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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1734/Rev.1)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in the Middle East:	
(a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);	
(b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 25 July 1973, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1734/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:
 - (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929).

The meeting was called to order at 11 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken previously by the Security Council in the course of the discussion of the item before us, I shall proceed now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the 19 representatives participating in the discussion to be seated in this chamber in conformity with the established practice.

2. Accordingly, as I hear no objection, I invite the representatives of Egypt, Israel and Jordan to take places at the Council table, and the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania, Chad, the Syrian Arab Republic, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Somalia, Guyana, Mauritania, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran and Bahrain to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber on the understanding that they will be invited to be seated at the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Zayyat (Egypt), Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) and Mr. A. H. Sharaf (Jordan) took places at the Security Council table, and Mr. H. G. Ouangmotching (Chad), Mr. H. Kelani (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. E. O. Ogbu (Nigeria) and Mr. E.

Ghorra (Lebanon) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT: The consultations to which I referred on Friday at the close of the Council's last meeting have been in progress since then among members of the Council. As a result of those consultations, a draft resolution has been prepared which is sponsored by the delegations of Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia [S/10974].

4. Mr. SEN (India): Our pleasure in seeing you back at the United Nations, even if only temporarily, is all the greater because you have come to preside over one of the most important series of meetings of the Council when your skill as a diplomat, your modesty and sensitivity as a man, and your understanding and experience of complicated problems as a life-long student of international politics have all been placed at the disposal of the Council. With disarming simplicity you said the other day that this was the first time in your long career at the United Nations you could use the gavel at the Security Council, but all of us who know you are aware that this symbolic and open exercise of authority is backed by your most valuable contribution to the Council's work in a variety of ways. We did not have an opportunity to render our tributes to you in the Council when you left us a few weeks ago, but were gratified to learn that your Government had awarded to you one of the highest honours of the Realm—the Grand Companionship of the Order of St. Michael and St. George—in recognition of your devoted service to your country. All our good wishes go to you on your retirement from a most active and useful career in diplomacy.

5. The intractable problem of the Middle East is the most urgent and the most serious of the problems the Council has before it. Years of efforts, decades of agony, bloodshed and misery and frequent introduction of new factors in a complex situation have not brought a solution any nearer. We had a most thorough review of the problem last month, and when we met here last Friday, the important question was what the Council could and should do to make some slight progress towards a solution. We had over a month to think about a suitable course of action.

6. On the one hand, we were aware of the strong views held by the parties about their rights and duties, their own appreciation of their national future and national interests and finally an expression of their human dignity, worth and pride. On the other hand, the members of the Council, the supreme organ of the United Nations, with prime responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and

security, have the duty to place their combined wisdom at the disposal of the parties so that they may know in what direction, in our opinion, they should move.

7. The draft I am about to introduce on behalf of eight members of the Council does not seek to do more than this. Our basic consideration has been that it should reflect the greatest common measure of agreement among the 15 members of the Council, that it should confine itself to the facts as they are today and express the Council's views on them in most moderate language without affecting or even discussing the legal rights of the parties or pronouncing on the various principles of international law and of our Charter and of our resolutions which may apply in the situation in the Middle East.

8. Before making further general comments, I think it would be useful at this stage to introduce the draft resolution in document S/10974 and read out its full text. I have been asked to do so, and I have the honour to do so, on behalf of the delegations of Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia. The text of the draft resolution is as follows:

[The speaker read out the text of the draft resolution.]

9. This text has been arrived at after most intensive consultation and any delegation which wished to contribute its views for such consultation had ample opportunity to do so. This draft resolution will not, I am afraid, bring much satisfaction to any of the parties directly involved, but it will, we believe, inform them of the general thinking of the Council and instruct them of the ways in which they should, in the opinion of the Council, move and make progress.

10. I should like now to offer a few brief comments on some of the preambular and operative paragraphs of the draft resolution.

11. The first, second, third and fourth preambular paragraphs are self-explanatory and do not require any comments. The fifth preambular paragraph is a reaffirmation of a resolution which the Council adopted unanimously and which contains some of the basic principles which apply to the problem of the Middle East. The sixth preambular paragraph refers to the problem of the Palestinians, which cannot be ignored in any solution and which has repeatedly been referred to inside and outside the Council in numerous forms and with varying emphasis. No comments are necessary on the seventh preambular paragraph.

12. Operative paragraph 1 sums up the views of the Council on the report which the Secretary-General submitted to us at our request. It also states the fact that a just and lasting solution of the problem has not been found during the long six years and deeply regrets this fact. Similarly, operative paragraph 2 states the fact that, contrary to the Charter, Israeli armed forces continue their occupation of all the territories they occupied in the June 1967 conflict and strongly deplores this fact. Operative paragraph 3 once again reflects the views of the Council based on the Secretary-General's report and also on his and others' oral statements before the Council on Israel's

attitude towards the mission undertaken by Ambassador Jarring as a result of his mandate from the Council. Operative paragraph 4 simply gives the views of the Council repeatedly expressed over the years and without dissension on the validity of Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 [S/10403, annex I]. Operative paragraph 5 expresses the Council's strong view that the States and peoples in the area, including the Palestinian people, have both the right and the duty to live in peace inside their own national territories. Operative paragraph 6 emphasizes that so long as the occupation continues nothing should be done in the occupied territories which may obstruct a settlement or which reduces or tends to reduce the rights of their inhabitants. Operative paragraph 7 renews the mandate of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and requests them to continue with the unfinished business of promoting a solution. Operative paragraph 8 simply shows the Council's determination to give all help to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in all their worthy and legitimate efforts. Operative paragraph 9 asks the parties for full co-operation in the work of the Secretary-General and his representative. Operative paragraph 10 implies that the Council does not believe that by adopting this draft resolution it has done all it could or that progress has automatically been achieved. The problem will require continuous attention.

