner by a perfidious and lawless horde of mercenaries. You may rest assured that it is not about the attack of 16 January 1977 against the People's Republic of Benin that I should now like to speak. That abominable act against a peaceful people did not fail then to stir all peace-loving and justice-loving countries and international organizations, which condemned and rebuked its organizers in the strongest of terms.

The commissions of inquiry then dispatched to my country by various international organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, revealed, among other astounding, bleak and sad facts, that the mercenaries who attacked Cotonou, the economic capital of my country, were led by one Colonel Bourgeaud. For the sake of the cause, he then went under the name of Maurin, Colonel Maurin, of French nationality.

That was one and a half years ago. Much more recently, we learned about certain distressing developments in the Comoros which culminated not only in the overthrow of the Government in power but also in the death of the then President, Brother Ali Soilih. The People's Republic of Benin noted those developments and would have taken them to signal an upheaval—regrettable perhaps—in the life of a friendly and brotherly nation in its quest for political stability if (and I mean if) the very full and particularly serious details furnished by the very author of the coup in the Comoros had not opened our eyes to the true nature of the new régime established at Moroni. In an interview given to a special correspondent (Mrs. Francine Gouchy) of the television channel FRZ and published in several newspapers in France, such as *Le Point* in issue No. 298 of 5 June 1978, Mr. Bob Denard, a notorious French mercenary now going under the name of Mr. Sahib Moustapha Mahjoub in the Comoros, again for the sake of the cause, revealed to the world, in terms particularly insulting and humiliating to all of Africa, the hideous way in which, on the instructions of his masters, whom everyone here knows, he organized and led the operation to overthrow the legitimate Government of the Comoros and assassinate President Ali Soilih. Bob Denard the mercenary, one of the worst scoundrels Africa has ever known, a scoundrel whom the heroic peoples of Zaire, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Guinea and Benin remember and will always remember with horror. I say the people of Benin because, Mr. President, dear colleagues, the infamous Colonel Maurin, alias Bourgeaud, who on 16 January 1977 fled in haste from Cotonou at the head of what was left of his gang, leaving behind even his most private documents, including his identification papers, at Cotonou Airport, is none other than Bob Denard.

To confirm this, you have only to compare the photographs published in the press of Mr. Bob Denard, co-President of the Comoros, and the photograph of Bourgeaud found among the articles left behind by the Cotonou aggressors. Colonel Bourgeaud, alias Maurin, is one and the same person as Bob Denard.

So today this sad specimen (I mean Bob Denard, the notorious mercenary and adventurer) is going under the Comorian name of Sahib Moustapha Mahjoub and is co-President of the Comoros, Chief of Staff of the Comorian armed forces and Chief of police. He is, in a word, the only true boss of the Comoros today. If this sinister individual takes the liberty of sending to the current Assembly a few Comorian brothers who do not mind playing

the miserable role of representatives of a mercenary, we say: "What impertinence and what moral squalor!"

Mr. President, dear colleagues and friends, after all the wrong that the mercenaries have done and continue to do to our continent, are we going to

allow them now to send official representatives to OAU to sit at the sides of the worthy sons of Africa? That would be an exceptionally grave development. As far as my country, the People's Republic of Benin, is concerned, we say loudly and clearly that such a thing is not possible.

DOCUMENT S/12818*

Letter dated 23 August 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[23 August 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 23 August 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nazmi AKIMAN
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Turkey
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 23 AUGUST 1978 FROM MR. NAIL ATALAY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 8 August 1978 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Örek, the Prime Minister of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 8 AUGUST 1978 FROM MR. OSMAN ÖREK TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention a recent programme broadcast by the Greek Cypriot controlled "Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation", which has caused great indignation both among the Turkish Cypriot community and on my part personally as the Prime Minister of that community.

The said programme was broadcast on the night of 21 July 1978 and depicted a Turkish Cypriot seated among three Greek Cypriots around a table in a Greek coffee shop in the south drinking alcohol and being interviewed by a reporter of the so-called Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. The interview was in Greek with Turkish subtitles.

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/213-S/12818.

Decency forbids me to repeat here the insults and slanderous language this Turkish Cypriot was heard using against the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in particular and Turks in general in the course of this interview. The significant thing to note, however, is not the type of language this person opted to use, for this only shows his personal character, but the fact that such obscenity was unabashedly broadcast on the public television of the Greek Cypriot community with a total lack of regard for all norms of decency, humanity and public morality, against a person who is the democratically elected President of the Turkish Cypriot community. It is indeed most regrettable that the "CBC", which since its establishment, has only fostered dissension between the two communities by declaring the Turks "the national enemy of the Greeks", has not in the least changed this distorted mentality and has sunk as low as using a puppet of such questionable standing to advance the baseless argument that Turkish Cypriots are dissatisfied with their leadership and the conditions in the north. As the Turkish Cypriot side has recently pointed out to Mr. Kyprianou, it is always prepared, if need be, to hold a referendum in the north in order to find out how many Turkish Cypriots actually wish to move to his alleged "utopia" in the south.

As you are aware, the Greek Cypriot side has recently resorted to every conceivable tactic in a vain attempt to create the impression that there is a divergence of views between the Turkish Cypriot community and leadership as regards the Cyprus problem. The aforementioned television programme demonstrates how base and repulsive such propaganda can get and how desperate the Greek Cypriot leadership indeed is in its efforts to create division within the Turkish community.

I am sure you will agree with me that the dissemination of such slander through the use of public media not only constitutes a flagrant violation of the ethics of the journalistic profession but is also most unfortunate at a time when the Turkish Cypriot side is showing every effort and goodwill for the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

DOCUMENT S/12820*

Letter dated 22 August 1978 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[24 August 1978]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I have the honour to bring to your notice certain facts, communicated to me by the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, relating to the treatment

by the Israeli authorities of Palestinian prisoners in their custody.

The Palestinian prisoners are subjected to continual assaults and humiliations and, on one occasion, on the orders of the Israeli prison authorities, they were even attacked by 500 soldiers. As a result of that attack, several prisoners were critically injured and 88 others forcibly removed to

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/218-S/12820.

Tulkarim prison, where they are reportedly having to endure the worst kind of torture.

On 19 June 1978, several mayors, representing charitable and social institutions, and families of the prisoners held a sit-in strike in the hall of Al-Bireh municipality. On that occasion, a memorandum was sent to the Israeli Minister of Defence, demanding that the assaults on the prisoners by the guards and security personnel should be stopped and the prisoners given adequate medical care.

On 15 August 1978, Palestinian prisoners and detainees began a hunger strike to protest against the harsh and inhuman treatment meted out to them by the occupation authorities. However, there has been no improvement in the living conditions of the prisoners.

Such treatment constitutes a violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949 Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and resolution 1A (XXXIV) adopted by the Commission on Human Rights in February of this year. That resolution

explicitly demands that Israel should cease forthwith all acts of torture and ill-treatment of Arab detainees and prisoners and should accord them, pending their release, the protection envisaged in the relevant provisions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war.

It is clear that the situation has been aggravated to such an extent that, if no measures are taken to protect the Palestinian prisoners and detainees from the harsh and inhuman treatment that they are now undergoing, an explosive situation could arise and further endanger peace in the area. I should be glad if you would take appropriate action to ensure that the demands made by the prisoners will be met.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Médoune FALL
Chairman of the Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable
Rights of the Palestinian People

DOCUMENT S/12821

Letter dated 25 August 1978 from the representative of Zambia to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[25 August 1978]

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the latest act of wanton aggression perpetrated against my country's sovereignty and territorial integrity by security forces of the racist Government of South Africa.

On Tuesday, 22 August 1978 at midnight, security forces of the *apartheid* régime commenced premeditated and wanton bombing operations against the civilian town of Sesheke, situated along Zambia's border with Namibia, which were continued through the early hours of Thursday, 24 August.

As of today, fighting is continuing between Zambia National Defence Forces and Fascist South African forces. Meanwhile, the Sesheke district has been completely deserted following the despicable bombing raids, and the district's main hospital has been closed and all medical staff and equipment removed to a neighbouring village.

This shameless and dastardly operation has so far resulted in the death of 12 innocent Zambian civilians, including eight men, three women and one child, serious injury to six civilians and substantial damage to civilian property, including the destruction of a power station, the local airport and school buildings.

At a time when world attention is focused on current efforts to resolve the problem of Namibia by peaceful means, this most recent act of armed aggression by racist South Africa against the freedom and peace-loving people of Zambia cannot but evoke a sense of grave concern, deep indignation and unreserved condemnation.

In particular, this recent manifestation of a systematic pattern of aggressive behaviour, typical of the Pretoria régime, raises serious questions concerning the credibility and genuineness of that régime's professed desire to reach a negotiated peace settlement on Namibia. In the view of my Government, this incident raises the ominous spectre of South Africa reneging on solemn undertakings made in relation with the existing United Nations peace efforts on Namibia.

It is evident to my Government and to others intimate with the behaviour of the Pretoria régime that its strategy

aims at provoking the already tense and delicate political situation prevailing in Namibia, the international Territory South Africa continues to rule illegally, to the point beyond which prospects for a peaceful solution will recede irreversibly and dissipate.

Zambia is aware that the racist and *apartheid* régime in South Africa aims resolutely at provoking SWAPO, the authentic representative of the Namibian people, and neighbouring independent countries, such as my own, into open armed confrontations which could only serve to derail the existing United Nations peace efforts on Namibia. In the event of such a negative and retrogressive development, racist South Africa would readily attribute blame to SWAPO. The Pretoria régime would thus have a ready and much desired excuse to proceed with its planned internal settlement with puppet elements inside Namibia.

My Government does not view this latest ignominious act in isolation from the unprovoked raid into Angola perpetrated by the security forces of the *apartheid* Pretoria régime in May this year; for we are only too aware that South Africa's diabolical strategy is aimed at destroying SWAPO's dependable rearguard, thereby rendering SWAPO ineffectual and amenable to the whims and dictates of the racists at Pretoria.

We urge once again all those Governments in a position to wield decisive influence on the Pretoria régime, in particular its principal Western allies, to do their utmost and demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt their declared commitment to a negotiated peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem. This is vital if only to salvage the remaining prospects for a peaceful solution.

Unless immediately arrested, South Africa's evil policy of unprovoked aggression and trumped-up retaliation against SWAPO and neighbouring independent States will undermine any confidence of impetus that may have been engendered by recent peace efforts. Such a suicidal policy or strategy will only serve to bolster confidence in the intensification of armed struggle as the sole effective means for the oppressed people of southern Africa to achieve self-determination and independence.

I need not reiterate that, in the face of repeated wanton aggression by the racist régime of South Africa, the Government and the people of Zambia remain undaunted in their firm support of the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa.

I should be grateful if you would kindly arrange for the

circulation of this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gwendoline C. KONIE
Permanent Representative of Zambia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12822

Letter dated 25 August 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[25 August 1978]

At 0115 hours on 23 August 1978, an attack was launched from Zambia on the towns of Katima Mulilo (Caprivi) and Ngwezi and on the South African military base at Katima Mulilo and the South African military post at Wenela. Mortars and 122-mm rockets based at the town of Sesheke in Zambia and on the west bank of the Zambezi River were fired at the South African installations, killing 10 members of the South African Security Forces and injuring eight. The fire was returned.

The South African Government is satisfied, on the basis of confirmed information, that the Zambian military authorities, both at Sesheke and Lusaka, were fully aware of the nature, timing and extent of the attack. Furthermore, the Zambian military authorities were fully informed of the participation of the Zambian unit at Sesheke in the attack when they fired mortars on Katima Mulilo between 0200 and 0400 hours and directed anti-aircraft fire at a South African helicopter at 1415 hours on 23 August.

In addition, the following circumstances lead clearly to the conclusion that the Zambian military and police authorities were aware of the planning and the execution of the unprovoked bombardment, by SWAPO terrorists and Zambian soldiers, of the above locations, which include civilian settlements:

(a) More than 600 SWAPO terrorists were situated in and around the small village of Sesheke in Zambia at the time of the attack. Their presence on Zambian soil and their violent intent could not have been unknown to the Zambian military authorities. (A unit of the Zambian defence force is based at Sesheke.)

(b) Several large (five-ton) trucks were used by SWAPO terrorists to transport personnel and equipment to the positions from which the firing took place. These massive movements along roads and across the Zambezi River by pontoons (controlled by Zambian police) could not have taken place without the knowledge and consent of the Zambian military and police authorities.

(c) Likewise, the large rocket launchers from which the 122-mm rockets were fired could not have been moved into position without Zambian knowledge and approval. Neither

could the aggressive purpose of this equipment have escaped the Zambian military and police authorities. (This equipment must have been transported over Zambian territory over long distances to the sites at which it was deployed.)

(d) Zambian reports on 24 August 1978 of civilian casualties at Sesheke provide proof that Lusaka was informed of developments there. (Sesheke was one of the locations from which the bombardment was launched on Katima Mulilo, and it was unavoidable that civilians would be hit in the return of fire.)

(e) SWAPO terrorists were captured by the South African Security Forces in follow-up action, and they have confirmed that the Zambian military authorities knew beforehand of the attack on Katima Mulilo.

The South African Government wishes to express the strongest possible objection to this action, which clearly took place with the knowledge and concurrence of the Zambian military and police authorities. Not only does it threaten the security of the people of South West Africa, but it endangers peace in the entire southern African area and places in serious jeopardy efforts to find a peaceful solution in South West Africa.

In conclusion, I also wish to inform you of the protest which my Government registered with the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 August 1978. That protest concerned an attack on 13 August in which South African Security Forces were fired on from across the Zambian border at 17 degrees 30 S, 24 degrees 14 E (approximately 2 kilometres north-east of Wenela). Six mortar bombs and automatic rifles were used in the attack. In that communication to the Zambian authorities, the South African Government expressed its earnest hope that appropriate action would be taken to prevent any recurrence.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. Adriaan EKSTEEN
Chargé d' Affaires of
the Permanent Mission of South Africa
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12823

Letter dated 25 August 1978 from the representative of Benin to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[25 August 1978]

On behalf of the Group of African States at the United Nations, I have the honour to request the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the

aggression by South Africa against the Republic of Zambia, which commenced on Tuesday, 22 August 1978 and which is still continuing.

(Signed) Patrice HOUNGAVOU
*Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Benin
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/12824

**Letter dated 21 August 1978 from the representative of Honduras
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]
[28 August 1978]

I have the honour to refer to your note of 29 March 1978 and to inform you that, as indicated in communication No. 2007 from the Secretariat of Foreign Relations of Honduras, the policy of Honduras is one of firm and consistent opposition to the system of *apartheid* in South Africa.

Honduras does not maintain relations, participate in military operations or engage in arms trade with South Africa. Honduras is therefore fully in agreement with the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) and supports it most strongly.

(Signed) Maria CARIAS
*Permanent Representative of Honduras
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/12825

Letter dated 28 August 1978 from the representative of Kuwait to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[28 August 1978]

I refer to the letter dated 24 August 1978 sent to you by the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization in connexion with the carnage committed by Israel against Palestinian refugees.

I would request you to circulate the letter mentioned above as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdalla Yaccoub BISHARA
*Permanent Representative of Kuwait
to the United Nations*

LETTER DATED 24 AUGUST 1978 FROM THE OBSERVER OF
THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION TO THE PRES-
IDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, I should like to draw your attention to the following.

On 20 August, Israel, a Member of this international body, committed yet another act of State terrorism. It sent its warplanes on a mission of death and destruction directed against innocent civilian Palestinian refugees of the town of Damour and the Burj Al-Barajnah refugee camp—both in the Republic of Lebanon.

Israel's latest attack, targets of which were a summer school and a sporting camp, left 4 dead and 25 wounded.

I am instructed to call on you to take immediate and effective measures to put an end to this series of Israeli atrocities, which constitute an imminent threat to international peace and security.

(Signed) Zehdi Labib TERZI
*Permanent Observer
of the Palestine Liberation Organization
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/12826

**Note verbale dated 23 August 1978 from the Mission of Togo
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]
[29 August 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Togo to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his notes of 18 May 1978 and to letter No. 409/MPT-ONU/78 of 21 July 1978 concerning the implementation by the Togolese Government of Security Council resolutions 418 (1977) and 421 (1977), has the honour to inform him that the provisions of decree No. 67-170 of 29 August 1967 implementing the

sanctions decided on by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity against the Republic of South Africa remain in effect and that the Togolese Government has therefore upheld the prohibition regarding relations of any kind whatsoever between Togo and South Africa.

This measure constitutes Togo's positive contribution to the implementation of the provisions of resolution 418 (1977).

DOCUMENT S/12827

Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia

[Original: English]
[29 August 1978]

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 2082nd meeting on 27 July 1978, the Security Council adopted resolution 431 (1978). By that resolution, the Council, recalling its resolution 385 (1976) and taking note of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in document S/12636 of 10 April 1978, requested me to appoint a Special Representative for Namibia in order to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. The full text of resolution 431 (1978) reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976,

"Taking note of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in document S/12636 of 10 April 1978,

"1. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Namibia in order to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;

"2. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing his recommendations for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976);

"3. Urges all concerned to exert their best efforts towards the achievement of independence by Namibia at the earliest possible date."

2. Immediately following the decision of the Council, I appointed Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, my Special Representative for the purposes of the resolution.

3. Mindful of the Council's further request contained in paragraph 2, I requested my Special Representative to undertake, at the earliest possible date, a survey mission to Namibia for the purpose of gathering for me all the information necessary for the preparation of the present report. To assist him in this task, I placed at his disposal a team of United Nations officials and military advisers.

4. This report, which is based on the survey of my Special Representative, is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General "to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing his recommendations for the implementation of the proposal in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976)".

I. THE SURVEY MISSION

5. As stated above, my Special Representative, accompanied by a staff of United Nations officials and military advisers, visited Namibia from 6 to 22 August for the purpose of carrying out a survey of all matters relative to the implementation of resolution 431 (1978).

6. In addition to meetings with the Administrator-General of the Territory and his staff, as well as with the South African military and police commanders and local authorities, the Special Representative had the opportunity to consult extensively representatives of political parties, churches, the business community and individuals. His consultations in this regard covered a wide spectrum of public opinion within the Territory. In this connexion, the Special Representative and his staff, by travelling extensively within the Territory, were able to familiarize themselves with local conditions which would have relevance to the effective organization and operation of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) entrusted with the tasks set out in the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in document S/12636.

7. In the course of his meetings and consultations, the Special Representative was able to obtain the views of not only the Administrator-General and his staff but also the representatives of the Namibian people on a broad range of important topics relating to the necessary conditions for the holding of free and fair elections and to the role of the United Nations. Among the principal subjects discussed were: the repeal of all the remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit the objective of free and fair elections; arrangements for ensuring the release of political prisoners and detainees, as well as the voluntary return of Namibians; the arrangements and dispositions required to ensure the cessation of all hostile acts; the electoral process; the composition and work of the Constituent Assembly; and the timetable for the accomplishment of the above stages. The military aspects of the operation, with special reference to the introduction and functioning of the military component of UNTAG, were also fully discussed. In addition, the Special Representative also discussed with the Administrator-General the manner of ensuring the good conduct of the police and the arrangements necessary to assure the free and unrestricted discharge by the United Nations staff of the tasks assigned to them.

II. GENERAL GUIDELINES

8. The implementation of the proposal in paragraph 2 of

solution 431 (1978) will require the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group in the Territory, consisting of a civilian component and a military component. Because of the unique character of the operation and the need for close co-operation between them, both components will be under the over-all direction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

9. The Special Representative will report to me, keeping me informed and making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council fully informed of developments relating to the implementation of the proposal and to the functioning of UNTAG. All matters which might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of UNTAG will be referred to the Council for its decision.

10. The deployment of both components of UNTAG must take into account the specific geographic, demographic, economic and social conditions prevailing in Namibia. These include, in particular, the vast distances and varied nature of topography and vegetation; the broad ranges of climatic conditions; the scarcity of water; the population distribution and existing communication network, the distribution and concentration of ethnic groups; and the lack of adequate infrastructure in the north, such as roads and other communications and facilities. All these factors, when analysed, make it evident that sizeable resources, both military and civilian, will be required to provide the close monitoring called for in document S/12636.

11. In performing its functions, UNTAG will act with complete impartiality. In order that the proposal may be effectively implemented, it is expected that the Administrator-General and all other officials from within the Territory will exhibit the same impartiality.

12. For UNTAG to carry out all its tasks effectively, three essential conditions must be met. First, it must at all times have the full support and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned, particularly with regard to the comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts. Thirdly, it must be able to operate as a combined United Nations operation, of which the military component will constitute an integrated, efficient formation within the wider framework of UNTAG.

13. To monitor the cessation of hostilities effectively, to maintain surveillance of the Territory's vast borders and to monitor the restriction to base of the armed forces of the parties concerned, the co-operation and support of the neighbouring countries will be necessary. Such co-operation will be most important, particularly during the early stages.

14. Implementation of the proposal, and thus the work of UNTAG, will have to proceed in successive stages. These stages, which are detailed in the annex to document S/12636, can be grouped as follows:

(a) Cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the withdrawal, restriction or demobilization of the various armed forces;

(b) Conduct of free and fair elections to the Constituent Assembly, for which the pre-conditions include the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures, the release of political prisoners and detainees and voluntary return of exiles, the establishment of effective monitoring by the United Nations and an adequate period for electoral campaigning;

(c) The formulation and adoption of a Constitution for Namibia by the Constituent Assembly;

(d) The entry into force of the Constitution and the consequent achievement of independence of Namibia.

15. The length of time required for these stages is directly related to the complexity of the tasks to be performed and to the overriding consideration that certain steps are necessary before it can be said that elections have been held under free and fair conditions. It will be recalled that the proposal envisaged a series of successive stages, spaced so as to provide a sufficient lapse of time before the holding of the elections. This should permit, among other things, the release of political prisoners and detainees, the return and registration of all Namibians outside the Territory who may wish to participate in the electoral process, the deployment of United Nations military and civilian personnel and electoral campaigning by all parties in an atmosphere of tranquillity. The timetable set out in the proposal called for the lapse of approximately seven months from the date of the approval of the present report by the Security Council to the holding of the elections.

16. In his discussions with the Special Representative, the Administrator-General said that the South African authorities, having previously established 31 December 1978 as the date of independence, felt that they were committed thereto and that, consequently, the elections should take place as scheduled, regardless of the fact that it would necessitate substantially reducing the timetable necessary for completion of the preparatory plans. A majority of the political parties was of the opinion, however, that it was essential to maintain the orderly phasing of the preparatory stages and to allow sufficient time for electoral campaigning in order to ensure free and fair elections. Further, it was pointed out that the actual date of independence would fall within the competence of the Constituent Assembly.

17. It will be recalled however that, at the time the proposal was first formulated, the date of 31 December 1978 was consistent with completion of these steps. The delay in reaching agreement among the parties now makes completion by this date impossible. It is therefore recommended that the transitional period should begin on the date of approval of the present report by the Security Council and proceed in accordance with the steps outlined in document S/12636. Using the same timetable that earlier provided the 31 December 1978 date, an appropriate date for elections would be approximately seven months from the date of the approval of the present report.

18. Estimates of the periods of time required for completion of stages *a* and *b* of paragraph 14 above are included in the annex to document S/12636. In view of the fact that the periods required for stages *c* and *d* would be determined by the Constituent Assembly, it is expected that the duration of UNTAG would be one year, depending on the date of independence to be decided by the Constituent Assembly.

19. UNTAG will have to enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks. For this purpose UNTAG and its personnel must necessarily have all the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as well as those especially required for the proposed operation.

20. The military component of UNTAG will not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence will include resistance to attempts to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. UNTAG will proceed on the assumption that all the parties concerned will co-operate with it and take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Council.

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF UNTAG

A. Military Component

21. The functions which will be performed by the military

component of UNTAG are set out in paragraph 8 and in the annex of document S/12636. These include, in particular:

(a) Monitoring the cessation of hostile acts by all parties, the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base, the phased withdrawal of all except the specified number of South African forces and the restriction of the remainder to specified locations;

(b) Prevention of infiltration as well as surveillance of the borders of the Territory;

(c) Monitoring the demobilization of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structure.

22. The military component will assist and support the civilian component of UNTAG in the discharge of its tasks.

23. The military component of UNTAG will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field will be exercised by a Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Council. The Commander will report through the Special Representative to the Secretary-General on all matters concerning the functioning of the military component of UNTAG.

24. The military component will comprise a number of contingents to be provided by Member States upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation. In addition, a body of selected officers to act as monitors will form an integral part of the military component.

25. The military component, including the monitors, will be provided with weapons of a defensive character, consistent with the guidelines set out in paragraph 20 above.

26. In order that the military component may fulfil its responsibilities, it is considered that it should have a strength of the order of seven infantry battalions, totalling approximately 5,000, plus 200 monitors, and, in addition, command, communications, engineer, logistic and air support elements totalling approximately 2,300. The infantry battalions should be fully self-sufficient.

27. It will be essential to establish an adequate logistic and command system at the very outset of the operation. It will therefore be necessary to obtain urgently from Governments the elements of such a system. In this connexion, it may well be necessary to use also the services of civilian contractors for some logistic functions, as appropriate. In the nature of the physical circumstances pertaining to this operation, UNTAG may have to rely to a considerable extent on existing military facilities and installations in Namibia.

B. Civilian Component

28. The civilian component will consist of two elements. One of these elements will be the civil police, whose function will be to assist the Special Representative in implementing the tasks set out in paragraphs 9 and 10 of document S/12636.

