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NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 11 December 1973, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1758)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in Namibia :
 - (a) Letter dated 4 December 1973 from the Permanent Representatives of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11145);
 - (b) Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 323 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10921 and Corr.1)

The meeting was called to order at 4.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

- (a) Letter dated 4 December 1973 from the Permanent Representatives of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11145);
- (b) Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 323 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10921 and Corr.1¹)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the Council's previous decisions, I shall now, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of the Niger, Nigeria and Somalia to take places at the side of the Council Chamber in order to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, on the usual understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Diallo (Niger), Mr. E. Ogbu (Nigeria) and Mr. H. Nur Elmi (Somalia) took

the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I should like to inform members of the Council that, in addition, I have just received a letter, dated 11 December 1973, from the representative of Saudi Arabia containing a request to participate in the Council's discussion of the item inscribed on the agenda, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, and I shall ask him to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber on the understanding that he will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is his turn to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 1756th meeting, I now invite the President and the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. P. J. F. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and Mr. P. Mikanagu (Burundi) and Mr. M. Sidik (Indonesia), the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia, took places at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The first speaker on the list is the representative of Nigeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and make his statement.

5. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria): I would like to express the gratitude of my delegation for the permission to participate in the Council's consideration of the report of the Secretary-General [S/10921 and Corr.1]. Allow me also, Mr. President, to offer you the sincere good wishes of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. My delegation is confident that, under your able guidance, the Security Council will continue to promote the course of peace generally and bring decisive progress in Namibia.

6. On Monday, 10 December 1973, the United Nations celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1973.*

Declaration of Human Rights. During this celebration, statements were made on behalf of some Member States, including those whose actions could not possibly be considered as a confirmation of their respect for the provisions of this historic document which sets out the rights of man in his relation to his fellow men all over the world, irrespective of race, religion or colour of skin. It is appropriate, therefore, that the Security Council should in the same week discuss the report of the Secretary-General which informs the Council of the outcome of the celebrated contacts with South Africa.

7. Members of this Council will clearly recall that by its resolution 309 (1972), unanimously adopted on 4 February 1972, it invited the Secretary-General, in consultation and close co-operation with a group of Security Council members composed of the representatives of Argentina, Somalia and Yugoslavia, to initiate as soon as possible contacts with all parties concerned with the problem of Namibia, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality, to exercise their right of self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. On the same day, this Council decided [resolution 310 (1972)] that the continued occupation of Namibia by the Government of South Africa, in defiance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Charter, created conditions detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. The same resolution therefore called upon the Government of South Africa to withdraw immediately its police and military forces, as well as its civilian personnel, from the Territory of Namibia. I recall at this stage that resolution 309 (1972) was adopted without the affirmative votes of France and the United Kingdom.

8. Since the adoption of these resolutions, the Secretary-General has made several attempts, although the futility of this was clear to many Members of the Organization, to reason with the Government of South Africa on the importance of its peaceful withdrawal from the Territory of Namibia. The report of the Secretary-General, which is before the Council, today clearly states that a study of the statements made by the representative of the Government of South Africa during his contacts was still far from coinciding with the aims of the resolutions I have just referred to. The Government of South Africa has refused to provide complete and unequivocal clarification of its policy with regard to self-determination and independence for Namibia, as envisaged in the provisions of Security Council resolution 323 (1972).

9. The Secretary-General's report further highlights doubts as to whether the contacts should be continued. He warns the Council that if it should be decided that the contacts should be continued, it should be borne in mind that time and protracted discussions would be required for any progress to be made.

10. The report was issued seven years after the General Assembly, in resolution 2145 (XXI), had resolved to terminate South Africa's Mandate over the Territory and had established a United Nations Council for Namibia to administer the Territory for an interim period until the final status of Namibia had been determined.

11. Since its establishment, and particularly in the last two years, the Council, under the dynamic leadership of my brother and friend, Ambassador Paul Lusaka, has heard a number of statements, freely made, by those who are fully knowledgeable about the reasoning and actions of the racist régime and by survivors of the brutalities perpetrated by the South African police. Details of several new administrative, political and military measures of a repressive nature, intended to entrench the already illegal occupation of the Territory still further, have been received and recorded. The spontaneous reaction of the Namibian people in the face of numerous arrests and other acts aimed at destroying the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia have similarly been catalogued.

12. In 1972 and 1973, for example, the régime established the so-called "advisory council", in spite of nation-wide rejection of the idea, and nominated "advisory councilors". In February 1973, the South African mockery of a parliament extended its policy of "Bantustanization" or Balkanization into Namibia by creating a separate "self-governing homeland" in the East Caprivi Strip. In adopting the relevant Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Amendment Act of 1968, the South African Government stated arrogantly that "it is the firm and irrevocable intention of the Government to lead the individual nations in South West Africa (Namibia) and the East Caprivi Strip to self-government and independence".

13. The leader of the Opposition, alarmed by the recklessness of the Government in adopting such measures while at the same time conducting negotiations with the representatives of the United Nations, drew attention to the insincerity the Government was demonstrating. Vorster, of course, did not view it from that honourable standpoint. In May 1973 Ovamboland was proclaimed a "self-governing region". The people, of course, rejected that act by successfully boycotting the mockery of elections that were planned to fill the 56-member Legislative Assembly.

14. The documents of the Council for Namibia contain accounts of numerous other repressive acts against Namibians, including non-black Namibians, who support the just cause of the Namibians. Surely the records of the Security Council must contain catalogues of these illegal acts and inhuman atrocities inflicted on the people of Namibia because of their struggle for independence in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

15. Questions have been asked since the decision of the General Assembly which terminated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia as to why South Africa continues its policies in that Territory in the face of the clear illegality of its position in Namibia. South Africa's persistence in its policy in Namibia, I submit, is, of course, only possible because of the support it receives from certain Western countries. This is the continuation of a deliberate policy started in 1950, when the United Nations made its first real contact with the Government of South Africa concerning this international Territory. Namibia is today, for all practical purposes, the exclusive colonial preserve of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, the

Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, with their two colonial representatives—South Africa and Portugal.

16. A closer examination of the ample information in the documents of the United Nations Council for Namibia, particularly the latest report of the Council to the General Assembly,² will provide ample evidence of the extent to which these Member States provide material support to the south African régime in Namibia. Their voting habits will show the political support given to the South African racist régime by these same States.