13. I believe that this brief introduction will establish beyond all doubt that the sponsors are interested neither in polemics nor in attempting to bring the Council to support the conflicting principles which divide the parties. What we have attempted to do, and with utmost moderation but with firm conviction, is to enable the Council to do its work by expressing itself on the current and significant facts of the situation in a manner which might bring about some progress in the deplorable and potentially dangerous stalemate.

14. We have worked for unanimous support and have every hope it will be forthcoming. Indeed, we do not see that this draft resolution, which is entirely based on facts and their objective consideration, can invite any reservations or criticisms. Such reservations or criticisms can be valid only if we wish to support, wholly and totally and without questioning, one side or the other. The sponsors could not have adopted such an attitude, nor did they ever have the slightest intention or inclination of doing so. We hope, therefore, that the Council will accept this draft resolution unanimously and thus encourage the parties to move towards a solution with the able and devoted assistance of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative.

15. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): Mr. President, my deputy has already had occasion to congratulate you on your accession to the high office of President of the Council and to assure you of my delegation's support and co-operation in the discharge of your duties. Similarly, he has had occasion to congratulate the Ambassador of the Soviet Union for the able way in which he presided over the Council's deliberations during the month of June. I wish to renew these sentiments at this meeting.

16. Turning to the subject under discussion, I am pleased to state that my delegation is a sponsor of the draft

resolution contained in document S/10974, so ably introduced by the representative of India on behalf of the eight sponsoring Powers. My delegation, which along with other members of the Council has participated in the process of consultations on this draft resolution, is happy that it takes into account the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/10929 and the views of the members of the Council and of other Members of the United Nations which took part in the debate.

17. We note that the preamble embodies uncontroversial aspects and is indeed as objective as it can be in the light of the debate and the report of the Secretary-General. I should like to underscore the importance of the fifth preambular paragraph, which rightly reaffirms resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. There is no doubt that that resolution is the corner-stone pointing to the solution of the Middle East problem, and I am happy that that resolution is not tampered with in the thrust of the present draft resolution.

18. Another important preambular paragraph is the sixth, which reads as follows:

"Conscious that the rights of the Palestinians have to be safeguarded".

This is an acknowledgement of the thrust of the debate and of the fact that the solution to the Middle East problem has duly to respond to, and to reflect, the rights of the Palestinians as well as those of the States in the region. This is also recognized in operative paragraph 5, and appears to embrace fully the sentiments expressed in the section entitled "Middle East" in the joint United States-Soviet communiqué, part of which reads as follows:

"Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East. This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all States in the area, be consistent with their independence and sovereignty and should take into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people." [see S/10964.]

I would like to emphasize the term "Palestinian people".

19. Many of us share a feeling of deep regret that the Secretary-General was unable to report any significant progress in the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). Little, therefore, in spite of the wish of the Council, has been realized toward the goal of a just peace in the Middle East. The Council must, therefore, stress the imperative of making progress toward a permanent and peaceful settlement of the problem. Indeed, it is only with such a peace that the valuable resources now deployed toward military goals could be usefully diverted toward the economic and social needs of the peoples of the area and the development of that area. The Council must encourage the principal disputants to search their souls seriously in an effort to usher in an era of mutual respect and of hope and peace. After all, they are, basically, a people of one region, with deeply shared historical and cultural roots. With the goodwill of the permanent members of the Security Council involved and of all the other members of the international community, renewed efforts by the parties

could, in the near future, yield a framework of peace in which we can all rejoice.

20. It thus appears unnecessary for me to emphasize the special role of the parties in being instrumental toward a permanent solution. It goes without saying that, when peace is inaugurated in the area, the parties, more than anyone else, will fully realize what they have missed in the past. I trust, therefore, that a constructive beginning will be made—and shortly, it is to be hoped—starting with the special visit of the Secretary-General to the capital cities of the principal parties in the Middle East.

21. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): Mr. President, allow me to express my delegation's great satisfaction on seeing you presiding over the meetings of the Security Council. We are glad to see you back in New York and we congratulate ourselves on having you in the Chair to guide us in our deliberations on the difficult and sensitive problem of the Middle East.

22. It is with great pleasure that my delegation has joined those of Guinea, India, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia in sponsoring draft resolution S/10974. After the admirably concise and lucid introduction of the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors by my colleague Ambassador Sen of India, followed by the equally clear statement of the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Odero-Jowi, it seems to me unnecessary to repeat their arguments, especially as the Indonesian position with regard to the problem of the Middle East and its solution was already made clear in my statement during the first round of the Council's debates on the Middle East last month [1725th meeting]. I should like, however, to dwell briefly on some points of the draft resolution and say a few words in explanation of our sponsorship thereof.