29. The duties of the civil police element of UNTAG will include taking measures against any intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter, accompanying the existing police forces, when appropriate, in the discharge of their duties and assisting in the realization of the function to be discharged by the Administrator-General to the satisfaction of the Special Representative of ensuring the good conduct of the existing police forces.

30. In order that the UNTAG police may fulfil their responsibilities, as described above, it is considered, as a preliminary estimate, that approximately 360 experienced

police officers will be required. It is hoped that police officers will be made available by Governments on a secondment basis, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation as well as the language and other requirements of the assignment.

31. The non-police element of the civilian component of UNTAG will have the function of assisting the Special Representative in implementing paragraphs 5 to 7 of document S/12636 and the relevant sections of the annex thereto. These tasks will consist, in particular, of the following:

(a) Supervising and controlling all aspects of the electoral process, considering the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures, monitoring the balloting and the counting of votes, in order to ensure that all procedures will be strictly complied with, and receiving and investigating complaints of fraud or challenges relating to the electoral process;

(b) Advising the Special Representative as to the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures which may abridge or inhibit the objective of free and fair elections;

(c) Ensuring the absence of or investigating complaints of intimidation, coercion or restrictions on freedom of speech, movement or peaceful political assembly which may impede the objective of free and fair elections;

(d) Assisting in the arrangements for the release of all Namibian political prisoners or detainees and for the peaceful, voluntary return of Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the Territory;

(e) Assisting in any arrangements which may be proposed by the Special Representative to the Administrator-General and implemented by the Administrator-General to the Special Representative's satisfaction intended to inform and instruct the electorate as to the significance of the election and the procedures for voting.

32. Bearing in mind the vast size of the Territory, the dispersal of the population and the lack of adequate communications, it is considered, as a preliminary estimate, that approximately 300 Professional officers, as well as the necessary supporting staff, will be required initially until the cessation of hostile acts has been achieved. Thereafter about 1,000 Professional and 200 field service and General Service staff will be required during the electoral campaign and the period of balloting in order to cover all the polling stations. The staff will, among other duties, be required for 24 regional centres and more than 400 polling stations.

33. It is anticipated that some of these officials will be provided from among existing United Nations staff and that some will be persons appointed specially for this operation. In addition, it is my hope that a significant number of officials can be seconded or loaned by Governments. All such seconded or loaned personnel will be required to assume the responsibilities incumbent on United Nations officials.

34. It is also my intention to conduct consultations concerning the designation of a jurist of international standing whose appointment as legal adviser to the Special Representative is provided for in paragraph 7b of document S/12636.

IV. PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION

35. Subject to the approval of the present report by the Security Council, it is my intention to initiate the operation as quickly as possible.

36. It is my intention to appoint Major-General Hannes Philipp Commander of the military component of UNTAG; he has extensive experience of United Nations peace-keeping operations and is already familiar with the situation in Namibia.

37. Immediately following such a decision by the Security Council, the Special Representative, accompanied by the Commander of the military component, the key elements of their staffs and the essential command and logistic elements, will proceed to Namibia in order to establish the headquarters of UNTAG and begin operations as quickly as possible.

38. A number of Governments have already expressed their interest in providing military contingents for UNTAG. Immediately upon the approval of the present report by the Security Council, it is my intention to consult the Council and the parties concerned on the composition of the military component, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation, on the one hand, and the necessity of obtaining self-sufficient units, on the other. Every effort will be made to begin the deployment of the military component within three weeks and to bring it to its full strength within 12 weeks. For this to be achieved, it will be necessary to determine the composition of the military component at the earliest possible time.

39. It is also my intention to approach Governments to provide military personnel to serve as monitors. In the initial stages, given the urgency of deploying at least some of the monitors, it may be possible to draw upon officers already serving with other existing United Nations operations. This may also apply to key staff positions.

40. As regards civilian personnel, it is likewise my intention, as stated in paragraphs 30 and 33 above, to approach

Governments to make available on secondment or loan experienced police officers to serve as police monitors and other experienced officials to serve in the civilian component of UNTAG. In recruiting civilian staff for UNTAG, I shall bear in mind both the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation and the urgent need to deploy a large number of experienced staff within the shortest possible time.

V. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

41. At present there are too many unknown factors to permit an accurate assessment of the cost of UNTAG. Based on the numbers of personnel specified in this report and the envisaged duration of 12 months, and taking into account the magnitudes and elements of the financial requirements experienced in other peace-keeping operations, the indications are that the financial requirements for UNTAG could be as high as \$300 million, of which approximately \$33 million will be required to finance the return of refugees and exiles. In view of the nature of the operation, due regard should be given to the fact that some elements of the operation may be phased out before the end of the mandate and that alternative arrangements may be possible which could result in lower costs.

42. The costs of UNTAG shall be considered expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Member States in accordance with Article 17 paragraph 2, of the Charter.

DOCUMENT S/12832

Note verbale dated 28 August 1978 from the representative of the Central African Empire to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[1 September 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Central African Empire to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to transmit to him the reply of the Government of the Central African Empire to his note of 18 May concerning the question of South Africa and the measures taken in implementation of resolution 418 (1977).

LETTER DATED 24 JUNE 1978 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

I have the honour to refer to your communication of 20 June 1978 transmitting to me, for action, the note of 18 May 1978 in which the Secretary-General invites Member States

to inform him as soon as possible, for transmission to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, of the measures taken to implement resolution 418 (1977) and, in particular, paragraph 3 thereof.

In this connexion, I should like to assure the Secretary-General that the Central African Empire neither sells arms to nor buys arms from South Africa and that it will act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the resolution on the arms embargo against South Africa.

(Signed) J. P. MOKODOPO
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Central African Empire

DOCUMENT S/12833

Letter dated 2 September 1978 from the representative of Venezuela to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Spanish]
[2 September 1978]

On the instructions of my Government, I should like to request you to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in Nicaragua, whose duration and gravity threaten the peace and security of the region. Not only is a Govern-

ment which does not tolerate the slightest dissidence brutally repressing the civilian population by means of military action, but also such action could have repercussions on other countries in the region, thereby, as I already said, threatening the peace and security of the region.

(Signed) Rubén CARPIO CASTILLO
Permanent Representative of Venezuela
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12834

Letter dated 5 September 1978 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[5 September 1978]

Upon instructions of the Government of Lebanon, we have the honour to bring the following to your attention and to that of the members of the Security Council, reserving our right to press for a meeting if conditions are deemed such that a debate by the Council becomes necessary or useful.

1. On 31 August 1978, the Government of Lebanon was advised that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) could now establish two "liaison offices" at Marjayoun and Bent Jbail, as well as some new "UNIFIL posts" in the border area of Southern Lebanon. A greater "freedom of movement" was also to be arranged for UNIFIL military personnel in that same area. These and other arrangements were and are still being negotiated with Israeli authorities, in conjunction with the so-called "*de facto* Lebanese forces" operating there. If UNIFIL considers its present move a positive step towards the full implementation of its mandate, the Government of Lebanon would raise no objection, provided no recognition is thereby entailed of a special status for the "border area" nor of the "*de facto* forces" and their so-called "commanders". In the light of the above-mentioned reservations, the dispositions now made by UNIFIL should be looked upon as merely a step forward towards the full deployment of both UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army.

2. As you are undoubtedly aware, the Israeli forces, who were supposed to withdraw totally from the "border area" (sometimes called "enclave") on 13 June, have systematically refused to turn over control of the said area to UNIFIL, in compliance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). This matter was taken up by the Secretary-General with the Government of Israel. It was brought to the attention of the Council and has since been the object of extensive negotiations with all the parties concerned, but to no avail.

3. Pressed by the United Nations and by Governments of the various States concerned, particularly by some of those who had contributed to the formation and deployment of UNIFIL, the Government of Lebanon, notwithstanding the various obstacles and difficulties, started implementing resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). Anxious to regain full control of and sovereignty over its territory, assisted by UNIFIL—as stated by the above-mentioned resolutions—the Government of Lebanon started to move units of the Lebanese Army towards the south on Monday, 31 July and Tuesday, 1 August. The United Nations, UNIFIL and the permanent members of the Security Council were all duly informed well in advance.

4. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Government of Lebanon had consistently considered—as consigned in the report of the Secretary-General of 13 June [S/12620/Add.5, para.16d]—that "all border problems shall henceforth be discussed with UNIFIL and in the framework of a reactivated Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission". A

meeting of the Commission (ILMAC) had been held on 12 June, as reported in the above-mentioned document. In the light of this attitude, and prior to the movement of fresh units of the Lebanese Army to the south, another meeting of ILMAC was requested and held at Naqoura on 30 July at 1020 hours, during which Israel was informed of what was happening in accordance with the Armistice Agreement of 1949 and within the framework of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

5. The difficulties that have been encountered by the Lebanese Army detachment in its movement to the south have since been brought to the attention of the United Nations through various channels, and particularly the UNIFIL command and the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Missions in the Middle East, as well as United Nations representatives in Beirut. Owing to the heavy shelling to which the Army was subjected in Kaoukaba (a position controlled by UNIFIL) on 1 August, with the ensuing casualties and heavy risks encountered, it was decided to discontinue movement as previously planned towards Tibnin, pending further arrangement through UNIFIL. It appears to us, as it was clearly apparent to all concerned, that Israel was actively opposing the deployment of both the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL by military, political and diplomatic action. Various pretexts have been evoked by Israel, all legally and politically unacceptable to both the international community and the Lebanese Government.

6. Since then and particularly since 18 August, extensive consultations and negotiations have taken place with a view to finding the appropriate means of ensuring not only the further deployment of the Lebanese Army but also, and more particularly, the unhindered deployment of UNIFIL in the "border area". The Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Brian Urquhart, as well as Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Missions in the Middle East, have come to Beirut more than once within this framework. During these consultations, the Government of Lebanon has stated unequivocally the following positions:

(a) UNIFIL has not, as yet, been enabled to entirely fulfil its mandate by deploying fully into the border area, thereby guaranteeing the "strict respect" of Lebanese sovereignty.

(b) Lebanon has required and is again requiring that UNIFIL should find it possible to assist "the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area", according to paragraph 3 of resolution 425 (1978) and the dispositions of the report of the Secretary-General confirmed and approved by resolution 426 (1978).

(c) The Government of Lebanon considers that since orders issued to Major Saad Haddad and Major Sami Chidiac have not been obeyed, the Commanders of the so-called "*de facto* Lebanese forces" are now to be considered as having no further quality or authority whatsoever to act on behalf

of the Lebanese Army, to negotiate with the United Nations or to exercise any legal command in the area.

7. As the mandate of UNIFIL nears expiration this month, the Government of Lebanon wishes to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the initial six months have not been and may not be sufficient for the fulfilment of the objectives set in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). Yet, it being in the interest of all parties concerned to seek the speediest and most effective modes of action, the Government of Lebanon considers it necessary that the Council should now assess the future possibilities of UNIFIL, its ability to achieve its objectives within the framework of its present terms of reference and the possibility of seeking a redefinition of its mandate to ensure the full implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and particularly paragraph 1 of resolution 425 (1978), which clearly states that the Council "calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries".

8. The Government of Lebanon, while bringing this whole matter to your attention, leaves it at present entirely

to your discretion to undertake whatever action you may judge fitting. It is, however, its wish that this letter should be distributed as a document of the Security Council and made available wherever necessary or useful.

9. In conclusion, the Government of Lebanon wishes to take this opportunity to express particular gratitude to all those who have brought assistance and support to us in the very difficult and tragic days in which we are living, more specifically to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, to his assistants, to the commanders, officers and soldiers of the United Nations forces, to the members of the Security Council and to the Governments of States which have contributed troops and assistance to UNIFIL. Their various efforts and the efforts of their representatives in the field, at United Nations Headquarters, in their respective capitals, at Beirut and in other capitals concerned have all been a tremendous contribution to the cause of international peace and security.

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12835

Letter dated 5 September 1978 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[5 September 1978]

[Same text as document S/12834 above.]

DOCUMENT S/12836

Letter dated 6 September 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[6 September 1978]

I have the honour to enclose the text of a letter addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the Honourable R. F. Botha.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. Adriaan EKSTEEN
Chargé d'Affaires
of the Permanent Mission of South Africa
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 6 SEPTEMBER 1978 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

When I addressed the Security Council on 27 July 1978 [2082nd meeting], I emphasized certain aspects to which your Special Representative would have to devote specific attention during his then envisaged visit to South West Africa. Because of their direct relevance to the crucial aspects of the report you have submitted to the Security Council [S/12827], I wish to recapitulate those points:

"First, as the legislative and administrative authority in the Territory, the Administrator-General will continue to govern during the transition period.

"Secondly, primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in South West Africa during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces.

"Thirdly, the Administrator-General and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General are required to work together and to consult each other with a view to full co-operation between them, to ensure an orderly and peaceful transition to independence. The proposal has deliberately been left somewhat vague in this regard but it will be appreciated that, unless the relationship between them is characterized by a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to implement their respective tasks successfully. It is in this light that my Government views this relationship. The size, composition, functions and deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) are precisely the sort of matters on which close consultation is required.

"Fourthly, the reduction of South African troops in South West Africa will commence only after the comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts and the establishment of a visible peace. The South African Government regards its responsibility for the security of the people of the Territory in a very serious light.

"Fifthly, the functions of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in respect of the electoral process are spelt out in the proposal in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves

and the certification of their results, the Special Representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all such measures. In the course of the negotiations, we were repeatedly assured that the Special Representative would be guided by the procedures and precedents established by the United Nations in other appropriate cases where the United Nations had played a role in the determination of the wishes of the people."

More than a month has passed since then. What has happened?

In pursuance of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), your Special Representative arrived in South West Africa on 6 August. He and his assistants spent two and a half weeks there gathering information on matters relevant to the implementation of the proposal [S/12636]. In this he received the fullest co-operation from the authorities in the Territory. With the active assistance of those authorities he went where he wanted to, he saw what he wanted to and he consulted whomsoever he wished. Indeed, upon his departure, the Special Representative expressly acknowledged the co-operation and assistance extended to him as Special Representative. Yet even while these efforts to further the cause of a peaceful solution in the Territory were under way, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) not only continued but intensified its vicious, vindictive campaign of terror and violence against its political opponents and the civilian population in the Territory.

Eight letters have already been addressed to you during the past three months concerning more than 80 incidents which have occurred on the border between Angola and South West Africa as a result of terrorist activities planned and executed by SWAPO. As recently as three days ago, an organizer of an opposing political party was murdered and another was robbed. Is this the manner in which SWAPO plans to conduct its participation in free and fair elections in the Territory? Violence, murder and intimidation cannot be tolerated during a democratic process.

Moreover, at the very time of the Special Representative's departure, SWAPO's plans to bombard Katima Mulilo were well advanced and in fact it commenced barely four hours after his departure and just a few days after your own appeal for a cessation of violence.

Once again we see further evidence of SWAPO's bad faith and its desire to wreck the prospects of a peaceful and successful solution in the Territory—and this at the very time when the Special Representative was actively engaged in carrying out his task.

This attitude of SWAPO is in complete violation of the spirit of the proposal and must raise the most serious doubts that SWAPO has any intention of fulfilling its obligations thereunder.

These doubts are strongly aggravated by statements made by various leaders of SWAPO, both within and outside the Territory. As recently as 25 August, a SWAPO press statement stated that SWAPO would not cease its hostilities until all South African troops in the Territory had been withdrawn. Other recent statements insisted that there would be no cessation of hostile acts by SWAPO until such time as a cease-fire agreement was reached and signed by South Africa and SWAPO. Yet other statements require the unconditional withdrawal of South African forces from the Territory.

Statements such as these are clearly not only directly inconsistent with the provisions of the proposal but, if adhered to, will make a complete farce of its implementation. SWAPO had indicated through its statements and violence that it is not interested in peace or in a solution in terms of

the proposal. Let me refer to further statements made by SWAPO:

—The Special Representative will take over full power from the Administrator-General during the transition period;

—The police force in the Territory will be restricted to base during the transition period;

—There can be no government in the Territory unless such government is declared and established by SWAPO.

How are these statements reconcilable with the relevant provisions of the proposal? Why should SWAPO be allowed to violate the proposal and apparently expect the other parties to act in accordance with it?

Indeed, even at this stage when serious consideration is being given to the implementation of the proposal, it is not clear whether SWAPO has accepted the proposal or not. We are entitled to ask where SWAPO stands. The inhabitants of the Territory have a right to know that too. Nobody can simply ignore SWAPO's statements and actions. Both are aimed at wrecking a peaceful settlement by way of murder, kidnapping, armed robbery and other forms of intimidation directed, for the most part, against civilians. It is surely no coincidence that there was a sharp increase—an increase of 50 per cent—in these terrorist activities after adoption of the proposal by the Security Council on 27 July last.

In planning the implementation of the proposal, it is essential to have clarity on SWAPO's intentions.

In the first place, we now insist on an unequivocal answer to the question of whether SWAPO has accepted the proposal or not, and, in the second place, if it has accepted it, we insist on knowing whether it commits itself to a cessation of all forms of violence. This commitment ought to be set out in writing and circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Decisions on major issues are dependent on this. To mention but one: the reduction of the South African military presence requires, as a prerequisite, the complete cessation of hostile acts and the establishment of a visible peace. This in turn will affect the size of the military component of UNTAG.

It has all along been argued that the cessation of hostilities is a crucial requirement for the implementation of the proposal. It is the key factor. If violence continues the proposal cannot be implemented. If violence ends, the need for a large number of United Nations military observers falls away. It is as elementary as all that but I stress: violence must first cease—and its cessation must be visibly established.

If this is not so, the argument for an increase in the United Nations military personnel applies equally to an increase in South African forces.

During our discussions with the Five on this very issue of troop numbers, the South African Government intimated that it was concerned about the danger of insufficient protection of the northern border areas once a reduction of South African troops had started. The Five repeatedly disagreed with out assessment, indicating that once a comprehensive and visible peace had been established there could be no justification for a substantial number of South African troops being stationed in the area. We cautioned the Five that we were sceptical that such a completely peaceful situation would eventuate. We urged them to accept the reality of the situation and the fact that we could not reduce our troops below a figure of 4,000 even after a cessation of hostilities. We were not an occupying force but a security force. It was our duty to provide security in order that the people could freely participate in the electoral process.

The Five persisted in claiming that an atmosphere of

peace would be brought into being once a cessation of hostilities took place. They said that our concerns were not justified. Once there was a firm, durable, peaceful situation backed by the front-line States and a Security Council resolution, the danger of outside attacks would be so minimal as to be discounted, the Five contended. They urged us to accept that there would be peace, visible peace. If peace were not obtained and did not prevail and last, the implementation of the proposal would be frustrated and would become impossible to achieve. No South African troop reductions would then take place. We stressed that, in that event, South Africa would be entitled to increase its troop strengths to levels sufficient to meet any increase in violence.

Using the argument that under conditions of comprehensive peace there would simply be no justification for large numbers of troops, we agreed under the force of reason to an eventual reduction of our troops to 1,500. Now we find ourselves in the incredible situation where we are told that 7,500 United Nations troops would be needed to undertake tasks which under conditions of total peace we were previously assured could be administered by a few hundred. In other words, a completely peaceful situation was the basis of the argument persuading us to reduce our troops to 1,500 but, in the case of the United Nations troops, the uncertainty of such a situation of comprehensive peace serves as a reason for introducing 7,500 troops. While on the one hand peace was the key factor for demanding a reduction of South African troops, the now apparently uncertain peaceful situation is used to demand an increase in United Nations troops.

Either peace is to be established or not. If it is established, there is no need for large numbers of United Nations troops. If it is not established, then it remains the responsibility of the South African security forces to ensure safety and security.

It is possible that the United Nations experts who had to estimate the numbers of United Nations troops required did so in terms of United Nations norms and standards against the background of uncertainty as to the precise task of the contingent. However, the Administrator-General was not consulted at all as to the numbers. It is also evident that the United Nations personnel were not fully informed as to the meaning and scope of certain key provisions of the proposal. No one can blame the South African Government for being unwilling to accept extended and changed provisions of a proposal which was described to us by the Five as final and definitive. The Five pledged that they would stand by their proposal. We already feel let down badly on other issues. There is apparently no end to the double standards interwoven in the fabric of commitments and understandings which formed the basis of these negotiations.

During the negotiations, we were told that appropriate United Nations precedents would be followed in all respects. What happened in the past?

In 1956, a team of 23 was sufficient to monitor a plebiscite in British Togoland in which 159,080 voters participated. A total of 575,267 voted in the 1961 plebiscite in the British Cameroons which was monitored by 34 United Nations observers, despite the difficult terrain and poor communications in the Territory. In the 1961 independence referendum in Western Samoa, 12 observers were required to monitor 37,897 voters, and this on a number of islands. More recently, the United Nations sent three representatives to observe the 1975 plebiscite in the Mariana Islands where 5,005 voted. Last year, three observers went to Djibouti to observe and report on the independence election and referendum in which 79,789 voters participated.

It should be recalled that the terms of reference of most

United Nations plebiscite teams were comprehensive and included responsibility for observing and reporting on polling arrangements, voting, counting of ballots and declaration of results. The plebiscites were conducted in territories where communications were often less adequate than in South West Africa.

There are also other aspects of the report which leaders in the Territory find objectionable. One of these concerns the timetable and the period of approximately seven months referred to in paragraph 17 of the report.

Two years ago, the leaders of the Territory told the South African Government that they were ready for independence and that they wanted it at the end of 1978.

It is something we cannot deny them. South Africa at the time accepted that South West Africa would become independent on 31 December 1978. It is something which cannot be delayed any longer. No one has the right to thwart the will of the people.

Throughout the negotiations with the five Western members of the Security Council, South Africa made it clear that that date must stand. This position was accepted by the Five. In fact the annex to the proposal, approved by the Council in resolution 431 (1978), expressly reflects the date of independence as "*31 December 1978 at the latest*". This is clear, imperative language.

The timetable was computed to attain independence by this date. This date determined the computation of the timetable and not vice versa.

As you know from a communication addressed to you on 25 April 1978, South Africa accepted the proposal on that date. That means in sufficient time for the attainment of independence, in accordance with the timetable, on 31 December 1978. It left eight months for a process which in any event is, even in your report, not foreseen to last more than seven months.

The fact that the Security Council adopted resolution 431 (1978) only on 27 July 1978 was due not to any fault on the part of South Africa but to the delaying tactics employed by SWAPO. If, therefore, in order to make it possible to achieve independence by 31 December 1978, the timetable must now be telescoped, that is entirely the fault of SWAPO.

I would add that all parties, including SWAPO, have been campaigning politically in the Territory for several years, and during the last year on an ever increasing and intensified scale.

As far back as October 1974, my Prime Minister invited those who had left the Territory and wished to return to propagate any constitutional changes they liked, provided only that they did so within the requirements of law and order. At Vienna in May 1977, my Prime Minister publicly repeated that invitation to SWAPO members. Pursuant to this, a substantial number have indeed returned and are still returning.

Furthermore, you and members of the Security Council are aware of the substantial financial and other assistance which SWAPO has received from this Organization in particular, but also from other quarters. Thus, during the current biennium an expenditure of just on \$3 million is budgeted for South West African activities in the United Nations.⁵ SWAPO is the major beneficiary of this financial assistance. Direct assistance to SWAPO from the regular United Nations budget for the biennium 1978-1979 totals \$263,400. You are also aware that none of the other political parties in South West Africa, which also look to the United Nations, and especially to the Security Council, for support in realizing

⁵*Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 6 A*, pages 12, 13, 70, 76 and 93.

their aspirations towards self-determination and independence, is receiving any assistance from this Organization whatsoever.

A crucial question, however, remains the military forces.

Throughout the negotiations between South Africa and the five Western members of the Security Council, the responsibility of South Africa for security in South West Africa was accepted. Indeed, during discussions at Cape Town in June 1977, the attitude of the Five was expressed in the following terms by one of their spokesmen:

"As you know, a lot of people say they [The South African armed forces] should be withdrawn before elections are accepted—that is out of the question. What we have got to do is somehow to ensure that there can be no accusations that the South African forces behaved improperly during the election campaign . . . all that we have in mind would be an observer with, I do not know how many units you have, but anyway sufficient observers that someone could publicly declare on record that during the election campaign we were with the South African armed forces and at no stage did they in any way improperly interfere in the elections. It would make it unnecessary for them to be withdrawn for fair elections . . . We are prepared to accept that South African troops must remain during this period but in order to meet the charge that they will improperly interfere, we will say that the South African forces have agreed that with each major unit there should be an observer who, at the end of the period, will be able to certify that there had been no intimidation or interference by the South African military personnel."

However, on 14 July 1977, after discussion with SWAPO and other interested parties, the Five informed the South African Government that the presence of South African troops was "a major area of dispute". For the first time, South Africa was requested to submit a schedule for the phased withdrawal of its forces from the Territory. This sudden change of attitude on the part of the Five caused my Government serious misgivings as to whether the Five would stand by their statements and commitments in good faith. Indeed, this changed attitude resulted in a number of acrimonious exchanges between my Government and the Five which all but brought to an end our negotiations.

At this juncture, the South African Government pointed out, as it had consistently done, that its troops were in the Territory at the request of the inhabitants and that their sole function was to provide protection against armed acts of aggression emanating from beyond the Territory's borders. South Africa had a continuing responsibility in regard to the security of the people of South West Africa and would leave only at their request.