17. Since the start of these contacts, a large number of mining companies from the United States of America have started new prospecting activities in Namibia. The United Kingdom has never accepted the termination of South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. It therefore continues to deal with South Africa over Namibia. France supplies sophisticated weapons which are far beyond the normal needs of a State enjoying internal peace and willing to live in peace with its neighbours. Japan is fast making a dubious name for itself on the continent of Africa for its apparent insensitivity to the political aspirations of the people of Africa in general and Namibians in particular. It is hoped that the Federal Republic of Germany will see fit to consider its involvement in Namibia within the context of the greatest good for the greatest number of Namibians as a whole, instead of adopting a narrow and parochial outlook based upon that of its nationals or descendants of its nationals in the Territory.

18. Three of these Powers which are members of the Security Council and were the principal Allied Powers that allocated the Mandate to South Africa were offered by South Africa in 1950 partnership in a proposed four-Power agreement embodying the provisions of the so-called "sacred trust". It was proposed that the three Powers should be the depositories for information about South Africa's administration. Although the proposal was rejected then, these same Powers are today enjoying the advantages the South African proposal intended to have recognized in an international agreement to replace the Mandate.

19. In the 23 years that have elapsed since then, South Africa's neighbours have become convinced that South Africa is incapable of sincere negotiations on its immediate withdrawal from Namibia; yet South Africa must realize that withdrawal is inevitable, and that it must take place soon.

20. The report of the Secretary-General contains yet another suggestion from the régime that

“... it might not take longer than 10 years for the population of South West Africa to reach the stage where it will be ready to exercise its right to self-determination.” [S/10921 and Corr.1, para. 14.]

21. It must be remembered that for South Africa the concept of self-determination for Namibians cannot be any different from what motivates the Pretoria régime to cling

doggedly to its *apartheid* policy already condemned by various resolutions of this Council and other organs of the United Nations as inhuman. If my delegation rejects these suggestions by South Africa, it does so because it finds it intolerable that in 1973 South Africa should have the United Nations accept its presence in Namibia for a further 10 years after its Mandate was terminated by the same Organization seven years earlier.

22. The Council remains the appropriate organ of the United Nations capable of restoring dignity to the Organization by taking effective action that will ensure the immediate withdrawal of the South African authorities from the Territory of Namibia. If the Security Council has hitherto been unable to take meaningful action, a considerable share of the responsibility must go to those members of the Council which have refused to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and have continued to protect South Africa with a view to holding on to their share of the profits resulting from the economic plunder of the Territory.

23. It is said by well-informed sources that because countries of the third world are not protected by the nuclear stalemate which has been established in Europe, Western strategists have deduced that there is a new freedom of action for the use of conventional weapons in the third world. Consequently, the situation in that area is becoming increasingly unstable. Western Governments have consequently reshaped their defence systems with greater emphasis on counter-insurgency measures in order to protect their interests built up on the basis of unfair agreements. History has provided ample evidence that attempts to subdue people by military might cannot but lead to disastrous consequences. In the case of Namibia, the best way to guarantee these interests is to deal with the authentic representatives of Namibians.

24. They are ready now, and have been ready to assume the responsibility of determining their future in their own land. We appealed and warned Portugal from these same chambers before, regarding Guinea-Bissau.

25. These Powers should now reshape their international policies to respond to these appeals and should turn away from anachronistic policies designed to guarantee wasteful luxury for themselves and perpetual poverty, hunger and disease for us in the third world.

26. The Security Council should terminate the contacts between the Secretary-General and the South African régime. It should take all appropriate measures in the light of South Africa's flagrant defiance of its international legal obligation and prevent South Africa from further use of Namibian territory for aggressive purposes.

27. The Security Council should also call upon the Secretary-General to strengthen the Unit that deals with the question of Namibia with a view to collecting and distributing data on the resources which are being plundered by South Africa and the role played by Member States in encouraging the régime to persist in its policies.

28. The Security Council should invite the Secretary-General to keep in constant contact with the Governments

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 24.

of Member States that are known to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with the régime in Pretoria with a view to the immediate suspension of those relations.

29. My delegation cannot accept a situation in which, in the words of the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity for this year, South Africa would be allowed to remain the only colonial Power to betray the international trust conferred on it under the trusteeship system.

30. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): It will be recalled that at its 1757th meeting the Security Council decided to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Mishake Muyongo, as requested in the letter from the representatives of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan [S/11153]. I understand that Mr. Muyongo is now ready to make a statement; accordingly, with the consent of the Council, I invite Mr. Muyongo to take a seat at the Council table in accordance with that decision and to make his statement.

31. Mr. MUYONGO: Allow me at the outset to express our gratitude to the members of the Council for according us this opportunity to address the Council in the debate on Namibia. We have had occasion more than once to appear before this august body of the United Nations, both here and in Africa, to state the position of our people concerning the burning issue of Namibia, which has haunted the United Nations since its inception.

32. Before I continue, Sir, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council for the month of December. We are particularly satisfied that this debate on Namibia is taking place under your leadership.

33. We have made our position clear on several occasions concerning the dialogue between the South African racist régime and the Secretary-General to establish the necessary conditions that would enable Namibians to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. In our view, this entails the following:

34. As a first step, the South African army and paramilitary police should be withdrawn to South Africa to create an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity, which are essential elements for negotiation.

35. Secondly, all the *apartheid* laws and other paraphernalia should be abolished.

36. Thirdly, all political prisoners and other victims of South Africa's illegal colonial occupation should be released and rehabilitated to human dignity and decency. I say "dignity and decency" because when one is in a South African prison one is stripped of all human dignity and decency.

37. Fourthly, all Namibians should be able to leave and return safely without fear of reprisals or persecution.

38. Fifthly, as a token of sincerity and good faith, the Pretoria régime should, at the minimum, halt the further implementation of the Bantustan scheme and cease alto-

gether all types of generalized terrorism, repression, wanton torture and imprisonment of our people.

39. We have our misgivings and apprehensions concerning this exercise, knowing the racist régime as we do, but have chosen not to be obstructionist if there were any possibility of resolving this problem peacefully; for we are the victims, the oppressed, the exploited, the dehumanized and disenfranchised. Therefore, we are the ones who will eagerly grasp the ray of hope appearing on the horizon.

