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The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament taking place each year, together with a brief history of the ~~major aspects of the overall question~~. The series started with the 1976 edition.

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* makes no claim to present fully the views of States Members of the Organization, or even of the Powers directly concerned. The substantive debates in the various disarmament bodies are summarized and a representative sample of statements is presented. Thus the views of all Member States are not covered. For further information on the official positions of States, the reader should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly*, referred to throughout the text, and other sources. For the definitive text of General Assembly resolutions quoted in *The Yearbook*, the reader should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/41/53)*. *A/42/53*.

For an overview of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, readers may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.6). For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization, they may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1) and the previous volumes of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, which are referred to in footnotes throughout the text simply as *The Yearbook*, together with the appropriate volume number. The complete references are: *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2); vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4); vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales Nos. E.79.IX.2 (clothbound) or E.79.IX.3 (paperbound)); vol. 4: 1979 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.80.IX.6 or 7); vol. 5: 1980 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.3 or 4); vol. 6: 1981 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.6 or 7); vol. 7: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.7); vol. 8: 1983 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.84.IX.3); vol. 9: 1984 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.4); and vol. 10: 1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.7). *vol. 11: 1986 (UN pub. 86.57.IX.1)*

It should be noted that in the preparation of this as well as all previous volumes of *The Yearbook* identified above, the Secretariat of the United Nations has taken into account General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI), of 25 October 1971, entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations"

ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASAT	anti-satellite
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CAS	Committee on Assurances of Supply
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDE	Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EC	European Community
ENDC	Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
ENMOD	Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GTS	Global Telecommunication System
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IDFD	international disarmament fund for development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
INFCE	International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
INSAG	International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
ISMA	international satellite monitoring agency
LRINF	longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces
MIRV	multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TNCD	Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament
UNCPICPUNE	United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
WFUNA	World Federation of United Nations Associations
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

INTRODUCTION

THE ELEVENTH VOLUME of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* covers a period of intense disarmament activity, largely continued from 1985, or earlier in the case of most international and multilateral efforts. However, these various endeavours failed to reach fruition in the course of the year.

In his message to the multilateral negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament, the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted that an atmosphere more conducive to productive negotiations had been created following the summit meeting in Geneva between the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America late in 1985. He emphasized, however, that the improved international climate in no sense decreased the size of the task of reaching tangible disarmament agreements. He noted that the dangers of large arsenals of nuclear weapons had not diminished and that to them were being added ever-increasing stocks of conventional weapons. The Secretary-General also recognized the Conference's major role in the completion of much needed, practical agreements. In closing, he observed that 1986 was the International Year of Peace, which offered new opportunities to deal constructively with the problems which threatened international security. Foremost among those problems, he stated, was the problem of disarmament.

The 40-nation Conference once again made concerted efforts towards concluding further arms regulation and disarmament instruments. Intense negotiations continued with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the search for a comprehensive agreement banning chemical weapons, and tangible progress was made in that regard. Differences concerning a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament were narrowed somewhat during the year and the Conference agreed to resume its endeavour in order to present the General Assembly with an agreed draft in the early part of 1987. Discussions in plenary meetings and subsidiary bodies of the Conference continued to clarify the current positions of its members on all the substantive issues on its agenda. However, no subsidiary bodies were established to deal with the items concerning a nuclear test ban; cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament; the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; and security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the United Nations Disarmament Commission, six agenda items were addressed with dedication and dispatch. The Commission was able to formulate agreed draft guidelines on confidence-building measures, albeit with some alternative formulations, for the consideration of the General Assembly in 1986. In September, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe reached consensus on significant improvements in the confidence-building measures included in the

1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Also in September, another review of the operation of an existing disarmament agreement took place: the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Although not totally free of controversy, particularly on the verification and compliance provisions of the Convention, the Conference ended successfully with the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration.

The possibility of an early breakthrough in the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear and space arms had been among the promising signs early in the year. This hope did not materialize in October when the two met again at the summit level. Although agreeing in principle on important aspects, they could not agree on the entire package regarding all the nuclear and space arms issues before them. They acknowledged, however, that their dialogue must and would continue on the basis of the proposals advanced by the two sides in Reykjavik. That dialogue was maintained on other issues, including discussions, which commenced in July, on nuclear testing. In this context, it should be noted that the Soviet Union extended its unilateral moratorium on all such tests—which it had undertaken on 6 August 1985—through to the end of 1986.

During the proceedings of the General Assembly of the United Nations at its forty-first session, the First Committee—which deals with disarmament and related international security questions—considered no fewer than 75 draft resolutions on disarmament questions alone, and the Assembly adopted 65 resolutions and 2 decisions on the basis of those proposals. Although 22 of this large number were adopted by consensus, conflicting and competing viewpoints continued in evidence in the deliberations on many central disarmament questions.

The main developments and positions taken in the forums mentioned above and at other relevant gatherings throughout the year are covered briefly in the various chapters of *The Yearbook*.

The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs produces *The Yearbook* under a 1976 mandate of the General Assembly. The Department requests outside contributions to cover some specialized elements in the volume. Thus, the chapter on nuclear safeguards—chapter XII—as well as parts of the one on peaceful uses of nuclear energy—chapter XI—were contributed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Annex II to chapter XXII was contributed by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. As in other years, five appendices—II through VI—were contributed respectively by the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the World Meteorological Organization.

Appendix I, prepared by the Department on the basis of available information, shows actions taken during the calendar year on multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements and the status of those agreements at

the end of the year. Finally, appendix VII provides information on the resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session, including page references in the text. A handy reference list of disarmament resolutions follows the table of contents. This year, a new introductory chapter, entitled "United Nations disarmament bodies and their activities in 1986", has been added to provide the reader with an overview of the structure of the Organization's disarmament machinery and thus permit some simplification of other chapters, particularly those in part one of the volume.

The Yearbook is intended primarily as a reference work for Governments and disarmament specialists, but also as a source of information for anyone interested in specific multilateral disarmament issues. Thus it should be of particular value to educational institutions and World Disarmament Campaign constituencies involved with topical study projects and of considerable use to researchers in the area of global peace and security.

PART ONE

Comprehensive approaches to disarmament

United Nations disarmament bodies and their activities in 1986

Introduction

ACCORDING TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, the purpose of the Organization is, among other things, "to maintain international peace and security" (Article 1). The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of those goals, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to them to the Members of the Organization or to the Security Council or to both (Article 11). "In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources", the Security Council is responsible for formulating plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments (Article 26).

The Charter thus envisages disarmament and the regulation of armaments as elements in the establishment of an international security system. The first explosion of an atomic weapon only days after the signing of the Charter, as well as the possibility that other weapons of mass destruction might be developed and used, gave disarmament enhanced significance in such a system.

During the course of the subsequent four decades, the question of disarmament has been discussed at every session of the General Assembly, in numerous subsidiary bodies and in a variety of forums outside the United Nations. In seeking to discharge its responsibilities in the field, the United Nations has used several different approaches. In addition, the number of issues addressed in connection with disarmament negotiations and deliberations has grown greatly.¹

The institutional framework for dealing with disarmament and related international security problems within the United Nations system, whose origin is in the provisions of the Charter, has evolved through various stages

¹ For a brief history of disarmament efforts under United Nations auspices, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.6). For more extensive presentations of the developments in the field in specific periods, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1) and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1). For summaries of yearly developments regarding specific disarmament issues since 1976, see earlier editions of *The Yearbook*.

as a result of decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The most recent developments took place following the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, also referred to as the tenth special session.²

This chapter, specifically its following section, is intended to acquaint the reader with the institutional framework or “machinery” within which United Nations disarmament efforts are pursued at present. It also briefly refers to the development of that machinery to familiarize the reader with a number of the predecessors of present disarmament bodies mentioned in subsequent chapters. In another section, the chapter gives an overview of the activities of three principal disarmament bodies in 1986 and covers their consideration of institutional questions or, more generally, the role of the United Nations in disarmament.

Disarmament machinery

General Assembly

The General Assembly is composed of the representatives of all Member States. As indicated above, it can consider and make recommendations on any questions relating to international peace and security, except when a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council. Since the 1950s, the Assembly and its subsidiary bodies have in practice exercised the main influence in the field of disarmament. According to the Final Document of the 1978 special session, the General Assembly is and should remain the chief deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures. Furthermore, it should be informed of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.³ The Assembly is thus a permanent forum for disarmament deliberations and the main source of both initiatives and recommendations by the international community on the whole spectrum of disarmament-related issues. Its regular sessions ordinarily take place between September and December annually.

First Committee

The First Committee of the General Assembly, consisting of all Member States, is one of the seven Main Committees of the Assembly and is subject to its rules of procedure. As decided in the 1978 Final Document, the First Committee deals only with disarmament and related international security

² The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session appears in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III. It is reproduced in *extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I; it was also published as a pamphlet, No. DPL/679.

³ *Ibid.*, paras. 114-115.

questions.⁴ It approves relevant draft resolutions and recommends them to the Assembly for adoption. Like the other Main Committees, the First Committee elects a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur. It holds its sessions from October to November or December.

Special sessions of the General Assembly

In 1978 and 1982, the General Assembly convened two special sessions devoted entirely to the question of disarmament. In 1978, the first of those special sessions adopted by consensus a 129-paragraph Final Document,⁵ which included an introduction, a declaration, a programme of action and a section on international disarmament machinery. The Final Document proposed a wide range of disarmament measures intended to enhance the security of all nations at progressively lower levels of armaments and stressed the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, in accordance with the Charter. The Concluding Document of the second special session on disarmament, in 1982, also referred to as the twelfth special session,⁶ was largely procedural in nature. The validity of the 1978 Final Document was unanimously reaffirmed, with all Member States solemnly committing themselves to it and pledging to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action. The launching of the World Disarmament Campaign (see chapter XXI) was one of the tangible accomplishments of the session. For the follow-up of the special sessions on disarmament and the decision to hold a third special session in 1988, see chapter II.

Disarmament Commission

The Disarmament Commission provides a subsidiary forum for deliberation on disarmament issues as mandated by the General Assembly, when the Assembly is not in session. It is a successor to the earlier Disarmament Commission, established in 1952, which, although active in the 1950s, did not meet after 1965. According to the 1978 Final Document, which re-established it, the Disarmament Commission is a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, whose function it is to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special sessions. The Commission reports annually to the General Assembly. Like the First Committee, it is composed of all Member States of the Organization.⁷

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 117.

⁵ See footnote 2.

⁶ The Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly appears in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32; it is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix I.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 118.

It meets in New York for a substantive session of approximately four weeks, usually in May-June.

Ad hoc committees

The General Assembly has at times established *ad hoc* committees in order to deal with specific disarmament matters. For the past several years there have been two such committees, namely, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference (see chapter V) and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (see chapter XX).

Conference on Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament is, in the language of the 1978 Final Document, paragraph 120, the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international community. Its membership of 40 States includes all the 5 nuclear-weapon States and 35 others.⁸ The membership of non-nuclear-weapon States is reviewed at regular intervals. The Conference on Disarmament, which meets in Geneva and is known by the acronym "CD", was constituted in its present form in 1978. It held its first session in 1979, carrying forward the negotiating efforts of its predecessors, namely, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or CCD (1969-1978), the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament or ENDC (1962-1969) and the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament or TNCD (1959-1960). From 1979 to 1983, the Conference on Disarmament was known as the Committee on Disarmament. To avoid repetition, the phrases "the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva" and "the Geneva body" are frequently used in this volume to refer to any one of the above-mentioned bodies.

The Conference on Disarmament has a unique relationship with the United Nations. It is not a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. It defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly. In accordance with the agreement reached at the 1978 special session, the Conference works on the basis of consensus. It reports to the General Assembly annually or more often, as may be appropriate. The Secretary-General of the Conference is appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Conference, and also acts as his personal representative. The budget of the Conference is included in that of the United Nations, and the Conference holds its meetings on United Nations premises and is serviced by United Nations personnel. The work of the Conference is conducted in plenary meet-

⁸ The members of the Conference on Disarmament are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

ings or under any arrangement agreed upon by its members. Non-members may submit written proposals or working documents and may, upon invitation, participate in the discussions on substantive items on the agenda. The chairmanship rotates among all members, on a monthly basis. The Conference meets annually in Geneva for approximately six months, usually when the Assembly is not in session.

In 1979, the Geneva body agreed on a permanent agenda consisting of ten areas:

1. Nuclear weapons in all aspects.
2. Chemical weapons.
3. Other weapons of mass destruction.
4. Conventional weapons.
5. Reduction of military budgets.
6. Reduction of armed forces.
7. Disarmament and development.
8. Disarmament and international security.
9. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned.
10. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

From that so-called decalogue, the Conference on Disarmament adopts an annual agenda and programme of work. For its 1986 agenda, see page 18.

United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

The role the United Nations Secretariat plays in disarmament matters derives from the general functions of the Secretary-General as defined in the Charter and developed over the years through the decisions of the General Assembly and other disarmament bodies. Pursuant to resolution 37/99 K, section V, of 1982, which sought to strengthen the efforts of the Organization in the field of disarmament, the former Centre for Disarmament was transformed, on 1 January 1983, into a department headed by an Under-Secretary-General reporting directly to the Secretary-General.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies was established by the General Assembly at the 1978 special session to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies on disarmament to be made under the auspices of the United Nations. For further information on the Advisory Board and its activities in 1986, see chapter XXII.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was established on 1 October 1980 as an autonomous institution within the frame-

work of the United Nations. It undertakes independent research on disarmament and related security issues and works in close relationship with the Department for Disarmament Affairs. The Institute is located in Geneva and is financed partly by voluntary contributions from Governments and other sources and partly from the regular budget of the United Nations. UNIDIR is governed by a board of trustees composed of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies (see above) and the Director of the Institute. For further information on UNIDIR, see chapter XXII; for a summary of its 1986 activities, see the annex to that chapter.

International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an autonomous intergovernmental agency, was established in 1956. It has responsibility for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in March 1970, the Agency was entrusted with the task of concluding safeguards agreements with the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to cover all nuclear materials and their uses. Full parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) have also concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA. The Agency reports annually to the General Assembly and, as appropriate, to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The General Conference of IAEA has responsibility for the policies and programmes of the Agency and is composed of all its member States, including the five nuclear-weapon States. Thirty-four countries are represented on the Board of Governors, which is the policy-making body of the Agency. For more information on IAEA and its activities in 1986, see chapter XII.

Specialized agencies and other organs of the United Nations system

Some of the specialized agencies and other organs of the United Nations system, including the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), also carry out disarmament-related activities. For reports on such activities by those organizations in 1986, see appendices II to VI of this volume.

Activities of principal disarmament bodies in 1986

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission

In 1986, the Disarmament Commission held its substantive session from 5 to 23 May under the chairmanship of Mr. Henning Wegener of the Federal

Republic of Germany. In the course of the session, the Commission held eight plenary meetings⁹ and adopted at the end of its session its report to the General Assembly.¹⁰

As in previous years, the Commission had on its agenda an item on the consideration of various aspects of the arms race with a view to elaborating a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament. Another established item concerned the reduction of military budgets and aimed at, *inter alia*, “finalizing” (instead of “identifying and elaborating”, which was the wording used in previous years) the principles which should govern the further actions of States in that field. Another item which had been on the agenda of several sessions concerned the question of South Africa’s nuclear capability, and after a one-year interval, the Commission resumed the consideration of an item concerning the elaboration of guidelines for confidence-building measures. Two items which first appeared in 1985 and were carried over from that session dealt with a review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and the question of the naval arms race and disarmament (the formulation of the latter item had been considerably modified). The wording of the substantive agenda items was as follows:

4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;
- (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.
5. Reduction of military budgets:
 - (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
 - (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A, 37/95 A, 38/184 A, 39/64 A and 40/91 A, with a view to finalizing the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage.
6. Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa’s nuclear capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (resolutions 37/74 B, 38/181 B, 39/61 B and 40/89 B, and document A/CN.10/4).
7. Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.
8. Substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament.

⁹ A/CN.10/PV.102-109, A/CN.10/PV.109/Corr.1 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*.

9. Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level.¹¹

On 6 May the Commission decided to establish a committee of the whole to consider item 4. This task was later entrusted to a contact group, which would consider the item and report back to the Committee of the Whole. The Commission further decided to establish three working groups to deal with various items and make recommendations on them: Working Group I for item 5, Working Group II for item 7 and Working Group III for item 6. In addition, it approved the arrangement, announced in the Committee of the Whole, under which the Chairman of the Commission would undertake informal consultations on item 9 until such time as a consensus on a text should emerge or be imminent, justifying the establishment of a more formal body to take up the question. On 9 May, on the basis of his consultations on item 8, the Chairman stated that sustained substantive consultations, which should be structured, would be conducted on that item under his full responsibility.

On 5, 6 and 9 May, the Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items. On 23 May it considered the reports of Working Groups I, II and III, the reports of the Chairman on agenda items 8 and 9, and the report of the Committee of the Whole on item 4. The deliberations and report of Working Group II are dealt with in this chapter, which also contains a brief summary of the general exchange, particularly as it addressed institutional aspects. The work of the Contact Group is discussed in chapter VI. Working Groups I and III are dealt with in chapters XVIII and X, respectively. The Chairman's report on item 8 is covered in chapter III, and that on item 9, in chapter II.

By resolution 40/94 O of 12 December 1985, the General Assembly had requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, as a matter of priority at its 1986 substantive session, its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, with a view to elaborating concrete recommendations and proposals. Accordingly, the Disarmament Commission included that subject in its 1986 agenda as item 7, and in the general exchange of views more than 20 countries spoke on it. Their statements clearly reflected their belief that the United Nations role in the field should be maintained and possibly enhanced.

In his opening address, the Chairman commented on the specific role and significance of the Disarmament Commission. In his opinion, its unique feature was its selective agenda, which enabled it to have in-depth deliberations with a view to elaborating specific recommendations to the General Assembly. Another advantage was that, in contrast to the Conference on Disarmament, all members of the United Nations could participate in the proceedings of the Commission. The Chairman further stated that the rule of consensus, which in previous years had been carefully observed on all substantive issues, had had a beneficial effect. Those properties, he believed, made the Commission an indispensable link in the multilateral disarmament process; yet its potential had not been fully realized.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

In Sweden's view, the disarmament machinery, established at the General Assembly's 1978 special session, had worked well. Institutional reforms had improved the capacity of the United Nations to meet the need of all States to participate directly in efforts to build security through disarmament. What was required was to let the United Nations bodies perform their institutional functions. Thus, the Conference on Disarmament, as a negotiating forum, should be allowed to negotiate and, in the same way, the Disarmament Commission, as a deliberative forum, should be allowed to deliberate. Sweden welcomed the continued attention the Commission gave to the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and believed that discussion on that subject could serve to prepare for a more thorough evaluation at the envisaged third special session devoted to disarmament.

Yugoslavia held that the Commission had contributed to clarification of some issues in the fields of nuclear disarmament, common security, and confidence-building measures and to better and more substantial dissemination of information on the gravity of disarmament matters. Referring to the accident at the Chernobyl atomic electric station, which in its view proved that those who had been calling for nuclear disarmament had been correct, Yugoslavia stated that the United Nations and the specialized agencies, particularly IAEA, should be put to immediate use in such cases.

India expressed its firm conviction that the "sorry state of affairs in the multilateral disarmament effort" was due to the political problems encountered by various international disarmament forums. Therefore it would be a grave error, it believed, to exaggerate the institutional aspects when examining the reasons for the failure to make progress in disarmament since 1978. The Commission should concern itself with devising ways to strengthen the collective commitment of the Organization's Member States to the process of disarmament in conformity with the 1978 Final Document. However, India added, a distinction must be drawn between the failure in the specific field of disarmament and the overall deterioration of the situation relating to international peace and security.

In Egypt's opinion, the Commission was a vital component of the United Nations system for the consideration of disarmament issues. It was therefore incumbent upon the members to promote its effectiveness in providing recommendations which would have a positive impact on disarmament negotiations. Burma agreed with that view and added that all States should be involved in the crucial multilateral disarmament efforts. There was a need to seriously examine the erosion of multilateralism, which was adversely affecting the prospects for disarmament.

Argentina believed that the role of the United Nations in disarmament depended on three distinct factors, namely: (a) adequate machinery; (b) the readiness of the Member States to make full use of it; and (c) existing international conditions. Both the multilateralism that the United Nations represented and the bilateral approach used by the two military alliances were necessary, because the first ensured that all Member States could participate in discussions on world security and the second enabled the alliances to seek the reduction and elimination of weapons which they alone possessed. Brazil

observed among the Member States a deeply felt frustration at the non-fulfilment of the commitment to the multilateral negotiation of the priority issues of disarmament. Uruguay recognized that, despite the prevailing adverse situation, the United Nations disarmament system had offered a good environment for developing new ideas and new formulas for action and for harmonizing the will of Member States.

The Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, expressed the hope that at the session it would be possible to identify a number of key questions regarding the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The timely and salutary analysis and recommendations contained in the document¹² submitted by Cameroon to the Commission's 1985 substantive session provided an excellent starting-point, as did the other responses to resolution 39/151 G of 17 December 1984, by which the General Assembly had invited all States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on how the United Nations could more effectively exercise its central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament.¹³ The Twelve believed the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies could play a central role in rationalizing and co-ordinating the conduct of disarmament studies. Although such a role could have disadvantages as well, it was necessary in the light of the Organization's financial difficulties.

Australia held that the disarmament machinery was not working well. However, it also believed that it would be unedifying and wasteful if the Disarmament Commission entered into a sterile debate on who was to blame for what was going wrong. A first step in the right direction might be for the Commission to report to the General Assembly at its forty-first session its powerful reaffirmation of the intrinsic importance of the multilateral disarmament effort and, at the same time, its conviction that the machinery available for that effort needed to be improved. Japan stated that the countries with major military capabilities should maintain a positive attitude towards the United Nations role in disarmament. Norway stressed the need to streamline and rationalize the First Committee's work procedures. Although some improvements in the procedures and practices had made the Committee more efficient, there was still room for improvement, it believed.

The Soviet Union felt the existing United Nations machinery for considering disarmament and security in general was quite in accord with the current tasks of the Organization, even though it might be improved. However, it was inadmissible, under the pretext of a so-called rationalization of procedures, the Soviet Union stated, to attempt to neutralize United Nations activities in the field of disarmament and render them ineffective. The main thrust should be to demonstrate a readiness to strive for tangible and conclusive results. In the Soviet view, the functioning of disarmament machinery could be revitalized by breaking out of the inertia of formalism and routine.

Bulgaria believed that lack of progress was not due to insufficiencies in the negotiating machinery of the United Nations, but to a lack of desire on

¹² A/CN.10/71.

¹³ A/CN.10/69 and Add.1-8 and A/CN.10/79.

the part of certain Western countries to agree to practical measures of disarmament. Similarly, Czechoslovakia stressed that it was necessary to make better use of the existing machinery, rather than merely try to reorganize it. Even the best system could not work well without the political goodwill and co-operation of States. This view was shared by the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Viet Nam and Cuba. Poland urged the United Nations to direct the total impact of its authority and dedication to the cause of disarmament. Romania stated that the United Nations must be increasingly involved in the question of disarmament and concentrate on stimulating the political will of States, first and foremost the nuclear-weapon and other heavily armed States, to start action aimed at preventing war, halting the arms race, promoting the non-militarization of outer space and eliminating nuclear weapons.

China, like several other speakers, emphasized that the United Nations role in disarmament was determined mainly by political factors. Therefore, it hoped that the right of the United Nations and the Geneva multilateral negotiating body to consider and negotiate on all the major disarmament issues of far-reaching significance would be reiterated and reaffirmed in the relevant proposals to be submitted by the Commission to the General Assembly. The appropriate relationship between the United Nations deliberations and multilateral negotiations, on the one hand, and bilateral, small-scale or regional negotiations, on the other, should be made clear, China stated.

Working Group II, under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon, held two formal and seven informal meetings between 7 and 21 May on the subject of the Organization's role in disarmament. The Chairman also conducted informal consultations within the Group during that period. The Group decided that the previous year's paper entitled "Topics for appropriate recommendations"¹⁴ would serve as its programme of work. In its report to the Commission,¹⁵ it listed the large number of documents, proposals and papers submitted to it in 1986. Among them were the replies of Member States to the Secretary-General regarding the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, referred to above, and a conference room paper, later withdrawn,¹⁶ containing findings, recommendations and proposals that had been prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group. A number of suggestions for possible recommendations were put forward; however, it was not possible to reach agreement on them.

On 21 May the Working Group adopted by consensus a recommendation to the effect that the Disarmament Commission should continue work on the item as a matter of priority at its 1987 session, with a view to elaborating concrete recommendations and proposals.

In concluding statements on 23 May, a number of countries reaffirmed

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/40/42)*, annex V. The document is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985. chap. II.

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*, para. 30.

¹⁶ A/CN.10/84 and Corr.1.

their belief that if a constructive attitude were displayed on all sides, the United Nations would be able to play a central role in the field of disarmament. It was also thought that progress could be more easily achieved if the debate focused on a few key aspects of the question. It was further suggested that the above-mentioned paper by the Chairman of the Working Group should form the basis of the Commission's deliberations on the item in 1987.

The Chairman of the Commission held that there was a good prospect that the item could be completed in a manner satisfactory to all at the following annual session of the Commission.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament

In 1986 the Conference on Disarmament held its session in two parts, as is customary, from 4 February to 25 April and from 10 June to 29 August. During this period the Conference held 49 formal plenary meetings and 35 informal meetings. The following member States assumed the presidency of the Conference: Australia for February, Belgium for March, Brazil for April and the recess between the first and second parts of the session, Bulgaria for June, Burma for July and Canada for August and the recess until the beginning of the 1987 session. At the end of the session, the Conference submitted a report on its work to the General Assembly.¹⁷

On 4 February the Conference reaffirmed the 10 areas within which it had decided, in 1979, to deal with the question of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament (see page 11). Within that framework, the Conference adopted the following agenda, which was the same as the previous year's:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.¹⁸

At the same meeting, the Conference agreed on a programme of work for the first part of its session to ensure that adequate time would be devoted to consideration of all the items on the agenda; it did likewise on 19 June for the second part of its session.

On 6 February the Conference decided to re-establish, for the duration of its 1986 session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons (the work

¹⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27)*.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

of which is described in chapter XIII). At the same meeting, the President made a statement noting that there was no need to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (chapter IV) and that its Chairman would continue to preside over that subsidiary body. On 4 March, the Conference decided to re-establish, for the duration of its 1986 session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons (chapter XVI), and on 24 April, it likewise re-established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (chapter XV).

A number of States which were not members of the Conference were invited to participate, upon their request, in the discussions on the substantive agenda items. The countries which thus took part in plenary meetings and/or *Ad Hoc* Committees were: Austria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Holy See,¹⁹ Iraq, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland,¹⁹ Turkey, Uruguay and Viet Nam. The Conference continued to consider the possibility of increasing its membership by nominating four additional States: two by the group of 21,²⁰ and one each by the socialist²¹ and the Western States,²² so as to maintain balance. It did not, however, take a decision on the matter in 1986.²³

In his opening statement at the beginning of the Conference's 1986 session, the President for February, Mr. Richard Butler of Australia, noted that the current form of the Conference originated with the 1978 Final Document. A fundamental concept involved in the stated role and purpose of the Conference was the member States' common responsibility for ensuring that disarmament played its required role in the maintenance of peace and security and in the fabric of international relations established under the Charter. But equally important was the universal recognition that a favourable outcome in the endeavours towards arms control and disarmament required participation by the wider international community and an active and productive process of multilateral negotiation of relevant agreements. In his view, it was necessary to recognize the crucial importance of success in the bilateral negotiations under way between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it would also be short-sighted to dismiss the role and importance of multilateral engagement in the vital issues of arms control and disarmament.

In statements made in plenary meetings,²⁴ a number of members addressed institutional questions, particularly the role of the Conference in

¹⁹ Non-Member of the United Nations.

²⁰ The term the "group of 21" refers to the non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Conference on Disarmament not associated with the major blocs. They are: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

²¹ The term the "group of socialist States" refers to the "Eastern European States" members of the Conference on Disarmament, which are: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and USSR.

²² The "Western" members of the Conference on Disarmament are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States.

²³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27)*, paras. 14-17.

²⁴ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

disarmament efforts. Argentina believed that the resumption of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union should be accompanied by a stepping-up of the multilateral negotiations. Accordingly, it would be appropriate to give a political boost to disarmament negotiations in the Conference. India held that the adoption of the 1978 Final Document had been a remarkable political achievement. The commitment of the entire membership of the United Nations to the continuation of the sole multilateral negotiating body manifested the collective political will to negotiate measures for arms limitation and disarmament.

The Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran declared that the central role of the United Nations should be preserved and that any dialogue outside its framework should be reported to it comprehensively. In particular, countries possessing nuclear and chemical weapons were duty bound to recognize the focal role of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament. Nigeria stressed that the question of disarmament should remain the concern of all countries, and accordingly bilateral negotiations should be seen only as complementary to multilateral ones.

Belgium noted that one advantage of the Conference was the participation of the main protagonists in the negotiations. It asked what the significance of negotiations on certain weapons would be if the members of the Conference possessing the weapons were absent from the negotiations or participated in them reluctantly. Canada held that the Conference, a disarmament body unique in its representative membership and autonomy, must take responsibility for the results of its labours, be they meagre or substantial. It also pointed out that the Conference did not conduct its work in a vacuum, as events around the globe impinged upon it and affected its priorities and atmosphere. France noted that the multilateral domain of disarmament had its own dynamics, and it saw signs of progress in the areas of chemical weapons, confidence-building and conventional weapons. It added that there was hope for the prospects of disarmament in general and the future of the Conference, if the member States did not miss opportunities which arose and if they avoided polemics and quarrels over procedure.

Hungary, speaking on behalf of the group of socialist States, expressed the conviction that in the existing circumstances no State or group of States could construct its own security through military force and without solving the fundamental problem of the modern world, disarmament. Reliable security for all countries could be ensured only through political means and activation of the entire machinery that had evolved for disarmament negotiations, including the Conference on Disarmament, with its broadly representative nature. Bulgaria hoped that in the current session, which followed a fruitless period in negotiations, the Conference would be able to respond to expectations of a breakthrough. Poland held that the Conference should make broad use of the ideas included in the programme which the Soviet Union had recently proposed, the essence of which Poland described as getting rid of weapons of mass destruction by the end of the century.

Consideration by the General Assembly

The General Assembly held a general debate²⁵ in its plenary meetings between 22 September and 10 October, during which a considerable number of Member States addressed disarmament questions.

The First Committee held a procedural meeting on 16 September and the rest of its session between 8 October and 26 November. Mr. Siegfried Zachmann of the German Democratic Republic was elected Chairman, Mr. Douglas Roche of Canada and Mr. Morihisa Aoki of Japan were elected Vice-Chairmen, and Mr. Doulaye Corentin Ki of Burkina Faso was elected Rapporteur. The Committee held 59 meetings; however, it completed the consideration of the agenda items concerning disarmament questions at its 48th meeting, on 18 November.

On 20 September the General Assembly decided to allocate 25 of its agenda items to the First Committee. Subsequently, on 14 October, the Assembly decided to include an item concerning Israeli nuclear armament in the agenda of its forty-first session and to allocate it to the First Committee as well. The following 21 items allocated to the First Committee concerned disarmament:

1. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).
2. Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
3. Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
4. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General.
5. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General.
6. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Secretary-General.
7. Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
8. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
9. Prevention of an arms race in outer space:
 - (a) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
10. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/88 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
11. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa:
 - (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.

²⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 32nd and 94th and 96th meetings.

12. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
13. Reduction of military budgets:
 - (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (b) Reports of the Secretary-General.
14. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
15. General and complete disarmament:
 - (a) Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Conventional disarmament on a regional scale: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (c) Conventional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (d) Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (e) Study on concepts of security: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (f) Naval armaments and disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (g) Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (h) Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans: report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (i) Objective information on military matters: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (j) Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission.
16. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures: report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (b) Disarmament and international security: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (c) World Disarmament Campaign: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (d) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/151 C on a nuclear-arms freeze;
 - (e) Freeze on nuclear weapons;
 - (f) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (g) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (h) United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (i) Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
17. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session:
 - (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (c) Status of multilateral disarmament agreements: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (d) Comprehensive programme of disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (e) Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies: report of the Secretary-General;

- (f) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: report of the Director of the Institute;
 - (g) Study on deterrence: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (h) Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (i) Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (j) Disarmament Week: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (k) Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (l) United Nations disarmament studies: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (m) Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (n) Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session:
 - (i) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (ii) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (iii) Verification in all its aspects: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (o) Prevention of nuclear war: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
18. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.
 19. World Disarmament Conference: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.
 20. Relationship between disarmament and development: report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.
 21. Israeli nuclear armament.²⁶

In addition, five agenda items on related security questions were allocated to the First Committee, namely, the items on the question of Antarctica, strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region, review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

In accordance with the programme of work it adopted on 8 October, the First Committee²⁷ held a general debate and heard statements on specific disarmament items from 13 October to 4 November. It considered and took action on draft resolutions from 5 to 18 November.

The First Committee's recommendations on disarmament items were considered by the General Assembly and the corresponding resolutions were adopted in plenary meetings on 3 and 4 December. Altogether, the Assembly adopted 65 resolutions on disarmament, 20 of them without a vote, and two decisions, both without a vote.

During the general debate in the First Committee, many delegations

²⁶ A/C.1/41/1 and Add.1.

²⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*. 3rd to 59th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

reaffirmed the view that the United Nations should have a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. Austria stressed its belief in the vital role of multilateral diplomacy and considered that the discussion on the subject was very timely. The United Nations machinery provided an appropriate framework for efforts in disarmament, and after the necessary rationalization of the workload, the Organization and, in particular, the First Committee could do even better. Cameroon held that the United Nations provided the opportunity to build an international security policy recognizing both the commonality of the threat to mankind and the unique concerns of specific countries. It regretted that in reality the world body had rarely been the primary forum for major disarmament negotiations. It hoped that the signs of change in super-Power relations would indicate the end of their by-passing the United Nations while adopting declarations on its central role, a practice that undermined its credibility in the eyes of the international public.

Mexico recalled the Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986 (see page 63), which stressed that in order to make progress in disarmament, the United Nations must be strengthened and its Charter, as well as treaties relating to disarmament, must be observed in both letter and spirit. Bhutan noted that in spite of the efforts of the United Nations, the international community had yet to witness any serious arms control or disarmament process in which all Member States participated on an equal footing. A practical way to increase the role of the United Nations, Finland believed, would be to create a verification data base compiled and managed by the Organization.

The Soviet Union declared itself in favour of enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations disarmament machinery and of holding a productive third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1988. It supported the proposal put forward by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a comprehensive examination of the question of resolutions on disarmament, aimed at, *inter alia*, reducing their number, but held that it was even more important to ensure that Member States respected the political obligations they had assumed in connection with United Nations recommendations, particularly those adopted by consensus. Poland agreed with that view, stating that there was an urgent need to activate consideration of a number of important disarmament issues in the Conference on Disarmament. It further held that the First Committee's deliberations should be oriented not only towards consensus, but also towards action. Mongolia was convinced that the international community had the necessary machinery to resolve the urgent problems of disarmament, but that it should be used more actively and intensively.

The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, affirmed that arms control and disarmament had a central role in the achievement of the goals set out in the Charter of the United Nations and that measures to enhance security at the lowest possible levels of armaments were vital for the Twelve. Speaking for the group of Western European and Other States, the Federal Republic of Germany expressed their firmly held view that the United Nations provided a unique public forum for presenting the views of its Members on the vital issues of

disarmament. The Organization had done much to shape public opinion world-wide about the necessity of arms control and disarmament. In Italy's opinion, the negotiations on a ban on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament provided the United Nations with a chance for a major success in its role in disarmament.

On 30 October, 58 mostly non-aligned countries, later joined by 6 others,²⁸ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". It was introduced on 6 November by Cameroon, which noted that the draft was essentially procedural. Its aim was to review the role of the United Nations in the entire field with a view to rendering it more effective. In its operative part, the most important element was the request to the Disarmament Commission to continue, as a matter of priority, its consideration of the item on that subject, and to submit its report, including conclusions, findings and recommendations as appropriate, to the General Assembly at its forty-second session. Cameroon believed that the results of the Commission's work would have a bearing on the judgement of Member States and of the international public regarding the role and credibility not only of the Commission, but also of the United Nations as a whole. It hoped that Member States would rise collectively to the occasion to ensure that, in the future, the Organization truly exercised its central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament.

In connection with the action on the draft resolution in the First Committee, Uruguay made a statement in which it called for realism, determination and clarity of purpose in strengthening the Organization's role in disarmament. It stressed that it was essential for resolutions to be of such a nature as to lead to effective action, and was concerned about the proliferation of draft resolutions in the First Committee, many of which were formulated in such a way as to go beyond the actual decision-making power of the Organization. Finally, Uruguay expressed its belief that the United Nations was in a position immediately to broaden its role in the international verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. India considered that no substantive progress had been made in disarmament, especially in recent years, because of political problems encountered by multilateral disarmament forums and not because of any institutional limitations. A commitment from the militarily significant States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and members of military alliances, was a prerequisite for progress in the area.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 3 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 41/59 O. It reads as follows:

²⁸ The sponsors were: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Zambia.

The General Assembly.

Recalling its resolutions 39/151 G of 17 December 1984 and 40/94 O of 12 December 1985,

Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security,

Reaffirming its conviction that genuine and lasting peace can be created only through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Reaffirming further that the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Recognizing the need for the United Nations, in discharging its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, to play a more active role in the field of disarmament in accordance with its primary purpose under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

Taking into account the part of the report of the Disarmament Commission relating to this question,

1. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as a matter of priority at its next substantive session, in 1987, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, taking into account, *inter alia*, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the aforementioned documents on the subject;

2. *Requests further* the Disarmament Commission to submit its report on the subject, including findings, recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission"

On 30 October, Australia, Burma, Cameroon, Ecuador, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Peru, Poland and Uganda submitted a draft resolution entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission", which was later also sponsored by Liberia. In introducing it on 5 November, Australia stated that its fundamental purpose was to enable the Assembly to take note of the Disarmament Commission's report on its 1986 session. The text also drew attention to some particular issues in the report, which the Assembly was asked to note as well. The representative of Australia added that the draft had been the subject of intensive consultations and, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the Commission, he commended it to the Committee for its unanimous acceptance.

On 10 November, the First Committee approved the draft without a vote.

Explaining its position in the Committee, India stated that it supported the consensus on the understanding that the Commission should continue to consider and make recommendations on disarmament problems and to follow up the recommendations of the Assembly's special sessions on disarmament. While it appreciated the progress made by the Commission on a few of the items on its agenda, it regretted that there had been little forward movement on a number of priority issues. The United States noted that the Commission's agenda for its 1987 session had not yet been set. Recalling that it had opposed the inclusion of one item during the 1986 session, it held that each agenda item should be addressed on its own merits.

On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft, also without a vote, as resolution 41/86 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Taking into account the relevant sections of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979, 35/152 F of 12 December 1980, 36/92 B of 9 December 1981, 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, 38/183 E of 20 December 1983, 39/148 R of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 F of 16 December 1985,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. *Notes* that the Disarmament Commission has yet to conclude its consideration of some items on its agenda, but notes also with appreciation that the Commission has transmitted to the General Assembly for consideration draft guidelines for the appropriate type of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level, and that progress has also been achieved on other items;
3. *Recalls* the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;
4. *Stresses* the importance for the Disarmament Commission to work on the basis of a relevant agenda of disarmament topics, thereby enabling the Commission to concentrate its efforts and thus optimize its progress on specific subjects in accordance with resolution 37/78 H;
5. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations, at its 1987 substantive session, on the outstanding items on its agenda, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the results of its 1986 substantive session;
6. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1987 and to submit a substantive report, containing specific recommendations on the items included in its agenda, to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the forty-first session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;
8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission"

Two different draft resolutions entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament" were submitted. On 30 October, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire submitted one draft, which was later also sponsored by Ecuador and Kenya. It was introduced on 5 November by Yugoslavia, which

stated that in the sponsors' opinion the Conference on Disarmament had a very important role to play in negotiations on priority issues of disarmament facing the international community. However, they felt that the 1986 report of the Conference gave cause for serious concern. Yet another session had elapsed without concrete agreements and the results achieved in some areas were still below what was needed. Such a state of affairs was unacceptable to the international community. The sponsors wished to emphasize that the Conference should not be further denied the right to discuss the substantive issues concerning the common destiny of mankind. Nothing was being done to detract from the great importance of the bilateral negotiations of the super-Powers, but those negotiations must be followed by multilateral negotiations, an important element in which was the Conference on Disarmament, Yugoslavia concluded.

Also on 30 October, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom submitted another draft resolution entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament", which was subsequently also sponsored by Japan, Portugal and Spain. In introducing the draft on 5 November, the Netherlands expressed the sponsors' opinion that the spirit of consensus that, they believed, had led to a balanced report of the Conference on Disarmament in 1986, agreed to by all, should be reflected in a resolution related to that report. It noted that encouraging progress had been made during the 1986 session, particularly in the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons. In the sponsors' view, the Geneva body remained the single multilateral negotiating body operating within the framework of the United Nations.

On 12 November the sponsors of the second draft submitted a revision. On 14 November the Netherlands further revised the draft orally, stating that it regretted that it had not been possible thus far to reach consensus on a draft resolution concerning the report of the Conference. It assured the Committee that the members of the group which it represented at the Conference were not against negotiations on various items. In a further attempt to reach consensus, the Netherlands suggested the deletion of one operative paragraph from the draft it had introduced.

In connection with the action on the two draft resolutions in the First Committee, 11 delegations explained their positions on either both or one of the drafts.

Among those addressing the two resolutions, Bolivia and Burma gave affirmative votes on both. Burma stated that it supported the draft introduced by the Netherlands because it believed it was purely procedural in nature, and that support for that draft did not diminish its support for the principles and objectives contained in the draft introduced by Yugoslavia. Bolivia supported both drafts because of the importance it attached to the follow-up of the tenth special session. It regretted that the sponsors of the two draft resolutions had not found it possible to reach agreement on a single text.

Mexico and the Soviet Union explained their positive votes on the draft introduced by Yugoslavia and their abstentions on the draft introduced by the

Netherlands. Mexico, which was a sponsor of the first-mentioned draft, held that it accurately reflected the situation in the Conference. In Mexico's view, the sponsors were justified in expressing deep concern that the Conference had not been able to reach concrete agreements on any disarmament issues to which the United Nations had assigned priority and which had been under consideration for a number of years. It was also relevant to call on the Conference to provide the existing *ad hoc* committees with appropriate negotiating mandates. As the other draft did not refer to such factors, which Mexico considered essential, it abstained in the vote on it. The Soviet Union noted that although the report of the Conference on Disarmament was a consensus document, it reflected divergencies among member States as to whether or not the Conference should start negotiations on certain priority items. That was the basic difference reflected by the two drafts. The Soviet Union felt, therefore, that it was necessary to have an answer from the General Assembly to such questions and to know what the majority of States thought in that regard.

Australia, which was a sponsor of the draft introduced by the Netherlands, explained its affirmative vote on that draft and its abstention on the one introduced by Yugoslavia. It believed that the latter drew selectively from arguments made in drawing up the 1986 report of the Conference. In its view, such an approach was inevitably distorted and therefore not acceptable. The Conference's report had been adopted by consensus and its content reflected adequately the agreements and disagreements characteristic of its work. It made no sense to seek to reopen that discussion. In Australia's view, the First Committee should act on the report by consensus.

Among those stating their positions on one of the texts, the United Kingdom explained its negative vote on the draft introduced by Yugoslavia. Like Australia, it stressed that the Conference's report was an agreed report. It felt that in recent years the language of the draft resolutions on the subject had become unbalanced and regretted that the sponsors had failed to discuss the draft with all members of the Conference.

Nigeria gave an explanation of its positive vote on the draft introduced by the Netherlands. In its view, the text was purely procedural. It regretted that it had not been possible to undertake adequate consultations with a view to merging that draft with the other one, which it had co-sponsored. Nigeria hoped that a spirit of co-operation would prevail in the future deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament.

Four countries explained their abstentions on the draft introduced by the Netherlands. Argentina believed that a resolution on the report of the Conference should be adopted by consensus, in the same way as that on the report of the Disarmament Commission, which also reflected divergent points of view. In Brazil's opinion, even the revised draft remained flawed because it did not explicitly mention the priority issues of disarmament as agreed upon in the 1978 Final Document. Peru expressed a preference for the draft introduced by Yugoslavia, which it—like Brazil—had sponsored, because it was clear and unequivocal about the mandate of the Conference and its central role in disarmament. In any case, it would have preferred one single resolution

on a subject so sensitive and important. Yugoslavia believed that the Conference on Disarmament should not be a body negotiating on only some selected questions of disarmament, nor a forum that would only discuss such questions. It was not acceptable that certain members singled out, in accordance with their interests, which questions the Conference could or could not negotiate on. The Conference should be a body that would negotiate on all the substantive issues of disarmament on its agenda. Further, it was not enough to call upon it to continue its work; the General Assembly could and should point to the priority issues of disarmament and request it to conduct negotiations on them. Yugoslavia wanted to convey an unequivocal and precise message to the Conference concerning the need to proceed to negotiations on key issues of disarmament. The draft introduced by the Netherlands, in its opinion, did not contain such a message.

On 14 November the First Committee approved the draft introduced by Yugoslavia by a recorded vote of 110 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 18 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it on 4 December by a recorded vote of 133 to 3, with 17 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 M. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979, 35/152 J of 12 December 1980, 36/92 F of 9 December 1981, 37/78 G of 9 December 1982, 38/183 I of 20 December 1983, 39/148 N of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 M of 16 December 1985.

Recalling also the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Reaffirming that the establishment of *ad hoc* committees offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and contributes to the strengthening of the negotiating role of the Conference,

Deploring the fact that, despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly and the expressed wish of the great majority of members of the Conference on Disarmament, the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament was once again prevented during the 1986 session of the Conference,

Deploring also the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has not been enabled to set up *ad hoc* committees under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", and on the prevention of nuclear war,

Noting with satisfaction that further progress has been made in the negotiations on the elaboration of a draft convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

1. *Expresses its deep concern and disappointment* that the Conference on Disarmament has not been enabled, this year either, to reach concrete agreements on any disarmament issues to which the United Nations has assigned greatest priority and urgency and which have been under consideration for a number of years;

2. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, to further its mandate more earnestly through negotiations and to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament;

3. *Once again urges* the Conference on Disarmament to continue or to undertake, during

its 1987 session, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and other resolutions of the Assembly on those questions;

4. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to provide the existing *ad hoc* committees with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, the *ad hoc* committees under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war;

5. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, without further delay, negotiations with a view to elaborating a draft treaty on a nuclear-test ban;

6. *Also urges* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its work with a view to completing negotiations on a draft convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

7. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament"

On 14 November the First Committee approved the draft introduced by the Netherlands, as orally revised, by a recorded vote of 70 to none, with 56 abstentions. On 4 December the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 101 to none, with 50 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 P. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the relevant portions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in particular paragraph 120,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, should play a central role in the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which the Conference adopted by consensus,

1. *Takes note* of the report on the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament"

On 30 October Iraq submitted a draft resolution entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session". In introducing the draft on 5 November, it noted that the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament provided for the right of all non-members to participate in its work. It also noted that the Conference adopted its resolutions by consensus. While Iraq supported that practice, it regretted that it was being interpreted in such a way as to give members the right of veto. It believed that interpretations which it considered to be contrary to the rules of procedure would have the effect of undermining the principal goals of the multilateral negotiating body, since important questions required the presence of the interested countries. The draft underscored the need to prevent misuse of the rules of procedure and urged that non-members of the Conference not be deprived of their right to participate in disarmament negotiations.

On 6 November Iraq and Jordan submitted a revised draft resolution.

At the time that action was taken on the draft in the First Committee, eight delegations explained their positions on it.

Among those voting in favour, France stated that its positive vote signalled its agreement with the general goal of the draft. However, it had reservations on operative paragraph 2 (see below), as it might be interpreted as inviting the member States of the Conference on Disarmament to renounce the rules concerning decision-making. It would be preferable, in its view, for the Assembly to express the wish that the members of the Conference reply favourably to requests made by non-member States for the right to speak in plenary meetings. Iraq stated its concern over what it called the practice of taking advantage of the rules of procedure to achieve narrow political gains, even if those gains worked against the interests and functions of the Conference itself. It believed that no Member State of the United Nations should be barred by any Conference member for any reason from contributing its share to the Conference's work, which was not much different from that of any other United Nations body. Israel voted in favour of the draft because it held that the Conference should be open to all Members of the United Nations wishing to attend as observers and to make statements. However, it questioned the appropriateness of Iraq's motives in introducing the draft resolution in the Committee.

Five delegations which had abstained in the vote on the draft also gave explanations. Burma, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sweden and the United Kingdom abstained because they considered that the question involved was a matter for the Conference and should be decided in accordance with its rules of procedure. Iran added that the Conference on Disarmament was a negotiating forum rather than a deliberative body. Therefore, it believed, the rules of procedure should not be interpreted in such a way as to change the nature and aim of the Conference. New Zealand did not think that the Assembly should comment on the procedures of the Conference, but considered that the Conference had an obligation to ensure that the spirit of its rules of procedure was respected. New Zealand and Sweden did not support the request to the Secretary-General in operative paragraph 3 (see below).

On 14 November the First Committee approved the revised draft by a recorded vote of 108 to none, with 19 abstentions. On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 18 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 39/148 L of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 J of 16 December 1985,

Noting with concern that the problem identified in the above-mentioned resolutions has not been alleviated.

Firmly convinced that all States have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Bearing in mind paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it affirmed that all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, as well as paragraphs 120 (g) and (h) of the Final Document,

Recalling further its resolution 38/183 F of 20 December 1983, in which it called upon the Governments of all States to contribute substantially, *inter alia*, to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war,

1. *Reiterates once more* the right of all States not members of the Conference on Disarmament to participate in the work of the plenary sessions of the Conference on substantive questions;

2. *Urges* States members of the Conference on Disarmament not to misuse the rules of procedure of the Conference so as to prevent States not members from exercising their right to participate in the work of the Conference;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.

Conclusion

In 1986, questions pertaining to the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and to disarmament machinery were addressed in all the principal disarmament bodies. The Disarmament Commission, which had on its agenda a specific item concerning the Organization's role, discussed a broad range of issues related to it. A number of suggestions for possible recommendations were put forward, but it was not possible to reach consensus on them. The Commission decided to recommend to the General Assembly that its work on the item be continued as a matter of priority at its 1987 session. By resolution 41/59 O, the General Assembly unanimously requested the Commission to continue consideration of the Organization's role in disarmament with a view to elaborating specific recommendations.

In the Conference on Disarmament, the significance of the multilateral negotiations on disarmament was generally reaffirmed. However, the two resolutions subsequently adopted by the General Assembly on the report of the Conference reflected different views. On the one hand, the non-aligned countries sponsoring resolution 41/86 M expressed concern at what they considered lack of results in the negotiations and emphasized the right of the Conference to discuss the substance of issues concerning the common destiny of mankind. On the other, the mostly Western countries initiating resolution 41/86 P emphasized the balanced nature of the Conference's consensus report and the progress they believed was made during the 1986 session, particularly on chemical weapons. A number of delegations regretted that it had not been possible to agree on a single draft on the report of the Conference and hoped that a spirit of compromise would prevail in the future discussions of that body.

During the debates in the General Assembly at its forty-first session, some delegations were content to underline the significance of the existing United Nations bodies and their potential for achievements, while others regretted that the machinery had not lived up to their expectations and favoured enhancing it. Still other delegations emphasized the importance of implementing the Assembly's recommendations on disarmament. Of the remaining two resolutions discussed in this chapter, resolution 41/86 E, which took note of the report of the Disarmament Commission, was adopted without a vote, but resolution 41/86 J, which concerned the right of non-members to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, had to be voted on.

In sum, in 1986 Member States continued to adhere to the basic view of the 1978 Final Document that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. However, the differences of opinion on the need to make that role more effective than it is at the present time, as well as the fact that the Disarmament Commission's mandate to discuss the issue was renewed, make it likely that an active debate on relevant questions will continue in 1987.

Follow-up of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

TWO SPECIAL SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, the first held in 1978 (known as the tenth special session, or the first devoted to disarmament) and the second held in 1982 (the twelfth special session, or the second devoted to disarmament), have marked particularly intensive efforts by the international community to reach agreement on a strategy for the future course of disarmament. They made possible the consideration of the whole spectrum of questions related to the arms race and the possibilities of limiting and reversing it. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,¹ usually referred to in this volume as the 1978 Final Document, was adopted by consensus and is considered the guide for all disarmament efforts within and outside the United Nations. The atmosphere at the twelfth special session² was less conducive to consensus, but the General Assembly unanimously reaffirmed the validity of the previous special session's Final Document.

