

UNITED NATIONS



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-EIGHTH YEAR

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OCT 8 - 1973

# 1752<sup>nd</sup>

MEETING: 27 OCTOBER 1973

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NEW YORK

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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1752) .....	1
Adoption of the agenda .....	1
The situation in the Middle East:	
(a) Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010);	
(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev.1) .....	1

## NOTE

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## SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND MEETING

Held in New York on Saturday, 27 October 1973, at 10.30 a.m.

*President:* Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1752)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:
  - (a) Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010),
  - (b) Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev.1).

*The meeting was called to order at 7.45 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev.1)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 1743rd meeting, I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Egypt, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to take their places at the Council table in order to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. E. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) and Mr. H. Kelani (Syrian Arab Republic) took places at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with further decisions taken at previous meetings, I propose also, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Zambia to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. I shall ask them to take the places

reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be called upon to be seated at the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. D. Blankson (Nigeria), Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) and Mr. P. J. F. Lusaka (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

3. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the item on its agenda, which, it will be noted, includes as sub-item (b) the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) [S/11052/Rev.1].

4. I wish on behalf of the Council to express our warm appreciation to the Secretary-General and to his staff for their prompt and valuable response to paragraph 3 of resolution 340 (1973).

5. Since our last meeting, yesterday evening, members of the Security Council have held informal consultations to consider the report, which is now before the Council for consideration.

6. The Council has before it a draft resolution [S/11054] submitted by Australia, approving the report. It reads as follows:

*[The President read out the text of the draft resolution.]*

7. It is the wish of the Council that I should begin the voting procedure immediately and I now propose to do so.

8. Before putting the draft resolution to the vote, I call on the representative of China, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote before the vote.

9. Mr. CHUANG Yen (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has carefully studied the report of the Secretary-General.

10. In our statement at the Security Council meeting of 25 October [1748th meeting], the Chinese delegation already made it clear that we oppose the dispatch of the so-called United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East. We are also opposed to the sending of troops by the five permanent member States, because the aforesaid practice will only pave the way for further international intervention and control with the super-Powers as the behind-the-scenes bosses, thus leaving behind infinite evil

consequences in its wake. As we are not in favour of the dispatch of the United Nations Force to the Middle East we, of course, cannot pay the expenses for that United Nations Emergency Force.

11. With regard to the Secretary-General's report on the question, the Chinese delegation will not participate in the voting on it.

12. The PRESIDENT: I shall now proceed to put the draft resolution in document S/11054 to the vote.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*The draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none.<sup>1</sup>*

*One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

13. The PRESIDENT: I shall now invite those members of the Council who wish to do so to speak in explanation of their vote after the vote. I appeal to them to do so as briefly as possible, and until they have finished I shall not entertain requests to be allowed to speak from representatives who are not members of the Council.

14. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): The report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Council with regard to the implementation of resolution 340 (1973) [S/11052/Rev.1] meets with the approval of my delegation, which has just voted accordingly. It seems to us to be specific and objective, and we are very grateful to the Secretary-General.

15. However, I should like to make some brief remarks with regard to four points which, in the opinion of my delegation, are essential.

16. First of all, concerning the competence of the Council, I should like to emphasize the position of my Government with regard to the exclusive competence of the Security Council in the matter of peace keeping and the maintenance of international security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter. We have always, in this respect, considered that the competence of the Council should not be limited simply to the establishment of an international Force, but that the Council should also have control over all operations that might be ordered by it. It is for the Council, in particular, to define the Force's terms of reference, its duration, its size and its composition. The Security Council must also appoint the commander, decide on the basic directives to be given to that commander, propose the method of financing, and, finally, ensure constant control over the application of its directives. Doubtless, the Security Council is not in a position to direct such a Force on a continuing basis. Hence it is possible to envisage, in application of Article 29 of the Charter, the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Council whose purpose would be to lessen the Council's work without prejudice, of course, to the primary responsibilities conferred upon the Council by the Charter. This committee would be in constant contact with the Secretary-General. It could, for example, propose to the

Council the name of a commander and draft basic directives.

17. My second point refers to the Force's mandate. It should, in our view, have as its terms of reference the supervision of the implementation of the cease fire during the so-called preliminary stage of the cease fire. The Force would be stationed on both sides of the cease-fire lines corresponding to the positions occupied by the belligerents at 1650 hours on 22 October, after having obtained the formal assent of the countries concerned. It should be perfectly clear that the Force in question is not to be confused with the Peace-keeping Force, the buffer force, and, possibly, the new groups of observers that would have to be set up by the Council for the later phases of the implementation of resolutions 338 (1973) and 242 (1967).

18. My third point refers to the composition of the Force. For the Emergency Force to be able to play its proper role in accordance with the directives of the Security Council, without giving rise to constant controversy which would impair its effectiveness, it is essential that its composition should be such as to give the best possible assurance of its objectivity towards the parties to the conflict. To this end the Security Council should without doubt take into account, at least so far as possible, the principle of equitable geographical representation and the wishes of the parties on whose territory the cease-fire lines are established.

19. My fourth and last point refers to financing. We have no objection to the financing of this Emergency Force in accordance with the normal scale of assessments of the Organization and to having the expenses attributed as part of the regular United Nations budget. However, since the countries of the third world have often expressed their desire to limit their contributions to the financing of peace-keeping operations in general, we would be prepared to accept the principle of complete exemption of the least advanced developing countries, their share being taken up by the other countries.

20. Mrs. Jeanne Martin CISSE (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation, which has carefully studied the report in document S/11052/Rev.1, wishes first of all to address to the Secretary-General and his assistants our warm gratitude for the promptness with which the Secretary-General has responded to the Security Council's request addressed to him in paragraph 3 of resolution 340 (1973).