23. First, I shall refer to operative paragraph 2, which *"Strongly deplores Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict, contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter" and of international law.* My delegation would have liked a stronger formulation for this paragraph. The continuing occupation of Arab territories by Israel constitutes, in the opinion of my delegation, a barrier to the peaceful solution of the Middle East problem; and we cannot insist strongly enough that that barrier be lifted. The withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories is an essential factor for the establishment of secure and recognized borders between Israel and its neighbours. Recognized and secure borders are directly linked to the withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories. The principle of non-acquisition of territory by the use of force, to which we all adhere, should be respected. Any attempt to acquire territory under the guise of wanting to establish recognized and secure borders will be self-defeating, as it cannot be expected that such borders will be recognized or secure. As I said in my statement during the last debates:

"My delegation is of the view that really secure borders can in the long run only be effectively guaranteed not in the first place by soldiers and guns but by peace and mutual goodwill. In the case of the Middle East, the return by Israel of all occupied Arab territories to their

rightful owners will pave the way toward a situation where boundaries will be secure because there is peace.”
[*ibid.* para. 95.]

24. My delegation attaches great importance to operative paragraph 5, which underlines respect for the rights of the Palestinians. It is unrealistic to expect that peace can return to the Middle East without justice being done to the Palestinians who are now living in the occupied territories and in the neighbouring countries, as refugees and in miserable conditions. Lasting peace cannot be based upon injustice. It is in conjunction with respect for the rights of the Palestinians that my delegation reads operative paragraph 6. In view of continuing Israeli efforts towards the *de facto* integration into Israel of the occupied territories, this paragraph is most relevant in avoiding the creation of situations of *fait accompli* which will very much complicate any solution of the problem.

25. In conclusion, my delegation would also like to comment briefly on operative paragraph 4, which we read in conjunction with operative paragraph 7. The Secretary-General has submitted a report of his activities and those of his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, since the adoption in 1967 of resolution 242 (1967) and up to 1973. The Council, in the view of my delegation, has to express itself on the initiatives that have been taken, if we want the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue their efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution of the Middle East problem. The least the Council can do is to express its opinion on the efforts that have been made by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. Especially with regard to the Special Representative, the Council has to keep in mind that his task is not only to act as a go-between, but, in the words of paragraph 3 of resolution 242 (1967), “to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution”. To be effective, however, he will need the concrete support of the Council for his ideas.

26. Though my delegation would have preferred a more strongly worded draft resolution clearly demanding the withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories we have been prepared to go a long way to accommodate the viewpoints of other representatives who are not entirely in agreement with our views in the hope that the draft resolution may obtain the votes necessary for its adoption by the Council. My delegation thinks that the draft resolution presented to the Council is balanced and takes into account the views expressed during the debate and the report of the Secretary-General.

27. I should like to conclude by expressing my sincere expectation that all the members of the Council will find it possible to support the draft resolution as a concrete contribution to the solution of the Middle East problem.

28. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, before dealing with the problem on our agenda may I, too, express my deep satisfaction at the fact that you are among us, even though for a short time, in your capacity as President of the Council at these important meetings. Your arrival and presence encourage us in our search for ways and means

leading to a peaceful solution of the conflict which has been at the centre of the Council's attention for many years. Your exceptional qualities as a diplomat and as a man, your noble attitude towards interlocutors both when you agree and when you disagree with them, represent a rare example of the co-operation, tolerance and mutual understanding, of which we are in such great need in the United Nations in our efforts aimed at finding agreed solutions for the numerous important issues with which we are confronted.

29. I now wish to say a few words about the draft resolution, sponsored by Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia, in addition to what has already been stated in such a detailed and competent manner by my colleagues the Ambassador of India, Mr. Sen, the Ambassador of Kenya, Mr. Odero-Jowi, and the Ambassador of Indonesia, Mr. Anwar Sani.

30. I do not deem it necessary to revert to an analysis and appraisal of the situation in the Middle East which has led to the Security Council being seized of the Middle East problem and to presentation of the draft resolution now before us. This subject was amply dealt with during the first phase of the debate in the Security Council, which revealed the existence of an almost unanimous approach regarding the following points. First, it is not possible to tolerate any postponement of the solution of the Middle East crisis without jeopardizing peace and progress in this region and more widely. Secondly, that the solution must be based on the principle of the unacceptability of acquisition of territories by force. Thirdly, that there can be no lasting solution without ensuring respect for the legitimate rights of all the peoples of this region, including, of course, the Palestinian people. Lastly, that the United Nations is an irreplaceable forum within the framework of which it is indispensable to search for a solution based on the platform provided by the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly—primarily, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of November 1967 and General Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII).

31. The draft resolution of which my delegation is a sponsor reflects the common denominator that has been endorsed by almost all the representatives who have spoken during the discussions in the Council. None of the principles embodied in resolution 242 (1967) are brought into question by the present draft. Consequently, every one of the paragraphs of the draft we are now considering is inspired by the statements made before the Council and by opinions expressed during our intensive consultations in connexion with presentation of the draft resolution. That is why the wording is so balanced and the whole text so moderate.

32. The draft resolution in fact reflects the situation prevailing in the region at the present moment and the efforts aimed at finding a political solution of the problem through the United Nations. It does not deal with principles, but, taking what has already been adopted by the Security Council as a starting point, it embodies an enumeration of the facts characterizing the current situation and also points out the responsibilities and tasks of the Council.