40. Equally, it must be added here that the African and other freedom-loving countries have shown their earnest desire for the solution of this perennial question of Namibia, by allowing the Secretary-General to try to mediate as an independent and impartial organ of the United Nations, uniquely eligible and equipped to render a face-saving device to South Africa, which could have been embarrassed otherwise, to make concessions to both the General Assembly and the Security Council, which are political bodies whose resolutions it ignored with impunity.

41. Instead, the racist régime used the contacts to hoodwink and deceive the United Nations, on the one hand, and to consolidate its illegal occupation of Namibia, on the other. In fact, it is reported that most, if not all, of the people who made representations to both Mr. Waldheim and Mr. Escher either lost their jobs or were arrested.

42. Moreover, the situation deteriorated markedly during and since the contacts. Contrary to the undertakings made to the Secretary-General, freedom of movement and political activity is not allowed in Namibia. Those who engage in political activity are victimized; for example, three Youth League leaders of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) were paraded through kangaroo courts and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. What was their crime? Their only crime was freedom of speech and assembly—those rights promised by the South Africans in the report we are now discussing. Over 20 are kept in prison in Windhoek and over 80 in concentration camps in Ovamboland for this same crime.

43. Yesterday afternoon [*1757th meeting*], the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Ambassador Lusaka, read out a letter in a very moving and touching way from Namibian women describing the crimes I have mentioned. We cannot add more to what that letter expressed.

44. These, then, are the results of the contacts. Therefore, we reiterate our earlier call to end this harmful contact. As we mentioned in the Fourth Committee at its meeting on 26 October 1973,³ during the debate on Namibia, we wonder about the wisdom of merely stockpiling resolutions regarding Namibia. It is our humble but firm belief that all reasonable resolutions have already been adopted both by this Council and the General Assembly. What is called for now is their vigorous implementation. In this case, the Charter of the United Nations provides for the necessary action with a view to giving effect to its decisions. Namibians,

³ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Session, Fourth Committee, 2046th meeting.*

for their part, will continue the struggle until final victory is achieved.

45. In conclusion, we should like to express our thanks and appreciation to the representatives who have intervened during this debate on Namibia. Finally, we should like to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his sincere efforts to create the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia to achieve freedom and independence.

46. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I now invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

47. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, it heartens me to see you in the chair as President of the Security Council, hailing as you do from a country which is the heir of one of the earliest world civilizations. But your people did not rest on past laurels, for, indeed, within less than a quarter of a century, by singleness of purpose and a high sense of individual as well as collective duty, they re-emerged on the world scene as an illuminated model to other States struggling to achieve social justice and national unity. Your country, Sir, should be a striking example to all those African peoples that still find themselves under the yoke of foreign rule.

48. I do not wish to let this occasion pass without referring to your predecessor, our good friend Ambassador Jankowitsch, who, in spite of his relatively young age, ably assumed the duties of guiding the deliberations of the Council as befitted a son of Austria, one of the most civilized countries of Europe.

49. I should be remiss if I failed to allude to the country of my good friend, Sir Laurence McIntyre. I was indeed exhilarated, when in a reception he recently gave, I shook hands with the Minister of Education of a new country formerly known as the Territory of Papua, whose people were placed by the United Nations under the tutelage of the Australian Government, and in a relatively short time the Australian Government, to its great honour, succeeded in preparing the Papuans for self-rule and independence. Such an achievement must be attributed to the high sense of responsibility which Australia clearly manifested from the day it was entrusted with such a noble task as preparing the Papuan people for full-fledged statehood. New Zealand should also be praised for the good work done in training another people which was placed under its tutelage.

50. Now, I put the following question to the members of the Council and to none other than the representative of South Africa, my good friend Ambassador von Hirschberg: Are the people of Namibia politically less developed than the people of Papua? Answer the question. Are they or are they not? Of course not. We all concur, and I am sure that in his heart—if not with his tongue—he concurs.

51. Why is it, then, that South Africa obdurately maintains its rule over a Territory which was peculiarly transferred to it by King George V in his capacity as Head of the Commonwealth, of which South Africa was a member. The Mandate over South West Africa was granted

by the Allied Powers to King George at Versailles, whence South Africa, by virtue of that transfer, became the administering Power. The terms of the Mandate stipulated that it was incumbent upon South Africa to train the people of South West Africa to attain independence.

52. Over half a century has passed during which all the mandated Territories created by the Allied Powers have been liberated. Colonies were liberated, not to mention mandated Territories. And they were classified A, B, C, D—I do not know whether there was a D. They were all liberated. What about Kenya? Tanganyika at one time belonged to the Germans. Look at it sitting there with us like a lion. Why should South Africa still shilly-shally in carrying out the terms of the Mandate entrusted to it? In other words, we would like to ask why South Africa has not yet fulfilled its responsibility in preparing the people of Namibia for independence? Is it that South Africa lacks the know-how? Let them tell us; then we will find someone who will know how to prepare the people of that Territory for independence.

53. Or is it that South Africa has no intention of liberating the Namibians? For heaven's sake, whom is the South African Government fooling? Not us; nor, I believe, itself. Then why, why, why, and a hundred times why does the South African Government not come out and tell us that it wants to maintain its control over Namibia for economic and perhaps strategic reasons? And why do not those States which clandestinely, if not overtly—and sometimes overtly—support South Africa avow to us in turn that they feel that it is in their own interests to maintain the *status quo*? Let us be frank with one another.

54. If the reason for maintaining South African rule over Namibia is economic, let South Africa come and tell us so. We can perhaps safeguard its economic interests. It is very well known that many of the erstwhile metropolitan Powers—or colonial Powers—call them what you will—after the colonies were liberated benefited from the liberation of those colonies. There was no more strife between the people of the erstwhile colonies and the people of the metropolitan Powers.

55. If the reason is strategic, remedies could also be found. I hear from a reliable colleague that it seems there are no natural barriers between South Africa and Namibia. Many neighbouring countries have no natural barriers; they do not have the Alps or the Pamirs, or whatever geographical hurdles, if we may call them that, to separate them from one another. And they work out treaties for the preservation of the rights of States.