21. Objective provisions taking duly into account the heavy responsibility incumbent on the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, are clearly defined therein. On their execution will depend in large measure whether there will be peace in the Middle East.

22. In the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), the terms of reference [see S/11052/Rev.1, para. 2] of the Emergency Force provide, in subparagraph (a), that

"The Force will supervise the implementation of paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973), which reads as follows:

<sup>1</sup> See resolution 341 (1973).

"1. *Demands* that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973".

23. At this stage of the terrible conflict which continues to plunge the Middle East into mourning, my delegation regrets that, taking advantage of the cease-fire called for by resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), Israel has continued to take over still further territories of Egypt by force. Those new escalations have met with the disapproval of the entire international community.

24. The addition made to subparagraph (b) of the terms of reference sets my delegation's mind at rest, although we remain deeply concerned about the fate of the Egyptian troops that are isolated on the East Bank of the Suez Canal. We hope that Israel will not create any obstacles in the path of the International Red Cross in carrying out its humanitarian task.

25. In the report it is emphasized that "The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation" [*ibid.*, para. 4]. I would like to point out that the reference to "consultation with . . . the parties concerned" will not create any difficulties for the Force, which will be called upon to operate on Egyptian territory, and that, consequently, this provision will not give rise to any opposition on the part of Israel.

26. My delegation is concerned also about paragraph 4 (e) of the report, which reads, *inter alia*:

"In performing its functions, the Force will act with complete impartiality and will avoid actions which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned . . ." [*ibid.*]

27. Every member of the Council is aware of the expansionist intentions of Israel, which persists in grabbing Arab territories by force. It is therefore clear to my delegation that the acceptable interpretation remains the strict safeguarding of the territorial sovereignty of Egypt. The Security Council must be very specific about the interpretation of texts, so as to avoid relapsing into the disputes which made the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) difficult, if not impossible.

28. In voting in favour of the draft resolution in document S/11054 and in accepting the Secretary-General's report, my delegation remains convinced that the strict implementation of the provisions of the report can give rise to no ambiguity, given the urgency of the situation.

29. We note with satisfaction the proposal just made by the representative of France; I am sure that the members of the Council, particularly the permanent members, will take due account of his observations.

30. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): In expressing our satisfaction at the Council's action today in approving, in a spirit of co-operation, the Secretary-General's report on the

implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), my delegation is guided by the following overriding considerations.

31. First, the United Nations Emergency Force is what its name says it is, an emergency force. This is an emergency operation, because of the most urgent need to ensure the cease-fire and the implementation of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), namely, the return of the forces of the parties to the positions they held 12 hours after the adoption of resolution 338 (1973). And here, in commending the attitude of co-operation of Egypt and in drawing the Council's attention to an important matter of principle, I should like to quote Mr. Abdel Meguid, who said on 25 October:

"At this stage I should like to state on behalf of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt that we accept this resolution in the hope that it will be able to make an effective contribution to bringing into force the decisions already taken by the Security Council. I should also like to inform you of the decision taken by Egypt, in the context of its territorial sovereignty, to grant the Emergency Force set up in this resolution [340 (1973)] all the assistance and co-operation necessary in order to enable it to discharge the tasks flowing from its responsibility to put into effect the two resolutions previously adopted by the Council." [1750th meeting, para. 122.]

32. Second, 14 members of this Council having unanimously voted for resolution 340 (1973)—one member did not participate in the vote—setting up, under the Council's authority, the United Nations Emergency Force, the Council and its members, individually and collectively and representing the United Nations as a whole, not only agreed to the United Nations Emergency Force but also clearly assumed the responsibility for its setting up, its operation and its maintenance.

33. Third, the adoption of resolution 340 (1973) and the establishment under that resolution of the United Nations Emergency Force mean looking forward and not looking backward. Whatever reservations and positions individual members may have had of some past peace-keeping operations and the obligations arising therefrom, what we have done in resolution 340 (1973) is take a new, individual, separate action and undertaking by this Organization. We have not created an eternal United Nations force for all seasons, for all situations, for all continents. This is a specific operation, and how and when and whether the Members of our Organization are going to agree on the general principles of peace keeping and so remove a burden that has been hanging for so long over the United Nations should be considered to be a separate matter. Should the successful, collectively approved and maintained operation of the United Nations Emergency Force established under resolution 340 (1973) set a good example and, by inspiring confidence, facilitate this new experience in building, no one would be happier than we.

34. Having said all that, I should like at the outset of my comments on some of the contents of the report to state that we have no basic problem with the report. It seems to us practical, constructive and balanced and we commend

the Secretary-General and his staff on such a good, constructive and balanced report.

35. Without going into too many details—for this is now neither the time nor is there a pressing need for that—I should like to make the following observations of a more general nature.

36. First, we find the definition of UNEF's terms of reference—which is really its task, its mandate—in paragraph 2 of the report clear and ample. By quoting paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973), the report very properly reflects the Council's decision as being of absolutely central importance. That means that the cease-fire in place does not mean in the present place, but in place as at "1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973". It means, therefore, that UNEF is to secure Israel's return to those positions—and now.

37. Secondly, in the section entitled "General considerations" a very important matter is dealt with in paragraph 4 (a). While we all may have our particular ideas and preferences about the exact distribution of the authority in the chain of command, about the formulation of decisions and broad, detailed policies, they all derive from the source and keeper of the authority of UNEF, the Security Council. My delegation considers that what is set forth in that subparagraph is a reasonable arrangement, combining the unmistakable meaning of resolution 340 (1973) in establishing the Council's authority with the practical necessities of the Secretary-General's role at the executive end of the operation.