Since the thirty-third regular session of the Assembly, in 1978, there has been an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" on the agenda of each session. Since the thirty-seventh session, in 1982, that item has been complemented by another, entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly"

The two agenda items on the follow-up of the special sessions devoted to disarmament, together with a third recurrent comprehensive agenda item, "General and complete disarmament" (the subject of chapter III), have served as a useful framework for the introduction of draft resolutions and thus for the initiation of action on a considerable number of disarmament problems. The proposals introduced under their numerous sub-items have in practice often been debated along with similar ones originating under other, more specific agenda items. In fact, so many draft resolutions have been introduced

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

² The Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly appears in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. document A/S-12/32; it is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix I.

each year in the First Committee under those collective items that they have considerably increased the number of questions which the First Committee must annually address.

A full list of the proposals submitted in 1986 in the First Committee under the two follow-up items is given on page 41, with an indication of where they are discussed, whether in this chapter or in other chapters which deal more specifically with their subject-matter. This chapter also describes the debates on relevant questions in the main United Nations disarmament forums in 1986.

Finally, by resolution 41/60 G, adopted at its forty-first session, the General Assembly decided to convene its third special session on disarmament in 1988 and to establish a preparatory committee for it. That action is also discussed in this chapter.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

By its resolution 39/63 E of 1984, the General Assembly requested the Disarmament Commission to continue and to conclude in 1986 its consideration of the item entitled "Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level" and to report on it to the Assembly at its forty-first session.

In the course of the general exchange of views,³ held between 5 and 9 May, a number of delegations raised the question of confidence-building measures. Thus Japan expressed the view that they were not meant to be a substitute for specific disarmament measures, but rather to create an environment conducive to disarmament. That was the opinion of many other States, including Pakistan, Romania and Yugoslavia. The Commission's task was not so much to develop confidence-building measures *per se*, Japan continued, but rather to elaborate guidelines for future work. Norway noted that although much of the practical and conceptual work on confidence-building measures had so far drawn from the European experience, the relevance and applicability of the term was worldwide. Norway believed that the Chairman's composite draft from the Commission's 1984 session⁴ could serve as a useful basis for the deliberations in 1986. That view was shared by the Netherlands, which spoke on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community.

The Byelorussian SSR stated that a range of confidence-building measures, including broad measures in the political area and in the areas of international law and military technology, would significantly improve the situation in many regions of the world and would promote the consolidation of general security. Czechoslovakia stressed that confidence-building, which should facilitate the implementation of the disarmament process, would be

³ A/CN.10/PV.102-106 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/39/42), annex XV.*

highly timely. Mongolia urged that confidence-building measures be adopted at both the global and regional levels. It added that not only military, but also political, measures should be taken, and it mentioned as an example an agreement on the renunciation of the use of force and the peaceful settlement of complex problems on a multilateral or regional level.

China recalled the five principles of inter-State relations that it had advocated: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Those principles were also, in its view, of fundamental significance in building confidence among States. Thus, provided there was adequate trust and co-operation, it should be possible to work out guiding principles for adoption by consensus.

India emphasized the importance attached to confidence-building measures in the 1978 Final Document. Consequently, the work of the Commission on that subject must be viewed in the light of paragraph 24 of the Document and the fundamental principles about negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament laid down by paragraph 25. In that connection, India cautioned against efforts to fragment the process of multilateral disarmament into artificially created partial approaches. Pakistan emphasized that the main objective of confidence-building measures should be to remove the causes of mistrust and tension and that, in order to be meaningful, they had to be verifiable.

Indonesia believed that a principal purpose of confidence-building measures was to help ensure that a particular region would remain free from undue outside interference, thus providing States in the area with the opportunity to decide their own destiny and to build regional cohesion. Another essential element should be mutual military restraint by non-regional Powers, especially in strategically important areas and waters. Finally, conditions of stability and mutual confidence could be ensured through joint regional endeavours. Those elements, Indonesia stated, would strengthen the confidence-building processes at both the global and regional levels. Viet Nam was convinced that regional confidence-building measures, not considered in isolation from global aspects, would greatly contribute to regional peace, stability and co-operation if they were achieved on the basis of agreement among all States concerned in the region, free from outside interference.

During a total of eight meetings between 7 and 21 May, the Chairman of the Commission held informal consultations that resulted in a text agreed upon as a draft and entitled "Draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level"⁵ Two sections under "Characteristics", however, contained alternative formulations, one taken from the Chairman's composite draft and the other from a proposal by socialist States. The draft text was subsequently approved by the Commission on 23 May for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

During the consultations, the question was raised whether the draft guide-

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*, annex II.

lines should be accompanied by an illustrative catalogue of specific, individual confidence-building measures. It appeared from the debates that there was no easy answer. A catalogue, it was felt, could not be adopted as long as some major definitional issues in the guidelines had not been resolved. Nevertheless, a structured compilation of measures suggested for inclusion in a catalogue would be useful in facilitating later consideration of the issues.

In a statement at the end of the session,⁶ the Chairman stressed that the achievement of agreement on the draft guidelines constituted a breakthrough. Some problems still remained, but undoubtedly a positive momentum would ensue from the Commission's work, and at its forty-first session, the General Assembly should provide a further impulse for the conclusion of the task. Meanwhile, the Disarmament Commission had completed the work entrusted to it by the Assembly and the item on confidence-building measures had been removed from its agenda.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

In his opening statement at the outset of the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the President of the Conference for the month of February, Mr. Richard Butler of Australia, noted that the General Assembly's 1978 special session on disarmament had constituted the largest and most representative meeting of nations ever held to consider disarmament issues and that its unanimously adopted Final Document remained a document of irreducible significance. The Declaration contained in it set forth the key goals and concerns of the international community in the field. The Final Document emphasized both the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to ensure that progress was made in disarmament, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war, and the right and duty of all States to participate on an equal footing in multilateral disarmament negotiations, the President stated.

During the debate in plenary meetings,⁷ the German Democratic Republic also noted that at the 1978 special session every country's right and duty to strive for nuclear disarmament had been established. Pakistan recalled that the consensus achieved in 1978 had aroused a great deal of expectation regarding genuine disarmament; it shared the disappointment felt that the specific goals set and accepted on that occasion were, in its view, nowhere near achievement. Algeria stated that the Final Document, whose adoption had been made possible only by the willingness of all sides to take each other's concerns into account, continued to be the basic reference text of Conference members. However, because of subsequent developments, including what it called the "bitter experience of the paralysis" of the multilateral body in Geneva, caution had become the order of the day in disarmament efforts.

⁶ A/CN.10/PV.109 and Corr. 1.

⁷ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

Argentina held that the Final Document's significance and scope could be seen more and more clearly as disarmament efforts were delayed. Czechoslovakia, speaking of the ambitious nature of the three-stage programme of nuclear disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union (see chapter VI), asserted that a comprehensive programme of disarmament could not be less than ambitious. Otherwise it would amount to nothing more than a shy reconfirmation, if that, of the Final Document. The Soviet Union believed that attempts were being made to confine the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the drafting of a weaker version of the Final Document or to transforming the programme into a register of agreements already reached. India found it alarming that a group of States, contradicting their own commitment made in the Final Document, was maintaining that the Document fell outside the purview of the Conference. In its view, the Final Document had established the Conference's agenda and identified its priorities in unambiguous terms, but there had been a drift away from its letter and spirit.

A number of delegations made references to various paragraphs of the 1978 Final Document to highlight the significance they attached to them. Thus Australia noted that paragraph 51 of the Document placed the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process. It believed it was simply wrong that the Conference was not contributing to that process. Brazil, speaking on behalf of the group of 21, shared that view and recalled that the major nuclear-weapon States had special responsibilities for disarmament measures in accordance with paragraph 48 of the Final Document. The non-aligned and neutral countries held that it was incumbent on those Powers to report on and inform the Conference of their joint endeavours so that multilateral and bilateral efforts might complement each other. Bulgaria and Cuba called for consideration of stages of implementation of nuclear disarmament, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document and in the new Soviet proposal.

In speaking of the urgent need to begin to work out practical measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, the German Democratic Republic stated that it regarded the Conference on Disarmament as the appropriate framework for multilateral negotiations and called upon Member States to demonstrate their will to conduct negotiations and uphold their commitment made in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. By that Declaration, they had urged the Conference on Disarmament "to proceed to early multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in pursuance of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session"⁸

The delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany noted that although the Final Document spelt out the right of all States to participate on an equal footing in multilateral negotiations having a direct bearing on their national security, nuclear disarmament in a real sense could be negotiated only by

⁸ *Final Document of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, part I (NPT/CONF.III/64/I), "Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12", B, para. 4.

nuclear-weapon Powers, a reality which the Document also took account of in paragraph 53. It would not, in the view of the Federal Republic, be realistic to expect those States to allow majority decisions to dictate that they should dispose of their nuclear arsenals. Speaking at a later meeting, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic emphasized the special significance which his Government attached to adequate measures of verification in connection with disarmament and arms limitation agreements, in accordance with paragraph 31 of the 1978 Final Document.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

Two collective agenda items entitled “Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session” and “Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly” were on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1986, as in previous years. The consideration of the follow-up of the two special sessions took place and relevant proposals were put forward within the framework of those two items. Altogether, the Assembly adopted 28 resolutions and one decision submitted under them in 1986.⁹

In the course of the debate in the First Committee,¹⁰ a number of States addressed various aspects of the follow-up of the two special sessions. Some of them mentioned the 1978 Final Document when referring to factors which had motivated them to initiate proposals in the session. Thus Canada noted that the Final Document had confirmed its own assessment of the importance of verification in connection with disarmament agreements, a conclusion which it had reached through its review of past negotiations. Similarly, in introducing one of its proposals, the German Democratic Republic pointed out that the text drew on the Final Document and particularly its paragraph 28, which stated that all peoples of the world had a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations.

Japan, speaking on behalf of the group of Asian States on the occasion of Disarmament Week, recalled that the week of the anniversary of the founding of the United Nations had been so designated by the first special session. Mexico, speaking on behalf of the Latin American and Caribbean group, mentioned that the World Disarmament Campaign had been launched at the second special session. In reporting on recent Soviet-American talks on arms limitation, the Soviet Union pointed out that the two major nuclear Powers had been called upon to make such reports in a number of General Assembly resolutions, beginning with the first special session on disarmament.

Some delegations brought up the need for effective implementation of the 1978 Final Document’s recommendations while commenting on the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Burma held that one way of redressing

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 94th and 96th meetings.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 48th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

the lack of effective multilateral treatment of nuclear disarmament would be to initiate in the Conference an in-depth elaboration of the principles embodied in paragraph 50 of the Document. Venezuela considered the item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament the most important one on the Conference's agenda and recalled that its inclusion was based on the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document. Cameroon expressed support for a number of recommendations contained in the Final Document, including the conclusion of a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and expansion of the Conference's membership.

In speaking of the need for a programme of disarmament, Romania expressed the view that negotiations based on the principles of the 1978 Final Document should be so ordered that they would develop simultaneously on several levels and could influence one another. Such an approach would aid in identifying new disarmament measures. Panama held that until general and complete disarmament had been achieved, as set forth in the Final Document, the immediate goal was to guarantee the survival of mankind, to eliminate the danger of war, especially nuclear war, and to rule out the use or threat of force in international relations.

As in previous years, many draft resolutions were submitted by delegations under the sub-items of the two collective agenda items on the follow-up of the Assembly's special sessions on disarmament. Under the item concerning the twelfth special session, 10 draft resolutions were introduced and all were adopted; under that on the tenth special session, 22 draft resolutions and one draft decision were introduced and 18 resolutions and one decision were adopted. The 28 resolutions and one decision adopted under the two items are discussed in this volume as follows:

- (a) In this chapter, beginning on the page shown—
 - (i) 41/60 C (Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures), page 42;
 - (ii) 41/60 G (Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament), page 44;
 - (iii) 41/60 H (United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament), page 46;
 - (iv) 41/86 K (International co-operation for disarmament), page 47;
 - (v) 41/86 L (Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe), page 48;
 - (vi) 41/86 O (Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session), page 50;
 - (vii) 41/86 Q (Verification in all its aspects), page 52.
- (b) In other chapters, chapter number shown—
 - (i) 41/60 A (World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities), chapter XXI;
 - (ii) 41/60 B (World Disarmament Campaign), chapter XXI;
 - (iii) 41/60 D (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa), chapter XXI;
 - (iv) 41/60 E (Freeze on nuclear weapons), chapter VI;
 - (v) 41/60 F (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons), chapter VII;
 - (vi) 41/60 I (Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/151 C on a nuclear-arms freeze), chapter VI;

- (vii) 41/60 J (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America), chapter XXI;
- (viii) 41/86 A (Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations), chapter VI;
- (ix) 41/86 B (Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war), chapter VII;
- (x) 41/86 C (United Nations disarmament studies), chapter XXIII;
- (xi) 41/86 D (Disarmament Week), chapter XXI;
- (xii) 41/86 E (Report of the Disarmament Commission), chapter I;
- (xiii) 41/86 F (Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament), chapter VI;
- (xiv) 41/86 G (Prevention of nuclear war), chapter VII;
- (xv) 41/86 H (Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter), chapter XXIII;
- (xvi) 41/86 I (Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session), chapter XXIII;
- (xvii) 41/86 J (Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session), chapter I;
- (xviii) 41/86 M (Report of the Conference on Disarmament), chapter I;
- (xix) 41/86 N (Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations), chapter VI;
- (xx) 41/86 P (Report of the Conference on Disarmament), chapter I;
- (xxi) 41/86 R (Study on deterrence), chapter XXIII;
- (xxii) Decision 41/421 (Comprehensive programme of disarmament), chapter IV.

In addition, two draft resolutions, one concerning verification in all its aspects and the other, obligations of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations, which were withdrawn by their sponsors, are briefly dealt with in this chapter (pages 52 and 50, respectively). Another draft resolution on which no action was taken, which concerned nuclear weapons in all aspects, is discussed in chapter VI. Finally, a draft resolution entitled “Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research”, which was rejected by the First Committee, is discussed in chapter XXII.

The draft resolution entitled “Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures” was submitted on 29 October by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom and was later also sponsored by Colombia, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In introducing it on 30 October, the Federal Republic of Germany recalled two steps that the international community had taken with respect to confidence-building measures in 1986. First, the Disarmament Commission had reached consensus on all but two confidence-building issues when dealing with draft guidelines for such measures during its session in May; the purpose of the draft resolution, the Federal Republic stated, was to recommend that all Member States implement the findings of the Commission. Secondly, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe had agreed on a document envisaging a regional confidence-building process over a long period of time. The Federal Republic expressed the view that the progress achieved in Stockholm gave reason for optimism concerning the prospects for further elaboration of the guidelines considered by the Commission. Reacting to the allegation that States interested in promoting confidence-building

were trying to divert the interest of the international community from the more urgent tasks of disarmament, the Federal Republic recalled that the need for confidence-building was clearly recognized in the 1978 Final Document.

On 13 November, Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria and Yugoslavia submitted a number of amendments to the draft. The amendments were introduced by Mexico, which stated that changes were suggested, *inter alia*, in the operative paragraph of the draft, by which the Assembly would “note” the draft guidelines “reproduced in the report of the Disarmament Commission”, whereas the original draft would “commend” the draft guidelines, “as annexed, to all Member States for their preliminary implementation”. In addition, changes which Mexico characterized as modest were suggested in the wording of some preambular paragraphs. It was proposed, among other things, that the single word “war” be replaced by the expression “all wars, in particular nuclear war” in the fourth preambular paragraph (see below). Venezuela commended the proposed amendments and stated that if they were adopted, it would be able to vote in favour of the draft instead of abstaining.

The Federal Republic of Germany then announced that the sponsors of the draft had wanted to express their conviction that confidence-building measures should help prevent armed conflict from breaking out because of miscalculation or misinterpretation. They were ready to accept the changes suggested for the preambular paragraphs. However, they felt that if the amendment to the operative paragraph were adopted, the draft guidelines would be put on the shelf and not be given life, as they should.

Singapore orally proposed an amendment to the amendment introduced by Mexico, by which the words “to all Member States with a view to their preliminary implementation” would be substituted for the words “reproduced in the report of the Disarmament Commission” in the operative paragraph. Mexico announced that the sub-amendment was not acceptable to the sponsors of the amendments.

The First Committee first voted on the sub-amendment proposed by Singapore. It was rejected by a recorded vote of 40 in favour to 41 against, with 15 abstentions. The amendments introduced by Mexico and pertaining to the preambular part of the draft were then adopted by a recorded vote of 125 to 1 (France), with 1 abstention (Bahamas). At the request of the Federal Republic of Germany, a separate vote was taken on the operative paragraph as worded in the amendment introduced by Mexico. It was adopted by a recorded vote of 83 to 31, with 3 abstentions.

Before the final vote was taken on the draft resolution as a whole, as amended, the Federal Republic of Germany made a statement expressing the view that confidence-building measures were the very key to the prevention of war. It believed that the text had lost some of its moral value, but it was unthinkable for the Federal Republic not to vote in favour of a draft on the subject.

The First Committee then approved the draft resolution, as amended, by a recorded vote of 130 to none.

Three States explained their affirmative votes. France stated that it as-

sociated itself with the consensus, but that that did not mean it accepted the full wording of the text and, in particular, the wording of the fourth preambular paragraph, as amended. The Netherlands stated that it shared the feeling expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany and regretted that it had not been possible to agree on stronger language on the draft guidelines. The Soviet Union drew attention to the provision in the Disarmament Commission's report that reflected the degree of consent achieved in the Commission in 1986: "It is understood that Member States reserved their final assent to the guidelines until such time as they are completed and can be assessed in their entirety."¹¹ In the light of that provision, the Soviet Union voted in favour.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 155 to none, with no abstentions, as resolution 41/60 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that the ultimate goal of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the prevention of all wars, in particular nuclear war,

Mindful of the importance of confidence-building for the peaceful settlement of existing international problems and for the improvement and promotion of international relations based on justice, co-operation and solidarity,

Stressing the potential of specific confidence-building measures to create favourable conditions for progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament,

Bearing in mind that confidence-building measures may serve the additional objective of facilitating verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

Welcoming the draft guidelines for confidence-building measures contained in the report of the Disarmament Commission as particularly appropriate to serve this important objective,

Expecting that new developments in the field of disarmament and growing positive and concrete experience with confidence-building measures will facilitate further elaboration of the text,

Takes note of the "Draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level" reproduced in the report of the Disarmament Commission.

On 30 October, Algeria, Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", which was later also sponsored by Ecuador. In its introduction on 5 November, Yugoslavia stated that the non-aligned countries that were sponsoring the initiative had been motivated by the desire to reassert the consensus achieved at the first special session and reconfirmed at the second. They were convinced that the United Nations should play the main role and have the primary responsibility in disarmament. The aim of the draft was for the General Assembly to establish the time for holding the third special session and to start preparations for it. It was proposed that an open-ended preparatory committee be set up which would prepare a draft agenda, consider all relevant

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*, annex II.

questions related to the session and submit appropriate recommendations to the Assembly at its forty-second session.

On 18 November the First Committee approved the draft without a vote. In that connection, the United States explained its position. It stated that it expected to participate constructively in the third special session and in the work of the Preparatory Committee. It supported the provisions of the draft resolution that dealt with preparations for the session. As to the preambular part, it noted that it was possible that the 1978 Final Document contained formulations that, with the passage of time, no longer fully reflected the views of all Member States. For example, the United States felt it was an oversimplification to say that funds allocated for military forces and equipment necessarily represented an inappropriate diversion of scarce economic resources otherwise applicable to development, and it did not agree with that suggestion.

The General Assembly adopted the draft on 3 December, also without a vote, as resolution 41/60 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the decision adopted at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, concerning the convening of the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Reaffirming its resolution 38/73 I of 15 December 1983, in which it decided that the third special session devoted to disarmament should be held not later than 1988,

Recalling its resolutions 39/63 I of 12 December 1984 and 40/151 I of 16 December 1985,

Reaffirming the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and its conviction that disarmament remains one of the essential objectives of the United Nations,

Expressing its concern at the continuation of the arms race, which aggravates international peace and security and also diverts vast resources urgently needed for economic and social development,

Reiterating its conviction that peace can be secured through the implementation of disarmament measures, particularly for nuclear disarmament, conducive to the realization of the final objective, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1. *Decides* to convene its third special session on disarmament in 1988 and to establish an open-ended preparatory committee for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft agenda for the special session, to examine all relevant questions relating to that session and to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-second session its recommendations thereon;

3. *Invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the agenda and other relevant questions relating to the third special session on disarmament not later than 1 April 1987;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the replies of Member States relevant to paragraph 3 above to the Preparatory Committee and to render to it all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records;

5. *Requests* the Preparatory Committee to meet for a short organizational session before the end of the forty-first session of the General Assembly in order, *inter alia*, to set the date for its substantive session;

6. *Further requests* the Preparatory Committee to submit its progress report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session an item entitled:

“Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament”

On 30 October, Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Zaire and Zambia submitted a draft resolution entitled “United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament”, which was later also sponsored by Argentina, Burkina Faso, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Nepal, New Zealand and Viet Nam. In introducing it on 3 November, Nigeria stated that the draft did not seek to create any new financial or other responsibilities, but to reaffirm the programme’s intrinsic qualities. By the end of 1986, the programme would have trained 175 governmental officials from 93 Member States, many of whom were holding responsible positions in their respective countries.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 134 to 1 (United States), with no abstentions. In that connection, three States explained their positions. Explaining its negative vote, the United States announced that it had been and continued to be a strong supporter of the programme. However, as in the previous year, it voted against the draft because it could not support additional expenditures associated with the implementation of new programmes. The United States pointed out that the draft’s operative paragraph 3 (see below) approved the modalities for the implementation of a new training programme, which continued to entail the additional costs approved in 1985.

Japan and the United Kingdom both explained their affirmative votes. Japan stated that it considered the programme very important in promoting expertise in disarmament, especially in developing countries. As for the implementation of the new training programme, it hoped that due attention would be paid to relevant parts of the Secretary-General’s report on the question¹² as well as to the current financial constraints on the Organization. The United Kingdom put on record that it supported the draft because of its support for the programme and on the understanding that operative paragraphs 2 and 3 would impose no additional budgetary commitments.

On 3 December the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 154 to 1, with no abstentions, as resolution 41/60 H. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, *inter alia*, to continue the programme and to increase the number of fellowships from twenty to twenty-five as from 1983,

Recalling also its resolutions 37/100 G of 13 December 1982, 38/73 C of 15 December 1983, 39/63 B of 12 December 1984 and 40/151 H of 16 December 1985,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained one hundred and seventy-

¹² A/41/720. The 20 States whose candidates participated in the programme were: Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Ghana, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Togo and United Republic of Tanzania.

five government officials from ninety-three countries, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries,

Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, particularly developing countries, under the programme, including the new disarmament training and advisory services, will enhance the capabilities of Member States to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the report of the Secretary-General;
2. *Reaffirms* its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General approved by resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;
3. *Approves* the modalities for implementation of the new disarmament training programme as contained in the Secretary-General's report;
4. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for inviting the fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;
5. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the operations of the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services.

On 30 October, Afghanistan, Angola, the Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "International co-operation for disarmament", which was later also sponsored by Mozambique. It was introduced on 5 November by Czechoslovakia, which stated that the debates in the First Committee confirmed that States considered disarmament vital to the basic interests of all peoples. The sponsors of the draft believed it was essential to stress the need for constructive international co-operation for disarmament based on the political goodwill of States. The draft contained an appeal to all States to increase co-operation and to strive actively for meaningful disarmament negotiations on the basis of reciprocity, equality, undiminished security and the non-use of force in international relations. It also stressed the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its role in disarmament and emphasized the need to refrain from disseminating any doctrines endangering international peace and justifying the unleashing of nuclear war.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 95 to 19, with 11 abstentions. On 4 December the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 118 to 19 (Western and associated States), with 9 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 K. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to expedite the implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament of 11 December 1979 and its resolutions 36/92 D of 9 December 1981, 37/78 B of 9 December 1982, 38/183 F of 20 December 1983, 39/148 M of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 I of 16 December 1985,

Stressing the vital need to proceed to concrete measures towards halting the arms race and attaining disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security,

Bearing in mind the vital interests of all States in the adoption of concrete effective disarmament measures, which would, *inter alia*, release considerable material, financial and human resources to be used for peaceful purposes and particularly for overcoming economic underdevelopment, especially in the developing countries,

Stressing the importance of the appeals and proposals of the group of six States of five continents and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and of their unwavering efforts to achieve genuine disarmament,

Convinced of the need to strengthen constructive international co-operation based on the political goodwill of States for successful negotiations on disarmament, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Stressing that international co-operation for disarmament should, as a matter of priority, be aimed at averting nuclear war through the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, the discontinuation of nuclear-weapon tests and the prevention of an arms race in outer space and at confidence-building as an indispensable component of relations among States,

Believing that the two nuclear-weapon States that possess the most important nuclear arsenals should jointly take the lead and show a good example in curbing the nuclear-arms race while mutually refraining from launching weapons into outer space,

Conscious that in the nuclear space age the reliable security of all countries can be ensured only by political means, through the joint efforts of all States,

1. *Invites* all States to increase co-operation and to strive actively for meaningful disarmament negotiations on the basis of reciprocity, equality, undiminished security and the non-use of force in international relations, so that they may prevent qualitative enhancement and quantitative accumulation of weapons, as well as the development of new types and systems of weaponry, especially weapons of mass destruction;

2. *Stresses* the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament;

3. *Emphasizes* the necessity of refraining from the dissemination of any doctrines and concepts endangering international peace and justifying the unleashing of nuclear war, which lead to the deterioration of the international situation and to the further intensification of the arms race and which are detrimental to the generally recognized necessity of international co-operation for disarmament;

4. *Declares* that the use of force in international relations as well as in attempts to prevent the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples constitutes a phenomenon incompatible with the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament;

5. *Reiterates its profound conviction* that outer space should be excluded from the sphere of military preparations and used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of all mankind;

6. *Appeals* to States that are members of military groupings to promote, on the basis of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and in the spirit of international co-operation for disarmament, the gradual mutual limitation of military activities of these groupings, thus creating conditions for their dissolution;

7. *Calls upon* all Member States and the international organizations concerned to continue to cultivate and disseminate, particularly in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign launched by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament;

8. *Calls upon* the Governments of all States to contribute substantially, while observing the principle of undiminished security, to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war.

On 30 October Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled “Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament

in Europe'', which it introduced on 18 November. Sweden pointed out that the Stockholm Conference, which had concluded on 19 September, was an integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Its task was to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament. The draft gave expression to the importance of continued efforts to build confidence, lessen military confrontation and enhance security for all. In the operative part, it welcomed the adoption of the Document of the Stockholm Conference, containing concrete, militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures. The Assembly would consider that the Document contributed to furthering the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.

At the same meeting, the First Committee approved the draft without a vote. On that occasion, Poland announced that it did not insist on putting to a vote its own draft resolution entitled "Confidence-building and conventional disarmament in Europe" (see chapter XVII), because it fully supported the draft introduced by Sweden. It had also, following consultations with France and Sweden, reached agreement with them on a revised version of a third draft, introduced by France and entitled "Confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament", which was adopted as resolution 41/59 E (see chapter XVII).

Five countries explained their positions on the draft introduced by Sweden. Referring to their difficulties with certain aspects of the draft introduced by France, three countries, Brazil, India and Peru, stated that they fully supported the Swedish text. India declared that it was gratified by the measures adopted by the Stockholm Conference and believed that they showed the value of multilateral negotiations. Nigeria noted that confidence-building measures differed from region to region and announced that it shared the view that a regional approach had positive effect in promoting international peace and security. The United States welcomed the results of the Stockholm Conference and would have preferred a single consensus resolution, as submitted by Sweden. It was committed to agreement on and implementation of confidence-building measures, specifically those designed to enhance security for all through increased openness and transparency.

On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Sweden, also without a vote, as resolution 41/86 L. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Determined to achieve progress in disarmament,

Reaffirming the importance of continued efforts to build confidence, to lessen military confrontation and to enhance security for all,

Stressing that confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities will contribute to these objectives,

1. *Welcomes* the adoption by the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Mea-

asures and Disarmament in Europe of the Document of the Stockholm Conference, which contains concrete, militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures;

2. *Considers* that the Document of the Stockholm Conference will contribute to furthering the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.

On 30 October, Algeria, Bangladesh, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Tunisia, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session" In introducing it on 6 November, Yugoslavia noted that for many years there had been no genuine progress in the negotiations on priority issues of disarmament, particularly nuclear issues. At the 1978 special session, the General Assembly had laid the foundations for an international disarmament strategy and had adopted a concrete programme of action. Eight years later, one was forced to note with regret that those goals had not been achieved. The sponsors of the draft were convinced that the 1978 Final Document retained all its validity and that it was more than ever imperative that new impetus be given to negotiations on disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and that genuine progress be achieved in the immediate future. They hoped to give impetus to disarmament negotiations at all levels through the draft resolution.

On 28 October the German Democratic Republic submitted a draft resolution entitled "Obligations of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations", which it introduced on 4 November. The draft called on States to start, conduct and intensify disarmament negotiations in good faith with a view to achieving concrete agreements. The text was largely identical to the draft submitted in 1985, but a new paragraph had been included which appealed to all nuclear-weapon States to enter into a dialogue on ways and means to strengthen peace and achieve disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. The German Democratic Republic looked forward, as in previous years, to co-operating with Yugoslavia in order to combine the draft with that introduced by Yugoslavia on the follow-up of the tenth special session.

The negotiations on merging the drafts were successful, and on 11 November the sponsors of the first-mentioned draft and the German Democratic Republic submitted a revised draft, which was subsequently also sponsored by Burkina Faso and Ecuador. At the same time, the German Democratic Republic announced that it would not insist on a vote on the draft it had introduced.¹³

On 14 November the First Committee approved the revised draft by a recorded vote of 112 to 13, with 7 abstentions. It was adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December by a recorded vote of 135 to 13 (Western and associated States), with 5 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 O. It reads as follows:

¹³ See A/41/842, paras. 17 and 18.

The General Assembly.

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 34/83 C of 11 December 1979, 35/46 of 3 December 1980, 35/152 E of 12 December 1980, 36/92 M of 9 December 1981, 37/78 F of 9 December 1982, 38/183 H of 20 December 1983, 39/148 O of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 N of 16 December 1985 and its decision S-12/24 of 10 July 1982,

Deeply concerned that no concrete results regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session have been realized in the course of more than eight years since that session, that in the mean time the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, has gained in intensity, that there has been further deployment of nuclear weapons in some parts of the world, that annual global military expenditures are estimated to have reached the staggering figure of \$1,000 billion, that mankind is faced with a real danger of spreading the arms race into outer space, that urgent measures to prevent nuclear war and for disarmament have not been adopted and that continued colonial domination and foreign occupation, open threats, pressures and military intervention against independent States and violations of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations have taken place, posing the most serious threat to international peace and security,

Convinced that the escalation of the nuclear-arms race, in both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations,

Further convinced that international peace and security can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and that, in this respect, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States have the primary responsibility,

Believing that the preservation of the existing bilateral, regional and global system of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the strict observance of such agreements by their parties are important elements of disarmament efforts at all levels,

Noting with great concern that no real progress in disarmament negotiations has been achieved in the course of several years,

Stressing once again that the active participation of Member States in effective disarmament negotiations is necessary for discharging their responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, that all States have the right to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament, that it is more than ever imperative in the present circumstances to give a new impetus to negotiations on disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, at all levels and to achieve genuine progress in the immediate future and that all States should refrain from any actions which have or may have negative effects on the outcome of disarmament negotiations,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Stressing that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the twelfth special session as the comprehensive basis for efforts towards halting and reversing the arms race, retains all its validity and that the objectives and measures contained therein still represent one of the most important and urgent goals to be achieved,

1. *Expresses its grave concern* over the acceleration and intensification of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, which increase the danger of nuclear war and constitute a threat to the continued survival of mankind;

2. *Calls upon* all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take urgent measures in order to promote international security on the basis of disarmament, to halt and reverse the arms race and to launch a process of genuine disarmament;

3. *Invites* all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to take urgent measures with a view to

implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, as well as to fulfilling the priority tasks set forth in the Programme of Action contained in section III of the Final Document;

4. *Calls upon* the two leading nuclear-weapon States to pursue their negotiations with renewed determination and taking into account the interest of the entire international community in order to halt the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, reduce substantially their nuclear arsenals, prevent the arms race in outer space and undertake effective measures of nuclear disarmament;

5. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to proceed urgently to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war, to intensify negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to elaborate drafts of treaties on a nuclear-test ban and on a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

6. *Calls upon* the Disarmament Commission to intensify its work in accordance with its mandate with a view to making concrete recommendations on specific items on its agenda;

7. *Invites* all States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed on the status and/or results of such negotiations, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"

On 30 October, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belgium, Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Turkey and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution entitled "Verification in all its aspects" In introducing it on 4 November, Canada recalled the previous year's consensus resolution on the subject, which had reflected the growing awareness of the significance of verification in disarmament agreements. Canada had been further encouraged by similar references to the importance of verification in statements by the Soviet Union and the United States. The document of the Stockholm Conference had enunciated several specific compliance and verification procedures. The new draft resolution was effectively similar to the 1986 one, but it advocated an additional step in requesting the Disarmament Commission to consider verification at its 1987 session. The language of the draft drew on concepts which had already won general agreement. Thus it reiterated the need for arms limitation agreements to provide for adequate measures of verification and recognized that the form and modalities should be determined by the characteristics of the relevant agreement.

On 17 October, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia submitted a draft resolution also entitled "Verification in all its aspects", which Bulgaria introduced on 20 October. Bulgaria stressed, among other things, the importance of verification in connection with the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and noted that the Soviet Union had accepted all forms of verification, provided that it was the cessation, rather than the continuation, of nuclear testing that was to be verified. As a result, the question of verification had, in Bulgaria's view, ceased to exist as a technical problem. All socialist countries were ready to accept verification on a mutual basis. There was a need for effective verification measures to build confidence in the compliance of all parties with disarmament agreements, but those measures must not be artificially singled

out from the context of concrete agreements, they must be adequate and proportional to the actual disarmament measure, and they must not be discriminatory.

On 11 November, a revised draft was submitted both by the sponsors of the draft introduced by Canada and by Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and it was later also sponsored by Malaysia. On that occasion, Canada stated that the revision was the product of intensive negotiations. For its part, Bulgaria expressed satisfaction with the agreement on a joint draft, an idea which it had considered well advised from the outset, and it and Czechoslovakia accordingly decided that their draft would not be put to a vote.¹⁴

The revised version of the draft introduced by Canada was approved without a vote by the First Committee on 12 November. Five States explained their positions on it. India had no doubt about the critical importance of effective verification arrangements in all disarmament agreements. However, it emphasized that a separate discussion on verification should not be used to draw attention away from specific and concrete disarmament measures. The requirement of a verification system acceptable to all parties should be considered in the context of actual negotiations. Indonesia endorsed the main thrust of the draft, but stressed its basic view that the consideration of verification in all its aspects could be effectively undertaken only while taking into account ongoing negotiations. Nigeria appreciated the importance of verification in disarmament negotiations, but had reservations about any action which might divert attention from the substance of negotiations. It hoped that the contradictory themes of the draft would not hamper progress in negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet Union welcomed the agreement that had been reached and stated that it was a confirmed champion of verification measures, beginning with national forms of verification and embracing the whole range of international forms, from constant on-site inspections to systematic inspections on demand. Uruguay believed that the consensus that had been reached on verification was one of the most important events of the session and might open up a historic stage with regard to the issue.

On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Canada, also without a vote, as resolution 41/86 Q. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/152 O of 16 December 1985,

Conscious of the urgent need to reach agreements on arms limitation and disarmament measures capable of contributing to the maintenance of peace and security,

Convinced that, if such measures are to be effective, they must be fair and balanced, acceptable to all parties, their substance must be clear and compliance with them must be evident,

Noting that the importance of verification of and compliance with agreements is universally recognized,

Reaffirming its conviction, as expressed in paragraph 91 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus at that session. its first special session devoted to disarmament, that in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective imple-

¹⁴ See A/41/842, paras. 5 and 6.

mentation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements,

Reiterating its view that:

(a) Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and to ensure that they are being observed by all parties;

(b) The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement;

(c) Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process;

(d) Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed,

Recalling that:

(a) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field should be considered;

(b) Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures that are non-discriminatory and that do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development,

Believing that verification techniques should be developed as an objective means of determining compliance with agreements and appropriately taken into account in the course of disarmament negotiations,

1. *Calls upon* Member States to intensify their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures;

2. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General containing the views and suggestions of Member States on verification principles, procedures and techniques, and encourages all States that have not already done so to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1987, their views and suggestions on verification principles as invited by the Assembly in its resolution 40/152 O;

3. *Urges* individual Member States and groups of Member States possessing verification expertise to consider means by which they can contribute to, and promote the inclusion of, adequate verification measures in arms limitation and disarmament agreements;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to consider at its 1987 session, in the context of pursuing general and complete disarmament under effective international control, verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification, and to report on its deliberations, conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare for the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session in 1987 a compilation of the views received from Member States on this issue;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects" under the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session: implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"

Conclusion

Member States of the United Nations continued to recognize in 1986 that the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament—the largest and most representative meeting of nations ever

held to consider disarmament issues—remained a document of irreducible significance. They emphasized the importance of translating into reality the priority goals identified in the Document, particularly nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, and the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States in that regard. Moreover, they underscored the right and duty of all States to participate on an equal footing in multilateral disarmament negotiations, as set out in the Document.

At the same time, Member States expressed disappointment that the specific goals set in the Final Document and adopted by consensus were far from being achieved, despite their reaffirmation at the second special session, in 1982. Some of them felt that there had been a drift away from the letter and spirit of the Document. Nevertheless, the desire to build further on the achievements of the 1978 special session continued to motivate a number of Member States to put forward new proposals on a variety of disarmament issues.

In 1986 the General Assembly adopted 28 resolutions and one decision on the two agenda items concerning the follow-up of the special sessions. Those among them dealing with specific issues are discussed in the relevant substantive chapters of this volume. The resolutions concerning follow-up questions in a general sense—seven in number—are discussed in this chapter. Three of them were adopted without a vote and a fourth one, though voted on, was also unopposed. The others were adopted by varying majorities.

CHAPTER III

General and complete disarmament

Introduction

THE FINAL OBJECTIVE OF UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT EFFORTS is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. That goal was explicitly declared in 1959, but it was implied already in the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the United Nations (see chapter I).

In practice, disarmament negotiations and deliberations under the auspices of the Organization have focused on both long- and short-term objectives and have, consequently, aimed at either comprehensive or partial measures for achieving disarmament.¹ During most of the 1950s, a long-term objective dominated, which envisaged the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments, by stages, in accordance with a co-ordinated, comprehensive programme. However, from 1955 on, parallel proposals were put forward for partial measures which could be implemented immediately. The partial approach was advocated with a view to achieving limited first steps to increase confidence among States and thus create a more favourable atmosphere for comprehensive agreements.

In 1959, the General Assembly expressly proclaimed, in adopting resolution 1378 (XIV), that “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” was the goal of its disarmament efforts and that measures leading to that goal were to be worked out and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. Since then, United Nations disarmament efforts have been conducted within that conceptual framework. The comprehensive approach was further underlined in 1961, when the General Assembly welcomed the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations² issued earlier that year by the Soviet Union and the United States and known as the Zorin-McCloy agreement.³ Elaborate proposals reflecting that approach were submitted by both countries in 1962⁴ to the negotiating body in Geneva, the

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chaps. 3-6, and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. 1.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

³ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970*, chap. 4.

⁴ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. C (ENDC/2) (Soviet Union) and sect. F (ENDC/30 and Corr.1) (United States).

ENDC. They were extensively discussed in the following years, but no consensus was reached.

By 1963, with the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, the emphasis again shifted towards reaching agreement on partial measures, some of which were: a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, and the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed.

By resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 1969, the General Assembly requested the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, then called the CCD, to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, while continuing its negotiations on collateral measures. The question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is dealt with in chapter IV.

General and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal of disarmament efforts was unanimously reaffirmed at the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978 and 1982 respectively, but no tangible steps were taken to bring it any closer to realization. Although non-aligned, socialist and Western Member States alike have repeatedly declared their commitment to that objective, there has been considerable scepticism about its feasibility in the foreseeable future. While some countries believe the world has simply not yet attained a state of general trust, which can be considered a prerequisite for general and complete disarmament, others caution that there is no justification for concluding definitively that such a state can never be achieved. Also in recent years, many countries have advocated limited interim steps, such as regional measures and various approaches to nuclear-arms limitation, as steps towards more comprehensive arrangements.

In any case, the term “general and complete disarmament” has provided the General Assembly with a very useful agenda item under which a variety of matters—often proposals that do not fit elsewhere—may appropriately be considered.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

In the course of the general exchange of views⁵ during the 1986 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, some countries referred to the overall problem of the security of States and its relation to disarmament.

The Soviet Union affirmed that there was a need for a fundamentally new concept of security, based on realities. In its view, security could be built only on a political, not a military, basis. A country's security could not be strengthened at the expense of that of others; indeed, it could be strengthened only by taking their interests into account. The security of any one State was inseparable from the security of all. The Soviet Union called upon all

⁵ A/CN.10/PV.102-106 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

States, and particularly the major military Powers, to set a good example and display maximum restraint in the field of security. Several Eastern European States, notably the Byelorussian SSR and Poland, shared those views.

Sweden recalled past commitments by the two super-Powers to find a more sensible way of handling their mutual relations. In Sweden's view, if a nuclear war must never be fought, there was no reason for them to pursue the development of ever more refined doomsday weapons by continuing their nuclear testing. Any military conflict could set off a chain reaction, with catastrophic consequences for all States and peoples. Speaking on the problems of non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia called for resolute steps to be taken towards disarmament and genuine security, equal for all. It felt that those countries were targets of a policy of force and were exposed to what it considered ruthless pressure originating from bloc confrontation. It believed that security could be enhanced only if more just international relations between States were maintained.

Pursuant to resolution 40/94 I, the Commission had on its agenda an item concerning the question of the naval arms race and disarmament.

At the opening meeting, on 5 May, the United States raised an objection to the inclusion of the item in the agenda and referred to the explanation that it had given when it had voted against the resolution the previous fall. The Chairman quoted the opinion of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations to the effect that the Disarmament Commission, a deliberative subsidiary body of the General Assembly, had no power to remove from its agenda an item which the General Assembly had requested it to include.

In the general exchange of views, some 20 countries spoke on the item.

The Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, stated that the completion of the United Nations study on the naval arms race⁶ had generally been considered a welcome development. It had been recognized that while current naval developments possessed certain characteristics of their own, the subject should not be considered without reference to the overall context of halting and reversing the arms race in general. That view was shared by Japan and Norway. Sweden stated that it expected all parties to assist in creating favourable conditions for an open, in-depth consideration of the important question of the naval arms race.

The Soviet Union held that it was no longer possible to avoid meaningful negotiations on the limitation and reduction of naval armaments and on the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans. In anticipation of such negotiations, appropriate consultations could be held in the Conference on Disarmament. It called for withdrawal of nuclear-armed ships from certain parts of the oceans, limitation of anti-submarine activities and reduction in the numbers of operational ships in the fleets of major Powers. China argued that since naval armaments consisted of two categories of weapons—nuclear and conventional—naval arms reductions should follow the direction for nu-

⁶ A/40/535, later issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.3.

clear and conventional disarmament envisaged in the 1978 Final Document,⁷ with the countries possessing the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals fulfilling their special responsibilities in that regard.

India found no rationale for the attempt to devote special attention to the naval arms race and to consider it as a separate channel of a concerted disarmament effort. In its view, the right approach—that of the 1978 Final Document—would be to identify weapons systems that could be eliminated in a systematic manner. Pakistan, on the other hand, recognized that the question of the deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines and other naval vessels needed immediate attention. Indonesia believed that it had become urgent for the international community to address the specific problems of naval arms limitation and disarmament as well as confidence-building within the overall context of halting and reversing the arms race in general.

Argentina expressed the view that non-nuclear littoral States had been forced into coexistence with nuclear-weapons systems carried by naval units that passed through maritime spaces adjacent to them. Such a situation had increased the danger of nuclear war, expanding the theatre for confrontation to the oceans. Furthermore, littoral States seriously suffered under the threat posed by such weaponry. The Commission, it held, had an opportunity to make a major contribution to the process of naval disarmament. Brazil held that nuclear-weapon Powers, in particular the two major Powers, had carried out a vast proliferation of nuclear arms over and under the seas and oceans in disregard of the security interests of the world at large and their commitments with respect to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

For its consideration of the item on the naval arms race, the Commission had before it a number of documents. Among them were a report of the Secretary-General containing the above-mentioned study, another document containing the views of some Member States on it,⁸ and three working papers, one submitted by China⁹ and two by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union.¹⁰

On 9 May, it was decided that substantive, structured consultations on the item would be conducted under the Chairman. Later, he delegated that task to Mr. Ali Alatas of Indonesia. The consultations took place in 7 meetings between 13 and 21 May. The resulting “Chairman’s paper on agenda item 8”¹¹ stated, *inter alia*, that while substantive reservations had been expressed on various aspects of the study on the naval arms race, there was agreement that the study, together with subsequent comments and separate proposals put forward by Member States, had provided a starting point for discussion of a new and complex range of issues. The fact that several significant elements had been identified in the course of the consultations made it worthwhile for

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

⁸ A/CN.10/77 and Add.1 and 2. Further replies received after the end of the Commission’s session were issued as A/CN.10/77/Add.3.

⁹ A/CN.10/78.

¹⁰ A/CN.10/73 and Corr.1 and A/CN.10/80 and Corr.1.

¹¹ A/CN.10/83.

the international community to devote a more informed and focused attention to the naval dimension of the global arms race and related issues. Therefore, the delegations participating in the consultations felt that the Commission should give further consideration to the item at its 1987 substantive session.

In a number of concluding statements,¹² members of the Commission expressed satisfaction at the fact that during the session it had been possible to find a way to begin to explore the issues of the naval arms race and disarmament. India restated its objection to separating the consideration of the naval arms race from the totality of the arms race. The United States reiterated its view that the item should not have been included in the agenda of the Commission, that its consideration could not be fertile, and that it saw no merit in considering the subject in any form in the future.

The work of the Contact Group, set up to deal with item 4, the arms race and the general approach to negotiations, is discussed in chapter VI.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

The annual agenda of the Conference on Disarmament traditionally begins with the following phrase: "The Conference on Disarmament, as the multi-lateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control."¹³ As in previous years, the question of general and complete disarmament was not a separate item on the Conference's agenda and was considered in plenary meetings¹⁴ in connection with various existing items.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany stressed that a nuclear-test ban must be seen in the context of article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, which committed the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate in good faith on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on general and complete disarmament. He recalled that Chancellor Helmut Kohl had explicitly affirmed that a test-ban treaty could not be a substitute for a substantial reduction of existing arsenals of weapons. In Italy's view, general and complete disarmament under effective international control was the most basic condition to prevent war. In order to reach that goal, it would be realistic to continue working towards the intermediate goal of attaining a balance of forces, both nuclear and conventional, at the lowest possible level of armaments. Italy respected all approaches to security issues by all countries, as it believed that only through the preservation of security was it possible to undertake a collective step towards effective disarmament. It therefore felt entitled to respect for its own policy, by which, while regarding nuclear deterrence as essential to its national security, it pursued in all possible ways increased security and equilibrium at lower levels of all types of armaments.

¹² A/CN.10/PV.109 and Corr.1.

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27)*, para. 7.

¹⁴ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

In addressing the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, Czechoslovakia supported the idea of compiling in one document the basic disarmament measures which would ultimately lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It was important to ensure that the process of disarmament would not be conducted in an improvised manner, but purposefully, and that the tasks the Conference set for itself would not be subject to fluctuations in the approach of any State, but would be clearly seen as components of the overall international disarmament strategy. Romania stressed the necessity of reducing military budgets. Reductions would give tangible expression to the desire to achieve general and nuclear disarmament and create the conditions required to eradicate war. It appealed to States to make maximum use of what it called "the auspicious signs at the beginning of this year's session" in order to embark on effective negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to secure progress towards concrete measures of disarmament.

Algeria drew attention to the climate of optimism which prevailed at the time of the opening of the Conference's 1986 session. It hoped that meant that general and complete disarmament, although a long-term objective, was no longer out of sight. In Cuba's view, it was unwise to imagine that general disarmament within a space of 15 years would be accepted easily, considering that powerful interests benefited from the arms race. Nevertheless, it held that there was a real possibility of working effectively to achieve the aim of reducing and then completely eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

India believed that the task of elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament could be tackled, given the necessary political will. The completion of such a programme would set a realistic scenario for movement towards general and complete disarmament. It criticized what it perceived as a trend to stress unduly issues of regional and conventional disarmament, without adequately placing them in the perspective of general and complete disarmament. Pakistan, in commenting on the Soviet proposal for a three-phase programme of disarmament, stated that the objective of abolishing nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament was a goal sought and supported by all neutral and non-aligned countries. In their opinion, specific time-frames for achieving agreements and implementing them would make the Conference's efforts in that direction purposeful and goal-oriented. Zaire recalled that 1986 had been proclaimed as the International Year of Peace and held, therefore, that the Conference should redouble its efforts for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It regretted that it had not been possible to reach agreement on priority issues, such as a nuclear-test ban and the prevention of nuclear war.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

During the forty-first session of the General Assembly, as in previous sessions, issues pertinent to general and complete disarmament under effective international control were addressed by many delegations. In the course of the

deliberations in the First Committee,¹⁵ the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, stated that general and complete disarmament remained their ultimate goal, though they recognized that it could be achieved only gradually. They considered it vital that the negotiations currently under way—whether at the bilateral, multilateral or regional level—should result in agreement on reduced levels of armaments, as that would both help strengthen international security and increase mutual confidence.

Spain was of the view that the limitation and control of nuclear and conventional weapons were not separable issues. Until general and complete disarmament was reached, peace could be preserved only if the weapons possessed by States remained in balance, which would prevent any temptation to commit aggression. That balance would have to be maintained through effective and verifiable arrangements, whereby security would be preserved at progressively lower levels of armaments. Italy, commenting on the objective of general and complete disarmament, stated that outer space should be used for exclusively peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

Romania declared that while it recognized the priority of nuclear disarmament, it was convinced that peace and the security of peoples could be ensured only through appropriate measures involving the whole of the arms race and disarmament. In its view, an organic interdependence existed among nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. There was a need for a complex approach which would permit better co-ordination among various total or partial measures in all spheres of disarmament by subordinating them to the single goal of general and complete disarmament. Such a programme would make it possible to take into account the interests of all countries and stimulate the disarmament efforts of States on all levels.

Democratic Yemen stated that there was an emerging determination on the part of the international community to put an end to the arms race. The peoples of the world looked forward to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. However, the numerous disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly had not resulted in any substantial progress towards changing the deteriorating international climate and bringing about the desired disarmament. The Lao People's Democratic Republic noted that the problems of peace were extremely complex, crucial and acute. Therefore, efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament, above all, a world free of nuclear weapons, had to be redoubled.

Argentina recalled that according to the 1978 Final Document, one of the principal tasks was to draw up a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which would make it possible to begin a process of global negotiations towards general and complete disarmament. It also underscored the importance of strengthening the United Nations role in disarmament. Côte d'Ivoire believed that the establishment of a climate of peace and security at the regional

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 45th and 51st to 59th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

level could help limit the expansion of conventional arsenals, and that that would mark an important stage in the process leading to general and complete disarmament.

When speaking of general and complete disarmament in plenary meetings and the First Committee, many delegations referred to two declarations¹⁶ issued during the course of 1986 by the heads of State or Government of six countries, both of which are quoted *in extenso* below. The first one, referred to subsequently as the joint message of 28 February, read as follows:

The world welcomed your summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev/President Reagan last year and the affirmation of your determination to achieve early results in the negotiations on space and nuclear arms. We are concerned, however, that no concrete measures have as yet been agreed which would help to "prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on Earth" This is a task of the utmost urgency for the future of humanity, and the very survival of our planet is at stake. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there can be no security for the world. We all live confronting the awful possibility of our extinction in a nuclear holocaust, whether by accident or design. This is why we feel it is incumbent on us to do all that we can to avert this threat and to build a new concept of global security without nuclear weapons.

The next summit meeting between you and General Secretary Gorbachev/President Reagan, which is expected to take place later this year, will in our view be a crucial opportunity for the two of you to agree on concrete steps to halt the nuclear-arms race.

We believe that everything which can be done to create confidence and a positive atmosphere for such agreements at your summit should be encouraged. One such confidence-building measure would be for your two countries to refrain from any nuclear test in the period up to the summit meeting. This could pave the way for an agreement on a mutual and adequately verified moratorium for nuclear explosions. It would also facilitate the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

We urge you not to authorize any nuclear test in the coming months before the summit. We are convinced that this would be seen, in the rest of the world, as a signal that the two of you at that meeting are prepared to draw practical conclusions from your joint statement in Geneva that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought"

We reiterate our offer to assist in verifying any halt in nuclear testing, to remove doubts about compliance and possible violations. Such assistance could include on-site inspection as well as monitoring activities both on your territories and in our own countries.

You have a major responsibility for ensuring our common survival. People the world over will support every step that you take to bring us nearer the goal of freeing the Earth from the threat of nuclear war.