33. Such a state of affairs—which, in fact, renders the situation incomparably more difficult than has been the case at any time in the past—is characterized by the following elements, which have been duly taken into account in the draft resolution.

34. First, all the efforts of the United Nations to implement resolution 242 (1967) have failed exclusively because of Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the basis of his initiative, set forth in his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971, which was endorsed by four permanent members of the Council.

35. Secondly, the occupation of the territories of three States Members of the United Nations continues, in violation of adopted principles and obligations assumed under the Charter and United Nations resolutions.

36. Thirdly, the changes of a demographic, economic and other character carried out by Israel in the occupied territories in contradiction of all the principles of international law not only are liable to prejudice or at least render more difficult a definitive solution but actually endanger the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of those areas, in some cases amounting to systematic colonization of occupied areas.

37. Fourthly, developments not only have confirmed the existence of the Palestinian factor but have also revealed the utter failure of all attempts to destroy it or to conceal it under the cloak of anonymity by means of force or all kinds of manoeuvring. The Palestinian political movement, as an expression of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, has imposed itself as an active factor in the Middle East without which no definitive solution of the crisis is possible. Its role is beginning to be recognized even by the forces which have ignored it so far for different reasons.

38. Those are all persistent and generally recognized facts to which no one wishing for a lasting and just solution of the Middle East problem can shut his eyes without thereby participating—consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly—in efforts designed to perpetuate the *status quo* created by force. The draft resolution we are discussing does nothing but take this actual position into account.

39. What should, or rather what must, the Security Council, which is entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, do in such a situation? In our opinion, the Council has no other option but to exert active efforts for the implementation of its own resolution; to ensure respect for the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all the States in the region of the Middle East; to thwart annexation and occupation; to protect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people; to proclaim all changes in the occupied territories null and void; to request the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to renew and to continue their efforts to find a solution and to give all the necessary assistance to them. And finally, the Council must deal with the problem actively and meet whenever its decisions are not carried out.

40. That is, in our view, the minimum to be expected of the Council. The failure to take such minimal action could have lasting consequences amounting to an acceptance of the present state of affairs which is in contradiction of the Charter of the United Nations.

41. It has been clear for a long time that two diametrically opposed policies are pursued in the region of the Middle East. The first is endeavouring to face the international community, the United Nations and every one of us, with the fait accompli of occupation and annexation, while the second policy, basing itself on the Charter and adopted resolutions, is striving to assist the United Nations in finding a political solution, a stable and lasting solution, which can be founded only on the basis of the principles of non-acquisition of territory by force, withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all occupied territories and on respect for the rights and interests of all peoples and States in the area. There is no doubt in the mind of my delegation as to the road that should be followed.

42. It is high time for the Security Council to devote its efforts to search for such a solution instead of using its energies to extinguish fires and search for palliative measures which do not eliminate the causes of frequent and dangerous explosions. The maintenance of the fallacious situation of “no war, no peace” is not an aim in itself. Closing one's eyes to the fundamental problems of the Middle East does not benefit anyone. The situation could rapidly get out of control, which would jeopardize not only peace, but also the role of the United Nations in general, and this would have catastrophic consequences.

43. The Middle East crisis can endanger the results achieved in other fields of international relations as well. The question of the situation in the Middle East is part of broader security, Mediterranean and European, and this is being recognized to an increasing extent as an irrefutable fact. African countries, Asian countries, European countries, non-aligned countries and Latin American countries are devoting increased attention because of all that to the Middle East. The awareness of the interdependence of European security and the situation in the Middle East is constantly gaining ground in Europe.

44. In such a situation, every action barring the road to a solution sounds anachronistic. Our draft resolution, which we hope will be adopted by a large majority, if not unanimously, points to the only road along which the Security Council should direct its action. It constitutes, at the same time, a contribution to the general orientation towards a political solution of the crisis and to all concrete efforts directed towards that end.

45. The PRESIDENT: The next name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Israel, on whom I now call.

46. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): In recent years our Organization has come under increasing criticism. Governments, statesmen and scholars, international organizations and media of information have all expressed disappointment and concern with the manner of our work and its results. Growing scepticism and even lack of interest have set in

everywhere. Attempts to explain, to justify or to laud are met more and more often with smiles of incredulity. How could it be otherwise when developments such as those now taking place in the Middle East debate are not uncommon?

47. The very initiation of the debate was a substitute for a serious peace-making effort. Egypt asked that another round of public polemics be held because it was not ready for quiet constructive talks with Israel. President Sadat and Foreign Minister El-Zayyat made it clear that the debate was to advance the cause of continued confrontation with Israel, and not agreement with it. In any event, whatever the motivation for the debate, the Council might have at least tried to work towards an outcome that would not prejudice the interests of peace. Instead, several Member States which identify themselves unreservedly with the Arab position in respect of Israel took it upon themselves to be the architects of the discussion's outcome and to prepare a draft resolution in accordance with Egyptian specifications. In conditions of the well-known parliamentary imbalance obtaining in the Security Council on Middle East questions, the authors of the draft know, of course, in advance that whatever they may produce there will be an automatic majority ready to join them in sponsorship or support.