56. Somebody told me that South Africa is afraid of guerrillas from Namibia. Well, guerrillas will make it difficult for South Africa if the Namibian people are not given independence; but once the Namibians are given independence why should there be guerrillas? There would be no reason for them. You see how easy it is to find excuses when a country is on the side of the aggressor.

57. I should be indeed frank and tell the Council that the manner in which it has been handling this question is becoming ludicrous—to put it mildly. Let us not go to the

very genesis. It is said that Baroody always takes us through the annals of history. Today I shall not do so, although I have been seized of this question in the United Nations actively for the last 15 years or so. It was in 1965 that I had a project which it was my privilege to present to my African brothers, and I negotiated privately with Mr. Müller, the Foreign Minister of South Africa. I do not know whether at one time South Africa toyed with the idea of appointing co-administrators from neutral countries to accelerate the independence of South West Africa, now called Namibia. But then what happened? I will let you know in time.

58. But let me resume. First, some major Powers concurred in cutting off the umbilical cord that tied Namibia to the United Nations and which could have put Namibia under the Trusteeship Council until the Namibians attained independence. That was a mistake. But never mind—it belongs to the past.

59. Secondly, the self-same Powers encouraged the creation of what came to be known as the Council for Namibia, as if by creating a glorified committee—and that is what the Council is—outside Namibia, presto! the Namibian people would be liberated. Time and again I have to recall what Clémenceau once said at Versailles: “If you want to kill any item, create a committee and refer that item to the committee”. There it lies buried. But who encouraged the creation of that Council? None other than our erstwhile colleague Ambassador Goldberg. Of course, he did not do it out of his head; he must have received instructions from those who formulate policy. Give those Africans a Council. And my good African friends got drunk with the word “Council”! Security Council, Trusteeship Council. And the Council for Namibia? Did you know, you Namibians sitting there, that you fell for it? What has the Council done so far in concrete terms? Oh, somebody will say that I should spare the feelings of our African brothers. But why should I? If I have been taken in, I should be told that I have been taken in, so that I may mend my ways.

60. Thirdly, those self-same Powers that have interests in South Africa spoke of sanctions and boycotts. These have so far proved to be of academic value. They also proved to be of academic value in Southern Rhodesia. You know, they get better prices for the tobacco when they age it. I don't smoke, but I am told so on good authority. So if the Southern Rhodesians cannot sell the tobacco now, they will sell it next year at better prices. What a sham and what a shame!

61. Fourthly, the Security Council appointed a High Commissioner. I tried to look to see how high he was. I found he was like me, an ordinary person, and a Commissioner without a commission. He was neither high, the poor man, nor did he have a commission. He was there just in order to beguile the Africans. A High Commissioner. We had High Commissioners in the Mandates of the Middle East. I never respected them. I always rebelled against them, until finally they came down. But the poor man is our High Commissioner; he is one of us, not from somewhere else. He is one of our colleagues. And what was the High Commissioner supposed to do? To preside over the implementation of decisions which remain, unfortunately, ink on paper.

62. Fifthly, the Security Council delegated our illustrious Secretary-General to visit Mr. Vorster, who promised nothing palpable. I read the report—“nothing palpable”, nothing you could touch. Put vaseline on a fish and try to hold that fish. I do now know where he imported the vaseline from. Maybe the United Kingdom. I am sure not from France or from the Federal Republic of Germany. He seems to be German—“Vorster”. But our Secretary-General could make no headway with him, except to tell us in his report what Mr. Vorster did and what he told him and what pious hopes could, perhaps, he hoped, be instilled in our African brothers.

63. Sixthly, reams of documents have been printed and distributed. I can assure you, there will not be much paper left. There is not only an energy crunch but also a shortage of paper. I am not being sarcastic. This is a fact, though it sounds sarcastic. These procedures—because there is not only one procedure—have made a mockery of us all, have made a mockery of the Council and of the United Nations.

64. And then we come to the super-Powers, or major Powers—call them what you will. I tried at one time several years ago to find out whether the super-Powers could do something about the situation. After all, they are members of the Security Council and peace is entrusted to them, and war also is their responsibility. I was told—and I am not going to mention the occasion—that they were not prepared to have a confrontation on account of the Namibian people. In the light of this, my friends from Namibia, what the major Powers have been giving us is only lollipops—and lollipops are bad for your teeth. You have beautiful teeth, good teeth. Lollipops—that is what we have been given on behalf of those who should know better amongst the major Powers. I would not say the super-Powers, because, after all, in fairness to the United States and the Soviet Union, this matter was not their immediate responsibility, but the responsibility of the United Kingdom. Is South Africa still a member of the Commonwealth? I think it is. No? All right, it is not. But morally, they are responsible, for, after all, it was the late King George V who transferred the Mandate to South Africa.

65. What is the remedy? I read my notes. The reason I did not jot more notes about the remedy is that we should explore with one another ways and means for liberating the people of Namibia.

66. There are several avenues. The worst one of them I shall mention first: to ask the members of the Organization of African Unity, as of now, to draft an army for the liberation of the Namibians. But this is the worst solution. We are here to resolve our differences by peaceful means. But I mention this first because if South Africa is impervious to reason, and continues to be so, then what is the answer?

67. There are, however, other solutions. If the Government of Mr. Vorster becomes amenable to logic and good sense, and if they are afraid that they will lose economically, we can assure them that the Namibians, once they have a sovereign State, will strengthen their economic ties with South Africa; we will take steps to prevail upon them to pursue an open-door policy in trade between South Africa and Namibia.

68. If it is a question of strategy, we can work out guarantees, in the Security Council, to South Africa that it will not be exposed to any aggression from outside. If it is a question of South Africa protecting certain vested interests of white people who happen to be in Namibia, there can be reparations made if they do not want to remain in the Territory after Namibia gains its independence. There are many ways and means that can be resorted to in finding a solution.

69. In the meantime, I am thinking aloud—and I hope the Council will think aloud with me—whether or not we can, depending on a resolution of the Council, ask South Africa to accept a couple of administrators from neutral countries to accelerate the process of independence. We would not get rid of the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner would be the liaison between the co-administrators, including South Africa, and the United Nations, so that we would not have to repeat the same procedure by rote every two or three months which has so far led to nothing.