The second declaration, hereafter referred to as the Mexico Declaration of 7 August, read as follows:

We are meeting today to proclaim Humanity's Right to Peace, and to reiterate our commitment to the task of protecting this right so that the human race may endure.

Exactly 41 years ago, death and horror descended upon Hiroshima. The most dreadful war in history came to an end, and the world's nuclear nightmare began. Since then we have lived on borrowed time. All that is precious and beautiful, all that human civilization has reached for and achieved, could, in a short time, be reduced to radioactive dust.

¹⁶ The joint message dated 28 February 1986, addressed to the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the First President of the United Republic of Tanzania, was circulated as a General Assembly and Security Council document (A/41/210-S/17910). The Mexico Declaration, adopted at Ixtapa on 7 August 1986 by the heads of State or Government of the same countries, was circulated as annex 1 to a General Assembly and Security Council document (A/41/518-S/18277). The attachment to the document appears as an annex to chapter VIII.

For four decades the nuclear-weapon States have had almost sole responsibility to end the nuclear-arms race, while the rest of the world has been forced to stand anxiously on the sidelines. The nuclear-arms race has continued and become more intense. In the face of the consequent danger of common annihilation, the distinction between the powerful and the weak has become meaningless. We are therefore determined that countries such as ours which possess no nuclear arsenals will be actively involved in all aspects of disarmament. The protection of this planet is a matter for all the people who live on it; we cannot accept that a few countries should alone decide the fate of the whole world.

The recent tragic accidents at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and at the launching of the Challenger space shuttle have shown once again how fragile is any security based on complex technology alone. And when an accident at a peaceful nuclear power plant has such great international repercussions, everyone can see very clearly the terrible consequences which would result from the use of even a small fraction of the nuclear armaments which now exist in the world. If a repetition of Hiroshima on a global scale is to be prevented, it is not merely more knowledge or new technologies which are needed, but more wisdom. We call for a binding international agreement which outlaws every use of nuclear weapons.

In January 1985 our Group met in New Delhi to consider the perilous development of the nuclear-arms race. We called for an immediate halt to nuclear testing preparatory to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, for a cessation in the production and development of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems as well as for a prohibition on the testing, production and deployment of space weapons. We also expressed our hope that the United States and the Soviet Union would make rapid progress in their bilateral negotiations towards the abolition of all nuclear weapons. We have since welcomed the declaration of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985, that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". Now is the time to ensure that such a war does not occur. We are therefore deeply concerned about the lack of evident progress so far in these negotiations.

We are aware, however, that both Powers have recently taken different steps that could help to overcome some obstacles and serve as a new framework for reaching agreements. We are convinced that security is not improved by increasing the capacity for destruction through the accumulation of weapons; on the contrary, true security is better ensured through the reduction of armaments. Nuclear disarmament, and ultimately the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, is an absolute priority. However, in this context, the problem of a balanced reduction in the conventional weapons must also be given appropriate attention.

We remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests. Both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing.

Furthermore, it is clear that continued development of nuclear weapons by those who already possess them is detrimental to the efforts to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other States which have until now refrained from acquiring them. We must recognize that, just as a drug addict cannot be cured by injecting him with more and more drugs, neither can an arms-addicted world be saved from war by an infinite accumulation of weapons. The time to stop is now.

In October 1985 and February 1986, and again in April this year, we have exchanged correspondence with President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. We urged them to undertake a fully verifiable suspension of nuclear testing, at least until their next summit meeting. We also proposed that this suspension should be immediately followed by negotiations for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We offered our assistance to help ensure adequate verification of such a halt in tests.

We have been encouraged by the consideration which has been given to our approaches and by the international attention which the nuclear test issue has been accorded. We continue to urge that what has so far been a unilateral moratorium by one of the two major nuclear States should soon become at least a bilateral moratorium.

To facilitate an immediate cessation of nuclear testing we are presenting in a separate document a concrete offer of assistance to achieve adequate verification arrangements (see attachment). We are prepared to participate in co-operative efforts together with the United States

of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to establish temporary measures. These could greatly enhance confidence in a United States-USSR moratorium and constitute important steps towards the establishment of an adequate verification system for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such measures could include the establishment of temporary monitoring stations at existing test sites, arrangements for utilizing existing stations in the United States and the Soviet Union for monitoring their territories outside the test sites, as well as inspections of large chemical explosions. We welcome that the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have started bilateral talks recently on nuclear testing issues. We have decided to propose to the leaders of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that experts from our six nations meet with Soviet and American experts. The purpose should be to explain in detail our proposals, to discuss how they could be implemented, and to explore other possible ways in which our six countries could facilitate test-ban verification. We are further strengthening our mutual co-operation with a view to monitoring and announcing ongoing test activities. And our six nations will also consider steps by which the non-nuclear-weapon States may co-operate in international verification arrangements related to future nuclear disarmament agreements.

We reiterate our demand that an arms race in outer space be prevented. Space belongs to humanity, and as participants in this common heritage of mankind, we object to the outer space of our earth being misused for destructive purposes. It is particularly urgent to halt the development of anti-satellite weapons, which would threaten the peaceful space activities of many nations. We urge the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on a halt to further tests of anti-satellite weapons, in order to facilitate the conclusion of an international treaty on their prohibition. Our New Delhi warning that the development of space weaponry would endanger a number of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament is already proving to be justified. We stress that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, be fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of more recent technological advances.

Unfortunately in recent times respect for international law has reached one of its lowest ebbs. Rights of weaker nations are being trampled upon with impunity. Treaties are being violated to suit the convenience of nations, especially the strongest among them. It is imperative, if the efforts to move towards nuclear disarmament are to make progress, that the United Nations must be strengthened and its Charter as well as Treaties relating to disarmament be observed in both letter and spirit.

The squandering of the world's limited resources on armaments stands in sombre and dramatic contrast to the permanent malnutrition leading to a life in misery and an early death—to say nothing of the ever-present threat of famine—which is the lot of millions of people on Earth. Poverty and economic hopelessness also constitute a threat to international peace and security. This threat is aggravated in many developing countries in which the external debt problem reduces still further their ability to allocate sufficient resources for dealing with the urgent and fundamental needs among their people. The transfer of resources from military expenditure to economic and social development is therefore a fundamental necessity of our times.

Our message from Mexico is to urge the leaders of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to continue and to reinvigorate the dialogue which they started last year; to set a firm date for a new meeting between them; and by an approach of mutual compromise and conciliation to ensure that such dialogue leads to practical results in the field of disarmament. Each side has the capacity to destroy the world many times over. There can be no suggestion that either would be showing weakness by a willingness to be conciliatory. The spirit of Geneva must be revived and strengthened. And we stress again our determination to try to facilitate agreement between the nuclear-weapon States, and to work with them, as well as with all other nations, for the common security of humankind and for peace.

Once again, we urge people, Parliaments and Governments the world over to give active support to our appeal. Every individual has a right to peace and a responsibility to strive for it. Neither together nor separately can the peoples of the world remove the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from human memory, but together we can and we must remove this looming horror from our future.

Out of the 17 draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee under

the agenda item "General and complete disarmament", 15 were approved by the Committee and recommended to the General Assembly for adoption. No action was taken on 2 draft resolutions at the request of their sponsors. The 15 draft resolutions which were approved—some of them in a revised form—by the First Committee were adopted by the General Assembly on 3 December as resolutions 41/59 A to 41/59 O.¹⁷

Of the 15 resolutions adopted, 4 are discussed in this chapter and 11 in other chapters, as follows:

- (a) In this chapter, beginning on the page shown—
 - (i) 41/59 B (Objective information on military matters), page 66;
 - (ii) 41/59 D (Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament), page 68;
 - (iii) 41/59 J (Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements), page 69;
 - (iv) 41/59 K (Naval armaments and disarmament), page 71.
- (b) In other chapters, chapter number shown—
 - (i) 41/59 A (Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons), chapter XVI;
 - (ii) 41/59 C (Conventional disarmament), chapter XVII;
 - (iii) 41/59 E (Confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament), chapter XVII;
 - (iv) 41/59 F (Nuclear disarmament), chapter VI;
 - (v) 41/59 G (Conventional disarmament), chapter XVII;
 - (vi) 41/59 H (Comprehensive study on the military use of research and development), chapter XXIII;
 - (vii) 41/59 I (Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons), chapter XVI;
 - (viii) 41/59 L (Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes), chapter VI;
 - (ix) 41/59 M (Conventional disarmament on a regional scale), chapter XVII;
 - (x) 41/59 N (Notification of nuclear tests), chapter VIII;
 - (xi) 41/59 O (Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament), chapter I.

In addition, a draft resolution entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements", which was withdrawn by its sponsors, is discussed in this chapter. Another draft on which no action was taken, entitled "Confidence-building and conventional disarmament in Europe", is discussed in chapter XVII.

The draft resolution entitled "Objective information on military matters" was submitted on 28 October by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom and was later also sponsored by Botswana and Samoa. On 31 October it was introduced by the United Kingdom, which stated that the draft built on resolution 40/94 K. The additional element was the emphasis laid on the value of objective military information at both

¹⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 94th meeting.*

regional and subregional levels. The sponsors believed that the provision of such information would contribute to an atmosphere of greater confidence and reduce the likelihood of an outbreak of conflict. It could also help avoid erroneous assessments of the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries, which could provoke unnecessary military buildups on the part of States. In that context, the sponsors appreciated the existence of a standardized reporting instrument on military expenditure. The draft requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the implementation of its provisions.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 88 to none, with 30 abstentions (Eastern European and non-aligned States). In that connection, four States explained their positions.

Among those that abstained, Brazil stated that the draft addressed issues extraneous to the crucial questions of disarmament proper and consequently would not contribute to the adoption of concrete multilateral disarmament measures. India held that progress in disarmament was a matter of political will, and lack of progress could not be attributed to lack of information on military matters. The Soviet Union shared that view and referred to its earlier statement in which it had recognized that there was a need for an exchange of information about armaments, but had also expressed its conviction that such an exchange should not be dissociated artificially from concrete disarmament measures.

Yugoslavia voted in favour of the draft, considering that it represented a continuation of action it had previously supported. It believed objective information on military matters was an important element which might, together with some other more important prerequisites, such as sincere political determination, contribute to the effectiveness of negotiations on disarmament issues.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 26 abstentions, as resolution 41/59 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which encourages Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the arms race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recognizing that the adoption of concrete, confidence-building measures on a global, regional or subregional level would greatly contribute to a reduction in international tension,

Emphasizing that the need for such measures at the regional and subregional levels is of special importance,

Believing that the adoption of such measures would contribute to greater openness and transparency, thus helping to prevent misperceptions of the military capabilities and the intentions of potential adversaries, which could induce States to undertake armaments programmes leading to the acceleration of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and to heightened international tensions,

Believing that objective information on the military capabilities, in particular of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, could contribute to the building of confidence

among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements and thereby help to halt and reverse the arms race,

Recalling its resolutions 37/99 G of 13 December 1982, 38/188 C of 20 December 1983 and 40/94 K of 12 December 1985,

Aware of the existence, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, and that annual reports on military expenditures are now being received from an increasing number of States,

1. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities could help relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements;

2. *Urges* those global, regional and subregional organizations that have already expressed support for the principle of practical and concrete confidence-building measures of a military nature on a global, regional or subregional level to intensify their efforts with a view to adopting such measures at the earliest possible date;

3. *Urges* all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to consider implementing additional measures based on the principles of openness and transparency such as, for example, the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, with the aim of facilitating the availability of objective information on, as well as objective assessment of, military capabilities;

4. *Expresses its thanks* to the Secretary-General for his report prepared in conformity with resolution 40/94 K;

5. *Invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General before 30 April 1987 the measures they have adopted to contribute to greater openness in military matters in general and in particular to improve the flow of objective information on military capabilities;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Objective information on military matters"

On 29 October, Cuba and Czechoslovakia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament", which was later also sponsored by the German Democratic Republic. In introducing it on 6 November, Czechoslovakia noted that previous resolutions on the subject had recognized that the various bodies mentioned in the title of the draft had an important role to play in general efforts to attain the goal of disarmament. Moreover, progress in disarmament would significantly enhance the resources those bodies had at their disposal for discharging their functions. The draft invited them to continue, within their areas of competence, to pursue their activities aimed at promoting arms limitation. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue to co-ordinate those activities and to submit an updated report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 95 to 15 (Western and associated States), with 18 abstentions. Two delegations explained their positions on it. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, stated that the Twelve could not support the draft because they felt that it ignored the procedures already agreed upon for pursuing disarmament within the United Nations system. They considered that the Department for Disarmament Affairs

was responsible for co-ordinating disarmament activities, including liaison with the relevant organizations and other bodies. In the opinion of the Twelve, rather than encouraging the specialized agencies to engage in activities that were likely to detract from the tasks for which they had been specifically mandated, the General Assembly should make maximum use of the existing United Nations disarmament machinery. Venezuela held largely the same view, although it voted in favour of the draft. It believed that excessive diffusion of debates on disarmament issues throughout bodies that had no specific disarmament expertise would not truly represent a contribution to the cause of disarmament. The activity of specialized agencies and comparable United Nations bodies should be conceived in a way that would support the work of those bodies that did have specific competence in the field of disarmament, Venezuela added.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 117 to 16, with 19 abstentions, as resolution 41/59 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 38/188 J of 20 December 1983 and 39/151 E of 17 December 1984,

Reaffirming that the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and should, accordingly, step up its activity in this field,

Convinced that all avenues should be effectively utilized for promoting the cause of disarmament in all its aspects,

Reaffirming further that the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system have a valuable contribution to make in this regard, while taking duly into account the relationship between disarmament and their respective areas of competence,

Taking note of various activities conducted by the United Nations agencies in pursuance of resolution 39/151 E as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General on this matter,

1. *Reaffirms* its invitation to the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to continue, within their areas of competence, the activities aimed at promoting the cause of arms limitation and disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, to continue to co-ordinate such activities and to submit an updated report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament"

On 30 October, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United States submitted a draft resolution entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements" which was later also sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. In introducing it the same day, the United States elaborated on an earlier statement in which it had addressed the importance of complying with and implementing arms control and disarmament agreements and had also referred to another issue closely related to that of compliance, namely, the need for openness and the free exchange of views on disarmament problems. It believed that openness would invite reciprocal

willingness to co-operate and to build further on a relationship marked by, if not trust, at least greater understanding. In introducing the draft, the United States asserted that compliance with agreements laid the groundwork for effective negotiations for further arms limitation, because negotiating parties were more likely to reach agreement if they worked in an atmosphere of mutual trust predicated on a history of compliance with existing agreements. Negotiations were also facilitated when the negotiators had confidence that the international community as a whole—not just the negotiating parties—was committed to ensuring compliance.

On 23 October, Czechoslovakia submitted a draft resolution which was also entitled “Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements” and was later also sponsored by the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR. On 10 November, it was introduced by Czechoslovakia, which stated that the sponsors were convinced of the urgent need for strengthening the legal basis of the arms limitation and disarmament process, including strict compliance with existing treaties and agreements in the area. Confidence in the reliability of compliance had to be engendered through adequate procedures for redress. The draft, *inter alia*, urged all parties to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions of agreements. Czechoslovakia also revised the draft by deleting one operative paragraph. It further stated that the draft it was introducing and the draft introduced by the United States had several overlapping provisions, and it expressed the wish that a joint approach could be found.

On 13 November the sponsors of the United States draft, together with Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Poland, submitted a revised draft resolution. The United States introduced it on the same day, drawing attention to a new preambular paragraph and minor changes in the operative part. It felt that the wide acceptance of the need for both compliance and resolution of matters calling compliance into question was reassuring. For its part, Czechoslovakia announced its appreciation of the agreement reached on the joint draft and expressed the view that only a balanced, rational and truly multilateral consideration of the question could serve the objectives of disarmament. It announced that the draft it had introduced would not be put to a vote.¹⁸

The revised draft resolution was approved by the First Committee without a vote on 14 November. On 3 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 41/59 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/94 L of 12 December 1985,

Conscious of the abiding concern of all Member States for preserving respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful in particular of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the inter-

¹⁸ See A/41/840, paras. 5-7.

national community are to derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements,

Stressing further that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system,

Recognizing in this context that, *inter alia*, full confidence in compliance with existing agreements can enhance the negotiations of arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

Believing that compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States parties is, therefore, a matter of interest and concern to the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations could play in that regard,

Convinced that resolution of non-compliance questions that have arisen with regard to agreements on arms limitations and disarmament would contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and security,

1. *Urges* all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions of such agreements;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications of non-compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament;

3. *Further calls upon* all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide Member States with assistance that may be necessary in this regard.

On 30 October, Australia, Austria, China, Finland, France, Iceland, Indonesia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament". Sweden introduced it on 10 November. It recalled that in 1985 the General Assembly had requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the issues contained in the United Nations study on the naval arms race,¹⁹ and noted that the Commission's work during its 1986 session had resulted in a number of substantive findings and recommendations on the subject, which were contained in a working paper by its Chairman.²⁰ All delegations participating in the substantive consultations approved the recommendations, held that they could form the basis of further deliberations and concurred that efforts in that area should be governed by certain basic principles, which were elaborated in the Chairman's paper. Sweden went on to state that the draft resolution was of a procedural nature. It requested the Disarmament Commission to continue at its 1987 session its substantive work on the issue and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 10 November by a recorded vote of 133 to 1 (United States), with 1 abstention (India). Two States explained their positions on it. Bulgaria recalled the considerable interest it had shown in the question of curbing the naval arms

¹⁹ A/40/535, later issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.3.

²⁰ A/CN.10/83.

race, the reduction of naval armaments and the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans. It was convinced that those issues were increasingly important for international security and welcomed the Disarmament Commission's consideration of them. It supported the draft introduced by Sweden, but regretted that it did not include some ideas and proposals that Bulgaria had entertained. In explaining its abstention, India indicated that it did not believe that disarmament measures or even limited arms reduction efforts should be confined to a narrow category of weapons such as naval armaments. In its view, the consideration of the naval arms race did not appear to make a positive contribution to the process of general and complete disarmament, and pursuing it further in the Disarmament Commission would divert attention from the higher priority areas of disarmament.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 153 to 1, with 1 abstention, as resolution 41/59 K. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 38/188 G of 20 December 1983, by which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on the naval arms race,

Recalling also its resolution 40/94 F of 12 December 1985, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the issues contained in the study on the naval arms race, both its substantive content and its conclusions, taking into account all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of naval arms reductions and disarmament, pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, as well as confidence-building measures in this field,

Having examined the report of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament during the 1986 session of the Commission, which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which, in their view, could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the report on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission;
2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1987, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;
3. *Also requests* the Disarmament Commission to inscribe on the agenda for its 1987 session an item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament";
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament"

Finally, Member States initiated in the First Committee, under other agenda items, a number of resolutions with aspects relevant to disarmament efforts. Three of them, resolutions 41/88 A, B and C, all entitled "Question of Antarctica", are dealt with in chapter X. The others are briefly dealt with in this chapter, namely, resolutions 41/89 (Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region), 41/90 (Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security), 41/91 (Need for result-oriented political dialogue to improve the international situation) and 41/92 (Establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace

and security). The four resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December.²¹

The draft resolution concerning the strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region was sponsored by Algeria, Cyprus, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Morocco, Romania, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. It was subsequently revised and introduced by Malta on 26 November. It was approved without a vote by the First Committee on the same day and by the General Assembly on 4 December as resolution 41/89. By the resolution, the Assembly recognized the importance of promoting peace, security and co-operation and of strengthening further the economic, commercial and cultural links in the Mediterranean region. It also expressed concern at the continuing military operations in the Mediterranean and the grave dangers that they created for peace, security and general equilibrium in the region. The passages which relate most directly to disarmament appear in paragraphs 1 and 2:

The General Assembly,

1. *Reaffirms:*

(a) That the security of the Mediterranean is closely linked with European security and with international peace and security;

(b) That further efforts are necessary for the reduction of tension and of armaments and for the creation of conditions of security and fruitful co-operation in all fields for all countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, security, non-intervention and non-interference, non-violation of international borders, non-use of force or threat of use of force, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for permanent sovereignty over natural resources;

(c) The need for just and viable solutions of existing problems and crises in the area on the basis of the provisions of the Charter and of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation and the right of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to self-determination and independence;

2. *Takes note* of paragraph 24 of the Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which, *inter alia*, confirms the intention of the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to develop good-neighbourly relations with all States of the region, with due regard to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, so as to promote confidence and security and make peace prevail in the region in accordance with the provisions contained in the Mediterranean chapter of the Final Act;

The draft resolution concerning the review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security was sponsored by Algeria, the Bahamas, the Congo, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda and Yugoslavia, and was introduced by Yugoslavia on 26 November. On the same day, the First Committee approved it by a recorded vote of 96 to 1, with 23 abstentions. On 4 December the General Assembly adopted it as

²¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 96th meeting.

resolution 41/90 by a recorded vote of 126 to 1, with 24 abstentions. By it, the Assembly stated its conviction that a comprehensive and just solution to pressing international problems, such as achieving peace and security, disarmament and development, could only be ensured through negotiations, based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in which all countries participated on an equal footing. The disarmament-related passages of the operative part of the resolution appear in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 14, as follows:

The General Assembly,

..

3. *Calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take immediate steps aimed at:

(a) Promoting and using effectively the system of collective security as envisaged in the Charter;

(b) Halting effectively the arms race and achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control and, to this end, to start serious, meaningful and effective negotiations with a view to implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to fulfilling the priority tasks listed in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document;

4. *Invites* all States, in particular the major military Powers and States members of military alliances, to refrain, especially in critical situations and in crisis areas, from actions, including military activities and manoeuvres, conceived within the context of East-West confrontation and used as a means of pressure on, threat to and destabilization of other States and regions;

5. *Expresses its conviction* that the gradual military disengagement of the great Powers and their military alliances from various parts of the world should be promoted;

14. *Welcomes* the continuation of the process within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe;

..

The draft resolution concerning the need for result-oriented political dialogue to improve the international situation was sponsored by the German Democratic Republic, which revised and introduced it on 26 November. On the same day it was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 91 to 1, with 28 abstentions. On 4 December, the General Assembly adopted it as resolution 41/91 by a recorded vote of 117 to 1, with 33 abstentions. By it, the Assembly noted with satisfaction the resumed dialogue between the leaders of the Soviet Union and United States, and hoped that every effort would be undertaken by both States with a view to achieving agreements on the halting of the nuclear-arms race, on a radical reduction of their nuclear arsenals, on nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Assembly also expressed deep concern at the escalation of the arms race, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, and the risk of its extension into outer space, as well as the increasing recourse to the threat or use of force in international affairs, military intervention and aggression, the prevalence of tensions and conflicts, the denial of peoples' right to self-determination and the continued existence of colonialism, racism and *apartheid*. The disarmament-related passage of the operative part of the resolution appears in paragraph 3, as follows:

The General Assembly.

3. *Appeals* to all Member States to enhance the role of the United Nations as a forum for political dialogue and negotiations in order to preserve peace, strengthen international security, promote arms limitation and disarmament under effective verification, develop equitable international economic relations, implement the right to self-determination of peoples under colonial rule, eradicate racism and *apartheid* and settle other urgent international issues;

The draft resolution on the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security was sponsored by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR, and was introduced by Hungary on 20 November. On 25 November Hungary introduced a revised version, also sponsored by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. On 26 November it was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 82 to 2, with 35 abstentions. On 4 December the General Assembly adopted it as resolution 41/92 by a recorded vote of 102 to 2, with 46 abstentions. By it, the Assembly expressed concern at the tense and dangerous situation in the world and the danger of continuing down the path of confrontation and the arms race towards the abyss of the nuclear self-destruction of mankind. The Assembly was also concerned at the continuous escalation of the global arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, and the consequent threat posed to the security of all States. The disarmament-related passage of the operative part of the resolution appears in paragraph 5, as follows:

The General Assembly,

5. *Calls upon* Member States to make their contribution to practical measures to ensure compliance with and implementation of the provisions of the Charter with particular regard to the crucial and interrelated areas of disarmament, crisis and conflict settlement, economic development and co-operation and the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

Conclusion

States representing all political and geographical groups stated in 1986 that general and complete disarmament under effective international control remained their ultimate goal. While some stressed that such an objective could only be achieved gradually, others underscored the need for a complex approach that would permit better co-ordination among various comprehensive and partial measures by subordinating them to the single goal of general and complete disarmament. In discussion of the concept, the need for a comprehensive programme, one which would make it possible to begin a process of global disarmament negotiations, was reaffirmed. Most countries put particular emphasis on the urgency of halting the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament. A number of delegations to the different United Nations disarmament bodies sounded a warning against unduly stressing specific issues

without adequately placing them in the context of general and complete disarmament.

As in previous years, the item on general and complete disarmament served in 1986 as a convenient framework for introducing various initiatives in the General Assembly. Thus, resolutions were adopted on such diverse subjects as compliance with disarmament agreements and naval armaments and disarmament. Among the four resolutions discussed in this chapter, only the one on compliance was adopted by consensus. The naval arms race, which is increasingly recognized by many States as a timely issue on which there are widely divergent views, was also the subject of intensive debates in the Disarmament Commission.

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

Introduction

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, in its article 11, mandates the General Assembly to consider “principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” and to make recommendations on such principles to Member States or the Security Council or both. In 1969, the Secretary-General, U Thant, suggested that the General Assembly establish a specific programme and timetable for dealing with all aspects of arms limitation and disarmament.¹ Responding to his proposal, the Assembly adopted resolution 2602 E (XXIV), by which it requested the negotiating body in Geneva, the CCD, while continuing intensive negotiations on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as discussed in chapter III.

The CCD debated the question between 1970 and 1978, and a number of specific proposals were submitted. In 1970, Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia proposed a comprehensive programme in the General Assembly,² but no agreement on such a programme emerged.

In 1978, at its tenth special session, the Assembly provided in paragraph 109 of the Final Document³ that the Committee on Disarmament would undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. It further entrusted the Disarmament Commission with the task of considering the elements of the programme. In 1979, the Commission adopted by consensus the “Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament”⁴ covering objectives, measures, and machinery and procedures. After examination, the General Assembly transmitted it to the Committee on Disarmament, requesting it to initiate negotiations, with a view to completing the elaboration of the programme before the next special session on disarmament. The Committee in turn established an *ad hoc* working group to undertake negotiations on the matter. It prepared for submission to the Assembly at its

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1 A (A/7601/Add.1).*

² *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 27, document A/8191 and Corr.1.

³ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19. The “Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament”, as agreed upon and recommended by the Disarmament Commission, is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, appendix II.

special session a draft programme⁵ setting out the views of individual States or groups of States in one document, but disagreement persisted on many specific points of the draft.

Intensive discussions were held on the draft at the 1982 special session, but the conflicting points of view did not make consensus possible. The Assembly referred the draft back to the Committee on Disarmament and requested it to submit a revision to the Assembly in 1983. Accordingly, the Committee submitted the document "Texts for the comprehensive programme of disarmament",⁶ which was less extensive than the 1982 draft, but which still contained reservations in a number of areas such as priorities, measures to be undertaken, a timetable for implementation, machinery for implementation and the legal character of the document. The Assembly then urged the Conference on Disarmament, as soon as it considered circumstances propitious, to renew its work and to submit, not later than at the Assembly's forty-first session, a complete draft of the programme.

In 1984 the Conference was not able to conduct substantive negotiations on the matter, and although in 1985 its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament held a considerable number of meetings, it achieved only modest progress. In the General Assembly, Member States expressed either pessimism or, at best, cautious optimism regarding the likelihood that the Conference would be able to submit to the Assembly at its forty-first session a complete draft of the comprehensive programme, as it was again, by resolution 40/152 D, requested to do.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

In 1986, the Conference on Disarmament considered the agenda item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament in plenary meetings during the periods from 7 to 11 April and from 28 July to 1 August. On 6 February, the President of the Conference made a statement noting that there was no need to formally re-establish the subsidiary body on that item and that its Chairman would continue to preside over it.

In plenary meetings,⁷ a number of delegations made statements regarding the item. Early in the session, Egypt pointed out that much remained to be done to finalize the draft comprehensive programme in time for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session. It urged members to hasten the process. Mexico asked delegations to bear in mind that the current session was the last chance the Assembly had given the Conference to discharge that task. India recalled that 1986 marked the International Year of Peace and believed that it provided the Conference with an occasion to complete the

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2)*, appendix I.

⁶ See *ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, paragraph 88, to which is annexed the "Texts for the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group". The annex is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 8: 1983, appendix II.

⁷ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

draft programme, which, in its view, would set a realistic scenario for movement towards general and complete disarmament. Romania noted that recent proposals by the Soviet Union for stage-by-stage disarmament highlighted the need for accelerating negotiations on a coherent framework for disarmament efforts within a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Belgium expressed the hope that sufficient progress would be made on the draft programme to allow the adoption of the entire document by consensus. In its view, the universal adoption of a concrete and flexible programme of step-by-step action leading to general and complete disarmament would constitute a major achievement.

During the summer sitting, Czechoslovakia stated that the elaboration of the comprehensive programme would ensure that the process of disarmament would be conducted purposefully, and that the tasks incorporated in such a document would clearly be component parts of the overall international disarmament strategy, not subject to fluctuations in the approach of one State or another. In its view, the guiding principle of the work on the programme should be comprehensiveness, starting from the assumption that individual aspects of disarmament were mutually interdependent and that it was not possible to find a durable solution to only some of them while ignoring others. The Soviet Union held that in the current circumstances it was not possible for countries to confine themselves to partial decisions that would slow down the arms race in some areas, only to speed it up in others. Among other priorities, a programme for eliminating chemical weapons should be included as an integral component. Viet Nam, a non-member of the Conference, considered it a source of satisfaction that at least an incomplete draft had been produced the previous year, although it was obvious that the pending questions, though few in number, were among the most important and urgent ones.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the chairmanship of Mr. Alfonso García Robles of Mexico, held 21 meetings between 20 February and 25 August. At their request, the Conference decided to invite the representatives of the following non-member States to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Bangladesh, Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. In addition to the documents of previous sessions relating to the agenda item, the Committee had before it three new working papers.⁸

In discharging its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee took as the basis of its work the text annexed to its 1985 report.⁹ Contact groups, open to all interested delegations, were established to resolve existing differences on certain parts of the text in chapter V, entitled "Measures and stages of implementation". A contact group was also set up to deal with paragraph 6 of the "Introduction" and paragraph 5 of chapter VI, "Machinery and pro-

⁸ See the 1986 report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly, contained in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27)*. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including a list of the documents before it, is incorporated into the report of the Conference on Disarmament under paragraph 107.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr.1)*, para. 111, annex.

cedures'' As a result of intensive efforts, the areas of disagreement were narrowed and, in some cases, considerable progress was made towards harmonizing views. It was understood that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on remaining points of difference and until the draft document was complete.

On 28 August the Conference adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, which became an integral part of the Conference's report to the General Assembly at its forty-first session. It contained, *inter alia*, the following conclusion:

In the time available to it during the 1986 session, despite intensive efforts, the *Ad Hoc* Committee was not able to resolve all outstanding issues. In view of that fact, and bearing in mind that under resolution 40/152 D the Conference on Disarmament had been requested to submit to the General Assembly a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at its forty-first session, at the suggestion of the Chairman, consideration was given to the desirability of continuing the work during the first part of the 1987 session with a view to completing the elaboration of a draft of the Programme at that time and submitting it to the General Assembly before the closing of the forty-first session. Taking into account the progress achieved during the 1986 session, the Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that work on the elaboration of the Programme be resumed at the beginning of the 1987 session for the purpose of completing the Committee's task during the first part of the 1987 session and submitting it to the General Assembly at that time.¹⁰

The results of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's work are contained in an annex to its report. In comparison with the corresponding 1985 text, the new version of the draft comprehensive programme reflects the progress made in some areas, for example, in the sections concerning nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and armed forces, related measures, and machinery and procedures.

Late in the session, some delegations commented on the agenda item and on the *Ad Hoc* Committee's work on it during 1986. India regretted that some delegations had not accepted the concept of stages of disarmament with indicative time-frames for their implementation, which, in its view, was basic to any global strategy for disarmament. Indonesia believed that the lack of progress was symptomatic of the weakness of the collective commitment to the early attainment of obvious disarmament goals. China hoped that agreement could soon be reached on the need for the comprehensive programme to contain stages and time-frames, which it considered natural.

The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the group of Western States, felt that all delegations shared in the objective of completing a draft text as a road map for future disarmament objectives. It believed that quiet but distinct progress had been made in 1986. The fact that a complete draft text could not be achieved by the deadline was an indication of the importance and complexity of the issues involved. It expressed the support of the Western group for the Chairman's formulation regarding future work. Hungary, speaking as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries, believed that the group's new proposals, in particular those on the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, were useful contributions to the elaboration of the comprehensive programme. It voiced dissatisfaction at the fact that the task of

¹⁰ See footnote 8.

presenting such a programme to the General Assembly at its forty-first session remained unfinished.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

At the forty-first session of the General Assembly, a few Member States made comments in the First Committee¹¹ on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Argentina stated that it was difficult to speak of disarmament without specifically referring to the negotiations on the elaboration of a programme, which the 1978 Final Document considered one of the principal tasks to be carried out. It announced that the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries had requested the Assembly to call on the Conference on Disarmament to conclude its negotiations in the first half of its 1987 session so that the General Assembly, at its resumed forty-first session, would be in a position to adopt a decision on the programme.¹²

The United Republic of Tanzania considered the Conference's failure to make any headway on the programme disappointing. Zaire paid tribute to the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the enrichment of the programme, calling that endeavour a time-consuming task, the substance of which required more active participation by Conference members. Bulgaria did the same in assessing the work of the Conference in 1986 and reiterated its desire to see the programme elaborated as soon as possible. It noted that the results of the Conference's work on that issue hardly lived up to the expectation of the General Assembly in the previous session.

Speaking on behalf of the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries, Mexico stated that they had already, during the 1982 special session, expressed their determination to continue to work for the urgent conclusion of negotiations on and the adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which should encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control became a reality.

Czechoslovakia believed that the programme was an important political instrument for promoting a systematic approach to the problem of disarmament and a means of mobilizing the efforts of States to resolve that problem. It also regretted that a draft programme had not been approved. Romania considered that a complex programme of disarmament should be formulated leading to the step-by-step elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of the century and also encompassing measures for the elimination of chemical weapons and the substantial reduction of conventional weapons, troops and military budgets. Romania added that negotiations based on the principles of the 1978 Final Document should be developed simultaneously on several

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 34th and 37th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹² A/41/697-S/18392, annex, para. 42.

levels, with a view to identifying new disarmament measures. The formulation of such a programme could be accomplished only with the participation of all States. Romania therefore favoured intensified negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the draft programme and its adoption at a third special session on disarmament.

On 30 October, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft decision entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" In introducing it on 5 November, Mexico noted that the Conference on Disarmament, despite intensive efforts, had not been able, in the time available during the 1986 session, to resolve all outstanding issues. However, in view of the request by the Assembly that the Conference submit a complete draft to it at its forty-first session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee had recommended to the Conference that work be resumed at the beginning of the 1987 session in order to enable the Committee to complete its task during the first part of that session and to submit the programme to the General Assembly at that time. By the draft decision, the General Assembly would keep open the agenda item on the comprehensive programme in order to allow the Conference to conclude its work. In that case, Mexico stated, the Assembly would resume its forty-first session on an appropriate date, as required, for the consideration of the complete draft. Mexico added that the session would not be resumed exclusively for the consideration of that item, because some other items on its agenda would also remain open.

The United States explained its position at the time that the First Committee took action on the draft decision. While joining the consensus, the United States expressed its appreciation for the common understanding that the forty-first session of the General Assembly would not be resumed exclusively for the consideration of the item on the comprehensive programme and thus additional financial implications would be avoided.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft decision without a vote. On 4 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as decision 41/421.¹³ It reads as follows:

At its 96th plenary meeting, on 4 December 1986, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, having recalled its resolutions 38/183 K of 20 December 1983, 39/148 I of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 D of 16 December 1985, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-first session a complete draft of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and having examined the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concerning its work during the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, which is an integral part of the report of the Conference, and noting the recommendation contained therein that work on the elaboration of the programme be resumed at the beginning of the Conference's 1987 session for the purpose of completing that task during the first part of that session and submitting a complete draft of the programme to the General Assembly at that time, decided to keep open agenda item 62 (d) in order to allow the Conference on Disarmament to conclude the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament during the first part of its 1987 session and to submit a complete draft of the programme to the General Assembly at that time.

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 96th meeting.*

Conclusion

In 1986, the Conference on Disarmament moved towards harmonizing positions on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In comparison with the corresponding 1985 text, the new version of the draft programme which it produced reflected progress made in such areas as nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and armed forces, related measures, and machinery and procedures. However, differences persisted among States on certain other questions. Thus, despite intensive efforts, the Conference could not meet the General Assembly's request, as stated in resolution 40/152 D, for submission of a complete draft of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the Assembly at its forty-first session.

In the Assembly, a few States expressed their disappointment at the lack of results in the Conference, but somewhat more optimistic views were heard regarding the possibility that the Conference would be able to complete its task soon. Those views found expression in the Assembly's decision 41/421, adopted unanimously, by which it decided to keep open the relevant agenda item in order to allow the Conference to conclude the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament during the first part of its 1987 session and to submit a complete draft to the Assembly at that time.

World disarmament conference

Introduction

THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES launched the idea of a world disarmament conference at their first summit conference,¹ held in 1961, and reiterated it at subsequent conferences. The General Assembly endorsed the idea in 1965 in adopting resolution 2030 (XX). In 1971, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, the Assembly adopted resolution 2833 (XXVI), which stated that consideration should be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all States. Since then, the item "World Disarmament Conference" has been on the Assembly's agenda each session.

In 1972, the Assembly established a special committee on the question, and in 1973 it set up the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, which was mandated to examine all the views and suggestions of Governments on the convening of a conference and related problems. In its annual reports submitted to the Assembly,² the *Ad Hoc* Committee has repeatedly expressed the view that in spite of differences of opinion that have delayed progress towards convening a world disarmament conference, it is widely felt that such a conference could be a useful forum for disarmament efforts.

The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session stated that a world disarmament conference should be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation.³ The question was also on the agenda of the Assembly's twelfth special session in the broader context of disarmament machinery, but no specific recommendation was made on it.

The basic positions of countries or groups concerning the convening of a conference, as expressed in the *Ad Hoc* Committee over the years, have

¹ For the relevant excerpt from the Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries adopted at the First Non-Aligned Summit Conference, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. III, document A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1.

² *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session through Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/9628 and A/10028 and Corr.1, and A/31/28 through A/41/28)*; in addition, the *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted special reports to the Assembly at its tenth special session, in 1978 (*ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-10/3 and Corr.1)*, vols. I and II), and at its twelfth special session, in 1982 (*ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-12/4)*).

³ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 122.

not undergone essential changes. The Eastern European countries and those non-aligned States that have referred to the issue have continued to call for a conference, noting the importance of universal participation and adequate preparation. China has in recent years expressed conditional support for the idea. Although the United States and other Western countries have not questioned the idea in principle, they have emphasized in the last few years that the international situation has not been conducive to undertaking preparations for such a conference. Nevertheless, the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate has been renewed each year and the item has been retained on the agenda of the General Assembly.

***Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1986**

In accordance with resolution 40/154 of 16 December 1985, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference continued its work, holding two sessions in 1986. Forty non-nuclear-weapon States continued to be represented in the Committee.⁴

By virtue of paragraph 3 of resolution 3183 (XXVIII) of 1973, the Soviet Union participated in the work of the Committee, and China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States maintained their contacts with it through its Chairman. The German Democratic Republic and Viet Nam attended meetings of the Committee as Observers. The Working Group, first established in 1974 to draft the Committee's report to the General Assembly, continued to function.⁵

At its first session, the Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Nisanka Wijewardane of Sri Lanka, held four meetings between 7 and 11 April. At its second session, it held three more meetings, between 7 and 10 July. Its Working Group met on 8 and 9 July to prepare its draft report, which was considered and adopted by the Committee at its closing meeting on 10 July.⁶

In its report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee stated that its members were fully aware of the positions previously expressed by the Governments of other States on the convening of a world disarmament conference. It also stated that pursuant to its mandate, it had maintained close contact through its Chairman with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States in order to remain informed of their attitudes and had obtained the following updated indications of their positions.

China reiterated that it had always stood for the convening of an inter-

⁴ Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

⁵ The following States were members of the Working Group: Burundi, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Spain (Chairman) and Sri Lanka. Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic participated in the Working Group as Observers.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/41/28)*.

national conference to discuss disarmament and recalled that as early as 1963, it had proposed to hold a world summit conference to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In its view, it was a matter of utmost urgency to urge the two super-Powers, which possessed the largest arsenals of both nuclear and conventional weapons, to reduce their armaments. It stated that if the majority of the Member States were in favour of a world conference to discuss how the two super-Powers should take the lead in drastically cutting their armaments, China would be ready to support the idea.

France indicated that its position concerning the combination of circumstances that would be necessary to make the convening of a world disarmament conference possible had not changed since the preceding year. It noted that in the current circumstances, there was no consensus on such a project. It would have no objection to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's examining the possibility of spacing out its meetings so as to take that persistent impasse into account.

The Soviet Union confirmed its position of principle regarding the convening of a world disarmament conference. It held that the problem of war and peace could be solved through disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons and international co-operation. With the acceleration of the arms race and the danger that it might spread to new spheres, there was a need for immediate action to rectify the situation and to establish a comprehensive system of security. It noted that the idea of holding a world disarmament conference had received broad international support, including support at the United Nations, and it held that in the current circumstances it would be very timely to convene such a world forum, which might work out effective ways and means of curbing the arms race and achieving genuine disarmament. For the short term, the Soviet Union had put forward important initiatives, including a programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century, which could provide a good basis for constructive discussion of disarmament problems at a world disarmament conference. It was prepared, without any pre-conditions, to consider in a constructive spirit any other proposals which might be put forward by States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or by non-aligned and neutral States. It called on the other nuclear Powers to take a similarly constructive position and to avail themselves of the opportunities that a world disarmament conference would offer for negotiations on a whole range of disarmament problems.

The United Kingdom believed that in view of the current international climate, no useful purpose would be served by preparing for the holding of a world disarmament conference. It therefore continued to doubt the usefulness of further meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

The United States still viewed a favourable international environment as an indispensable prerequisite for a successful world disarmament conference. However, it considered the convening of such a conference at that time to be premature due to the lack of agreement within the international community on both the conditions necessary for a conference and the substantive issues that it would consider. It maintained that an unsuccessful or inconclusive conference on that important subject would serve no useful purpose and could

place additional obstacles before ongoing international efforts to achieve deep, meaningful and verifiable arms reductions. It believed that under those circumstances and in view of the budgetary crisis confronting the United Nations, the *Ad Hoc* Committee should suspend its activities until the political and financial climate improved sufficiently to permit a conference to be convened successfully.

In the "Conclusions and recommendations" of its report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee reiterated that the idea of a world disarmament conference had received wide support by the membership of the United Nations, with, however, varying degrees of emphasis on and differences concerning conditions and certain aspects related to convening it, including the deteriorating international situation. It was also evident from the updated positions of the nuclear-weapon States, whose participation had been deemed essential by most member States, that no consensus had been reached among them on convening a world disarmament conference under existing conditions.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended that the question of convening a conference be further considered by the General Assembly at its forty-first session, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of resolution 36/91, adopted by consensus, in particular paragraph 1 of that resolution, and resolution 40/154, also adopted by consensus. The Committee further stated that the General Assembly might wish to renew the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate and request it to continue to maintain close contact with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as with all other States, in order to remain informed of their attitudes and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

On 30 October, Peru, Poland, Spain and Sri Lanka submitted a draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Conference". On 6 November the representative of Sri Lanka, who had been the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, introduced the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report and draft resolution in the First Committee.⁷ He called attention to the respective positions of the nuclear-weapon States contained in the report and to the Committee's conclusions and recommendations. By the draft, the General Assembly, besides renewing the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate, would recommend that its Chairman undertake consultations with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to remain informed of the development of their positions. The Assembly would also request the Secretary-General to report to it at its forty-second session on the results of those consultations. Those two provisions differed from the corresponding ones contained in the resolutions adopted in previous years, as the earlier texts had requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee itself to maintain close contact with nuclear-weapon States and also to report to the Assembly. The Chairman pointed out

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 35th meeting. For the report, see footnote 6.

that, by the draft, the question of convening meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee would be deferred to the forty-second session of the Assembly and could be further considered, with due account taken of developments in the situation. The sponsors also held that the suggested order of actions for the current stage of the proceedings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee could contribute to easing the current financial situation of the United Nations.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 3 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 41/61.⁸ It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977, 33/69 of 14 December 1978, 34/81 of 11 December 1979, 35/151 of 12 December 1980, 36/91 of 9 December 1981, 37/97 of 13 December 1982, 38/186 of 20 December 1983, 39/150 of 17 December 1984 and 40/154 of 16 December 1985,

Reiterating its conviction that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its conviction that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could provide the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 23 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, the General Assembly considered it pertinent also to recall that in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session it had stated that at the earliest appropriate time a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that, in paragraph 14 of its report to the General Assembly, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference stated the following:

“Having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, the General Assembly should take up the question at its forty-first regular session for further consideration, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of resolution 36/91, adopted by consensus, in particular paragraph 1 of that resolution, and resolution 40/154, also adopted by consensus”;

2. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee;

3. *Recommends* that the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee undertake consultations with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as with all other States, in order to remain currently informed of the development of their positions on the question of convening a world disarmament conference;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the results of those consultations;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled “World Disarmament Conference”

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 94th meeting.

Conclusion

In 1986, as in previous years, there was no agreement among the nuclear-weapon States on convening a world disarmament conference. While the Soviet Union continued to support the idea and China voiced conditional support, France, the United Kingdom and the United States held the view that the current international climate was not conducive to holding such a conference and favoured curtailing or suspending further meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The General Assembly, in renewing the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, deferred the question of convening meetings of the Committee to the forty-second session of the Assembly.

P A R T T W O

Nuclear disarmament

Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament

Introduction

EVER SINCE THE INVENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, it has been recognized that they pose a danger to the very survival of mankind. Among the measures that have been proposed in subsequent decades to avert that danger have been the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons; the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; the restriction or prohibition of the deployment by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States; and a freeze on nuclear weapons. Yet the number and destructive capability of nuclear weapons have continuously increased, amounting to what has been called “overkill capacity” In addition to the 5 nuclear-weapon States, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, from 15 to 25 other States are believed to be able to develop a rudimentary nuclear weapon, should they decide to do so.¹

In the 1978 Final Document, the General Assembly declared that it was essential for the survival of mankind to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects; that the ultimate goal was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; and that the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two major ones, had the primary responsibility for taking effective steps towards nuclear disarmament.² Making those considerations the corner-stone of their disarmament policies, a number of States have criticized any tendency for international disarmament efforts to focus on any other issues than those relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.

There have been bilateral negotiations on nuclear matters—particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States, but also between France and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom—and through the years a number of agreements have been reached. The bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which the Soviet Union and the United States first entered into in 1969, led in their first phase (SALT I) to the signing of two agreements in Moscow on 26 May 1972: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), subsequently amended by a Protocol of 3 July 1974, and the Interim Agreement on Certain

¹ See *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons* (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.81.I.11), chaps. VI and VIII.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 47 and 48. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with a Protocol attached.³ Both agreements entered into force on 3 October 1972. The primary goal of the second phase of the negotiations (SALT II), which began in November 1972, was to replace the Interim Agreement with a more comprehensive one, providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems. That phase ended on 18 June 1979 in Vienna with the signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a Protocol to be considered as an integral part of the Treaty, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.⁴ By the end of 1986, the SALT II Treaty had not yet entered into force, and there was a degree of uncertainty as to whether each party agreed to adhere to its substantive provisions as long as the other did likewise, as had previously been the case.

In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union and the United States were involved in bilateral negotiations on strategic arms and intermediate-range systems, but the talks were discontinued towards the end of 1983. No bilateral negotiations on nuclear-weapon questions took place in 1984, but the Soviet Union and the United States announced towards the end of that year their agreement to enter into new negotiations on the subject. In early January 1985, they further agreed that the subject of the negotiations would be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate-range—with all those questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations would be “to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability”⁵ At their meeting in Geneva in November 1985,⁶ President Reagan of the United States and General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union agreed to accelerate the negotiations which had begun in March 1985 and continued in the course of 1986. The two leaders also met in October 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland, and were able to agree in principle on important aspects, but they did not reach agreement on the whole package of issues concerning nuclear and space arms which was before them.

Meanwhile, items relating to nuclear weapons have been on the agenda of the multilateral disarmament forums—the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly. Divergencies of view have hampered substantive progress on the question in that framework; for example, no *rapprochement* has taken place between the positions of the Western States, on the one hand, and those of the socialist and non-aligned, on the other, concerning the desirability of establishing a subsidiary body in

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13446 (ABM Treaty); vol. 1042, No. 13446 (Protocol of 3 July 1974); and vol. 944, No. 13445 (Interim Agreement).

⁴ For the text of the Treaty, the Protocol and the Joint Statement of Principles, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr. 1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr. 1), document CD/28.

⁵ The USSR-United States statement on the Geneva meeting of their foreign ministers, 8 January 1985.

⁶ The USSR-United States statement following the November 1985 summit was circulated as a General Assembly document (A/40/1070), and the disarmament-related sections appear in *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chap. II.

the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating forum in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Among the proposals in the problem area, a freeze on nuclear weapons was the focus of active debate in the early 1980s. The growing international interest in the concept of a freeze was reflected in two draft resolutions submitted by neutral and non-aligned countries during the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, in 1982,⁷ but no consensus was reached on them. At the regular session later in the year, they were adopted, with a number of mainly Western States either voting negatively or abstaining.

In 1983, the Soviet Union proposed at the multilateral negotiating body that all the nuclear-weapon Powers should simultaneously freeze, both quantitatively and qualitatively, all the nuclear weapons at their disposal.⁸ The proposed freeze could enter into effect initially with respect to the United States and the Soviet Union, on the understanding that the other nuclear Powers would follow suit. In the debates in the First Committee in the course of the following years, most Western States have continued to maintain that a freeze would reinforce imbalances in nuclear forces, present verification problems and impede negotiations on balanced reductions, thus diminishing Western and international security. On the other hand, the proponents of a freeze have held that it would contribute to international security by serving as a first step towards substantial nuclear-arms reductions, which could be verified with existing techniques. In 1985 the issue generated less discussion than in previous years, although three resolutions calling for a freeze were adopted and supported by a large majority of Member States.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

As in previous years, in 1986 the Disarmament Commission had on its agenda an item (item 4) comprising two sub-items covering various aspects of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and also conventional disarmament (for the full wording of the item, see page 13). In the course of the general exchange of views during the session as well as in their concluding statements,⁹ several members of the Commission took up the issues of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

China made clear once again its basic position that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament should be the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. To that end, the United States and the Soviet Union should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of such weapons and drastically reduce them. That would make it possible to create favourable conditions for convening a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament, with the participation

⁷ The two proposals are discussed and reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chaps. II and VII and appendix I.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/385.

⁹ A/CN.10/PV.102-109, A/CN.10/PV.109/Corr.1 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

of all the nuclear-weapon States, to discuss measures for further nuclear disarmament and the complete destruction of nuclear weapons. In order to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and not to use or threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. On that basis, an international convention should be concluded with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States to ensure the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In China's view, those measures should be accompanied by a number of others, including: (a) a simultaneous and balanced reduction and on-the-spot destruction of the medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe and Asia by the Soviet Union and the United States; (b) a drastic reduction of conventional arms; (c) an international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons; and (d) the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Furthermore, disarmament agreements should provide for effective measures of verification and all countries should enjoy equal rights to participate in the discussion and settlement of problems related to disarmament.

The Soviet Union commented on its initiative for the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere by the end of the century (for a summary of the initiative, see page 99). Regarding the timing of such a process, the scope of each stage and the interrelationship of the stages, it emphasized the primary importance of the concept of undiminished security for all at any stage. It underscored that the reductions would begin with a 50 per cent cut in the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, with other nuclear States joining in the process only at a later stage. The Soviet Union recalled the view expressed by the United States that it would take about 10 to 15 years, or less, to determine the practical feasibility of developing and deploying space weapons. The Soviet Union proposed that nuclear weapons be eliminated within the same span of time. It further held that medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe should be eliminated simultaneously. If that proposal were not acceptable to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, an alternative solution would be to eliminate Soviet and United States medium-range missiles in Europe without linking the issue to other components. As to Soviet medium-range missiles deployed in Asia, their number depended directly on the military and strategic situation in the region. The essence of its proposal for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union stressed, was that ultimately there would be no nuclear weapons anywhere, including in Asia.