48. What would be thought of a situation in which the advocates of one party set themselves up as judges and formulate a judgement in conformity with their own clients' views? The absurdity of such a situation in the present instance is accentuated by the international conduct of the advocates of the Arab cause who formulated the text submitted to the Council. What is it that makes States such as India and Yugoslavia feel that their authorship of a draft resolution on the Israel-Arab conflict could be considered proper? Is it the fact that they have no diplomatic relations with Israel? Is it that both decided to bow to Egypt's demand for the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1967 and announced the withdrawal of their contingents even before the Secretary-General had time to consider the matter, thus contributing to the outbreak of hostilities? Or is it, for example, India's record in the United Nations in questions of peace and security that qualifies it to play the role of arbiter on these questions in the Middle East?

49. When the Security Council puts itself in the hands of such States on an issue as complex and as delicate as the Middle East situation and votes on a text prepared by them, can it expect its activities to be regarded with the confidence and esteem due to a high international organ? A mere glance at the draft is sufficient to realize how one-sided and destructive an attitude it reflects.

50. Egypt seeks support for its continued belligerency against Israel. The draft provides such support. In its wording and in its entire spirit it is an act of political hostility which disregards fact and law and maligns Israel simply to please Egypt. Egypt's persistent refusal to negotiate with Israel, its rejection in the last six years of numerous peace proposals made by Israel and by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Egypt's resort to force in violation of the cease-fire and its support for terror warfare are all completely ignored, while, in the usual

style of Arab propaganda, the draft focuses on the vilification of Israel. It is such a rehash of Arab distortion and calumny that is suggested as the Security Council's contribution to the Middle East situation.

51. The essence of the search for peace in the Middle East is the effort to reach agreement between Israel and the Arab States. This is the corner-stone of resolution 242 (1967) and the basic goal of the peace-making process it set in motion. However, out of deference for Arab sensitivities, there is no mention in the draft resolution of the need for agreement between the parties. It is security, the right to live in peace and security, that resolution 242 (1967) sought to introduce and to ensure in an area torn by strife and insecurity for two decades. The draft is silent on this objective.

52. Could there be a clearer subversion of resolution 242 (1967) than the omission of its very foundations--agreement between the parties and security? These have been brushed aside to give place to one-sided interpretations, sharpened differences and heightened confrontation. The draft does not stop there. It distorts resolution 242 (1967) by selectively taking out of context some principles, such as territorial integrity. It misquotes and misinterprets it while ignoring other principles. It deals in a similar manner with the numerous ideas put to the parties since 1967 by the Secretary-General's Special Representative. One of these, the suggestion contained in the aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 that Israel should accept the Egyptian *diktat* on the restoration of the old line, is singled out, thus undermining the concept of secure and recognized boundaries as it appears in resolution 242 (1967). It is amazing that of all the initiatives by the Secretary-General's Special Representative the one included in the draft should be the initiative that has caused the paralysis of the Jarring Mission since 1971.

53. The draft further distorts resolution 242 (1967) by its references to Israel's occupation of territories. It is clear from that resolution and from the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions that the present cease-fire lines are to be replaced by secure and recognized boundaries which will be determined in the peace agreements between Israel and its neighbours. Until then the cease-fire lines continue to delimit the Israeli presence, and to speak derogatorily of the situation created by them is to make a mockery of the Security Council's own resolutions.

54. The draft also contains an unwarranted assertion concerning the force of Security Council resolutions. In fact, only resolutions under Chapter VII can be said to be mandatory--and even that has been denied by some Member States, and in particular by Egypt.

55. As if all that were not enough, the draft introduces the element of Palestinian rights and aspirations, which does not appear in resolution 242 (1967). All are aware of the meaning of references to the issue of Palestinian rights. All are aware that such references have been and are being used to support the demand for Israel's destruction and the dismemberment of the Palestinian Arab State of Jordan. All know that such references play into the hands of the Palestine terror organizations which have, in the name of

the so-called Palestinian rights, brought about bloodbaths of barbaric atrocities. This was confirmed only the day before yesterday by President Sadat, who, in his speech on the occasion of the Anniversary of the Revolution, pledged unreserved support for the terrorist organizations in their sanguinary campaign. At the very time when the entire world remains in shock over the ordeal of the hijacked Japanese aircraft and its hapless passengers and crew, the draft resolution would have the effect of giving succour and encouragement to hijackers and to murderers such as those of Lod, Munich and Khartoum.

56. The implications of a resolution of such a nature would be destructive. It would mean the end of resolution 242 (1967) as an agreed basis for settlement of the conflict. It would make futile whatever effort the Secretary-General might have planned to undertake in the cause of peace. Indeed, it would cripple the ability of the United Nations to play a role in the Middle East situation. It would constitute a serious setback for the prospects of initiating negotiation and agreement.

57. The question that poses itself is: why should Egypt be acting in a way that makes such a development inevitable? The answer must be sought in the peculiar character of Egyptian policy regarding Israel. In Egypt's attitude and acts on the Middle East situation there seems always to have been an undercurrent of courting disaster. Peace between Israel and Egypt could have been attained long ago if Egypt had charted its policies and decided on its actions with due deliberation. Instead, by continuous war and hostility it has followed a course that has led to unavoidable disaster time and again. That was what happened in 1948, in 1956 and in 1967. Today, it is evident that the position Egypt has adopted in the present debate cannot advance a settlement of the conflict. Egypt itself knows this, and even says so openly. Yet it pursues this course, though it can only lead to an aggravation of the situation. This is a sad fact, but not necessarily a surprising one in the light of past experiences.