38. Thirdly, with reference to the very important and complex matter of the composition of the Force, while waiting for the Secretary-General's report on that—which he has promised to give us as soon as possible—we would merely like to recall that we, as well as many others, have stressed the absolute importance of equitable geographical—which is, of course, always political—representation of countries in the Force. There must not be any bias or any *a priori* discriminatory selectivity on any grounds whatsoever; no other conditions should be introduced except those stipulated in resolution 340 (1973).

39. Fourthly, with regard to the financing of UNEF, we agree with the Secretary-General's report that it should be based on Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. In this regard, I support the proposal just made by the representative of France.

40. I shall not conclude my statement on this occasion—which is truly historic—without making a final point. By virtue of resolution 340 (1973) we have created a new United Nations Emergency Force, which should not only keep the guns silent in the Middle East but should also make a sizable contribution towards achieving a just and long-awaited peace. With the adoption of the Secretary-General's report, this United Nations Emergency Force now clearly has its mandate and its means of functioning. By these two actions of the Security Council we have, I am sure, again vindicated the United Nations in the eyes of the peoples and the Governments of the whole world as an indispensable and effective instrument for avoiding major

confrontations, as an instrument of peace keeping and, let us hope, of peace making. This was done just in time, when many doubts had been raised, here and elsewhere, about the role and functioning of the United Nations.

41. We are now proving again that the United Nations is alive, that the United Nations is indispensable, that there is no room for a sceptical approach to the United Nations and that there is no time for despair. What we need to do is to strengthen still further the role of the United Nations and our collective political will and readiness to use the United Nations as the best instrument for solving all burning international problems and crises.

42. Mr. SEN (India): A few minutes ago we adopted the resolution on the report which was so promptly, completely and admirably presented by the Secretary-General. In doing so, we had the benefit of a very long discussion amongst ourselves in an informal, closed meeting of the Council. At that meeting many questions were asked, many clarifications sought and many explanations requested. The Secretary-General, with his usual courtesy, fulfilled all our requests and made a very interesting and thorough statement.

43. During those discussions we were highly appreciative of the co-operation extended to us not only by you, Sir, as President, but also by the delegations of the United States, the Soviet Union and, particularly, Kenya, in arriving at an agreed solution. We are grateful to all of them. I shall not take up the Council's time in discussing the questions and answers because some of them related to my own delegation. I only hope that should any question arise in the future about what the Secretary-General said or did not say we would have the benefit of that declaration—and perhaps it has also been recorded on tape.

44. Now, the fundamental question before us is that this is a job that we have, with the Council's approval and full confidence, entrusted to the Secretary-General. We trust his judgement and we should like to leave it to him to decide how best he can carry it out. We are therefore not too worried about various political, polemical and theoretical ideas on the specific problem before us. The problem is grave and our need is urgent; therefore, we should be quite happy to leave this decision to the Secretary-General. If he cannot perform his task as he sees best, we are there to help him—not to frustrate him, not to divert him, but to help him—and it is in this spirit that we have accepted his report and supported the resolution.

45. I should, however, like to make two or three comments on the substance of the report itself. Much of what I was going to say has already been covered by my friend and colleague from Yugoslavia, Ambassador Mojsov, so there is no point in repeating them at this time; but two specific points need to be emphasized.

46. First, the Force which we are sending to the area of conflict will be operating mainly on Egyptian territory. Therefore, whatever might be the practical inconvenience or difficulties or considerations, the question of Egyptian sovereignty in this respect must not be overlooked. We fully realize that in the actual, practical, day-to-day application

of this theory of sovereignty, it may have to be applied in a variety of ways. But we should like to emphasize not only this aspect of Egypt's legal sovereignty over its territory but also what the Ambassador of Egypt stated in his letter to the Secretary-General of 26 October [see S/11055]. What I have said about Egypt applies *mutatis mutandis* to Syria as well.

47. The second point I should like to emphasize is that the whole purpose of our endeavour for the last six or seven days has been: first, that there should be brought about a condition of cease-fire, which we hope will be maintained fully and effectively; secondly, that the parties must return to the positions which they occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October; and thirdly—a point which is no less important than these preliminaries—that negotiations must start as soon as possible. Without that third aspect of our problem we shall be going round and round as we have been doing for the last seven years. So I cannot on behalf of my delegation emphasize too strongly the urgent need to open the negotiations as soon as possible.

48. My third point, after those two points—highly political, if you like—may appear to be a little trite but it is important: it is finances. We in this Council do not deal with finances. That is a matter which will be taken up in the Fifth Committee and I hope that my delegation will not hesitate to give our views in that Committee at that time.

49. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): First of all the Soviet delegation would like to note the important decision adopted unanimously by the Security Council at today's informal consultative meeting. I emphasize that it was a unanimous decision, since no member of the Council objected to this unanimous view of the Council concerning such an important and urgent question.

50. I am referring to the fact that on the initiative of the Soviet delegation the Council considered, as a matter of urgency, the important proposal that in accordance with resolution 340 (1973) the Secretary-General should urgently and immediately instruct the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East to propose to Israel that it return its troops to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973.

51. During the ensuing discussion the Council noted that the authority for this action already existed, having been established in Security Council resolutions 338 (1973), 339 (1973) and 340 (1973).

52. The Soviet delegation wishes to make the following statement on the question of the report of the Secretary-General.

53. The delegation of the USSR has carefully studied the Secretary-General's report on the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East [S/11052/Rev.1]. As a result of our careful study of this document we have certain misgivings concerning some of its provisions, since they do not conform fully with the Soviet approach to the question of the establishment of the Force and the conduct of United Nations peace-keeping opera-

tions. However, the delegation of the USSR did not oppose the Council's approval of the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the question of measures for the implementation of resolution 340 (1973).