70. Let me get this straight. The Council will prevail on South Africa—through the Secretary-General, if possible, or by any other means—to accept two or three neutral co-administrators to accelerate the independence of Namibia, and the Trusteeship Council will be informed, through the High Commissioner, of the progress that will have to be achieved within a certain period of time, not to exceed three or four years. If the Australians could work miracles with Papua, it is not far-fetched that something could lead to the eventual independence of Namibia within a relatively short period of time. Let us set the target date for the achievement of independence, and if we fail, we will do our little part, and I am speaking now on behalf of my delegation.

71. We will maintain the embargo on oil and apply it 110 per cent—not 5 per cent—to the maximum, to South Africa. I will see to it as the representative of a country that has witnessed what colonial Powers can do, to encourage the maintenance of an embargo until doomsday if the South Africans are not amenable to reason.

72. You know what I was told by certain people—I do not want to mention where they came from, but we all know anyway—that “If you Arabs persist in maintaining that embargo, we shall occupy your territory by force”. They do not know that dynamite surrounds many of our airfields. And by Jove, we have existed for 6,000 years without oil. Our oil is only 50 years old. “Drink it”, we were told; “Drink your oil”. I said, “No, we will feed it to you yet when you procreate like rabbits and you have no proteins”. Protein can be produced from oil; one does not have to drink it.

73. We should be as one in the Security Council. I say this in a friendly manner and without any hostility, although my voice may be high on this question because this is my style of speaking. We should ask this gentleman whom I have known for many years to be our ambassador again, not just the ambassador of his own Government, while our ambassadors convey to his Government that it had better mend its ways lest, indeed, we find ourselves inadvertently engulfed in an African conflict which may become a racial conflict, something which we should avoid.

74. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the current month, my delegation would like to join previous speakers in offering its sincere congratulations and good wishes to you. We should like to add to this the pledge of our full co-operation in the fulfilment of your most important task. Your great seniority and experience in the direction of the foreign affairs of your country, China, a country to which Austria feels bound by close and friendly relations, will no doubt assist you in guiding us successfully through the Council's deliberations during this month.

75. May I also take this opportunity of thanking you, Mr. President, members of the Council and my respected friend—may I say my respected fatherly friend—Ambassador Baroody, for their kind and generous words on my behalf.

76. As this is the first time that my country as a member of the Security Council is taking part in a debate on the question of Namibia, may I be permitted to outline briefly the position of principle of my Government on this issue.

77. The attitude of the Austrian Government was expressed unequivocally by Austria's positive vote on General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) by which the United Nations terminated South Africa's mandate and declared that it had no right to administer the Territory.

78. Austria has no diplomatic, consular or trade representation in Namibia.

79. Austria welcomed the decision of the Security Council, as reflected in its resolution 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, requesting an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the “legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)”.

80. The position which the Court took in its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971⁴ flows with impeccable logic from earlier decisions of this Organization which placed Namibia under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. The highest judicial organ of the United Nations has thus confirmed the unlawfulness of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia.

81. By voting for General Assembly resolution 2871 (XXVI), which welcomed the advisory opinion, Austria fully supported the Court's opinion that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa was under an obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory.

82. It is a consequence of this position of principle that Austria has co-operated with the United Nations Council for Namibia in the past and will continue to do so. May I take this opportunity to salute the talented and distin-

⁴ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

guished leadership that Ambassador Paul Lusaka of Zambia has offered to the Council for Namibia as its President. Austria very recently supported the proposal that the United Nations Council for Namibia should be invited to participate in the Conference on the Law of the Sea to protect future interests of Namibia.

83. Austria has further accepted the travel and identity documents issued by the Council for Namibia as valid travel documents within the sphere of Austrian jurisdiction as another token of our spirit of co-operation.

84. The special attention that questions concerning Namibia receive in Austria is further underscored by the fact that the Federation of Austrian Trade Unions was the first non-governmental organization to contribute to the United Nations Fund for Namibia.

85. Turning now to recent developments in Namibia, in particular developments after the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 323 (1972) of 6 December 1972, we find little which can be termed encouraging. Contrary to resolutions of this Council, the South African Government seems to have proceeded in its efforts to implement a "homelands" type of policy in Namibia on the basis of the so-called Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Amendment Act. The creation of a so-called advisory council in March 1973 represents a further step which can hardly be seen as implementing the will of the people of Namibia and relevant decisions of the United Nations.

86. We have noted with great distress repeated reports of police and military violence in Namibia, suppressing the peaceful activities of political forces within the country. The moving letter of the women of Namibia, which the President of the Council for Namibia read out to this Council at the preceding meeting, is a testimony of the plight of the Namibian people.

87. Let me now turn to the mandate entrusted by this Council to the Secretary-General in consultation and close co-operation with a group of three Council members, to which our special thanks and regards are due, to initiate as soon as possible contacts with all parties concerned as provided for in Security Council resolution 309 (1972). The Council today has to consider the third report presented by the Secretary-General in this context.

88. The report before us again shows the measure of the efforts of the Secretary-General, and my delegation would like to join others in paying a tribute to the painstaking and conscientious manner in which he has implemented his mandate.

89. Although Austria at the time of the adoption of resolution 309 (1972), was not a member of this Council, my country would have had little difficulty in supporting the initiative taken by members of the Council, in view of the complete deadlock existing over Namibia, an initiative taken furthermore during its historic meeting in Addis Ababa. It was this initiative which led to the various efforts on the part of the Secretary-General to secure co-operation from the Government of South Africa in the implementa-

tion of United Nations policy towards Namibia. We felt that the approach adopted by the Council pointed in the right direction, namely, to secure, without abandoning the principles of United Nations policy on Namibia and while insisting on the need for the immediate transit of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, the co-operation of the Government which bears the responsibility for the non-implementation of United Nations decisions by all the peaceful means to which the Charter points.

90. In examining the latest report of the Secretary-General, my delegation shares many of the views expressed around this table. Those views could hardly be better expressed than by the words of the Secretary-General himself, when he states in his report:

"... the position of the Government of South Africa is still far from coinciding with that established in the resolutions of the United Nations concerning Namibia." [S/10921 and Corr.1, para. 18.]

91. The Secretary-General rightly points out in the same paragraph that South Africa's position on some of the basic questions which arose during earlier contacts with the Government of South Africa have been made clearer. In this context I quote from paragraph 14 of the report, which contains information to the effect that the South African Government recognizes that South West Africa has a separate international status and that "it does not claim any part of South West Africa".