Several countries urged the United States and the Soviet Union to persist in their negotiating effort. Canada stated that it would be an encouraging sign if there were less public posturing and more concentration on concrete proposals in the privacy of the negotiating room. Other countries should support and in no way undermine the efforts of the two major nuclear Powers to conclude substantial arms control and disarmament agreements. Japan expressed the hope that the two sides would keep the multilateral disarmament bodies informed about progress in their bilateral negotiations. Sweden regretted that the bilateral negotiations in Geneva were moving slowly. In its view, both parties continued to think in outdated concepts of nuclear balance

and sub-balances. If they wanted nuclear arsenals to be reduced and ultimately eliminated, they should have no reason to continue to build up their nuclear stockpiles. If a nuclear war must never be fought, there was no reason to pursue the development of even more refined doomsday weapons by continuing nuclear testing, Sweden emphasized.

India stated that the subject-matter of item 4 made it the most crucial agenda item not only of the Disarmament Commission, but also of any international disarmament forum. However, India felt that a mechanical approach to what was clearly the burning issue of the times had prevailed in the Commission in previous years. Such an approach should be abandoned, it declared, and the Commission should instead focus its energies on selected aspects of the nuclear-arms race with a view to drawing up well-defined guidelines for further substantive work by the Conference on Disarmament. Indonesia thought that there was a need for an integrated approach, one that would serve as a common platform for negotiations in the relevant forums on the various aspects of disarmament, both in their quantitative and their qualitative dimensions.

Pakistan held that the Commission, in its work on agenda item 4, should build upon the consensus reached in the 1978 Final Document by recommending concrete measures within the context of general and complete disarmament. Similarly, Yugoslavia believed that the Commission could make important recommendations and that it could contribute to the launching of new negotiations as well as to the more effective conduct of the current ones on nuclear weapons. The common denominator of those issues was contained in the Final Document, which, it felt, should be used as the foundation for decisive international action for disarmament. Nigeria considered that if the two super-Powers succeeded in narrowing their differences, meaningful recommendations could be made to the General Assembly with a view to expediting negotiations on nuclear disarmament, including the prevention of nuclear war. Egypt called on the two super-Powers to give more impetus to their Geneva talks, to serve not only their bilateral interests, but the wider interests of humanity.

Regarding the Commission's responsibilities in the priority area of nuclear disarmament, Brazil proposed that those few recommendations that had already been agreed upon under item 4 should be conveyed to the General Assembly. Work should then proceed on the elaboration of those formulations on which it had not been possible to reach consensus. Such an approach would strengthen the principles, goals and priorities established by the 1978 Final Document.

A few speakers, notably Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Egypt and Norway, addressed the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in connection with nuclear disarmament. Some, notably Bangladesh and Indonesia, referred to a nuclear freeze.

On 6 May, the Disarmament Commission decided to establish a committee of the whole to deal with item 4. The task was entrusted to a contact group, under the chairmanship of Mr. Miguel A. Alborno of Ecuador, which was to consider the item and report back to the Committee of the Whole.

The Contact Group held eight meetings between 7 and 21 May and submitted its report to the Committee of the Whole on 22 May.

The Group continued the work on agenda item 4 on the basis of the compilation of proposals for recommendations on that item contained in annex I to the report of the Commission for its 1985 session.¹⁰ It also had before it a working paper entitled "Basic issues of nuclear and conventional disarmament", submitted by the socialist States.¹¹

The state of the deliberations of the Contact Group was reflected in the "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4", which was annexed to the 1986 report of the Commission.¹² In the compilation, 11 recommendations (out of a total of 30) were clear of brackets or alternatives, indicating that they were generally acceptable, without prejudice to the right of delegations to review them as appropriate. The Contact Group, therefore, having been unable to reach a consensus on a complete set of recommendations, recommended that the Commission continue its efforts at its substantive session in 1987.

In concluding statements in plenary meetings, a number of delegations regretted the lack of adequate progress on nuclear disarmament issues. The United States noted that item 4 had been the subject of protracted and inconclusive deliberations for many years and suggested that it be removed from the agenda of the Disarmament Commission.

In his final statement, the Chairman of the Commission expressed the view that some progress had been made on the overriding topic of nuclear and conventional disarmament and that that partial success was encouraging for the future deliberations of the Commission.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

In 1986 the Conference on Disarmament again had on its agenda an item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" The item was considered in plenary meetings¹³ of the Conference during the periods from 17 to 28 February and from 16 to 27 June. During the session, the Conference also held nine informal meetings devoted to the substance of the item. Some delegations stated that their agreement with the decision to address the item only in plenary meetings should not be construed as representing a change in their position of principle, namely, that an *ad hoc* committee should be established to consider it. The Conference also reached an agreement on how to reflect in its annual report to the General Assembly the discussions held at both plenary and informal meetings on the item.

In his message to the Conference on 4 February, the Secretary-General

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/40/42)*.

¹¹ A/CN.10/81.

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*, annex I.

¹³ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, stated that the dangers stemming from the existence of large arsenals of nuclear weapons had not diminished. All Governments knew that, in the nuclear age, any major conflict carried with it the risk of world-wide disaster. All must recognize the common responsibility which that imposed for the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of international security.

The Soviet Union drew attention to a statement¹⁴ made by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, on 15 January, in which he put forward a programme for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. During the first stage of the programme, to be implemented within the next five to eight years, the Soviet Union and the United States would reduce by half their nuclear weapons that could reach each other's territories. The first stage would also include the complete elimination of the intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles of those two Powers in Europe and their renunciation of the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons. During the second stage, which should start no later than 1990 and last from five to seven years, the other nuclear-weapon States would begin to engage in nuclear disarmament. They would pledge to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to station them in the territories of other countries. The two major Powers would continue with the reductions agreed upon during the first stage and carry out measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear arms. Following the completion of the 50 per cent reduction in the Soviet and American strategic nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States would eliminate their tactical nuclear arms and cease nuclear-weapon testing. During the third stage, which would begin no later than 1995, the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons would be completed and a universal accord would be drawn up to ensure that such weapons would never again come into being. According to the programme, the verification of the destruction or limitation of arms would be carried out both by national technical means and through on-site inspections, and the elimination of nuclear weapons should go hand-in-hand with measures relating to other weapons.

For its part, the United States referred to the public statement of President Ronald Reagan, made on 24 February, in which he had commented on the Soviet proposal. The United States was pleased that the Soviet Union agreed in principle with the ultimate goal of moving to the total elimination of nuclear weapons when that became possible, but cautioned that the complexity of the task should not be underestimated. It noted elements in the proposal that appeared to be constructive, including the recognition of the importance of verification in negotiating agreements, but stated that other elements continued to present problems. It believed that significant reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, which were being negotiated bilaterally, should be the first step in the process of nuclear disarmament. The United States endorsed its previously stated objective of beginning the process by an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of each side's offensive nuclear forces, as well as by an agreement

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. I, document CD/649; the statement was also circulated as a General Assembly document (A/41/97).

on intermediate-range nuclear forces. It further recalled its long-held position that the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons was a process that required the resolution of other serious security issues at the same time, such as the imbalance it perceived in conventional and other forces, the need to ensure full compliance with existing and future agreements and the free and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts without outside interference. With regard to the common objective of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons, the United States held that both sides should focus on equitable and verifiable measures to achieve deep and stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear forces and must correct those basic conditions that gave rise to the need for reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence.

A number of Western States expressed the view that Soviet-American bilateral talks on nuclear and space weapons offered the best means of achieving progress in nuclear-arms control and disarmament and called for early progress in areas where there was common ground, including conclusion of an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. They were not convinced that the creation of a subsidiary body to deal with the Conference's agenda item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race would contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament. Western States stressed that for negotiations to stand a chance of success, their subject would have to be carefully defined and their objective precisely agreed upon.

Thus the United Kingdom stated that it had a vital interest in the Soviet-American negotiations and that the priority was substantial reductions in the nuclear weapons of those two States. It welcomed the agreement to apply the principle of 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom believed that the tone of Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January and Mr. Reagan's constructive proposals in response to it provided a sound basis for progress in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. It further restated its position that its own strategic nuclear forces were not relevant to any possible agreement on intermediate nuclear forces in Europe, as they were not comparable in their capability or role with those of the two major Powers. Similarly, France observed that the Soviet proposal for large cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two major Powers was a step in the right direction, but rejected the idea that France and the United Kingdom should freeze their nuclear weapons at the outset. In its view, such a move would unacceptably jeopardize their security, which was based on deterrence of the strong by the weak.

Western States further considered that it was incorrect to interpret paragraph 50 of the 1978 Final Document as setting out successive stages in the process of nuclear disarmament. In their view, the paragraph described the objectives to be achieved, but did not establish a sequence. They also believed that it was impractical to attach time-frames to the negotiations and emphasized that nuclear-arms reductions could not be divorced from conventional arms control and disarmament measures and should be pursued so as to enhance international stability and security.

Socialist countries regarded the Soviet Union's proposal as a good starting-point for negotiations on nuclear disarmament and gave it their full sup-

port. At the same time they stressed the importance of the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms. In their view, discussion concerning the item should take place within an *ad hoc* committee, and they brought up the possibility of setting up a sub-committee that would be composed of the five nuclear-weapon States and that could have a negotiating mandate. Socialist countries emphasized the relationship between disarmament measures in the nuclear and conventional fields and underlined their belief that the prevention of an arms race in space would remove the obstacle to deep cuts in nuclear weapons. They called for new thinking on the problems of security based on recognition that neither the arms race nor a nuclear war could be won.

The German Democratic Republic believed that a turn towards disarmament would be difficult after decades of a nuclear-arms race, yet it had to be achieved. The proportions and qualitative development of the nuclear arsenals called for a systematic and complex approach and required readiness to compromise. In the same vein, Poland hoped for a common effort towards eliminating unnecessary constraints, including lengthy discussions of a semantic nature on, for instance, the wording of mandates for relevant subsidiary bodies.

The non-aligned and neutral States regretted that so far it had not been possible to establish an *ad hoc* committee on the item. In the absence of such a body, discussions in informal meetings should, in their view, aim at clarifying issues and positions regarding the various aspects of nuclear disarmament so as to prepare ground for eventual negotiations in a subsidiary committee. They pointed out that the consideration of the item still lacked structure and purpose and thus did not advance the search for a common approach. They recalled their proposal that a future *ad hoc* committee should submit recommendations as to how the Conference could initiate the multilateral negotiation of agreements with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages, for (a) the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems; (b) the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and (c) the substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination. They further believed that the adoption of certain priority measures, such as halting the testing of nuclear-weapon systems, would create favourable prospects for negotiations on reductions. Welcoming the ongoing bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons, they stressed that the bilateral and multilateral negotiations should facilitate and complement each other.

India considered false the claim that nuclear weapons had kept peace in the world during the last four decades, as there had been over 130 wars during that time, most of which originated, in its view, from the global strategic confrontation of the great Powers. The possession of enormous nuclear power by some nations, which was a consequence of the nuclear-arms race, was an intimidating factor for smaller countries, which felt exposed to disguised nuclear blackmail. Sweden considered that nuclear weapons were unique as weapons in the sense that they put the very survival of humankind in jeopardy. They had also changed the meaning of national security, as the consequences

of the use of even one average-sized ballistic missile could affect a large geographical area. Morocco believed that the continued development of nuclear and other weapons had made the arms race even more difficult to control than before and appealed to all members to provide the multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament with the institutional means it needed to fulfil its mission.

China held that the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons was essential to the elimination of the menace of nuclear war. By “complete prohibition”, it meant the prohibition of all types of nuclear weapons, including their testing, development, production, deployment and use. By “thorough destruction”, it meant the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. It stressed the super-Powers’ special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and reiterated its proposal for a broadly representative international conference with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States to discuss further measures for nuclear disarmament, once the super-Powers had drastically reduced their nuclear weapons.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

As in previous years, there was a lively debate on nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in the First Committee.¹⁵

President Ronald Reagan of the United States, addressing the General Assembly on 22 September, recalled his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union in Geneva in November 1985 and stated that the two leaders had resolved to work together for real reductions in nuclear arms, as well as progress in other areas. The nuclear threat, he said, did not come from defensive systems, which were a shield against attack, but from offensive weapons, especially the Soviet Union’s heavy, accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with multiple warheads, which had no counterparts in size or number in any other country. That was why the United States had long urged radical, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive systems. The real purpose of arms control, he emphasized, was “not just to codify the levels of today’s arsenals, not just to channel their further expansion, but to reduce them in ways that will reduce the danger of war” The United States believed that the prospect of a future without such weapons of mass destruction must be the ultimate goal of arms control. For the time being, it continued to seek a 50 per cent reduction in American and Soviet arsenals—with the central focus on the reduction of ballistic missile warheads. In the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States sought total elimination on a global basis. If the Soviet Union insisted, however, on

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 32nd, 94th and 96th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 45th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

pursuing such a goal in stages, the United States was prepared to conclude an interim agreement without delay.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, noting that ideologies were beginning to give way to the understanding that peace was the supreme value, stated that only if peace were translated from declarations into practical action would there be a chance for survival. The Soviet Union, which was not the last member of the nuclear club, was proposing its dissolution. There was only one path to security—eliminating existing weapons instead of replacing them with new ones. The technology of destruction, he added, must not be allowed to determine policy, and questions of verification must not be used as an excuse for never translating verbal pronouncements into practical deeds. There was no longer a problem in that area, he affirmed. The Soviet Union was open to any form or method of verification, convinced that there could be no trust without it.

The Prime Minister of France, Mr. Jacques Chirac, affirmed that in view of the considerable disproportion in existing arsenals, any progress toward nuclear disarmament must begin with verifiable, progressive and balanced reductions in the entire range of American and Soviet strategic weapons systems. Those reductions must be carried out in a way that would not call into question the balance of nuclear deterrence.

The United Kingdom believed that the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe could make significant progress toward disarmament without compromising their security. China, while welcoming recent developments in the relations of the two major Powers, thought that the United States and the Soviet Union were still far apart in their views and positions on the question of disarmament.

In the First Committee, the bilateral negotiations between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers, including the Reykjavik talks of October 1986 between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, received wide attention.

The Soviet Union stressed that it had not gone to Reykjavik “empty-handed”, but had presented a package of compromise proposals which, had they been accepted, could have led in a very short time to a major breakthrough in all areas of nuclear-arms limitation and have effectively averted the threat of nuclear war, making it possible to start moving towards a nuclear-free world. It had proposed that the two States draft three agreements concerning: (a) strategic weapons, stipulating a 50 per cent reduction, leading to their total elimination by the end of the century; (b) medium-range missiles, accommodating the original United States option of completely eliminating American and Soviet missiles in Europe (the so-called zero option); (c) strengthening the régime of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty through both parties’ undertaking not to exercise the right to withdraw from the Treaty in the course of the next 10 years. In connection with medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union had made serious changes in its position. It had taken into account the interests of the European States and thus left aside the nuclear capabilities of France and the United Kingdom, although those two allies of the United States had a nuclear potential that continued to be built up and

improved, and all their military activities were closely co-ordinated within the framework of NATO. As for the concern over medium-range missiles in Asia, the Soviet Union had ultimately agreed that the number of warheads on Soviet medium-range missiles there would be limited to 100, while an equal number would be retained on American missiles of the same type stationed on United States territory. In connection with the third proposal, the Soviet Union had suggested the banning of all testing in space of all space-based anti-ballistic missile elements; only research and laboratory testing would be permitted. At the same time, it had proposed that during negotiations in the course of the next few years the parties should find further mutually acceptable solutions in that area. However, the United States had insisted that it should have the right to test and to carry out research pertaining to its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) not only in the laboratory, but also outside it, primarily in space itself.

The United States underscored its proposal, made during the Reykjavik meeting, to eliminate entirely offensive ballistic missiles within a period of 10 years. The plan was designed to meet the Soviet Union's concerns about defensive systems. Both countries would eliminate offensive ballistic missiles during the time the United States was researching SDI. As there would be no ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union would have no fear of SDI being used as a shield behind which the United States could launch a first strike. Both sides would reduce all strategic nuclear arms by 50 per cent over a five-year period. During the next five years they would continue to eliminate all remaining offensive ballistic missiles. In the meantime, the United States would continue with the research, testing and development of advanced strategic defences consistent with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. At the end of the 10-year period, both would be free to deploy strategic defences. After Reykjavik, the question had come up: Why should the two sides concentrate on strategic offensive ballistic missiles and not strategic arms in general? The reason was that the world had known since 1957 that offensive ballistic missiles were the most dangerous element in the nuclear arsenal. The SDI system to be deployed would make reductions and the elimination of ballistic missiles possible by offering each side assurance against the possibility of cheating and of clandestine ballistic missile deployment by the other side or by a third country. In that connection, the United States had repeated at Reykjavik its willingness to share with the Soviet Union the benefits of strategic defence for the good of both sides and the good of the world. It had also agreed to postpone deployment of the strategic defences for a period of 10 years, provided that at the same time the parties could move towards the elimination of ballistic missiles and there would be some acceptance of deployments of strategic defences at the end of the 10-year period. Agreement had foundered, the United States believed, on an additional demand of the Soviet Union, which wanted to place more restrictions on defensive research—restrictions that were not in conformity with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. Such restrictions would confine testing of space-based strategic defence systems to laboratories and, in the opinion of the United States, would have the effect of killing SDI.

Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom stressed that current, wide-ranging proposals in the nuclear field must not be allowed to languish in limbo. The fact that at the Reykjavik meeting the two sides had not been able to reach agreement on a very wide range of issues must not mean a return to "square one". By building on what had been achieved, by concentrating on specific proposals, by moving step by step and with determination, a truly safer world could be created. That approach applied with special force to the bilateral Geneva talks. Measures to enhance security at the lowest possible level of armaments were of vital importance, the United Kingdom stated.

Japan stressed the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. In the light of those States' responsibility, the international community had placed great hope in the Reykjavik meeting, seeing it as an opportunity to strengthen East-West political dialogue, enhance mutual trust and make progress on various issues of arms control and disarmament. Thus, the inability of the two sides to attain a final agreement at the meeting was disappointing. Japan hoped that the two nations would make use of every opportunity to continue their dialogue.

Argentina stated that the mere fact that the two major Powers had reached the preparatory stage of a possible compromise on nuclear weapons was of the highest importance for the cause of nuclear disarmament. It hoped that the stage reached at Reykjavik would serve as a solid basis for a continuation of the bilateral negotiations at Geneva. Nigeria expressed concern about the possibility that the arms race would rapidly move into a new environment, namely, outer space. It was convinced that the only safe route to the preservation of global, as well as national, security was through effectively verified nuclear disarmament. Yugoslavia, while aware that the dividing line between failure and success was "sometimes very thin", regretted that an opportunity to reach agreement at Reykjavik had been lost. Consequently, the two major Powers must be urged to resume their efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Yugoslavia, like several other countries, also expressed concern about the lack of progress on nuclear questions in the Conference on Disarmament.

A number of States referred to the Mexico Declaration of 7 August (see page 63) and expressed support for the ideas and proposals contained in it. Mexico gave a full account of the contents of the Declaration. Several countries, including China, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, the Soviet Union and the United Republic of Tanzania stressed the role and responsibility of non-nuclear-weapon States in promoting measures of nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament. Numerous countries also made reference to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and addressed the question of strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, addressing the First Committee on the occasion of Disarmament Week, and many countries, including China, Cuba, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom (on behalf of the European Community) during the general debate, stressed the need for a disarmament approach that would

cover not only nuclear, but conventional weapons as well. China stressed that both nuclear and conventional arms were basic components of the total military buildup of the two super-Powers and the two major military blocs, and that there was no insuperable barrier between a conventional and a nuclear war. Should a conventional war break out in an area with a high concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons, there would be a possibility of its escalating into a nuclear war. Concerning the nuclear-arms race, China recalled its proposal for a broadly representative international conference to work out measures for nuclear disarmament, once the two major nuclear Powers had drastically reduced the numbers of their nuclear weapons.

France emphasized that a lasting improvement in international security depended on the substantial reduction of Soviet and American strategic weapons, which presupposed an understanding on the upholding and interpretation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty and on the relationship that could exist between offensive and defensive weapons. Very ambitious proposals had been put forward by the two sides. By comparison with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II), which had aimed simply at limiting overkill capacity, current Soviet and American proposals aimed at radically reducing strategic offensive weapons. One could not but express the hope of seeing progress in that area, France stated.

Altogether, about two dozen resolutions dealing with nuclear questions were adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session. Seven of them are considered in this chapter and the remaining ones in other chapters. Resolution 41/86 O, entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session", which deals largely with measures to halt and reverse the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, is dealt with in chapter II. In this chapter, three of the resolutions dealt with were adopted under the agenda item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", two under the item "General and complete disarmament" and another two under the item "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly"

On 27 October, the German Democratic Republic submitted a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", by which the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, call upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed without delay to negotiations on the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. In introducing the draft on 31 October, the German Democratic Republic stressed that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament must complement and stimulate each other.

On 30 October, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cameroon, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Romania, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela submitted a draft resolution entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In introducing it on 6 November, Argentina stated that by the draft, the Assembly would reiterate its request to the Conference on Disarmament to initiate multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race. The Conference had been prevented from taking up that

subject in structured negotiations, Argentina stressed, because some delegations felt that it should be dealt with bilaterally. Argentina believed, however, that bilateral negotiations had, over the years, been concerned only with freezing nuclear weapons at increasingly higher levels and they could, therefore, be said to have been a disappointment to the international community. Although nuclear weapons represented the greatest danger to mankind, the relevant United Nations bodies had been prevented from dealing with that crucial issue. To remedy the situation, it was necessary that the Conference set up an *ad hoc* committee on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament. That was what the draft resolution proposed.

On 10 November the original sponsors and the German Democratic Republic submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later also sponsored by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam. The revisions affected the preambular part of the draft.

On 11 November the German Democratic Republic informed the First Committee that it would not insist on a vote on its initiative¹⁶ because important elements of the text had been incorporated into the draft introduced by Argentina. The First Committee then approved the latter draft by a recorded vote of 113 to 15 (Western States), with 5 abstentions. In connection with the vote, five States explained their positions.

Among those voting in favour, Mongolia made clear that while it attached great importance to the Soviet-American bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms, it thought that the Conference on Disarmament could perform an auxiliary role on a question which affected all States and peoples. The Soviet Union welcomed the adoption of the draft and stated that one of the important ways of curtailing the arms race continued to be the prohibition of the neutron weapon.

Greece, which abstained, stated that it would have voted in favour had it not been for the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft, which, recalling the Political Declaration adopted at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare in September 1986,¹⁷ referred to nuclear deterrence as “the most dangerous myth in existence”

Among those States that voted against the draft, Australia explained that its action was due to the fact that the text failed to express adequately the relationship which should exist between bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament, underestimating the importance of the former. In the view of the United Kingdom, it was self-evident that bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers—possessing approximately 95 per cent of all nuclear weapons—offered by far the most realistic hope of halting the nuclear-arms race and initiating a balanced and verifiable process to reduce substantially the number of such weapons in the world. If the strategic arsenals of the two major nuclear Powers were very substantially reduced and if no significant changes occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, the United King-

¹⁶ See A/41/842, paras. 12-13.

¹⁷ A/41/697-S/18392.

dom would consider how best it could contribute to nuclear-arms reductions in the light of the reduced threat.

On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 130 to 15, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in paragraph 11 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the Assembly stated that the nuclear-arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary weakens it and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 47 of the Final Document, the Assembly expressed the belief that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons, and that the ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting that in the Political Declaration adopted at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, it was stated that the renewed escalation in the nuclear-arms race, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, had heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations, and that it was also stated that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of war, that such weapons were instruments of mass annihilation,

Noting further that in the Political Declaration adopted at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, it was stated that the idea that world peace could be maintained through nuclear deterrence, a doctrine that lay at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons, was the most dangerous myth in existence,

Believing that all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

Welcoming proposals on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world,

Considering that it is necessary to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons of all types and versions and their delivery systems as a first step in the process which should lead to the achievement of substantial reductions in nuclear forces, and welcoming in this context the Joint Declaration issued on 22 May 1984 by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, which was reaffirmed in the Delhi Declaration and the Mexico Declaration issued by the leaders of those States on 28 January 1985 and 7 August 1986, respectively,

Noting that in the Conference on Disarmament, at its 1986 session, several proposals were presented for the consideration of practical measures.

Regretting, however, that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to reach agreement on the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament,

Convinced of the imperative need to take constructive action towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

1. *Affirms* that the existence of bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms in no way diminishes the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament;

2. *Believes* that efforts should be intensified with a view to initiating, as a matter of the highest priority, multilateral negotiations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3. *Again requests* the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee at the beginning of its 1987 session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to

submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for:

- (a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;
- (b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- (c) Substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on its consideration of this subject;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament"

On 30 October, China submitted a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament". In introducing it on 3 November, China stated that it was important that the two major Powers carry out negotiations in earnest on the basis of their mutually agreed principles and that they start a process of nuclear disarmament as soon as possible, so as to create conditions in which other nuclear-weapon States could participate in it. That constituted, China held, a reasonable and practical approach to nuclear disarmament and the gradual achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Those objectives were in keeping with the interests of the small- and medium-sized nations, as well as with the fundamental interests of the Soviet Union and the United States.

On 10 November, China submitted a revised draft resolution, from which it had deleted an operative paragraph appealing to nuclear-weapon States other than the Soviet Union and the United States to participate in the process of nuclear disarmament once the two major Powers had drastically reduced their nuclear weapons. China explained that the revision had been made to accommodate the concerns of some other countries and declared that it, as a nuclear-weapon State, would not evade its own responsibilities. It would continue to oppose the nuclear-arms race and remained committed to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution without a vote. The United Kingdom stated that its comments in connection with the draft introduced by Argentina (see above) also applied to the one introduced by China. The Soviet Union, referring to all the draft resolutions discussed in this chapter, with the exception of the text introduced by the United Kingdom (see below), welcomed their adoption as proof of the awareness of the majority of the world community of the need for practical decisions on matters of nuclear disarmament. The United States asserted that it recognized its special responsibility, as evidenced by the fact that it was negotiating in earnest on nuclear disarmament in the bilateral negotiations in Geneva. In addition, the Conference on Disarmament could continue to play an appropriate role in the consideration of the subject. France wished that the preambular part of the draft had been somewhat different: in its opinion, the emphasis placed on the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons overlooked the genuine conditions for security. Regarding the complementarity and linkage of bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear dis-

armament, referred to in operative paragraph 3, France held that priority must be given to prior negotiations between and reductions by the major nuclear Powers.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 41/59 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced that the most acute and urgent task of the present day is to remove the threat of a world war—a nuclear war,

Recalling and reaffirming the statements and provisions on nuclear disarmament set forth in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and in particular, the provisions that “effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority”, contained in paragraph 20, and that “In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility”, contained in paragraph 48,

Bearing in mind that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America agreed in their joint statement issued at Geneva on 21 November 1985 that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and the common desire they expressed in the same statement calling for early progress in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and the United States appropriately applied,

Also noting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have held further bilateral negotiations on various issues of disarmament,

Further noting that the Conference on Disarmament has not played its due role in the field of nuclear disarmament,

Bearing in mind that the Governments and peoples of various countries expect that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will reach agreement on halting the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear weapons, so as to start the process of nuclear disarmament,

1. *Expresses its deep concern* that negotiations on nuclear disarmament should yield concrete results at the earliest possible time;

2. *Urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear weapons;

3. *Reiterates its belief* that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session an item entitled “Nuclear disarmament”

Two draft resolutions entitled “Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations” were presented to the First Committee.

The first, submitted on 24 October by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Rwanda, Spain, Swaziland, Turkey and the United Kingdom, was later also sponsored by Greece and Liberia. By the draft, which the United Kingdom introduced on 27 October, the General

Assembly would call upon the two major nuclear-weapon Powers to spare no effort to attain their agreed objectives in nuclear-arms control and disarmament and to reach early agreements in those areas where there was common ground. In addition, the Assembly would express encouragement for the bilateral negotiations and their successful outcome. The sponsors believed that strong support of the draft on the part of the First Committee would contribute to the objective that all members shared.

The second draft resolution was submitted on 30 October by Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and Yugoslavia. In introducing it on 10 November, Yugoslavia stated that the main goal of the sponsors was to encourage the Soviet Union and the United States to conduct their bilateral negotiations with the greatest resolve and with a view to achieving agreements on concrete and effective measures for the halting of the nuclear arms race, the radical reduction of their nuclear arsenals, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The sponsors hoped that the text would be adopted by consensus.

On 14 November, when the First Committee was considering the two drafts, the United Kingdom expressed the belief that they covered somewhat different ground and that the one which it was sponsoring concentrated on the nuclear aspects of the negotiations. Subsequently, responding to Mexico and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom orally revised the draft's preamble and operative paragraph 2, which, in the revised form, urged the super-Powers to make early progress, rather than reach agreement, in those areas where common ground already existed. As it still appeared, however, that there was no possibility of agreeing on a single draft resolution on the subject, it was decided to take action on the two texts.

The First Committee then approved the draft resolution introduced by the United Kingdom and orally revised by a recorded vote of 57 to none, with 66 abstentions. China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States voted in favour; the Soviet Union abstained. The Committee next approved the draft resolution introduced by Yugoslavia by a recorded vote of 114 to none, with 15 abstentions (mostly Western countries).

A number of countries explained their votes on one or both of the proposals.

In explaining its affirmative vote on the first draft, France expressed the view that while the two major Powers must be encouraged to continue their bilateral negotiations, a certain caution must be observed in order not to prejudice the results—which were still hypothetical—that could be achieved. Also, the two Powers should be reminded of the need for a balance in conventional forces at reduced levels.

Among those States which abstained on the first draft and supported the second, the Soviet Union stated that the first gave a one-sided assessment of the Reykjavik meeting, and it regretted that it had not been consulted by the sponsors. In its view, the meeting had "created new frontiers in international relations and in Soviet-United States relations", and it believed that the draft introduced by Yugoslavia reflected that assessment. Mexico regretted that it

had not been possible to merge the two texts. It, like the Soviet Union, considered the revised draft unbalanced, citing a number of paragraphs as examples. Similarly, Uruguay and Venezuela had problems with some of its language, and Uruguay stated that the second draft expressed a viewpoint closer to its own. Yugoslavia also explained that it could not support the first draft since it set forth the position of only one group of countries. At an earlier meeting, Viet Nam had explained its support for the draft introduced by Yugoslavia. It held that it was imperative that a new impetus be given to negotiations on measures aimed at preventing nuclear war and attaining nuclear disarmament at all levels. It shared the view that while the Soviet Union and the United States had special responsibilities, the other nuclear-weapon States should also assume their responsibilities with regard to active negotiations.

The United States, which abstained on the second draft, indicated that it appreciated the call for bilateral negotiations contained in operative paragraph 1. It recalled that it had put forward a number of proposals aimed at the objectives mentioned in the draft as objectives of the bilateral negotiations. Regrettably, however, the draft also included in its preamble references to certain unbalanced documents, as well as to formulations that the United States could not endorse.

On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by the United Kingdom by a recorded vote of 88 to none, with 56 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Noting its resolutions 38/183 P of 20 December 1983, 39/148 B of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 B of 16 December 1985,

Noting with satisfaction that at their meeting at Geneva in November 1985 the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America committed themselves to the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth,

Noting that in their joint statement of 8 January 1985 the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America agreed that the subject of the negotiations was a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

Noting that at the further meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986, although no comprehensive agreement was reached, intensive discussion of far-reaching arms-control understandings took place,

Noting also that a large measure of agreement was reached on a number of issues,

Noting further with satisfaction that the two sides remain committed to further progress in their bilateral negotiations, building on what has been achieved so far,

Expressing its appreciation to the two Governments concerned for their readiness to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in those negotiations, in accordance with paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Believing that, through negotiations pursued in a spirit of flexibility, and with full account taken of the security interests of all States, it is possible to achieve far-reaching and effectively verifiable agreements,

Firmly convinced that an early agreement in these negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments, would be of crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security.

Further convinced that the international community should encourage the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America in their endeavours, taking into account both the importance and complexity of their negotiations,

1. *Calls upon* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of their agreed objectives in the negotiations, in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament;

2. *Urges* the two Governments to make early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground;

3. *Expresses its firmest possible encouragement and support* for the bilateral negotiations and their successful conclusion.

On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Yugoslavia by a recorded vote of 140 to none, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 N. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/18 of 18 November 1985,

Recalling also the Harare Appeal on Disarmament, adopted at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries on 6 September 1986,

Gravely concerned over the continuing escalation of the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that this increases the risk of nuclear war and endangers the survival of humanity,

Convinced that the alternative today in the nuclear age is not between war or peace, but between life and death, which makes the prevention of nuclear war the principal task of our times,

Further convinced that international peace and security can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament,

1. *Appeals* to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to conduct, pursuant to their special obligations and responsibilities as leading nuclear-weapon States, their bilateral negotiations with the greatest resolve with a view to achieving agreements on concrete and effective measures for the halting of the nuclear-arms race, radical reduction of their nuclear arsenals, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

2. *Invites* the two negotiating parties to keep the General Assembly duly informed of the progress of their negotiations.

Two draft resolutions dealing with the question of a freeze on nuclear weapons were presented to the First Committee.

The first, entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons", was submitted by India on 30 October. In introducing it on 4 November, India stressed that the subject was central to the objective of the prevention of nuclear war. It believed that the existing stalemate in disarmament must be addressed through a bold approach and that a nuclear-weapons freeze would serve to arrest the continuing escalation of the nuclear-arms race and help to create the right atmosphere for nuclear disarmament. The essence of the draft resolution was that a freeze should be practical and enforceable, that is, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. With those two measures, all nuclear-weapon laboratories, repro-

cessing plants and enrichment facilities would be rendered peaceful, and that would allow the application of non-discriminatory safeguards on a universal basis. The verification of such a freeze would not present great difficulties. India stressed that a freeze could be put into effect without awaiting the results of protracted disarmament negotiations.

The other draft resolution on a freeze, entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/151 C on a nuclear-arms freeze", was submitted on 30 October by Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru and Sweden. In introducing it on 10 November, Mexico stated that the nuclear-arms freeze was not an end in itself, but a first step to prevent the arms race from continuing while negotiations on arms reductions were going on. The freeze would embrace: (a) a comprehensive test ban on both nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles; (b) the complete cessation of their manufacture; (c) a ban on their further deployment; and (d) the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The freeze would be subject to appropriate measures and procedures of verification.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the draft introduced by India by a recorded vote of 115 to 12 (Western and associated countries), with 5 abstentions. It also approved the draft resolution introduced by Mexico by a recorded vote of 118 to 12 (Western and associated States), with 4 abstentions.

In connection with the vote, a number of States explained their positions on one or both of the drafts.

Among those voting in favour of both drafts, Mongolia stated that the freezing of nuclear arsenals was a necessary and logical step, which would lead to the reduction and final elimination of nuclear weapons, the main source of the threat of nuclear warfare. New Zealand stated that its support for the drafts signaled its conviction that the nuclear-arms race must be brought to a halt as soon as possible and that the reduction of nuclear weapons should begin forthwith. In its view, a nuclear freeze must be based on a balance of deterrence at the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons. The two drafts did not accord with New Zealand's views in all respects; in particular, it noted the absence of any reference to the need for adequate measures of verification and to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban in the Indian initiative. It also had difficulty in accepting some of the assertions in the draft introduced by Mexico, including the characterization of the freeze as the most effective first step for preventing the continuation of the nuclear-arms race. Similarly, Norway cast a positive vote to demonstrate its basic attitude towards the nuclear-arms race, even though the drafts did not meet all its concerns. It did so on the understanding that both texts recognized that a freeze must be balanced, mutual and verifiable in order not to upset stability. In Norway's view, curbing the arms race and reducing the overall levels of armaments must be the primary goal.

Australia explained its positive vote on the draft introduced by Mexico, stating that it wanted to demonstrate its support for a freeze on nuclear-weapon testing, production and development as a means of breaking the upward spiral of the nuclear-arms race. It noted with approval that the text affirmed the fact

that the freeze was not an end in itself, but only a first step, to be followed by negotiations aimed at deep cuts in the high stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Australia's approach to the question of a freeze took into account the need for a number of other elements as well: (a) mutuality and balance; (b) adequate measures of verification; (c) support for alternative approaches, such as the priority goal of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; and (d) strong support for the bilateral nuclear-arms limitation negotiations, not mentioned in the draft. It welcomed the fact that the text did not contain critical references to nuclear deterrence, which it regarded as the only currently available option to avert serious nuclear instability and overt nuclear conflict. It stressed, however, that it considered deterrence only an interim step to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.

Japan abstained on the draft introduced by India and voted against that introduced by Mexico. It indicated that it had some reservations about the practicability or meaningfulness of freeze proposals, although it had consistently supported various efforts for nuclear disarmament. It believed one could not overlook the existing situation, in which a balance of military capability played a role in maintaining an equilibrium, and that any realistic approach to disarmament must take into account the stability thus created. A nuclear freeze, unless immediately followed by arrangements for a balanced reduction in nuclear weapons, could lead to the preservation of a real or perceived nuclear superiority by one side or the other. Japan also believed that verification of a nuclear freeze would be extremely difficult.

The Netherlands, for its part, cast a negative vote on the draft introduced by India and abstained on that introduced by Mexico. It considered that the first draft contained an inadequate, open-ended definition of scope and remained silent on the subject of verification. It appreciated that an attempt was made in the second draft to lay down a precisely defined scope, but noted that the text failed to take account of recent Soviet-American developments concerning verification. Although the Netherlands thus considered the second draft "in a slightly more favourable spirit" it concluded that the objective of a nuclear-arms freeze was "somewhat out of touch with reality" Encouraged by the intensified dialogue between the major nuclear-weapon Powers, it was increasingly of the view that striving for a freeze would be tantamount to putting emphasis in the wrong place.

Among those delegations that cast a negative vote on both drafts, France expressed objections to the very idea of a freeze and held that declarations aimed at such a measure would not encourage the reduction of nuclear arsenals. Such reductions, it stated, should begin with the two major nuclear Powers, and the negotiations on reductions should have as their starting-point the definition and then the establishment of a satisfactory balance. France believed that a freeze would, by definition, mean fixing the existing situation and the imbalances involved in it, including the risks entailed for the security of the States concerned, and be equivalent to conferring a lasting advantage upon any State that had increased its armaments significantly. It also felt that a freeze would be difficult to verify and, if it benefited a given Power, might reduce the interest of that Power in negotiating. The United Kingdom voted

against the two freeze resolutions because it considered that bilateral negotiations offered the best hope of halting the arms race.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by India by a recorded vote of 136 to 12, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 41/60 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/100 A of 13 December 1982, 38/73 B of 15 December 1983, 39/63 G of 12 December 1984 and 40/151 E of 16 December 1985 concerning a freeze on nuclear weapons,

Convinced that in this nuclear age lasting world peace can be based only on the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Further convinced that the highest priority objectives in the field of disarmament have to be nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recognizing the urgent need to halt the arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons,

Recognizing further the urgent need for a negotiated reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles leading to their complete elimination,

Noting with deep concern that nuclear-weapon States have not so far taken any action in response to the call made in the above-mentioned resolutions,

1. *Once again calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, which would, *inter alia*, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons"

The same day, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Mexico by a recorded vote of 139 to 12, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 41/60 I. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling also that, on those occasions, it pointed out that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth and stressed that mankind is therefore confronted with a choice: halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation,

Bearing in mind that in the Delhi Declaration of 28 January 1985, the heads of State or Government of six States Members of the United Nations, coming from five different continents, stated: "A halt to the nuclear-arms race is at the present moment imperative. Only thus can it be ensured that nuclear arsenals do not grow while negotiations proceed". that in the Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986 it was stressed that they "continue to urge that what has so far been a unilateral moratorium" by one of the two major nuclear States should soon become at least a bilateral moratorium", and that at the same summit a document was issued on verification measures to facilitate the immediate halting of nuclear tests,

Believing that it is a matter of the utmost urgency to stop any further increase in the awesome arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States, which already have ample retaliatory power and a frightening overkill capacity,

Noting that the heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at their Eighth Conference, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, called upon the leaders of the two

States to pursue without delay and in a spirit of goodwill the objectives they set themselves at Geneva.

Welcoming the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing declared by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in August 1985 and extended by it on four different occasions, the last time until 1 January 1987.

Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step towards preventing the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations take place, and that at the same time it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons,

Firmly convinced that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an overall rough parity,

Conscious that the application of the systems of surveillance, verification and control already agreed upon in some previous cases would be sufficient to provide a reasonable guarantee of faithful compliance with the undertakings derived from the freeze,

Convinced that it would be to the benefit of all other States possessing nuclear weapons to follow the example of the two major nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Urges once more* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would be a first step towards the comprehensive programme of disarmament and whose structure and scope would be the following:

(a) It would embrace:

(i) A comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;

(ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;

(iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;

(iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(b) It would be subject to appropriate measures and procedures of verification, such as those that have already been agreed by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, those agreed upon in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva and those contemplated in the document on verification measures issued at the Mexico summit on 7 August 1986;

(c) It would be of an initial five-year duration, subject to prolongation when other nuclear-weapon States join in such a freeze, as the General Assembly urges them to do;

2. *Requests* the above-mentioned two major nuclear-weapon States to submit a joint report or two separate reports to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its forty-second session, on the implementation of the present resolution;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/60 I on a nuclear-arms freeze"

On 30 October, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Sweden and Uruguay submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes", which was later also sponsored by Ireland, the Philippines and Samoa. In introducing it on 5 November, Canada stated that although the draft might be viewed simply as a procedural one, it was important for a number of reasons. First, it stood as a reminder that the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes constituted a key

element in any progress towards nuclear disarmament. Secondly, it recognized that the continuing production of fissionable material was related to both the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, it pointed to an effective means of stopping both the horizontal and the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Canada also stressed that in order to achieve realistic progress towards nuclear disarmament, there was a need to negotiate agreements on specific arms control measures in a logical sequence. A ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes represented a step in that sequence.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 129 to 1 (France), with 6 abstentions.

In connection with the vote, the Soviet Union explained that it voted affirmatively on the understanding that the subject would be examined during an exchange of views among all nuclear Powers on nuclear disarmament—an exchange which it believed should begin immediately. India recalled that it had consistently abstained in votes on proposals that sought to separate the question of the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes from the question of the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons because such an approach was not in conformity with the 1978 Final Document. In its view, production in both areas should be stopped simultaneously. Argentina stated that while it favoured the cessation of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, it felt that the question should not be divorced from the general problem of nuclear disarmament. Consequently, it could not support the draft.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 148 to 1, with 6 abstentions, as resolution 41/59 L. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, 36/97 G of 9 December 1981, 37/99 E of 13 December 1982, 38/188 E of 20 December 1983, 39/151 H of 17 December 1984 and 40/94 G of 12 December 1985, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for 1986 included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the programme of work of the Conference for both parts of its session held in 1986 contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Conference on Disarmament on those items,

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

Considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices also would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Conclusion

The bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms between the United States and the Soviet Union, which began early in 1985, continued and intensified in 1986. At the summit level, the two Powers met in October at Reykjavik, Iceland, and were able to agree in principle on important aspects, but did not reach agreement on the whole package of issues which was before them. The multilateral negotiations in Geneva dealing with the same questions continued during the course of the year, and the two major nuclear-weapon Powers, as well as other States, made further contributions to the debate on the relevant issues.

Within the multilateral framework—the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly at its forty-first session—no major substantive progress was achieved. As in previous years, Western States, on the one hand, and socialist and non-aligned States, on the other, reached no agreement on establishing a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament for the item concerning nuclear disarmament. Only one of the seven General Assembly resolutions that are dealt with in this chapter was adopted by consensus. By it, the Assembly urged the Soviet Union and the United States to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching early agreement on a drastic reduction of their nuclear weapons, and it expressed the belief that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.

Prevention of nuclear war

Introduction

AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION, IN 1978, the General Assembly endorsed the view that removing the threat of a nuclear war was the "most urgent task of the present day"¹ This statement has been time and again reaffirmed by most States, including the two major nuclear Powers. The Soviet Union made a solemn commitment at the twelfth special session, in 1982, that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.² President Reagan of the United States, addressing the General Assembly the following year, declared: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."³ In spite of such consensus on the principle, there are fundamental differences on the specific aspects of the question.

When it made its pledge in 1982, the Soviet Union called for reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear States. Such a development, it and its allies believe, would be tantamount to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, open the way to nuclear disarmament and strengthen the principle of the non-use of force. Considering that the Soviet Union's pledge and China's long-standing commitment⁴ never to be the first to use nuclear weapons offer an important way to decrease the danger of nuclear war, some socialist States have called on the other nuclear-weapon States to make similar commitments and have urged the Conference on Disarmament to elaborate an international instrument of a legally binding character establishing the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The United States and its allies believe that a strategy of nuclear deterrence is indispensable at present in pursuing the goal of the prevention of nuclear war and all wars. In the view of NATO, a declaration of the non-first use of nuclear weapons would restrict and thus undermine the wider principle of the non-use of force in the Charter of the United Nations. The prevention of nuclear war must be viewed from a coherent overall perspective and involve an effort to reshape the conduct of States. The key concepts Western States have stressed, in that context, are renunciation of force, restraint, balanced disarmament measures, confidence-building and reducing

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 18.

² *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 12th meeting.

³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th meeting.

⁴ A/S-10/AC.1/17, annex, para. 7.

the risk of nuclear escalation implicit in a conventional war.

The non-aligned States strongly emphasize the importance of the prevention of nuclear war. India, with the support of other non-aligned and like-minded countries, has promoted the view that an international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons should be concluded. Mainly the non-aligned countries have also advocated that the Conference on Disarmament undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

In connection with the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations expressed the view that by its very nature nuclear war could not remain limited and, once a nuclear exchange began, there would be no way to contain it within a predetermined framework. In addition to the human costs, the ecology of the world would be severely affected and the infrastructure of civilization would be shattered. In his opinion, the prevention of nuclear war was not only a moral imperative, but also a question of survival.

In 1981 and 1983, the Soviet Union initiated resolutions in the General Assembly condemning nuclear war as a crime against humanity and declaring that it was the obligation of the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

In the course of 1985, as in previous years, there was agreement on the necessity of preventing nuclear war if the survival of humankind was to be ensured, but no agreement on how to deal with the issue at the multilateral level. In the bilateral context, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States declared at their Geneva summit meeting in November⁵ their conviction of the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They also agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought and that they would not seek to achieve military superiority.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

At its 1986 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission addressed the question of the prevention of nuclear war under item 4 of its agenda, concerning various aspects of nuclear and conventional disarmament (for the full wording of the item, see page 13). The item was discussed in both plenary meetings of the Commission⁶ and the subsidiary body dealing with item 4.

In the course of the general exchange, China reaffirmed that, in order to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and not to use or threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. On that basis, an international convention should be concluded with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, ensuring

⁵ The USSR-United States statement following the November 1985 summit was circulated as a General Assembly document (A/40/1070) and the disarmament-related passages appear in *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chap. II.

⁶ A/CN.10/PV.102-109, A/CN.10/PV.109/Corr.1 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Bulgaria held that the Commission's efforts should be aimed at preparing concrete recommendations, which, if implemented, would contribute to settling problems related to eliminating the threat of nuclear war. The concrete proposals of the socialist countries in that regard had not lost any currency. Bulgaria stressed that the adoption of a code of conduct for nuclear-weapon States would constitute an important contribution to safeguarding peace. A first and decisive step to that end would be the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so should, therefore, follow the example set by the Soviet Union and China. The German Democratic Republic emphasized that peace could not be won through an arms buildup and that nuclear war was not a means to reach political ends—it would put an end to any policy. Convinced of that fact, the international community should continue its efforts for arms limitation and disarmament so as to head off a nuclear war, prevent the militarization of outer space, abolish nuclear weapons and, through co-operation among States, overcome confrontation.

Poland held that practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war should include: (a) the commitment of all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; (b) a freeze by all nuclear-weapon Powers on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and on the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; (c) a moratorium on all nuclear testing; and (d) the prevention of the militarization of outer space. Those measures should be supplemented by additional steps, such as further consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and maintenance of peaceful relations between the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, as well as the elaboration of binding norms to regulate relations between nuclear Powers.

New Zealand stated that it was incumbent upon all States to contribute to the negotiation of agreements that would enhance global and regional security, help stop the arms race and reduce the risk of nuclear war. The primary responsibility fell, however, on the nuclear-weapon States—especially the United States and the Soviet Union. They had the greatest contribution to make.

Egypt felt that it was imperative for the Disarmament Commission to adopt concrete and practical measures to help the Conference on Disarmament reach agreement on its agenda item concerning the prevention of nuclear war. The non-aligned countries, Egypt stressed, had repeatedly expressed their concern over the adverse effects of the arms race. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi in March 1983,⁷ had emphasized that the renewed escalation of the nuclear-arms race, in both its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/354. The final documents of the Conference were also circulated as a United Nations document (A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2).

as reliance on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, had heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Nuclear weapons were more than weapons of war: they were instruments of mass annihilation. The non-aligned summit Conference had, therefore, found it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States.

Similarly, Pakistan stressed that in the current circumstances—with mankind living precariously in the shadow of super-Power rivalry and confrontation and with the spectre of a nuclear holocaust looming on the horizon—the issues of security and disarmament assumed crucial significance. Yugoslavia stated that the generally accepted belief that nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought should be followed by concrete measures for the elimination of the instruments of nuclear war.

After the conclusion of the general exchange of views, the question of the prevention of nuclear war was taken up in a contact group, the Commission's subsidiary body on item 4. The work of the Contact Group is discussed in chapter VI.

In concluding statements in a plenary meeting, a number of speakers emphasized that the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament was the main cause for the continuing threat to the survival of mankind.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

In 1986 the Conference on Disarmament had for the third consecutive year an item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" on its agenda. It was considered in plenary meetings⁸ during the periods from 17 to 21 March and from 7 to 11 July. Argentina, Bulgaria and China submitted working papers on the subject.⁹

The President of the Conference had consultations with delegations to consider an appropriate organizational arrangement to deal with the item. However, no agreement could be reached on the establishment of a subsidiary body. On 7 August, the neutral and non-aligned countries belonging to the group of 21 put before the Conference their proposal for a draft mandate for an *ad hoc* committee that would, as a first step, consider all relevant proposals, including appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. During the discussion that ensued, Western countries stated that they attached great importance to the subject and recalled that they had repeatedly stated that they were prepared to have a thorough discussion and exchange of views on it. However, they were unable to associate themselves with a consensus on the proposed mandate, because the subject could not be dealt with in isolation from the underlying security situation. The question at issue was, therefore, the prevention of war in the nuclear age in all its dimensions.

⁸ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

⁹ *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. II, documents CD/688 (Argentina), CD/691 (China) and CD/710 (Bulgaria).

The socialist countries expressed their disappointment at what they considered the negative position of the Western delegations. They indicated that, as in the previous year, they supported the proposal of the neutral and non-aligned countries. The members of the group of 21 also expressed disappointment and pointed out that the proposed mandate was a well-considered and balanced text that took into account the views of other groups, including those of the Western countries. China considered the proposed mandate reasonable and realistic. It hoped that in the future the sides concerned would adopt a co-operative and flexible attitude towards the mandate, so that an *ad hoc* committee might be established.

During the course of the substantive discussion on the item, neutral and non-aligned countries expressed their conviction that the greatest peril facing the world was the threat to human survival posed by nuclear weapons and that, consequently, the prevention of nuclear war was a matter of the highest priority. In their opinion, nuclear weapons were weapons of mass annihilation rather than weapons of war. They noted with concern that the continuing nuclear-arms race and the growing risk of an arms race in outer space heightened the danger of nuclear war. They strongly agreed with the view contained in the Soviet-American statement issued at the November 1985 summit meeting¹⁰ to the effect that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought, and they urged that the statement be followed by immediate and concrete measures to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race. They further stressed that all nations had a vital interest in the negotiations on measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

The non-aligned and neutral States rejected doctrines of nuclear deterrence. In their opinion, it was inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization was used by some States to promote their security, and they held that if nuclear disarmament was to become a reality, nuclear deterrence through a balance of terror had to be discarded. Egypt asserted that the theories of achieving international peace and security through the accumulation of armaments, a balance of deterrence, limited nuclear war and strategic stability had proved invalid and unacceptable. In fact, they increased the risks of nuclear war and led to instability in international relations as well as to the squandering of resources. India believed that the consideration of the prevention of nuclear war could make no progress as long as the security postures of the nuclear-weapon Powers continued to be predicated on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Pakistan stated that it was not an admirer of the concept of strategic deterrence, but it was concerned at attempts to replace it with an even more dangerous one: nuclear weapons could not be made obsolete through a ruinously expensive and highly destabilizing arms race, but rather, very simply, through measures aimed at eliminating them.

Non-aligned and neutral countries further supported the proposal contained in the Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986 (see page 63) for a binding international agreement which would outlaw every use of nuclear weapons. In its above-mentioned working paper on the item, Argentina suggested ex-

¹⁰ See footnote 5.

tending or broadening existing agreements in order to establish direct communication among all the nuclear-weapon States and to set up a system of crisis control centres that would involve the five nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Socialist countries reaffirmed that the prevention of nuclear war was the most urgent task of the day. In their view, it was necessary to create a comprehensive system of international security based on the principle that it was no longer possible to win either the arms race or nuclear war itself. They emphasized the statement made at the November 1985 summit meeting that any war between the Soviet Union and the United States, whether nuclear or conventional, must be prevented and that those two Powers would not seek to achieve military superiority.