Nevertheless, as an expression of its serious desire to meet the concerns of the Five and with a view to the importance of international recognition for a future independent South West Africa, the South African Government indicated its willingness initially, as from a date to be agreed upon, to reduce its troops to 20,000 and, after a period of three months, to 8,000. These troops would finally be confined to eight bases. The Five indicated, however, that these reductions would still not enable them to overcome the difficulties they envisaged. In a further effort to accommodate the Five, the South African Government was, as an alternative, prepared to reduce its troops to 12,000 by a specified commencement date, to 8,000 after three weeks and to 4,000 after another three weeks.

On the political side, the Five argued that other parties would find it difficult to accept more South African troops than United Nations personnel. They would insist at least on parity. And, in this connexion, the Five were thinking of a

United Nations military presence of 2,000 men. On the practical side, the Five reminded South Africa that the whole plan pre-supposed the existence of a situation of visible peace, arguing that in those circumstances it was not clear why South Africa wanted so many troops in South West Africa.

In the light of these arguments, particularly of that that large numbers of troops would not be required once peace was established, the South African Government indicated during a subsequent round of discussions with the Five, on 3 December 1977, that it would consider a further reduction from 4,000 to 3,000. The Five maintained, however, that the larger the South African force in South West Africa, the larger the United Nations contingent would have to be. In addition, they asked whether logistic services could not be rendered by civilian elements rather than by military personnel. The South African Government considers its responsibilities for physical security in South West Africa in a serious light and therefore indicated that it could not reduce its troop levels beyond the minimum considered necessary to be on hand immediately should hostile actions be resumed unexpectedly.

In spite of this and of South Africa's strenuous objections, the Five included in their proposal of 31 January 1978 a figure of 1,500 South African troops to be confined in Grootfontein or Oshivello or both.

The question of United Nations military observer teams was discussed at various stages of the negotiations. During the discussions with the Five on 3 December 1977, it was suggested that the proposed United Nations military presence should be somewhat larger than the South African contingent. In fact, it was stated that the Five were thinking in terms of 2,000 men "tailored to the task which they would be called upon to perform".

The Five, however, did not see their way clear, in the light of practical difficulties, to support a South African suggestion that, if there were to be 2,000 United Nations military observers, 1,000 should be stationed south of the South West Africa/Angola border and 1,000 north of it.

As it was not possible to reach agreement on the size of the United Nations military observer group, it was suggested that the figure should be determined by the Special Representative in consultation with the Administrator-General. The underlying idea was that the two officials should, in line with the requirements of close co-operation and mutual trust, determine the figure according to the need of the situation on the ground.

While the Five argued that the Administrator-General could not be given a veto in this matter, South Africa pointed out that if no agreement were reached it would become impossible to implement the proposal anyway.

Paragraph 8 *e* of the proposal attempted to find a solution to the problem. It provided, *inter alia*, that:

"In establishing the military section of UNTAG, the Secretary-General will keep in mind functional and logistical requirements. The five Governments, as members of the Security Council, will support the Secretary-General's judgement in his discharge of this responsibility. The Secretary-General will, in the normal manner, include in his consultations all those concerned with the implementation of the agreement. The United Nations Special Representative will be required to satisfy himself as to the implementation of all these arrangements and will keep the Secretary-General informed of developments in this regard."

When the South African Government considered the proposal as a whole it sought further assurances that the Administrator-General would be consulted also in regard to the

size of the military group. To this end, the Five defined their interpretation of the situation, in writing, as follows:

"We believe we have taken full account of your political difficulties, in leaving the Secretary-General to determine the size, composition and deployment of the contingent. We have explicitly provided for him to consult all those concerned with the implementation of the agreement. And we have told you that these will of necessity include the Administrator-General and your Government."

In the light of these facts, it cannot be argued that a military peace-keeping force of the nature envisaged in the report was ever contemplated during the negotiations which led to the submission of the proposal of the Five. It is also clear that, in deciding on the composition and size as well as the deployment of the military observers required for monitoring purposes, there had to be consultations, and it is implicit in the concept of consultation that reasonableness should be shown.

But lest there should be any argument on the functions envisaged for United Nations military observers in South West Africa, may I draw your attention to Security Council resolution 385 (1976) adopted on 30 January 1976.

While addressing certain demands to my Government, it spells out the task envisaged for the United Nations in paragraph 7. This task is related to the supervision of free elections for the whole of South West Africa to enable the people freely to determine their own future, i.e. a monitoring and not a peace-keeping role.

Throughout the negotiations leading up to the submission of the proposal in its final and definitive form, it was stressed that any agreement should satisfy the main requirements of resolution 385 (1976). This was no easy task but finally agreement was reached on how these essential requirements could be resolved.

But nowhere in this resolution is there the slightest hint of a type of peace-keeping force such as the one now proposed in the report. In fact, if there had been such a suggestion, the negotiations would never have got off the ground.

I submit that if there ever had been a plan to introduce such a far-reaching element into the framework of resolution 385 (1976) it should and would have been addressed specifically in the negotiations and in the proposal itself. Such a major new element cannot be slipped in casually. In this connexion, I might well ask what the meaning is of the second sentence in paragraph 20 of the report which states:

"Self-defence will include resistance to attempts to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council."

Also, without any consultation, South Africa has now been confronted with what amounts to 7,500 United Nations military personnel plus 360 policemen.

Where in the proposal itself is there any provision for a United Nations police contingent?

On the contrary, the proposal is very specific in defining the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order during the transitional period. It rests primarily with the exist-

ing police forces. Furthermore, the Administrator-General will ensure the good conduct of the police forces to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.

The language of the proposal is clear. There is no provision for a United Nations police contingent. There is no room for the recommendation in paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of the report for the creation of a civil police element of UNTAG for the purpose of, *inter alia*, taking measures against any intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter. It does not form part of the proposal and is completely unacceptable to the South African Government.

As far as the activities of the existing police forces are concerned, provision is made in the proposal for the Special Representative to make arrangements, *when appropriate*, for United Nations personnel to accompany them in the discharge of their duties.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that the present difficulties have arisen in spite of the fact that all the elements which formed the basis of so many years of dispute and acrimony between South Africa and the United Nations have been eliminated.

Over the years it has been demanded of South Africa that we should grant immediate independence to South West Africa on the basis of:

- A unitary State;
- One man, one vote;
- The removal of discrimination on the basis of colour;
- The holding of free and fair elections to the satisfaction of the United Nations;
- The right of all South West Africans to return to participate peacefully in the political process;
- The release of detainees wherever held.

South Africa has committed itself to doing all this and has already gone a long way towards making possible the realization of these goals.

It is a cause of great concern and disappointment to the South African Government that, in spite of what has been achieved and the clear wishes of the people of South West Africa, we are caught up in arguments far removed from the main questions of principle.

My Government for its part accepted the proposal on 25 April 1978 in its final and definitive form—nothing more, nothing less. We are prepared to adhere to that decision but not to go along with interpretations inconsistent with the proposal. The proposal cannot, however, be implemented unless accepted and honoured by all concerned.

SWAPO cannot continue to engage in violence while at the same time paying lip-service to the proposal and claiming the benefits therefrom. The people of South West Africa demand to be told where they stand and are ready to assume their independence as envisaged and as promised.

(Signed) R. F. BOTHA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of South Africa

Letter dated 6 September 1978 from the representative of Botswana to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[7 September 1978]

On behalf of the Group of African States at the United Nations, I have the honour to transmit to you resolutions AHG/Res.86 (XV) and CM/Res. 629 (XXXI) on Namibia, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and by the OAU Council of Ministers at Khartoum, and to request that they should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Thomas TLOU
Permanent Representative of Botswana
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Resolution AHG/Res. 86 (XV)

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its fifteenth ordinary session in Khartoum, Democratic Republic of the Sudan, from 18 to 22 July 1978,

Reaffirming its unreserved support of the struggle of the people of Namibia for self-determination and genuine national independence,

Mindful of the special responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Recalling all relevant United Nations resolutions on Namibia, in particular Security Council resolution 385 (1976),

Having heard the statement of the President of SWAPO on the development of the struggle and recent negotiations to bring about a settlement of the question of Namibia in accordance with the provisions of resolution 385 (1976),

Having also been informed of an accord reached in Luanda on 12 July 1978 between SWAPO and the representatives of the five Western members of the Security Council on the proposal to effect a negotiated settlement of the Namibian question on the basis of resolution 385 (1976),

1. Welcomes the agreement in Luanda reached between SWAPO and the representatives of the five Western countries;

2. Recognizes that this agreement is the result of the victorious struggle of the Namibian people led by SWAPO and effectively supported by free Africa;

3. Expresses its appreciation to SWAPO, which has over the years stood firm and unrelenting in its gallant and courageous struggle to bring freedom and independence to Namibia, and commends SWAPO for its steadfastness and statesmanship in bringing about the Luanda agreement;

4. Requests the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to proceed expeditiously towards giving effect to resolution 385 (1976) as a follow-up to the Luanda agreement;

5. Declares that the United Nations must have effective powers and authority to exercise supervision and control regarding the transitional administration, the security measures and the conduct of the election process;

6. Reaffirms its support of the United Nations Council for Namibia as the sole legal authority for the Territory until its independence;

7. Requests the United Nations Secretary-General to maintain consultations with and keep the United Nations Council for Namibia duly informed on the various stages of the process to give effect to resolution 385 (1976);

8. Reiterates its unequivocal support for SWAPO in the struggle for the total liberation of Namibia;

9. Requests the current Chairman and members of the Bureau of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government to maintain contact with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in an effort to ensure that all the necessary steps will be taken towards the achievement of the independence of the people of Namibia.

Resolution CM/Res. 629 (XXXI)

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its thirty-first ordinary session in Khartoum, Democratic Republic of the Sudan, from 7 to 18 July 1978,

Having examined once again the serious political and military situation currently obtaining in Namibia because of the continued illegal occupation of the country by the racist apartheid régime of South Africa,

Bearing in mind the constant obstinate refusal of the racist South African régime to relinquish its illegal grip on Namibia and its determination to forge a fake election and impose its puppets and quislings of the Turnhalle tribal gathering on the Namibian people,

Gravely concerned by the repeated acts of aggression and the military provocations and incursion into neighbouring independent African States, particularly the recent savage military attack on the unarmed Namibian refugees in Kassinga during the invasion of the People's Republic of Angola,

Noting with equal concern the racist régime of Pretoria's disregard and violation of the relevant United Nations resolutions and especially Security Council resolution 385 (1976), as manifested in its current so-called registration of voters,

Further noting the successful covering of the ninth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, on the question of Namibia, by which the General Assembly adopted resolution S-9/2 containing a Declaration on Namibia and a Programme of Action in Support of Self-Determination and National Independence for Namibia,

Noting with satisfaction the progress made by SWAPO in the political, military and diplomatic fields,

Reiterating Africa's firm support for the just and legitimate armed liberation struggle by the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned movement;

2. Endorses the Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action in Support of Self-Determination and National Independence for Namibia adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its ninth special session, on 3 May 1978;

3. Commends SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, for its political mobilization of the Namibian people as well as its intensification of both the armed struggle and diplomatic campaign;

4. Expresses its deep appreciation and support to the heads of State of the front-line countries for the very positive role they have assumed and the commendable efforts they are making to help solving the Namibian problem;

5. Reaffirms its commitment to end South African illegal occupation of Namibia through complete and unconditional withdrawal to enable the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, to exercise freely their right to self-determination and genuine national independence;

6. Urges all OAU member States, States Members of the United Nations and other States not to accord recognition to any régime created by South Africa in Namibia;

7. Strongly condemns the registration of voters by South Africa which is aimed at side-stepping and undermining the authority of the United Nations;

8. Condemns the creation of tribal armies in Namibia by South Africa as a measure of ensuring its control of the Territory after independence;

9. Strongly condemns the military build-up of South Africa in Namibia in preparation for a major confrontation with the liberation forces led by SWAPO;

10. Strongly condemns the aggressive policies of the illegal South African occupation régime in Namibia reflected in its repeated acts of aggression against neighbouring States, in particular Angola and Zambia, causing considerable loss of human life and damage to property;

11. Firmly resolves to increase material, financial and moral assistance to SWAPO in order to intensify the armed struggle and maintain vigilance until final victory;

12. Reaffirms in the most solemn manner that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia and reiterates its unequivocal condemnation of South Africa's attempts at annexation of Walvis Bay, which would constitute a flagrant violation of Namibia's unity and territorial integrity;

13. Calls upon the Security Council of the United Nations to act decisively against any manoeuvres of the illegal occupation régime to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia.

We have sought to remain firm and unswerving in defence of the inalienable rights, legitimate aspirations and true interests of the oppressed people of Namibia. At the same time, however, we have demonstrated flexibility and a spirit of compromise in order to ensure that progress will be made.

It is because of SWAPO's statesmanship and willingness to make the necessary concessions that this exercise has reached the present stage.

The joint communiqué issued at Luanda on 12 July 1978 by SWAPO and the representatives of the five Western Governments marked a significant break-through in this diplomatic exercise.

At Luanda, the two delegations were able to agree, for the first time, to proceed to the Security Council so that the decolonization process of Namibia could be started. Had SWAPO rejected the Western proposal because of certain difficulties contained therein, it would have been impossible for the Council to have met. Thus, when the Western five took the initiative leading to the Council meeting on 27 July 1978, SWAPO supported and encouraged its friends and supporters, Africans and non-Africans, to go along with the adoption of Council resolution 431 (1978). Clearly, all these efforts by SWAPO were undertaken in the firm conviction that, wherever it was possible to attain the objectives for which our people have been fighting with the minimum of bloodshed and sacrifice, that course of action should be embarked upon. This principled position of SWAPO is also in keeping with our firmly held view that negotiation is an indispensable and equally important element of the struggle of any people fighting for its liberation.

SWAPO has studied your report contained in document S/12827 submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978). We have taken note of the fact that this report was prepared after a survey mission led by your Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari. We have also noted the careful and reasoned way in which this report is written. SWAPO wishes to commend your efforts and those of your Special Representative and his colleagues for having produced this report.

In general, SWAPO, having studied this report, wishes to declare its support for the same. However, there are some specific areas of concern which we wish to underline. Our support for this report is therefore based on the understanding that the areas of concern would be overcome.

Our major area of concern is the question of registration of voters. We have noted that the Secretary-General's report is silent on this question. At the same time, however, we wish to draw your attention to paragraph 6 of the proposal of the Western five [S/12636] which, *inter alia*, stipulates that "the implementation of the electoral process, including the proper registration of voters and the proper and timely tabulation and publication of voting results will also have to be conducted to the satisfaction of the Special Representative". Despite this provision, it is a known fact that the South African racists have continued with the unilateral registration of voters. They have done so despite the opposition firmly expressed by the United Nations. Clearly, therefore, the South African illegal racist régime began to interfere with the election process long before the anticipated beginning of the transition period. Their unilateral action was a calculated defiance of the United Nations position. It was also a rebuff to the spirit and letter of the Western proposal on this question. But our concern is not only related to the South African defiance because by now the international community has come to expect such systematic acts of defiance. Our concern derives from the fact that, in undertaking the unilateral registration of voters, the South African racist authorities have engaged in acts of harassment, intimidation and victimization of many Namibians.

They have also engaged in calculated frauds by registering some people who are not Namibians. Clearly, therefore, the South African illegal régime, through the process of unilateral registration, has tried and is trying to create conditions most favourable to its own ulterior designs in Namibia. SWAPO cannot accept this situation.

SWAPO, which derives its legitimacy from the overwhelming support of the people of Namibia, has always maintained that we are prepared for free and fair elections in the Territory. For such elections to be held, a climate of confidence, free of fraud, intimidation and harassment, must be created. It is on that basis that SWAPO has supported one of the fundamental provisions of resolution 385 (1976), that is to say, the holding of elections under United Nations supervision and control. And it is for the same reason that we cannot accept a situation where South Africa is trying to create further *faits accomplis* in the Territory and attempting to pre-empt the legitimate expression of the people of Namibia. We would therefore insist that this question of registration should be looked at afresh and we should prefer that a new registration of voters be undertaken immediately upon the beginning of the transition process.

We have studied the sections of the report dealing with the composition, power and functions of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) [S/12827, paras. 21-34]. We are satisfied with the provisions concerning the military component. We consider, for example, the proposed strength of the force, as contained in paragraph 26, to be both realistic and sound, considering the special circumstances that prevail in Namibia. We have taken note of the fact that we shall be consulted concerning the composition of this force. We have some definite views which we have already brought to your attention in the course of several meetings that we have had with you.

We are concerned with the provision of paragraph 30 in respect of the civil police element of UNTAG. We should like to point out that in not objecting to the provision that the existing police force, which will be provided only with side arms, will be responsible for normal police duties during the period of transition, we took that position on the clear understanding that the United Nations police would effectively monitor the performance of the existing police. Such monitoring would include the assurance that they would behave in an acceptable manner so as to ensure that no intimidation, harassment or victimization would take place. In the course of the negotiations, we had been assured by the Western five that United Nations police officers would accompany existing South African police whenever and wherever the Special Representative deemed it necessary for them to do so. We therefore believe that in the fulfillment of these responsibilities, the number proposed in your report, that is to say approximately 360 experienced police officers, will not be adequate. We should definitely prefer a significantly higher number. In making this point, we wish to stress once again the need to create a climate of confidence in the Territory so that the people of Namibia can decide for themselves their ultimate destiny, free from the omnipresent harassment, intimidation and victimization by their South African oppressors.

Another major area which we wish to address ourselves to is the question of cessation of hostilities, referred to in para. 14 a. It should, in this connexion, be noted that the very nature of the South African occupation régime is based on violence against our people and persistent aggression against independent African States. The South African régime has never stopped or relaxed its repressive violence against Namibians internally and its naked aggression against Angola and Zambia. The South African régime must put an immediate end to its murders of Namibians, including

women and children, as did in their massacre at Kassinga. The international community and more particularly the Security Council should see to it that South Africa's notorious lawlessness is brought to a halt.

SWAPO has taken up arms to resist the violence and repression of the occupying forces. When conditions can be created for putting an end to that violence, the necessity for the continuation of the armed struggle will no longer be there. You will recall that, at our meeting with you on Tuesday, 5 September 1978, we made it very clear that we attached the utmost importance to the scrupulous honouring of the cease-fire. In this connexion, we had proposed that a formal and binding instrument should be signed by SWAPO and South Africa. Such a cease-fire agreement is logical and necessary to avoid further confrontations and to ensure a scrupulous observance of the provisions of the cease-fire. We hereby reiterate our readiness to sign the agreement provided that the South African régime does the same. We would also propose that the agreement should be authenticated by the Secretary-General. This is a further demonstration of our good faith and commitment to seriously honour and abide by the resolution of the Security Council aimed at implementing the proposal in accordance with resolution 385 (1976).

One last area which we wish to place on record is our

understanding, in respect of the role, duties and powers of the Special Representative. We take note that these have been partly defined both in the proposal of the Western five and in your report. The Western five and you know our position on this. We should have preferred that the whole operation leading Namibia to independence be handled by the United Nations. We should have preferred to see the role of the Special Representative more clearly defined to include that he would see to it that Namibia attains genuine freedom and that during the period of transition it would be his role to ensure the fair and honest preservation of security, law and order. In any case, we wish to stress that it is our understanding that, at any time the Special Representative is not satisfied with any action or measure adopted by the "Administrator-General", that action or measure will not be effected.

With the above understanding, SWAPO accepts the Secretary-General's report and pledges its full co-operation for a speedy action by the Security Council. In so doing, SWAPO is conscious that it is fulfilling its historical responsibilities as the legitimate and authentic representative of our people.

I should be most grateful if you would arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12842

Note verbale dated 31 August 1978 from the representative of Austria to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 September 1978]

The Acting Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the latter's note of 18 May 1978 concerning the implementation of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

Austria has already complied with the non-mandatory arms embargo against South Africa of Security Council resolution 181 (1963). Thus Austria welcomed resolution 418 (1977) and consequently implemented its mandatory provisions. The Acting Permanent Representative of Aus-

tria wishes to recall the respective detailed information given to the Secretary-General in his note of 5 April 1978 [S/12632].

Investigations carried out by the Federal Government of Austria in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977) have shown that neither contractual arrangements with nor licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles are known to the competent Austrian authorities.

DOCUMENT S/12843

Note verbale dated 11 September 1978 from the Mission of Benin to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[12 September 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Benin to the United Nations has the honour to communicate to the Secretary-General the text of the press conference given by the Permanent Mission of Benin on 7 September 1978 at Headquarters.

The Secretary-General is requested to issue the full text of the press conference as a document of the Security Council in connexion with the question of armed aggression against the People's Republic of Benin.

ANNEX

Text of the press conference given on 7 September 1978 by the Mission of Benin

EXPULSION OF BENINESE NATIONALS RESIDENT IN GABON

I. BACKGROUND

Since the imperialist armed aggression of Sunday, 16 January 1977, and increasingly since the various investigations carried out have irrefutably established the active participation in this aggression of President Bongo, the head of State of Gabon, the Gabonese régime is thrashing about, so to

speaking, in convulsions and making wild comments which ill conceal Bongo's guilt in this criminal operation.

1. President Bongo reacted by threatening to retaliate against the Beninese community in Gabon shortly after the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity in February 1977 at Lomé.

At Libreville itself, verbal threats against our country and its nationals are proliferating.

2. July 1977, fourteenth OAU summit at Libreville. The issue of the imperialist armed aggression against our country was not placed on the agenda. Because it firmly upheld the view that Gabon was disqualified to act as host to the summit, the People's Republic of Benin was not represented at Libreville.

At Libreville itself and indeed throughout Gabon, the counting of Beninese nationals, in a barely discreet manner, had started. The idea of repatriation had already matured, but the process was not set in motion while OAU met at Libreville and subsequently while the head of State of Gabon was the acting Chairman of OAU. Nevertheless at Libreville and Port-Gentil the insults and direct threats were continuously uttered against Beninese nationals, who became the scapegoats of a régime desperately trying to find an explanation for its failures and especially its crumbling economy. The bank accounts of Beninese nationals were frozen and restrictions were imposed on the circulation of people and goods.

3. July 1978, fifteenth OAU summit at Khartoum. The issue of the aggression against the People's Republic of Benin was inscribed on the agenda. Our great comrade in arms, President Mathieu Kérékou, made a statement in the general debate and spoke of subversive manoeuvres of all kinds against progressive States and especially of armed aggressions, the most patent example being that perpetrated against the people of Benin and its democratic People's Revolution on Sunday, 16 January 1977:

(a) President Kérékou recalled a few facts:

"Early in the morning of that Sunday, 16 January 1977, a pirate DC-7 aircraft from Franceville in Gabon made a secret landing at Cotonou international airport, carrying a horde of mercenaries recruited and paid by international imperialism and equipped and trained at the Benguerir military base in Morocco." [SI/2817, annex II.]

(b) This simple recapitulation of the facts relating to the aggression against our country must have prompted the Libreville authorities to launch the process of repatriating Beninese nationals, a process the details of which had been elaborated ever since the OAU summit at Libreville in July 1977.

II. EVENTS

1. At Khartoum. President Kérékou made his speech on Wednesday, 19 July 1978, shortly after 7 p.m. While the speech was being delivered, the head of State of Gabon and the delegation accompanying him tried to create a disturbance in the conference hall in order to distract the delegates' attention.

The following day, President Bongo held a press conference at which he stated, *inter alia*, that he would "review the situation of all Beninese nationals living in Gabon". He sent a telex to this effect to his Prime Minister, Mr. Léon Mébiame, before leaving Khartoum on the same day for Libreville via Paris.

2. At Libreville. The Prime Minister of Gabon, speaking over the air on the "Voix de la rénovation", launched the campaign for the repatriation of Beninese citizens. The "pursuit of the Beninese" was under way, enjoying the complicity of the Gabonese security forces. The scenario of the "Gabonese people's fury" was thus in place, with adequate assistance from the Libreville authorities.

On 21 July, President Bongo, on his return to Libreville, stated *inter alia*: "All Beninese nationals living in Gabon will be repatriated to Benin within the next few days, with the exception of the political refugees whose security is guaranteed by Gabon".

The repatriation announcement made by the head of State of Gabon prompted acts of vandalism, rape and murder, which began on 19 July, and the sacking of Monbouet and Akebe markets. Then, under the pretence of affording protection, it was decided to place all the Beninese nationals awaiting repatriation in the State Lycée de l'Estuaire. Over 4,000 Beninese citizens (men, women and children) were exposed to bad weather, without food or medical care, penned up like cattle in miserable sanitary conditions.

Meanwhile, inhuman acts of all kinds were perpetrated against Beninese nationals, and they were stripped of all their belongings. Those who tried to resist police brutality and the assault of the thugs of the Libreville authorities were bludgeoned and beaten to death.

Blackmail. For more than 10 days, President Bongo invoked the pretext of an alleged unwillingness on the part of the authorities of the People's Republic of Benin to receive their nationals; he did this in order to maintain the latter in inhuman conditions in the concentration camp that the State Lycée de l'Estuaire had become. It must be noted that at the time President Bongo was making this statement, the People's Republic of Benin had already set up a permanent national committee to receive persons deported from Gabon, and President Bongo knew of its existence. The People's Republic of Benin, confronted with this distortion of facts by the Gabonese President, had to give an accurate account of events in a communiqué.