92. While this statement seems to hold out some encouragement, it is severely tempered by the lack of any reference to the independence of Namibia, even after the long period of time the Government of South Africa seems to need to ascertain the wishes of the people of Namibia. This is evident from the last paragraph of the information given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the Secretary-General in Geneva, contained in the Secretary-General's report, which reads as follows:

"On the basis of present developments, the Government of South Africa anticipates that it might not take longer than 10 years for the population of South West Africa to reach the stage where it will be ready to exercise its right to self-determination." [ibid., para. 14.]

93. It seems difficult by any standards to accept delays of such length which are in total contradiction with the repeated calls of the United Nations, of a general and a specific nature, to grant self-determination and independence immediately to all colonial countries and peoples. If the slightest uncertainty about the will of the people of Namibia still exists, the speedy organization of a referendum under United Nations auspices could dispel any such doubts.

94. In looking to the future, which is the task of this Council, the overriding consideration guiding our efforts must be the well-being of the Namibian people as a whole. No less an authority than the International Court of Justice has affirmed this duty of our Organization in paragraphs 121, 125 and 127 of its advisory opinion.

95. My Government, therefore, will support any initiative that can bring about by peaceful means the withdrawal of the South African authorities from the Territory of Namibia.

96. It is in this spirit and with this understanding that we find ourselves in broad agreement with the terms of the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Peru [*S/11152/Rev.1*]. We should like to thank the delegation of Peru for its painstaking work in preparing this draft resolution.

97. We regret the circumstances that have led to the present situation, circumstances which are the motivation for the proposals contained in the aforementioned draft resolution. However, many speakers in the present debate, and foremost of them all our Secretary-General, have highlighted these developments and stressed how much the response of the Government of South Africa has fallen short of the expectations of the Security Council.

98. Furthermore, in considering a question of the deepest interest to the peoples of Africa, we feel that we also have to respect the considered opinion of the highest and most representative instances of these very African peoples and nations. I refer to the decisions adopted by the Tenth Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa in May 1973.

99. The draft resolution before us, therefore, reflects an element of disappointment, combined with an attempt, however, to bring movement into an extremely difficult situation. Although this attempt has failed, we should not lose sight of the fact that it was an initiative which had to be taken in order to demonstrate the willingness of the international community to explore all possibilities to attain a peaceful solution. Although this process did not yield the results that have been expected, it did add to a further clarification of the question and of various aspects of the problem. This in itself is no mean result.

100. At the same time, we have to ask ourselves what can be done, realistically and constructively, to bring about the attainment of those goals which the United Nations has set for Namibia and which the International Court of Justice has confirmed.

101. Consequently, my delegation will interpret the draft resolution as keeping the way open for the initiation of a new, more positive phase in the efforts of the United Nations to realize the objectives which have been established for the future of Namibia. My delegation hopes that further developments will enable the Security Council, in the foreseeable future, to deal with the question again on a more positive note. My delegation is convinced that the efforts of all the organs of the United Nations will contribute towards this goal and prepare the ground for it.

102. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): As I begin, Mr. President, I should like to assure you of the fullest co-operation of my delegation in the conduct of your important duties as President of the Security Council for the month of December. We appreciate that a man of your experience is at our head this month and we

appreciate the impartial dignity with which you are presiding over these proceedings.

103. At the same time, I should like to express a word of appreciation to Ambassador Jankowitsch of Austria for the very energetic and constructive way in which he carried out his duties as President of the Council last month.

104. Given recent events, it is entirely fitting and, in fact, necessary that the Council should review again the unique role of the United Nations with regard to Namibia, and that we should examine the situation in that Territory. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Secretary-General for his conscientious efforts in carrying out his mandate under the terms of Security Council resolutions 309 (1972), 319 (1972) and 323 (1972), and I would like to express our appreciation for the detailed report of 30 April on his contacts with the representatives of the Government of South Africa. With hindsight, perhaps it would have been more useful had the Council met sooner to consider the conclusions reached by the Secretary-General in his report.

105. It has been nearly two years now since the Council first invited the Secretary-General to initiate contacts to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination. The situation in Namibia today appears on the surface much as it was when resolution 309 (1972) was adopted. It has been said, accordingly, that the contacts between the Secretary-General and the South African Government have not been successful in meeting the objectives set by the Council.

106. Rather than simply accepting this assertion, however, let us examine what has taken place. Through the Secretary-General's consultations, United Nations officials visited Namibia, examined conditions at firsthand, and met the Namibian people. These visits were a concrete illustration to the people of the Territory and to the world of the United Nations concern and responsibility for Namibia.

107. We should not, in my delegation's view, undervalue the Secretary-General's achievement in obtaining South Africa's assurances on Namibia. Foreign Minister Müller stated that South Africa would respect the wishes of the whole population of Namibia and would allow all political parties "full and free participation in the process leading to self-determination and independence" [*see S/10921 and Corr.1, para. 13*]. The Foreign Minister added that South Africa had no intention of delaying self-determination and would co-operate with the Secretary-General to determine measures to achieve this goal. The South African Government also asserted that it did not foresee the sudden independence of individual population groups. On balance—and my delegation believes that history will support this view—we believe that the Secretary-General's efforts have been beneficial to United Nations involvement in the Namibian question.

108. We have followed recent events in Namibia, however, with deepening concern. We believe that the South African Government could have avoided, and still can avoid, such developments which call into question its good faith. We have in mind, in particular, that Government's persistence

in implementing its so-called "homelands" policy in evident contradiction to previous assurances given to the Secretary-General. The numerous arrests, the arbitrary suppression of political activity, and the public floggings of dissidents conflict sharply with the tenor of South Africa's statements to the Secretary-General.

109. The reaction of my own Government to South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia in fact predates these moves. Since May 1970, we have followed a policy of discouraging further American investment there and we have advised potential investors that we will not intercede as a Government to protect their investments against claims of a future legitimate Government in that Territory.

110. As members of the Council will recall, it was on 29 July 1970 that the Security Council in its resolution 284 (1970) requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following question:

"What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?"