The Soviet Union held that the world had become too small and too fragile for wars and a policy of force. It could not be preserved if States did not do away with a mode of thinking rooted in the admissibility of war. It was prepared to support the establishment of either an *ad hoc* committee on the subject of the prevention of nuclear war or, if it were more acceptable to Western countries, a committee of the whole to discuss all related issues. The essential thing was to achieve practical results. The prevention of nuclear war was increasingly, in the view of socialist States, a political task that could be solved only by political means. In introducing its working paper, mentioned earlier in this section, Bulgaria stated that little had been done on the issue, although it was a task of the utmost importance. It wished, therefore, to draw attention to the necessity of acting in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. Czechoslovakia considered that since a number of specific proposals on the prevention of nuclear war had been submitted, it could no longer be seriously argued that it was not clear what the Conference should negotiate on within the item. It referred in that connection to the Soviet Union's declaration of 15 January 1986 (see chapter VI) and the socialist countries' 1979 proposal for stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament.¹¹

Another initiative which, in the view of socialist countries, would contribute to the prevention of nuclear war was the creation of a comprehensive system of international security based on concrete measures to be taken in the military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres. Among the measures they called for in the military field were the renunciation of war—nuclear and conventional—by the nuclear-weapon States against each other or against third countries; the prevention of an arms race in outer space; the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests; and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Socialist countries also suggested that partial or interim measures, including measures on a regional scale, could be of importance for the prevention of nuclear war. In that context, they reiterated their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world.

Western countries reaffirmed that they attached the utmost importance to the prevention of nuclear war and that they supported a thorough, in-depth

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), document CD/4.

and structured consideration of all its aspects in an appropriate format. They emphasized that such a comprehensive approach was in no way designed to belittle the catastrophic consequences and inadmissibility of a nuclear war. In commenting on the statement made at the November 1985 summit meeting to which the socialist States had referred, Western States stressed that it underlined the need for the super-Powers to address the dual aspects of conflict, nuclear and conventional, a need which also applied to the Conference.

The Federal Republic of Germany expressed the view that the prevention of war was a multidimensional task that involved directing State behaviour in its totality towards more peaceful ways. Thus, the gist of a diplomatic strategy for the prevention of war was to induce States to adopt a new code of non-aggressive behaviour in their mutual relations. The Federal Republic commented on the above-mentioned working papers of Argentina and China, observing that the latter had the merit of placing the problem of effective prevention of nuclear war in the overall context of security, while the former was noteworthy, among other things, for insisting on effective verification arrangements.

The United States disagreed with India's view that coming to grips with the related issue of preventing conventional conflict would detract from the importance of nuclear disarmament. It noted that in tackling that issue, the prospects for nuclear disarmament would certainly be improved. Belgium reported on consultations it had had with other delegations on the basis of a working paper¹² it had submitted in 1983 to arouse interest in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. The document envisaged measures to prevent an accidental use of nuclear weapons. In the course of the consultations, Belgium had noted that there was uncertainty about the precise scope of the subject, which was, in fact, vast and complex. It believed that an organized dialogue would make it possible to identify points of agreement or disagreement on the role that the Conference could play specifically in respect of the agenda item. In connection with the adoption of the Conference's report to the General Assembly, Belgium expressed its opposition to the formulation used by the group of 21 to the effect that "it was inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization was used by some States to promote their security", because it contained an offensive insinuation in Belgium's view.

Western delegations further stated that strict compliance by all States with the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force and to settle all disputes by peaceful means, was a key element in the prevention of nuclear war.

In its paper, referred to earlier, China stated that the fundamental approach to the prevention of nuclear war lay in the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons. At the same time, it pointed out that that was a long-term objective. At the moment, the two major nuclear-weapon States, in particular, should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and should unconditionally pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear

¹² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/380.

weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. It believed that along with the prevention of nuclear war, conventional wars should also be prevented, as the outbreak of a conventional war in areas with a high concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons ran the danger of escalating into nuclear war.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

At the forty-first session of the General Assembly, several speakers in the First Committee¹³ once again took up the question of the prevention of nuclear war.

In opening the general debate of the First Committee, the Chairman, Mr. Siegfried Zachmann of the German Democratic Republic, stated that the world was confronted with very difficult problems, including, first of all, averting the danger of nuclear war. He warned that the availability of increasingly sophisticated technology and the concomitant development of new weapons systems might preclude the chance of keeping under control the ever-increasing arsenals of war.

Brazil noted that while scientists and statesmen alike realized the unprecedented power of destruction of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States had not hesitated to build up their arsenals, thereby increasing the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. The security of all nations was in jeopardy because a few powerful countries predicated their own security on the threat posed by those weapons. Brazil felt that it was important to make sure that the primary responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers in the field of disarmament was emphasized, and it would accordingly focus attention first and foremost on the prevention of nuclear war and other priority issues of nuclear disarmament. It would not support any attempts to justify, under pretext of promoting the prevention of war, concepts that, in its view, had been responsible for the worsening of the nuclear-arms race and for the increase of the danger of nuclear war; nor would it support shifting the emphasis from the prevention of nuclear war to collateral problems.

On the basis of a recent survey, Sweden stated that the greatest fear of young people all over the world was the fear of nuclear war. It believed that nuclear weapons, which were unique in their destructive capacity, should be a priority disarmament issue. India emphasized that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons was of critical importance, for both preventing nuclear war and setting in motion a process of nuclear disarmament. Pakistan saw in the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests a disincentive to resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons. Liberia referred to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa¹⁴ as a concrete demonstration of Africa's support for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war.

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 34th and 41st meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹⁴ Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo in July 1964.

Viet Nam emphasized that world public opinion had for a long time demanded that all nuclear-weapon States assume a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, to be followed by the signing of a legal instrument prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and by international arrangements at an early date to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union stated that it would like to see the Conference on Disarmament get down to business-like negotiations on nuclear disarmament and measures for preventing nuclear war. It stated that its proposals on verification proved its willingness to deal constructively and without delay with the problem of lessening the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. It supported proposals for concluding multilateral agreements to reduce the risk of nuclear war and the proposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for establishing a multilateral nuclear alert centre.

Poland viewed nuclear deterrence as particularly dangerous because, by stimulating both the quantitative and the qualitative development of nuclear arsenals, it increased the risk of nuclear war. The very nature of deterrence, Poland believed, made it impossible to reach agreement on, for instance, a test-ban limiting the possibilities of modernizing nuclear weapons. It enhanced the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and did not ensure against the outbreak of an accidental nuclear war caused by either human or mechanical error.

The German Democratic Republic stressed that measures of regional arms limitation would make a significant contribution to preventing the danger of nuclear war. Thus, non-nuclear-weapon States could promote the process of nuclear disarmament by establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Hungary held that the cessation of nuclear testing would be a very important step towards removing the danger of nuclear war. Czechoslovakia spoke in favour of the non-first use of nuclear weapons.

Norway affirmed that the question of the prevention of nuclear war could not be considered separately from the question of the prevention of war in general, as a nuclear war could be triggered by the escalation of a conventional conflict. What was therefore at stake was the prevention of war in all its dimensions in a nuclear age. That view was expressed by several other Western States, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.

The Federal Republic of Germany stated that the objective of its security policy, pursued jointly with the other members of NATO, was stability, reliably excluding every kind of war, nuclear as well as conventional. That policy of war prevention was based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force in international relations and was reflected in NATO's declaration of 10 June 1982 to the effect that none of its weapons would ever be used except in response to attack.¹⁵ In the nuclear age, reliable and durable security could not be established by military means

¹⁵ Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Bonn, 10 June 1982, published in *NATO Review*, No. 3, 1982.

alone. Individual countries' defence efforts must be complemented by broad co-operation in all areas, in particular in the field of arms control and disarmament. In the Federal Republic's view, additional essential elements of the concept of the prevention of war were: mutual restraint in relations among States; confidence-building through increased openness and increased exchange of information in military matters; regional efforts for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of conflicts; measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; measures to prevent the unintentional outbreak of war; and an assurance that all States would adapt their military potential exclusively to their defence.

Denmark reminded members that, along with its allies, it had actively supported efforts to reduce dependence upon nuclear weapons, and it called upon the parties to the various ongoing negotiations to reach early agreements in order to create the conditions necessary for such reduced dependence. That would, then, pave the way for negotiations with a view to reaching an international agreement on the non-first use of nuclear weapons.

China called on the two major Powers to take the lead in cutting down their nuclear armaments, to be followed by corresponding measures by the other nuclear States. For its part, China had unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use those weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or in any circumstances. The limited number of nuclear weapons China possessed only served the purposes of self-defence.

Three draft resolutions were submitted on the subject of the prevention of nuclear war. They reaffirmed positions that the General Assembly had previously endorsed and were adopted by the Assembly on 3 and 4 December.¹⁶

On 27 October, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania submitted a draft resolution entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war", which was introduced by the German Democratic Republic on 31 October. In introducing the draft, it noted that the text, based on resolution 40/152 A of 1985, expressed the hope that all nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so would follow the example of the Soviet Union and China and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The sponsors believed that such an obligation, if assumed by all nuclear-weapon States, would constitute an important first step and a significant confidence-building measure aimed at lessening the danger of nuclear war. By the draft, the General Assembly would request the Conference on Disarmament to consider the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 93 to 19 (mostly Western countries), with 10 abstentions. In connection with the vote, a number of States explained their positions.

Among those that voted in favour, the Soviet Union highly commended

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 94th and 96th meetings.*

the position taken in the draft as supporting action to eliminate the nuclear threat. It emphasized its resolve to do everything it could so that by the year 2000 peace would be ensured without nuclear weapons. The Byelorussian SSR added that the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was not simply a declaration, since it had consequences in the field of military doctrine and organization. In its opinion, the continuation of the Western nuclear Powers' policy of relying on their being able to be the first to carry out a nuclear strike involved an increased risk of nuclear war. It rejected the assertion that it was impossible to agree not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in the absence of a balanced reduction of conventional weapons and recalled that the Warsaw Treaty Organization had recently appealed for a radical reduction of conventional armaments in Europe.

India stated that it had voted in favour because it agreed with the main thrust of the draft resolution. However, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the best course of action for preventing nuclear war, it added, would be to forswear completely the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapons in any circumstances whatsoever.

Finland, which also voted in favour, reaffirmed its declared policy that nuclear weapons should never, under any circumstances, be used. It believed that nowhere was nuclear war professed to be an element of rational policy. Sweden stated that it viewed unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons as an important concept in efforts to reduce the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war; for that reason it hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would find it possible to make such declarations. It added that the establishment of rough parity in conventional forces on a lower level would facilitate such commitments. If the commitment were to be made through an international instrument of a legally binding character, it would be an important contribution to the efforts to prevent nuclear war. However, such an international instrument should deal solely with the concept of non-first use of nuclear weapons and should not contain any further elements not directly related to it. In fact, Sweden considered that the prohibition of the use or threat of force in international relations laid down in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations was mandatory and sufficient. What was required was improved compliance by Member States with the existing prohibition and with the obligation, also laid down in the Charter, to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

Colombia, which abstained, stressed that declarations of intention would not be productive if they did not lead to effective disarmament measures. It believed that the idea of not being the first to use nuclear weapons that was expressed in the draft weakened the prohibition of the use of force as defined in the Charter of the United Nations. Instead of promoting the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, the draft retained the military option of the nuclear-weapon States and their potential to threaten to use their weapons.

Among the States that voted against the draft, Australia observed that the prevention of nuclear war was an objective of the highest priority, but it was not advanced by *a priori* and unverifiable declarations about the use of nuclear weapons. Until nuclear disarmament occurred, other arrangements,

including nuclear deterrence, were required. In Denmark's view, the draft advocated a biased and simplistic solution. The concept of deterrence had been developed as an integrated part of a defence strategy and as an answer to an actual situation in which a group of States found themselves. A mere declaration not to be the first to use nuclear weapons without adequate follow-up measures was of limited value. Given the right conditions, an agreement between the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons could, however, make a positive contribution towards greater security, but it was the attainment of adequate conditions that was essential, not the declaration itself. New Zealand stated that, in general, it supported disarmament resolutions that were mutual, balanced and verifiable and that would promote stability at a lower level of armaments, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. It did not support resolutions that lacked balance and were of a vague and declaratory nature. The draft introduced by the German Democratic Republic promoted the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons while ignoring the need for balancing reductions in conventional forces. In the modern age, such reductions and the renunciation of the first use of force were essential to the avoidance of conflict that could escalate into a nuclear war.

On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 118 to 17, with 10 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority and that this commitment was reaffirmed by the Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document, it is stated that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered.

Reaffirming that the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and for undertaking measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war.

Convinced that it is possible and necessary for mankind to block the way to a nuclear catastrophe and that the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons is a most urgent measure to this end,

Welcoming the joint statement issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 21 November 1985 and, in particular, the conviction expressed therein that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Taking note of the Political Declaration adopted at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, in which all nuclear-weapon States are called upon to enter early into an internationally binding commitment not to be the first to use or to threaten to use nuclear weapons,

1. *Considers* that the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States made or reiterated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, concerning their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, offer an important avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war;

2. *Expresses the hope* that those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so would

consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons;

3. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to consider under its relevant agenda item, *inter alia*, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"

On 30 October, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, the Congo, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, the Sudan, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", which was later also sponsored by Ecuador. The draft was introduced on 5 November by Argentina, which stated that it was similar to resolution 40/152 Q of 1985, but contained some new elements, which, it was hoped, would help to revive the consideration of the item in the Conference on Disarmament. By the draft, the Conference would undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Argentina noted that several such measures, as well as confidence-building measures, had been proposed. It suggested that one of the reasons why the Conference had so far been unable to establish an *ad hoc* committee to conduct negotiations on such measures might be the global nature of their presentation. The draft provided the opportunity to establish a subsidiary body to negotiate and adopt specific measures to prevent nuclear war, instead of negotiating on the global aspects of the subject.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 113 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 14 abstentions (Western and associated countries).

In connection with the vote, four States that voted in favour explained their positions. The Soviet Union supported the thrust of the draft, as it did in the case of the other two drafts on the prevention of nuclear war. The Byelorussian SSR specifically welcomed the resolution's urgent appeal for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to consider measures to prevent nuclear war. Australia also supported the establishment of such an *ad hoc* committee, but it would have preferred to see the text drafted in such a way as to give due recognition to the fact that the issue could not be dealt with in isolation, but in the context of the prevention of all wars. Australia was not certain that an *ad hoc* committee could undertake negotiations on the matter at that stage, but it hoped that the Conference would consider and identify possible areas for detailed examination of the issue. Accordingly, it urged the Conference on Disarmament to establish such a body at its 1987 session. In a general statement on the drafts on the prevention of nuclear war, Colombia, a sponsor of the text introduced by Argentina, expressed the hope that the General Assembly resolutions might lead to the conclusion of specific agreements.

On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 134 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing nuclear-arms race.

Deeply concerned by an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the serious deterioration of the international situation,

Conscious that removal of the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war,

Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war,

Recalling also that at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, it was stated that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of war, they were instruments of mass annihilation, and that at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, it was stated that the accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, constituted a threat to the survival of mankind and that, therefore, it had become imperative that States abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral security through armament and embrace the objective of common security through disarmament,

Recalling further its resolutions 36/81 B of 9 December 1981, 37/78 I of 9 December 1982, 38/183 G of 20 December 1983, 39/148 P of 17 December 1984 and, in particular, its resolution 40/152 Q of 16 December 1985, in which it expressed its conviction that, in view of the urgency of this matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it is necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war, and once more requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war,

Having considered that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1986 session relating to this question,

Noting with grave concern that the Conference on Disarmament was once again unable to start negotiations on the question during its 1986 session,

Taking into account the deliberations on this item at its forty-first session,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risk of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority and of vital interest to all peoples of the world,

Also convinced that the prevention of nuclear war is a problem too important to be left to the nuclear-weapon States alone,

1. *Notes with regret* that, despite the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has discussed the question of the prevention of nuclear war for several years, it has been unable even to establish a subsidiary body to consider appropriate and practical measures to prevent it;

2. *Reiterates its conviction* that, in view of the urgency of this matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it is necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war;

3. *Again requests* the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures which could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an *ad hoc* committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1987 session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war"

On 30 October, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Romania, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", which was introduced by India on

4 November. India recalled that since 1982 it had promoted negotiation of such a convention. As far back as in 1961, the General Assembly, by resolution 1653 (XVI), had recognized that the use of nuclear weapons would be a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations and that any State using them would be considered to be acting contrary to the laws of humanity and to be committing a crime against mankind. In 1985, the Assembly had adopted by an overwhelming majority resolution 40/151 F on the subject, and the new draft was based on that resolution. As in previous years, a document entitled "Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" was annexed to the resolution, and the Conference on Disarmament was to be requested to initiate negotiations using it as a basis.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 107 to 17 (Western countries), with 4 abstentions. In connection with the vote, four States explained their positions.

Among those voting in favour, China stated that it supported the thrust of the draft, even though certain formulations used in the preamble and body of the draft convention would need further consideration. The Soviet Union commended the text, as it had all others on the subject. Sweden supported the concept of prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an international legal instrument. However, it had reservations about the interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations given in the sixth preambular paragraph of the draft. If the use of nuclear weapons were to be uncontestedly considered a violation of the Charter, it stated, there would be no need for another international legal instrument in that respect.

The explanation which New Zealand gave for its negative vote on the resolution introduced by Argentina (see above) also applied to the resolution introduced by India. *The GDR*

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 132 to 17, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 41/60 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Conscious of an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the serious deterioration of the international situation.

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that a prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of

12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1986 session, was not able to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 40/151 F of 16 December 1985,

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the results of those negotiations.

ANNEX

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Government of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at ____ on the ____ day of ____ one thousand nine hundred and ____ .

Finally, on 30 October, Bangladesh, India, Mexico, Pakistan and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled “Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter”, which was subsequently revised. This draft resolution, which was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 41/86 H, is dealt with in chapter XXIII.

Conclusion

In 1986, the General Assembly continued to pursue the goal of the prevention of nuclear war, which it viewed as an absolute condition for the survival of humanity. The proposals submitted to that end largely followed previous Assembly resolutions, with a somewhat increased reliance on the possibilities offered by the multilateral negotiating process within the Conference on Disarmament.

While it is not clear whether or when the Conference on Disarmament will be able to start negotiations on specific aspects of the question, the General Assembly's initiatives in 1986 stressed once again the urgent need to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war.

Cessation of nuclear-weapon tests

Introduction

EFFORTS AIMED AT THE COMPLETE CESSATION of nuclear-weapon tests, prompted initially by political and military considerations, but also by anxiety about the possible effects of radioactive fall-out from such tests, have been going on since 1954 as an independent item on the nuclear disarmament agenda. In the 1978 Final Document, the General Assembly identified the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as a most important initial measure in working towards the highest priority requirement of nuclear disarmament.¹ The item has been accorded ever-growing attention since then, as a comprehensive test ban has been increasingly regarded as overdue and it has become more and more widely postulated that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is the *sine qua non* for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

A first step towards the objective was taken with the conclusion in 1963 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,² often referred to as the partial test-ban Treaty. Its original parties, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, specifically announced in the preamble that they sought to achieve “the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time” and expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that end. By the end of 1986, the Treaty had 115 parties. Two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, are not among the parties, but, since 1980 and 1974 respectively, they have refrained from conducting tests except in the permitted underground environment, and on 21 March 1986 China for the first time confirmed that it would not conduct atmospheric tests in the future.³

In the preamble of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁴ the parties recalled the objective set out in the partial test-ban Treaty. Thus the non-proliferation Treaty has contributed to the prominence

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 45-51.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*. vol. 480, No. 6964. The text is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*. 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

³ Address by Premier Zhao Ziyang of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 21 March 1986, circulated as a United Nations document (A/41/230-S/17937 and Corr.1).

⁴ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

of the test-ban issue in various disarmament forums. At the three Review Conferences of the parties to that Treaty—held in 1975, 1980 and 1985—it was considered an essential element in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, by which the parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

As to further steps, in 1974 the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,⁵ known as the threshold test-ban Treaty, and in 1976, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes,⁶ known as the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. The former instrument limits permitted nuclear-weapon tests to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons, while the latter prohibits: (a) any individual nuclear explosion exceeding the 150 kiloton yield; (b) any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the individual explosions can be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures; and (c) any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons. Neither Treaty had formally entered into force as of the end of 1986, but it was generally understood that both Powers were adhering to their provisions.

In 1977, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States began trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty, which was expected to cover nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in a separate protocol. The last progress report⁷ on those negotiations was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in 1980, and although it indicated considerable progress, the negotiations have not been resumed since then.

In July 1982, the United States announced that while a comprehensive test ban remained an ultimate goal, it was not prepared to resume the negotiations because, in its view, the international situation was not propitious. It would, however, participate in further work on verification and compliance—a position which has remained basically unchanged. The United States has continued to emphasize the need for prior clarification of questions in those areas and to regard the negotiation of deep, verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals as of greater priority than a test ban. The United Kingdom's position has also reflected concern about questions of verification and the scope of a treaty, particularly with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Also in 1982, the Soviet Union requested that an item entitled "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. In that connection, it submitted a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests",⁸ and since then it has repeatedly expressed its

⁵ Circulated in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/431.

⁶ Circulated as a General Assembly document (A/31/125). The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, appendix III.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), document CD/130.

⁸ A/37/243 and resolution 37/85, annex; see *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. X.

readiness to enter into negotiations to that end.

With a view to addressing the already long-standing problem of the verification of a ban, the multilateral negotiating body in 1976 established the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which continues to work and report to the Conference on Disarmament on the question.

In the 1980s, the multilateral negotiating body has been the main forum involved in efforts to reach a comprehensive test ban. In 1982 and 1983 it was able to reach agreement on the establishment of a subsidiary body with a limited mandate to examine verification and control questions, but not to actually negotiate a treaty. It made no tangible progress in those years, however, because of disagreement over the mandate; and, for the same reason, in 1984 and 1985 it was not able to agree to establish such a body. While the socialist States and the group of 21 in the Conference held the view that all questions relating to verification had been adequately studied and the actual negotiation of a treaty must be undertaken, in the opinion of most Western members, consideration of the matter was far from exhausted and the question of scope—the treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions under conditions of a ban—should also be examined and some understanding reached before negotiations could begin. In 1985 the Western members proposed a programme of work with a view to fostering practical progress in that context.

From 1983 to 1985, the General Assembly adopted 10 resolutions on the question of a nuclear-test ban. Only 2 of them were adopted without negative votes and none was adopted without a number of abstentions, a pattern reflecting the continuing divergence of positions on how the test-ban objective might best be achieved. Nine of the resolutions, however, called for action on the part of the negotiating body, while the tenth, new in 1985, concerned the possibility of converting the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Nuclear-weapon testing has continued since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963—most of it by the major Powers and all of it underground since 1980—because the States in question have felt that in the existing circumstances their security interests are promoted by developing new weapons, further refining existing ones or, occasionally, confirming the integrity of their stocks.

An attempt was made to break this pattern in July 1985, when the Soviet Union announced that starting 6 August it would unilaterally halt all nuclear explosions until 1 January 1986, or even beyond that date provided the United States would also refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions. Its action was welcomed in the hope that it would give further impetus to the ongoing international efforts to conclude a test ban. In 1986, the Soviet Union renewed its unilateral moratorium four times, first until 31 March, then until the United States carried out a test subsequent to that date, then until 6 August, and finally until the end of the year;⁹ its aim was to enhance confidence and facilitate the bridging of differences. However, among others, the United

⁹ See A/41/97, A/41/222, A/41/339 and A/41/525.

States did not accept a moratorium as a substitute for a negotiated, binding treaty, and it continued to regard the agreed reduction of numbers of nuclear weapons as a more urgent issue. At the same time, it still advocated more precise means of verification and measurement of limitations on permitted tests, and in July 1985 it unconditionally invited the Soviet Union to have experts visit a site and observe and measure the yield of a test explosion in order to enhance confidence in compliance-monitoring techniques. Subsequently, in July 1986, an agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States to start bilateral talks on the verification issues related to nuclear testing. Following a preliminary exchange between experts later that month, a second round of talks, focusing generally on verification and measurement methodology, took place in Geneva early in September, with further rounds scheduled through the remainder of the year.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

The question of a comprehensive ban, which has never appeared as a separate item on the Disarmament Commission's agenda, none the less received heightened attention at the Commission's substantive session in 1986,¹⁰ mainly because of the Soviet moratorium and the question of verification.

The representative of Poland, for instance, drew attention to the moratorium and its extensions, and regarded the continued United States nuclear testing as a further step in raising the level of the arms race and extending it to outer space. Poland regarded a moratorium on nuclear testing as a practical measure in the context of the prevention of nuclear war. Bulgaria felt that the Soviet moratorium and its extension had created all the necessary conditions for speedy settlement of the test-ban question. The Assembly at its fortieth session had taken the view that the Soviet example should be followed by the other nuclear-weapon States, Bulgaria added, and public opinion had regarded the Soviet initiative as a real step towards the cessation of tests. Yet the United States had refused to join and apparently did not intend to cease nuclear testing. Similarly, the German Democratic Republic referred to the readiness of the Soviet Union to start negotiations on a nuclear-test ban, despite the negative response of the United States to its invitation to join the Soviet moratorium. The German Democratic Republic expected the Commission to call explicitly for an immediate bilateral moratorium and the opening of relevant negotiations. Other Eastern European States and Viet Nam also expressed support for the Soviet moratorium.

The Soviet Union stated that its extensions of the moratorium were attempts to keep alive the unique opportunity for the cause of peace which it presented, stressing that it was doing its utmost to make a bilateral Soviet-American moratorium a reality. It was prepared immediately to enter into negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban in any form—bilateral, tripartite or multilateral—and felt that the Commission could express an au-

¹⁰ A/CN.10/PV.102-109, A/CN.10/PV.109/Corr.1 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

thoritative view regarding the early start of negotiations covering all aspects of nuclear disarmament and a test ban, including verification.

China, in reiterating its basic position on disarmament matters, emphasized that the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. It also reaffirmed that it would not conduct atmospheric nuclear tests.

New Zealand, for its part, referred to the continuing failure of the Conference on Disarmament to do any work on a test ban, although it was the first item on that body's agenda, and deeply regretted that such a long-sought goal had not been achieved. It was convinced that a test-ban treaty would be a vital, practical and immediate way of halting the nuclear-arms race. The divergent positions on the question should not, in New Zealand's view, completely paralyse the Conference; the issues of scope, verification and compliance could and must be addressed. New Zealand also welcomed the Soviet moratorium but emphasized that it was not a substitute for a binding, verifiable treaty and that an international seismic monitoring network could clear up some of the confusion about treaty verification requirements. Finally, as a South Pacific country, New Zealand registered the deep disappointment of the countries of that region that France continued to conduct tests there. Japan once again reaffirmed its support for the early realization of a comprehensive test ban and recalled its 1984 proposal and papers for a step-by-step approach, which it had presented in the Conference on Disarmament to advance its work. It also supported the international exchange of level II or wave-form seismic data, which would allow more in-depth analysis of seismic events. Given, first, the fact that the drafting of a treaty required extensive work and, secondly, the emerging recognition that the issues of structure, scope, compliance and verification must be considered, Japan felt that the absence of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament in recent years was very negative, and it hoped that practical work under a realistic mandate would soon begin. To that end, it believed that the Disarmament Commission should recommend that all States adopt a realistic approach to break the deadlock in the Conference.

India stated that in order to facilitate negotiations, the Disarmament Commission should bring its authority to bear on the States obstructing substantive consideration of the test-ban issue. It advocated that the Commission scrutinize the various positions and elaborate an agreed approach that could assist the Conference on Disarmament. It felt that definite recommendations on a test ban by the Commission in 1986 would constitute a satisfactory achievement in the context of its agenda item 4. Egypt, for its part, held that the responsibility for the lack of nuclear disarmament, including the absence of a freeze and a test-ban treaty, lay with the major Powers and observed that the heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries had appealed to those Powers to enter into a constructive dialogue.

In concluding statements, Bulgaria, India and Poland referred to the absence of any noteworthy progress on the various issues falling under the Commission's agenda item 4, including a nuclear-test ban, and the Soviet

Union again elaborated its position, stressing the relationship between a test ban and progress in nuclear disarmament.

With regard to its agenda item 4, the Disarmament Commission, in its report to the General Assembly,¹¹ again annexed a compilation of proposals for recommendations, thus providing an updated indication of the state of deliberations on the various issues and elements embraced by the item. With regard to its recommendation on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, seven draft texts were included,¹² all within brackets indicating that agreement had not been reached on them. Three of the texts referred to the negotiation or conclusion of a treaty and a fourth to the examination of specific issues with a view to the negotiation of a treaty; a fifth referred, in addition, to the extension of the partial test-ban Treaty to include underground tests and relevant verification provisions; and, finally, two alternative texts called for a moratorium on all test explosions pending the conclusion of a treaty.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

Once again, in 1986, members of the Conference on Disarmament stressed repeatedly the importance of the item "Nuclear test ban" and the relevance that conclusion of a ban would have for other nuclear disarmament questions.¹³ At the opening meeting, the President, who was the representative of Australia, read a statement of his Foreign Minister in which he asserted that it would be foolish not to recognize the varying opinions and approaches on the test-ban issue and that they must no longer be hidden by procedural or other disputes. He called upon the Conference to make practical progress towards the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The two major nuclear Powers referred to the question in their respective opening addresses, with the Soviet Union stating that the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests was one of the most important elements of the nuclear disarmament programme it had announced on 15 January¹⁴—one on which concrete results were within reach and concerning which it favoured starting negotiations in any form without delay. It had shown its readiness for practical steps by extending its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions even though the United States had not followed that example; the Soviet Union had taken that decision in the interests of international security. For its part, the United States declared that it was prepared to participate in both the renewal of practical work on issues related to a nuclear-test ban and the continuation of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events. However, its position remained that a nuclear-test ban was an objective to be

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*.

¹² *Ibid.*, annex I, sect. I, recommendation No. 7 and "Text to be added at the end of recommendation No. 7"

¹³ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. I, document CD/649. The statement concerning the programme was also circulated as a General Assembly document (A/41/97). For a summary of the programme, see chapter VI in this volume.

achieved in due course, in the context of significant reductions in existing nuclear arsenals and substantially improved verification measures. With weapons at their current levels, the United States held, testing played a role in ensuring the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent and the security of the Western alliance.

As to the other nuclear-weapon States, China, in its opening address, announced that if an *ad hoc* committee on a nuclear-test ban were established, it would participate in its work, and that it would again participate, as it had already done the previous year, in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. France held to its established position that a test-ban could only be considered in the framework of a long-term process of arms reductions. It made clear that as far as it was concerned, the halting of tests could not be a condition or prerequisite for the reduction of nuclear arsenals. The United Kingdom saw a comprehensive test-ban treaty as one of its policy objectives in arms control, but it remained concerned about verification and, in the light of scientific advice available to it, saw inadequacies in the current capability to both detect and identify nuclear testing. Thus any potential verification régime would require improvements before a ban could be agreed upon. It noted that there was plenty of work to be done and hoped, therefore, that an *ad hoc* committee would be established with an acceptable mandate.

Mexico, among many others, drew attention to the 1985 Delhi Declaration,¹⁵ in which six heads of State or Government had urged the nuclear-weapon States to halt testing and to conclude a treaty at an early date. Sweden stated that the estimated number of nuclear explosions carried out globally in 1985 was 30, down from 55 in 1984, with the decrease attributable mainly to the Soviet moratorium. It warned against gradual or threshold approaches to a ban, as they would not stop the development of new nuclear weapons or, over time, render existing ones obsolete. Calling attention to the demand of the international community for a halt to nuclear testing, Sweden stated that the Conference could no longer afford not to take action and that the working process itself could lead to the solution of many unsettled questions. Subsequently, both Mexico and Sweden, among numerous others, argued that the alleged lack of adequate means of verification could no longer be used as an excuse for delaying a test ban. Sweden also held that the United States argument that the reduction of nuclear arsenals was more urgent than a test-ban did not explain its reluctance to engage in negotiations on the latter. Furthermore, in the light of the overkill capacity of both major nuclear-weapon Powers, Sweden was not convinced by the argument that testing played a role in ensuring the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent.

India, for its part, found little substance to arguments that, it believed, were intended to endlessly defer the commencement of negotiations. and it rejected the arguments that modernization could provide a security advantage *vis-à-vis* the adversary and that possible evasion of a future treaty by others could create a disadvantage: any marginal change derived from those factors could hardly be so significant as to alter the state of mutual vulnerability. On

¹⁵ A/40/114-S/16921. The Declaration is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chap. II.

the grounds that a previous subsidiary body had concluded introductory work according to a specific mandate, Egypt advocated that a new *ad hoc* committee on the item proceed immediately to negotiate a treaty, with verification being considered on an equal footing with other elements.

Bulgaria, like other socialist States and several others in the Conference, particularly welcomed the Soviet moratorium and its extension, and emphasized that the question of a nuclear-test ban was more than ripe for solution. It held that there were no legal or technical impediments to setting up an *ad hoc* committee with a negotiating mandate. Czechoslovakia, for its part, did not agree with the view that the *ad hoc* body's work in 1982 and 1983 had shown that verification problems still required solution. Furthermore, it stated, the forthcoming fourth report of the Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events (discussed below) would show that their work could make a positive contribution. Czechoslovakia believed that the work of both the subsidiary body and the Group of Scientific Experts really indicated that verification problems could not be settled separately from other provisions of a treaty and that if the negotiations on a test ban were blocked again, the work of the experts would remain just an exercise in seismology. It also noted that should the United States join the Soviet Union in the moratorium, verification would be fully ensured by national and international procedures, including on-site inspection whenever necessary. Mongolia, in discussing the subject at some depth, similarly stated that it was quite false to maintain that verification of a moratorium would be impossible and that, therefore, the United States could not join in. Not only did both countries possess sophisticated technical means, but, in fact, if either side violated the moratorium, it would risk the burden of political responsibility. Poland added that other parallel measures, such as resumption of the trilateral negotiations, could be useful for the work on a test-ban treaty.

The Western members tended to be somewhat cautious. Canada favoured a careful, step-by-step approach through the re-establishment of a subsidiary body with a mandate that would allow substantive work to resume immediately, with a view to negotiating a treaty. It stressed that verification was not an obstacle, but an essential part, of the solution. The Federal Republic of Germany also underlined the need for appropriate verification and compliance provisions and stressed that a test ban should be related to article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty: negotiations in good faith on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear and general disarmament. Thus a test ban could not be a substitute for a substantial reduction in existing arsenals.

Several non-members of the Conference, addressing it under the rules of procedure, also covered the question. Finland held that a ban, by slowing down technical advances, would, *inter alia*, strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime. Its basic position was that verification must be adequate and all nuclear explosions must be included in a ban because, in the technical sense, peaceful nuclear explosions were indistinguishable from those for military purposes. Norway adopted a similar position, observing that it would be impossible in practice to arrange for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes that would preclude the acquisition of military benefits. And New

Zealand, emphasizing its long-standing support of a nuclear-test ban, stressed the urgency of such a measure and the frustration it felt at the lack of progress towards that goal. It was firmly convinced that the Conference must respond to the expectations of the international community and ensure that no more time was lost.

During the early part of the session, informal consultations were held on establishing an *ad hoc* committee under the item. In reporting on those consultations late in February, the President of the Conference for that month confirmed that all members had expressed the wish to see such a committee established. The groups had continued to favour their respective draft mandates, put forward in previous years,¹⁶ but had indicated some flexibility. However, an informal proposal that he had worked out in order to bridge differences had not met with the acceptance of all groups.

Following a further number of statements on the item—most of which reiterated established positions and expressed frustration at the absence of progress, but some of which also criticized a test explosion conducted by the United States on 22 March—the Islamic Republic of Iran, speaking for the group of 21, announced that the group was submitting for decision a second revision of its draft mandate (referred to above). Iran expressed the hope that consensus could be reached on it. The German Democratic Republic announced the socialist members' support of that mandate. Australia stated that there was no consensus for it in the Western group, but added that the consultations to find common ground were not exhausted and should be continued. The Western States would not put their own proposed mandate up for decision and would continue to search for a formula to permit practical work. In that context, Australia called attention to the Western draft programme of work¹⁷ and other substantive papers tabled in 1985. Mexico deplored the attitude of the small number of delegations that had again made adoption of a mandate for an *ad hoc* committee impossible. Iran expressed the disappointment of the group of 21, but made clear that group's intention not to relax its efforts to enable a negotiating process to commence as soon as possible.

At the same meeting, the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events reported on the Group's twenty-first session, which had taken place from 10 to 21 March. He introduced two documents, the first containing a provisional summary report of the technical test exercise that had been conducted from 15 October to 14 December 1984 and the second, a progress report on the Group's session.¹⁸

¹⁶ Found in their latest versions in CD/732, appendix I, vol. I, document CD/520/Rev.2 (the group of 21); *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/39/27)*, appendix II (CD/540), document CD/521 (Western States); and *ibid.*, *Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/642), document CD/522/Rev.1 (a group of socialist States).

¹⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix I (CD/642), document CD/621. The programme was incorporated into General Assembly resolution 40/81.

¹⁸ CD/732, appendix I, vol. II, documents CD/681 and CD/682, respectively; for a discussion of the 1984 test, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chap. VIII.

During its session, the Group had discussed a detailed draft report on the test and had undertaken to shorten it—a task which it did not complete. It had, however, agreed upon a provisional summary report reviewing the purposes of the test and what it had achieved. Quoting from the agreed text, the Chairman stated:

Overall, the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT) proved very successful, as the test has provided a vast amount of experience, previously unavailable, on many aspects of practical operation of a global seismic data exchange system.

The GSETT demonstrated that the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization in many parts of the world ensures in general an operative and undistorted transmission of Level I seismic data for the proposed international system for exchange of such data.

The GSETT showed that most of the procedures developed by the Group to collect, exchange, compile and analyse seismic Level I data worked satisfactorily in practice. However, the Technical Test also showed that in some areas further developments are necessary.¹⁹

The progress report on the Group's session contained its plans for its future work, its agreement that the detailed report would be submitted following the Group's next session, and various views on the relation between the work of the Group and outside developments.

Several delegations made statements of support and appreciation of the work of the Group, some with qualifications to the effect that efforts should be more closely associated with the question of negotiations on a ban or that seismic monitoring capabilities were already adequate.

During the remainder of the spring part of the session, a number of additional views were put forward on the item, including one by the Soviet Union in which it explained its refusal to accept the United States invitation to Soviet scientists to observe and measure the yield of an underground nuclear-test explosion. It had refused on the grounds that it already knew of the methodology concerned, that its participation would appear to be giving a blessing to American tests, and that the American proposal did not cover what it was seeking, namely, the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests rather than their monitoring. Subsequently, the Soviet Union denounced an April test explosion carried out by the United States and observed that that action freed it from its twice-extended commitment to a moratorium; it added, however, that it was in no hurry to resume testing.

The United States, for its part, rejected any implication that its tests had somehow violated an agreed commitment or gone back on a pledge to the world community. On the contrary, its action was consistent with its clearly stated position. It believed that the Soviet Union should negotiate seriously to reduce offensive nuclear arsenals, rather than argue for the benefits of an unverified moratorium.

Italy, speaking on behalf of the Western members, stated that they continued to stand behind their proposed draft mandate and felt that it should meet the requirements of all who wished to see the Conference's work on the question advance. On that note, Italy enumerated the list of 18 working

¹⁹ CD/732, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/682, para. 10.

papers that the Western members plus Norway had submitted to the Conference in 1983, 1984 and 1985²⁰ and mentioned still other substantive materials presented. In the Western countries' view, the point was not that their draft mandate was not a negotiating mandate, but rather that there were real, vital differences of view on a future comprehensive test-ban treaty that should be resolved in a properly mandated *ad hoc* committee.

India could not accept that a test ban could be concluded only after substantial reductions in nuclear forces and held that both elements must be tackled simultaneously, because testing could only lead to competitive escalation of the arms race. It was for that reason that the six heads of States or Government referred to above concentrated their recent efforts on the testing issue. They were not convinced that verification constituted a credible obstacle to a ban and had offered their technical expertise for monitoring explosions. India also noted that the Foreign Ministers of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-aligned Countries, at their conference in Delhi, had called on the United States to stop its tests and on the Soviet Union to continue to refrain from conducting them, preferably until an agreement was reached on a test ban.²¹

In the period set out in the programme of work for the summer part of the Conference's session, several socialist members of the Conference further addressed the question—Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland and Romania—noting again the extended Soviet moratorium and the need for an *ad hoc* committee with a negotiating mandate. The German Democratic Republic, on behalf of a group of socialist States, introduced a working paper²² entitled “Negotiations on a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests”, in which those States underlined the high priority of the issue and their flexible position on possible negotiating arrangements, with the understanding that the multilateral Conference could be involved in preparing an appropriate draft treaty. The paper went on to propose a structure for the negotiations covering the following: (a) scope and main obligations, including issues pertaining to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; (b) means of verification—national technical means, international exchanges of seismic data and data on the radioactivity of air masses, and on-site inspection; and (c) procedures for consultation and co-operation. Their verification proposals reflected an effort to ensure a practical system providing sufficient guarantees of compliance, one which would commence operation with the coming into force of the treaty. The authors hoped the paper would help to get negotiations started.

Japan, for its part, called for utilizing the Conference to the maximum

²⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr. 1)*, appendix II (CD/421), documents CD/383, CD/384, CD/388, CD/389, CD/390, CD/395, CD/400, CD/402 and CD/405 in 1983; *ibid.*, *Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/39/27)*, appendix II (CD/540), documents CD/491, CD/507, CD/524 and CD/531 in 1984; and *ibid.*, *Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr. 1)*, appendix II (CD/642), documents CD/599, CD/610, CD/612, CD/624 and CD/626 in 1985. It should be noted that other States and groups of States also submitted several working papers, the main ones of which are referred to in the relevant editions of *The Yearbook*. All working papers submitted in 1986 are covered below in this section.

²¹ See A/41/341, paras. 38-39.

²² CD/732, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/701.

extent practical under the circumstances. As a common understanding seemed to have emerged that structure, scope, verification and compliance must be examined, steps should be taken to begin actual work. As the purpose was not just to find an adequate mandate for an *ad hoc* committee, but rather to initiate concrete work, Japan proposed that plenary meetings be used for that purpose while efforts continued to find a solution to the mandate question. It further suggested that the work previously done in the working group on the item (in 1982 and 1983) and the working papers submitted since then be built upon. Japan thereupon briefly initiated discussion, covering what appeared to it to be the various positions on the major issue areas, and concluded by expressing the hope that fruitful work could be achieved during the remainder of the session.

Mexico reiterated its proposal, contained in General Assembly resolution 40/80 A, that an *ad hoc* committee, mandated to negotiate a treaty, establish two working groups, one on structure and scope and the other on compliance and verification. It regarded that proposal, designed to satisfy the position of a very small number of members of the Conference and specifically supported by the group of 21, the socialist States and China, as a step going 90 per cent of the way to bridge the gap between the two positions.

Australia subsequently defended the mandate set out in the Western proposal,²³ contending that the clear, responsible approach it reflected could in no way be considered an obstacle to progress. It suggested that the obstacle had in fact been erected by those who claimed that there were no problems of verification. Later, Australia submitted a working paper²⁴ in which it proposed that the Conference decide to: establish a global seismic monitoring network based on existing facilities; pledge to make appropriate national facilities available to that network; invite non-member countries similarly to make facilities available; and request the Group of Scientific Experts to prepare a plan for developing the network.

Norway also introduced a working paper²⁵ proposing utilization of small-aperture seismic arrays in a global seismic network. It recalled its 1985 workshop to demonstrate the Norwegian Regional Array System (NORESS)—a small-aperture array designed to detect small events over distances of less than 3,000 kilometres. In its paper, Norway assessed the results of the research—after more than a year of full operation of NORESS—and their implications for seismological verification. It concluded that a globally distributed network of stations, as elaborated by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts, would be greatly enhanced if supplemented by small-aperture arrays. Sweden also submitted a working paper concerning verification,²⁶ in which it analysed technical aspects of seismological monitoring. In introducing it, Sweden noted other recent working papers which discussed seismic detection capabilities with regard to underground explosions and considered the problem of evasion of detection and small yield explosions. In its paper it analysed

²³ See footnote 16.

²⁴ CD/732, appendix I, vol. III, document CD/717.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, document CD/714.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, document CD/712.

such matters and concluded that it should be possible for a system of verification and compliance to create sufficient confidence in parties' adherence to obligations under a nuclear-test-ban treaty. At the same time, Sweden added, a considerable amount of work remained to be done to create such a system on an international basis and that work should be given priority. It also recommended the development and testing of a prototype monitoring station for seismic detection.

While supporting a comprehensive test ban, the Netherlands elaborated on the main arguments used in defence of some continued testing: modernization—new designs and defences against incoming missiles; assurance of reliability; and maintenance of a testing and design capability and staff. It also considered questions of verification capability, and it concluded that while they should be seriously addressed, they did not constitute convincing arguments against a comprehensive test ban. Moreover, it held that if the two major Powers were to agree to reduce their nuclear arsenals, they should simultaneously and correspondingly agree to reduce nuclear tests, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The Soviet Union introduced a working paper²⁷ in which it proposed that the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts devise a system for the prompt transmission of level II (wave-form) seismic data making use of all advances in seismology, including satellite communication channels. It also proposed that the *Ad Hoc* Group carry out an international experiment of an exchange of level II data, perhaps in 1988. Towards the end of the session, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its decision to extend its unilateral moratorium until the end of the year.

Several States referred to the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States had opened discussions late in July on the issues of nuclear testing and to the expectation that the two sides would meet again in September, following further study. Brazil, on behalf of the group of 21, emphasized the need for bilateral and multilateral efforts to be complementary and pointed out that the group considered it incumbent upon the two super-Powers to inform the Conference of their joint endeavours. Burma, speaking as President for July at the end of the month and reaffirming that intensive consultations to reach a consensus draft mandate for an *ad hoc* committee still had not been successful, stated that the start of the bilateral talks increased the need for the establishment of such a body.

The Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts introduced the fourth main report of the Group²⁸ in its 10 years of existence. The detailed report covered the results of the 1984 technical tests and future tasks. The Chairman stated that the Group, in the course of its work, had outlined the design of an international system with three components: (a) a global network of seismological stations operated by individual countries; (b) a data exchange system between those countries and international data centres; and (c) inter-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, document CD/724.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, document CD/720; at the same time, the Group's finalized summary report, in *ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/681/Rev. I, and a progress report, in *ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/721, were introduced.

national data centres for the processing of results and their distribution to participating countries. After reviewing the various achievements of the Group, the Chairman referred to its future activities, including: working out technical specifications for stations; further developing and testing methods, procedures and computer algorithms for automatic signal detection and computer-interactive data analyses; developing and testing communication links between national facilities and international data centres; further developing methods, procedures and computer algorithms to be used at the centres; and planning and carrying out a large-scale experiment on the exchange of level II data. Late in the session, the Conference took note of the fourth report and its summary and adopted the progress report of the Group.

In summing up the position of the group of 21, Brazil singled out testing or not testing as the watershed between the arms race and disarmament and emphasized that the Conference should proceed forthwith to negotiations. While the Western countries were correct in insisting that there must be agreement on verification, compliance and scope, even solutions to those questions outside negotiations would not mean a step towards the common goal, because there would be no common goal as long as the key delegation did not want a test ban. Thus it seemed that the Conference would be looking forward to dealing with all matters related to tests, but not to a ban on tests.

In speaking for the socialist States, Hungary stated that they were convinced that the Conference could be an important multilateral forum for negotiating a nuclear-test ban if the artificial barriers impeding its activities were removed. They attached importance to reliable monitoring of the implementation of a ban and strict verification, including on-site inspections, and held that the availability of reliable seismic monitoring meant that doubts regarding verification capability were unfounded. They also considered the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts useful and supported its development of a system for transmitting level II seismic data. In conclusion, Hungary stated that the socialist States intended to continue to show flexibility with a view to setting up an *ad hoc* committee and ensuring a rapid start of negotiations.

The closing Western view, conveyed by Australia, was that an *ad hoc* committee should be established with an appropriate mandate, which would provide for a substantive examination of the issues involved, with a view to the negotiation of a treaty. The Western States rejected any suggestion that their mandate was a device to delay work or that it reflected only the ideas of one country or a few countries of their group. Given recent bilateral and multilateral developments, they were especially concerned that no consensus decision had been taken to establish an *ad hoc* committee so that the Conference could resume work on the test-ban issue. They believed it was important that the report of the Conference reflect their position and their commitment to seeing work commence at the earliest possible moment in 1987.

During the session, numerous additional declarations, statements, appeals, responses or reports not mentioned above were submitted to the Con-

ference under the test-ban item.²⁹ One of these, by Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, the text of which is reproduced on page 63, included a document on verification measures, which is reproduced below as an annex to this chapter.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

Throughout the debate in plenary meetings of the General Assembly in 1986, as well as the debate in the First Committee,³⁰ the question of a nuclear-test ban was brought up. In general, the statements of members paralleled those voiced in other forums, focusing on the urgency of a comprehensive ban and, in numerous cases, making mention of the Soviet moratorium.

Two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, further clarified their positions in plenary meetings, with China recalling its official declaration that it would no longer conduct atmospheric nuclear tests and France explaining that as long as its security was dependent on nuclear deterrence and other States retained an excess nuclear capacity, it would not halt its underground nuclear tests. A number of States of the South Pacific region—Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu—expressed strong opposition to French testing in their region, leading France to reply that independent experts had deemed that the French tests were conducted under unquestionable conditions of security and to claim that they were harmless to both the population and the environment.

A large number of States, including several Eastern European ones and Afghanistan, Angola, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Guyana, Jamaica, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Viet Nam, referred to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests or the non-aligned States' call for a moratorium and hoped for at least a bilateral halt to nuclear tests pending the conclusion of a test-ban treaty. Several emphasized the role of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a suitable international instrument, with New Zealand observing that there could be more than one route to a treaty, for instance, through provisional measures that would delay escalation and permit talk. None of them, however, could substitute for a comprehensive test ban, which, it felt, the Conference on Disarmament should start drawing up immediately. Japan, for its part, called on the Conference on Disarmament and other forums to redouble efforts to conclude a comprehensive test ban.

In the First Committee, the Soviet Union cited the fact that it had four times extended its moratorium on nuclear explosions and that for 14 months silence had reigned at Soviet nuclear-testing sites. It announced that in the

²⁹ *Ibid.*: vol. I, CD/647 (USSR); vol. II, CD/676 (Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden). CD/680, CD/684, CD/690 and CD/696 (USSR), CD/692 (a group of socialist States) and CD/695 (Mongolia); and vol. III, CD/723 and CD/725 (Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden). CD/729 and CD/730 (USSR) and CD/731 (Mongolia).

³⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 32nd and 94th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 48th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

course of the Reykjavik meeting, it had proposed immediate negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear explosions. During that process, it would be possible to consider specific issues, such as the question of thresholds and the yield and annual number of nuclear explosions. The main thing, however, was to ensure further progress towards a full-scale ban. The Soviet Union believed that in Reykjavik the two sides had come close to finding a formula. It then noted that the cessation of nuclear testing was also the priority area of multilateral disarmament efforts and the simplest, clearest, and most effective step which could be taken immediately to end the arms race. A Soviet-American and, subsequently, a multilateral moratorium would also be a step towards concluding a treaty to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet Union was open to any ways and means of verifying the cessation of tests, including the establishment of a supranational verification network.

For its part, the United States recalled that it had put forward a plan for ratifying the two existing treaties on nuclear testing, the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty—which had been before the United States Senate and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for more than 10 years—that was contingent on achieving adequate verification. The United States had also put forward a plan for follow-up negotiations on further limitations on testing in association with reductions in nuclear weapons, an approach to which the Soviet Union had essentially agreed. The United States acknowledged that the Soviet Union had proposed steps on the nuclear-testing issue that resembled in most ways its own plan of action: verification, ratification of the two existing but unratified Treaties, build-down in the number or yield of nuclear tests on each side in association with reductions in the number of strategic forces and then, with the elimination of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban. The United States further welcomed the submission of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts at the Conference on Disarmament and the Group's plans to continue its work by carrying out investigations by advanced methods.

Belgium welcomed the Soviet decision to prolong its moratorium as a politically important gesture, but added that a moratorium still was a unilateral measure that did not offer all the guarantees required. Only a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, based on complete verification, could guarantee universal participation. Belgium reiterated its proposal, put forward in a plenary meeting, for an agreement between the super-Powers that would limit the number of nuclear tests and be linked to a system for exchanging information on scientific and technical data. Italy held that the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban could not be dealt with in isolation from other issues, including negotiations on the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons and, in general, the maintenance of stability and a balance of forces. In its view, the goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty could be effectively pursued through a realistic and gradual approach.