Finally, only those Beninese nationals who could afford to buy air tickets were able to return to the People's Republic of Benin. In general, they were taken as far as Cotonou by CAMAIR (Cameroon Airlines) aircraft. The Gabonese authorities had refused to use their own means of transport to carry out the operation that they themselves had launched, on the grounds that "they were uncertain of the reception that might be accorded to their aircraft at Cotonou". (See the statement made by Mr. Martin Bongo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Gabonese daily newspaper *L'Union*, No. 784, 5 and 6 August.)

Weariness of the long wait spent in anxiety and subjection to provocation, the Beninese nationals rebelled angrily because of the blackmail aimed at compelling some of them, mainly the highly trained personnel, to remain in the Republic of Gabon. There followed a bloody repression by Gabonese security forces. No one will ever know for sure how many were killed in this deadly attack by policemen, in which, according to eye-witnesses, hand-grenades, tear gas and sub-machine-guns were used.

3. At Cotonou. The Beninese nationals expelled from Gabon started to arrive at Cotonou on 1 August. On that day, the first CAMAIR aircraft brought back to Cotonou 76 Beninese nationals who had paid their fares themselves.

On the same day, a ship of the Christian Vieljeu Company, chartered by the Gabonese Government, brought 473 Beninese to the Port of Cotonou.

(a) *Progress of the repatriation operations*

(i) CAMAIR: between 1 and 15 August, several flights from Libreville to Cotonou, the deportees paying their own fares; 17 August, two flights from Port-Gentil to Cotonou.

(ii) Air Afrique: a few flights from Libreville; trip entirely at the expense of the repatriated persons.

(iii) UTA: two flights from Libreville; travel expenses borne by those repatriated.

(iv) SABENA: a single flight from Libreville at the request and expense of the Gabonese Government. It was not a special flight but a regular flight diverted to Cotonou.

(v) Liberia: six special flights Libreville-Cotonou on Wednesday and Thursday, 16 and 17 August, to bring to Cotonou the remaining Beninese residing at Libreville.

(vi) *Trans International Airlines*: an American chartered aircraft made two flights on Thursday, 17 August, to take to Cotonou Beninese citizens residing in the Gabonese hinterland (Port-Gentil, Franceville, Mouanda, Akeni, Tchibanga, Mayoumba, Lambaréné, N'Djolle, etc.).

In summary, as of 20 August, a total of 10,000 Beninese nationals who were living in Gabon have come back to the People's Republic of Benin, 260 of whom having returned via Lomé and Lagos.

(b) *State of health of the deportees*

Among the deportees were a large number of injured people, some in a serious condition. There were also cases of miscarriages and premature births.

(c) *Miscellaneous information*

The Government of the People's Republic of Benin was informed by the Zairean Ambassador at Cotonou that his country was requesting overflight and landing authorization for Air Zaire aircraft chartered by the Gabonese authorities to provide special flights for Beninese nationals repatriated from Gabon.

The Libyan Government donated foodstuffs for the repatriated.

The Algerian Government offered to come to the help of the expelled Beninese.

The People's Republic of Benin received goodwill missions dispatched to Cotonou by President Sékou Touré of Guinea and by President Gaafar Nimeiri of the Sudan in his capacity as acting Chairman of OAU.

A permanent national committee was set up by the People's Republic of Benin to welcome Beninese citizens repatriated from Gabon.

As the Gabonese authorities had decided and announced over the air that

Beninese teachers, physicians, and other highly trained personnel would not be repatriated, the Central Committee of the Party of the People's Revolution of Benin and the Revolutionary Military Government made three appeals, which were broadcast several times by the media, inviting all Beninese nationals to come back home, whatever their qualifications or their occupations in Gabon.

At the end of the first joint session of the Central Committee of the Party of the People's Revolution of Benin and the Revolutionary Military Government, held on 2 August 1978, President Mathieu Kérékou sent a telex message to President Bongo asking him not to exclude from the scope of his decision (to repatriate Beninese citizens living in Gabon) any Beninese national, regardless of his qualifications or his occupation in Gabon.

The Government of the People's Republic of Benin expressed a desire to send to Gabon its Ambassador at Kinshasa to see first-hand the treatment being meted out to the Beninese deportees, but the Gabonese Government categorically rejected its request.

III. POSITION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN

The position of Benin with regard to the expulsion of Beninese nationals from Gabon was stated during the three joint sessions of the Central Committee of the Party of the People's Revolution of Benin and the Revolutionary Military Government.

According to the relevant documents, "the Central Committee of the Party of the People's Revolution of Benin and the Revolutionary Military Government are resolved to meet fully their responsibilities". In addition, it was stated that "President Bongo is alone responsible to history for the despicable, criminal, inhuman and anti-African acts of which our compatriots living in Gabon have been the wretched victims".

At the joint session of 11 August 1978, the Central Committee of the Party of the People's Revolution of Benin and the Revolutionary Military Government appealed to international opinion "to bring about an end to the pressures and the maltreatment to which the traitor Bongo was subjecting our compatriots as they awaited repatriation".

The People's Republic of Benin was therefore not surprised by the return of the sons that helped to construct Gabon. The militants of the People's Revolution of Benin were ready from the beginning to give a dignified and militant welcome to their compatriots. The Permanent National Committee set up for the purpose has taken all necessary measures to welcome the Beninese nationals and has successfully carried out its task.

It must be acknowledged that, although they underwent maltreatment and blackmail of every description, our compatriots have returned home in large numbers to the People's Republic of Benin and are happy to be back in the free African land of Benin.

Ready for the revolution. The struggle continues.

DOCUMENT S/12844*

Letter dated 8 September 1978 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[12 September 1978]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to respond to the misleading, abusive and ominous letter addressed to you on 17 July 1978 [S/12777] in which the Israeli representative strove to reply cavalierly to a letter dated 19 June 1978 [S/12752], sent to you by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Arab Group at the United Nations and circulated as a document both of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

The representative of Israel, in his letter of 17 July, cunningly attempts to ridicule the Arab Group's protest against Israel's annexationist designs in substituting the phrase "the Judaea and Samaria districts" for the term "West Bank", which is the legal and recognized terminology used consistently by the General Assembly and the Security Council to connote the area of Arab Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank forcibly occupied and colonized since Israel's aggression of 5 June 1967.

The representative of Israel's refuge in historical records merely renders his note vulnerable to floodgates of corrective rehabilitation.

The representative of Israel's ignorant and malicious references to the State of Qatar are unworthy of evoking a reply. Qatar's existence goes back to time immemorial and, besides, references to the state of Qatar are irrelevant in the context of the note sent by the Arab Group protesting Israeli annexationist policies and designs.

The representative of Israel, in his letter dated 17 July states that the term "West Bank" had only been given currency since about 1950 when, as he alleges, "the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan illegally annexed the districts of Judaea and Samaria which it had acquired by force in the war of 1948".

The representative of Israel seems to be callously oblivious to the following facts:

1. If the term "West Bank" was given currency only in 1950, then the term "Israel" was given currency only on 15 May 1948—and a falsified currency for that matter. The

reason is that Israel's legal entity derives from General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947.

2. Resolution 181 (II) never gave to Israel the substantial territories which it had illegally and forcibly annexed and carved out from Palestinian territories allocated for the Palestine Arab State embodied in that very same resolution.

3. Israel is the only country in the world whose admission to membership in the United Nations was conditional upon its acceptance and implementation of two United Nations resolutions:

(a) Withdrawal from the Palestinian territories which Israeli armed forces had forcibly and illegally occupied beyond the territories earmarked for the proposed Israeli State. This was an imperative prerequisite to enable the Palestinian Arabs to set up their own viable State over their homeland from time immemorial.

(b) Israel's admission to the United Nations was likewise conditional upon Israel's acceptance and implementation of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, which provided for the inalienable right of all Palestinian refugees to repatriation to their homes and homeland, as a first choice, and compensation for those who might not wish to exercise the right.

The Foreign Minister of Israel gave a pledge before the General Assembly to implement the two aforementioned resolutions. But, as soon as Israel had gained admission to the United Nations, it flagrantly and unabashedly reneged on its pledge.

Clearly then, Israel's legal existence as it existed between 1948 and 1967 was illegal within the framework, the letter and the spirit of the United Nations resolutions.

4. Israel's letter of 17 July 1978 claims that the alleged annexation by Jordan was never recognized internationally, except by the United Kingdom and Pakistan. This is refuted by the fact that, when Jordan was admitted to the United Nations in 1955, its admission was unconditional and comprised both the East Bank and the West Bank. The admission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was approved unanimously and without a single vote of dissent. If this is

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/233-S/12844.

changes as a consequence of the build-up of the Force and the successive withdrawals of the Israeli forces.

12. In the initial phase up to 10 April, the first UNIFIL troops which had arrived in the mission area were deployed in a strip of land immediately south and east of the Litani River. During the first days of the operation, the French battalion was deployed in the Tyre area in the west, the Iranian company was positioned in the Akiya Bridge area in the central sector and the Swedish company occupied positions in the eastern sector around and east of the Khardala Bridge. At the end of March, the Norwegian battalion had arrived and was deployed in the eastern sector, and the Swedish company was redeployed in the central-western sector between the French battalion and the Iranian company.

13. On 11 and 14 April, the first and second phases of the Israeli withdrawal took place. In the first phase the Israeli forces withdrew from the Rachaiya El Foukhar area east of the Litani River and in the second from the Taibe area south of the Litani. Following those two withdrawals the Israeli positions were taken over by the Norwegian battalion. By 14 April the main body of the Nepalese contingent had arrived and was deployed in the central-eastern sector between the Iranian company and the Norwegian battalion.

14. On 30 April, the third phase of the Israeli withdrawal took place in the western sector in the Qana and Tibnin areas. By that date the Senegalese contingent had arrived in the mission area and had been deployed in the central-western sector between the French battalion and the Swedish company. The positions evacuated by the Israeli forces were taken over by UNIFIL units, most of them Senegalese but some also French, Iranian and Swedish.

15. On 12 May, the Nigerian battalion which had recently arrived in the mission area took over positions from the Senegalese battalion and the Swedish company in the central sector, and the Swedish company was returned to its parent unit in UNEF.

16. During the first days of June, the Irish, Fijian and Iranian battalions arrived in the mission area. The Irish troops were deployed in the south-eastern sector in the Tibnin area, the Fijians took over positions in the western sector from the French battalion which moved to the south-western sector east of Naqoura. The Iranian battalion was deployed south of the Litani River near the Akiya Bridge in positions previously manned by the Iranian company from UNDOF. This company left the area of operation and returned to UNDOF on 14 June.

17. On 13 June, the fourth and last phase of the Israeli withdrawal took place. But this time, except for five positions, the withdrawing Israeli forces handed over control of the evacuated area not to UNIFIL but to the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups. Following extensive negotiations of the parties concerned, UNIFIL subsequently succeeded in establishing in this area a total of 24 positions, in addition to the five former UNTSO observation posts.

18. The present deployment of UNIFIL is as follows (see annexed map):

- (a) The Force headquarters is located at Naqoura.
- (b) The Senegalese battalion is deployed in the northern part of the western sector with its headquarters at Marakah.
- (c) The Fijian battalion is deployed in the southern part of the western sector with its headquarters at Qana.
- (d) The Nigerian battalion is deployed in the northern part of the central/western sector with its headquarters at Taysr Zibna.
- (e) The French battalion is deployed in the southern part of the central/western sector with its headquarters at Haris.

(f) The Iranian battalion is deployed in the northern part of the central/western sector with its headquarters at Qallawiyah.

(g) The Irish battalion is deployed in the southern part of the central/eastern sector with its headquarters at Tibnin.

(h) The Nepalese battalion is deployed in the western part of the eastern sector with its headquarters at Blate.

(i) The Norwegian battalion is deployed in the eastern part of the eastern sector with its headquarters at Ebel es Saqi.

(j) The Canadian signal unit provides communication facilities for the Force. Its headquarters is at Naqoura.

(k) The French logistic component less its engineer unit is located at Naqoura. The engineer unit is located at Jwaya.

(l) The Norwegian logistic component is deployed as follows:

(i) The maintenance company is located in the vicinity of Tibnin;

(ii) The medical company is located at Naqoura;

(iii) The helicopter wing is located at Naqoura.

(m) UNTSO military observers continue to man OP Lab and OP Hin. The other three OPs (Ras, Mar and Khiam) are manned by the Norwegian and Irish battalions. Other military observers are entrusted with the task of providing liaison with the various *de facto* forces.

(n) A composite guard detachment is situated in Tyre Barracks. This multinational unit comprises 80 men from two battalions drawn on a rotational basis from all battalions in the Force.

B. ACCOMMODATION

19. The Force as a whole faces an increasingly severe problem of accommodation. Approximately 80 per cent of contingent personnel are accommodated under canvas since buildings are not available in sufficient quantities or in the required locations. Of those buildings which are occupied by UNIFIL, many have suffered severe damage or are in an unfinished state. Self-help projects are in progress to improve unit accommodation, but neither the Force headquarters nor the units possess the capability or resources for large-scale construction. At Naqoura a few repaired buildings have been adapted as offices, and prefabricated buildings provide an operating room and a temperature-controlled drug storage facility in the Norwegian medical unit. All military personnel of UNIFIL headquarters and units at Naqoura are accommodated under canvas except for the headquarters officers who are accommodated in recently repaired or prefabricated buildings.

20. With the approaching rainy season and winter, the hardship imposed on the members of UNIFIL will quickly become severe. Therefore, it will be necessary to take urgent action for the provision of further prefabricated buildings if the Security Council should decide to extend the mandate of UNIFIL.

C. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

21. Logistic support for UNIFIL is provided by a headquarters logistic branch with a staff of 40, a French logistic component of 537, a Norwegian logistic component of 217 and a Canadian signals unit of 126.

22. The French logistic component comprises a supply platoon, a transport company, a maintenance company and an engineer company. The supply platoon provides all UNIFIL contingents with food, fuel, clothing and all types of equipment and *matériel*. The transport platoon, with a total of 72 task vehicles, provides second-line transport throughout the mission area as well as supplementary first-

line transport support to the contingents as requested. The maintenance company undertakes second-line inspection, maintenance, recovery and repair of military items of French origin; it also maintains and repairs the refrigeration equipment of the Force and supplies spare parts for the three helicopters of the French battalion. The engineer company is engaged in mine clearing as well as in road and track repair, water point improvements and minor construction tasks. By September, the engineer company had destroyed approximately 3,000 assorted mines as well as a large number of other explosive devices.

23. The Norwegian logistic component consists of an air unit, a medical company and a maintenance company. The air unit operates four utility helicopters for medical evacuation and normal personnel and freight transport tasks within and outside the area of operation. The medical company operates the UNIFIL field hospital, supplies contingents with medical and dental equipment and stores and maintains a hygiene inspection team which operates throughout the area of operation. A large number of local emergency cases have also been treated by this unit. The maintenance company undertakes second-line inspection, maintenance, recovery and repair of military materials of non-French origin.

24. The Canadian signals unit provides communications facilities for UNIFIL headquarters as well as for the battalion headquarters. This unit was provided by the Canadian Government in response to a special appeal by the Secretary-General for the initial period of six months and is due to leave the area by the end of September. Subject to the extension of the UNIFIL mandate by the Security Council, action is being taken to replace the departing unit by additional personnel made available from certain troop-contributing Governments and by additional civilian staff.

25. All the logistic units were established initially to serve a Force of 4,000 and have had to stretch their resources to the limit to meet the increased demands of the Force after its strength was brought up to 6,000. There is a lack of storage facilities for supplies, particularly in view of the approaching winter season, and the light engineering plant operated by the engineer company is not quite adequate for dealing with the variety of tasks required of it. Efforts are being made to remedy the situation, partly by reallocating personnel and partly by planning for the acquisition of the most urgently needed equipment. These improvements will have to be dealt with as a matter of urgency, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force.

III. FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. GUIDELINES AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

26. The guidelines for the operation of UNIFIL are set out in the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) [S/12611] which was approved by the Council in its resolution 426 (1978). According to that report UNIFIL was envisaged as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this was achieved, UNIFIL was to establish and maintain an area of operation. In this connexion, the Force was to supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.

27. To carry out its responsibilities in its area of operation, the following methods are being used:

(a) UNIFIL establishes road blocks and check-points

throughout the area of operation along all the main and secondary road networks and, assisted by Lebanese gendarmes when and where available, checks and inspects vehicles and personnel for military equipment and supplies. Uniformed or armed personnel and military equipment are not allowed to enter the UNIFIL area of operation.

(b) UNIFIL establishes observation posts along all key infiltration routes. These observation posts utilize a variety of methods, techniques and equipment to prevent infiltration. For example, radar is used by one battalion and night observation devices by three others during the hours of darkness to detect suspicious movement, and any unauthorized personnel detected are escorted out of the UNIFIL area.

(c) Foot and mobile patrols are conducted day and night. These patrols move and operate along the key highways and in villages to ensure maximum UNIFIL visibility to the local population. They also operate in the remote wadis to keep any unauthorized armed personnel from the area.

(d) Random night-time listening posts are also established to detect unauthorized armed movement. These listening posts are relocated frequently.

(e) A UNIFIL presence is established in as many populated areas as possible. One method to achieve this with the limited troops available is to assign a 10-man detachment to a given village for a one to three-day period and then to move this detachment to another populated area. This has proved effective in providing the population with some measure of assurance and safety.

B. CO-OPERATION WITH UNTSO

28. As provided in its terms of reference, UNIFIL has had from its inception the co-operation of UNTSO military observers. On 20 March, before the arrival of the first troop contingents, military observers were detached to UNIFIL to staff the temporary headquarters at Naqoura and make the necessary arrangements for the arrival and deployment of the first units of the Force.

29. During the initial phase of deployment, UNTSO military observers assisted UNIFIL by filling selected staff positions at the Force headquarters and by manning mobile teams for liaison between the UNIFIL battalions and Israeli forces within the area of operation. Subsequently, the military observers have been assigned various tasks in accordance with the requirements of the Force.

30. At present these military observers are organized into two elements. First, the headquarters of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) at Beirut headed by the Chairman of ILMAC also functions as a liaison office for UNIFIL and for the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East. Secondly, 36 military observers form the "Observer Group Lebanon" which performs various tasks under the operational control and supervision of the Force Commander. In this connexion, the military observers man two former UNTSO observation posts along the armistice demarcation line, conduct patrols as necessary and provide liaison teams with various parties.

31. In addition to the functions carried out by the military observers, UNTSO has also provided administrative support for UNIFIL, particularly during the initial stages. This support has continued to a significant degree in the fields of administration, procurement and transport.

32. In assigning the UNTSO military observers in the Israel-Lebanon sector to assist UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks, the structure of ILMAC has been preserved since, in accordance with the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425

(1978), the termination of the mandate of UNIFIL by the Council will not affect the continued functioning of ILMAC as set out in the appropriate Council decision.

C. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES

33. As mentioned in my progress report of 5 May 1978 [S/12620/Add.4] I visited the area from 17 to 19 April. My letter of 19 April to the Security Council [S/12657] gave the details of this visit. During that time, I had conversations with the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Lebanon on all aspects of the situation in Southern Lebanon and on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). I also met the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization at Beirut. In Israel I had talks with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister.

34. During the period under review, Mr. Roberto E. Guyer and Mr. Brian E. Urquhart, Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs, paid visits to the area at my request to consult the parties concerned on questions relating to the implementation of the two Council resolutions. General Siilasvuo, the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, maintained contact with all the parties concerned on the steps to be taken for the speedy implementation of these resolutions. Mr. John Saunders, my Special Representative for humanitarian assistance in Lebanon, has also assisted UNIFIL by providing a liaison channel with the Lebanese authorities at Beirut whenever required.

35. General Erskine, the Commander of UNIFIL, has been in constant contact with the parties on matters concerning the deployment and functioning of the force. In the area of operation, negotiations and consultations are held by members of UNIFIL with the various armed groups in the area as required to ensure the smooth functioning of the Force and to minimize the risks of confrontation and armed clashes. This is generally done through liaison teams and through contacts by the battalion commanders. The battalion commanders also investigate local violations of the cease-fire and all other situations involving incidents which may lead to hostile activities within the UNIFIL area of operation. UNIFIL is also maintaining regular contacts with the local civilian authorities and population.

D. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE DURING THE INITIAL STAGE

36. Owing to the tense situation prevailing in the area during the initial phase, UNIFIL was deployed so as to determine the cessation by Israel of its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity. At the same time, UNIFIL took control of the Akiya and Khardala Bridges to ensure that no armed element would infiltrate into its area of operation and to prevent clashes between the opposing forces in the area.

37. In the absence of a precise initial definition of the limits of the UNIFIL area of operation, attempts were originally made to deploy elements of UNIFIL in the vicinity of the Kashmiye Bridge, as well as in the Tyre pocket. When this deployment was challenged on the grounds that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had not in fact occupied either the bridge or the city of Tyre during the fighting, UNIFIL deployment in the vicinity of the Kashmiye Bridge and the Tyre pocket was not pressed. However, with a view to maintaining an atmosphere of calm and quiet, UNIFIL carried out regular patrols on the coastal road from Zahrani to Tyre, as well as in the city itself.

38. Although the French contingent, after establishing contact with the PLO, was able to reach its location in the Tyre barracks from Beirut unimpeded, both the Iranian and Swedish reinforced companies encountered difficulties

when they passed through areas partially controlled by members of Lebanese *de facto* armed groups. Through the intervention of IDF, an understanding was reached that enabled both the Iranian and Swedish companies to secure passage through these areas. Similarly, in the eastern sector, the Norwegian battalion took over from the reinforced Swedish company with great difficulty, because of the hostile attitude of both the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups and Palestinian armed elements.

E. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE FOLLOWING THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD PHASES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES

39. The first and second phases of the withdrawal of Israeli forces took place on 11 and 14 April [S/12620/Add.3]. The third phase of withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon took place on 30 April [S/12620/Add.4]. In the wake of these withdrawals, and in particular following the third phase, Palestinian and Lebanese armed elements made efforts to enter the UNIFIL area of operation on the grounds, in the case of the Palestinians, that they had legitimate rights to do so under the terms of the Cairo agreement.

40. In accordance with its mandate, which includes the control of movement and prevention of infiltration, UNIFIL took measures to counter these efforts. In these circumstances, some armed clashes resulted. The most serious of these occurred on 2 May, when a clash developed between the French troops in the Tyre barracks and armed elements in the city of Tyre. Full details of this incident were reported in paragraphs 10 to 19 of document S/12620/Add.4.

41. The accommodation reached following the armed clash on 2 May did not put an end to attempts to enter the UNIFIL area of operation. While the Palestinian and Lebanese *de facto* armed elements in the area were prepared to accept an undertaking to stop all attempts at infiltration, it was indicated that this could be done only on the basis of an agreement by UNIFIL to allow non-military supplies to reach Palestinian armed elements that were said by PLO to have remained in the area throughout the Israeli military action. On the basis of humanitarian considerations an *ad hoc* interim arrangement was worked out for the delivery, under UNIFIL control, of certain non-military supplies—food, water and medicine—to these limited Palestinian groups [S/12620/Add.5., para. 14]. UNIFIL worked out stringent procedures for the implementation of the *ad hoc* arrangement; the armed elements in question are currently under the close surveillance of UNIFIL and access to their locations is controlled. Since the interim arrangement went into effect, the incidence of deliberate infiltration has abated.

42. During this period, UNIFIL instituted measures to deal with armed elements intercepted within its area of deployment. The procedure is to seal off the area while negotiations are conducted for the withdrawal of the group in question.

F. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE AFTER 13 JUNE

43. The manner in which IDF carried out the last phase of its withdrawal on 13 June has posed major problems to UNIFIL. In contrast to the previous procedure of handing over evacuated areas to UNIFIL, IDF, on 13 June, formally turned over the remaining evacuated areas to the leadership of the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups in the area. The territory involved, which runs for the most part along the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line (ADL), encompasses Shia and some Sunni Muslim villages, as well as Christian villages. Prior to the withdrawal on 13 June, extensive contacts were maintained between Israeli and UNI-

FIL officials on the appropriate modalities for carrying out the withdrawal in accordance with resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) but no common ground was reached. In the event, IDF handed over the area to Major Haddad, on the grounds that it considered him to be a legitimate representative of the Lebanese army.

44. In response to a letter dated 13 June from Foreign Minister Dayan [S/12736], which informed the Secretary-General of the fulfilment by Israel of its part of the implementation of resolution 425 (1978), the Secretary-General, in a letter dated 14 June [S/12738], observed *inter alia* that the difficult tasks ahead for UNIFIL had certainly not been facilitated by the decision of the Israeli Government not to turn over control of the remainder of the evacuated area to UNIFIL. The Secretary-General added that he was making efforts to deal satisfactorily with the consequences of that development in co-operation with the Lebanese Government. As reported by the Secretary-General in paragraph 22 of document S/12620/Add.5, UNIFIL on 13 June was able to occupy five positions evacuated by IDF on that day. Later in June and in July, 14 more positions were occupied. On 10 and 11 September, as a result of renewed efforts to further its deployment, UNIFIL was able to occupy five new positions.

45. The Secretary-General, the Chief Co-ordinator, the Commander of UNIFIL and other representatives of the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Lebanese Government, have continued to exert every effort to achieve, as a first practical step, progressively wider deployment of UNIFIL in the area turned over to the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups and to ensure that UNIFIL ultimately would be in a position effectively to discharge all parts of its mandate in its entire area of operation. The Secretary-General has made it known to all the parties concerned that it remains his intention to utilize peaceful and diplomatic means to achieve this objective. In this connexion, UNIFIL has shown the utmost restraint, even though the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups have consistently threatened to use force to oppose UNIFIL attempts to gain wider deployment in the area under their control. Although there have been indications of flexibility from time to time, UNIFIL thus far has been able to occupy only 24 positions in this area in addition to the five former UNTSO observation posts. However, very much remains to be done since UNIFIL continues to be hampered by restrictions on its freedom of movement and is not in a position to exercise the measure of control that is required for the full discharge of its mandate.