54. At the same time the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to state in this connexion that the position of principle of the Soviet Union on the question of United Nations peace-keeping operations, including the financing of such operations, has been repeatedly set forth and is well known. In connexion with the Council's approval of the Secretary-General's report we now reaffirm this position of the Soviet Union.

55. Mr. ABDULLA (Sudan): The time we have already taken in our informal discussion of the report of the Secretary-General indicates how extensively we have examined it. My delegation accepts the report in document S/11052/Rev.1 of 27 October 1973. In so doing my delegation wishes to make the following remarks.

56. It is the understanding of my delegation that the term "with the full co-operation of the parties concerned" in paragraph 3 and the phrase "of the parties concerned" in paragraph 4 (*e*) do not in any way compromise the unquestionable sovereignty of the Arab Republic of Egypt over its territory. We interpret these paragraphs within the context of the letter of the representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Secretary-General dated 26 October 1973, as well as on the basis of his statement in the Council at its 1750th meeting.

57. To leave no doubt as to our understanding of the aforementioned phrases in paragraphs 3 and 4 (*e*), I beg to read out the contents of the letter of the representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Secretary-General dated 26 October 1973.

[*The speaker read out the text of the letter contained in document S/11055.*]

58. The same applies to the paragraph which was read out by Ambassador Mojsov of Yugoslavia from the verbatim records of this Council.

59. I think the key point in this report is the implementation of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 340 (1973)—but surely as a short prelude to the implementation of resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

60. I should like now to touch on a small point raised by the French delegation as regards contributions. I wish to thank the representative of France for his suggestion for exempting the least developed countries from contributions to the budget of UNEF. My delegation appreciates the noble motives of the French delegation, but I beg to submit that contribution to peace is too noble for the willing, least developed countries to be excluded from contributing to such a noble end. I therefore appeal to the delegation of France not to press its aforementioned suggestion, and for that reason we fully agree to and support the contents of paragraph 7 of the report of the Secretary-General. That is just a provisional comment, but surely, as suggested by Ambassador Sen of India, the subject will come up in the

Fifth Committee and most probably we shall make the same comment on it.

61. Last but not least, my delegation expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and his aides for the speedy and precise manner in which they produced this report in the short time available. We are fully confident that within his mandate the Secretary-General will fulfil his duty with the same spirit of devotion and urgency with which he submitted his report.

62. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): I shall be brief. Some of the points I had in mind to mention have been expressed in a most eloquent manner by my colleagues from Yugoslavia and India.

63. My delegation voted for the resolution approving the revised report of the Secretary-General as we are generally in agreement with the provisions contained in the report. My delegation would like to express its highest appreciation to the Secretary-General and his staff, who have provided us with a valuable report in the shortest possible time.

64. My delegation would like, however, to clarify its position on certain paragraphs of the report. First, concerning paragraph 4 (c), where it is stated:

“The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation.”

Consultations “with the parties concerned” should, in our view, be interpreted as making serious efforts to persuade the parties at least not to object to the contingents selected by the Secretary-General. This is purely a question of practicality and does not of course in any way affect the question of territorial sovereignty. As far as Indonesia is concerned, the sovereignty of Egypt, Syria and Jordan over their territories occupied by Israel since the June 1967 war is beyond question. However, for the contingents to perform their task as effectively as possible it is a practical necessity that their presence should at least not be objected to by the parties.

65. That also concurs with one of the essential conditions mentioned in paragraph 3 which requires that the Force “must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned”. Full co-operation can be achieved only if the presence of the contingents is not objected to by the parties from whom full co-operation is requested.

66. In the implementation of paragraph 4 (c) we have of course to take fully into account the statement of the representative of Egypt as quoted by our colleague from the Sudan.

67. My delegation is happy with the revised text of paragraph 4 (e) because, as it emphasizes that the performing of the functions of the United Nations Emergency Force is based upon paragraph 1 of resolution 339 (1973) as well as paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973), it makes quite clear which lines are meant as the cease-fire lines in the terms of both resolutions.

68. My last remark refers to paragraph 7. It is the understanding of my delegation that paragraph 7 should not be so read as to exclude voluntary contributions. In fact, my delegation looks especially to the affluent Members of the United Nations which are in a position to do so to make voluntary contributions to the costs of the Force. In this connexion my delegation would like to look especially to the two super-Powers, which have taken the most praiseworthy initiative for resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) and therefore have certain responsibilities for the efficient performance of the Emergency Force.

69. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): The United States welcomes with great satisfaction the action of the Council in approving the Secretary-General's report. We have demonstrated that indeed this organ can act effectively to fulfil its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace.

70. But even as we rejoice in our agreement it is important to recognize the difficult task confronting the Emergency Force. Supervising cease-fire lines in an area in the wake of war will not be easy. The Force, from its inception, will require the full co-operation of the parties concerned, as the Secretary-General's report states. In addition, it must operate as an integrated military unit with efficiency and with special privilege for none.

71. We consider the language of the report carefully drawn. For instance, the statement in paragraph 4 (a) that “All matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force will be referred to the Council for its decision” assures an orderly agreed withdrawal of the Force but only when the Council so decides.

72. We are also satisfied that the phrase “bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation” is consistent with Article 101 of the Charter and assures that all the obvious and necessary criteria will be given appropriate consideration in the composition of the Force.

73. Looking to the future, we hope that the Secretary-General can move as swiftly as possible to implement the resolution we have just adopted. The United States, as I have said in a previous statement, is prepared to consider requests for assistance to this end.

74. Finally, I should like to express my personal satisfaction that my Government has helped to arrange for a meeting, on the ground, of Egyptian and Israeli military representatives under United Nations auspices, to discuss the practical application of the cease-fire. This is a significant practical result of the thorough deliberations in this chamber. I regard it as especially noteworthy that arrangements are now being made to provide non-military supplies for the Third Army area. For us, the humanitarian aspect of the United Nations effort is a critically important element in this peace-keeping mission.