The Federal Republic of Germany believed that following the Reykjavik meeting, concrete results in some areas, including those concerning a nuclear-test ban, were within reach. It was encouraged by the positions held by both super-Powers and felt that the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union towards

the verification of nuclear tests and the process of reducing them opened up a realistic path for achieving a comprehensive test ban step by step. For its part, France stated that Reykjavik had strengthened its view that a lasting improvement in international security did not depend primarily on the possible cessation of nuclear tests or on the elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, but rather on the drastic reduction of strategic weapons by the super-Powers.

New Zealand recalled that it had long argued that a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests in all environments for all time was a most urgent and practical means for halting the nuclear-arms race. No other single step would do so much to establish confidence in the will of the nuclear Powers to eliminate nuclear weapons from their arsenals.

Hungary considered the cessation and prohibition of nuclear tests to be the first step in the complex and difficult process of nuclear disarmament. Any intermediate measure with prospects of success—such as a moratorium—was justified and useful as a confidence-building measure or forerunner of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, provided it was at least bilateral. As to the question of verification, Hungary fully shared the United Kingdom's position that it would be crucial in all future agreements, as well as Sweden's view that technical solutions could be found for verification problems.

Bulgaria expressed concern at the refusal of the United States to join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions. It considered the attitude of States towards banning nuclear testing to be a litmus test of their positions on nuclear disarmament. Not only future relations between the two major Powers, but also the prospects for the international situation as a whole, depended largely on whether the moratorium would soon become mutual or whether it would become the last Soviet decision of the kind. The continuation of nuclear-test explosions was linked to the nuclear-arms race and increased tension in relations among States.

Czechoslovakia made clear its belief that if the United States and other nuclear-weapon States adopted a spirit of mutual interest, greater progress could be made towards concluding a treaty banning all nuclear tests. Such a prohibition could not be side-stepped by arguing the need to enhance the reliability of nuclear weapons. Romania was in favour of the cessation of nuclear tests, believing it was a prerequisite for slowing and halting the nuclear-arms race, especially in its qualitative aspects. Poland commended recent declarations of the non-aligned countries, particularly the Mexico Declaration of 7 August (see page 63), as significant pronouncements on the nuclear-test-ban issue.

Early in the debate, Mexico summarized the Mexico Declaration. The Declaration, it stated, was largely devoted to the subject of the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions and the attachment to the document was devoted entirely to it. The assistance offered by the six signatories would focus on verification of a moratorium in co-operation with the United States and the Soviet Union as a step towards the establishment of an appropriate verification system for a comprehensive treaty. It would be based on monitoring existing test sites to ensure that they were not used for clandestine testing and on

monitoring the territory of the United States and the Soviet Union outside the test sites to ensure that nuclear explosions did not occur and that natural seismic movements were not mistakenly interpreted as clandestine nuclear-test explosions.

Nigeria recognized the importance of establishing a satisfactory system of verification to ensure compliance. It cautioned, however, that that should not be used as an excuse to avoid negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as verification arrangements would have to be part and parcel of any agreement that would be concluded. Nigeria called upon the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the super-Powers, to consider seriously the offer made in the Mexico Declaration.

Brazil advocated early conclusion of a multilateral agreement banning all test explosions of nuclear weapons. Interim unilateral measures of restraint were welcome, but the emphasis must be on an international instrument. As a ban would stem the development and improvement of nuclear weapons, it would be the first practical step towards halting the nuclear-arms race and would symbolize the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to start taking concrete measures to fulfil the disarmament goals defined in the 1978 Final Document.

In the same vein, Pakistan felt that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would contribute more than any other single step to nuclear disarmament, even though it recognized that that objective could be attained only gradually. It recalled that States parties to at least two international treaties had assumed the legal obligation to seek such a ban. In its view, all scientific and technical aspects of the question, including the question of verification, had been exhaustively discussed and debated.

Austria held that as the total elimination of nuclear weapons seemed to be a possibility, albeit a distant one, there was no need to continue nuclear-weapon testing. Although a moratorium could not replace a comprehensive test-ban treaty, one way to achieve such a treaty would be to extend the Soviet unilateral moratorium into a bilateral Soviet-American moratorium and, later, into a moratorium including all nuclear-weapon States. Finland stressed that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would set limitations on the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. In its opinion, disagreements related to verification should no longer prevent the negotiations from proceeding, as international scientific co-operation under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament had made significant progress.

Five draft resolutions on a nuclear-test ban were introduced in the First Committee, two by Mexico, two by Australia and one by Hungary. Three States gave general explanations of vote pertaining to all the drafts at the time that the Committee took action on them.

Explaining its negative vote on all the texts, France expressed the view that they did not reflect appropriate treatment of the question. It believed that nuclear tests should be banned within the framework of an effective process of nuclear disarmament, as noted in paragraph 51 of the 1978 Final Document. A ban must not, therefore, be seen as a pre-condition nor must it be given priority over a very substantial reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the two

most heavily armed Powers. France, for its part, was conducting nuclear tests to maintain its deterrent force at the minimum level of credibility indispensable for its security. The conditions under which France could associate itself with negotiations on nuclear disarmament applied to any commitment relating to nuclear tests.

Japan stressed the importance of resolving verification questions so as to ensure compliance with treaty obligations. To follow up on its 1984 proposal for a step-by-step approach, Japan suggested developing a system for the exchange of more accurate data on seismic wave-forms. Together with other interested countries, it intended to begin such an exchange on an experimental basis. In view of the urgency of the test-ban issue, Japan hoped that the Conference on Disarmament could reach early agreement on a framework for conducting substantive work on the item at its 1987 session. Japan abstained on the two initiatives introduced by Mexico and the one introduced by Hungary, and it voted for the two introduced by Australia.

Uruguay, which voted in favour of all five draft resolutions, held that small countries with no great power and outside the area of nuclear confrontation were in no position to prejudge or even truly assess the value that measures adopted by the super-Powers might have in the strategic nuclear field. At the same time, it expressed the hope that the unilateral moratorium would become a bilateral one between the super-Powers and that it would be the point of departure for a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

The five draft resolutions on the question were submitted under three separate agenda items carried forward from previous years. Two of the draft resolutions, submitted on 30 October under the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions", were introduced by Mexico on 6 November.

The first draft resolution introduced by Mexico was also sponsored by Finland, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and, later on, Ireland. Mexico noted that the draft had many points in common with the previous year's resolution 40/80 A. Its main objective was multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States. By operative paragraph 7, the General Assembly would call upon the three depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty and of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, by virtue of "their special responsibilities under those two Treaties", to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions.

The second draft resolution introduced by Mexico was also sponsored by Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia and, subsequently, Bolivia. By the draft, which was substantially the same as resolution 40/80 B, the General Assembly would recommend that the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty undertake practical steps to convene a conference to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty and would request that they report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the progress of their efforts.

On 13 November the First Committee approved the first draft resolution by a recorded vote of 110 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States),

with 14 abstentions. At the same meeting, it approved the second draft resolution by a recorded vote of 100 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 25 abstentions.

In connection with the voting, a number of States explained their positions on one or both initiatives.

The Netherlands, which abstained on both, noted that in recent months there had been a convergence of the views of the major nuclear Powers with regard to nuclear tests and that a broad measure of agreement had been reached on the course to follow for a test ban. In its opinion, the first draft introduced by Mexico did not take that into account. It added, however, that it had not failed to note certain positive developments in the language of the draft, compared with that of the previous year's resolution. As to the second draft, the Netherlands abstained because it considered that the idea of arriving at a comprehensive test ban via an amendment to the partial test-ban Treaty would detract from a more realistic approach. Although Canada also abstained on both drafts, it was especially cognizant of the forward movement by the sponsors in the first text.

Brazil, which abstained on the first draft but voted for the second one, noted that although the first contained some positive elements, such as the recommendation that an *ad hoc* committee be established in the Conference on Disarmament for the multilateral negotiation of a test-ban treaty, it favoured linkages and made assumptions not in line with Brazil's view on the matter. It supported the second draft in the hope that it would encourage compliance with commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon Powers under the partial test-ban Treaty.

Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Norway all voted in favour of the first draft introduced by Mexico and abstained on the second one. Australia expressed a reservation concerning the paragraph in the first draft that called for a joint moratorium pending conclusion of a test ban, because it believed a moratorium would be no substitute for tackling the issues that remained to be resolved before a legally binding, verifiable and durable treaty could be achieved. New Zealand acknowledged that there was more than one route to a comprehensive test ban, but it would have preferred the call for a moratorium on nuclear testing in the first Mexican draft to have been more comprehensive. Austria explained that it traditionally voted for all realistic initiatives for ending nuclear testing and concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Denmark and Norway noted that the text of the first draft contained significant changes compared with the corresponding resolution in 1985, making it closer to their approach. Norway pointed out, however, that the text referred only to the three depositary Powers of the partial test-ban Treaty and omitted any mention of the other two nuclear Powers. Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Norway abstained on the second draft because they did not consider that amending the partial-test ban Treaty would be the most appropriate way in which to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

Among the seven countries that explained their votes in favour of both draft resolutions introduced by Mexico, the Soviet Union stated that it supported the idea of achieving the early cessation and prohibition of nuclear-

weapon tests through a treaty and that it had extended its moratorium four times on the assumption that such a measure created the sole historical possibility for progress towards concluding a treaty. It recalled that it had repeatedly expressed its readiness to work for agreement on the strictest verification measures, including on-site inspection and the use of all possible data provided by seismic control. It then noted that both drafts emphasized the significance of a possible solution to the test-ban issue for the limitation, reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear armaments. Bulgaria and Cuba voted for both Mexican drafts because of the importance they attached to the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time. Sri Lanka, for its part, stated that it had co-sponsored both drafts because they represented viable approaches to achieving the objective of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Argentina explained that it voted affirmatively on the first draft because the text clearly urged the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee with a mandate to initiate negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests. It also voted in favour of the second draft, although it preferred the multilateral framework offered by the Conference on Disarmament for elaborating a treaty since the five nuclear-weapon States were represented in it, but were not all parties to the partial test-ban Treaty. Burma stated that it supported the main thrust of the first draft introduced by Mexico but was unable to associate itself with the part relating to the non-proliferation Treaty, as it was not a party to it. It also voted for the second, although its operative paragraph 1 contained certain ambiguities and Burma did not wish to prejudge the outcome of the practical steps to be taken with regard to the envisaged conference. India, also voting affirmatively on both texts, explained that it supported the first draft because it gave the Conference on Disarmament an unambiguous mandate on the item, but it believed that the scope of the treaty envisaged in the draft was at variance with that generally accepted for such a treaty and it could not accept the linkage suggested between a comprehensive test ban and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

The third draft resolution was submitted on 30 October and sponsored initially by Australia, Austria, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sweden and Thailand under the item "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" and subsequently also by Greece, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Vanuatu, making 26 sponsors in all. In introducing the draft on 5 November, the representative of Australia stated that the sponsors had sought to remove from the text statements which, while valid, were part of past history and did not need to be directly recalled and, instead, they had taken into account important developments during the previous 12 months, including bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The single objective of the draft was to advance practical work on a treaty that would provide for an end to all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time. By the draft, the General Assembly would urge the Conference on Disarmament to commence such work at the beginning of its 1987 session

and the nuclear-weapon States to agree to appropriate verifiable interim measures with a view to realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

In commenting on the draft after it had been introduced by Australia, New Zealand stated that the sponsors recognized that nuclear testing had long concerned the countries of the South Pacific, as the region had been used as a testing ground for many years by a succession of nuclear Powers, and that it was an issue of universal concern as well. In spite of the clarity with which the goal of a test ban had been expressed, progress towards its achievement had been very slow, a situation that was difficult to explain to a disbelieving public. The sponsors believed that an international seismic monitoring network, such as the one called for in operative paragraph 3, could provide an answer to the ongoing arguments about verifying a test-ban treaty by seismic means.

On 13 November, when action was taken on the resolution, separate votes were requested on its operative paragraphs 2 and 3. The First Committee approved paragraph 2 by a vote of 96 to 1 (France), with 35 abstentions; it approved paragraph 3 by a vote of 101 to none, with 30 abstentions. The Committee then approved the draft resolution as a whole by a vote of 117 to 1 (France), with 16 abstentions.

The United States abstained, stating that the draft was, in some respects, in fundamental conflict with its policy, which sought improvements in verification in the existing threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties as its highest arms control priority. It remained committed to achieving the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear testing, but only when it no longer needed to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability and when it had achieved broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures and greater balance in conventional forces. Specifically, the United States had concerns regarding operative paragraph 2. It remained strongly opposed to the idea that the Conference on Disarmament should itself begin work on a multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty. In addition, it believed that paragraph 5 perpetuated the impression, which in its view was mistaken, that a test-ban treaty was one of the most urgent arms control items. The United States considered that reducing nuclear weapons and eventually ridding the world of the nuclear threat were far more urgent goals.

The United Kingdom, which also abstained, explained that it believed third parties could have a role to play in establishing adequate verification arrangements for a comprehensive test ban and that its interest in the proposal for an international seismic monitoring network should be seen in that light. However, it did not believe that all the technical and practical problems involved in establishing such a system had been resolved and felt that it would be more pragmatic to resolve them first, before proceeding with the proposal mentioned in paragraph 3 (a) of the draft. It would, therefore, welcome discussion in the Conference on Disarmament of the outstanding technical issues associated with adequate verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It also supported the work being done by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific

Experts under the auspices of the Conference.

Among the other States that abstained on the draft, Argentina pointed out that the text did not explicitly refer to the immediate conduct of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to banning nuclear-weapon tests. Brazil noted that the draft did not even contemplate a negotiating mandate for the Conference, contenting itself instead with collateral measures. Cuba stated that it was unable to support the draft because, first, it felt that the Conference on Disarmament must be clearly asked to initiate urgently the negotiation of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and, secondly, it believed that the proposal for establishing an international seismic monitoring network would have meaning only within the context of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests, something that did not yet exist.

India was not able to support the draft because of reservations, particularly on its operative paragraph 2, which, it felt, limited the Conference's mandate to deal with the subject. In its opinion, the mandate should focus on the need to commence negotiations on a ban. Indonesia shared the view of the sponsors that the achievement of a comprehensive test ban should retain the highest priority. However, it pointed out that what was needed was not merely the commencement of practical work, as indicated in operative paragraph 2, but concrete negotiations within the Conference.

Among the 12 States explaining their vote in favour of the draft, the Soviet Union noted that the general thrust of the text favoured an early beginning of negotiations on and the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests. It was ready immediately to embark on full-scale talks on the total cessation of nuclear explosions, in the course of which it would be possible to also consider the questions of limiting nuclear explosions and ratifying the 1974 and 1976 Treaties. Bulgaria explained its affirmative vote by the great importance it attached to the immediate cessation of nuclear-weapon testing and its agreement with the main thrust of the draft.

Among the other States voting in favour of the Australian draft, Belgium stated that the concept of an agreement to limit the overall number of nuclear tests, beginning with those of the two major nuclear Powers, was a useful one. Such an agreement would be accompanied, of course, by appropriate verification measures and an undertaking to provide all the data necessary for verification. Belgium had put that idea forward early in the session in the context of a gradual reduction in nuclear arsenals, believing that it would make it possible, from the outset, to reconcile the quest for a total halt to nuclear tests with the security needs that could compel States to carry out such tests for the foreseeable future.

Canada also supported the draft, considering that the initiative had made advances in both substance and support. Since, in Denmark's view, a comprehensive test ban must deal satisfactorily with the questions of scope, verification and compliance, it had, over the years, co-sponsored the Australian-New Zealand draft. It felt again, in 1986, that that draft offered the most constructive approach for concluding a test-ban treaty.

The Federal Republic of Germany emphasized its interest in achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test ban at the earliest possible date. It advocated a

step-by-step approach and saw encouraging signs of a similar view in the speech of the President of the United States to the General Assembly at that session. The Federal Republic stressed the importance of a global seismic monitoring system, stating that reliable verification was a *sine qua non* of a treaty. It did not consider unilateral test moratoriums a healthy basis for solving the problem. Also commenting on that subject, New Zealand, a sponsor of the draft, noted that a moratorium could give valuable time for negotiation and delay the danger of escalation, but it believed that a general call for such a measure should apply to all five of the declared nuclear-weapon States.

Austria welcomed the reference to the Mexico Declaration of 7 August in the preambular part of the draft. Although Burma supported the draft, it felt there was a lack of specificity in paragraph 2, which urged the Conference on Disarmament to commence practical work on a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of its 1987 session. Mexico noted with appreciation that there had been fruitful co-operation between itself and Australia and New Zealand, which had allowed them to support each other's drafts. It agreed with Australia that a nuclear-test moratorium was not an end in itself, but an instrument for the creation of the appropriate conditions in which to achieve the final goal.

Sri Lanka explained that its hesitation concerning the draft introduced by Australia arose over the formulation of its operative paragraph 2, which appeared to dwell too much on interim measures. In the separate vote on operative paragraph 2, Sri Lanka demonstrated its concern by abstaining, while voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole. Similarly, Venezuela was not entirely satisfied with the draft's approach to the activities to be carried out by the Conference on Disarmament according to paragraph 2 (a). In its view, the only activity it should undertake was the commencement as soon as possible of substantive negotiations on the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. It also had doubts regarding the activities requested of the Conference in paragraphs 3 (a) and (c), which did not appear to be in keeping with its function as a negotiating body. However, following its traditional support for all initiatives and efforts aimed at the speedy achievement of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, Venezuela voted in favour of the draft.

The fourth draft resolution, submitted on 27 October under the item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/88 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", was sponsored by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam, and was introduced by Hungary on 3 November. The Hungarian representative stated that the discussions in various forums in 1986 provided ample proof of the feasibility of an agreement prohibiting nuclear tests and of the possibility of verifying any State's compliance with its obligations. In comparing the text with the corresponding one of the previous year, resolution 40/88, he noted that one change had been made in the operative part. When resolution 40/88 had been adopted, several delegations had stated that a moratorium could not be verified. In order to accommodate them, the sponsors in 1986 included a new paragraph dealing expressly with verification. Hungary concluded by

declaring the sponsors' readiness to discuss an eventual merging of the various drafts on the test-ban issue.

On 12 November Ireland submitted amendments to the draft resolution which affected the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1. The next day, Cuba proposed an oral amendment adding a new third preambular paragraph to emphasize the need to conclude a comprehensive multilateral treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments for all time. On the same day, Ireland proposed an oral sub-amendment deleting the word "weapon" before the word "tests". Still later on the same day, all the proposed amendments and sub-amendments were withdrawn by their sponsors. The Committee then approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 90 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 26 abstentions.

Among the States that abstained in the vote, Brazil stated that although it had supported the corresponding resolution in other years, it was abstaining because it felt that the initiative had begun to highlight views which constituted a departure from the earlier approach. Côte d'Ivoire held that, in the current climate of mistrust, any unilateral actions, such as those mentioned in operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft, were unlikely to contribute substantially to the cessation or prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Both Australia and New Zealand abstained because the draft referred throughout to nuclear-weapon tests and did not take sufficient account of the need to ensure that a test-ban treaty would not be circumvented through resort to peaceful nuclear explosions. Both also had reservations about setting up a seismic monitoring network following—not preceding—an agreed moratorium by all nuclear-weapon States. They did not believe that the establishment of such a network had to await an actual end to testing.

The Netherlands, which also abstained, pointed out that the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft did not take into account the approach of reducing nuclear tests in parallel with reducing nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, it could not believe that a moratorium would solve the problem of how to achieve a verifiable ban on nuclear tests. However, it considered that the call to work towards establishing an international seismic network—albeit presented exclusively in the context of the Soviet moratorium—was a positive development. Norway abstained because it felt it would be impossible to work out an arrangement for carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions that would preclude the acquisition of military benefits. In addition, it was of the opinion that a global seismological network should apply not only to a moratorium, but also to a comprehensive test ban.

Five countries that supported the resolution stated their positions. The Soviet Union explained its affirmative vote in the same terms it had used in its statement concerning the drafts introduced by Mexico. Austria noted with pleasure the invitation extended, in operative paragraph 5 of the draft, to all interested States "to establish an international network for monitoring and verifying compliance with such a moratorium joined by other nuclear-weapon States".

Argentina supported the wording of the draft, bearing in mind the clarity of the recommendation made to the Conference on Disarmament to initiate

negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests. Burma stated that its positive vote was consistent with its long-standing position that, pending achievement of a comprehensive treaty, there should be a suspension of all test explosions. India noted that the draft's goal, clearly stated in its title, corresponded to the approach laid down in the preamble of the partial test-ban Treaty.

Notification

On 30 October, under the item "General and complete disarmament" Australia, Cameroon, Fiji, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Sweden, later joined by Austria and Ireland, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Notification of nuclear tests" In introducing it on 5 November, the representative of Australia stated that it rested on two basic considerations. First, the sponsors were committed to the objective of an early and complete end to all nuclear explosions. Secondly, they recognized that nuclear testing was a dangerous activity which affected all countries and that, therefore, all countries had a right to know when and where and in what manner nuclear tests were conducted. The sponsors proposed that the States that conducted nuclear-test explosions be required to provide to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within one week of each nuclear explosion, information regarding the date and time of the explosion, the exact location, the geological characteristics of the site, and the estimated yield. The sponsors believed that widely available and complete public information on nuclear tests would help Governments to see the full nature of the problem and to find the means to eliminate it.

On 13 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 107 to 1 (France), with 23 abstentions.

Three nuclear-weapon States that abstained explained their positions. The United States was unable to support a draft whose stated objective was to facilitate the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. It recalled that it routinely announced information about certain nuclear explosions. It did not rule out the possibility of confidence-building measures that involved the reciprocal exchange of information concerning nuclear explosions; the modalities and specific content of such exchanges would need to be worked out in advance. The United Kingdom briefly pointed out that it already routinely released information about its nuclear-test explosions. In the Soviet Union's opinion, notification of nuclear tests must be considered only as a temporary measure for strengthening trust in the course of appropriate negotiations and the major goal of negotiations in any context and in any forum must be the prohibition of nuclear tests by all nuclear Powers everywhere. Since that goal did not emerge from the draft, the Soviet Union was unable to support it.

Four other States also explained their abstentions. Bulgaria regretted that the draft, like some of the others, did not take into account the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. In addition, Bulgaria wondered if the proposed notification procedures, as formulated in the text, would not direct the efforts of Member States into simply registering nuclear tests and divert them from taking action to stop or prohibit them. In Brazil's view, the draft seemed to further legitimize current tests by establishing a body to monitor rather than curb them. Cuba believed that what was necessary was not a notification about when nuclear tests were going to be carried out, but

what should be done to put an end to them. India was not convinced that the notification of nuclear tests would serve any useful purpose in the context of seeking nuclear disarmament.

Among the States that voted in favour, Sri Lanka observed that the draft might appear to emphasize procedures to monitor tests rather than efforts to ban them completely. It noted, however, that the second preambular paragraph stated categorically that the exercise would be adopted pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and that the draft thus in no way legitimized testing. Indeed, the information provided should give the international community more evidence as to why testing should be banned comprehensively. Argentina supported the draft, bearing in mind that it would help to provide the United Nations with very important information. Austria had co-sponsored the draft on the understanding that the measure envisaged would not serve as an excuse for further delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Burma believed that compliance by all nuclear-weapon States with the procedure for notification that the draft urged would facilitate the early conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Belgium considered that the provision of data would contribute to transparency and that the draft offered a good, concrete opening, of which full advantage should be taken. It believed that transparency would be enhanced if the data provided by States were made available to the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts for examination and interpretation. The Group's work would be more effective and credible were the nuclear Powers to demonstrate their interest in the matter. Belgium thought the proposal might be developed further at a later stage. Denmark and Norway also expressed support for the views contained in the text. The Federal Republic of Germany voted in favour of the draft on notification and on the other draft introduced by Australia in order to emphasize its interest in achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Its explanation of vote on the latter (see above) also applied to the draft on notification.

After voting on the test-ban draft resolutions in the First Committee, Canada made a general statement to the effect that members should take some satisfaction in having given the Conference on Disarmament a strong message to proceed with the practical work programme on a test ban, particularly on the aspects concerning scope, verification and compliance. In addition, both Australia and Canada stated that they were encouraged by the fact that a number of countries identified with the Australia-New Zealand draft and the non-aligned draft had supported each other's proposals. They believed that the change in voting pattern indicated the possibility of achieving a consensus resolution at the next session.

The General Assembly, on 3 December, adopted the five draft resolutions recommended under the test-ban items as follows.

The first draft resolution, introduced by Mexico under the item "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions", was adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 41/46 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than thirty years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than fifty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on eight different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Recalling that the Secretary-General, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, after appealing for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty, emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament.

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in article 1 of that Treaty to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear-test explosions, including all those explosions underground, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

Bearing in mind that the same three nuclear-weapon States, in the report they submitted on 30 July 1980 to the Committee on Disarmament after four years of trilateral negotiations, stated, *inter alia*, that they were "mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments will have" as well as "conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems", adding furthermore that they were "determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion".

Noting that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration adopted on 21 September 1985, called on the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament,

Recalling that the leaders of the six countries associated under the five-continent peace and disarmament initiative affirmed in the Mexico Declaration, adopted on 7 August 1986, that they "remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests", adding that "Both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing",

Bearing in mind that the multilateral negotiation of such a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament must cover all the various interrelated problems that it will be necessary to solve in order that the Conference may transmit a complete draft treaty to the General Assembly,

1. *Reiterates once again its grave concern* that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority;

3. *Reaffirms also its conviction* that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race;

4. *Urges once more* the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to abide strictly by their undertakings to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to expedite negotiations to this end;

5. *Appeals* to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular to the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1987 session of an *ad hoc* committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions;

6. *Recommends* to the Conference on Disarmament that such an *ad hoc* committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification;

7. *Calls upon* the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two Treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria, which should include appropriate means of verification;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions"

The second draft resolution, introduced by Mexico under the same item, was adopted by a recorded vote of 127 to 3, with 21 abstentions, as resolution 41/46 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Bearing also in mind that in 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalled such determination and included in its article VI an undertaking by each of its parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date,

Recalling that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, adopted unanimously, it had stressed that one of the basic principles on which the treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based was that such treaty, which was then to be negotiated, should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,

Recalling also that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration adopted by consensus on 21 September 1985, expressed its deep regret that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty had not been concluded so far and called for the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority,

Noting that article II of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water provides a procedure for the consideration and eventual adoption of amendments to the Treaty by a conference of its parties,

1. *Recommends* that the States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertake practical steps leading to the convening of a conference to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

2. *Requests* that States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the progress of their efforts.

The third draft resolution, submitted under the item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty" and introduced by Australia, was adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to 1, with 15 abstentions, as resolution 41/47, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Convinced of the consequent urgent need for an end to the nuclear-arms race and the immediate and verifiable reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

Convinced, therefore, that an end to all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and further nuclear proliferation and to contribute, along with other concurrent efforts to limit and reduce nuclear arms, to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are engaged in nuclear and space talks and in consultations on the entire scope of issues relating to nuclear testing, and expressing the hope that those talks and consultations will lead to both early and concrete results,

Noting also recent initiatives, including the proposals by the leaders of the six countries associated with the five-continent initiative, to promote an end to nuclear testing,

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time is through the conclusion of a verifiable, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty open to and capable of attracting the adherence of all States,

Reaffirming the responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

1. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time is a matter of fundamental importance;

2. *Urges*, therefore, that the following actions be taken in order that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty may be concluded at an early date:

(a) The Conference on Disarmament should commence practical work on a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of its 1987 session;

(b) States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, and all other States, should co-operate with the Conference on Disarmament in order to facilitate and promote such work;

(c) The nuclear-weapon States, especially those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should agree to appropriate verifiable, interim measures with a view to realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(d) Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so should adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water;

3. *Also urges* the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) To take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network with a view to the further development of its potential to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(b) In this context, to take into account the progress achieved by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including the exchange of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives by individual States and groups of States;

(c) To initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity;

4. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty"

The fourth draft resolution, introduced by Hungary under the item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/88 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". was adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to 3, with 26 abstentions, as resolution 41/54. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the growing threat of nuclear war,

Recalling that over the past three decades the need for cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing has been in the focus of attention of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming its conviction that the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States would constitute an indispensable element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, thus contributing to the achievement of the final goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate verification,

Stressing once again that the elaboration of such a treaty is the task of the highest priority and should not be made dependent on the attainment of any other measure in the field of disarmament,

Recalling the proposals contained in the Delhi Declaration adopted by the heads of State or Government of six States on 28 January 1985, and their joint message of 28 February 1986 addressed to the leaders of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Recalling its previous resolutions on this subject, in particular resolution 40/88 of 12 December 1985,

Emphasizing the importance of verification measures, including those proposed by the leaders of six countries in the Mexico Declaration which they adopted at Ixtapa on 7 August 1986,

Deeply deploring that the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to carry out negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on such a treaty,

Deeply deploring that appeals to refrain from nuclear testing have remained unfulfilled,

1. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly to negotiations on all aspects of this matter, including adequate measures of verification, with the aim of preparing without delay a draft treaty that would effectively ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere and would contain provisions, acceptable to all, preventing the circumvention of this ban by means of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;

2. *Resolutely urges* all States, and especially all nuclear-weapon States, to exert maximum efforts and exercise political will for the elaboration and conclusion without delay of such a treaty;

3. *Invites* the United States of America—pending the conclusion of such a treaty—to join the moratorium on nuclear explosions declared unilaterally and extended several times by one nuclear-weapon State;

4. *Expresses its hope* that all other nuclear-weapon States will also consider joining in such a moratorium;

5. *Invites* all interested States to agree without delay to establish an international network for monitoring and verifying compliance with such a moratorium joined by other nuclear-weapon States;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/54 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests"

The fifth draft resolution, introduced by Australia under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", was adopted by a recorded vote of 130 to 1, with 22 abstentions, as resolution 41/59 N. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Noting the repeated calls by the General Assembly for the urgent conclusion of a treaty to ban all nuclear explosions in all environments for all time,

Expressing its conviction that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban

treaty, the States concerned should provide all other States with information on all nuclear explosions conducted by them,

Convinced that the provision of such data by all States conducting nuclear explosions would supplement and contribute to the improvement of independent monitoring capabilities and thereby facilitate the early conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

1. *Calls upon* each of the States concerned to provide to the Secretary-General within one week of each nuclear explosion:

- (a) The date and time of the explosion;
- (b) The exact location of the explosion in terms of geographic co-ordinates and depth;
- (c) The geological characteristics, including the basic physical properties of the rock, of the site of the explosion;
- (d) The estimated yield of the explosion;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make this information immediately available to all States and to submit to the General Assembly annually a register of the information provided on nuclear explosions during the preceding twelve months.

Conclusion

In 1986, the question of the cessation of nuclear tests was intensively discussed in the various disarmament forums. In their bilateral contacts, the two major Powers took initiatives and exchanged views—actions which were interpreted by some other States as encouraging signs. A few positive developments on the multilateral level were also observed. Among other things, it was pointed out anew that the verification question should not prevent further work on a test ban from proceeding in view of the progress made towards international, scientific co-operation under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament. A number of States actively advocating a halt in nuclear testing sought to contribute to that objective through initiatives of their own. At the same time, reservations about the urgency of such a measure continued to be expressed by some, which believed that a lasting improvement in international security did not depend primarily on the cessation of nuclear tests.

Throughout the year, the Soviet Union maintained the moratorium on all nuclear explosions that it had declared in August 1985. As before, the United States did not join it, believing a moratorium could not be a substitute for a binding treaty. Various views were expressed on the significance of such a unilateral measure. They ranged from strong support of it as a first step towards more comprehensive arrangements to interpretations of it as a mainly political gesture, albeit an important one.

As in the previous two years, the Conference on Disarmament could not agree to establish a subsidiary body to consider the nuclear-test-ban item, since the group of 21 and the socialist States, on the one hand, and Western States, on the other, continued to hold divergent opinions regarding its mandate.

The General Assembly adopted five resolutions on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests and a comprehensive ban. None of them was unopposed, however, and a great number of explanations of vote reflected the fact that Member States continued to hold a variety of views on the specific problems pertaining to the question. Four of the resolutions dealt with the

same subjects as those adopted in 1985 and closely resembled them; a fifth one concerned the notification of nuclear tests.

ANNEX

Document on verification measures issued at the Mexico summit on 7 August 1986*

1. It is the responsibility of the nuclear Powers to halt nuclear testing as a significant step to curb the nuclear-arms race. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, being the two major nuclear Powers, have a special responsibility to initiate the process of nuclear disarmament by immediately halting their nuclear testing. To facilitate such an immediate step the six nations of the Five Continent Initiative are prepared to assist in the monitoring of a mutual moratorium or a test ban.

2. We are prepared to participate in co-operative efforts together with the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and also to take certain steps on our own to facilitate the achievement of adequate verification arrangements.

Verification of a moratorium in co-operation with the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

3. In our view, some temporary measures could greatly enhance confidence in a United States of America-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics moratorium and would constitute important steps towards the establishment of an adequate verification system for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Possible monitoring of test sites

4. To provide assurance that the test sites, which are well equipped for nuclear testing and where the effects of nuclear explosions are well known, are not used for clandestine testing, we consider the establishment of temporary monitoring facilities at existing test sites to be an important measure.

5. The three test sites recently used, Nevada in the United States and Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya in the Soviet Union, are quite small geographically and could be monitored by a limited number of seismic stations placed in these two countries at or close to each test area.

6. Rapidly to establish temporary stations at the test sites, available portable seismic equipment would have to be used. Five to eight interconnected stations placed around each test area would be adequate. Some of the stations at the test sites could also be equipped with instruments interchanged between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to enhance mutual confidence.

7. In connection with a mutual halt in nuclear testing, our six nations are prepared to establish promptly and in co-operation with the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, temporary monitoring stations at existing test sites and to operate them for an initial period of one year. All data should be available to the six nations, the United States and the Soviet Union. Data analysis could be a joint undertaking and preliminary analysis would be done at the sites. Monitoring of test sites by instruments installed on-site would provide an extremely high sensitivity down to small fractions of kiloton and even tons of explosives.

8. It is expected that a number of earthquakes would be detected at the test sites. The numbers and sizes will vary between the three sites. To reduce the risk of misinterpreting such shallow earthquakes as being nuclear explosions, a scheme of on-site inspections at the test sites could be envisioned. This would be most important during the initial period while experience is gained at the actual sites. Our six nations are prepared to participate in such inspections conducted in co-operation with the host country.

* Attachment to document A/41/518-S/18277, which contains the Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986. The Declaration is reproduced on page 63.

Possible monitoring of the territories of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics outside the test sites

9. To provide assurance that nuclear explosions are not conducted and that natural earthquakes are not misinterpreted as clandestine nuclear test explosions, events all over the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would have to be monitored.

10. There are areas of the two countries, in addition to the test sites, that might be considered to be more important to monitor than others. The possibilities of conducting unnoticed tests are for example increased by the availability of large cavities or unconsolidated rock which reduce the strength of the seismic signals. Other possible areas of importance are regions of shallow seismicity. It might be desirable to establish specific verification arrangements in some of these areas, and our six nations are prepared to co-operate with the United States and the Soviet Union on this issue.

11. There is today a large number of seismological stations, established to record local earthquakes, both within the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Some of these stations might not be equipped at present with the most modern or high sensitivity instruments and they might not be sited in an optimal way to monitor a moratorium or a comprehensive test ban. They are however operational today and could initially be of great value in rapidly improving the present monitoring capability. A major question is to assure the authenticity of the measurements obtained at these stations.

12. This could be achieved by "internationalizing" a number of selected stations, tentatively 20 to 30, in each of the two countries by placing observers from our six nations at these stations. Their task would be to verify that the instruments are properly operated and that all information obtained is reported without omission. We are prepared to work out the necessary arrangements, which could be made with little delay and to contribute observers for an initial period of one year.

13. To replace these temporary measures with permanent arrangements, our experts are ready to co-operate with experts of the United States and the Soviet Union in the development of permanent verification facilities at test sites, and also in the development of an optimal network of internal stations in the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Possible inspection of large chemical explosions

14. To ensure that large chemical explosions conducted during a moratorium are not misinterpreted as nuclear tests, we are prepared to establish, together with the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, procedures for on-site inspections of large chemical explosions and to take part in such inspections.

Activities by our six countries independently of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

15. In order to pave the way for the establishment of efficient verification measures, our six countries will take a number of technical actions independently of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We shall be strengthening our mutual co-operation with a view to monitoring and announcing ongoing test activities. This will involve rapid exchange of data related to presumed explosions as well as informal technical consultations about the nature of observed events. Our countries will jointly publish yearly statistics on test activities in the nuclear-weapon States. To this end, efforts are also being made further to improve our national verification facilities to achieve an even higher and balanced monitoring capability with regard to existing test sites.

16. We will also support the establishment of an international verification system by actively participating in the ongoing work on such a system by the Group of Scientific Experts at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Our six nations will also consider steps by which the non-nuclear-weapon States may co-operate in international verification arrangements related to future nuclear disarmament.

Expert discussions with the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

17. We have proposed to the leaders of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that experts from our six nations meet with Soviet and American experts. The purpose should be to explain in detail the proposals put forward in this document, to discuss how they could be implemented, and to explore other possible ways in which our six countries could facilitate test-ban verification.

Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

Introduction

NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES, especially those outside military alliances that include a nuclear-weapon State, have ever since the beginning of the nuclear age insisted on the need for effective measures that would ensure their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The intensifying global arms race, the further increase in the effectiveness and lethality of nuclear weapons and the inclusion of the concept of limited nuclear war in some strategic doctrines have, in the view of those States, made that need even more urgent. The issue was expressly addressed in connection with the negotiations on the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation Treaty¹ and has been included almost constantly since then in the agenda of disarmament bodies. However, the non-nuclear-weapon States have not as yet considered any of the proposed solutions generally acceptable.

In the 1978 Final Document,² the General Assembly noted the individual declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers on the question and urged them to conclude effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.³ Three different approaches to the question have since been proposed. The two advocated mainly by the Eastern European States, on the one hand, and by Pakistan, on the other, are largely similar in substance and scope in that they welcome in principle the idea of concluding a convention on the issue and recommend that negotiations to that end be held in the Conference on Disarmament. The Eastern European States specifically advocate the conclusion of an international convention of a legally binding character as the best solution. Pakistan's proposal focuses on the need for effective international arrangements based on a common

¹ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 59.

³ Two types of security assurance are generally recognized. Under a "negative assurance", nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This is in contrast to a "positive assurance", whereby nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves, under specific circumstances, to come to the defence of non-nuclear-weapon States, as envisaged by Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

approach, and, while noting that such arrangements might be embodied in a convention, also recommends that other alternatives be considered. These two views have received wide support in the General Assembly each year.

The third approach, that of the United States, assumes differences in the nature of the security requirements of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States that will make it difficult to reach a common formula. It proposes, instead, that the individual declarations announced or reaffirmed by the nuclear-weapon States in 1978 be formalized. However, the United States has not insisted on this approach since 1979. Summaries of the unilateral pledges given in 1978 and, in several cases, subsequent reformulations are contained in the annex to this chapter.

The question of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States has been actively considered by both the General Assembly and the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, which has established a subsidiary body to deal with it each year since 1979. No significant progress has been made in the matter in the last few years. In the Conference on Disarmament, the positions of States on the scope, substance, form and nature of the envisaged guarantees have remained unchanged. Most States agree on the desirability of an international convention, but there are differences of opinion about the practical implementation of the idea. As a result of such stagnation, decreasing interest on the part of the delegations has been discernible. In 1985, as in previous years, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the question, which reflected the two main approaches described above.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

The agenda item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" was considered by the Conference on Disarmament in plenary meetings during the periods from 7 to 11 April and from 28 July to 1 August. The Conference had before it the documents of previous sessions relating to the item.

During the first part of the session, the President of the Conference held consultations on the question of the re-establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on the item. Some delegations expressed the view that there was no point in resuming discussion on the question, unless the positions of the nuclear-weapon States had changed or developed since the previous year. Consultations with those States convinced the President that their positions had not changed. In July, it was agreed that because the session was by that time well advanced, the question of re-establishing an *ad hoc* committee and the appointment of its Chairman would be taken up at the beginning of the 1987 session.

Several delegations addressed various issues relating to the item at plenary meetings⁴ of the Conference. Nigeria considered the nuclear-weapon States' arguments for making their security assurances conditional to be un-

⁴ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

necessarily obstructive in nature. It pointed out that there were three categories of non-nuclear-weapon States, namely: (a) non-members of military alliances with no nuclear weapons on their territories; (b) members of military alliances with no nuclear weapons on their territories; and (c) members of military alliances that did have other States' nuclear weapons on their territories. In Nigeria's view, there were feasible treaty formulations for each category, which would be realistic, discourage the geographical spread of nuclear weapons and satisfy the security considerations of all parties. However, finding a consensus formulation required negotiations, and it was not helpful for delegations to prejudge their outcome. Nigeria further held, in referring to the commitments made under the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, that if nuclear-weapon States did not totally exclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States that did not have them, the very basis of the Treaty would become morally indefensible. Pakistan believed that negative security guarantees, perhaps in conjunction with other arrangements such as nuclear-weapon-free zones, could be the appropriate means to protect a region against an external nuclear threat.

In general, members of the group of 21 stressed again their belief that the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. In their view, until nuclear weapons were eliminated, nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to guarantee in an internationally binding instrument that non-nuclear-weapon States would not be attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons, and they were disappointed at the lack of progress on the question. Thus, Kenya stated that until nuclear weapons were totally eliminated, the only morally justifiable security arrangement would be the prohibition of nuclear weapons along with joint or unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States. Some non-aligned States noted that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States were the least nuclear-weapon States could expect to give in exchange for the commitment by other States under the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Some other non-aligned countries stressed that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be without qualification and pre-conditions, not subject to divergent interpretations and unlimited in scope, application and duration.

Bulgaria, speaking on behalf of the group of socialist States, underlined their interest in helping advance the consideration of the subject. Developments in the nuclear field had shown the vulnerability of non-nuclear-weapon States to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. The socialist countries believed that the Conference should persist in seeking a meaningful solution to the problem of security assurances, one which would be acceptable to all and could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. They welcomed the solemn declarations made by the Soviet Union and China concerning the non-first use of nuclear-weapons, and they were convinced that if all nuclear-weapon States were to assume obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would constitute a ban on their use against all States, including all non-nuclear-weapon States.

The socialist countries shared the belief that the most effective guarantee

would be nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Romania held that until that objective was achieved on a universal basis, it was imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

China also expressed the view that the most effective security guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon States would be the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It held that pending nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones and stated that it unconditionally assumed such an obligation. It also supported all efforts conducive to breaking the impasse on the item.

Western States drew attention to the unilateral declarations made by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, which they regarded as credible and reliable and which, in their view, amounted to firm declarations of policy. They expressed readiness to continue discussion of the item in an *ad hoc* committee, but acknowledged that previous experience had shown the difficulties involved in elaborating an international convention on the subject.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

Pursuant to resolutions 40/85 and 40/86, adopted by the General Assembly in 1985, the agenda for its forty-first session again included two items on the issue of security assurances: "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament" and "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament"

Some delegations referred to the issue while addressing disarmament matters in the plenary meetings.⁵ Mongolia considered that a tangible step towards preventing the outbreak of nuclear war would be taken if all nuclear-weapon Powers undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; it cited the pledges of the Soviet Union and China in that regard. It held that such a step would contribute to strengthening the atmosphere of trust between States and enhance the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. China believed that in order to create favourable conditions for disarmament and the relaxation of international relations, the two major nuclear Powers should first jointly undertake not to launch a nuclear war or resort to the use or threat of force against other countries.

Sweden asserted that non-nuclear States had a right to make their voices heard on security issues of vital importance to them. In that connection, it noted that the right of participation of non-nuclear-weapon States was one of the leading ideas behind the Mexico Declaration of 7 August (see page 63).

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 32nd and 94th meetings.

Pakistan hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would elaborate, as soon as possible, agreed security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Czechoslovakia expressed support for the proposal of the Soviet Union, announced on 15 January,⁶ concerning the entire range of issues relating to nuclear disarmament: it considered the proposal provided a detailed, specific and concrete basis for progress in disarmament and also paid due regard to the legitimate security interests of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear.

In the First Committee,⁷ many non-nuclear-weapon States, including Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia and the Dominican Republic, favoured a legally binding international instrument as the best solution to their security requirements. Pakistan felt that it was the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to extend security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States in a legally binding form. That measure would advance the ultimate goal of a denuclearized world by removing an important incentive for the non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire a nuclear capability, while protecting them from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Philippines also supported such a measure, adding that it was necessary for all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will to reach agreement on a common approach to the question.

Some States, including Bangladesh and Nepal, drew attention to the merits of nuclear-weapon-free zones as arrangements for maintaining international peace and security and for providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Sweden held that the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against targets within a zone was an essential element of such arrangements. Finland defined nuclear-weapon-free zones as arrangements for geographical limitations on the deployment and the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Some other States, such as Morocco and the United Arab Emirates, believed that the nuclear capabilities of Israel and South Africa posed a threat to their security interests. In advocating nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East, Morocco emphasized the obstacles to their establishment posed by the nuclear capabilities of those two nations. Sri Lanka expressed concern at reports of such capability.

In appraising the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in providing dependable security guarantees, certain States directed their comments towards zones in specific regions of the world. New Zealand commended the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, recalling that its three Protocols called on the nuclear Powers to respect the zone, to provide an assurance to the parties to the Treaty that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them, and that they would not test nuclear weapons within the zone. Malta was convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the Mediterranean would be instrumental in enhancing the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in that region. On the other hand, India

⁶ A/41/97.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 32nd, 36th and 39th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

held that it was unrealistic to hope that States of South Asia would obtain a reliable security guarantee by establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their area.

China stated once again that nuclear-weapon States should unconditionally pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Several delegations, including Viet Nam and Mongolia, perceived the pledge of non-first use of nuclear weapons as an important step to avert nuclear war and were hopeful that their security could be enhanced through that option.

Some delegations commented on the work of the Conference on Disarmament regarding security arrangements. In general, they voiced disappointment at the lack of progress, though some were optimistic that work would advance in 1987. Pakistan attributed the inability of the Conference to reach agreement on the issue to the rigid positions of some countries. Bulgaria regretted that it had not been possible to establish an *ad hoc* committee on the agenda item. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the main obstacle was the reluctance of the United States to participate in the discussions, despite the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

Two draft resolutions were submitted to the First Committee on the subject, one under each of the two agenda items.

On 29 October, under the agenda item "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", a draft resolution with the same title was submitted by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Mongolia, the Soviet Union and Viet Nam. Bulgaria introduced it on 3 November, reaffirming the conviction of the sponsors that, until nuclear disarmament was achieved on a global basis, it was imperative for the international community to elaborate security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The draft expressed the sponsors' disappointment at the lack of progress on the subject in the Conference on Disarmament in 1986 and their belief that there was a general readiness to continue a substantive dialogue. They were convinced that non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories had every right to receive reliable international legal guarantees against the use or threat of use of such weapons. By the operative part of the text, the General Assembly would reaffirm the urgent need to reach agreement on effective arrangements for such guarantees and to find a common approach, which would be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The sponsors considered that the Conference on Disarmament should continue to explore methods of overcoming the difficulties encountered in the negotiations on the question. By the draft, the Assembly would request the Conference to continue active consideration of the subject and to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee at its 1987 session.

On 29 October, under the agenda item "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", Pakistan submitted a draft resolution, which it introduced in the First Committee on 6 November. It noted that the

most effective assurance against the nuclear threat remained the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. However, until the objective of nuclear disarmament would be achieved, the critical importance of credible guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States could not be over-emphasized. Actively involved in the search for a viable and acceptable international agreement, Pakistan was deeply disappointed to observe that while no one had put forward any objection in principle to the concept of negative security assurances, the Conference on Disarmament had failed to register any progress in negotiating a legal instrument on the subject. It therefore considered it important that the General Assembly call upon the Conference to intensify its efforts to agree on a formula that would enable it to conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It felt that the unilateral declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States did not adequately reflect the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States and that the assurances had to be unconditional and of a legally binding nature. The draft appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on an instrument of a legally binding character.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the draft introduced by Bulgaria by a recorded vote of 91 to 18 (Western and associated States), with 19 abstentions. On the same day, it approved the draft introduced by Pakistan by a recorded vote of 126 to none, with 5 abstentions.

In connection with the action in the First Committee, a number of States explained their positions on one or both of the drafts.

Among those delegations that explained their abstentions in the votes on both drafts, Argentina doubted the usefulness of security assurances, but had no doubt as to the moral and political obligation of nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. The former must, Argentina declared, state unequivocally and without any pre-conditions that they renounce the use or threat of use of such weapons against the latter. In Brazil's opinion, the drafts did not adequately reflect the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. All that the nuclear-weapon Powers had offered other nations, Brazil stated, were unilateral declarations of guarantees, which, with one exception, were tantamount to virtually no reliable guarantees at all. As long as that situation prevailed, no progress could be made in the multilateral consideration of the matter. India held that the only credible and non-discriminatory guarantee would be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear-weapon States did extend some form of security assurances, the non-nuclear States would not be any more secure unless the nuclear-weapon States made a simultaneous commitment to give up the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Japan explained its positive vote on the draft introduced by Pakistan and its negative vote on that introduced by Bulgaria. Regarding the latter, it noted "some improvement" compared with resolution 40/85 of 1985, such as the deletion of references which might prejudice the work of the Conference on Disarmament. However, the draft still contained references to specific modalities and, on the whole, Japan found it neither balanced nor objective. As to the former, Japan had reservations on the paragraphs that referred to specific

modalities of negative security assurances, feeling that they might prejudice the work of the Conference, but it felt that the draft reflected correctly the stage of work in the Conference.

New Zealand explained that it voted against the draft introduced by Bulgaria because it found it unbalanced in its approach to important security questions. New Zealand believed, however, that the text had been improved over the corresponding 1985 resolution.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Bulgaria by a recorded vote of 106 to 18, with 25 abstentions, as resolution 41/51. It read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States, and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent nuclear conflagration,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of such weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the determination of non-nuclear-weapon States in various parts of the world to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories and to ensure the complete absence of such weapons in their respective regions, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to encourage and contribute to the attainment of this objective,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its numerous resolutions on this subject, as well as the relevant part of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting that the Conference on Disarmament considered in 1986 the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", as reflected in its report, and that disappointment was expressed at the lack of progress on that item,

Noting further that this consideration revealed the existence of a general readiness to continue a substantive dialogue on the issue,

Recalling the proposals submitted on this subject to the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention, and the widespread international support for the conclusion of such a convention,

Welcoming once again the solemn declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States concerning non-first use of nuclear weapons, and convinced that if all nuclear-weapon States were to assume obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount in practice to banning the use of nuclear weapons against all States, including all non-nuclear-weapon States,

Considering that the non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories have every right to receive reliable international legal guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

1. *Reaffirms once again* the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international

arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and to find a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

2. *Considers* that the Conference on Disarmament should continue to explore ways and means of overcoming the difficulties encountered in carrying out negotiations on this question;

3. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue active consideration on this subject, including through the re-establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons as soon as practicable, at its 1987 session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

Also on 3 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Pakistan by a recorded vote of 149 to none, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 41/52. It read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 3261G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 and 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 B of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/155 of 12 December 1980, 36/95 of 9 December 1981, 37/81 of 9 December 1982, 38/68 of 15 December 1983, 39/58 of 12 December 1984 and 40/86 of 12 December 1985,

Further recalling paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Noting the proposals submitted under this item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note of the decision of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated in the Final Communiqué of the Sixteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Fez from 6 to 10 January 1986, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Recommends* that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

Conclusion

In 1986, consideration of effective security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States did not bring the declared goal any closer. Unlike recent years, the work on the issue in the Conference on Disarmament was limited to general discussion in plenary meetings, as no subsidiary body was established for negotiations on the item. The views and positions of States on the scope, substance, form and nature of the envisaged guarantees were similar to those expressed in former years.

In the General Assembly, divergent views on the nature of the guarantees themselves and on the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States persisted. In accordance with the two resolutions adopted by the Assembly in 1986, the Conference on Disarmament will continue to deal with the issue in 1987.

ANNEX

Unilateral security assurances by nuclear-weapon States

China

In the annex to a letter of 7 June 1978 from the Permanent Representative of China to the Secretary-General, China stated:

For the present, all the nuclear countries, particularly the super-Powers, which possess nuclear weapons in large quantities, should immediately undertake not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones. China is not only ready to undertake this commitment but wishes to reiterate that at no time and in no circumstances will it be the first to use nuclear weapons.^a

In a communication of 28 April 1982 to the Secretary-General, the Chinese Government declared:

Pending the realization of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear countries must undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.

As is known to all, the Chinese Government has long declared on its own initiative and unilaterally that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that it undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.^b

France

On 30 June 1978, the representative of France stated:

Furthermore, as regards paragraph 59 [of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session] concerning assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, the delegation of France would recall that France is prepared to give such assurances, in accordance with arrangements to be negotiated, to States which constitute non-nuclear zones.^c

On 11 June 1982, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France declared:

For its part, it [France] states that it will not use nuclear arms against a State that does not have them and that has pledged not to seek them, except if an act of aggression is carried out in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State against France or against a State with which France has a security commitment.^d

Soviet Union

On 26 May 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union stated:

From the rostrum of the special session our country declares that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories.