58. What is surprising is that Egypt's friends, instead of encouraging and assisting it to modify its position, simply watch Egypt hurling itself against a wall of its own creation. It is surprising that Egypt's friends do not indicate that this is both harmful to its interests and unnecessary. There is an opening in the wall. Egypt could pass through it and move toward a solution of the conflict and genuine peace. This opening is provided by the possibility to enter into a serious dialogue with Israel. This opening is one of the most important and hopeful factors in the Middle East situation, a factor completely ignored by the present draft.

59. Under the Charter of the United Nations the responsibility of the Security Council is to promote international peace and security. It would be lamentable if the Security Council, by adopting the text presented to it today, were to contribute to an aggravation of the situation in the Middle East.

60. The PRESIDENT: The next name on my list of speakers is that of the Foreign Minister of Egypt, on whom I now call.

61. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): I had not intended to speak today—indeed I had not put my name on the list of

speakers—but I think I owe it to this Council, after the enlightening statement that has just been made, to put before the Council some more enlightening statements from Israel.

62. I have with me here this week's issue of *Time* magazine, dated 30 July 1973, containing an interview between *Time* diplomatic editor Jerrold Schecter and the head of the military establishment in Israel, Mr. Moshe Dayan. Let me read from it verbatim, because I do not want to go into an exercise of distortion of declarations of the sort that has been indulged in here. Speaking about the occupation lines that are going to stay until agreement between Israel and Egypt through negotiations or dialogue or whatever else will indeed effect the liberation of Egyptian territory, Mr. Dayan says: "The next 10 years will see the borders frozen along present lines—but there will not be a major war." About the United Nations, whose Charter and duties were just mentioned, Mr. Dayan says the following:

"Nobody has faith in the United Nations: first of all, because it has no power, and its composition"—the whole of the United Nations—"is absolutely against us. It can never have any positive decisions for us, so how can we rely on it? It is powerless and it's against us. All those Communist countries and Arab countries and African countries. It is the worst place for us to go and put our case."

As to Palestine he has this to say:

"There is no more Palestine. Finished. I should have said I'm sorry, but I'm not sorry. There are Palestinians, and there was a country named Palestine. That Palestine was divided between Israel and Jordan so there are Palestinian people but there is not any Palestinian State. The country called Palestine vanished in 1948. Palestine should be a part of the State of Jordan. Call it the Palestine zone in the Federation of Jordan, call it what you like, but not an independent State."

And this is what Mr. Dayan has to say about other occupied territories:

"... Israel must stay in the Golan Heights; ... Sharm el Sheikh ... is not essential in any way for Egypt. We should stay there. Sinai should be divided by one line or another."

Lastly, with regard to the super-Powers, Mr. Dayan says:

"I think the most important thing is the arms we got from the Americans. Because we are strong, then the problem for the Russians is how to deal with us without getting much more deeply involved militarily. Had we not been militarily strong, we would not have been able to oppose all kinds of pressure, and the Egyptians would have tried exerting military pressure on us."

63. The last sentence, with which I end my quotation and my statement, is the following, which I hope the representative of the United States of America will hear:

"We can even allow ourselves to disagree with our friends"—which means: "With the military power we have

in our hands, we not only defy the United Nations, we not only defy Egypt, but indeed we can defy the United States of America.”

64. The PRESIDENT: I have just received a letter from the representative of Tunisia in which he asks to be allowed to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote. As there is no objection, I accordingly invite him to take part in our discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. R. Driss (Tunisia) took a place at the Council table.

65. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, the Tunisian delegation would first of all like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. This is all the more noteworthy because you returned to New York, after having bid us farewell, expressly to assume the presidency. We regretted your departure, and we welcome you back.

66. I should like also to thank all representatives of member States of the Council who were kind enough to permit us to speak in the extremely important debate for which we are assembled today. My delegation, of course, would like to congratulate your predecessor, the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik, for the expert way in which he presided over the Council last month.

67. We had not intended to speak in the Council debate on the Middle East question but since the name of my country and that of our President were repeatedly mentioned at the 1733rd meeting, on 20 July 1973, it seemed to me worth while to make a statement in order to make certain clarifications necessitated by the statement of the representative of Israel.

68. The Middle East conflict is the result primarily of a serious injustice which was done to the people of Palestine and also of a series of misunderstandings and acts of aggression which have only served to complicate further a problem which was very complicated at the outset. It is a secret to no one that the unfortunate development of events in this grave problem has now reached a deadlock. However, Tunisia remains firmly convinced that peace in the Middle East can be restored, because our attachment to the principles and ideals of the United Nations Charter is unswerving.

69. It is within this framework that we view the most recent initiative of President Bourguiba, who, in his concern for peace and justice, thought it was his duty to make a series of proposals that could lead to a peaceful solution to the conflict.

70. In his statement the representative of Israel mentioned the appeal of President Bourguiba that the conflict be resolved by the best peaceful means, which is that of negotiation. The representative of Israel, however, quite deliberately cast doubt upon the Tunisian concept of negotiation. It is our duty to set matters straight so that no misunderstanding can remain in the minds of members of this Council.