75. May I again express my delegation's firm support for this constructive action by the Council. The future will record this as an historic moment in the annals of the United Nations if we can maintain the momentum generated here and move on to a peaceful, durable settlement



76. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution [S/11054], in order to help pave the way for the implementation of urgent and necessary steps to bring peace and normalcy to the Middle East. These urgent measures are contained in the Secretary-General's report [S/11052/Rev.1], to which the resolution we have just adopted gives effect.

77. We hope that the United Nations Emergency Force will effectively prevent the recurrence of fighting in the area. We hope that the presence of the Force will make it possible for humanitarian and reconstruction activities to be launched immediately in the affected area. Furthermore, we hope that the Force will ensure the return to positions occupied by the parties as at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973. Finally, we hope that, as envisaged in resolution 338 (1973), the parties concerned will start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of resolution 242 (1967), in all its parts, and further, that immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations will start between the parties concerned under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

78. My delegation would like to express its very sincere gratitude to the Secretary-General and his staff for the great and dedicated effort which they put into the preparation of this very practical and useful report which we have just approved. We thank them and would like to inform them that my delegation, like others, appreciates their dedication and the hard work they are doing in the Council's service.

79. Mr. BOYD (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Panama congratulates the Secretary-General and his assistants for their tireless endeavours in setting up this important undertaking on a sound basis.

80. The revised report which the Secretary-General has submitted [S/11052/Rev.1], earned the affirmative vote of the delegation of Panama, because it seemed to us that this was the best way in which to implement resolution 340 (1973) which established the United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East. The equitable way in which the foundations were laid for the establishment of this peace machinery warrants our having faith and hope that soon this embattled region will, through just and equitable agreements, achieve the lasting peace which we all wish for them.

81. In expressing the satisfaction of the delegation of Panama at the progress we have achieved today, through the action which has just been taken, we renew our offer to be as useful as we possibly can in the effort to achieve the noble goal of peace which we desire for that important sector of the international community.

82. The spirit of understanding that has been shown by members of the Security Council and in particular by the permanent members deserves acknowledgement. We trust that a similar attitude will be taken when the time comes to finance the Emergency Force. The peoples of the third world, who are anxiously following these developments, will appreciate the contributions of the great Powers to

these peaceful ends, far more than their gifts in the form of weapons.

83. By the way in which it has set up this peace Force, the Security Council has set in motion a new experiment which, we hope, will give fruitful results for the benefit of all mankind and the glory of the United Nations.

84. Sir Donald MAITLAND (United Kingdom): My delegation commends the Secretary-General and his staff for this report. It deals comprehensively and effectively with the immediate issues. It reflects accurately the letter and spirit of our resolutions. For these reasons my delegation voted for the resolution approving the Secretary-General's report.

85. As regards certain issues of principle raised in the discussion on this report, my delegation's views are already on record.

86. The PRESIDENT: All members of the Council wishing to explain their vote have now done so, and I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt.

87. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt): I should like to declare, on behalf of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, that upon receipt of the Secretary-General's cable on 25 October 1973, communicating to us the text of resolution 340 (1973), I sent the following reply to the Secretary-General on 26 October 1973:

*[The speaker read out the text of the letter contained in document S/11055.]*

88. I wish also to refer to my statement before the Council on 25 October 1973 [1750th meeting]. In giving its consent to the entry and presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on Egyptian territory, the Government of Egypt is exercising its sovereign rights to enable the United Nations to proceed with this first step and temporary measure towards putting an end to the aggression committed against Egypt since 1967. The Force is not there to infringe Egyptian sovereignty to any extent or in any form. On the contrary, it is on Egyptian territory with Egypt's consent to enable Egypt to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to give expression to the United Nations determination to uphold the Charter and implement its resolutions.

89. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Israel.

90. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): I have already stated in the Security Council that Israel's policy has been and continues to be guided by three principles: cease-fire, negotiation, peace. The cease-fire has become effective. Tranquillity prevails in all sectors of the front. United Nations military observers have taken up their positions. The first units of the United Nations Emergency Force have arrived in the area. Today a meeting is being held between representatives of the Israeli and Egyptian military forces. Direct contact between the parties has always proved to be the most constructive method for resolving differences and arriving at mutual understandings. Arrangements have been made

today for a convoy of non-military supplies to be sent to the beleaguered Egyptian Third Army. Tomorrow, 28 October, 30 wounded Egyptian prisoners of war will be repatriated to Egypt via Cyprus through the good offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

91. It was on Yom Kippur, precisely three weeks ago, that the armies of Egypt and Syria descended on Israel in flame and death. They were soon joined by the forces of eight other Arab States. The people of Israel, small and bled by 25 years of Arab warfare, Israel's citizen army, have proved again that those who fight for their lives, those who defend the existence of their motherland, those who bear no malice towards their neighbours, those whose cause is just, have within them the strength to withstand and repel the onslaught of hatred and destruction.

92. This is the time to change course and to work for peace, for understanding and for friendship. This is the time to abandon policies that have brought devastation to the attackers and suffering to all the peoples of the area. This is the time to join together in building a new, a different future for all the nations of the Middle East, a future of co-operation, creativity, peace and prosperity.

93. May this day, may this meeting of the Security Council, mark the end of one sad chapter and the beginning of another and brighter era.

94. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

95. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I shall confine my intervention as strictly as is humanly possible to the financial implications referred to in the last two paragraphs of the report of the Secretary-General, under the heading "Estimated cost and method of financing". We note that the estimated cost for a force of 7,000, all ranks, for a period of six months is approximately \$30 million. We have no quarrel with this figure, namely, \$30 million for six months, or \$60 million a year.