We are aware of the responsibility which would thus fall on us as a result of such a commitment. But we are convinced that such a step to meet the wishes of non-nuclear States to have stronger security guarantees is in the interests of peace in the broadest sense of the word. We expect that the goodwill evinced by our country in this manner will lead to more active participation by a large number of States in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.^e

On 12 June 1982, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union read a message from the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, according to which the Soviet Union assumed "an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This obligation shall become effective immediately, at the moment it is made public from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly" The Soviet Union added that the question of the granting of security guarantees to the non-nuclear countries parties to the non-proliferation Treaty by the nuclear Powers "could be solved by concluding an international convention. The USSR is also prepared

^a A/S-10/AC.1/17, annex, para. 7.

^b A/S-12/11.

^c *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 27th meeting, para. 190.*

^d *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 9th meeting.*

^e *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th meeting, paras. 84 and 85.*

to conclude bilateral agreements on guarantees with States which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory".^f

United Kingdom

On 28 June 1978, the representative of the United Kingdom declared:

I accordingly give the following assurance, on behalf of my Government, to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices: Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.^g

United States

In the annex to a letter of 17 November 1978 from the representative of the United States to the Secretary of the First Committee, the United States cited a Presidential Declaration which read as follows:

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT (non-proliferation Treaty) or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.^h

^f *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 12th meeting.

^g *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 26th meeting, para. 12.

^h A/C.1/33/7, annex. The Presidential Declaration was also cited by the representative of the United States on 23 June 1978 in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 13th meeting.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Introduction

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES has, during the last 30 years, been considered by its advocates an effective means of halting the spread of nuclear weapons and thus promoting disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. It has also been argued that such a measure would assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons, thereby enhancing their security. The 1978 Final Document¹ states that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure, and that the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

In 1975, an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts prepared and submitted to the General Assembly a report entitled *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects*,² as requested by the Assembly the previous year. The Group was able to agree on the recommendation of certain principles that should be taken into account in creating such zones when appropriate conditions existed, but it did not reach consensus on a number of other principles. In 1982, the General Assembly requested that a new group of governmental experts review and supplement the 1975 study. That Group was, however, unable to reach agreement on the study as a whole and on its conclusions in particular.

Since 1957, there have been several proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions.³ Hitherto only one such zone has come into effect in a densely populated area, namely, Latin America. The main obligation of the parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) of 1967⁴ is to use exclusively

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 60 and 61.

² United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7.

³ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 15; *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. V; *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.6); and previous issues of *The Yearbook*.

⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: (a) the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and (b) the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. The Antarctic Treaty⁵ of 1959 ensures the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material there. The new South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty⁶ was signed in 1985 and was welcomed by a large number of States as an example that should be followed by States elsewhere.

In 1985, a lively discussion on the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world again took place during the sessions of the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament and at the fortieth session of the General Assembly. A considerable number of States supported the idea of the creation of such zones, either in general or in the regions of their particular concern. Many of them stressed that each zone should be modelled according to the specific characteristics of its region. Along with the extensive debate on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, on which several resolutions were adopted as in previous years, proposals for the creation of such zones in some other regions, such as the Balkans and Northern and Central Europe, were also dealt with.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

A number of delegations commented on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones during the Disarmament Commission's 1986 session in connection with, among other things, the consideration of item 6, concerning South Africa's nuclear capability, and item 4 (see page 13), and generally in plenary meetings.⁷

The German Democratic Republic stated that it supported the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and was seeking the setting up of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Mongolia recalled the recent initiative of the Warsaw Treaty States addressed to European States, the United States and Canada on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the European continent, including northern Europe, the Balkans and all along the line between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Central Europe. Romania stated that it would redouble its efforts to make the Balkans a zone free of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and foreign military bases.

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

⁶ For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII.

⁷ A/CN.10/PV.102-109, A/CN.10.PV.109/Corr.1 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

New Zealand, referring to the conclusion of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in August 1985, stated that the Treaty gave concrete expression to the region's determination that it should never become an arena for nuclear confrontation. Brazil urged that nuclear weapons be excluded from the whole South Atlantic, where there was a real danger of an extension of East-West confrontation.

The number of delegations that referred to the denuclearization of Africa was very large, and their statements were made almost exclusively in the context of South Africa's nuclear capability. Many countries expressed concern about the threat to African States and to international peace and security posed by South Africa's acquisition of a nuclear capability, as well as about the lack of progress in the work on the question in the Disarmament Commission. India considered that the collective failure of the Disarmament Commission to inform the international community of its considered position on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability was unpardonable. China stated that a solution to the problem was long overdue and expressed the hope that further consideration of the issue might bring about some change.

Speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community, the Netherlands stated that the Twelve felt it should be noted that there was general agreement on the importance of establishing Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and refusing to contribute to the development of a South African nuclear explosive capability. Canada believed that the way for South Africa to reassure the international community of its peaceful nuclear intentions was to adhere fully to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Similarly, Australia held that the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be prevented and that the possibility that South Africa might possess such weapons was intolerable.

Brazil, sharing the frustration of African States at the continued lack of agreement on the issue before the Commission, urged members to make every effort to defuse the emotional atmosphere and to broaden the agreement already achieved on many points so that those differences that still remained might be overcome and a complete set of recommendations could be adopted by consensus.

The item concerning South Africa's nuclear capability was also considered in Working Group III, which held five meetings between 12 and 21 May under the temporary chairmanship of Mr. Davidson Hepburn of the Bahamas. The Chairman of the Commission also held informal consultations on the item on 19 and 20 May, but it was not possible to reach conclusions and recommendations on the subject.⁸

In concluding statements in plenary meetings, several countries expressed disappointment that, once again, no progress had been made on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability. The representative of the Bahamas, who had been the temporary Chairman of Working Group III, stated that it had become evident, as soon as the Group had begun to deal with the basic

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*, sect. IV, para. 29.

substantive document on the item,⁹ that it would be unable to carry out the Commission's mandate as contained in resolution 40/89 B, and that there could be no collective message sent to South Africa that would reflect the condemnation of its system of *apartheid*. The Chairman of the Commission, in a final statement, pointed out that at the very moment when the aggressive policies of South Africa had become manifest to an unprecedented extent, the Commission had lost a singular opportunity to consider agenda item 6 in a purposeful and determined manner.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

There is no item on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Consequently it has traditionally been discussed in connection with items related to the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. In 1986, as before, there was some discussion in the Conference on the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general, but the debate¹⁰ on the issue consisted mostly of statements supporting specific zonal proposals.

The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view that the third world countries, which had no intention of being dragged into the East-West confrontation, should enjoy adequate security *vis-à-vis* the use of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, the announcement of zones free of nuclear weapons must be recognized and guaranteed by those countries that had such weapons. In Pakistan's opinion, a comprehensive programme of nuclear disarmament should make provision for interim and collateral measures of disarmament, including the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such measures, in conjunction with other related ones, could protect a region against an external nuclear threat.

Bulgaria introduced in the Conference a document on the issue of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe.¹¹ In it, the Warsaw Treaty member States (a) appealed to the States of Europe, the United States and Canada to undertake actions for the implementation of such zonal proposals on the European continent; (b) called for support for the efforts of the States that favoured the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; (c) voiced their readiness to participate in the exchange of views between the countries concerned so as to help implement practical measures for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Northern Europe and the Balkans; and (d) declared themselves in favour of starting negotiations between the States concerned on the establishment of a corridor free of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. The document expressed the belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe would contribute to strengthening the security of the zonal States, as well as European and global security; achieving greater stability and mutual confidence; reducing armed forces and armaments; strengthening the non-proliferation régime; and promoting the peaceful uses

⁹ See *ibid.*, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/40/42), annex III.

¹⁰ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/687.

of nuclear energy. The Warsaw Treaty States pointed to the readiness of the Soviet Union to give guarantees to such zones, and they expected the United States, as well as the United Kingdom and France, to display a similar willingness.

As to specific proposals concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Indonesia, Mongolia and Viet Nam (a non-member) expressed support for a South Asian zone, Kenya and Zaire for the denuclearization of Africa, and Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania for one or several of the zonal proposals for Europe. Mongolia called on the States of Asia and the Pacific to support initiatives for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and expressed satisfaction at the declaration of the southern part of the Pacific Ocean as such a zone. Indonesia, also welcoming its creation, expressed the hope that the proposed South-East Asian zone would soon become a reality and form a natural extension to the South Pacific zone. Kenya and Zaire warned that South Africa's nuclear capability frustrated the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa¹² and posed a threat to regional and international security.

New Zealand stated that people in the South Pacific had become very sensitive to the issue of nuclear testing because of testing done by countries from outside the region. They felt such testing did not contribute to the maintenance of security in the South Pacific. With that in mind, they had in the previous year endorsed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,¹³ establishing the world's second nuclear-free zone in a populated region. The Treaty had been ratified by three countries and signed by six others. In the near future, it was expected that the South Pacific Forum would adopt and open for signature three protocols to the Treaty, one of which would contain an obligation not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone. By establishing the zone, the regional States hoped to free themselves of the tensions generated by the nuclear-arms race in other parts of the world.

In a message to the Conference, President José Sarney of Brazil noted that his country had taken the option of banning atomic armament in its own territory and had subsequently signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It would make every effort to keep the South Atlantic as an area of peace, shielded from the arms race, the presence of nuclear arms and any form of confrontation originating in other regions. In speaking of efforts to control and reduce the arms race in general through negotiated international agreement, the United States mentioned the Treaty of Tlatelolco as one such agreement, whose signal importance should not be diminished.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

As in previous years, in 1986 the Assembly had four items on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones on its agenda: (a) "Implementation of General

¹² Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo in July 1964.

¹³ For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII.

Assembly resolution 40/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)", (b) "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", (c) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" and (d) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". In addition, a separate item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament", which had relevance for the zone in the Middle East, was considered.

During the general debate in plenary meetings and in the First Committee,¹⁴ many States advocated nuclear-weapon-free zones in general and specific proposals for their establishment in regions of particular concern to them. Besides the areas referred to in the agenda items, Northern Europe, the Balkans and Central Europe were also discussed. A great deal of interest was expressed in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, signed in 1985.

In the First Committee, among the delegations that expressed general support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Finland noted that there was increased world-wide interest in regional disarmament measures, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones. It regarded such zones as arrangements for limiting geographically deployment and the threat or use of nuclear weapons and felt that they would strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The verification problems connected with such zones should be studied further, Finland believed.

Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom stated that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones could, in certain parts of the world, contribute to stability in those areas, to non-proliferation and to the disarmament process in general. However, in the view of the Twelve, establishment of a zone was conditional upon the readiness of the States concerned to participate on the basis of agreements freely entered into and in keeping with internationally recognized principles. The Netherlands stated that it supported nuclear-weapon-free zones in those parts of the world where consensus on such zones existed among the countries concerned. Turkey reiterated its support for nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they could contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, in regions saturated with nuclear weapons, the establishment of such zones, in its view, would not enhance security unless region-wide and effective nuclear disarmament measures were carried out simultaneously.

The Soviet Union stated that it supported the demands of peoples in various parts of the world for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in their areas. The German Democratic Republic considered that measures for regional arms limitation would also make a significant contribution to preventing the danger of nuclear war and that non-nuclear-weapon States were able to promote the process of nuclear disarmament by establishing nuclear-

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 32nd, 51st, 58th to 64th, 94th and 96th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 40th, 46th and 51st meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

weapon-free zones. It welcomed the fact that, especially in recent years, the movement to establish such zones had gained momentum. Hungary warned against underestimating the potential of partial and interim arrangements, such as establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and setting up a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Europe, provided that they formed part of a process leading to a full-scale treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear explosions.

Guyana expressed its support for regional initiatives and for wider recognition of and respect for nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the globe, open to participation by all States of the respective regions. It pledged its readiness to co-operate with other delegations in efforts to ensure a nuclear-free planet. Kuwait regretted that most proposals on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones had remained a dead letter, in spite of the fact that regional countries had a vital interest in them. Morocco believed that a total ban on nuclear-weapon tests, respect for the nuclear non-proliferation régime and encouragement of the creation of denuclearized zones would be effective disarmament measures that would help to create an atmosphere conducive to general and complete nuclear disarmament. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones would strengthen the security of States in such areas and contribute to reducing the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan supported all measures promoting nuclear disarmament, whether they were global or regional, or of an interim, particular or collateral nature. One collateral measure was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. It could contribute significantly to nuclear non-proliferation and thus reduce the risk of nuclear war. Colombia believed that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones was one of the viable ways of avoiding horizontal proliferation, achieving nuclear disarmament and, consequently, attaining greater security. It would not only bring total nuclear disarmament to the countries belonging to the zones, but would also reduce the geographical areas where a nuclear confrontation would be possible. Peru shared that view.

The Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Sweden and the Soviet Union advocated a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northern Europe. Denmark was in favour of discussions aimed at establishing a zone in the Nordic area within a larger European context and stated that a Nordic zone would have to be guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Sweden held that geographical constraints on the deployment of nuclear weapons should be carried out. Nuclear-weapon-free zones could help to prevent new areas from being dragged into the nuclear-arms race. It noted that the debate on a nuclear-weapon-free zone continued in the Nordic area and that important national studies of the matter had been carried out in the Nordic States. It hoped that discussions and studies on the subject would continue and would help to bring about a Nordic consensus on the issue.

A number of States, including the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Romania and the Soviet Union, advocated a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. Greece, reiterating its firm commitment to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in gen-

eral, noted that it had made every effort to promote the specific proposal concerning the Balkans, which, in its view, could make a major contribution to the process of effective disarmament and significantly strengthen the non-proliferation régime. Romania stated that it was working steadily to build confidence and co-operation among all the Balkan countries and to bring about a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons and free of foreign military bases.

The idea of establishing a nuclear-free corridor along the dividing line between the two alliances in Central Europe was advocated mainly by the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The German Democratic Republic announced that the corridor should encompass parts of its territory, as well as parts of the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia, and that it would extend initially to 150 kilometres on each side of the dividing line. It believed that the creation of such a corridor could be regarded as a first step; after three years, the Governments concerned could negotiate to extend the corridor so that it would become a Central European nuclear-weapon-free zone. Czechoslovakia favoured the idea of the corridor, which it viewed as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe. It expressed its readiness to join in establishing the corridor and to participate in negotiations to that end. For its part, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that any approach envisaging a limited geographical separation of nuclear-weapon systems in Europe and the creation of "a partial and arbitrary nuclear-weapon-free zone" would only side-track the basic purpose of eliminating those weapons.

A number of States advocated the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a partial measure that could contribute to the security of the region, as well as to international security. Among them, Egypt called upon the nuclear Powers, especially the two super-Powers, to encourage the translation of the proposals put forward into concrete reality. It appealed to them to respond through practical measures to efforts to protect the Middle East and Africa from the nuclear danger and warned of the serious implications at regional and international levels that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would have for those two regions.

Democratic Yemen stated that while it supported the efforts of the United Nations to create nuclear-weapon-free zones as a first step towards general and complete disarmament, the creation of such a zone in the Middle East was, in its view, conditional on three points: (a) Israel must be called upon to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty; (b) Israel should place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and (c) Israel must cease to develop, test or manufacture nuclear weapons and/or acquire them by other means. In the light of the recent reports of Israeli nuclear capability, it felt it was very urgent that those conditions be met. Kuwait held that creation of a zone in the Middle East was obstructed by the nuclear capability of Israel, which, in its view, had been confirmed by many reports and by information from scientific and other sources. It was convinced that Israel's possession of nuclear weapons was the reason for the non-implementation of the resolutions calling for a zone in that region.

Israel, for its part, stated that it strongly advocated the concept of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It stressed that such a zone, including mutual reassurances, would preclude recourse to war. The zone could only come about through a long process of negotiation among the potential partners, as had been done in South America and the South Pacific. Israel fully supported the principle of non-proliferation and had declared that it would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. It believed that negotiations would be the best way to allay the fears expressed by the Arab States about what they called Israel's "nuclear potential"

The question of the denuclearization of Africa was dealt with mostly in the context of nuclear non-proliferation and South Africa's nuclear capability. Thus, Benin, speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, recalled that Africa was the first region to adopt a position on non-proliferation and unilaterally to renounce the right to acquire nuclear weapons. Despite the adoption of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and the fact that the General Assembly had, in 1965, called on all States to respect it, South Africa had gone against the common will. Its nuclear capacity constituted a threat to peace and security not only in the region, but throughout the world. The African States expected the international community to exert sufficient pressure on South Africa to lead it to renounce its nuclear capability and to ensure that it complied with the non-proliferation Treaty and placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Among those States that expressed their disappointment at the failure of the Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus text on the nuclear capability of South Africa, Democratic Yemen stressed the importance of the implementation of the above-mentioned Declaration. It condemned South Africa's acquisition of nuclear weapons and called for immediately halting co-operation with that régime. Ghana considered the Declaration an expression of Africa's collective commitment to strengthen international peace and security. It also reflected African States' concern over the effects of the spread of nuclear weapons and their support for disarmament. It believed that some nuclear-weapon States had unwittingly assisted South Africa to develop a nuclear capacity, because they needed its uranium.

Among the States addressing the question of the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and South-East Asia, Pakistan declared its conviction that the establishment of a zone in South Asia would be in the interests of all the regional States that had already committed themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons. It hoped that the other countries of the area would also recognize the merit of the proposal and join the endeavours to implement it. Thailand recalled the joint communiqué of the Nineteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, which had noted with satisfaction the progress report of a working group studying the concept of a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone as a component of a proposed zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia. The Ministerial Meeting had requested the working group to continue its consideration of the subject with a view to drafting as soon as possible a treaty for a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

A number of States welcomed the conclusion in 1985 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. New Zealand recalled that the South Pacific Forum had adopted three Protocols to the Treaty, calling on the nuclear Powers to respect the zone and to provide assurance that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty and that they would not test nuclear weapons within the zone. In New Zealand's view, the Treaty and its Protocols gave concrete expression to the region's determination that its security must not be diminished by the introduction of nuclear weapons, that its environment must not be contaminated by the dumping of radioactive wastes and that it must not be a testing ground for nuclear Powers.

France stressed its readiness and willingness to engage in dialogue with the parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga. Its position was that, on the pretext of establishing a denuclearized régime, the Treaty would attempt to impose a régime discriminatory with regard to France. It stated that it exercised its legitimate rights in the Pacific with full respect for the legitimate interests of its neighbours in the region and expected the same respect for itself.

Later in the debate, New Zealand, speaking also on behalf of Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, stated that the Treaty neither discriminated against any country nor imposed obligations on any country against its will. It added that obligations under the Treaty would pertain to its parties only, while those contained in the three Protocols would pertain only to those eligible States that chose to assume them. The South Pacific countries attached great importance to adherence by the nuclear-weapon States.

A. *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America*

The item on the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has remained on the agenda of the General Assembly even though all five nuclear-weapon States had signed and ratified Additional Protocol II of the Treaty by 1979. Additional Protocol I concerns the application of the Treaty to territories in the Latin American region for which outside States have *de jure* or *de facto* responsibility. Three of those States—the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States—became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively.

On 30 October, a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)" was submitted by Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. It was later also sponsored by the Bahamas. The draft resolution was introduced on 6 November by Mexico, the depositary Government of the Treaty. As in previous years, Mexico pointed out the fact that there were some territories in the zone which, although not sovereign

political entities, were in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I and that it was not fair that some of those territories were deprived of such benefits without being given the opportunity to express their opinion. By the draft, the Assembly would once again deplore the fact that France had not yet followed its signature of Additional Protocol I with ratification and would urge it not to delay such action any further. Mexico concluded by stating that if the situation continued unchanged in 1987, it might be appropriate for the General Assembly to consider what type of measures could be adopted so that the peoples of the territories for which France had international responsibility within the zone of application of the Treaty could be consulted on a matter of such a vital nature.

Three countries explained their positions at the time of the vote on the draft in the First Committee. Brazil, which voted in favour, stated that it would continue firmly to support the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which it had signed and ratified. Among those abstaining, Cuba and France explained their positions. France could not agree that its action should be called into question, while certain countries in the actual zone of application of the Treaty had not signed or ratified it. It restated that it would take an appropriate decision in due course in the light of the status of the ratification of the Treaty itself. Cuba shared the view of the 1978 Final Document that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements freely entered into by the States of the regions in question was an important disarmament measure. It declared that it did not possess nuclear weapons and was not about to develop them. It added, however, that as long as a part of its territory was illegally occupied and the only nuclear Power in its hemisphere maintained a hostile attitude, it could not renounce its right to defend itself with weapons it deemed necessary.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 11 November by a recorded vote of 126 to none, with 7 abstentions. On 3 December the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 145 to none, with 7 abstentions, as resolution 41/45. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979, 35/143 of 12 December 1980, 36/83 of 9 December 1981, 37/71 of 9 December 1982, 38/61 of 15 December 1983, 39/51 of 12 December 1984 and 40/79 of 12 December 1985 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-three sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the four States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Considering that it would not be fair that the peoples of some of those territories were deprived of such benefits without being given the opportunity to express their opinion in this connection,

Recalling that three of the States to which the Additional Protocol I is open—the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America—became parties to the Protocol in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively,

1. *Deplores* that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

2. *Once more urges* France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times and which appears all the more advisable, since France is the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is open that is not yet party to it;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"

B. Denuclearization of Africa

Since the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa was adopted in 1964 by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the General Assembly has repeatedly called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" was included in the agenda of the forty-first session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 40/89 A of 12 December 1985. By another resolution adopted the same year, resolution 40/89 B, the Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the Assembly at its forty-first session.

In his report,¹⁵ the Secretary-General informed the Assembly that he had obtained a report prepared by the Director General of IAEA and containing updated information on South Africa's nuclear resources and activities to the extent that they were known to the Agency. In the view of the Secretary-General, the substance of the report went a long way towards meeting the requests made by the General Assembly on the subject, and he was therefore submitting it to the Assembly as an annex to his report.

On 29 October, Benin, on behalf of the Group of African States,¹⁶ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", consisting of part A, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration", and part B, entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa". In introducing the draft in the First Committee on 10 November, Benin noted that the text reflected the desire expressed by the African States since the beginning of the 1960s that their continent become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Benin pointed out that the issue had been on the Disarmament Commission's agenda for some years, but—mainly because of "the very worrying matter of the nuclear capability of South Africa" and certain Western

¹⁵ A/41/490.

¹⁶ The Group of African States is composed of: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

countries' co-operation with that State in the nuclear field—unanimity on the subject had not been possible. By part A of the draft, the General Assembly would renew its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone as well as to desist from further collaboration with South Africa; it would also request the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance that OAU might seek in order to implement the Declaration. By part B, the General Assembly would call upon all States, corporations, institutions or individuals to terminate all forms of military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa and demand that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by IAEA.

On 11 November the First Committee took action on both parts of the draft. Part A was approved by a recorded vote of 126 to none, with 7 abstentions. Part B was approved by a recorded vote of 117 to 4 (France, Israel, United Kingdom and United States), with 12 abstentions. Before the vote on part B, Israel requested a separate vote on the deletion of the words “and Israel” in the eleventh preambular paragraph, stating that it had no nuclear collaboration with South Africa. The proposed deletion was rejected by a recorded vote of 76 to 23, with 26 abstentions.

In connection with the voting on the draft resolution in the First Committee, nine States explained their positions on one or both of its parts.

Among the States which voted in favour of both parts, Albania stated that its vote was in keeping with its policy in support of the just cause of the African peoples and did not affect its previously expressed attitude towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Brazil supported the draft, noting that it was fully compatible with its initiative for establishing a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Atlantic (discussed below). Jordan expressed opposition to introducing nuclear weapons into the African continent on the grounds that that action would further complicate an already dangerous situation, and, in that context, it referred to Israel's alleged collaboration with the régime of South Africa. The Soviet Union reiterated its support for the African States's attempt to set up a nuclear-free zone on their continent and condemned any effort by South Africa to acquire nuclear weapons. It stressed that in the creation of such a zone in Africa, principles of international law, in particular the principle of free navigation on the high seas, should be recognized.

Several of the States voting affirmatively had some reservations about the draft. Argentina declared that its votes were in keeping with its support for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in general and their geographical non-proliferation in particular. It recalled, however, that it had reservations with regard to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA's safeguards régime, referred to in both parts of the draft. Finland, speaking on behalf of Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, stated that the Nordic countries supported both parts of the draft because they strongly condemned *apartheid* and shared the concern that South Africa might acquire nuclear weapons. However, they had reservations about certain formulations used in both texts, which, they felt, failed to take into account the proper division of

competence between the Security Council and the General Assembly. They also believed that the draft inappropriately and selectively mentioned individual countries or groups of countries and felt that the Assembly should address itself to Governments rather than to private citizens and enterprises.

Australia voted in favour of part A, but abstained on part B because it disagreed with several of its aspects, particularly the singling out of States by name, which it considered to be unacceptable and unhelpful. Japan, voting similarly, made a general statement regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. It felt they would contribute to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it stressed that they should be established with the agreement of all concerned, i.e. regional States and nuclear-weapon States.

France and the United Kingdom abstained on part A and voted against part B. France stated that it agreed with the fundamental objectives of the draft resolution but felt that both parts did not make the necessary distinction between the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, the expression of views on the possession and development of the nuclear capability of South Africa went beyond what it thought to be useful. While the United Kingdom noted that South Africa had announced its intention to abide by the spirit of the non-proliferation Treaty, it believed that it should accede to the Treaty at the earliest opportunity and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The United Kingdom declared that it did not collaborate with South Africa in the nuclear field. None the less, it held that all States had an internationally recognized right to apply and develop programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It considered that both parts of the draft contained insufficiently substantiated judgements and others that were more properly matters for the Security Council.

The General Assembly adopted both parts of the draft on 3 December. Part A was adopted by a recorded vote of 150 to none, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 41/55 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, its earliest on the subject, as well as its resolutions 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 31/69 of 10 December 1976, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76 A of 11 December 1979, 35/146 B of 12 December 1980, 36/86 B of 9 December 1981, 37/74 A of 9 December 1982, 38/181 A of 20 December 1983, 39/61 A of 12 December 1984 and 40/89 A of 12 December 1985, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability" undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, as well as of the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Noting the actions taken recently by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields.

Expressing regret that despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission has, once again, in 1986, failed to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

1. *Strongly renews its call* upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. *Reaffirms* that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security;

3. *Expresses once again its grave alarm* at South Africa's possession and continued development of nuclear-weapon capability;

4. *Condemns* South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime that enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;

5. *Calls upon* all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to desist from further collaboration with the racist régime that may enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

6. *Demands once again* that the racist régime of South Africa refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons;

7. *Appeals* to all States that have the means to do so to monitor South Africa's research on and development and production of nuclear weapons, and to publicize any information in that regard;

8. *Demands once again* that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance that the Organization of African Unity may seek towards the implementation of its solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"

Part B of the draft, concerning the nuclear capability of South Africa, was adopted by a recorded vote of 139 to 4, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 41/55 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979, 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, 36/86 A of 9 December 1981, 37/74 B of 9 December 1982, 38/181 B of 20 December 1983, 39/61 B of 12 December 1984 and 40/89 B of 12 December 1985,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling that, in paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it noted that the accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, presented an increasingly dangerous and challenging obstacle to the world community, faced with the urgent need to disarm,

Recalling also that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

Noting with regret the non-implementation by *apartheid* South Africa of resolution

GC(XXIX)/RES/442, adopted on 27 September 1985 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency during its twenty-ninth regular session,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability", undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity,

Expressing regret that despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission has, once again, in 1986, failed to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

Alarmed that South Africa's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities enable it to develop and acquire the capability of producing fissionable material for nuclear weapons,

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has continued its acts of aggression and subversion against the peoples of the independent States of southern Africa,

Strongly condemning the continued military occupation by South African troops of parts of the territory of Angola in violation of its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and urging the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan soil,

Expressing its grave disappointment that, despite repeated appeals by the international community, certain Western States and Israel have continued to collaborate with the racist régime of South Africa in the military and nuclear fields and that some of these States have, by a ready recourse to the use of the veto, consistently frustrated every effort in the Security Council to deal decisively with the question of South Africa,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the implementation of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,

Stressing the need to preserve peace and security in Africa by ensuring that the continent is a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

1. *Condemns* the massive buildup of South Africa's military machine, in particular its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;

2. *Further condemns* all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa, in particular the decision by some Member States to grant licences to several corporations in their territories to provide equipment and technical and maintenance services for nuclear installations in South Africa;

3. *Reaffirms* that the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

4. *Expresses its full support* for the African States faced with the danger of South Africa's nuclear capability;

5. *Commends* the actions taken recently by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields;

6. *Demands* that South Africa and all other foreign interests put an immediate end to the exploration for and exploitation of uranium resources in Namibia;

7. *Calls upon* all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all forms of military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime;

8. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to consider as a matter of priority during its session in 1987 South Africa's nuclear capability, taking into account, *inter alia*, the findings of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on South Africa's nuclear capability;

9. *Requests* the Security Council to conclude expeditiously its consideration of the recommendations of its Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to

render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

10. *Demands once again* that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

In connection with the item entitled "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa", the General Assembly adopted several resolutions with some disarmament-related provisions; those provisions are outlined below.

By resolution 41/35 B, entitled "Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa", the General Assembly called upon the Security Council urgently to take action, under Chapter VII of the Charter, against South Africa. It further urged the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and others to reassess their positions and facilitate the application of sanctions by the Security Council. It urged the Security Council to adopt measures to strengthen the mandatory arms embargo adopted by its resolution 418 (1977). The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 16 (Western and associated States), with 13 abstentions. By resolution 41/35 C, entitled "Relations between Israel and South Africa", the Assembly strongly condemned Israel's collaboration with South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields, and demanded that Israel terminate all such collaboration. It further called upon all Governments and organizations in a position to do so to exert their influence to persuade Israel to desist from such collaboration. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 102 to 29 (Western and other States), with 26 abstentions. By resolution 41/35 H, entitled "Concerted international action for the elimination of *apartheid*", the Assembly urged the Security Council to consider without delay the adoption of effective mandatory sanctions against South Africa and to take steps for the strict implementation of the mandatory arms embargo instituted by it in resolution 418 (1977) and, in that context, to secure an end to military and nuclear co-operation with South Africa. It also appealed to all States to consider national legislative and other appropriate measures so that nuclear collaboration with South Africa would be terminated. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 149 to 2 (United Kingdom and United States), with 5 abstentions.

Finally, under the agenda item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security" the Assembly adopted resolution 41/90, by which it called upon all States, particularly the members of the Security Council, to take appropriate and effective measures to promote the fulfilment of the objective of the denuclearization of Africa in order to avert the danger which the nuclear capability of South Africa constituted for the African States, as well as for international peace and security. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 1 (United States), with 24 abstentions (mainly Western States).

C. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

In connection with the item entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” Egypt submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee on 29 October. In introducing it on 6 November, Egypt stated that it firmly believed that the dangers caused by nuclear weapons could be alleviated permanently through a comprehensive and global solution. It had, however, complemented its global efforts with concerted regional endeavours aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that context, since 1974, Egypt had submitted draft resolutions calling for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. It pointed out that the draft was practically identical with resolution 40/82 of the previous year. It acknowledged the wish of some delegations to expedite the process leading to the establishment of a zone in the Middle East, but it felt that it would be helpful to accord the different parties concerned more opportunity to convey their opinions on the issue to the Secretary-General. In conclusion, Egypt emphasized the importance of adopting the draft resolution by consensus.

On the same day, Iraq commented on the draft introduced by Egypt. It noted that most of the previous resolutions on the subject had been adopted by consensus, but had not been implemented, owing to—in its view—the position taken by Israel. Iraq had demonstrated its deep conviction that it was necessary to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East by supporting United Nations resolutions on the subject, by ratifying the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and by placing its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It was convinced that the only way to achieve the objective was for Israel to renounce the nuclear option, accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under international safeguards. Refusal to do so would nullify the positive efforts being made to achieve the objective.

On 11 November, the Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

Seven countries explained their positions. Argentina stated that nuclear-weapon States must show scrupulous respect for the wishes of those countries and regions that had decided to declare their territories free of nuclear weapons. Brazil reiterated its view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should not in any way be related to adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty, which it considered a discriminatory and unbalanced instrument that had allowed the only existing proliferation of nuclear weapons—that carried out by the nuclear-weapon Powers—to proceed unchecked. India put on record the fact that its support for the draft was without prejudice to its position on the inadequacy of partial measures, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, and to its position on the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and the application of the so-called full-scope safeguards.

Jordan considered that nuclear weapons in the Middle East would create danger and add further complications to an already dangerous and complex situation. It cited views to the effect that Israel was the closest contact for South Africa in the Middle East and that South Africa had supplied it with

large amounts of hardware. Oman hoped that all the States of the Middle East would see the establishment of a zone in terms of the need for stability and a just peace in the region and for the solution of all its problems. That approach would bring the world closer to true international peace and security.

Israel restated its position that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East could take place only through direct and free negotiations among the sovereign States of the region, a position in accordance with the practice that had been followed in Latin America and the South Pacific.

For its part, the United States referred to its explanation of vote in connection with the resolution on radiological weapons (see chapter XVI), because the draft mentioned the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities. It continued to believe that additional legal protection against attacks on nuclear facilities should be considered separately from the question of a ban on radiological weapons.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, without a vote, as resolution 41/48. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984 and 40/82 of 12 December 1985 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing further the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous to build on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General.

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in

the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Invites* those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with the relevant paragraph of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

4. *Further invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

5. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and spirit of the present resolution;

6. *Extends its thanks* to the Secretary-General for his report containing the views of parties concerned regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

7. *Takes note* of the above-mentioned report;

8. *Requests* those parties that have not yet communicated their views to the Secretary-General to do so;

9. *Welcomes* any further comments from those parties that have already communicated their views to the Secretary-General;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"

On 10 October the representative of Oman, as Chairman of the Group of Arab States, requested the inclusion of an additional item, entitled "Israeli nuclear armament", in the agenda of the General Assembly at its forty-first session.¹⁷ On 14 October the Assembly decided to include the item in its agenda and to refer it to the First Committee.

On 29 October, Algeria, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen submitted a draft resolution entitled "Israeli nuclear armament". In introducing it on 3 November, Iraq stated that instead of implementing the resolutions of the United Nations and other organizations that called upon it to subject all its nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards and instead of acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty and renouncing possession of nuclear weapons, Israel was putting forward the so-called doctrine of Israeli nuclear deterrence. Iraq referred to a newspaper report according to which Israel possessed between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons. Given the existing data and information, Iraq believed that the United Nations and its specialized agencies should accord special importance to the issue in order to compel Israel to comply with the desire of the international community. The draft, *inter alia*, condemned Israel's refusal to

¹⁷ A/41/242.

renounce any possession of nuclear weapons; requested the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear activities; requested IAEA to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel in that field; and requested the Secretary-General to closely follow Israeli nuclear activities in the light of the latest available information, to update the 1981 study on Israeli nuclear armament¹⁸ and to submit the update to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

In commenting on the draft on 4 November, the representative of Israel stated that his Government was not in violation of any undertaking. Wherever it had submitted to IAEA safeguards, it had been certified by IAEA as complying with its undertakings. It was not a party to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. It had declared that it would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East and stood by that declaration. Israel asked the Committee to reject the draft in its entirety, as it singled out Israel from all other countries which had comparable scientific and technical capability.

On 11 November the First Committee took action on the draft resolution introduced by Iraq. It first approved operative paragraph 3 by a recorded vote of 89 to 23, with 19 abstentions; operative paragraph 4 by a recorded vote of 79 to 27, with 21 abstentions; operative paragraph 5 by a recorded vote of 79 to 27, with 20 abstentions; and operative paragraph 6 by a recorded vote of 81 to 21, with 25 abstentions. The Committee then approved the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 92 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 42 abstentions.

Five delegations explained their votes. In explaining its negative vote, Israel repeated that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, emphasizing that that was its declared policy. It also reiterated that it was unacceptable to single it out from among all the countries with comparable capability and recalled that a similar request by Arab States at the latest General Conference of IAEA had not been put to a vote (see chapter XI). Israel objected to operative paragraph 3, because it considered that the Security Council should not investigate speculations; to operative paragraph 4, because it believed that the paragraph denied it right of membership in IAEA; to operative paragraph 5, because the paragraph, in its view, ran counter to United Nations objectives fostering international co-operation; and to operative paragraph 6, because it insisted that it had no nuclear collaboration with South Africa.

Among those abstaining, Australia pointed out that it voted against paragraphs 3 to 6. It considered that the call for the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear activities asked the Council to engage in activities outside its field of competence, particularly if it involved an examination of Israel's relationship with IAEA. The requests in paragraphs 4 and 5 could, in its opinion, have implications for Israel's rights and privileges as a member of IAEA. It stated that the alleged nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa had never been satisfactorily substantiated.

Among those voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, Iraq

¹⁸ *Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.2).

reiterated its position that Israeli nuclear armament posed a serious threat to all the people of the Middle East, as it impeded all efforts to implement resolutions to consider Africa and other regions as nuclear-free zones. It referred to the draft resolution concerning South Africa's nuclear capability, which implicated Israel in co-operating with South Africa. In addition, it stressed that Israel must comply with the requirements of IAEA and adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty. Jordan pointed to recent reports and publications which, in its view, revealed that Israel possessed nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union expressed its conviction that the international community had every reason to be seriously concerned at the fact that Israel refused to assume the obligation not to manufacture or to acquire nuclear weapons, despite frequent appeals by the General Assembly, the Security Council and IAEA.

On 4 December, the General Assembly voted on the draft resolution. It adopted operative paragraph 3 by a recorded vote of 90 to 28, with 28 abstentions; operative paragraph 4 by a recorded vote of 81 to 37, with 26 abstentions; operative paragraph 5 by a recorded vote of 83 to 34, with 27 abstentions; and operative paragraph 6 by a recorded vote of 88 to 22, with 35 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a recorded vote of 95 to 2, with 56 abstentions, as resolution 41/93. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament, the latest of which is 40/93 of 12 December 1985.

Recalling resolution 40/82 of 12 December 1985, in which, *inter alia*, it called upon all countries of the region that had not done so, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Recalling further Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981 in which, *inter alia*, the Council called upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting with grave concern Israel's persistent refusal to commit itself not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, despite repeated calls by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards,

Aware of the grave consequences that endanger international peace and security as a result of Israel's development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and Israel's collaboration with South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,

Deeply concerned over the continuing development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel,

1. *Reiterates its condemnation* of Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons;

2. *Requests once more* the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and places all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Reiterates its request* to the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear activities and the collaboration of other States, parties and institutions in the nuclear field;

4. *Reiterates its request* to the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities;

5. *Calls upon* all States and organizations that have not yet done so to discontinue co-operating with and giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear field;

6. *Reaffirms its condemnation* of the continuing nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities in the light of the latest available information, and to update the *Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament* and submit it to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament"

The question of Israeli nuclear armament was also discussed in the context of the agenda item entitled "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security", dealt with in plenary meetings of the Assembly. By resolution 41/12, which was adopted on 29 October by a recorded vote of 86 to 5, with 55 abstentions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, called upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; considered that Israel had not yet committed itself not to attack or threaten to attack nuclear facilities in Iraq or elsewhere, including those under IAEA safeguards; reaffirmed that Iraq was entitled to compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of the Israeli armed attack on 7 June 1981; requested the Conference on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities; and decided to include the item in the agenda of its forty-second session.

In the plenary debate on the item, most delegations that took the floor, including Bahrain, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic, the USSR and Yugoslavia, condemned the Israeli attack against Iraqi nuclear facilities in 1981 as a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law and as an attack against the non-proliferation Treaty, IAEA and the Agency's safeguards régime. Some of them underlined the inalienable right of every nation to develop nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes and particularly the significance of that right for developing countries.

Israel reiterated the position of its Government on the issue. It noted that IAEA had in 1985 accepted as satisfactory Israel's oral and written assurances that it would not attack, or threaten to attack, peaceful nuclear facilities in Iraq or elsewhere. Having adopted resolution GC(XXIX)/RES/443, the Agency had dropped the question from its agenda. Israel accordingly considered the draft resolution superfluous.

Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom stated that the Israeli attack was in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations; thus, the Twelve condemned it. They stressed that every State had the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under effective international safeguards in conformity with the non-proliferation Treaty. Noting that by its statement in response to the IAEA General Conference resolution GC(XXVIII)/RES/425, Israel had committed itself not to attack or threaten to attack peaceful nuclear facilities in Iraq or elsewhere in

the Middle East or anywhere else, the Twelve questioned the need to include the item any longer on the Assembly's agenda.

In connection with the vote on the resolution, several States explained their positions.

Among those voting in favour, three States explained their votes. Although supporting some elements of a general nature in the draft, Brazil nevertheless put on record its intention to reassess its position on future occasions, if it became clear that the item was being used as a tool for unduly increasing tensions rather than promoting a positive and objective development of the matter it addressed. The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its dissatisfaction that Iraq had not accepted its amendment, by which it had sought a general condemnation of all military attacks on all nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes. The Syrian Arab Republic explained that it did not sponsor the draft resolution because it did not embody an unequivocal condemnation of the aggression committed against Iraq.

Among those countries which abstained, Argentina stated that its vote should be considered as being without prejudice to its past condemnation of the Israeli attack. It had difficulty, however, in reconciling two passages in the draft: one by which the General Assembly noted relevant IAEA resolutions and the other by which it considered that Israel had not yet committed itself not to attack nuclear facilities. Australia condemned the attack by Israel in 1981 and supported the call in the draft for Israel and all other countries in the Middle East to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. However, it voted against operative paragraph 2, because it considered that the commitment made by Israel at the 1985 IAEA General Conference had been in good faith. It was concerned at the repetitive consideration of the issue by the General Assembly. Canada changed its negative vote of the previous year to an abstention, but it continued to have serious difficulties with some points raised in the draft and considered that the adoption of IAEA General Conference resolution 443 should have closed discussion on the question.

Mexico explained its abstention by referring to its explanation of the previous year to the effect that it would have been preferable for the draft to embody entirely the results of the session of the General Conference of IAEA. Norway felt that operative paragraph 2 was inconsistent with the main thrust of IAEA resolution 443 and that no further action was necessary in the General Assembly. Peru, which had voted in favour of draft resolutions on the item since 1981, held that the Assembly's repeated unequivocal condemnation of an event that had occurred several years before gave rise to procedural problems. Although Sweden had clearly condemned the 1981 Israeli attack against Iraqi nuclear installations, it found some elements in the draft unacceptable, particularly because IAEA resolution 443 had effectively brought to an end consideration of the question. Uruguay voted against paragraph 2 because, in its view, Israel had offered to IAEA in 1985 acceptable guarantees with respect to attacks on the Iraqi nuclear reactor or any similar action. It abstained on the draft as a whole because it considered that the matter had already been sufficiently discussed.

Among those which cast a negative vote, two countries explained their positions. Israel reiterated its view and stressed that it had already given assurances against future attacks on nuclear facilities. The United States opposed the draft for reasons both of substance and principle. In its view, the issue had been addressed in a definitive manner by the 1985 IAEA General Conference. The draft would fan the flames of hostility and debate, which was completely contrary to the goals and purposes of the United Nations.

D. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The item on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia was included in the agenda of the forty-first session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 40/83 of 12 December 1985. The Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General¹⁹ in which he stated that he had been in contact with the States of the South Asian region with regard to paragraph 4 of resolution 40/83 and that they had made no request for his assistance in connection with the subject. In the course of those contacts, however, the view had been expressed that he should continue to be available for that purpose.

On 29 October, Pakistan submitted a draft resolution entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia” In introducing it on 6 November, Pakistan stated that pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important collateral measure. Non-aligned countries had repeatedly expressed support for the zonal concept as a partial measure in a step-by-step approach to general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Pakistan shared with other States of the South Asian region a commitment to keep the area free of nuclear weapons, a commitment reflected in the unilateral declarations of individual States. It believed that appropriate conditions existed in the region to carry forward the objective. The draft was on the same lines as resolution 40/83.

On 5 November, Maldives submitted several minor amendments to the draft resolution, and on 17 November it orally revised one of those amendments. The same day, the First Committee approved the amendments to the preambular part of the draft by a recorded vote of 77 to 2, with 44 abstentions. The amendments to operative paragraphs 2 and 4 of the draft were approved by a recorded vote of 78 to 2, with 44 abstentions. The Committee then approved the draft resolution as a whole, as amended, by a recorded vote of 90 to 3 (Bhutan, India and Mauritius), with 37 abstentions. Seven countries explained their positions in connection with the vote in the First Committee.

India voted against the draft and the amendments because, in its view, they did not take into account the provisions of the 1978 Final Document. A nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia could be established only if and when all States of the region had successfully and freely arrived at arrangements

¹⁹ A/41/519.

to do so and if and when the characteristics of the region could be objectively seen as justifying the establishment of the zone. India regretted that the proposal served to introduce an unnecessarily discordant note into the process of regional co-operation. It restated its view that any zone must be conceived as part of a nuclear-disarmament programme; that the zonal idea must emanate voluntarily from all the States of the region in question; and that a zone must involve a well-defined and distinct geographical and political unit. As far as South Asia was concerned, none of those criteria had been met, India believed. It concluded by noting that given the current security environment, it would be unrealistic to hope that States of the South Asian region would obtain a credible and reliable security guarantee through establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their area.

Among those abstaining, Brazil pointed out that the proposal did not command unanimous support in the region. Indonesia agreed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an effective regional approach to preventing proliferation. However, the process should be initiated by the States of the region concerned, based on voluntary participation and common agreement, and lead to arrangements freely arrived at among them. Sweden stated that besides general agreement among all the States concerned, there were other important elements, such as non-possession of nuclear weapons by zonal States, absence and non-deployment of nuclear weapons in such States, and commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against targets within the zone. Taking those principles into account, Sweden could not support the draft resolution, as it was evident that all the States concerned were not prepared to support it.

Among those voting in favour, Japan believed that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in South Asia or any other region, would contribute to the overall objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as to the peace and security of the region in question. However, it held that the establishment of such a zone should be based on the initiative of the countries in the region and agreed to by all concerned, including the nuclear-weapon States, and that it should strengthen the peace and security not only of the region, but also of the world as a whole. Somalia supported the draft resolution for similar reasons and added that many non-aligned countries hoped to prevent themselves from being drawn into cold-war confrontation by establishing zones. While Sri Lanka supported the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it was mindful of the need to take into account the specific characteristics of each zone and of the fact that there was no model that was applicable universally. In addition, nuclear-weapon-free zones must enjoy a consensus in the region if they were to succeed. The United Kingdom also stressed the importance of the particular characteristics of each region and of agreement between all States of the region concerned.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 107 to 3, with 41 abstentions, as resolution 41/49. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December

1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981, 37/76 of 9 December 1982, 38/65 of 15 December 1983, 39/55 of 12 December 1984 and 40/83 of 12 December 1985 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting with appreciation the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States that are developing their peaceful nuclear programmes reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Reaffirms* its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. *Calls upon* those nuclear-weapon States that have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to find their views on the issue and explore the best possibilities to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia"

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* *

Two other items related to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which concerned Antarctica and the South Atlantic, were on the General Assembly's agenda at its forty-first session.

The item entitled "Question of Antarctica" was included in the agenda in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 40/156 A and B of 16 December 1985. The item was discussed in the First Committee, and three draft resolutions were submitted.

On 18 November, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, the Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and Zimbabwe submitted a draft resolution, which was introduced by Malaysia. The draft was approved by the First Committee on 19 November by a roll-call vote of 76 to none, with 9 abstentions, and adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December by a roll-call of 94 to none, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 41/88 A. By the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to follow all aspects of the question of Antarctica and to provide an updated report thereon to it at its forty-second session.

A second draft resolution was submitted on 18 November by Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, the Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and Zimbabwe, which was introduced by Malaysia the next day. The draft was approved by the First Committee on 19 November by a roll-call of 76 to none, with 10 abstentions, and adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December by a roll-call of 96 to none, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 41/88 B. By that resolution, the Assembly, *inter alia*, reaffirmed that any exploitation of the resources of Antarctica should ensure the maintenance of international peace and security in the continent and the protection of its environment. It called upon the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to impose a moratorium on the negotiations to establish a minerals régime until such time as all members of the international community could participate fully in such negotiations.

A third draft resolution on the subject was submitted on 18 November by 56 States²⁰ and was introduced by Malaysia on 19 November. The draft was approved by the First Committee the same day by a roll-call vote of 99 to 1, with 5 abstentions, and adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December by a roll-call vote of 119 to none, with 8 abstentions, as resolution 41/88 C. By the resolution, the Assembly, *inter alia*, appealed once again to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to exclude South Africa from participation in their meetings at the earliest possible date.

At the request of Brazil,²¹ the General Assembly included in its agenda a new item entitled "Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic". At a plenary meeting on 27 October, Brazil introduced a draft resolution entitled "Declaration of a Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic", which was sponsored by a group of mainly African and Latin American States. The same day the Assembly adopted the draft by a recorded vote of 124 to 1 (United States), with 8 abstentions, as resolution 41/11. By the resolution, the Assembly declared the South Atlantic a zone of peace and co-operation; and called upon the regional States to promote co-operation among themselves; upon all other States, particularly the militarily significant ones, to respect the zone, especially through the reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence there; and upon all States to co-operate to eliminate all sources of tension in the zone. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its forty-second session a report on the implementation of the Declaration, taking into account the views expressed by Member States.

²⁰ Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

²¹ A/41/143.

Conclusion

The question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general and in various regions of the world continued to be discussed at length during the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament and at the forty-first session of the General Assembly. Many States expressed their support for the concept and specific zonal proposals, especially in regions of particular concern to them. The concept was stressed in the context of regional disarmament measures and the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

In the debate during the year, several delegations restated their views on the prerequisites for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, underlining the need for consensus among the countries concerned and their participation on the basis of agreements freely entered into and in keeping with internationally recognized principles. It was also pointed out that verification was an essential element of such arrangements and that the nuclear-weapon Powers, especially the two super-Powers, should guarantee the denuclearized status of the zones.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, signed in 1985, was widely supported not only by the States of the region, but also by some outside it. While the denuclearization of Africa and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East received general support, a number of States expressed their concern about the alleged nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel, which they considered the main obstacle to the creation of zones in those regions.

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Introduction

THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON THE PEACEFUL USES of nuclear energy both inside and outside the United Nations has focused on two main themes: (a) the link between the transfer of nuclear technology and the spread of nuclear weapons and (b) the benefits that can result from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The supplier countries have emphasized the linkage aspect and advocated strict policies on transfers of nuclear technology with a view to preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful endeavours. The recipient countries, which are mostly developing countries, have attached importance to unimpaired access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy for their economic, technological and scientific advancement. For several years, efforts have been made to bridge those divergent views on the question.

In 1977, 15 supplier countries¹ agreed on guidelines and principles to govern their nuclear exports. They adopted criteria for the application of IAEA safeguards on exports and required assurances against unauthorized applications, including restrictions on re-export.² In February 1980, the Conference on the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), initiated by the United States, completed a technical evaluation of data and options regarding less-proliferation-prone nuclear fuel cycles. Sixty-six States took part in the evaluation. In June 1980, following the INFCE evaluation and in response to the need for adequate supplies of fuel and related services, the IAEA Board of Governors established the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). CAS, which is open to all IAEA members, advises the Board on ways to ensure long-term availability of such supplies and services in accordance with non-proliferation considerations and IAEA's role.

In response, the recipient countries have sought to develop mutual assistance, self-reliance and co-ordinated action on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the United Nations and in other international organizations, particularly IAEA. In 1980 they proposed that an international conference be con-

¹ Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland (non-Member of the United Nations), USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. IX, for a detailed outline of the guidelines.

vened to promote co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. By resolution 35/112, the General Assembly decided to hold the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) and to establish a preparatory committee for the Conference. As of the end of 1985, the Preparatory Committee had held one organizational session and five substantive sessions. At its 1985 session,³ some further progress was made in the preparations for the Conference, including a decision on a revised time-frame—23 March to 10 April 1987.

IAEA has convened international conferences to discuss aspects of nuclear power. In 1982, it organized the Conference on Nuclear Power Experience, in Vienna, and in 1983, the International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management, in Seattle. Two further significant developments in the field took place in 1985. A safeguards agreement between the Soviet Union and IAEA went into effect and the first inspection under that agreement was carried out, and China announced its intention to place some of its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Work of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference, 1986

The Preparatory Committee, composed of 66 States,⁴ held its seventh and final session at Vienna from 10 to 21 November.⁵

In his statement at the opening meeting, the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Novak Pribicevic of Yugoslavia, noted that recent events and activities had led to greater understanding of the objectives of the forthcoming Conference and a more active interest on all sides to ensure its success. The accident at Chernobyl (see page 216) had drawn world attention to the urgent need for international co-operation to reduce the recurrence of such mishaps and secure safer development of nuclear energy for the future. In that connection, he referred to two aspects of international co-operation in nuclear safety: one, of a post-accident remedial nature, which was related to mitigating the consequences of an accident, and the other, of a long-term and comprehensive nature, which was related to the safe development of nuclear energy and included co-operation in such areas as infrastructure, manpower training,

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/40/47)* for the report of the sixth session of the Preparatory Committee.