71. Tunisia feels that the solution of the Middle East problem can be achieved by negotiation, which, incidentally, is not the only means of settling a conflict. An objective analysis of past events and our own experience have confirmed us in this conviction. Nevertheless, we consider that negotiation should not constitute an end in itself. In this case, negotiation, a judicious means of peacefully resolving disputes, is only useful and desirable if it is undertaken in clarity and to the extent that it makes it possible to achieve something positive. For that, it is necessary for negotiation to take place in a climate of tranquillity, open to no possible misunderstanding or bad faith.

72. Unfortunately, we have to note that this is not the intention of Israel. President Bourguiba has clearly stated this. He stated it on Saturday, 7 July 1973, when he stated in *Le Monde*:

“What I can say does not constitute a response, but I do think it useful to make even clearer what I think about the gulf which divides us and which makes improbable, if useless, a meeting with the leaders of Israel, because it could not lead to anything worth while; it emerges from the statements of the Israelis that they want to impose prior conditions to any meeting, to a recognition of the *status quo*, a maintenance of the new frontiers. It is for two reasons that I am making my proposal. First, because I consider that to maintain the *status quo* is a bad thing which can only lead to hatred and complicate the problem even further, and also because I have noted a changed attitude on the part of Arab leaders with regard to the existence of Israel. For example, I quote the words of the Foreign Minister of Egypt Mr. El-Zayyat, who said that the Arab countries were ready to recognize Israel and to make peace.

“This change on the part of the Arab leaders is an extremely important fact, and if reason prevails over the superiority complex and the pride of some and the humiliation of others, then the future can lead to a solution which will be good for everyone: Israelis, Palestinians, and Arabs. Mr. El-Zayyat talks of recognizing Israel, but it is not the greater Israel which he is talking about, but the Israel of 1947, which was legitimized by the United Nations.

“The change in attitude on the part of the Arabs completely transforms the elements of the problem. Previously, when the Arabs were unwilling to recognize the decision of the United Nations, which created Israel and which delimited its frontiers, the problem existed in terms of life and death for Israel. Israel felt itself in danger of elimination, of extermination, of being thrown into the sea by all the Arab countries, which did not wish to recognize its existence in spite of the vote of the United Nations. It was then that the problem of Israel's security arose and Security Council resolution 242 (1967) attempted to clarify this by mentioning secure and recognized frontiers. Mr. Eban confirmed this thought, when he mentioned the lapsing of the decision of 1947. But this argument can be used against Israel, because if the decision is no longer valid, Israel itself is no longer valid, because this is, as it were, its birth certificate.

Dayan has said that 'we shall not give up an inch of soil, it is a question of security'. Mr. Eban was more subtle and abandoned that argument, but the attitude of Israel is nevertheless just as intransigent."

73. Thus it emerges clearly that a possible meeting with the Israelis has proved impossible—and I stress this word "impossible". While Tunisia considers that it is necessary that Israel should recognize the resolution of 1947 as the positive basis for negotiation, the Israeli Government replies by an attitude of obstructionism and negativism, as indicated by its refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories, territories occupied in the 1967 war. This attitude on the part of Israel is also clearly confirmed in the reply to the representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring.

74. The position of Tunisia in the face of the grave problem of the Middle East is well known and has been known for a long time. But we should like to take this opportunity here to reaffirm once again our total support for the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Arab countries whose territories have been occupied and our profound conviction that any agreement providing for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should necessarily proceed through withdrawal from all occupied territories and the restoration to the Palestinian people of their national rights.

75. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel in exercise of his right of reply.

76. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): I have listened carefully to the statement made by the representative of Tunisia and take note of his elaborations regarding President Bourguiba's proposal for negotiations between Israel and the Arab States. I am certain that all agree that the central, most important element in that proposal is the support for the only method that could bring about, in our view and in the light of international experience, genuine peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Consequently, this is the thought, this is the conclusion that those who are actively engaged in the search for peace in the Middle East should retain. The conditions, the circumstances are secondary to this fundamental and central premise, that negotiations between Israel and the Arab States are essential, are inevitable, are being supported even by distinguished voices in the Arab world.

77. The Foreign Minister of Egypt chose to comment on a number of remarks made by Israel's Minister of Defence. I could not see exactly the purpose of repeating these publicly circulated observations by General Dayan until the Foreign Minister of Egypt reached the real point which he wanted to make. He started out by quoting General Dayan's views on the border. In fact, the Minister of Defence of Israel did say that in his view the borders would remain frozen for 10 years. But why? Why? That is the question. The answer is because Egypt refuses to negotiate peace with Israel, because Egypt refuses to agree on secure and recognized boundaries that would replace the present cease-fire lines on which Israeli armed forces are deployed. The key is in Egypt's hands. We are still waiting for an indication on the part of the Government of Egypt that it is

ready to initiate, to enter into a serious dialogue with us that would hopefully and, we believe, surely lead to agreement between the two States.

78. Minister El-Zayyat referred to General Dayan's comments on the United Nations. In my statement earlier at this meeting I expressed similar views. Mr. Hasanin Heykal, an adviser and close confidant of Egypt's President, expressed exactly the same views in *Al-Ahram* when he said that the United Nations is "a mere stage of free deliberations, without any difference between what is going on there and what visitors can see on the corners of Hyde Park in London". Apparently, General Dayan's views, the Israeli views, regarding the United Nations are shared by distinguished Egyptian leaders.