46. Parallel to efforts to enlarge its deployment and control in the area, UNIFIL has been able to assist in the maintenance of the cease-fire, as well as to ensure that its area of deployment is not used for hostile activities of any kind. With the return of the civilian population to their villages, UNIFIL has taken effective measures to ensure the peaceful character of this area. In this connexion, UNIFIL, as indicated above, has worked out stringent measures to prevent infiltration of armed personnel and weapons by active patrolling, the establishment of static observation posts and manning of check-points.

47. UNIFIL activities after 13 June have been complicated by fire directed at UNIFIL forces. During the months of June, July and August, fire was frequently directed by the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups at or in the close proximity of UNIFIL patrols or positions. These incidents ranged from small arms and/or heavy machine-gun fire in the vicinity of the French and Irish battalions to artillery fire in the vicinity of the Nepalese and Norwegian sectors. On 12 July, one serious clash occurred in the vicinity of Qana between Palestinian armed elements and the French battalion. This resulted in 51 UNIFIL soldiers being detained

for several hours in various areas of Tyre by Palestinian armed elements. As a result of intervention by Chairman Arafat, the UNIFIL personnel were released unharmed. Another potentially serious clash occurred in mid-August, when Palestinian armed elements opened fire on a Norwegian battalion outpost near Rachaiya El Foukhar, resulting in an hour-long exchange of fire. Local negotiations ended the firing.

G. EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN ENSURING THE RETURN OF ITS EFFECTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE AREA

48. Since the inception of UNIFIL, the Secretary-General, the Chief Co-ordinator, the Force Commander and other representatives of the Secretary-General have devoted considerable time and energy, in close co-operation with the Lebanese Government and others concerned, in an effort to bring about the effective return of Lebanese authority to Southern Lebanon. Initially attention was focused on the provision by the Government of Lebanon of its administrative personnel and gendarmes in Southern Lebanon. Accordingly, by the end of July, the Government of Lebanon was represented south of the Litani River by a civilian administrator at Tyre and approximately 100 Lebanese gendarmes based at Tyre, Qana, Jwaya, Tibnin and Hasbaya. The gendarmes work in co-operation with UNIFIL at many check-points, where they assist in the inspection of persons and vehicles. In many instances they also serve as interpreters and liaison officers. Purely civil offences and crimes which are reported to UNIFIL are handed over to the gendarmes for investigation.

49. The other area of concern in ensuring the return of effective Lebanese authority is related to efforts to deploy elements of the Lebanese army in the south. The Secretary-General and his representatives, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, have emphasized the necessity of initiating this vital move at the earliest possible time. After extensive exchanges of views on all sides, it appeared that the major obstacles to moving units of the Lebanese army south of the Litani had been surmounted, and the Government of Lebanon informed the Secretary-General that it had reached a decision to send, on the morning of 31 July, a task force to Tibnin through Marjayoun. This task force, consisting of 700 men, 80 vehicles, 9 armoured cars, 4 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and 4 122 mm howitzers, reached the Kaoukaba area on the morning of 31 July. On their arrival, elements of the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups opened fire on them with artillery.

50. In these circumstances, the Lebanese army contingent found itself unable to proceed and remained in the area of Kaoukaba. From 31 July to 8 August, about 300 shells were fired by the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups into the vicinity of Kaoukaba and around and into positions of the Nepalese battalion. One Lebanese soldier was killed and nine injured; no casualties were sustained by UNIFIL. On 13 August the Lebanese task force in Kaoukaba was reduced to a rifle company reinforced with three armoured cars and four APCs. The main body was redeployed north-east of Kaoukaba in Rachaya el Ouadi and Ablah.

51. The Lebanese *de facto* armed groups have continued to deny the peaceful transit of the Lebanese army contingent to Tibnin through the area under their control. The Secretary-General addressed a personal appeal on this problem to the Prime Minister of Israel on 1 August. Also with a view to facilitating the movement of the Lebanese army contingent to Tibnin, UNIFIL has conducted a series of high-level meetings with the Lebanese army command on the one hand, and the Lebanese *de facto* armed groups and IDF on the other. Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart

also went to the area in an effort to resolve this and other problems. Contacts are continuing with this end in view, but all efforts have so far proved inconclusive.

H. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

52. The United Nations has set up a sizeable emergency relief and reconstruction programme for Southern Lebanon which is co-ordinated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for humanitarian assistance in Lebanon. UNIFIL assists the Special Representative in the performance of his responsibilities in various ways. At UNIFIL headquarters, a humanitarian section provides liaison in the area of operation in relation to all aspects of the United Nations assistance programme, and each contingent has a liaison officer assigned to this task.

53. During the first month of its mandate, UNIFIL assisted villagers in Southern Lebanon in recovering their dead and wounded, in locating missing persons including children, in assisting in the closing of uprooted graves and burying many dead animals. To the extent of its capacity and as an emergency measure, the Force also provided the civilian population with temporary accommodation, household stores and medical treatment and supplies. In addition, a major mine and bomb clearance programme was conducted by UNIFIL. This activity is continuing, particularly in support of water and electricity projects.

54. With the restoration of stability in the area of deployment of UNIFIL, the United Nations Development Programme has initiated a number of projects with the Assistance of UNIFIL. These projects include food distribution to the local population, survey and repair of water and electrical equipment and supply, provision of health services to civilian patients, the provision of tentage for emergency accommodation, the supply of fertilizer for agriculture and the reconstruction and repair of school buildings.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

55. Should the Security Council decide to extend the UNIFIL mandate for a period of six months beyond 18 September 1978, the cost of maintaining the Force for that period would be of the order of \$69 million, based on continuance of its existing responsibilities and the manpower requirements indicated earlier in this report. The appropriation approved by the General Assembly for the present mandate amounts to \$54 million, in addition to which the Secretary-General was authorized to enter into commitments for the Force of up to \$6.9 million under the terms of General Assembly resolution 32/214 on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the biennium 1978-1979, following the increase in the strength of UNIFIL from 4,000 to approximately 6,000 troops approved by the Council in its resolution 427 (1978). In discharging his responsibilities relating to the Force under the budgetary provisions for the present mandate, the Secretary-General has been mindful of the necessity of exercising the utmost economy consistent with efficient performance.

V. OBSERVATIONS

56. UNIFIL is now completing its first six months of operations. During that time the Force has been built up and has developed cohesion and *esprit de corps*. It has, in circumstances of great difficulty, established the necessary framework of command, staff and logistics. It has progressively deployed and exerted control over most of its area of operation. It has allowed normal and peaceful life to be resumed in much of the territory, and has helped much of the civilian population to return. Where it is fully deployed there is a progressive normalization of life.

57. None the less, very much remains to be done before the task entrusted to UNIFIL by the Security Council is fulfilled. The Force has yet to exert control over and establish peaceful conditions in the entire area of operation. Above all, the task of bringing about the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and authority in Southern Lebanon has only begun, and even in the large area under the full control of UNIFIL progress has been slow.

58. My colleagues and I have made continuous efforts to expedite the fulfilment of the mandate and will continue to do so. I fully understand and share the sense of frustration expressed on many sides at the fact that six months has not proved long enough to discharge the task prescribed by the Security Council last March.

59. It is important, however, not to underestimate what has been achieved and above all not to overlook the enormous difficulties underlying the tragedy of Lebanon. The situation in Southern Lebanon is very closely linked to the formidable problems of Lebanon as a whole. Without an amelioration of those problems, it will be extremely difficult fully to carry out the UNIFIL mandate in Southern Lebanon. But the Lebanese problem is in itself in turn inextricably linked with the problem of the Middle East. It is difficult to envisage a full and satisfactory over-all solution of the problems of Lebanon except in the framework of a general settlement of the Middle East problem or, at the very least, of a significant degree of movement toward such a settlement. It is only in this perspective that one can view realistically the task of UNIFIL. In these circumstances it seems to me that UNIFIL has made good initial progress.

60. That being said, however, we must face the fact that the present situation, through no fault of UNIFIL, is unacceptable. The resistance of certain armed groups to its full deployment and the support from outside which these groups are known to enjoy, combined with the resulting difficulties experienced by the Lebanese Government in exerting its authority in the UNIFIL area of operation, constitute formidable obstacles to the implementation of the mandate of UNIFIL.

61. The fact that the Israel Defence Forces handed over control of the border area to *de facto* armed groups rather than to UNIFIL has continued to make impossible the full deployment of UNIFIL and the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in the whole area of operation. In this connexion, it is important to stress that one of the main tasks of UNIFIL is to protect the rights and security of *all* the inhabitants of its area of operation. To do this, it requires full freedom of movement and deployment throughout the area.

62. The course pursued by UNIFIL has been to establish itself by firmness, restraint and persuasion, and to promote confidence and reach workable understandings with all the groups in and around the area. As agreed by the Security Council at the outset, full co-operation of all parties is an essential element for the effective functioning of UNIFIL. Greatly to the credit of all concerned, this procedure has so far on the whole worked well with the armed elements to the north and west of the area of operation. I sincerely hope that our unremitting efforts will have the same results with the armed groups in the south of the area of operation. If this does not come about soon, I am fully aware of the fact that the purposes and the practical performance of UNIFIL will inevitably become blunted and compromised. In such a situation, an erosion of the support for and effectiveness of this vital operation will be inevitable. Furthermore, the co-operation which has hitherto been extended to UNIFIL by other groups will be jeopardized.

63. In this connexion, I feel obliged to mention an essential, but not always understood aspect of the situation in

Southern Lebanon. The problem is not only to come to terms with a number of armed groups with strongly conflicting objectives. It is also to change the psychological climate in which these groups live and to bring about a change in the way they view not only each other but also the outside world. The degree of suspicion, fear, violence and even fatalism which prevails in this afflicted part of the world poses a tremendous obstacle to the forces of peace and order, including UNIFIL.

64. The courageous men of UNIFIL have already done much to restore normality in their area of operation and have suffered casualties, hardships and much danger in the process. If for any reason UNIFIL were to be removed, the result, in the present circumstances, could only be a disastrous change for the worse in Southern Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon has informed me that it is fully in agreement with an extension of the mandate of UNIFIL. I support this position and therefore recommend to the Council the renewal of the UNIFIL mandate for a further six-month period.

65. In making this recommendation, I feel obliged to warn against the notion of an indefinite and automatic renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL. In this connexion, it has even been suggested that the mandate might be renewed for a shorter period. The existence of UNIFIL must not be allowed to become the pretext for delay in achieving the objectives of the Security Council's original decisions. The United Nations must expect and has a right to expect the full co-operation of all parties and Governments concerned in pursuing this enterprise to a successful conclusion.

66. The establishment of UNIFIL and its prolongation are a heavy burden on the resources of the United Nations and of many of the Member States. Such a burden can only be justified by the seriousness of the situation and the infinitely greater burden on Lebanon and on the international community which would certainly result from a further deterioration of the situation in the area. I wish here to pay tribute to the Governments who have provided support in other practical forms. I wish also to give the highest praise

to the Force Commander, Major-General Erskine, his staff, both military and civilian, the officers and men of the Force, as well as the military observers of UNTSO and the United Nations Field Service staff assigned to UNIFIL for their skill, understanding and courage.

67. It is easy to pay tribute in words to our men in the field, and they deserve it. I am, however, very conscious of the hardships, risks and even deprivations which these United Nations operations impose on those who carry them out. Some of these are inevitable and are accepted as a matter of course by soldiers. Others, unfortunately, derive from a lack of adequate resources and support. A military force in the field is not and cannot be an inexpensive enterprise. While all due economy and good management must be exercised, this must not be done at the expense of the health, safety or minimal comfort of the troops. In particular I am concerned about winter conditions in Southern Lebanon, which will test the endurance of the Force to the utmost. The fact that UNIFIL was initially established only for six months has added greatly to this problem, since it did not allow provision for winter conditions. I therefore appeal to all Member Governments, and especially to those with particular responsibilities for administrative and budgetary questions, to approach the problem always bearing in mind what we are asking of our peace-keeping forces, what conditions they are operating in and how important their morale and well-being are to the discharge of their vital tasks.

68. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the memory of those members of the Force who have given their lives in the service of peace in Southern Lebanon. Their sacrifice reminds us that the road to peace is long, hard and often dangerous. Their best memorial would be the carrying on of the task of UNIFIL to a quick and successful conclusion.

ANNEX

[Map. UNIFIL deployment as of September 1978. See end of volume.]

DOCUMENT S/12846

Note verbale dated 16 August 1978 from the Mission of Nigeria to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[13 September 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's notes dated 18 May 1978, has the honour to communicate the following.

As a matter of principle, the Federal Republic of Nigeria since its independence in 1960 has never had any relations with the racist régime in South Africa. The Government of Nigeria believes in total isolation of the obnoxious régime in South Africa in all areas.

The Permanent Mission of Nigeria will continue to co-operate with the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) in all its efforts to bring the South African régime to its knees.

DOCUMENT S/12847

Note verbale dated 11 September 1978 from the Mission of Mongolia to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[13 September 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, in connexion with his note of 18 May 1978, has the honour to draw to his attention the contents of the note addressed to him on 6 April 1978 [S/12634].

The Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic assures the Secretary-General that the Mongolian People's Republic does not maintain and has never maintained any relations of a political, economic, military or other nature with the racist régime of South Africa. There are no contractual arrangements between the Mongolian People's Republic and South Africa concerning the man-

ufacture and delivery of arms, ammunition of any kind, or military *matériel* and equipment.

The Mongolian People's Republic fully supports the Security Council's decision on the institution of mandatory sanctions with regard to deliveries of arms and military equipment to South Africa.

The Mongolian People's Republic will continue in the future its consistent adherence to this principled position and its strict implementation of the relevant United Nations decisions.

The Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic requests that this note should be circulated as a Security Council document.

DOCUMENT S/12849

Note verbale dated 13 September 1978 from the representative of Sierra Leone to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[18 September 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his note of 10 November 1977, has the honour to inform him that the Government of Sierra Leone commits itself to complying with resolution 418 (1977), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977, on the question of South Africa.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone has been further instructed by his Government to convey the following.

The Government of Sierra Leone is firmly opposed to the criminal policies of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa and has repeatedly called for an end to that régime.

With regard to the adoption of resolution 418 (1977)—the decision to impose an arms embargo against South Africa—Sierra Leone views this as a unique decision which, if faithfully and strictly implemented, could mark the beginning of putting an end to the *apartheid* policies now carried out by the régime at Pretoria.

Sierra Leone, for its part, does not maintain any relations—political, economic, social or military—with the South African régime. It has scrupulously observed all the United Nations resolutions against South Africa. It therefore supports this sanction against South Africa and calls for its strict and fullest implementation.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone has the honour to request that this communication should be issued as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12851

Letter dated 18 September 1978 from the representative of Kuwait to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[19 September 1978]

I have the honour to request that, in accordance with past practice, the Security Council should extend an invitation to the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the present deliberations of the Council on the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

(Signed) Abdalla Yaccoub BISHARA
Permanent Representative of Kuwait
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/12852

Telegram dated 18 September 1978 from the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]
[19 September 1978]

In accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to communicate to you the text of the resolution adopted today by the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States calling the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in accordance with the first part of article 59 of the Charter of the Organization of American States:

“Calling of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

“The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,

“Having considered the request of the Government of Venezuela of 2 September 1978 (CP/INF.1321/78) and heard the statements of the other member States, and viewing with deep concern the events that have occurred in Central America, the gravity of which affects the peace of the region and creates a situation of an urgent nature and of common interest to all member States,

“Decides:

“1. To call a meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the first part of article 59 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, to consider the grave events which are occurring in the Central American region;

“2. To designate the seat of the Permanent Council of the Organization as the venue of this meeting of Consultation and 21 September 1978 as its opening date;

“3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the contents of the present resolution, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

(Signed) Alejandro ORFILA
Secretary-General of the
Organization of American States

DOCUMENT S/12853

Letter dated 20 September 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[20 September 1978]

I have the honour to attach for your attention a copy of the press statement issued this morning at Pretoria by the South African Prime Minister, the Honourable B. J. Vorster, regarding South West Africa.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. A. EKSTEEN
Chargé d'Affaires
of the Permanent Mission of South Africa
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of a press statement by the Honourable B. J. Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa, regarding South West Africa

South West Africa never formed part of the territorial sovereignty of South Africa. As from 1920, the Territory was administered as a Mandated Territory and, after the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946, successive South African Governments made it their policy to continue administering South West Africa in the spirit of the Mandate, i.e. the Territory should be so administered as to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants.

The emphasis has thus, as far as South Africa is concerned, throughout been placed on the furtherance of the interests of the inhabitants of South West Africa. This is also the reason why it is the Government's basic point of departure that the inhabitants of the Territory should themselves freely decide on their political future.

This corner-stone of our policy was formulated as follows 10 years ago in an official publication, *South West Africa Survey 1967*, which was given world-wide distribution:

“[It is not] necessary to embark on speculation as to what the ultimate future political pattern will be—i.e. whether and to what extent there may be amalgamations or unions of some kind, federations, commonwealth or common market arrangements, etc. The peoples themselves will ultimately decide.”

These were indeed prophetic words, especially when it is taken into account that they were written in 1967. Thus the political future of the Territory lies in the hands of the inhabitants. All options are open to them. The South African Government does not prescribe policy for South West Africa. Through the years we have honoured this commitment and encouraged and assisted the peoples of South West Africa on the road to self-determination. In August 1976, the elected representatives of the people of South West Africa requested independence by 31 December 1978.

In an effort to resolve the 31-year-old dispute with the United Nations over South West Africa and also in the hope of realizing international recognition for an independent South West Africa, the South African Government, 17 months ago, entered into negotiations with the five Western Powers in the Security Council. In these discussions efforts were made to resolve the issues of principle which had in the past made a solution impossible. As stated by me in Windhoek in May 1975: Perhaps the South African position was not so far removed from that of the United Nations to make agreement impossible. Over the years the main elements of the dispute centred around the following issues:

- A unitary State;
- Universal adult suffrage;
- The removal of discrimination based on colour;
- The holding of free and fair elections;
- The urgency of achieving independence;
- The right of all South West Africans to return to participate peacefully in the political process;
- The release of detainees wherever held.

South Africa has committed itself to doing all this and has already gone a long way towards making possible the realization of these goals.

It is therefore a cause of great concern and disappointment to the South African Government that, in spite of what has been achieved and the clear wishes of the people of South West Africa, we are now caught up in arguments far removed from the main questions of principle.

I say this because, as far back as 25 April 1978, by Government accepted the proposal of the five Western countries, in its final and definitive form, in good faith and in time to allow for the implementation of the proposed

schedule leading to independence. The people of South West Africa expected the early implementation of the proposal and thereafter international recognition of an independent South West Africa.

In terms of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), adopted on the Western proposal, the Secretary-General's Special Representative visited South West Africa in August 1978 for the purpose of submitting a report on the implementation of the proposal. During his visit he received the full co-operation of the Administrator-General and the authorities concerned.

The Secretary-General's report to the Security Council [S/12827], based on his Special Representative's recommendation, deviated substantially from the proposal of the Five. The most striking deviations concerned:

- The size of the United Nations military contingent;
- The introduction of a United Nations civil police component;
- The lack of consultation with the Administrator-General;
- The election date.

I do not wish to refer extensively to these matters, since they have all been dealt with in communications addressed by my Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General and the Five, as well as in discussions with them.

As far as the United Nations military component is concerned, it should be made absolutely clear that never during the discussions with the Five was a figure higher than 3,000 mentioned by them, and South Africa for its part had indicated that it could not accept a figure exceeding 2,000. It will be appreciated that in these circumstances the figure of 7,500 put forward by the Secretary-General came not only as a surprise but also as a shock. Indeed, I am aware that those who had been negotiating with us all this time must have been equally surprised. The people of South West Africa are now being confronted in the Secretary-General's report with a military component which virtually amounts to an operational peace-keeping force or an occupation force.

South Africa's objection to this figure stems from the fact that the guiding principle in the Western proposal is the establishment of a visible peace. Under such circumstances, the need for a large military presence is obviated as, indeed, the Five pointed out to South Africa when they sought a reduction in our troop numbers. By the same token the order of numbers now being suggested by the Secretary-General in his report is totally unacceptable to South Africa.

During the lengthy negotiations, the Five were repeatedly reminded of the political and psychological effect of such a large number of United Nations personnel on the people of South West Africa. The impartiality of the United Nations is rendered suspect by the continued and sustained assistance to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to the exclusion of all other political parties in South West Africa. Thus, for example, SWAPO is recognized by the General Assembly as "the sole and authentic representative" of the people of South West Africa and receives considerable financial assistance. Furthermore, it enjoys extensive facilities to beam propaganda to the Territory and elsewhere. Indeed, the United Nations whole information system itself supports SWAPO.

The proposal of the Five specifically defines that during the transitional period the maintenance of law and order would rest with the existing police forces. There is no provision in the proposal for a United Nations police contingent as proposed in the Secretary-General's report, and while subsequent exchanges were somewhat reassuring in this regard, there is still an insistence of the figure of 360 police—an unnecessarily high number.

In the course of the negotiations with the Five, it was often stressed that the underlying idea was that the Administrator-General and the representative of the Secretary-General should, in keeping with the vital requirements of close co-operation and mutual trust, consult each other in many fields, including the composition and size of the United Nations military component. We received specific assurances from the Five in this regard. Nevertheless, no such consultation took place in determining the figure of 7,500, nor has there as yet been any consultation on the composition of the United Nations forces.

The report of the Secretary-General does not offer any real hope that it

might be possible to reach consensus on the timing of elections in South West Africa. In fact, it creates the impression that the date for elections is unimportant.

A full three months lapsed after South Africa's acceptance on 25 April before the proposal was, for the first time, referred to the Security Council. This in itself made it impossible to adhere to the programme envisaged for the electoral process and at the same time to observe the independence date. This delay was caused by the intransigence of SWAPO.

The Five tell us SWAPO has accepted their proposal. In fact only last week-end Nujoma repudiated the proposal. The reason is that the proposal provides for free elections in the Territory and SWAPO has no confidence that it can win an election. SWAPO feels the only way it can assure itself of assuming power is by disorder and violence. The proposal definitively provides for elections and independence by 31 December at the latest and for a run-up period of seven months before elections.

As already stated, this programme was possible when South Africa accepted the proposal. The registration of voters, a long drawn-out process which SWAPO strenuously opposed, has virtually been completed. The registration of voters is opposed by SWAPO and others despite South Africa's willingness to allow the process to be fully examined by the United Nations. Again this testifies to the delaying tactics of SWAPO.

SWAPO wants to build up bases and supplies of weapons and to train terrorists to attack South West Africa.

The firm intention of SWAPO is to keep on delaying elections. The people of the Territory, however, do not want to delay elections.

I reiterate that South Africa has always accepted the principle that it is for the people themselves to determine their own future. It is not for the Secretary-General or the United Nations or any other entity to delay the process leading to self-determination and independence.

South Africa accepted the proposal of the Five in good faith, but no one can blame the South African Government for being unwilling to accept extended and amended provisions of a proposal which was described to us as being final and definitive. Indeed, the Five pledged that they would stand by their proposal.

During the past few days the most strenuous efforts were made by the South African Foreign Minister and the Five to overcome their differences. Unfortunately these efforts have not succeeded. While the South African Government does not wish to close doors, it cannot allow this impasse to continue indefinitely.

Bearing in mind the consequences of these developments for the people of South West Africa as well as those of southern Africa as a whole, the Government has given its most serious attention to all the alternatives.

The Cabinet, in its deliberations yesterday, concluded that the people of South West Africa, in accordance with their wishes, would have to be given the opportunity to elect their own representatives. This will be done on the basis of universal adult suffrage in country-wide elections in order to establish unequivocally who has the right to speak for the people of South West Africa.

The people of South West Africa have clearly signified their desire to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Thus more than 85 per cent of the estimated eligible voters in the Territory have enthusiastically registered to vote, this notwithstanding intimidation from certain quarters not to do so.

All options remain open to them. We will not prescribe to them.

The body to be elected may:

- Decide to draw up a constitution or postpone the drafting thereof;
- Decide to proceed with the implementation of the proposal of the Five;
- Decide to accept the Secretary-General's report.

They will, of course, also be free to express themselves on numerous other matters, which will be dealt with in the relevant proclamation to be issued shortly.

DOCUMENT S/12854

Letter dated 20 September 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[20 September 1978]

I have the honour to attach for your attention an excerpt from a communication regarding South West Africa which the South African Government addressed to the five Western members of the Security Council on 12 September 1978.

This communication serves to confirm the undertaking of the South African Government concerning the cessation of violence.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. A. EKSTEEN
Chargé d'Affaires
of the Permanent Mission of South Africa
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Excerpt from a communication addressed by the South African Government to the five Western members of the Security Council on 12 September 1978

Cessation of violence

As indicated in the Foreign Minister's letter of 6 September 1978 to the Secretary-General [S/12836], it is essential, in planning the implementation of the proposal, to have clarity on SWAPO's intentions. Apart from wanting to know whether or not SWAPO has unconditionally accepted the proposal and is willing to commit itself to the cessation of all forms of violence, the Foreign Minister stated that this commitment ought to be set

out in writing and circulated as a document of the Security Council. The South African Government, for its part, accepted the proposal on 25 April 1978 in its final and definitive form. The Foreign Minister added:

"We are prepared to adhere to that decision but not to go along with interpretations inconsistent with the proposal. The proposal cannot, however, be implemented unless accepted and honoured by all concerned."