111. The United States participated in both the written and the oral phases of the argument of the case. The United States position was that the United Nations had succeeded to the supervisory powers of the League of Nations over the Mandate granted South Africa to administer Namibia, and that, therefore, the General Assembly had terminated with validity that Mandate by its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966. The United Nations had assumed direct responsibility for the Territory and South Africa was under an obligation to withdraw its administration. Until it did so, however, its responsibilities to the people of Namibia continued. On 21 June 1971, the Court handed down its advisory opinion, the conclusions of which were consonant with the United States position.

112. The United States regrets that South Africa has not abided by the spirit of its discussions with the Secretary-General. Yet, we are reluctant to eliminate the possibility of future talks. As we are all aware, a number of seemingly intractable international conflicts and problems have been solved during the past several years by patient, dogged negotiations. Are the people of Namibia not deserving of similar efforts? The United States continues to believe that such discussions are also the most realistic way of gaining self-determination for the people of Namibia. A number of questions concerning South Africa's plans for Namibia require more specific replies. What time-table does South Africa propose for Namibia's self-government? What steps is South Africa willing to take now—now—to improve political and social conditions in the Territory? The Secretary-General, in our view, should be free to seek answers, and to look into the welfare of Namibians reportedly arrested for speaking to visiting United Nations officials.

113. We should not delude ourselves that progress towards Namibian self-determination will be quick. As the Secretary-General has cautioned, time and protracted discussion will be required. None the less, we believe contacts between the Secretary-General and South Africa are valuable in

illuminating South African policies and actions. It is negotiation on Namibia, as on other differences, that holds the promise of ultimate success.

114. No matter what one may think of the sincerity of the South African Government, responses already given to the Secretary-General by Foreign Minister Müller represented important departures from previous South African policy. They signal openings which are admittedly narrow but which we believe are worth further exploration.

115. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I should like now to make a statement on the question of Namibia as the representative of CHINA.

116. The Chinese delegation has studied the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 323 (1972) [*S/10921 and Corr.1*] and has listened attentively to the speeches of many representatives. As is known to all, the Chinese delegation has serious reservations and is not in favour of initiating a "dialogue" between the Secretary-General and the South African authorities. In our opinion, to conduct a "dialogue" with the South African colonialist authorities before there is any indication on their part that they will accept the United Nations resolutions on Namibia would be of no help to the Namibian people's struggle for national independence, but would only be utilized by the South African colonialist authorities to create confusion, deceive the masses and actively pursue the criminal policy of "Bantustans", in the name of "dialogue", so as to legalize their unlawful existence in Namibia. For these reasons, the Chinese delegation did not participate in the voting on Security Council resolution 309 (1972) or on Security Council resolutions 319 (1972) and 323 (1972), which called for a prolongation of the dialogue.

117. The development over the past two years has turned out as China and many African countries had expected. Far from producing any positive results, the "dialogue" has been used by the South African colonialist authorities to step up the pursuance of their reactionary policy of splitting the territorial integrity and national unity of the people of Namibia, serving to hoodwink public opinion and cover up the true state of affairs. For instance, in disregard of the strong opposition of the people of Namibia, the South African colonialist authorities set up last March a so-called "advisory council", appointed by the South African racist régime. Last May, under the signboard of so-called "self-determination", the South African colonialists and racists concocted a "Bantustan" in Ovamboland and Kavangoland, a farce of sham self-government. On 19 February last, South African Prime Minister Vorster announced in the South African House of Assembly:

"It was the choice of the peoples of the Territories in South West Africa to decide for themselves whether or not they should enter into a federation, a confederation or whether each of the peoples should stand on their own."

This has pointedly revealed South Africa's intention of creating more "Bantustans" under its control through the so-called "self-determination" so as to achieve its criminal purpose of divide and rule in Namibia.

118. While actively pushing that reactionary policy, the South African colonialist authorities said in the dialogue:

“On the basis of present developments, the Government of South Africa anticipates that it might not take longer than 10 years for the population of South West Africa to reach the stage where it will be ready to exercise its right to self-determination.” [ibid., para. 14.]

119. In the first place, the mention of the so-called “exercise of self-determination within 10 years” constitutes in itself not only a conspiracy and fraud to prolong the colonialist rule but also a gross insult to the people of Namibia and the entire African people. What deserves particular notice is that such an assertion represents in itself a brazen negation of the United Nations resolutions on Namibia. If the conspiracy of the so-called “self-determination within 10 years” under the auspices of the South African authorities were to be accepted, would it not mean a nullification of all the just United Nations resolutions on Namibia through the instrumentality of the United Nations and thus a legalization of the South African colonialist authorities’ illegal occupation of Namibia?

120. In addition to all this, the South African colonialist and racist authorities have issued a great variety of Fascist decrees, which have completely deprived the indigenous people of their basic rights and human freedoms. Moreover, they have steadily reinforced their troops and military installations in Namibia and set up a so-called “police force” of the black people in pursuance of their vicious policy of “using Africans to fight Africans”, to suppress the national liberation struggle of the Namibian people.

121. Where there is repression, there is bound to be resistance. On the one hand, the South African authorities are utilizing “dialogue” for the intensified pursuance of their reactionary policies; and on the other hand, the Namibian people are daily stepping up their opposition and resistance to the reactionary policies of the South African authorities. Last March the Namibian people launched a mass campaign to boycott the so-called “advisory council” in Katutura, during which they set fire to the municipal buildings serving colonialism. Last August, when a phoney election was being conducted by the South African authorities in Ovamboland, the people there, who have a tradition of struggle, in defiance of the ban imposed by the South African colonialist authorities, held a mass rally on the eve of the election to expose the fraud of the South African authorities and call on the Ovamboland people to boycott the election. As a result of the firm resistance of the Ovamboland people, the “election” farce stage-managed by the South African colonialists and racist authorities ended in ignominious failure.

122. The Namibian people and the broad masses of the African countries and peoples have already seen through the sinister motives of the South African authorities to use the “dialogue” to serve their insidious purposes. The Tenth Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity held last May came to the correct conclusion that the United Nations contacts with the South African racist authorities were detrimental to the interests of the Namibian people and prejudicial to an early attainment of

independence by this Territory. It therefore asked the Security Council to terminate such contacts. Not long ago, the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Special Committee on decolonization, as well as the Fourth Committee, reached the same conclusion and adopted resolutions to that effect. The Chinese delegation fully agrees with and supports this conclusion and maintains that the Security Council should respect the just demand of the Namibian people and the resolutions adopted by OAU, the General Assembly and its related committees by terminating the “dialogue” forthwith and harbouring no more illusions about it.