79. But I think I should take this opportunity to put on record a very interesting comment, a frank, realistic appraisal of how we the United Nations appear in the eyes of outside and objective observers. I quote from an article which appeared in the prestigious *New Statesman* on 4 May 1973. It was written by Paul Johnson, a former editor. He says:

"... the United Nations has become an arena for nation-State behaviour at its worst: hypocritical horse-trading, the formation of voting blocs united not by common principles but by the backstage bargains of *real-politik*, and the triumph of collective might over individual right. Moral issues have been settled by head-counting, and the claims of the guilty but well connected have been preferred to those of the innocent but friendless. The operations of the Arab bloc... have shown United Nations politics at its most disreputable, and most damaging to the institution itself. And the most frequent victim of the system has been Israel."

Apparently, the assessment which Minister El-Zayyat quoted from the interview with General Dayan is widely shared all over the world.

80. I said that I understood what the real purpose of Minister El-Zayyat's intervention here was as he went on quoting from the statement by Israel's Minister of Defence and reached the point at which he expressed his unhappiness with General Dayan's remarks regarding Palestine. All that Israel's Minister of Defence said is borne out by history. All of us are aware of the fact that the geographic area known as Palestine first came into being after the destruction of the Jewish State by the Romans and in an attempt to eliminate any reference to Jewish names. The political entity known as Palestine, which came into being artificially as a result of agreements between what the Arab delegations frequently call here the imperialist Powers in 1917-1918 after the First World War, was in fact partitioned, divided into two—Trans-Jordan and the West Bank—and disappeared as a political entity in 1948 when the State of Israel declared its independence. What is wrong, what is incorrect in this statement of historic fact?

81. But Minister El-Zayyat understandably is unhappy with this description because he is not satisfied with the fact that in the area of Palestine there are today two independent States—the Palestinian Arab State of Jordan

and the sovereign Jewish State. He has made it clear from the very beginning of this series of meetings that Egypt's intention, Egypt's objective, his own aspiration is to see the dismemberment of one of those independent States established within the area of Palestine, and perhaps the destruction of the other. Obviously, a comment by an Israeli reflecting known historic facts but contrary to the sinister designs of Egypt regarding the future of the area of Palestine, regarding Israel's sovereignty and independence, regarding Jordan's sovereignty and independence cannot be to the satisfaction of the Egyptian Foreign Minister.

82. The day before yesterday, on 23 July, President Sadat of Egypt made a speech on the occasion of the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. The most important points in it were: one, a reaffirmation of the Khartoum resolution of 1967—no peace, no agreement, no recognition of Israel; two, a reaffirmation of the view that there can be no political solution of the Middle East conflict and that war is the only way to resolve it; three, a reaffirmation of Egypt's unreserved support for the terrorist organizations; four, a reaffirmation of the notorious Egyptian two-stage doctrine, namely, first Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines and then the continuation of the struggle till the Palestinians achieve their aims—and these are well known: the destruction of Israel, the annihilation of its people.

83. I believe that not only the Israeli Government but all Governments attach particular importance to official statements by the Head of State of Egypt and consider them even more important than the statements delivered by Egyptian representatives to score tactical points in a Security Council debate, though these statements do reveal to a sufficient degree Egypt's true attitude and intentions. Indeed, if any documents can be considered as authoritative enunciations of the Egyptian position, they are the statements by Egypt's President. There can be no mistake about it in view of these facts. Support for Egypt in the present debate is in fact support for the warlike views and the sinister designs reflected in President Sadat's statement two days ago.

84. There is a story about how a man saw Nasr Ad-Din searching for something on the ground. "What have you lost, Mullah?", he asked. "My key", said the mullah. So they both went down on their knees and looked for it. After a time, and not being able to find the key, the man asked, "Where exactly did you drop it?" "In my own house", was the reply. "Then why are you looking for it here?" "You see", said the mullah, "there is more light here than inside my own house".

85. Now, it is true—and we are all aware of the fact—that there is probably more light in this chamber, perhaps, than in any other hall in any other part of the world. But to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt I would say: This is artificial light. The real light is there in the area, and if you are looking for the key, if you really want to find the way to peace with Israel, you will find it not here in the artificial light of the Security Council chamber, but in the Middle East, in contacts, in negotiation, in joint construction of peace with Israel.

86. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Jordan.

87. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan): I wish that the disagreement of Jordan with General Dayan was a semantic one or an academic one with regard to the geographical extent of Palestine and the application of the name, or with regard to the nature of the people. That, again, could have been ascertained by objective observers. Unfortunately, however, the fundamental disagreement is one based on the existence of General Dayan's troops on Jordanian territory, on Palestinian territory, on Arab territory. The solution to that is not academic and is not semantic. It can be brought about only by an act of will, by action, and if this is not done willingly by General Dayan's Government it will certainly be the responsibility of this Council to see to it that this matter, which is not semantic and not academic, is settled on the ground.

88. The PRESIDENT: There are no further names on the list of speakers. The Council now has before it the draft resolution contained in document S/10974, sponsored by the delegations of Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia. This was circulated last night and has just been introduced, as members have heard, by the representatives of India, Kenya, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. I understand that it is the wish of the sponsors that, before the draft resolution is put to the vote, the Council should adjourn for 24 hours to permit delegations to receive instructions. I trust this period will also be used for further consultations in the hope that this debate may have a positive outcome. Needless to say, if there is anything I can do as President to help in such consultations, I am at the disposal of the members of the Council.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.