Bearing this in mind, and having regard to the need to establish necessary conditions of peace for the holding of free elections leading to an internationally accepted independence, an undertaking by SWAPO that at a given time it will cease all warlike acts and operations etc. would be welcomed if implemented in practice. South Africa, for its part, has, in effect, by its acceptance of the proposal, already given its positive reaction. Furthermore, it is willing to confirm that the moment SWAPO undertakes to stop violence and in fact carries out its undertaking, action against SWAPO by the South African Forces will cease.

Within 48 hours of the delivery of a written declaration by SWAPO, all South African commanders of the military and para-military forces and other armed personnel will cease all warlike acts and operations against SWAPO. Furthermore, they will ensure that all commanders will, from that time onwards, enforce and maintain a cessation of all such acts by personnel under their command, provided the cease-fire is not broken by SWAPO. The South African Forces in any case do not and will not engage in acts of violence or acts of intimidation against any inhabitants of South West Africa.

The establishment of such a cease-fire is an essential prerequisite for the implementation of the proposal set out in Security Council document S/12636 of 10 April 1978.

DOCUMENT S/12855

Note verbale dated 14 September 1978 from the representative of Benin to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[20 September 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Benin to the United Nations has the honour to request the Secretary-General to have circulated as a Security Council document, in connexion with the complaint by Benin, the text of the statement made by Comrade Michel Alladaye, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the People's Republic of Benin, at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade.

ANNEX

Statement made at Belgrade on 29 July 1978 by His Excellency Mr. Michel Alladays, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the People's Republic of Benin, at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries

First of all, on behalf of my country, the Republic of Benin, and on behalf of my delegation, I wish to express the great satisfaction and pleasure we feel at being here today at Belgrade, the beautiful capital of a country which the People's Republic of Benin is honoured to number among its friends, whose name evokes so many struggles and so many victorious combats against innumerable foreign invasions, against systems for the exploitation of man by man and for the building of a socialist society, a country which, in its unshakeable determination to maintain its national independence and dignity has constantly remained open and attentive to the appeals of other peoples, particularly those of the third world who are struggling resolutely for the effective conquest of the right to freedom, independence and social progress.

We conceived and established the bases of our movement at Bandung in 1955, but it was at Belgrade in 1961 that its principles were developed and

its bases extended so as to make it a vast and powerful international movement. Consequently, no better site for this conference could be found today. What country could be in a better position than the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—a veritable keystone of our movement by reason of its fidelity to principles and the permanent availability of its eminent leader, Marshal Josip B. Tito—to host our conference in a period when the third world countries are facing special difficulties, a period when all the forces of evil are sounding the trumpets of confusion and division with the cynical aim of destroying the unity and solidarity created at the price of so many years of effort and struggle.

You will readily understand that my delegation, taking the floor after so many brilliant speakers, feels some diffidence in seeking to restate what has already been said so often and so well.

Nevertheless, you will, I trust, allow me to add our modest contribution to the important and constructive contributions made by my predecessors on this rostrum which have already ensured that this conference will be an unprecedented success.

The basic characteristic of our time is the exacerbation of the antagonistic contradictions which divide the camp of the forces of liberation and progress from the camp of reaction, oppression and the exploitation of many by man.

International imperialism, faced with the dynamic development of the struggle of the peoples of the world for freedom, independence and sovereignty, brought to bay by the legitimate struggle of the peoples and countries of the third world for the establishment of a more equitable and just new international economic order, and harassed by the struggles of the peoples of the capitalist countries, is now in the throes of a serious crisis.

Ever since the historic meeting at Bandung, all the oppressed peoples have raised high the standard of freedom, in opposition to enslavement and in support of social progress and dignity.

In turn, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, our heroic peoples have, by the force of arms, won their right to freedom, independence and full and complete sovereignty.

Since the historic 1973 Algiers summit in particular, the national liberation process has gained new momentum both quantitatively and qualitatively. Thus, the heroic peoples of Cambodia, Viet Nam and Laos have broken the chains of domination and enslavement by inflicting an unprecedented defeat on American imperialism.

The peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde have shattered the Portuguese colonial empire which had endured for more than five centuries.

The struggles of the people of Palestine and the peoples of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Western Sahara have likewise increased in scope and strength, while in many other countries the struggle to consolidate national independence has been waged victoriously.

However, one of the greatest victories won in recent years by the third world countries has undoubtedly been the courageous decision taken at the Algiers summit to ensure their full sovereignty over their natural resources. All these victories, and particularly that won in the economic sphere, which is the very essence of international imperialism, have inevitably intensified the latter's resentment of the third world countries. Consequently, international imperialism has for some years now been stepping up its general counter-offensive with a view to halting the national liberation struggle, putting an end to the just claims of the third world countries and pursuing its iniquitous plundering of our natural resources.

Attacks by national armies and armies of mercenaries, application of the "divide to weaken and conquer" policy, political assassinations and attempted economic suffocation are some of the appropriate methods used by international imperialism to achieve its sinister ends.

In recent years, the most characteristic events in this general offensive by international imperialism, notably in Africa, have been the following:

—The flagrant aggression and attempted genocide organized against the Saharan people.

—The imperialist armed attack launched against the People's Republic of Benin on Sunday, 16 January 1977 with the complicity of certain puppet African heads of State.

—The cowardly and treacherous assassinations of the great Nigerian leader Murtala and the great African patriots Amílcar Cabral and Marien Ngouabi.

—The repeated armed attacks against the valiant peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana.

—The tense situation in the Horn of Africa deliberately created and maintained by international imperialism.

—The attempts to liquidate the Palestinian resistance movement.

—The destruction of the legal régime of the Comoros by a mercenary army paid by international imperialism.

—The overt threats of destruction made by some European leaders against the progressive African régimes.

Elsewhere in the world, other characteristic and equally important events illustrate this aggressive policy of international imperialism.

In the Far East, the Korean homeland is arbitrarily divided by United States imperialism, whose military occupation of the southern part of Korean territory prevents the question of Korea from being settled by the Koreans themselves in peace and freedom.

Similarly, the people of East Timor, after waging a heroic liberation struggle against the former colonizers, have seen their national territory invaded by foreign troops from a country which is a member of the movement of non-aligned countries, with the blessing of international imperialism.

In Latin America, international imperialism maintains its colonization of Belize and Puerto Rico, despite the legitimate and profound aspirations of the peoples of those territories.

In the Indian Ocean, international imperialism, pursuing its aggressive policy, is illegally occupying islands over which African States hold sovereignty, and using them as military bases for the implementation of its diabolical plan for the colonial reconquest of countries in Africa and Asia.

My country, the People's Republic of Benin, has not been spared from the schemes of international imperialism for colonial reconquest and further enslavement and exploitation. After more than 80 years of barbarous direct colonization and more than 10 years of neo-colonialization, the Beninese people chose, by the popular revolution of 26 October 1972, to build their own future in full independence and in full sovereignty on the basis of the fundamental principles of non-alignment, following the course of scientific socialism.

Since that historic decision of our people, my country, the People's Republic of Benin, has been a standing target for international imperialism which, in a frantic effort to destabilize our political system so as to reconquer our country, launched an imperialist armed attack by mercenaries, who are international outlaws and specialists in mass crime, on Sunday, 16 January 1977.

This imperialist armed aggression, aimed at overthrowing the Government of Benin and liquidating the leaders of the Beninese revolution, was organized by international imperialism with the active complicity of the leaders of certain countries, who are unfortunately members of the non-aligned movement and present here in this room.

Irrefutable proof of this despicable act of piracy, banditry and colonial reconquest has been provided. Collusion at all levels has also been brought to light by the different fact-finding missions sent to Cotonou, such as the Security Council Special Mission headed by His Excellency Ambassador Illueca of Panama, the Commission of the Secretariat-General of the Organization of African Unity headed by Mr. Peter Onu, and the Ministerial Commission of inquiry of OAU headed by Mr. Abdussalam Treiki, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

The base and ignoble roles played by certain African heads of State, in complete violation of the principles of the non-aligned movement and the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, have been clearly established.

In the course of these tragic and dramatic events, one of our colleagues, who is present here, was paying a friendly visit to my country. This was the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Comrade Ho Dam, whose residence was, for several hours, at the centre of the particularly bloody confrontations which we had with the army of mercenaries. Comrade Ho Dam could have lost his life as, unfortunately, several of my compatriots did on that day.

The Beninese people are still suffering the consequences of that cowardly act of imperialist armed aggression aimed at colonial reconquest. As everyone knows, after the historic summit meeting of OAU at Khartoum, the President of the Gabonese Republic took the serious decision to expel from his country the Beninese nationals who had settled on Gabonese land decades ago and whom he himself estimated as numbering more than 10,000. The President of Gabon, as he himself has said, decided to expel all Beninese except for the political exiles, and these political exiles are precisely the ones who betrayed the cause of the Beninese people and have been found to be agents of international imperialism.

Even now, as we are speaking in this august assembly, thousands of my compatriots are herded in camps like cattle, their houses plundered and their property stolen; whole families have been separated, children abandoned without food or care, a number of people seriously wounded, while others have died as a result of brutal treatment.

Allow me, Mr. President, now that I have been given the opportunity to address this august assembly and particularly the African Group and you yourself, to express the gratitude of the Beninese people for the solidarity you have shown in this time of trial. These are the conditions which the Beninese people are enduring in their struggle to build their own future, drawing on their own forces in consistent application of the principles of non-alignment.

These, too, are the most typical features of the large-scale offensive launched by international imperialism in Africa, in Asia and in Latin America.

In view of this situation, what should the non-aligned movement do?

In our opinion, the non-aligned movement should adhere firmly to the principles of the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism and its by-products—racism, *apartheid* and zionism. Within this framework our conference must support and assist by all possible means the struggle of the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Western Sahara, Palestine, East Timor, Belize and Puerto Rico for independence, liberation and sovereignty, and that of the Korean people for the independent and peaceful reunification of their divided homeland.

In our opinion, as a corollary to the anti-imperialist struggle, the non-aligned movement must support the struggle of peoples and States to guarantee their sovereignty and security.

This conference must therefore condemn the imperialist acts of armed aggression and subsequent acts aimed at destabilizing the régimes of independent countries for the sake of colonial reconquest. This conference must also, therefore, understand the reasons why certain independent countries are appealing to other friendly countries of their choice to help them, under special circumstances, to guarantee their security. In this connexion, my delegation was particularly shocked by the malicious insinuations circulating in some quarters concerning the internationalist assistance of Cuba and

of the socialist countries in Africa. My country supports the internationalist assistance of Cuba in Africa because this assistance, given to sovereign Governments at their request, is in keeping with the Charters of OAU and the United Nations and the principles of the non-aligned movement. We also support the assistance given by the socialist countries to the non-aligned countries.

In our opinion, the non-aligned movement must support the struggle of peoples for a free and independent choice of economic and political system in keeping with their aspirations and for social progress.

The positions of the People's Republic of Benin on the various problems confronting our world today are quite well known, having been repeatedly stated in various international forums.

We should like, however, to reiterate here, without empty eloquence but with all due firmness, not only our condemnation of the revolting Vorster and Smith régimes but also our support for the struggle of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa against colonial domination, racism and *apartheid*.

We should like to reiterate our indignation and sorrow at seeing two African States belonging to our movement invading and occupying the ancestral land of the Saharan people and to assure the POLISARIO Front of

the unswerving support of the militant people of Benin for the just struggle they are waging against their aggressors.

We support the struggle of the peoples of East Timor and the South Moluccas.

We support the heroic Korean people in the struggle they are waging against United States imperialism and the puppet clique of Park Chung Hee to reunify their divided homeland in harmony, through dialogue and without foreign interference.

We assure the peoples of Belize and Puerto Rico of our support in the struggle they are waging for the attainment of independence and sovereignty for their territories.

We should like, lastly, to reaffirm that the militant and revolutionary people of Benin will always be behind the valiant and heroic people of Cuba in the fight they are waging to thwart all the manoeuvres of United States imperialism and recover their sovereignty over Guantánamo, which is being arbitrarily occupied.

I should not wish to conclude without thanking most sincerely the Government and people of Yugoslavia for the militant and fraternal welcome given to our delegation since our arrival in the beautiful land of Yugoslavia. I wish you every success in your work. Thank you.

Ready for the revolution. The struggle continues.

DOCUMENT S/12856

Note verbale dated 15 September 1978 from the representative of Norway to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[21 September 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 18 May 1978 drawing attention to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), which called on all States to review existing contractual arrangements and licences granted to South Africa relating to arms, ammunition and equipment manufacture, with a view to terminating them.

The Permanent Representative of Norway wishes to inform the Secretary-General that no such contractual or licensing arrangements are in existence between Norway and South Africa.

DOCUMENT S/12857

Letter dated 21 September 1978 from the representative of Chad to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[21 September 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the communiqué issued at N'Djamena on 12 September 1978 by the Government of National Unity.

I should be grateful if you would inform the members of the Security Council of its contents and circulate the text as a Council document.

(Signed) B. DESSANDE
Permanent Representative of Chad
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUÉ

One year has passed since the signing of an agreement, known as the "Khartoum Agreement", which establishes the basis for seeking a comprehensive solution to the conflict in Chad with a view to achieving total national reconciliation.

During that time, the co-signatories have spared no effort to maintain a dialogue with the other factions of the opposition. To that end, contacts were established by the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North (CCFAN)

at El-Geneina with the leaders of the First Army, and communications were subsequently addressed to Wilaya 4 (First Army) and to the Bao-Bilia headquarters. A meeting was later held at Oum-Chalouba between a CCFAN delegation and a delegation of the Goukouni faction of Frolinat.

Similar efforts were exerted by the Supreme Military Council. These resulted in the negotiations at Sebha and Benghazi and later at Tripoli, and also the Libreville meeting with Dr. Abba Siddick.

Since the approaches both of them had made had not produced the expected results, CCFAN and the Supreme Military Council proceeded to implement the Khartoum Agreement. Thus, a basic charter, providing for radical transformations in the political, economic and social structures of our country, was drawn up. The Government of National Unity is resolved to eradicate the causes of the rift among the citizens of Chad and to take action to satisfy the aspirations of the people of Chad. With this end in view, it solemnly appeals to all factions of the opposition to resume the dialogue in the interests of peace, national unity and

national reconstruction. The contribution of the entire nation is needed for this work. At a time when the Government of National Unity is applying itself to its task of bringing about the complete unity of all citizens of Chad, the continued bloodshed within the Goukouni faction of Frolinat is regrettable. The Government of National Unity deplores these tragic events, which are simply the logical consequence of Libyan policy aimed at the destruction of

Chad, and strongly condemns the murderous acts of the Libyan army in these fratricidal slaughters.

In view of the foregoing, the Government of National Unity reaffirms once again its availability for a resumption of the dialogue with all factions without exception and reiterates its firm desire and resolve to work towards total and complete national reconciliation.

DOCUMENT S/12859

Note verbale dated 12 September 1978 from the Mission of Gabon to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[22 September 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Gabonese Republic to the United Nations has the honour to transmit herewith to the Secretary-General a press release in reply to the press conference held on 7 September 1978 by the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the People's Republic of Benin to the United Nations [See S/12843].

ANNEX

Press release issued in New York on 8 September 1978 by the Mission of the Gabonese Republic concerning the repatriation of Beninese residents in Gabon

The press release issued on 7 September 1978 by the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Benin to the United Nations in New York gives a summary and dilatory account of the origins of the events which caused the valiant Gabonese people to react against the untruthful accusations made against its valorous leader, President Bongo.

The Permanent Mission of the Gabonese Republic categorically denies the gross and defamatory allegations to the effect that the Beninese nationals repatriated from Gabon were the victims of acts of violence by the Gabonese security forces.

The Gabonese authorities, speaking from Libreville, and the Permanent Mission of the Gabonese Republic have already provided enough proof of the wild and grotesque nature of those accusations to make any further reference to them unnecessary.

However, one wonders what would have been the attitude of the revolutionaries at Cotonou if their leader had been the target of the constant threats and insults that were broadcast over the radio before the Khartoum summit meeting.

What would have been the attitude of the revolutionary authorities at Cotonou if, at Khartoum, their leader had been directly and publicly subjected to the same insults and threats?

Contrary to what is stated in the press release issued by the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Benin, we wish to say that before the Khartoum summit meeting the justified anger of the militant people of Gabon at the insults broadcast by Radio Cotonou was strictly restrained at the express urging of President Bongo.

It can easily be verified that, before the Khartoum summit meeting, the Beninese nationals resident in Gabon were continuing freely to exercise their activities as small shopkeepers and taxi-cab operators.

When at Khartoum President Kérékou worked himself into a rage and it was accordingly decided to repatriate the Beninese, they and their property were immediately given protection by the forces of law and order.

Why, if the authorities at Cotonou wanted to "meet fully their responsibilities", did they not immediately dispatch to Libreville suitable means of transport for the repatriation of the Beninese?

Why did those authorities wait several days before authorizing the *Christian Vieljeu* to berth at the Port of Cotonou in order to land the first contingent of repatriates?

However, in view of the deliberate procrastination of the authorities at

Cotonou, who were embarrassed by the dimensions which events had assumed, the authorities at Libreville decided, on the basis of the exhaustive survey that had been carried out for the purpose, to make use of repatriation guarantees in the case of those Beninese for whom they were available.

That accounts for the few departures with tickets booked on regular CAMAIR and Air Afrique flights.

The Government of Gabon assumed full responsibility for the repatriation of the other Beninese (99 per cent) and chartered ships and aircraft for the purpose.

As regards the Beninese personnel (teachers and doctors) who voluntarily decided to remain in Gabon, we would make it clear that these were persons recruited outside Benin, having fled the bloodthirsty police régime of President Kérékou. Returning them to Cotonou would have been tantamount to sending them straight to the gallows or, in other words, to certain death.

Gabon, whose Government has no opponents in exile abroad and whose gaols contain no political prisoners, cannot be an accomplice to such inhuman acts because of its concern for respect for human rights.

In fact, how can the Gabonese authorities be criticized for having, in the case of education for example, sought the assistance of their African brethren, even if the latter were nationals of so-called progressive States, rather than using technicians from imperialist countries outside Africa?

As regards the other Beninese, the Permanent Mission of the Gabonese Republic would point out that they arrived in Gabon by the thousand, with no belongings at all. They chose Gabon because they knew that its legendary hospitality needed no proof and also because, in fleeing from misery, they went where the real revolution is taking place—the economic revolution, involving a daily struggle against sickness, hunger and poverty.

Lastly, an attempt is being made to mislead world public opinion into believing that the 10,423 Beninese who have been repatriated were taking an active part in the economic emancipation of Gabon.

The truth is that those Beninese were content to live in very low-rent housing and that their only occupation was as small shopkeepers. How, then, could these people be the dynamic factors of productivity in the major sectors of the Gabonese economy, the manifest growth of which is certainly not due to retail trading or the operation of taxi-cabs but rather to industrial activities?

Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that during the past three years Beninese nationals remitted to Benin, by bank or postal transfer, the handsome sum of 600 million CFA francs, or more than \$2.5 million, not including covert transfers.

Thus it is not surprising that the drying up of this important source of income should cause serious concern to the authorities of the People's Republic of Benin.

The Permanent Mission of the Gabonese Republic invites any observers who may wish to do so to go to Gabon, where they will find that the Beninese who voluntarily decided to remain are living in perfect friendship with their Gabonese brethren and that the economic health of Gabon has in no way suffered from the departure of the Beninese.

DOCUMENT S/12860

Note verbale dated 21 September 1978 from the Mission of Belgium to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[22 September 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations has the honour, with reference to the Secretary-General's note dated 18 May 1978 concerning implementation of the provisions of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), to inform him of the following.

Belgium has formally undertaken to comply with the mandatory provisions of resolution 418 (1977). This undertaking, which was confirmed to the Secretary-General by the note verbale of 16 December 1977, [S/12498], is in line with the measures which Belgium has long been applying on a voluntary basis with respect to the embargo on deliveries of arms to South Africa.

With regard to paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977), there are no licensing arrangements between Belgian companies and South African companies relating to materials or technologies used for the manufacture of arms in South Africa.

It should be noted in this connexion that South Africa has for many years been manufacturing the FAL rifle, which was invented by a Belgian company in 1952 and from then on enjoyed the legal protection provided in Belgium by the Patents Act of 24 May 1854, which is still in force. In accordance with article 3 of the Act, which stipulates that "the term of a patent shall be 20 years", the FAL patent expired in 1972 and the product is now in the public domain. Since that time, many other countries have copied the FAL rifle. The licensing contract entered into with a South African company on 24 September 1960, i.e., prior to the first international measures against South Africa, terminated automatically in 1972 when the patent itself lapsed.

The Permanent Mission of Belgium requests the Secretary-General to have this note circulated as a Security Council document.

DOCUMENT S/12861

Telegram dated 23 September 1978 from the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]
[25 September 1978]

In conformity with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the resolution adopted today by the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs:

"The Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,

"Considering:

"That at the meeting of 15 September 1978 the Permanent Council decided to establish an *Ad Hoc* Commission of Observers to verify the facts brought to its attention by the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua,

"That at the meeting of 18 September 1978 the Permanent Council decided to convene the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the first part of article 59 of the Charter of the Organization, to consider the serious events taking place in the Central American region,

"That those events include regrettable incidents in that region, such as incursions by the armed forces of one country into the territory of another, thus creating a serious risk of international conflict,

"That the human suffering in Nicaragua, and in the border areas of neighbouring countries, seems to be of a magnitude necessitating urgent humanitarian efforts to mitigate the situation,

"That the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has accepted the invitation of the Government of Nicaragua to visit that country on 5 October next,

"That the basic principles of the Organization include the peaceful settlement of controversies of an international character, non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of States and respect for the fundamental rights of the human person,

"Resolves:

"1. To urge the Governments directly concerned to abstain from any action that might aggravate the present situation;

"2. To request the Secretary-General of the Organization to consult the Governments of the affected region and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the organizations of the United Nations system and other humanitarian intergovernmental organizations as required to alleviate the suffering in the region, and to urge member States to give urgent and generous support to efforts aimed at providing such assistance;

"3. To request the Permanent Council likewise to submit for consideration by this Meeting the report to be submitted to it by the *Ad Hoc* Commission established by resolution CP/RES.249-341/78, and to keep that Commission in operation as long as the Meeting of Consultation remains open, for any mission which the latter may entrust to it;

"4. To note that, having accepted the invitation of the Government of Nicaragua, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights will visit that country, and to express the hope that the Commission, in agreement with the Government concerned, will advance its visit to Nicaragua if possible;

"5. To note that, without prejudice to the full observance of the principle of non-intervention, the Government of Nicaragua has stated that it is prepared in principle to accept the friendly co-operation and conciliatory efforts which various States members of the Organization may offer it with a view to establishing without delay the conditions necessary for a peaceful solution of the situation;

"6. To keep the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs open as long as the present situation persists;

"7. To request the Secretary-General of the Organization to keep the United Nations Security Council informed of the decisions adopted by the Meeting of Consultation."

(Signed) Alejandro ORFILA
Secretary General of the
Organization of American States

DOCUMENT S/12862*

Letter dated 23 September 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[25 September 1978]

I have the honour to request that the aide-mémoire annexed hereto should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES
Permanent Representative of Cyprus
to the United Nations

AIDE-MÉMOIRE OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1978

1. The main subject before the General Assembly is the aggression, invasion and continuing military occupation by Turkey of 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic and the international crimes committed by the army of occupation in the expulsion of one third of the total indigenous population of Cyprus, coupled with the forcible implanting in their usurped homes and properties of alien population transported from Turkey in a design to change the demographic structure of the island.

2. The gravity of this situation has rendered the question of Cyprus one of the three most serious problems in the United Nations. Its forum, as previously, is the General Assembly plenary and no other.

3. On this grave problem, Turkey, and no one else, is accountable for its flagrant violations of the relevant resolu-

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/264-S/12862.

tions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Turkish Cypriots cannot be a party in an issue directly between Turkey and Cyprus.

4. The constitutional issue in which they are involved is by no means the main issue. It necessarily comes after the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces from the territory of Cyprus in the appropriate sequence established in the relevant United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, so that intercommunal negotiations could be genuine and not directed by Ankara, under whose domination the Turkish Cypriot leadership is operating as the instrument of the invader. To this end, General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), in its reference to the constitutional matters, provides that relevant negotiations between the two communities should be "freely" conducted.

5. At the present time, the General Assembly has to deal with the question of implementation of its resolution 3212 (XXIX), in accordance with its resolution 32/15 of last year. The forum for this subject is obviously the General Assembly plenary and no other, as it has constantly been every year. As a matter of compromise to the request that the Turkish Cypriots should have the chance of being heard, it was agreed by common consent that the relevant matters could be discussed in the Special Political Committee. This forum is still open.

DOCUMENT S/12863*

Letter dated 25 September 1978 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/French]
[25 September 1978]

I have the honour to enclose the text of the address to the Lebanese people delivered by President Sarkis and to request that it should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Address by the President of the Lebanese Republic

Men and women of Lebanon,

The fact that today is the 23rd of September is not the only reason that I am addressing these words to you. Another reason is that I increasingly feel the need to speak to you and to be in direct contact with you. At a time when the situation is once again becoming grave, you have a right to know the true facts.