123. In the opinion of the Chinese delegation, the correct way of solving the Namibian question is as follows: the correct position previously adopted by the United Nations on the Namibian question must be adhered to, namely, the South African colonialist authorities must immediately end their illegal occupation of Namibia, withdraw their military and police forces, as well as their administration, from Namibia and let the United Nations Council for Namibia take over so that Namibia can achieve its independence at an early date. The heroic Namibian people are fighting for this lofty goal, and all justice-upholding countries and people throughout the world are duty-bound to give firm support to this just struggle.

124. At the same time, we are pleased to note that the militant unity between the African and Arab peoples has grown ever stronger. The Arab Summit Conference held recently in Algiers proposed to sever all relations with South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal and effect an oil embargo against them in support of the fighting African peoples, including the Namibian people. The implementation of this decision will certainly deal a telling blow at the South African colonialist authorities.

125. A just cause enjoys abundant support. We believe that the people of other countries will also continue to give support and assistance to the Namibian people by various means. The Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly stand on the side of the Namibian people and give them all support and assistance within our capability until they win final victory.

126. The Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Peru. But it should be pointed out that operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution can in no circumstances be interpreted as making it possible to resume the dialogue between the Secretary-General and the South African authorities before the adoption of a new resolution by the Security Council.

127. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I wish to say that the list of speakers has been exhausted, and if there are no further representatives wishing to address the Council at this stage I shall consider that the Council is now ready to turn to the consideration of the draft resolution contained in document S/11152/Rev.1. There being no further speakers and as no one has asked to speak in explanation of vote before the vote, we will now proceed to vote on the draft resolution submitted by Peru.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia.

*The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.*⁵

128. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call now on the representative of France, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote after the vote.

129. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, as this is the first occasion for the French delegation to speak this month of December we would not wish to miss this opportunity to extend our congratulations to you on your taking office as President and to assure you of our desire to co-operate with you to the fullest extent in the work that you are conducting.

130. I also wish to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Jankowitsch, the heartfelt thanks of the French delegation for the good-humoured and highly efficient authority which he displayed last month.

131. The affirmative vote of the French delegation on the draft resolution in document S/11152/Rev.1 is of dual significance. It reflects, first of all, the disappointment that we felt last April when we received the report of the Secretary-General on the mission that had been entrusted to him pursuant to resolution 309 (1972) and reaffirmed in resolutions 319 (1972) and 323 (1972), which he fulfilled with a sense of dedication to which we wish here to pay particular tribute. We had hoped, when the Council met just about a year ago in order once again to consider the question of Namibia, that the South African Government—which had announced some decisions and promised some reforms—would commit itself to a policy that would enable the Namibian people to exercise their right to self-determination. We had some doubts which, unfortunately, turned out to be well founded.

132. Indeed, we are bound to note today that South Africa has not responded to the expectations of the Council.

133. Of course, the contacts which the Secretary-General has had with the authorities of Pretoria have not been entirely useless. They have made it possible to obtain or to catch a glimpse of some concessions, which, to be sure, are minor but which nevertheless are the first which the South African Government has been willing to grant in this matter. A certain interest by the United Nations in Namibia has been conceded.

134. However, we very much regret that the Government of South Africa has not supplied the Council with the "complete and unequivocal" clarifications which the Council wished to obtain concerning the right to self-determination and independence of the Territory. The

conditions under which this right would be exercised, the scope and extent of the consultations referred to by the South African declaration which is included in the report of the Secretary-General have not been spelled out. We also deplore the pursuit of the policy of the so-called 'separate homelands', which accentuates tribal antagonisms whereas it would be more appropriate to attempt to reconcile them. We note, moreover, that the intentions displayed by South Africa in regard to public freedoms in the course of the talks which took place in Geneva, which appeared to us to be much too restrictive even at that time, are far from being translated into fact. That being the case, the French delegation has subscribed to a resolution which, in principle, corresponds to the wish of the majority.

135. However, our vote is also the expression of the hopes which, in spite of so much disappointment, we would not wish to renounce. The course chosen at Addis Ababa, which we do not regret having supported, the action of the United Nations being based upon the pursuit of ways of making it possible to arrive at a peaceful settlement of disputes, has not yielded the expected results. It is now for the Government of South Africa to adopt the positive measures which, by providing an opportunity to the Secretary-General to submit another report to the Security Council, would make it possible to bring the Namibian question out of its present impasse. That is our interpretation of paragraph 3 of the resolution that has just been adopted.

136. We venture to hope that the Government of South Africa will understand that contacts could be fruitful only to the extent that it would not limit itself to affirming piously its intention of making it possible for the population of South West Africa to exercise its right to self-determination and independence, and would take the necessary action which would prove unambiguously its will to renounce the oppressive policy condemned unanimously by the international community and to apply the principles contained in the Charter.

137. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Kenya to explain his vote after the vote.

138. Mr. FAKIH (Kenya): I have not asked to speak to explain my vote as such, but to inform the Council that a second draft resolution has been prepared. It is now being circulated and we hope that as soon as the necessary consultations have been concluded with the members of the Council it will be formally introduced.

139. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

140. Mr. LUSAKA (President, United Nations Council for Namibia): It is not my wish to hold back the Council after it has concluded the first part of the item under discussion.

141. Perhaps it would be unfair to the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia to accept certain reservations and interpretations of the resolution that has

⁵ See resolution 342 (1973).

just been adopted. The unanimous decision of the Security Council, in the view of the United Nations Council for Namibia, is found in paragraph 2, which calls for the discontinuation of the dialogue. Our interpretation of paragraph 3 is that what is meant by "important developments concerning the question of Namibia" are events like strikes in the country—that is, Namibia—torture by the racist régime of Prétoria in Namibia, or even requests by SWAPO as and if it deems it necessary to ask the Secretary-General to draw the attention of the Security

Council to any basic action against the Namibian people in the Territory.

142. As you yourself, Mr. President, have pointed out, our interpretation of paragraph 3 does not include any further contacts with the South African régime by the Secretary-General, even after the consideration of the second draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.