96. The two super-Powers must be quite optimistic to set a renewable target-date of six months for working out a lasting and just peace in a most complicated conflict which began in 1947 with the partition of Palestine, which by arbitrary action introduced an alien people into the region.

97. Even before 1947—indeed 25 years before then; since the early 1920s—the Arab world reacted vehemently when it knew that the mandatory Power was in the beginning encouraging Jewish immigrants to go to Palestine. The Arab world as a whole, and especially its youth, which constitutes the majority of the Arab world, will not accept what they may consider to be an imposed solution. There would be no peace, and periodically other conflicts would flare up. Hence expedient, makeshift solutions may trigger a series of conflicts.

98. It is therefore to be noted that to avoid such contingencies it is most likely that the United Nations Emergency Force may have to be extended for many years, which may bring the total expenditure to more than

\$1 billion. Do you hear, Mr. Secretary-General? There is a billion dollars involved here. Because you and your aides prepared the report, I shall repeat what I have said. To avoid such contingencies—meaning repeated conflicts—it is most likely that the United Nations Emergency Force may have to be extended for many years, which may bring its total expenditure to over \$1 billion for a period of six or seven years, taking into account the rampant inflation for which the Western world has still to find a remedy.

99. Members of the Council, please remember the stupendous expenses, which shot up to astronomical figures, in the Korean and Viet-Namese conflicts. Because of the exigencies of ideological differences between the people of the northern and southern regions of that unhappy land, which ethnologically speaking had a homogeneous population, the negotiations in Korea took more than a decade to come to an end, and the problems existing between North and South have not yet been solved. The unjust *de facto* partition has not been resolved since 1950 in the case of Korea, and a few years later in the case of Viet-Nam—and both Korea and Viet-Nam, I must repeat, have a homogeneous ethnological population.

100. Members of the Council, do you mean to tell me that a miraculous just solution can be found in six months or a year between the Arabs and Israel—Israel, which the Arabs consider a foreign element in their midst? Therefore no one should be so optimistic as not to take into account that the negotiations might be protracted for a very, very long time.

101. On the other hand, suppose the countries whose territory has been occupied are persuaded, if not coerced, to accept an imposed solution. I must warn you that imposed solutions have a way of backfiring, and the whole question would revert to where it started: resumed conflict or, at best, a "no war, no peace" state of affairs, and all of a sudden war would break out anew.

102. Hence the better part of wisdom would be not to bank on the assumption that we can divorce the cease-fire—which, although its primary objective is to stop the fighting, cannot solve this problem—from the ultimate aim of finding a just solution.

103. Judging by negotiations relative to the Viet-Nam war, I must repeat that the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai and elsewhere may run into \$1 billion, if not very much more, within a period of a few years.

104. Now I come to paragraph 7 of the report of the Secretary-General, which reads as follows:

"The costs of the Force shall be considered as expenses of the Organization"—meaning the United Nations—"to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter."

The report should not have bypassed paragraph 1 of Article 17, which states: "The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization". It is the prerogative of the General Assembly and not the Security Council

to approve the budget of the United Nations. Did you take that into account, Mr. Waldheim? It is the prerogative of the General Assembly and not the Security Council to approve the budget of the United Nations. Approval or disapproval of expenditures has to be decided by a majority vote of all the members of the Assembly participating.

105. What if the General Assembly does not approve the expenditures estimated by the Secretary-General and his aides in the report before us? May I go a little further. What if a good number of members of the General Assembly oppose these expenditures? If a good number of States does not constitute a majority, then they are bound to contribute their share, and no financial problem arises. But what if a permanent member of the Security Council categorically refuses to pay its share, regardless of the outcome of the vote in the General Assembly? Would Article 19 of the Charter apply to that permanent member?

106. In order to refresh the memory of the Secretary-General and his aides as well as the memory of the Council regarding Article 19, I shall read it out:

“A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member”.

But what if that permanent member of the Security Council is able to pay? There is nothing beyond its control there. What would happen? Have you, in your haste, forgotten the Charter, my dear friend, Mr. Secretary-General? Have the others, in their haste, forgotten Article 19?

107. The nineteenth session of the General Assembly is still vivid in my memory and in the memory of those who witnessed what happened. The Soviet Union had consistently refused—and rightly so—to pay its share in connexion with the United Nations operations in the Middle East. On the other hand, France did not consider itself bound to pay its share of the costs entailed by the United Nations operations in the Congo.

108. The United States insisted, during the nineteenth session, that unless the Soviet Union footed its share of the bill for what might be called extra-curricular budgetary expenses of the United Nations it would lose its right to vote. When the late Adlai Stevenson, the then representative of the United States, realized that nothing would budge the Soviet Union from its position after it had insisted that it would not pay, he resorted to third parties in order to save face and conspired with Alex Quaison-Sackey—who was President during that session of the General Assembly—and other representatives on whose countries the United States wielded influence. A secret formula was improvised to solve the problem. That secret formula reminded me of how you members of the Council had shut and locked the door so that no one could see what

you were doing, and I have to send messengers through the back door, as if you had learned nothing from the past.

109. Returning to the nineteenth session—in the meantime the late Ambassador Budo of Albania thought it appropriate to expose what he considered to be connivance by certain Powers striking secret deals without previous widespread private consultations. I sent a message to the President of the Council early this afternoon through both the Secretary-General and Mr. Herndl that no hasty decision should be taken about financing before someone who had scrutinized the financial situation was allowed to speak. But no, it seems that you gentlemen borrowed a pressure cooker from the United States instead of letting us all put charcoal under the pot and help in cooking some solution. With all due respect to your efforts, you put the whole thing in an American pressure cooker and we are asked to eat what you have cooked.