I am convinced that by revealing these facts to you I am enabling you to make a sound judgement that is free of bias and subjectivity.

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/266-S/12863.

I have long remained silent because the circumstances were such that silence spoke most eloquently and was the wisest course. I have long endured irresponsible attacks which were directed against me at a time when I was endeavouring to bridge the gap between differing viewpoints and thus preserve the unity of the country and the State—unity between one group of Lebanese who have been and remain concerned about their future in a land where their existence has affirmed itself over the centuries, a land which they have defended for generations throughout their history, and another group of Lebanese who have complained and continue to complain that their rights are being taken from them and their claims ignored, who are fearful of what will become of the national identity of a country of which they represent a basic element, and who are concerned about the future of a State of which they are an essential constituent. This is so despite the efforts made by the previous governments and those made in the past two years to remove all grounds for concern and all the other factors which prompted their complaint. It is my belief that the head of State represents the nation in its entirety and that he is responsible for the welfare of all its component parts, without distinction of any kind.

I wish to acknowledge to you frankly that the Government has not met with the understanding that it sought for this attitude, nor has it received the assistance it had hoped for in the process of achieving peace and of restoring and extending the authority of the State. It is chiefly for that reason that a new crisis has arisen, that the formation of the Lebanese Army has been

blocked and that the state of anarchy prevailing in the country has persisted and even grown worse.

It was in the midst of these different currents of opinion that I undertook my task and sought to develop a consensus among the various opposing factions and points of view. I am sorry to say that I have only succeeded to a certain extent and that events have therefore unfortunately resumed their previous course, thus obstructing the peace process and the programme of reconstruction.

As a result, it has proved impossible for me and for the Government which is so loyally assisting me to achieve all the objectives which the country sought, particularly in the matter of security and stability.

My Lebanese brothers,

I am addressing myself to you at a time when, with our country being torn asunder, the future bids us rise above despair and life must break free from the grip of annihilation.

The authority which I wield reflects a conscious continuity for whose preservation I feel responsible at all times, as I do for our tomorrows, for the right of our children to joy, of our future generations to happiness, of every man, whoever and wherever he may be, to dignity, freedom, justice and equitable treatment.

The tragedy of all Lebanon weighs upon my heart each time a victim falls. Each time a family is forced to leave its home, each time a house is destroyed or the fruits of a lifetime of toil are lost, pain and sadness grip me and I cry out from the depths of my being: Enough! Our people have suffered enough misfortune and dispersal, have had enough victims, bloodshed and martyrs. The people of Lebanon have paid a high enough price for existence and they have the right to live.

Fellow citizens,

The State, your State, is weak, very weak indeed, and no one is more aware of that fact than I am. Who but the people, however, can strengthen the State? What sense does it make to cast stones at it? Would it not be better for everyone to support it, if only with a small pebble? What are people thinking of when they abandon the State, heap blame upon it and keep trying to weaken it? What do they suppose they are doing? Do they not realize that when they act in that way they are bringing about the downfall of Lebanon and their own destruction?

I, for my part, am guided by God and my own conscience, seeking neither testimonials nor endorsements from anyone in order to voice my own convictions. Proud and honoured to be the spokesman of my country and the servant of its people, I reply to the tendentious campaigns now being waged by saying: "Judge not, lest ye be judged."

People of Lebanon,

You have certain rights to be asserted against legal authority, just as it has certain rights in relation to you. As far as I am concerned, you have the right to expect me to honour my constitutional oath by preserving our country in its soil, its human values, its institutions and its territorial integrity and to devote myself to the task of leading our country into the safe harbour of security and dignity.

For my part, I am right in asking you to rally round me, to help me, to have confidence in me and to trust me to exercise the powers of the presidency without abusing them.

You need legality, but legality needs you even more. Why then do you not put your shoulders to the wheel, in order to lighten the burden and in order that we may all recover together? Do you not realize, at the present time, how much I need you in order to save Lebanon?

Was it not in order to uphold legality that you did the impossible, to the point of astonishing the whole world? Did you not, when the abyss opened before us, accomplish the miracle of democracy in this vast orient, bearing testimony to the purest traditions of liberty and preventing the dismemberment of the State and the disintegration of the homeland? Two and a half years ago, it seemed probable that the presidential election would not take place.

Two years ago, it seemed probable that there would no longer be any president, but Lebanon opted for continuity in legality, and, consequently, it is its duty to safeguard it. I suppose that you wonder about legality. What is it? What is the point of it? Legality is you, and you are legality. It is not a person, not even an institution, but the soul of the nation, the face of its civilization, the symbol of its membership in the human race. What legality would mean for you is what you would wish for yourselves, with the highest degree of awareness and the utmost clarity of vision.

Everyone would like to have legality for himself, to the exclusion of others, whereas the aim of legality is the salvation of Lebanon.

This undertaking cannot be achieved by magic or by rash adventure but by the meeting of wills and hearts, and by unity in the ranks.

I am one of your sons, born of a modest family, in a small village. I came from your ranks, and it is towards our common destiny that I pursue my path, because between the two of us there is more than a covenant of authority, there is the covenant of a whole lifetime.

Because I am first a citizen and secondly President, because citizenship takes precedence over presidency, will exist after it and without it and is the essential and permanent status to which I aspire, it is in this capacity of citizen-President that I share with you my vision of the future of our homeland. Lebanon's strength is built on three fundamental bases: its internal unity, its Arab relations and its international friendships.

Lebanon's strength lies primarily and above all in being a single State for a single people in a single territory. Its strength lies in the fact of having a single capital and not two capitals separated by a gate under guard, one Beirut, united and unified, without an eastern sector or a western sector, one south over which there flies the flag of the homeland, one north, where harmony and love prevail, one Biqa' and one mountain incarnating brotherhood and pride. Its strength lies in having an army composed of the elements of the homeland as a whole and for the homeland as a whole, thus depriving any faction whatever of any pretext for taking up arms illegally and enabling us to relieve Arab and international forces of their responsibility to safeguard peace and security in our territory.

Lebanon's strength lies in the presence of Lebanese throughout the world and the maintenance of their spiritual link to the roots of their national soil.

Lebanon's strength lies in the system of parliamentary democracy and a free economy for which it has opted. It has derived its strength, above all, from its evolution towards a modern State based on the broad decentralization of administration and development in which capability, intrinsic worth and national dedication are the sole criteria—a State which has abolished the mini-States which triggered the series of events of recent years and which those same events have created in various places.

Lebanon's strength lies, secondly, in its fraternal relations with the Arab countries, beginning with the one closest to it geographically, the one to which it is linked by history, ancestry and interest. I am speaking of Syria, with which Lebanon must continue to maintain, now and hereafter, dedicated understanding and sincere co-operation in all areas of mutual interest.

I wish here to emphasize the authenticity of our role in this Arab environment of ours, in which we live, to which we belong and whose bridge we are to the outside world. I would draw attention also to the fact that the Lebanese, and the Christians in particular, have played a pioneering role in the service of Arab causes and the Arab heritage, whose literature, language and politics they have enriched. Credit is due to the Lebanese Christians for that, but they should not assume sole credit, because they were and will remain, together with their Muslim brothers, companions in the struggle and companions in destiny.

While I place emphasis on our duty towards the Arab world, I none the less consider that our Arab brothers must, in exchange, accord the Lebanese people the respect, protection and interest which they deserve.

I also feel bound to draw attention in this context to the difference in approach and attitude between the adverse effects of the armed Palestinian presence in our territory and our total commitment to the just cause of the Palestinian people, and its right to return to its own land and to self-determination.

In the light of recent international developments, I feel I must reaffirm our categorical rejection of any settlement that is based on the resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon and that does not include a just and lasting peace.

Thirdly, the fact remains that Lebanon's strength lies in its international friendships and its relationships throughout the world, in this firm position and this leading role which it will not give up.

Although it appeared at one time that our international friendships were wavering, that feeling soon evaporated. The most recent Israeli aggression against Southern Lebanon has brought about the strengthening of international support for our country. The praiseworthy efforts made by the United Nations, in the person of its Secretary-General, and the Security Council resolutions on the subject are further proof of the international goodwill our country enjoys, and we must exploit that goodwill to settle the problem of Southern Lebanon as quickly as possible. We are certainly gratified by and appreciative of these friendships, but we realize that it would be wrong to rely unduly on them, to abuse them, and we must watch for the right and opportune moment to utilize them sensibly and efficaciously.

People of Lebanon,

The settlement of the Lebanese crisis must inevitably be a political settlement. A solution by means of security measures can only be a stage in the process of achieving a political settlement based on understanding

among Lebanese, co-operation with our brothers and receptivity to our friends.

That is why the advent of the Arab forces, after the Syrian initiative, was a response to an urgent security requirement. Their role was defined at the Riyadh and Cairo conferences. Although the mission of these forces has been impeded by reason of circumstances which are known to all of us, by causes beyond our control and theirs, by considerations that go beyond our frontiers, the maintenance of these Arab forces is, for the moment, one of the necessities demanded by the welfare of our country and the security of the State.

I can give an assurance and a guarantee of the return of the Arab forces to their own countries when, in the near future, we shall be, with God's help, sufficiently well-equipped to ensure our security ourselves and have trained the national army satisfactorily.

In the meantime, and in order to avoid new clashes, to speed the return of displaced persons to their homes, of students to their schools and universities, of citizens to their work and the resumption of normal daily life, I have given the necessary instructions for the taking of a series of security measures based largely on a gradual increase of the responsibilities of the Lebanese Army and the internal security forces in certain regions.

I have come before you prepared to give an account of my actions, prepared at all times to confront destiny with you. My heart bleeds for what you have all suffered, but I shall spare no effort to try to save my country and to satisfy my conscience.

My noble people, I remain steadfast by your side: be steadfast at mine.

Your well-being depends on your determination. Do not worry about what others have in store for you but about what you want for yourselves. Mobilize your energies, awake from your apathy and start to move in the right direction.

I am speaking to you and, through you, to all the political forces whatever their colour, to ask them to join forces with legality and to organize themselves behind an effective national policy which will consolidate the foundations of the State and hasten the process of power.

Leaders, citizens, students, workers, farmers, writers,

We are facing a challenge of destiny, a historic choice between peace and violence, between living for a cause and dying for no cause. I am fully convinced that from the bottom of your hearts will come a single cry: "Yes to peace, no to violence, yes to a united, strong Lebanon, no to a disintegrated, mortgaged Lebanon."

People of Lebanon,

If life's pleasures once separated us, if we could not rejoice together, it is sorrow that now unites us and among us there is partnership in suffering.

Does not that mean that our unity is an act of fate? That we can attain, through unity in sorrow, joy in unity?

I invite you to this encounter with joy in the name of Lebanon and for Lebanon.

Long live Lebanon!

DOCUMENT S/12864

Letter dated 25 September 1978 from the representative of Angola to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[25 September 1978]

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to attach herewith a statement regarding repeated South African violations of the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola.

I request that the attached should be issued as a document of the Security Council, in connexion with the complaint by Angola against South Africa.

(Signed) *Elisio DE FIGUEIREDO*
Permanent Representative of Angola
to the United Nations

ANNEX

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola wishes to draw the attention of the international community to the alarming acts of aggression that continue to be carried out against the People's Republic of Angola by the racist minority régime of South Africa.

For more than a week serious violations of Angolan air space by South African aircraft have been taking place and border incursions into sovereign Angolan territory have been routine on the part of the South African army. What is particularly significant and alarming is the intensity and the timing of these attacks. Past experience has shown that whenever the racist minority régime wants to sabotage peace negotiations regarding the process

of decolonization in southern Africa, it undertakes vicious attacks, not only against the territory and nationals of the People's Republic of Angola but also against civilian refugee camps in Angola.

Using various pretexts, South African armed forces launched a massive airborne and ground troops assault against the People's Republic of Angola in May 1978, murdered over 700 unarmed Namibian men, women and children at Kassinga and inflicted severe damage to the economy of the region. The heroic people of Angola are no strangers to South African attacks and invasions, which they have been facing since the early days of independence.

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola takes this opportunity to warn the racist South African invaders that it will not countenance any further violation of its sovereignty and no wanton attack against its people. The South African régime must bear full responsibility for the consequences arising from these criminal and provocative acts, which we know are designed to sabotage our efforts at national reconstruction.

It is the duty of all and those who support the rule of law in international relations to join in solidarity with the Government of Angola against these attacks. Furthermore, it is the duty of the international community to condemn the South African régime for its criminal acts and for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola. It is only through international action and a united front that the forces of imperialism and racism can be defeated.

A luta continua! A vitoria e certa!

Letter dated 28 September 1978 from the representatives of Gabon, Mauritius and Nigeria to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[28 September 1978]

We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), during the course of the Council's consideration of "The situation in Namibia".

Signed by the representatives of the following States members of the Security Council:

Gabon
Mauritius
Nigeria

DOCUMENT S/12867*

Letter dated 27 September 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[27 September 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 27 September 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Orhan ERALP
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 27 September 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Mr. Rauf R. Denktas, I have the honour to draw your attention and that of the Members of the United Nations to the enclosed note which reveals the fact that Achilleas Spyros Kyprianou, son of the Greek Cypriot "President", is the leader of the new underground organization in the Greek Cypriot controlled area of Cyprus.

It will be recalled that, at the time of Achilleas' alleged kidnapping, the opponents of Mr. Kyprianou had alleged that the kidnapping was a ruse for boosting Mr. Kyprianou's position as a candidate for the "presidency". In fact, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, who was his rival in the elections, chose to withdraw his candidature in order to help the situation. As a result, Mr. Kyprianou succeeded in becoming the "president" of the Greek Cypriot community. It will also be remembered that the alleged kidnapper, Vassos Pavlides, was given a pardon by Kyprianou at the time.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

MR. ACHILLEAS SPYROS KYPRIANOU, THE SON OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT "PRESIDENT", IS THE LEADER OF THE NEW UNDERGROUND TERROR ORGANIZATION IN THE SOUTH OF CYPRUS

Bomb outrage at Dhekhelia Base Area last November was ordered by Achilleas because his father considered British a friend of Turks

The Greek Cypriot community and foreign observers in Cyprus were astounded to hear Greek Cypriot "President" Spyros Kyprianou's son, Achilleas Kyprianou, cited in the Larnaca Assize Court last Monday as "leader" of a new EOKA-B type underground organization and a close collaborator of Vassos Pavlides, alias "Yiatros" (Doctor), who led the recent dramatic prison rebellion.

The startling disclosure was made in court by Zenon Chr. Poyadjis, who

is being tried on charges of acts of sabotage which took place at the Dhekhelia Base Area last November.

Poyadjis, who appears without counsel, admitted placing three bombs at the Dhekhelia Base but told the court in his defence that he had been ordered to carry out the sabotage by Achilleas Kyprianou, because his father considered the British a friend of the Turks. He referred to Achilleas Kyprianou as the "leader" and claimed that he was a close collaborator of Vassos Pavlides, "Yiatros", now awaiting trial in prison for seditious conspiracy.

Poyadjis explained that his association with Achilleas Kyprianou dated back to the time when Archbishop Makarios had his first heart attack. He said:

"Achilleas contacted me and said that Makarios could not live much longer and that I and Vassos Pavlides should help his father become president so as to enable him to strike hard at the Turks and at their allies. I agreed to help Mr. Kyprianou become president for three reasons, because his son Achilleas:

"(a) Told me that it was his father who had tried to reconcile Archbishop Makarios with George Grivas;

"(b) He assured me that his father would unite the people and start a new struggle against the Turks;

"(c) He also assured me that he would give me a 'post' as soon as his father assumed power."

He also explained how he had arranged two meetings between Achilleas Kyprianou and Vassos Pavlides which took place in his presence. Pavlides' condition for co-operation, broached at the first meeting, was that the past should be forgotten, the people should really be united and defence should be strengthened. At the second meeting, Achilleas Kyprianou informed Pavlides that his father had accepted his conditions and, thereafter, the two men became good friends.

Poyadjis told the court that in September 1977 he had recruited members to the new underground organization on the orders of Pavlides and with the approval of Achilleas Kyprianou. He also disclosed that Achilleas Kyprianou's kidnapping, on 14 December 1977, had been arranged on his own orders.

At this point, the public prosecutor intervened with the objection that the accused's deposition was irrelevant and that he should not be allowed to continue. The judge allowed the objection but ruled that the accused would be free to say what he liked at his cross examination.

Poyadjis submitted to the court certain documents to substantiate his deposition and sought permission to produce further evidence which was guaranteed. The court also ordered the police to return to the accused the written defence he had prepared while in detention, which was taken away from him on the excuse of censoring. The hearing was adjourned to next Monday.

*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/273-S/12867.

Letter dated 27 September 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[27 September 1978]

I have the honour to enclose the text of a letter addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the Honourable R. F. Botha.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. Adriaan EKSTEEN
Chargé d'Affaires
of the Permanent Mission of South Africa
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1978 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 6 September 1978 on the question of South West Africa [S/12836]. In that communication I drew your attention specifically and in detail to four major points in the report which you had submitted to the Security Council [S/12827] and which were of considerable concern to the South African Government, since they deviated substantially from the Five's proposal which my Government accepted on 25 April 1978. These points of concern related to:

- The size of the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group;
- The question of consultation between the Administrator-General and your Special Representative;
- The United Nations civil police component;
- The election date.

The views of the South African Government on these issues are well known and have been fully discussed in my letter referred to above. Despite the most strenuous efforts undertaken between South Africa and the Five, these differences have not yet been resolved.

In these circumstances, the South African Government finds it difficult to understand how the Security Council can now be asked to adopt your report and you be requested to implement it.

I would remind you that South Africa accepted the proposal of the Five in good faith, but no one can blame the South African Government for being unwilling to accept

extended and amended provisions of a proposal which was described to it as being final and definitive. Indeed, the Five pledged that they would stand by their proposal.

South Africa has repeatedly stated that it abides by its decision to accept the proposal of the Five and even now does not wish to close any doors. In this connexion, I should like to recall the statement by my Prime Minister, the Honourable B. J. Vorster, on 20 September 1978 [see S/12853]:

"Bearing in mind the consequences of these developments for the people of South West Africa as well as those of southern Africa as a whole, the Government has given its most serious attention to all the alternatives.

"The Cabinet, in its deliberations yesterday, concluded that the people of South West Africa, in accordance with their wishes, would have to be given the opportunity to elect their own representatives. This will be done on the basis of universal adult suffrage in country-wide elections in order to establish unequivocally who has the right to speak for the people of South West Africa.

"The people of South West Africa have clearly signified their desire to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Thus more than 85 per cent of the estimated eligible voters in the Territory have enthusiastically registered to vote, this notwithstanding intimidation from certain quarters not to do so.

"All options remain open to them. We will not prescribe to them.

"The body to be elected may:

- Decide to draw up a constitution or postpone the drafting thereof;
- Decide to proceed with the implementation of the proposal of the Five;
- Decide to accept the Secretary-General's report.

"They will, of course, also be free to express themselves on numerous other matters."

(Signed) R. F. BOTHA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of South Africa

DOCUMENT S/12870

Letter dated 28 September 1978 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[28 September 1978]

With reference to the letter sent to you by the representative of Chad on 21 September 1978 requesting that the members of the Security Council should be informed of its contents and that the communiqué of the Government of Chad issued at N'Djamena on 12 September 1978 should be circulated as a document of the Council [S/12857], I have the honour to inform you that the contents of the said communiqué with regard to accusations against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya are baseless and unfounded. They merely constitute fabricated accusations and fictitious claims. The Government of Chad has designed to implicate the Libyan

Arab Jamahiriya in the serious internal problems of Chad trying to use Libya as a scapegoat. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, therefore, rejects these allegations entirely and categorically in form and substance.

With these accusations, the Government of Chad thinks that it can divert attention from the critical situation it is facing and conceal its failure to be at peace with its people. The problem that the Government of Chad is facing is absolutely an internal one and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has no responsibility in this regard.

The Government of Chad has accused the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of forming disturbances and encouraging rebels. But whom does the Government of Chad want to deceive: the members of the Security Council or the entire membership of the United Nations? Everyone knows that the revolution in Chad has been in existence for a long time, even before the independence of this country and, of course, before the Libyan revolution.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has sought and is always seeking a conciliation between the Government of Chad and the Chad revolutionaries. The last of these endeavours was its endorsement of President Nimeiri's initiative for the realization of a national conciliation between the Chad brothers whereby representatives of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Sudan and Chad met during the period from 16 to 18 February at Sebha in the Jamahiriya.

At the conclusion of this meeting, a joint communiqué was issued and distributed as a Security Council document [S/12568, annex I]. The communiqué expressed the senti-

ments of appreciation and acknowledgement from the delegation of Chad for the constructive efforts undertaken by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Sudan in the cause of assisting Chad to resolve its internal problems and achieve national reconciliation.

At the same time, bilateral discussion took place between the representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with regard to assisting the Republic of Chad in attaining national conciliation. As a result of these discussions, a joint press communiqué was issued [*ibid.*, annex II].

I would be grateful if the members of the Security Council were kept informed of the above facts and request that this letter should be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mansur R. KIKHIA
*Permanent Representative
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
to the United Nations.*

DOCUMENT S/12872

Letter dated 28 September 1978 from the representatives of Gabon, Mauritius and Nigeria to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[28 September 1978]

We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Edem Kodjo, Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, during the course of the Council's consideration of "The situation in Namibia".

*Signed by the representatives of the following
States members of the Security Council:*
Gabon
Mauritius
Nigeria

DOCUMENT S/12873

Report of the Secretary-General on assistance to Benin

[Original: English]
[29 September 1978]

This report is submitted to the Security Council in compliance with Council resolution 419 (1977) adopted on 24 November 1977 to assist Benin to repair the damage caused by the act of aggression. The report contains information on the kinds of aid required by Benin, including details of commodity and project assistance that could be furnished as alternatives to cash contributions. The substantive part of the replies received from the international community to the Secretary-General's letters of appeal dated 16 and 22 February 1978 are also included. Any further replies received will be issued as addenda to the present document.

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INTRODUCTION

1. On 24 November 1977, the Security Council adopted resolution 419 (1977) which, in paragraph 5, appealed "to all States and all appropriate international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, to assist Benin to repair the damage caused by the act of aggression". In paragraphs 6 and 7, the Secretary-General was requested "to provide all necessary assistance to Benin for the implementation of paragraph 5", "to watch over the implementation" of the resolution, and "to report to the Security Council not later than 30 September 1978".

2. In furtherance of paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Secretary-General arranged for a mission, led by the Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, to visit Benin from 20 to 23 January 1978 to consult the Government on details of its requirements and the most effective manner in which the international community can assist in meeting them. It will be recalled, in this regard, that an estimate of the damages and losses caused, directly or indirectly, by the act of aggression, amounting to approximately \$28 million, was given in the letter dated 13 October 1977 from the representative of Benin to the President of the Security Council [S/12415].

I. NATURE OF ASSISTANCE REQUIRED

3. The mission was briefed on the situation, in separate meetings, by the Dean of the Government and Minister of Industry and Handicrafts and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. These meetings were followed by daily discussion with an interdepartmental committee appointed by the Government to liaise with the mission.

4. During its consultations, the mission was informed of the serious economic losses which had been suffered by Benin as a result of the attack. It was indicated that, considering the general economic circumstances of that country, the most desirable form of assistance would be cash contributions, possibly in the form of grants or soft loans. It was recognized, however, that some donors might not be in a position to provide cash contributions. In such cases, the Government of Benin proposed, as an alternative, aid in the form of commodity and project assistance. The Government of Benin provided the mission with details of what could usefully be contributed under these alternative forms of assistance. These details are given in annexes I and II.

5. It will be noted in annex I that the commodity aid requested consists of food, petroleum products, building materials and pharmaceutical products.

6. The assistance detailed in annex II involves a number of urgent development projects already forming part of the national development plan. The selected projects are designed to benefit the poorer sections of the population by supporting agricultural production, promoting village settlement, and by processing and marketing agricultural products. Approximate costs are given in the annex. Project documents relating to these projects, as well as to a number of other projects in the national development plan, can be obtained from the Government.

II. RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

7. The findings of the mission, as summarized above, were conveyed by the Secretary-General in his note dated 16 February 1978 addressed to all States and by his letter dated 22 February 1978 addressed to all appropriate international organizations. These communications recalled the appeal by the Security Council and requested Member States and international organizations to provide the Secretary-General, before 1 August 1978, with all information relating to the implementation of resolution 419 (1977), including details of any financial, material or development assistance they may provide in response to this appeal:

8. A further note requesting pertinent information on the implementation of resolution 419 (1977) was addressed to all States and all appropriate international organizations on 16 August 1978.

9. Responses by the international community to these communications are reproduced in annex III. Any further replies received subsequent to the date of the present report will be issued as addenda.

ANNEX I

List of commodities requested by the Government of Benin as an alternative to cash assistance

COMMODITIES

1.1 Food

Sugar, rice, wheat and canned evaporated milk are requested in quantities equivalent to 80 per cent, 50 per cent, 100 per cent and about 66 per cent, respectively of 1976 imports:

Commodity	Quantity	Million \$
Sugar	2,000 metric tons	1.44
Rice	3,000 metric tons	0.73
Wheat	6,000 metric tons	0.62
Canned evaporated milk	1,000 metric tons	0.60

1.2 Petroleum products

These are requested in quantities representing the equivalent of two months' imports:

Commodity	Quantity	Million \$
Jet fuel A.1	12,000 metric tons	1.60
Low-test gasoline	11,000 metric tons	1.56
Gas oil	10,000 metric tons	1.22
High-test gasoline	5,000 metric tons	0.63
Asphalt	2,000 metric tons	0.25

1.3 Building materials

Galvanized sheet-iron, cement-reinforcing rods, cement and sheet glass are requested in the following amounts:

Commodity	Quantity	Million \$
Galvanized sheet-iron	600,000 sheets	0.76
Cement-reinforcing rods	3,000 metric tons	0.63
Cement	20,000 metric tons	1.01
Window glass (grey)	70,000 square metres	0.59

1.4 Pharmaceutical products

These are requested to a total value of \$1.05 million. Not individually identified here, they consist of items in common use for major endemic diseases: antibiotics, vaccines, aspirin, various forms of quinine, veterinary products etc.

ANNEX II

Selected list of development projects requested by the Government of Benin for support by the international community

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN SUPPORT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

2.1 Irrigated multicrop co-operative farms

Assistance is requested in establishing two of these, of 300 hectares each—at Hinsi (southern region) and at Wama (north-western region)—at a cost of about \$1,265,000 each. As part of the planned national programme for improving the use of water resources in agriculture and the level of agricultural technology, the farms will not only add to farm production but will also serve for research, training and demonstration purposes.

2.2 Expansion of cultivation of selected oil palms

In accordance with the high priority given to this sector in the national development plan, assistance is requested for an expansion amounting to 3,250 hectares at Takon-Yoko, zone of Agony (Oueme province, south-eastern region). The cost of the plantings and equipment is estimated at \$843,900.

2.3 Equipping of mechanized farms

Equipment estimated to cost \$1.7 million is requested to contribute to the already existing programme for establishing six 1,000-hectare and six 500-hectare mechanized farms in the six provinces. The equipment includes (estimated cost in parentheses): 10 bulldozers (\$422,000); 40 tractors (\$422,000); 60 ploughs with ploughshares (\$127,000); 60 disc ploughs (\$152,000); 60 "gyrobroyeurs" (\$177,000); 60 trailers (\$228,000); 20 motorpumps (\$168,000).

3.1 Well drilling

For implementing national plans to improve rural levels of living, assistance amounting to \$1,265,000 is requested for well-drilling programmes to provide drinkable water. One third of the cost is attributable to the programme for medium-depth wells of 60 metres depth on average and 1.80 metre diameter, which requires an excavation conveyor belt equipped with five hemispheric buckets as well as related equipment. The remainder of the cost is attributable to the programme for deep wells (400 metres), which requires two well-drilling machines and related equipment.

3.2 Electricity supply

Since all villages, regardless of size, require electricity to support (a) agricultural efficiency, (b) the establishment of small-scale industries and (c) an adequate level of living, 45 electricity-generating sets are requested, the estimated cost being \$1,180,000. To accommodate villages of different sizes, four types of sets are needed (estimated cost in parentheses): 20 30-KVA units (\$211,000), 10 90-KVA units (\$254,000), 10 120-KVA units (\$336,000), and 5 300-KVA units (\$379,000).

PROJECTS FOR PROCESSING AND MARKETING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

4.1 Plant for compounding fertilizer

To make different mixes of fertilizer available for different purposes at costs lower than those of imported already mixed fertilizers and thereby reduce the financial burden to the State of the fertilizer subsidy and help improve the country's foreign exchange position, assistance is requested to set up a unit capable of mixing 20,000 tons annually at an estimated cost of \$1,265,000.

4.2 Plant for compounding insecticides and pesticides

To reduce the farm cost of these products by more than a quarter while simultaneously reducing the financial burden of the corresponding subsidy and helping to improve the country's foreign exchange position, assistance is needed in establishing a plant estimated to cost about \$844,000.

4.3 Cassava flour plant

To liberate farm women from the time-consuming task of making cassava flour and thereby make much more of their time available for other purposes, there is need to establish a plant capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of cassava flour annually. The estimated cost is \$422,000.

4.4 Animal-feed and poultry-feed plant

In support of its programme for improving the quality of the national diet, the Government wishes to encourage livestock and poultry raising on small-scale and co-operative farms. To meet the corresponding demand for animal feed and more efficient use, in this connexion, of readily available by-products of other agricultural activities (the cultivation of peanuts, oil palms, cotton and, eventually, sugar) one plant, with a capacity of 1,400 tons annually, is to be established in each of the six provinces. The six plants are estimated to cost \$422,000.

4.5 Expansion of modern sawmills

Despite the existence of two modern sawmills in the north-western region in the Atakora area, the demand for wood results in continual increases in wood imports. The country's forest resources are, by and large, sufficient to make possible the elimination of this burden on the country's foreign exchange position, provided the capacity of the two sawmills is increased. Accordingly, additional equipment having an estimated value of \$422,000 is sought.

4.6 Plant for manufacturing plastic pipes for irrigation

Much greater use of irrigation is a key element in the Government's plans for the agricultural sector. The resulting demand for plastic pipes for this, and for other additional uses as well, can be most economically satisfied by establishing a pipe-manufacturing plant having an annual production capacity of a million metres of pipe. The estimated cost is \$1,265,000.

4.7 Grain storage silos

In order to have adequate cereal reserves on hand for the sake of ensuring continuity of supply to consumers, it is planned to double storage capacity, bringing it to a level of 40,000 tons. The first stage of this programme calls for the construction of one 2,000-ton silo at Natitingou (north-western region) and one 3,000-ton silo at Bohicon (central region), at an estimated cost for the two of \$928,000.

Replies to the Secretary-General's letters of appeal for assistance to Benin dated 16 and 22 February 1978

A. AS NOTIFIED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. Replies of Member States

CHINA

[Original: Chinese]
[9 May 1978]

An agreement on economic and technical co-operation has been concluded between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the People's Republic of Benin. Under that agreement, the Chinese side is providing assistance to Benin by undertaking certain projects of economic and technical co-operation, which are now under way.

CYPRUS

[Original: English]
[15 September 1978]

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus decided to make a token contribution of \$500 towards the collective effort for assisting Benin to repair the damage caused by the act of aggression

ETHIOPIA

[Original: English]
[11 July 1978]

Ethiopia has always stood by and assisted, within the limits of her resources, sister African States in their struggle against colonial, neo-colonial, racist and imperialist aggression, domination and exploitation. In spite of the fact that she is currently experiencing severe economic hardship as a result of the aggression and the policy of subversion pursued against her by the reactionary ruling circles of some neighbouring States, the provisional military Government of socialist Ethiopia wishes to affirm that it stands resolutely behind the People's Republic of Benin and will do its utmost to assist the sister republic to repair the damage caused by the imperialist aggression of 16 January 1977.

FIJI

[Original: English]
[11 May 1978]

Because of its economic difficulties, Fiji regrettably will not be in a position to contribute to the appeal for assistance to Benin.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

[Original: English]
[13 July 1978]

The people and the Government of the German Democratic Republic provide all-round assistance to the People's Republic of Benin. In accordance with Security Council resolution 419 (1977) they also granted direct material assistance to overcome the consequences of the aggression. In 1977, solidarity consignments worth 2 million marks, consisting of medicaments, clothing, foodstuffs, technical goods and other were sent.

Further relief consignments to the People's Republic of Benin have been or will be dispatched in 1978. A first shipment worth about 800,000 marks was sent on 20 May 1978. This consignment contained, among other things, medicaments, medical instruments, fabrics, clothing, photographic recorders and phototechnical goods.

Moreover, a six-week seminar providing further training to 300 economic officials of the People's Republic of Benin was held by a group of lecturers from the German Democratic Republic in Cotonou in the first quarter of 1978. For 1978/79, the German Democratic Republic is offering scholarships for improving the theoretical and practical qualifications of personnel of the People's Republic of Benin in the fields of agriculture, medicine, pedagogics and pharmaceuticals.

GUINEA

[Original: French]
[14 September 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey to you the firm support of the people of Guinea for the brother people of Benin, the victims of aggression on 16 January 1977.

The Government of the Republic of Guinea is prepared to support the

efforts of the Secretary-General aimed at re-establishing justice and providing Benin with all the assistance necessary in such circumstances.

IRAQ

[Original: English]
[28 September 1978]

The Representative of Iraq has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that the Government of Iraq will contribute the amount of \$1 million to assist Benin to repair the damage caused by the act of aggression.

LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

[Original: English]
[8 May 1978]

In addition to the support and assistance extended by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the context of the bilateral relations between the two countries, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has made the following contributions in the context of the said appeal:

—A grant in the amount of \$US 500,000 was made in August 1977, as assistance from the Libyan Arab people to the people of Benin;

—The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has decided to allocate the amount of 70,000 Libyan dinars to cover the expenses of a training course in public administration for 38 students from Benin at the National Institute for Public Administration in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

—The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has decided to approve the training of 150 students from Benin in all educational fields and in all schools, universities and institutes in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

LUXEMBOURG

[Original: French]
[21 March 1978]

Owing to budgetary constraints, the Government of Luxembourg does not propose to provide Benin with material or financial assistance.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Original: English]
[29 September 1978]

The United Kingdom, as a member of the Security Council, voted for resolution 419 (1977) concerning the complaint by Benin and made clear that it condemned the attack launched against Benin on 16 January 1977, as well as any act of aggression against any State.

So far as concerns the provision of assistance by the international community, you will already be aware, as a result of the communication you have received from the Commission of the European Communities, that Benin has been informed of the possibilities whereby aid could be provided under the Lomé Convention and other aid programmes operated by EEC, of which the United Kingdom is a member. As the Government of Benin has already been informed, the United Kingdom does not itself have any plans to contribute directly.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

[Original: English]
[25 September 1978]

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania has made a contribution of \$50,000. This amount has been paid directly to the Government of Benin.

In view of Tanzania's own economic circumstances this sum should be regarded as a token contribution in full solidarity with the Government and people of Benin.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Original: English]
[8 April 1978]

The representative of the United States of America wishes to advise the Secretary-General of the United States' concern upon learning of the situation which precipitated conditions referred to in document S/12415. As a result of this concern, the United States supported Security Council resolution 419 (1977). The United States hopes that Benin, through the determined efforts of the Beninese people and such international assistance as may be forthcoming, will be enabled to repair any damages stemming from the attack of 16 January 1977. The United States, however, will be unable to make a contribution to this effort.

2. Replies of United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and organizations

UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME

[Original: English]
[19 June 1978]

I wish to inform you that UNEP, not being a funding organization, is not involved in technical assistance as such. It has thus unfortunately no contribution to make in connexion with Security Council resolution 419 (1977) concerning the complaint of Benin.

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND

[Original: English]
[13 September 1978]

Our Regional Director has been in direct touch with the Benin officials concerned to discuss the possible contributions that UNICEF can make in response to the appeal. Of the list of commodities listed in annex I, only the last item (1.4 Pharmaceutical products) is within the mandate and possibility of UNICEF to provide. Although a large amount of products of this type, such as vaccines, drugs and health equipment and transport, are currently being provided to Benin under our expanded programme (a formula UNICEF applies to least developed countries) we mentioned to the officials concerned that UNICEF stood ready, within its budgetary possibilities, to provide any additional urgent supplies which may be required.

The projects listed in annex II fall largely outside the mandate and competence of UNICEF, with the exception of well drilling (item 3.1). In this area of assistance, UNICEF, in co-operation with FAO and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has committed itself to a programme of assistance costing about \$750,000 from its regular resources and from special assistance. I am happy to report that the latter funds have since been largely pledged and are therefore available for implementing the water projects.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

I

[Original: English]
[31 July 1978]

The Government is now authorized to plan expenditures for the second indicative planning figure (IPF) cycle, 1977-1981, to the full level of its IPF. As you know, as a safety measure against possible shortfall in resources during the current IPF period, the present United Nations Development Programme policy allows programming for expenditure purposes of only 92 per cent of the total IPF. This decision now increases the expenditure ceilings available to the Government by \$707,000 in 1979, \$435,000 in 1980 and \$285,000 in 1981. The Government is exceptionally authorized to overprogramme the adjusted 1979 IPF expenditure ceiling of \$US 3,545,000 by 20 per cent. The authorized overprogramming level for other countries is only 10 per cent.

The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), following our request, has agreed to explore possibilities of financing from its own resources one or two additional projects included in the list submitted by the Benin Government, as attached to your letter of 22 February 1978 (project 2.1 and 2.2 of annex II).

II

[Original: English]
[13 September 1978]

The Government of Benin has sent to UNCDF documentation describing global plans relating to project 2.2 (Expansion of cultivation of selected oil palms) as listed in annex II of your letter to Mr. Bradford Morse dated 22 February 1978. UNCDF will shortly be in touch with the Government of Benin asking for further clarification on the specific Government request for UNCDF aid for this project.

UNCDF is still awaiting information from the Government concerning project 2.1 (Irrigated multicrop co-operative farms).

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

[Original: English]
[13 April 1978]

Under project 2096 "multi-purpose project", the World Food Programme is already assisting co-operative farms (subproject 2.1), oil palm plantations (subproject 2.2) and well digging (subproject 3.1). The project, which was approved for a period of four years, will cost the programme \$US 10,910,700, of which \$US 7,870,200 is for food only.

I wish to point out that WFP would be ready to consider an acceleration

of the project in all the above-mentioned fields to the extent that financial means and equipment were supplied from other sources.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

[Original: English]
[14 July 1978]

A high-level delegation from the Government of Benin visited FAO headquarters on 12 May 1978 to discuss possibilities of special food aid and assistance by means of a number of the development projects listed in annexes I and II.

In the case of the food aid, discussions were held with the World Food Programme and it was agreed that the Programme's representatives in Benin would formulate projects under quick procedural arrangements, in consultation with the responsible government authorities. Under these arrangements, projects must be limited to food supplies and related activities within a one-year period, the total WFP contribution per project not exceeding \$US 1 million.

In the case of the projects in the field of agricultural development, the delegation was informed that, being a technical agency, FAO had limited financial means at its disposal, and that it could not provide direct financial assistance nor, from its own resources, finance large-scale technical assistance projects. It was pointed out, however, that if donor agencies and, in particular, the International Fund for Agricultural Development were to indicate an interest in funding these projects, FAO could contribute by financing project preparation activities if so requested.

In this context, I referred to the system of "country allocations" under the FAO technical co-operation programme (TCP) and agreed to make additional allocations over and above the ceiling fixed for Benin. I also agreed to give favourable consideration to the financing of certain other activities under the newly established FAO scheme for the prevention of food losses (PFL).

A positive response has already been given to the Government's request for assistance in the field of grain storage silos (project proposal 4.7 in annex II). A combined TCP/PFL and food security mission visited the country at the end of May this year and the mission's report, which includes concrete assistance proposals, will be submitted within the next few weeks to the Government for its approval.

In the meantime, an amount of \$US 250,000 has been earmarked under the PFL scheme for the setting up of village-level and regional storage facilities for cereals, the training of personnel in the use of these facilities and the development of commercial procedures to promote better utilization of both existing storage facilities and those to be created.

Further, a three months' mission to study the feasibility of creating a processing plant for root and tuber crops has been recommended and scheduled for the end of 1978 (cf. project proposal 4.3, annex II).

In addition to the above, FAO is implementing an extensive and well-balanced assistance programme in Benin, covering several fields such as land and water improvement, food crop production and conservation, phytopathological plant protection, forestry development and the promotion of forest industries, nutrition, agricultural planning, agricultural extension and the development of rural youth.

FAO has a strong and efficiently organized field force in Benin, capable of rendering a significant amount of assistance in co-operation with the responsible government authorities and of contributing to the rehabilitation of the country's economy so gravely disrupted by aggression. Further, I have agreed with the Government of Benin to establish an FAO office at Cotonou in charge of a representative of the Organization.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

[Original: English]
[3 April 1978]

Please be advised that this organization is in a position to provide assistance for civil aviation, but only through funding by the United Nations Development Programme. At the present time a UNDP/ICAO project is in the final stage of formal signature by UNDP. This is for provision of civil aviation operational equipment for which UNDP input is \$US 252,296. A project for UNDP-funded fellowship training is also being considered by the Government of Benin.

Further assistance is provided to the Government of Benin by the ICAO African Regional Office, located in Senegal, which provides technical advice to States in the region within its function of promoting the installation of air navigation facilities necessary for the safe operation of civil aviation.

However, in view of the nature of its mandate, ICAO is not in a position to offer the commodity or development assistance described in annexes I and II to your letter.

UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION

[Original: French]
[2 May 1978]

I wish to inform you that a Beninese mission headed by Mr. François Dossou, Minister of Planning, visited UPU headquarters on 24 April 1978 to discuss the assistance which our organization could give Benin to repair the damage caused by the act of aggression suffered by that country on 16 January 1977.

In the course of the talks which the mission held with me and my staff, possible sources of financing for assistance in the postal sector were reviewed; it was decided that the responsible Beninese authorities would prepare for UPU a list of projects deemed necessary, which we shall study with a view to determining what steps should be taken.

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE
ORGANIZATION

[Original: English]
[29 March 1978]

I note that none of the projects mentioned falls within the area of activity of IMCO. Accordingly, it would not be possible for IMCO to contribute to the implementation of these or related projects. I wish, however, to assure you of our readiness to co-operate with your office and other agencies in connexion with any future projects which may fall within the field of work and competence of IMCO.

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

[Original: English]
[14 March 1978]

The International Fund for Agricultural Development, under its charter, can provide assistance only to member nations for agricultural development projects on request. Benin became a member of IFAD on 28 December 1977, when it acceded to the Agreement establishing IFAD, and is therefore entitled to seek assistance from IFAD for specific development projects in accordance with the Fund's policies and criteria. Financing from the Fund is normally provided on highly concessional terms at 1 per cent for 50 years with a grace period of 10 years, or in the form of grants for technical assistance. But the Government of Benin has to submit to the Fund one or more development projects which, in its view, deserve high priority and are suitable for financing by the Fund.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

[Original: English]
[20 March 1978]

Owing to the highly specialized and technical nature of the Agency and its programmes dealing only with peaceful uses of atomic energy, the kind of assistance that IAEA could provide would not be relevant to the needs of Benin and would be outside the scope of useful assistance indicated in annexes I and II to your letter.

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

[Original: English]
[28 March 1978]

We have taken note of this resolution. It would appear, however, that there is no action which GATT can take in response to the appeal to assist Benin, as the matter falls outside this organization's area of competence.

3. Replies of regional and intergovernmental
Organizations

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

[Original: French]
[18 April 1978]

I have noted all the forms which the assistance that the international community might provide to the Beninese Government could take.

With regard to the African Development Bank group, it should be noted that, since January 1977, it has disbursed 13 million units of account, that is, \$US 15.7 million in loans on favourable terms. Other economic projects are being considered and some have reached a very advanced stage of preparation or even evaluation.

ARAB BANK FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

[Original: English]
[30 June 1978]

In November 1975, the BADEA Board of Directors approved a loan of \$US 8 million to Benin for the construction of a cement factory (clinker grinding) with a capacity of 200,000 tons. This project is progressing satisfactorily and the plant is expected to start its operations in the coming weeks. This action surely conforms perfectly with the preoccupation expressed in annex I to your letter concerning the supply of 20,000 tons of cement to Benin.

In November 1976, BADEA accepted to contribute an amount of \$100,000 for the preparation of a feasibility study on the extension of the port of Cotonou which, as you may know, plays a fundamental role in Benin's imports. This study has been completed with favourable conclusions. BADEA is considering participation in the financing of the extension works and is planning to present this project to the forthcoming meeting of the Board of Directors in June 1978.

I should also like to mention that the Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa, which is now under the control of BADEA, extended a loan amounting to \$US 2.4 million to Benin in 1974.

Within the framework of Afro-Arab co-operation, and in conformity with an equitable distribution of assistance between the different African countries, BADEA will continue to assist Benin through participation in the financing of well defined projects.

I am not at present in a position to precise the field of future BADEA interventions in Benin; BADEA will, however, always aim at promoting a rapid economic development in this country.

ARAB FUND FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

[Original: English]
[1 April 1978]

I regret to inform you that the activities of the Arab Fund are restricted to the Arab countries. Consequently, the Arab Fund is not in a position to consider any kind of assistance to Benin.

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

[Original: English]
[29 March 1978]

In accordance with the directives of Commonwealth Governments, Commonwealth secretariat assistance is normally earmarked for its member States. The only exceptions are the secretariat's programmes to Mozambique and Namibia specifically approved by Commonwealth Governments in view of the Commonwealth's deep commitment in the struggle against the racist policies of the white minority régimes in southern Africa. In the circumstances, it will therefore unfortunately not prove possible for the secretariat to accede to the request contained in Security Council resolution 419 (1977).

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

[Original: English]
[5 June]

I should like to inform you that a delegation of the Government of Benin came to Brussels on 3 May 1978 in order to discuss with the Commission the problems related to the implementation of Security Council resolution 419 (1977).

At that time, I assured the delegation of the Commission's support of the above resolution, particularly in as far as it condemns the act of armed aggression perpetrated against Benin and all forms of external interference in the internal affairs of an independent State.

Furthermore, I informed the delegation of the possibilities existing under the Lomé Convention, and under other EEC aid programmes, where aid could be provided to assist Benin in repairing the damage caused to its economy.

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

[Original: Arabic]
[21 March 1978]

I have the honour to inform you that the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance concentrates its activities, at present, on providing Arab experts, scholarships, fellowships and training programmes in Arab countries. Direct financial and monetary assistance to States does not fall within its field of activity.

The Fund has received a request from the Government of Benin for technical assistance in the field of education. On 10 November 1977, the Board of Governors of the Fund agreed to provide Benin with 15 high-school teachers and 2 university lecturers. On 1 January 1978, a technical assistance agreement was signed between the Fund and the Government of Egypt to send eight teachers to Benin for one year at the expense of the Fund.

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

[Original: English]
[28 September 1978]

I have the honour to inform you that the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, at its thirty-first ordinary session at Khartoum, adopted resolution CM/Res.639 (XXXI) on the aggression and invasion attempts by mercenaries against the People's Republic of Benin and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. This resolution was subsequently endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its fifteenth ordinary session and its full text circulated in document A/33/235 [see also S/12817, annex I].

I wish to reproduce for your information paragraphs 6 to 10 of the resolution, relating to the kinds of assistance which the Organization of African Unity proposes to give to the People's Republic of Benin:

[For the text, *ibid.*]

ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES

[Original: English]
[14 March 1978]

The OPEC Special Fund has so far given two loans to the Government of Benin. The first loan was for balance of payments support in the amount of \$2 million and was utilized in 1977. The second loan, in the amount of \$1.6 million is to be used partly to finance foreign costs of the Godomey-Bohicon-Abomey highway project. The agreement for this loan was signed on 10 January 1978 between the Special Fund and the Government of Benin.

Both loans are interest free. The repayment period for the first loan is 25 years, including a grace period of five years, and the second loan has a repayment period of 20 years, including a five-years' grace period. A service charge of half of one per cent applies to the first loan and three quarters of one per cent to the second. The service charges are intended to cover the cost of administering the loans.

The new lending programme of the Fund for 1978/79 is under preparation and will be proposed to the Fund's Governing Committee for approval at the end of March. We hope that the Government of Benin will be able to benefit further from the Fund's assistance in future.

B. AS REPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BENIN PERMANENT MISSION OF BENIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS

[Original: English]
[28 September 1978]

I have the honour to inform you that I have just received information from Benin that the following country has contributed in cash for the reparation of the damages caused by the aggression: Liberia, \$US 25,000.

Letter dated 27 September 1978 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[28 September 1978]

I have the honour to draw your attention to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 32/40A, in which the Security Council was urged to take as soon as possible a decision on the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People endorsed by the Assembly in its resolution 31/20.

In this connexion, the Committee has authorized me, as its Chairman, to refer to the statement made on 27 October 1977 by the President of the Security Council at the conclusion of the latest consideration of those recommendations by the Council, in which he indicated that the Council had agreed to adjourn the debate on that item for the time being and that the date of the next meeting of the Council on the item would be fixed after consultations among the members of the Council [2041st meeting, para. 134]. Since then, a long period of time has elapsed and certain events have occurred; the Committee therefore ex-

presses the hope that the Council will soon take a decision on its recommendations.

You will find attached hereto copies of the two reports that the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first and thirty-second sessions, containing the recommendations which the Security Council has been requested to re-examine.⁶


I should be obliged if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Médoune FALL
*Chairman of the Committee on
the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights
of the Palestinian People*

⁶Not reproduced in the present document. For the texts, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 35*, and *ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 35*.

160°00'E 170 180 200 210 220°00'E

310°00'N 300 290 280°00'N



黎巴嫩南部 • SOUTHERN LEBANON • LIBAN MÉRIDIONAL
 ЮЖНЫЙ ЛИВАН • LIBANO MERIDIONAL

一九七八年九月临时部队的部署情况
 UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF SEPTEMBER 1978
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS DE SEPTEMBRE 1978
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА СЕНТЯБРЬ 1978 ГОДА
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN SEPTIEMBRE DE 1978

- 图例 • LEGEND • LÉGENDE • ЛЕГЕНДА • LEYENDA
- ▲ 7.4 观察所 ——— 临时部队活动范围的界限
 - Observation post — UNIFIL operational boundaries
 - Poste d'observation — Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
 - Наблюдательный пункт — Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ
 - Puesto de observación — Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretary of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

MAP NO. 3000 UNITED NATIONS
 SEPTEMBER 1978

160°00'E 170 180 190 200 210 220°00'E

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