110. Again I refer to the nineteenth session. Incidentally, when I was privately asked by the late Adlai Stevenson about my attitude, I made it clear to him that I had not been a party to the consultations that went on between certain Powers and which evinced the objection of the late Ambassador Budo of Albania. Deals were struck in private. And then I reminded Adlai Stevenson how the United States failed to achieve any constructive results in 1950 when after Ambassador Malik walked out of the Security Council chamber, the United States decided to transfer discussion of the question of Korea to the General Assembly. The Soviet Union boycotted the General Assembly when it dealt with the question of Korea, and that General Assembly came to be known as the “Little Assembly” consisting of 46 Members. It was at the “Little Assembly” that the United States began to enlist help in the war it was waging against North Korea. Fifteen States were dragged into that war, and I remember how I saw to it that the country I represented would not be dragged into siding with a State that was instrumental in partitioning Korea *de facto*, on ideological grounds.

111. Have you taken all those facts into consideration, my good friends, members of the Council?

112. Why am I mentioning all this? It is because it has a bearing on the imbroglio with which we are at present confronted, the imbroglio which arose from the involvement and commitment of the late President Harry Truman to the Zionists. He cast aside the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people in order to win Jewish votes for his re-election to the Presidency. All that was done in the name of sham humanism and perverted democracy, about which I spoke in the General Assembly in 1947, after the partition of Palestine. What a perpetration of injustice by the leader of a great Power. I repeat, and let it appear in the record, what a perpetration of injustice by the leader of a great Power.

113. Again we come to the crux of the question: what if China, for example, and other States refuse to pay the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force? Will we be pushed into another United Nations crisis similar to the one we had during the nineteenth session of the General Assembly? Will the United Nations survive such a crisis? I

noted what Mr. Malik said a few days ago, namely that the aggressor should bear the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force. Has he received fresh instructions from his Government that, due to the détente between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the Soviet Union may accommodate the United States and accept paragraph 7 of the Secretary-General's report? Mr. Malik said the other day that the aggressor should foot the bill. What if the aggressor claims that it cannot afford to do so? What about the United States, by virtue of whose bounty Israel has survived all these years? What about the United States?

114. The United States, whilst trying to reduce its domestic expenditures, has recently sent an initial \$2,000 million worth of lethal weapons to Israel, and more military aid is on the way. Why should not the United States pay every cent of the cost of the United Nations Emergency Force? What is \$30 million every six months? To the United States, \$30 million is a bagatelle. The United States spent \$300,000 million in the Viet-Nam war for a travesty of a solution. The war in Viet-Nam has not been resolved. Mr. Kissinger tried to save the face of his adopted country. He did not find a solution. He gave the false impression to the American peoples that he had solved the problem. The United States had no choice but to withdraw from an unjust war, and rightly so. The United States withdrew, but it did not repair the damage of its intervention in the Far East, 10,000 or 15,000 miles away from its shores.

115. Who do you think you are fooling, Mr. Ambassador Bennett? You were in Portugal then as ambassador, but who do you think your Government has been fooling, throughout the years, about aggression in Viet-Nam? I do not want to wear the gloves of diplomatic decorum—because such a policy has failed so miserably—and not call a spade a spade. That is why when Baroody asks for the floor they say, "He is not a conformist". The conformists do not want me to speak and tell the truth as I see it.

116. Some \$300,000 million were spent by the United States in the Far East. In Korea it dragged 14 States, or 15, I do not know, into the war. The United States tried to drag us in, but we would not be duped that the United States was fighting in Korea for justice and for its brand of democracy. The North Koreans were "ogres"—the same people, north and south. And the United States made its "clients", those 15 States in Korea, share those astronomical figures incurred in that war.

117. Why does not the United States Government pay, foot the bill, for what the United Nations Emergency Force would cost? It would be much cheaper than the \$250,000 million it spent on Viet-Nam, and the I don't know how much it spent in Korea. I shall have to get it from some friend in the United States Mission. The figures must be in some book. Why should not the United States pay every cent of the cost of the United Nations Emergency Force that is to be sent to the Middle East?

118. There is another alternative. Why does not Israel ask the Rothschilds—and they are billionaires; we are not talking about millionaires now—and other Zionist millionaires and billionaires scattered all over the world, including the De

Beers and the Oppenheimers in South Africa? They must be friends of Mr. Abba Eban; he probably can play on their sentiments to get them to foot the bill. Why does not Israel ask the Rothschilds and other Zionist millionaires and billionaires scattered all over the world, including the De Beers and the Oppenheimers in South Africa, to underwrite the cost of the Emergency Force which is to be sent to the Middle East?

119. Incidentally, why do not those millionaires—declaring themselves for Israel as they have consistently done—emigrate to Israel and become Israeli citizens? Are they not Jews of the Diaspora? And should they not be good Zionists and conform to the Zionist ideology, whose aim is to ingather all the Jews of the world in Palestine? Or is it more profitable for those millionaires and billionaires, at this stage, to keep exploiting the gentile world?

120. Who should foot the bill—rather than who will foot it—is the burning question.

121. The mass media of information—most of which are controlled and manipulated by the Zionists or Zionist sympathizers: will they continue to brainwash the American people into accepting that Israel, the so-called outpost of democracy in the Middle East, should, by direct contributions and increased taxes imposed on the American people, continue to be financed by them?

122. Does the United States Government really believe that without Israel in the Middle East—at a distance of 6,000 miles—United States security may be threatened? If Israel as a State vanishes, will the mighty United States totter and fall down?

123. The Zionist media of information—whether visual or auditory—such as the ABC, CBS and NBC networks have been referred to by none other than President Nixon as "outrageous", "vicious" and, when the occasion calls for it, "malicious", "hypocritical" and "hysterical, to say the least"—and I am using his words. Will the pro-Zionist press continue to brainwash and mislead the people of the United States and other Western countries into believing that without the State of Israel the world will come to an end?

124. I have spoken about those mass media many, many times; the last time was about three days before your illustrious President, Mr. Nixon—my good friend Ambassador Bennett—referred to the mass media of information. Do not think that he consulted with me privately and I gave him those adjectives—

125. The PRESIDENT: I think that I must, with great reluctance—

126. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): You always do it with great reluctance, Sir; go on.

127. The PRESIDENT:—remind my friend the representative of Saudi Arabia that the members of this Council have been sitting in these same chairs almost continuously, for, I think, 11 hours; and I do appeal to him to shorten his speech and bring it to a close as soon as possible. We have

listened with interest to his earlier comments on the financial aspects of the report that the Security Council has approved. But, I would appeal to him once again and urge him to bring his remarks to a close so that I can adjourn this meeting.

128. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): The bulk of my speech was over. I know that you are under great strain, Sir; I sympathize with you. I know; I also have been under great strain. Incidentally, I am older than you. I too have been working on my speech and other things for 15 hours, and I still have some stamina. I think that there is still some strength in the old horses that you and I are. It will not take me long to finish. If you had exercised a little patience you would not have had to make an appeal.

129. The PRESIDENT: We have great stamina in this Council, but there are limits.

130. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): You should have more stamina than I. But I am going to finish—not just to please you, because I would be a hypocrite to say that I am doing it just to please you, but because I have only three or four more pages of longhand notes. Because of my poor eyesight I have to use large letters. This interruption is uncalled for. If you had not interrupted me, I would have been finished by now. Appeal, appeal. Appeal to somebody else for a change. Good heavens, you are getting to be incorrigible, Sir Laurence McIntyre, my good friend.

131. Don't laugh. It is sad. The man is under pressure: you should sympathize with him. I stand up for his human rights.

132. I will not speak extemporaneously after I have finished these pages of my notes. I was going to speak extemporaneously, which I think would have been more effective than my dry financial speech.

133. Where was I now? Let me see. Good God, I am all mixed up. I said, "Good God, have mercy upon me." For heaven's sake, don't do it any more, Sir. I am glad you have only three or four more days as President of the Council—for your sake and mine.

134. When the Zionist leaders free themselves from the illusion that God gave them Palestine and when they cease claiming that they are the chosen people of God, and once the Zionists come to their senses and realize that the Arab youth will see to it that there will be no lasting peace without the restitution of the right of self-determination to the Palestinians in the land of Palestine where they had lived for thousands of years, then, and only then, can peace be established between Arab and Jew; then, and only then, can Arab and Jew live as brothers under a common flag—after the Israeli flag is hauled down. If, on the other hand, the political Zionists persist in their present policy, not all the money in all the United States and Western Europe would be sufficient to maintain Israel in the precarious position in which she will always find herself. Wake up you Jews of the world that have not yet been

indoctrinated, for it is you and only you who may be able to drive some sense into the heads of misguided Zionists and thereby save all the Jews from, God forbid, becoming scapegoats whence the innocent will suffer. With nuclear weapons in abundance lying around, who can guarantee—

135. Mr. Tekoah is up to his old tricks. He is talking behind me and saying "Madness, Saudi Arabian madness". For heaven's sake. I do not want to tell you to shut up again. Shut up. This is too much. I stand on my right not to be interrupted again. Who is prolonging this meeting, Sir?

136. I say again, wake up you Jews of the world that have not yet been indoctrinated, for it is you and only you who may be able to drive some sense into the heads of misguided Zionists and thereby save all the Jews from, God forbid, becoming scapegoats when the innocent will suffer.

137. "Jewish official"—not Baroody—"fears a backlash. Gold says war may cause rise in anti-Semitism". It should say "anti-Jewishness" not anti-Semitism because I am a Semite. This is a headline in *The New York Times* of today, Saturday, 27 October.

138. With nuclear weapons in abundance lying around, who can guarantee that, with the stubbornness of the Zionists, and possible miscalculations on the part of the United States Government, these Zionists may not push the whole world into the abyss of destruction. Arise ye Jews, before it is too late, to prevail on the Zionists to see the writing on the wall and to remember Jeremiah who in vain tried to make the ancients amongst you see the light. If you and your supporter, the United States, do not relent and heed the warning there may be no one left like Jeremiah to lament the fate of mankind.

139. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I shall be brief. I have just received from Moscow the text of a statement issued by TASS today, 27 October 1973. I should like to read it to the Council:

"In connexion with the events in the Middle East, it has been reported in Washington that United States armed forces have been placed on alert in certain parts of the world, including Europe.

"In attempting to justify this step officials have referred to actions by the Soviet Union allegedly giving grounds for concern.

"TASS is authorized to state that such reports are absurd, since the actions of the Soviet Union are designed exclusively to promote the implementation of Security Council decisions concerning the cease-fire and the restoration of peace in the Middle East.

"The United States took this action, which makes not the slightest contribution to the easing of international tension, in an obvious attempt to intimidate the Soviet

Union. However, we can tell the instigators of the action that they are knocking at the wrong door”.

140. The PRESIDENT: I have no more names on my list of speakers, so I propose now to adjourn this meeting. The Council will continue to be vitally concerned with the situation, and will remain on instant call to meet as required.

141. In closing I think I may say one word of gratitude on behalf of the Council as a whole for the efforts of all those members of the Secretariat who helped us through on this week-end day, and not least of all the interpreters.

*The meeting rose at 9.45 p.m.*

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