⁴ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/41/47)* for the report of the seventh session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference.

research and development, technical and scientific information, technological know-how and advances in safety mechanisms. It was the international community's responsibility to co-operate in both those aspects, with IAEA playing the central role. The Chairman recalled that the major Western industrial nations, at their economic summit in Tokyo in May, had recognized that nuclear power was and would continue to be increasingly widely used as a source of energy. The Soviet Union shared that view and had suggested setting up an international régime for the safe development of nuclear power.⁶ For its part, the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare in September, had stressed in its Declaration the importance of international co-operation in the nuclear field.⁷ The heads of State had also underlined the role of UNCPICPUNE in facilitating the development of national programmes in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for social and economic development, and they had urged the non-aligned and other developing countries to participate actively in the preparations for the United Nations Conference to ensure its success. The Chairman observed that UNCPICPUNE provided a unique opportunity for the widest possible participation in a debate that was taking place at a very special moment for the future peaceful and safe development of nuclear energy in all parts of the world.

At the same meeting, the Preparatory Committee was informed that the inter-sessional intergovernmental Working Group, established the previous year to prepare the concluding documents of the Conference, had been unable, at its last session, to approve a report to the Committee. Nevertheless, it had made progress on the question of topics to be discussed in Committee II of the Conference, dealing with practices and experiences in legal, administrative and regulatory aspects of nuclear energy. It had also agreed on procedures for the work of that Committee and on an outline of the output document of the Conference. In addition, it had carried out a preliminary discussion on constraints to the introduction and development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, principles universally acceptable for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and recommendations on appropriate ways and means of promoting such co-operation. The Chairman felt that it was up to the Preparatory Committee itself to continue the remaining work of the Working Group. The Committee subsequently decided to establish for that purpose an open-ended contact group of members of the Committee under the guidance of the Chairman.

The Preparatory Committee developed four working papers based on the deliberations and conclusions of the Contact Group and agreed to forward them to the Conference for its consideration. It was understood that countries might wish to present reports on particular topics to support the discussion in Committee II. The Preparatory Committee stressed that all decisions on those matters rested with the Conference. At its closing meeting, the Committee decided that the papers submitted to it which had either not been

⁶ A/41/652.

⁷ A/41/697-S/18392, sect. I.

discussed or on which discussion had been inconclusive should also be forwarded to the Conference.

Special session of the General Conference of IAEA, 1986⁸

On 26 April, a serious accident occurred in unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Soviet Union, resulting in loss of life, injury and considerable radioactive releases.

Following urgent consideration by IAEA's Board of Governors, the Agency engaged in extensive activities in response to the accident, including the elaboration of proposals for expanded international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiological protection. It convened a group of governmental experts from 21 July to 15 August to prepare drafts of two international conventions: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. This was followed by a post-accident review meeting from 25 to 29 August, at which about 600 experts from 62 countries and 21 international organizations discussed a comprehensive report presented by the Soviet delegation.

From 24 to 26 September, the Agency's General Conference held a special session, which was attended by delegates from 94 countries—20 countries being represented at the ministerial level—and 27 national and international organizations. After consideration of the role of nuclear energy and measures related to nuclear safety and radiological protection, the two above-mentioned Conventions were adopted and immediately signed by more than 50 States. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident entered into force on 27 October.

Regular session of the General Conference of IAEA, 1986⁸

The thirtieth regular session of the General Conference of IAEA took place in Vienna from 29 September to 3 October, with 102 of the 113 member States participating.

The discussion in the general debate focused on nuclear power, technical co-operation and nuclear safety.

Several delegations emphasized that the safety and viability of nuclear power had been questioned after the Chernobyl accident and a serious reappraisal was needed in order to regain public confidence. Others pointed to the fact that nuclear power plants in most countries showed a steadily improving performance, thus bearing witness to the maturity of the technology.

With regard to nuclear power in developing countries, there remained the problem of high initial investment. In response to requests made during the Third Review Conference of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and the

⁸ The text for this section was contributed by IAEA.

1985 General Conference of IAEA, a senior expert group was established to advise the Agency on mechanisms to assist developing countries in promoting and financing nuclear power programmes. Many developing countries expressed satisfaction concerning the work of the Senior Expert Group. Recognizing the problems faced by developing countries, the Group proposed defining constraints on introducing nuclear power in such a way as to take into account individual country profiles. That task was carried out in co-operation with the World Bank, and joint missions were undertaken to assist a number of countries in assessing their future energy and electric power needs and the role which nuclear power could play.

As for IAEA's technical co-operation activities, there was consensus among the member States that the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, which was financed from voluntary contributions, should be increased by 12 per cent annually for the next three years. Member States expressed general support for the Agency's programme. Many developing nations pointed out the need to establish the necessary infrastructure in their countries, particularly the training of technicians and operators for nuclear installations.

The Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific (RCA) met with support, and many countries expressed the hope that its activities would expand further. Support was also expressed for the Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Advancement of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL).

In the light of the Chernobyl accident, expanded nuclear safety activities for 1987 and 1988 were generally endorsed by IAEA member States in the following specific areas: safety of nuclear installations, radiation protection, human health, radioactive waste management, nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle. All speakers commended the Agency for its speed and effectiveness in working out an expanded programme. Most agreed that the Board of Governors should give additional consideration to the subject in order to achieve well-focused programmes with priorities accorded to key areas of operational safety and radiation protection.

All States recognized the importance of IAEA's safeguards activities. They felt, however, that there was room for improvement, in particular in the areas of increasing the effectiveness of safeguards through practical methods and in rationalizing the system itself.

Among the resolutions considered by the General Conference was one on South Africa's nuclear capabilities. By that resolution—introduced by Tunisia on behalf of the African Group—the General Conference, *inter alia*, requested the Board of Governors to consider, in accordance with article XIX.B of the Statute, recommending the suspension of South Africa from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership at the next session of the General Conference if, by that time, it had not complied with the relevant General Conference resolutions and conducted itself in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It also requested the Director General to bring the resolution to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The General Conference adopted resolution

GC(XXX)/RES/468 by a vote of 66 to 26, with 3 abstentions. While wholly rejecting the system of *apartheid*, some delegations voted against the resolution because they felt that it would set a precedent for the suspension of membership rights for political motives. Others explained that they had cast a negative vote in order to uphold the principle of universality.

A draft resolution was tabled entitled "The Israeli nuclear threat" By it, the General Conference would, *inter alia*, express its alarm at the unsafe-guarded nuclear facilities in Israel; demand that Israel submit forthwith all its nuclear facilities and installations to IAEA safeguards; and also call upon States to discontinue co-operating with and giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear field as long as Israel did not comply with the provisions of the resolution. After some voting on procedural questions, the entire debate on the issue was adjourned.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

At its forty-first session, the General Assembly had on its agenda two items on the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency"⁹ and "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy"¹⁰ Both items were discussed mainly in plenary meetings, but also in the First Committee.¹¹

In presenting the Agency's report for 1985, the Director General of IAEA, Mr. Hans Blix, first drew attention to events which had taken place in 1986 and were, therefore, not covered in the report. He pointed out that until the accident at Chernobyl, the nuclear industry could point to some 4000 power reactor years without a single death due to radiation or any major environmental contamination. The Chernobyl accident had prompted important new activities and developments in the field of nuclear safety and had raised public questions concerning the role of nuclear power. Mr. Blix noted that the Soviet Union had taken comprehensive measures to stop radioactive releases, to give medical care and to protect and decontaminate the environment. Other European countries had taken a variety of protective measures and a series of actions had been initiated at IAEA.

The Director General stated that following his visit to the Soviet Union, at its invitation, shortly after the accident, the IAEA Board of Governors decided on the actions to be undertaken immediately by the Agency. In July and August, it convened the above-mentioned governmental expert group to draft two agreements to improve international co-operation in the event of a nuclear accident. In August, it convened a post-accident review meeting in Vienna. In September, it held the first special session of its General Confer-

⁹ *The Annual Report for 1985* (GC(XXX)/755).

¹⁰ See footnote 5.

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 65th and 66th and 101st meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 32nd meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

ence, at which two Conventions, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, were opened for signature.

Some 60 States had already signed the two international Conventions, Mr. Blix noted. By the first, which was already in force, the parties undertook, under article 1, to report immediately any nuclear accident which might "result in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance". Under that agreement, the Soviet Union had immediately notified IAEA about a recent accident involving its nuclear submarine in the Atlantic. By the second, the parties undertook to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency in order to minimize the consequences and to protect life, property and the environment.

Mr. Blix held that the post-accident review meeting proved of great value in that the international expert analysis was able not only to explain the causes of the Chernobyl accident, but also to reach more precise conclusions concerning its real dimensions. There had been exaggerated early reports on casualties; in fact, some 30 persons had died of radiation. The contamination resulting from the accident would make a substantial area of land and forest around the plant uninhabitable for some time, perhaps for several years, but certain areas had already been decontaminated. There had been significant contamination of animal grazing areas in some regions, such as parts of Scandinavia. As a result of a consensus report prepared by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), a considerably expanded nuclear safety programme was to be considered by IAEA's Board of Governors in December 1986 and would commence in 1987.

Mr. Blix further noted that the consensus on certain basic policy questions that had been reached at the first special session of the IAEA General Conference had been significant, namely, that nuclear power would continue to be an important source of energy for social and economic development; that each country was responsible for securing the highest level of safety; that there was scope for further international co-operation in nuclear safety; and that IAEA had the central role in encouraging and facilitating such co-operation.

In commenting on the fundamental question which had been frequently raised in 1986—whether nuclear power entailed unacceptable risks—Mr. Blix maintained that the risks of nuclear electricity generation to health and the environment had remained precisely that—risks, while the daily and normal use of coal and oil to generate electricity had had the most serious environmental consequences. He observed that the major concern with coal was not accidents, but rather the environmental consequences of burning huge quantities of it. Through the emission of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide or carbon dioxide, burning coal damaged forests and lakes and contributed to a change of the global climate. He pointed out that if the amount of electricity generated by nuclear power, currently 15 per cent of the world's total production, were to be generated by oil, it would take something like the entire 1982 Saudi Arabian oil production to achieve it. Were it to be generated by coal, it would require the annual coal production of the United States. He concluded that

nuclear power was needed until some other alternative could provide large quantities of electricity at reasonable cost.

In underlining the importance of establishing an international nuclear safety régime, Mr. Blix drew attention to the question of uniform safety norms. The subject was complicated, he explained, by the fact that nuclear reactors differed from each other and their siting conditions varied. He noted that both the Three Mile Island accident, which took place in March 1979 in the United States, and the Chernobyl accident were caused in large part by operator error. Awareness of that fact had focused attention on designing features to neutralize such errors. The Director General declared that the period following the Chernobyl accident had seen international co-operation in the nuclear field at its best.

Turning to the report of IAEA, the Director General cautioned that the Agency's activities in nuclear safety in 1986 should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that other areas of work had been de-emphasized. Regarding nuclear power, Mr. Blix stated that the world's total electricity generated by nuclear power in 1985 had increased by 14 per cent, accounting for between 40 and 70 per cent of the electricity in a growing number of countries or in large industrialized regions. Better maintenance, management and operator training accounted for the improved performance of nuclear plants in most countries.

In reviewing IAEA's safeguards system, Mr. Blix referred to it as a unique experience in international on-site verification, which might serve as a model for the design of verification measures in future arms control agreements. During 1985, about 2,000 inspections had been carried out at over 500 nuclear facilities all over the world and, as in previous years, no anomaly had been detected which would indicate the diversion of safeguarded nuclear material for military purposes. The Director General also noted that IAEA had concluded a first full-scope safeguards agreement with a State not party to the non-proliferation Treaty—Albania. In addition, an IAEA team had gone to Beijing, in accordance with China's decision to submit certain of its peaceful nuclear activities to Agency safeguards. Mr. Blix pointed out that although there had been some increased safeguards activity in nuclear-weapon States, the increase had been very limited so far, due to financial restraints.

On the question of South Africa, Mr. Blix reported that the situation concerning the application of full-scope safeguards to all of that country's nuclear facilities had remained unchanged and that no response had yet been received to his requests for the initiation of discussion. Furthermore, the negotiations with South Africa on the application of safeguards to its semi-commercial enrichment plant were at an impasse. As for Israel, the Conference had decided at the conclusion of its discussion of the item to adjourn the debate on the question and no resolution had been adopted.

Mr. Blix ended his statement by presenting a number of conclusions borne out by experience. First, if nuclear power and other applications of nuclear energy were to continue to be used to contribute to human well-being and prosperity, all scenarios which might affect its safe and peaceful use—diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes, armed attacks against

nuclear installations, nuclear terrorism and serious nuclear accidents—should be scrutinized in a comprehensive manner. Secondly, international rules and regulations must not lag behind the leaps made by science and technology. In that connection, he felt gratified because notification procedures for nuclear accidents with possible transboundary effects had been adopted. Thirdly, despite criticisms directed against the United Nations and its system of organizations, international organizations continued to perform an indispensable role in the turbulent world. Fourthly, in the computer, space and nuclear age, co-operation between nations was an absolute necessity to reduce the risks of modern technologies. Above all, that co-operation was required to avert the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. He called on the international community to redouble its efforts to ensure non-proliferation, to end the nuclear-arms race and to work towards disarmament.

During the debate in two plenary meetings of the General Assembly, many delegations, including Austria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, the United Kingdom, speaking for the 12 member States of the European Community, the United States and the Ukrainian SSR commended IAEA for its speedy response to the Chernobyl accident and for the swift elaboration of the two Conventions.

The Ukrainian SSR reported that the first reactor at Chernobyl had been started up again and that work was proceeding on recommissioning the second, that protective shielding had been built for the destroyed fourth block, and that decontamination of the area was continuing. Furthermore, it was paying great attention to the housing and living conditions of the displaced population that was evacuated. In welcoming the measures adopted by IAEA, it noted that the accident had not destroyed prospects for nuclear energy. On the contrary, by focusing attention on the need for greater security, it had highlighted the importance of safety as the only way of guaranteeing reliable energy resources in the future.

In the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, there was considerable discussion of the question of nuclear safety. In Canada's view, the developments at Chernobyl had underlined the fundamental importance of the nuclear safety and radiological protection activities of the Agency. When the accident revealed the urgent need for international agreements on safety standards and early notification, the Agency rose to the challenge and provided the world with the negotiating mechanism that made such agreements possible. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, believed that INSAG's recommendations could play an important role in enhancing nuclear safety. The Soviet Union shared the view that it was necessary to give prompt warning about nuclear incidents, including those which might be linked with military installations and nuclear testing.

China attached great importance to international co-operation for nuclear power safety. Austria called on the international community to address itself to fundamental concerns, such as harmonization of safety standards. A number of delegations, including the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland and the Soviet Union, in expressing concern regarding the safety of nuclear power installations, advocated the drafting of an international

convention prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities.

Bulgaria and Hungary stated that in developing their nuclear power generating capacity, they had paid special attention to the problems of nuclear safety and radiation protection and had co-operated most actively with IAEA in that respect. Poland was of the view that international recommendations should be drawn up to improve the safety standards of nuclear facilities, to establish internationally acceptable intervention levels of radiation doses and derived intervention levels of radionuclides in the environment and in food-stuffs, to articulate the responsibility of States for the damage caused by nuclear accidents, to construct a new generation of safer reactors and to protect nuclear facilities from terrorism.

Argentina and Austria both welcomed the conclusion of the two new Conventions negotiated at the special session of IAEA's General Conference and, at the same time, expressed some reservations on them. Argentina believed that the Conventions represented significant progress in the nuclear field, but it would have preferred them to refer to accidents involving nuclear weapons. Regarding the agreement on early notification of nuclear accidents, Austria felt that the obligation of the State where a nuclear accident occurred to notify other countries threatened by radioactive releases transgressing national boundaries should have been spelt out more clearly and objectively. On the Convention on assistance in the case of nuclear accidents, it raised the question of international liability and compensation for damages suffered because of nuclear accidents that occurred on foreign territory.

The United States pointed out that the Conventions were significant not only for their practical application, but for the fact that they had emerged from a spirit of compromise and co-operation. In that regard, it also referred to the constructive spirit evidenced at the ensuing meetings on nuclear safety. It believed that IAEA must continue to be the principal international institution in which all States could join together to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Denmark, speaking on behalf of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, stated that those countries strongly supported the two new Conventions and appealed to those States which had not already done so to accede to them. In the Nordic countries' view, more work should be done to develop further, or establish new, international guidelines for safety in the design, siting, construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear installations. In stressing the need for maintaining the highest standards, the Nordic countries asserted that concern for national sovereignty should not be allowed to hamper efforts to strengthen safety, which was in the interest of all countries. Denmark announced the formalization of Nordic co-operation in nuclear safety and suggested that similar arrangements could probably be applied in relations between other neighbouring countries.

Australia, in underlining the importance of IAEA's safeguards activities, reiterated its concern that some non-nuclear-weapon States still refused to accept the fact that IAEA's safeguards inspections in no way compromised indigenous nuclear technology for peaceful applications. Those countries continued to decline to submit their peaceful nuclear facilities, many of them

sensitive fuel cycle facilities, to IAEA safeguards. Canada declared its commitment to the Agency's safeguards operations. Denmark stated that the Nordic countries attached crucial importance to IAEA's safeguards system. They held the view, also shared by Egypt, India, Mexico, and the United Kingdom, that the Agency's safeguards activities should gradually be expanded until they applied to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States.

The United Kingdom expressed the view of the Twelve that international confidence in IAEA's safeguards system was a necessary pre-condition for the interchange of nuclear techniques and trade. They recognized that continuous research and development activities to improve safeguard techniques and the geographical extension of the safeguards inspection coverage were essential to further the efficiency and effectiveness of the system as a whole.

The Byelorussian SSR hoped that additional methods would be adopted—especially among those countries which had not signed the non-proliferation Treaty—to raise the level of inspection activities and the effectiveness of the safeguards system in the nuclear threshold countries. In the same vein, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic called for full-scope IAEA safeguards in those countries which had not yet acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, especially those that had developed nuclear programmes. The Soviet Union stated that as part of its programme of scientific and technical support for IAEA's safeguards system, it had expanded its participation in the Agency's technical assistance activities to further enhance the effectiveness of its safeguards.

Egypt observed that in spite of the various programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the greater and most important part of nuclear application—particularly the nuclear generation of electricity—was still the preserve of the industrialized countries. On the other hand, Pakistan expressed appreciation of the fact that it, like many other developing countries, had greatly benefited from IAEA's co-operation, support and expertise in elaborating its nuclear power generation programme.

The Soviet Union was convinced that at the moment there was no alternative to nuclear power, which, it cautioned, should be developed in conditions of maximum safety for people and for the environment. At IAEA's latest regular session, it had put forward a programme for the establishment of an international régime for the safe development of nuclear power.¹² Among other things, it dealt with the establishment in the near future of a system for early notification of accidents and problems in nuclear power plants that posed a transboundary threat. The programme also provided for the drafting of a multilateral legal instrument on liability for nuclear damage and enhancement of IAEA's role in strengthening the system for the safe development of power.

Many delegations addressed the role of technical assistance and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mexico appreciated the increased participation of developing countries in the technical co-operation programme of IAEA. It believed that while the Agency's safeguards programme deserved recognition, it was also necessary to increase the amount

¹² A/41/652.

of resources devoted to technical co-operation and assistance. Canada stated that as a leader in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, it had always strongly supported the Agency in its technical assistance and co-operation activities and would continue to do so. The United Kingdom declared that the Twelve would also continue to support the Agency's programme in that area.

China stated that in its bilateral co-operation with other States in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, it would continue to abide strictly by its established policy of not encouraging or assisting other countries to develop nuclear weaponry.

Speaking in the First Committee, several countries, including Benin, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco and the Sudan, again voiced concern about the nuclear capabilities of Israel and South Africa and called upon all States to end any nuclear co-operation with those two countries. They also urged the two States to place all their nuclear facilities under international control. Israel denied that it collaborated with South Africa in the nuclear field (see chapter X.)

On 11 November, Pakistan, in its capacity as Chairman of the Board of Governors of IAEA and on behalf of Canada and Czechoslovakia, introduced a draft resolution entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency". The largely procedural draft followed the format and text of earlier General Assembly resolutions under the item, with some additions to reflect IAEA's recent activities in nuclear safety. By the draft, the Assembly would commend the Agency for its recent speedy responses and initiatives concerning nuclear safety and for its expeditious efforts in concluding the Convention on early notification of nuclear accidents and the Convention on emergency assistance. The Assembly would also welcome the signing by a significant number of States of the two Conventions and call on those States that had not yet done so to become parties to them as soon as possible.

Luxembourg, in an explanation in connection with the action on the draft in the Assembly, expressed reservations on the text's operative paragraph 4, as it was not in a position to sign the two Conventions at that time. It felt strongly about the lack of acknowledgement of responsibility on the part of producer States towards their non-producer neighbours and the lack of formal unequivocal stipulations concerning compensation in the event of catastrophe. It regretted that the problem of civil responsibility in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was not dealt with in the Convention. It deemed it essential that, in the near future, a convention be drafted under the aegis of IAEA to settle that problem at the international level. Until then it would not be able to sign the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

On 11 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 41/36. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1985,

Taking note of the statement of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 11 November 1986, which provides additional information on the main developments in the Agency's activities during 1986,

Recognizing the importance of the work of the Agency to promote further the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in its statute,

Also recognizing the special needs of the developing countries for technical assistance by the Agency in order to benefit effectively from the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as well as from the contribution of nuclear energy to their economic development,

Conscious of the importance of the work of the Agency in the implementation of safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to achieve similar objectives, as well as in ensuring, as far as it is able, that the assistance provided by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purposes, as stated in article II of its statute,

Recognizing the importance of the work of the Agency on nuclear power, nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management, including its work directed towards assisting developing countries in planning for the introduction of nuclear power in accordance with their needs,

Emphasizing the need for the highest standards of safety in the design and operation of nuclear plants so as to minimize risks to life and health,

Commending the International Atomic Energy Agency for its recent speedy responses and initiatives in the field of nuclear safety, in co-operation with its member States and with other international organizations concerned, and for its timely and expeditious efforts in the conclusion of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

Bearing in mind resolutions GC(SPL.I)/RES/1 and GC(SPL.I)/RES/2 adopted on 26 September 1986 by the General Conference of the Agency at its first special session, and resolution GC(XXX)/RES/468 adopted on 3 October 1986 by the General Conference at its thirtieth regular session,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
2. *Affirms* its confidence in the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
3. *Urges* all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, pursuant to its statute; in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to health; in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system;
4. *Welcomes* the signing by a significant number of States of the two Conventions regarding nuclear accidents referred to above and calls upon those States that have not yet done so to become parties to them as soon as possible;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the records of the forty-first session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities.

Two draft resolutions entitled "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" were submitted in a plenary meeting under the agenda item with the same title.

The first draft was submitted on 26 November by Australia, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. On 11 December, Yugoslavia introduced a revised version. The revision, it explained, was the result of consultations and negotiations carried out by its original sponsors, Australia on behalf of the

Western States, Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Eastern European States, and Yugoslavia on behalf of the non-aligned. During the discussions, it had been proposed that the draft text be made procedural so that it could be adopted by consensus, as corresponding resolutions had been in the past. Following revision, however, Australia and a number of other Member States could no longer sponsor the draft resolution. It had then been decided that the most practical solution to the question of sponsorship would be for Yugoslavia to submit the resolution on its own behalf. Yugoslavia pointed out that even after Australia had withdrawn its own sponsorship, it had continued to participate actively in the elaboration of the revised text and had made a significant contribution to its successful completion.

In the meantime, on 1 December, Austria submitted an amendment to the original draft resolution. On 11 December, however, it withdrew it on the understanding that the General Assembly would act on an Austrian initiative on the same subject, in addition to acting on the revised draft text.

The second draft resolution was submitted on 9 December by Austria. In introducing it on 11 December, Austria noted that the importance of UNC-PICPUNE had even increased as a result of the events of 1986 and the experience gained in the aftermath of nuclear accidents. In its view, it was essential that the international community face the risks and challenges arising from the use of nuclear power for energy production. It was therefore very satisfied at the efficient manner in which IAEA was dealing with the matter and hoped to see the Agency continue to play a central role. By the draft, the General Assembly would appeal to Governments to ensure that the highest standards of safety in the design and operation of nuclear plants were applied to minimize, if not eliminate, risks to life and health. It would also call on all Governments to consider, during the discussion of energy matters at the 1987 Conference, the legitimate interests of neighbouring countries that could be affected by transboundary effects of nuclear energy.

Both drafts were adopted by the General Assembly at the same plenary meeting, on 11 December. The Yugoslavian draft was adopted by consensus, the Austrian draft, by a recorded vote (see below). In connection with the vote, a number of States explained their positions.

Among the delegations voting in favour of the draft introduced by Austria, Norway emphasized the importance that it placed on increasing the safety of nuclear installations and intensifying international co-operation in the field. In the light of the special role of IAEA regarding nuclear safety and radiation protection, it would have preferred a single procedural draft resolution under the agenda item, a view that Canada shared. Canada felt that the discussion of nuclear safety at the Conference must not in any way detract from IAEA's work in that field and should complement it. Canada understood that the final operative paragraph reflected the recognition that the Conference must report to the forty-second session of the Assembly and did not suggest the establishment of a longer-term post-Conference machinery.

Among those delegations that abstained in the vote on the draft introduced by Austria, Algeria, Australia, France and the Netherlands explained that they would have preferred a single draft resolution of a procedural nature on

the item. Algeria felt that the submission of the second draft tended to undermine the significance of the consensus on the draft introduced by Yugoslavia. Australia considered a separate resolution inappropriate, because the matter of nuclear safety was already on the draft agenda for UNCPICPUNE in 1987. Belgium felt that the draft's general terms could cast doubt on the safety of the use of nuclear energy, to which it attached great importance. In view of the good work done by IAEA, the Federal Republic of Germany found it difficult to understand why it should be necessary again to emphasize, in a separate resolution, a point that the Assembly had already adopted by consensus under the agenda item on the report of IAEA. France believed that questions of safety had been amply taken into account in the agenda for the 1987 Conference. Mexico abstained because it felt that the draft introduced elements that could raise doubts concerning the agreement that had prevailed on the item since the Assembly had begun considering it. The Netherlands held that a parallel draft, in emphasizing the safety aspects of the production of nuclear energy, prejudged in a selective manner the work of the Conference. The United Kingdom was of the view that Austria's proposal was drafted in general terms that could lead to misunderstanding about the future of nuclear energy. It regretted that a contentious draft resolution had been introduced into what could, and should, have been an uncontroversial debate.

The draft introduced by Yugoslavia was adopted as resolution 41/212 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the principles and provisions of its resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977,

Recalling its subsequent resolutions 33/4 of 2 November 1978, 34/63 of 29 November 1979, 35/112 of 5 December 1980, 36/78 of 9 December 1981, 37/167 of 17 December 1982, 38/60 of 14 December 1983, 39/74 of 13 December 1984 and 40/95 of 12 December 1985,

Noting with satisfaction that the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy has successfully concluded its work related to the preparations for the Conference,

Recalling that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, to be held from 23 March to 10 April 1987 at Geneva, represents a global effort under the auspices of the United Nations specifically for the purpose of promoting international co-operation in this field for economic and social development,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy on its seventh and final session;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Chairman and the members of the Preparatory Committee for the time and effort devoted to the preparation for the Conference;

3. *Invites* all States to participate in the Conference at an appropriately high level;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy"

The draft resolution introduced by Austria was adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to none, with 28 abstentions, as resolution 41/212 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Aware of the intensification of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in order to ensure safer development of nuclear energy for the future,

Bearing in mind that the need to improve the safety of nuclear energy and the need for intensified international co-operation are in the forefront of public opinion,

Aware of the central role that the International Atomic Energy Agency is being given in this context,

Realizing that effects and consequences of possible nuclear accidents are of equal concern to all States, including those which may not be carrying out any nuclear activity on their territory,

Bearing in mind its resolution 41/36 of 11 November 1986 on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Convinced that it is in the interest of the international community that safety aspects be considered whenever nuclear energy is being discussed,

1. *Appeals* to all Governments to ensure that the highest standards of safety in the design and operation of nuclear plants are applied in order to minimize risks to life and health;

2. *Further appeals* to all Governments to take into account, when discussing nuclear energy matters during the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the legitimate interests of neighbouring countries that could be affected by transboundary effects of the use of nuclear energy.

Conclusion

Preparations for convening the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, to be held in March and April 1987, were successfully concluded in 1986.

A nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl, in the Soviet Union, in April 1986 led to new activities in nuclear safety, notably to the swift elaboration and adoption at a special session of IAEA's General Conference of two international conventions, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

In 1986, a first full-scope safeguards agreement was concluded between IAEA and a State not party to the non-proliferation Treaty—Albania.

In the General Assembly, the Chernobyl accident contributed to the submission of two proposals on UNCPICPUNE. The second text, proposed by Austria, focused on nuclear safety and was voted on, while the procedural draft introduced by Yugoslavia was adopted by consensus.

IAEA safeguards and related activities

Introduction

THIS CHAPTER HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE International Atomic Energy Agency. It deals primarily with safeguards and related activities of the Agency during 1986 and describes the situation as of the end of the year. IAEA safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials and other equipment or information for military and other prohibited activities have been evolving almost since the Agency's establishment in 1956, and thus their methodology has been described briefly in earlier editions of *The Yearbook*.¹

Status of safeguards

A. Safeguards agreements pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty²

As of 31 December 1986, non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements had entered into force for 78 of ~~131~~¹³³ non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty at that time. The non-nuclear-weapon States having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty are shown in annex I to this chapter.³ For 53 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the relevant safeguards agreements had not entered into force at the end of 1986.

B. Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States

During 1986 safeguards continued to be applied to some of the peaceful nuclear activities in four nuclear-weapon States pursuant either to voluntary-offer agreements or to safeguards transfer agreements.

At the IAEA General Conference in September 1985, China announced that it would be ready to place some of its civilian nuclear installations under

¹ See, for instance, *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. XI, or vol. 5: 1980, chap. XII.

² Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

³ A reference to a party in this chapter, including its footnotes and annexes, does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the secretariat of IAEA or of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or of its authorities or of its designation or concerning the limitation of its frontiers.

IAEA safeguards. Negotiations have commenced for the conclusion of a voluntary-offer agreement.

C. Safeguards agreements pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco⁴

The terms of the safeguards agreements negotiated so far under the Treaty of Tlatelolco are practically identical to those of the non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements, with some variations to take account of the different provisions of the two Treaties. Three States (Colombia, Mexico and Panama) have negotiated safeguards agreements with the Agency pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Mexico's agreement had entered into force but was suspended upon the subsequent conclusion of an agreement in connection with both the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The agreements with Colombia and Panama, which entered into force in 1982 and 1984 respectively, are still being applied, although these States have also become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. A new agreement with Colombia, based on both Treaties, has been proposed. A new agreement for Panama awaits ratification.

D. Safeguards agreements other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty and/or the Treaty of Tlatelolco

By the end of 1986, safeguards agreements were in force for 9 non-nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain. Viet Nam and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, but since the safeguards agreements pursuant to that Treaty had not been concluded by 31 December, safeguards were being applied in both States under previously concluded agreements.

A safeguards agreement was concluded with Albania covering all nuclear material and facilities.

For a complete list of the status of agreements other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty as of 31 December 1986, see annex II of this chapter.

E. Safeguards agreements pursuant to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

The parties to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, in force as of 11 December 1986, undertake to conclude with the Agency safeguards agreements along the lines of INFCIRC/153 to cover all their peaceful nuclear

⁴ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 1967. United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068.

activities.

Related activities

A. *International plutonium storage*

The concept of international plutonium storage was incorporated into the statute of the Agency in 1957 under article XII.A.5. Its aim is the international physical control of plutonium in separated form after reprocessing and before use.

In December 1978, an expert group on international plutonium storage was established, consisting of experts from 37 States members of the Agency. In late 1982, the Expert Group presented its technical report to the Director General of the Agency. The Expert Group did not reach consensus on a concept for international plutonium storage implemented under the provisions of the Agency's statute. The report of the Expert Group was submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors in 1983. Consultations were held in 1984 and 1985. In 1986 some Board Members asked the Director General for an update of the plutonium data base used for the report.

B. *Physical protection of nuclear material*

In response to growing recognition of the need for physical protection against theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups, the Agency in 1972 published recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear materials in use, storage or transit. That publication, subsequently revised in 1977, has been widely used by member States as a guide for establishing their national systems of physical protection of potentially hazardous nuclear material. While physical protection is not part of the Agency's safeguards systems, it is recognized that the national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material and of containment and surveillance measures, as required for safeguards purposes, are also relevant to the national systems of physical protection.

In order to further enhance co-operation among States in the area of the physical protection of nuclear material, the Agency provided a forum for negotiation of an international agreement on the subject between governmental representatives. That task was completed on 28 October 1979 with the adoption of the text of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Convention aims at ensuring that the prescribed levels of protection are applied to potentially hazardous nuclear materials during international transport. It also provides for establishment by States parties of criminal jurisdiction over certain offences involving nuclear material and for extradition of criminals committing such offences. The Convention was opened for signature on 3 March 1980 and has since been signed by 45 States and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); it had been ratified by 20 States by the end of 1986. The Convention will enter into force

after 21 instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval are deposited with the Director General of the Agency.

C. Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS)

In June 1980, the Board of Governors decided to establish the Committee on Assurances of Supply. Its mandate is to consider and advise the Board on:

(a) Ways and means by which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services could be assured on a more predictable and long-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation;

(b) The Agency's role and responsibilities in relation thereto.⁵

At its fourth session, in November 1981, the Committee established two working groups to carry forward its work on two subjects between sessions. At its seventh session, in January 1983, the Committee established a further working group. The mandates of the Working Groups were as follows:

Working Group 1: to consider the possible formulation of draft principles of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy in accordance with the mandate of the Committee;

Working Group 2: to consider further the concepts of emergency and back-up mechanisms;

Working Group 3: to consider the question of mechanisms for revising international nuclear co-operation agreements.

In 1984, CAS also considered the existing practical, technical and administrative problems involved in international shipments of nuclear materials and equipment and felt that there was a need for Governments to give consideration to reducing administrative burdens and practical problems in that area.

CAS concluded its discussion on emergency and back-up mechanisms and on revision mechanisms, and the conclusions were referred to the Board of Governors.

During 1985 and 1986, CAS continued its consideration of principles of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy and further narrowed down the areas where the views of member States diverged. However, the goal of an agreed set of principles has eluded the Committee, and it was therefore agreed at CAS's twentieth session, in November 1986, to assess the Committee's current situation and future prospects at its next session, in May 1987.

Conclusion

The Agency applies safeguards to a large number of States which are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to a number of States which have unilateral submission agreements with the Agency. The

⁵ IAEA documents GOV/1997 and GOV/OR.553.

large majority of nuclear facilities in the non-nuclear-weapon States, as indicated in the annexes below, are under non-proliferation Treaty safeguards, and most others, including complex and sophisticated facilities, are under separate safeguards agreements negotiated between the member States concerned. It must be noted, however, that the number of unsafeguarded facilities is growing.

ANNEX I

Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty

The following 78 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have concluded safeguards agreements—now in force—pursuant to the Treaty.*

Afghanistan	Holy See	Netherlands
Australia	Honduras	New Zealand
Austria	Hungary	Nicaragua
Bangladesh	Iceland	Norway
Belgium	Indonesia	Papua New Guinea
Bulgaria	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Paraguay
Canada	Iraq	Peru
Costa Rica	Ireland	Philippines
Côte d'Ivoire	Italy	Poland
Cyprus	Jamaica	Portugal
Czechoslovakia	Japan	Republic of Korea
Denmark	Jordan	Romania
Dominican Republic	Lebanon	Samoa
Ecuador	Lesotho	Senegal
Egypt	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Singapore
El Salvador	Liechtenstein	Sri Lanka
Ethiopia	Luxembourg	Sudan
Fiji	Madagascar	Suriname
Finland	Malaysia	Swaziland
Gambia	Maldives	Sweden
German Democratic Republic	Mauritius	Switzerland
Germany, Federal Republic of	Mexico	Thailand
Ghana	Mongolia	Turkey
Greece	Morocco	Uruguay
Guatemala	Nauru	Venezuela
	Nepal	Yugoslavia
		Zaire

* In 37 cases, no safeguards are applied because the State concerned does not yet have any significant nuclear activities. Full application will begin as soon as the State concerned acquires nuclear material or a plant requiring the application of safeguards.

ANNEX II

Agreements providing for safeguards, other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty, approved by the Board as of 31 December 1986

(While the Agency is a party to each of the following agreements, the list mentions only the State(s) party(ies) to them.)

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
<i>(a) Project agreements</i>			
Argentina	Siemens SUR-100	13 March 1970	143
	RAEP Reactor	2 December 1964	62
Chile	Herald Reactor	19 December 1969	137
Finland ^b	FiR-I Reactor	30 December 1960	24
	FINN sub-critical assembly	30 July 1963	53
Greece ^b	GRR-I Reactor	1 March 1972	163
Indonesia ^b	Additional core load for TRIGA Reactor	19 December 1969	136
Iran (Islamic Republic of) ^b	UTRR Reactor	10 May 1967	97
Jamaica ^b	Fuel for research reactor	25 January 1984	315
Japan ^b	JRR-3	24 March 1959	3
Malaysia ^b /United States	TRIGA—II Reactor	22 September 1980	287
Mexico ^b	TRIGA—III Reactor	18 December 1963	52
	Siemens SUR-100	21 December 1971	162
	Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant	12 February 1974	203
Morocco ^b	Fuel for research reactor	2 December 1983	313
Pakistan	PRR Reactor	5 March 1962	34
	Booster rods for KANUPP	17 June 1968	116
Peru ^b	Research reactor and fuel therefor	9 May 1978	266
Philippines ^b	PRR-I Reactor	28 September 1966	88
Romania ^b	TRIGA Reactor	30 March 1973	206
	Experimental fuel elements	1 July 1983	307
Spain	Coral-I Reactor	23 June 1967	99
Thailand ^b /United States	Fuel for research reactor	30 September 1986	—
Turkey ^b	Sub-critical assembly	17 May 1974	212
Uruguay ^b	URR-ReactoR	24 September 1965	67
Venezuela ^b	RV-I Reactor	7 November 1975	238
Viet Nam ^c	Fuel for research reactor	1 July 1983	308
Yugoslavia ^b	TRIGA-II	4 October 1961	32
	Krsko Nuclear Power Plant	14 June 1974	213
Zaire ^b	TRICO Reactor	27 June 1962	37

<i>Party(ies)*</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
<i>(b) Unilateral submissions</i>			
Albania	All nuclear material and facilities	approved by Board, June 1986	—
Argentina	Atucha Power Reactor Facility	3 October 1972	168
	Nuclear material	23 October 1973	202
	Embalse Power Reactor Facility	6 December 1974	224
	Equipment and nuclear material	22 July 1977	250
	Nuclear material, material, equipment and facilities	22 July 1977	251
	Atucha II Nuclear Power Plant	15 July 1981	294
	Heavy water plant	14 October 1981	296
	Heavy water	14 October 1981	297
	Nuclear material	8 July 1982	303
Chile	Nuclear material	31 December 1974	256
	Nuclear material	22 September 1982	304
Cuba	Nuclear research reactor and fuel thereto	25 September 1980	298
	Nuclear power plant and nuclear material	5 May 1980	281
	Zero-power nuclear reactor and fuel therefor	7 October 1983	311
Democratic People's Republic of Korea .	Research reactor and nuclear material therefor	20 July 1977	252
India	Nuclear material, material and facilities	17 November 1977	260
Pakistan	Nuclear material	2 March 1977	248
Spain	Nuclear material	19 November 1974	218
	Nuclear material	18 June 1975	221
	Vandellos Nuclear Power Plant	11 May 1981	292
	Specified nuclear facilities	11 May 1981	291
United Kingdom	Nuclear material	14 December 1972	175
Viet Nam	Research reactor and fuel therefor	12 June 1981	293
<i>(c) Treaty of Tlatelolco</i>			
Colombia	All nuclear material	22 December 1982	306
Mexico ^a	All nuclear material, equipment and facilities	6 September 1968	118
Panama	All nuclear material	23 March 1984	316
<i>(d) Agreements concluded with nuclear-weapon States on the basis of voluntary offers</i>			
France	Nuclear material in facilities submitted to safeguards	12 September 1981	290

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
Soviet Union	Nuclear material in facilities selected from list of facilities designated by USSR	10 June 1985	327
United Kingdom	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	14 August 1978	263
United States	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	9 December 1980	288
<i>(e) Other agreements</i>			
Argentina/United States		25 July 1969	130
Austria ^d /United States		24 January 1970	152
Brazil/Germany, Federal Republic of ^d		26 February 1976	237
Brazil/United States		31 October 1968	110
Colombia/United States		9 December 1970	144
India/Canada ^a		30 September 1971	211
India/United States		27 January 1971	154
Iran (Islamic Republic of) ^d /United States		20 August 1969	127
Israel/United States		4 April 1975	249
Japan ^d /Canada ^d		20 June 1966	85
Japan ^d /France		22 September 1972	171
Japan/United States		10 July 1968	119
Japan ^d /United Kingdom		15 October 1968	125
Pakistan/Canada		17 October 1969	135
Pakistan/France		18 March 1976	239
Philippines ^d /United States		19 July 1968	120
Portugal ^d /United States ^e		19 July 1969	131
Republic of Korea/United States		5 January 1968	111
Republic of Korea ^d /France		22 September 1975	233
South Africa/United States		26 July 1967	98
South Africa/France		5 January 1977	244
Spain/United States		9 December 1966	92
Spain/Canada ^d		10 February 1977	247
Spain/Germany, Federal Republic of ^d		29 September 1982	305
Sweden ^d /United States		1 March 1972	165
Switzerland ^d /United States ^e		28 February 1972	161
Turkey ^d /United States ^e		5 June 1969	123
Venezuela ^d /United States ^e		27 March 1968	122

^a See footnote 3 in this chapter.

^b Agency safeguards are being applied to the items required to be safeguarded under this (these) project agreement(s) pursuant to an agreement in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty covering the State indicated.

^c The requirement for the application of safeguards under this agreement is satisfied by the application of safeguards pursuant to the agreement of 12 June 1981 (INFCIRC/293).

^d Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended in the State indicated as the State has concluded an agreement in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty.

° Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended in the United States in order to comply with a provision of INFCIRC/288.

Editorial note

IAEA has informed the United Nations of two additional safeguards agreements by which the Agency has applied safeguards to the nuclear facilities in Taiwan, China. The relations between the Agency and the authorities in Taiwan are non-governmental and the agreements are implemented by the Agency on that basis.

P A R T T H R E E

Prohibition or restriction of use of other weapons

CHAPTER XIII

Chemical weapons

Introduction

THE ELIMINATION OF ALL WEAPONS ADAPTABLE to mass destruction was one of the objectives which the General Assembly recognized by the adoption of its very first resolution, on 24 January 1946. One important element of that endeavour is the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, defined as weapons of mass destruction by the Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948. However, the first attempts to do so date back to the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which banned the use of poisons and poisoned bullets in warfare, and a separate declaration of the Hague Convention of 1899 that condemned the use of projectiles for the sole purpose of diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Nevertheless, during the First World War the widespread use of chemical agents caused some 1,300,000 casualties, more than 100,000 of them fatal. Those tragic figures contributed to a new global awareness of the need to prevent chemical warfare and to the emergence of the basic instrument for its elimination, the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.¹ The Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as of bacteriological methods of warfare. As of 31 December 1986, it had 110 States parties (see appendix I of this volume).

While the Protocol makes the “use” of chemical or biological weapons illegal, it does not prohibit their development, production and stockpiling, a shortcoming which quickly led to the recognition of the need for a more comprehensive ban. Some 40 parties to the Protocol made reservations to the effect that it would not be binding on them with regard to States that failed to respect its prohibitions. Various disarmament bodies, particularly in the course of the last 15 years, have discussed the possibility of strengthening the existing prohibition and widening its scope.

In 1971, the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva decided that chemical and biological weapons should be considered as separate issues. For the subsequent development regarding biological weapons and the conclusion of

¹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65. The text of the Protocol is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5). See appendix I below for details on its status.

the biological weapons Convention, see chapter XIV.

The separate negotiations on chemical weapons have continued since 1971, but consensus on the content of a corresponding chemical weapons convention has turned out to be elusive. Some of the main problems concern the scope of a prohibition, in particular the appropriateness of its covering the use of such weapons, the pace of implementation and the methods of verification of compliance. Between 1972 and 1985, numerous proposals were considered in the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, including complete texts of draft conventions. Each year the General Assembly has adopted resolutions expressing the urgent need to intensify negotiations on a comprehensive and effective convention. The 1978 Final Document considered the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.² At the second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal on the basic provisions of a convention banning chemical weapons.³

The negotiating body in Geneva took a significant step in 1980 by establishing a subsidiary body on chemical weapons, with a mandate to define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with in the negotiation of a chemical weapons convention. In 1981, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group set out 18 draft "elements" for inclusion in such a convention. Since 1984, the Conference on Disarmament has had before it the full draft text of a convention submitted that year by the United States.⁴ It contains a proposal for verification based on inspection by challenge, a procedure which has received support from Western countries, but which has been regarded as intrusive in nature by socialist and many non-aligned States. Accordingly, while progress has been made in the formulation of certain aspects of the convention—the urgency of which all delegations have stressed—some difficult, controversial questions remained as of the end of 1985.

Bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons have also taken place. From 1974 to 1980 talks were held between the Soviet Union and the United States, and in 1979 and 1980 substantial reports were submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress which they had achieved.⁵ There were no further talks, however, for several years. Then at their meeting in November 1985, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement,⁶ in which they agreed to intensify bilateral discussions at the level of experts on all aspects of a chemical weapons ban, including the question

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 21 and 75. The Final Document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

³ A/S-12/AC.1/12 and Corr.1. The document is reproduced in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/335), document CD/294. See *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XIV, for discussion of the proposal.

⁴ For the text of the draft treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, appendix VII.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), document CD/48, and *ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), document CD/112; the reports are summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XV, and vol. 5: 1980, chap. XIII.

⁶ For the part of the joint statement which dealt with arms limitation and disarmament problems, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chap. II.

of verification, and to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable multilateral convention. That understanding contributed to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on chemical weapons during its 1986 session, as discussed below.

Besides being involved in efforts to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons, the General Assembly has endeavoured, on several occasions, to investigate allegations of their use. In 1981 and 1982, at its request, the Secretary-General submitted expert reports on the use of chemical weapons in certain parts of the world.⁷ In 1984, following a fact-finding mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran, four specialists concluded that chemical weapons had been used in that country.⁸ In addition, the Assembly established a group of experts to devise procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of information concerning activities that might constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or relevant rules of customary international law; their findings were reported in 1984.⁹

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

In the course of the general exchange of views in plenary meetings¹⁰ during the Disarmament Commission's session, several States referred to the issue of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union stated that it attached great importance to saving the world from chemical weapons, both existing ones and new types, such as binary weapons. Therefore, to give fresh impetus to the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, it was proposing that the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles be started not later than 6 months, and the demolition or dismantling of State- or privately owned production facilities be started not later than 12 months, after an appropriate international convention entered into force. Moreover, as early as 30 days after its entry into force, all parties should disclose the exact location of those facilities. As to verification, the Soviet Union stated that whether in nuclear, chemical or conventional disarmament, it stood for the strictest verification through both national and international means, including, as appropriate, on-site inspection.

The Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland stressed the feasibility of eliminating chemical weapons and the consequent need to intensify negotiations. The German Democratic Republic stated that it was working to set up a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe. Viet Nam indicated that it supported the proposals of Bulgaria and Romania to turn Europe into a chemical-weapon-free zone.

Japan urged that the scope of the work on chemical weapons carried out in the Conference on Disarmament not be unduly expanded so that the Conference would not run the risk of losing sight of the basic objective of the

⁷ A/36/613, annex, and A/37/259, annex.

⁸ A/39/210 and S/16433.

⁹ A/39/488; the experts' report is contained in annex II.

¹⁰ A/CN.10/PV.102-106 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

negotiations. In that connection, Japan noted that the identification of substances to be regulated had begun and thus the work had progressed a step beyond the abstract. It was important that in that process those substances which had substantial commercial use should be dealt with in a different manner from those having exclusively military use. As a whole, the chemical weapons negotiations were proceeding at too slow a pace, Japan believed, and it held that the Disarmament Commission should express its great interest in seeing them accelerated. Norway considered that significant progress had been made since 1982, when a negotiating mandate had been agreed upon within the Conference on Disarmament. It hoped for the early conclusion of a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

China held that an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons should be concluded at an early date. Pending this, all countries capable of manufacturing chemical weapons should pledge never to use them and stop their testing, production, transfer and deployment.

The question of chemical weapons was also referred to in the "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4", which was annexed to the Disarmament Commission's report.¹¹ In that document, the Commission included a formulation generally agreed upon, without prejudice to the right of delegations to review it, which read as follows:

Efforts should be made to conclude urgently a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. To this end, the Conference on Disarmament should expedite its work with a view to presenting a draft treaty to the United Nations General Assembly without further delay.¹²

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

The agenda item entitled "Chemical weapons" was considered at the plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament during the periods from 24 March to 4 April and from 14 to 25 July.¹³ On 6 February the Conference decided to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons with the same mandate as in previous years, namely, to continue negotiations on a multi-lateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to develop and work out a convention, except for its final drafting.¹⁴

Among the new documents on the item that delegations submitted to the Conference were seven which dealt with various aspects of verification. Australia and the Netherlands submitted one document each on the verification

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*, annex I.

¹² *Ibid.*, sect. II, recommendation 1.

¹³ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹⁴ See the 1986 report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27)*, paragraph 87, section I. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, including a list of documents before it, is reproduced *in extenso* under paragraph 87.

of the non-production of chemical weapons;¹⁵ Finland (a non-member), a document on air monitoring as a means of verification of chemical disarmament;¹⁶ Norway (a non-member), three documents, and the United Kingdom, one document, on the verification of a chemical weapons convention.¹⁷

Belgium submitted a document on the order of elimination of chemical-weapon stocks;¹⁸ Canada, on the identification of chemical substances;¹⁹ Japan, on some quantitative aspects of a chemical weapons convention;²⁰ Pakistan, on fact-finding under the future convention;²¹ and the United States, on a disposal programme for chemical stockpiles.²² Both the Soviet Union and the United States transmitted to the Conference the text of their joint statement issued at the November 1985 summit meeting.²³ For its part, Canada submitted a handbook for the investigations of allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons²⁴ and a compendium of all the Conference's documentation on chemical weapons during the period 1983-1985.²⁵ The *Ad Hoc* Committee also had before it a report on its inter-sessional work during the period from 13 to 31 January.²⁶ A number of other documents were submitted as documents of the Conference on Disarmament and/or as documents of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The Conference's work on the question of chemical weapons proceeded in a more positive atmosphere in 1986 than in previous years, as the Soviet-American understanding²⁷ to accelerate agreement on a comprehensive ban on those weapons, reached at the November 1985 summit meeting, contributed to the intensity of the negotiations. In his message of 4 February to the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted that the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons had been for a number of years the most productive area of negotiation within the Conference. Given the work already done in elaborating a convention and the commitment made by the two major Powers at the summit, it seemed to him reasonable to expect that the remaining obstacles could be overcome during 1986. The United States declared early in the session that it would press for the implementation of the joint commitment and believed that with clear responses from the Soviet Union to the proposals contained in the American draft convention, tabled in 1984,²⁸ it would be possible to speed up the work. For its part, the Soviet Union referred to General Secretary Gorbachev's statement of 15 January

¹⁵ CD/732, appendix I, vol. II, documents CD/698 (Australia) and CD/706 (Netherlands).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/719.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. II, documents CD/702, CD/703 and CD/704 (Norway) and vol. III, document CD/715 (United Kingdom).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/697 and Corr.1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, document CD/679.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/713.

²¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/664 and Corr.1.

²² *Ibid.*, document CD/711.

²³ *Ibid.*, documents CD/667 (United States) and CD/668 (USSR).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, document CD/677.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, document CD/689.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, document CD/651.

²⁷ See the introduction to this chapter and footnote 6.

²⁸ See footnote 4.

1986,²⁹ in which he had urged that the Conference's work on chemical weapons be intensified with a view to concluding an effective and verifiable convention and had declared that the Soviet Union regarded the task of completely eliminating chemical weapons by the year 2000 as entirely feasible.

In a plenary meeting, the United States submitted an amendment³⁰ to its draft convention. The amendment was designed to allow for special on-site inspection of private facilities used for the provision of goods and services to Governments in addition to facilities owned by Governments. The United States wished to make clear, by its amendment, that no imbalance was intended in inspection obligations and that there was no discrimination against States with economic structures in which private industry had little or no involvement in the chemical industry. As to the verification issue as such, the United States continued to insist that for the convention to be effective, there was a fundamental need for a mandatory, short-notice inspection by challenge to complement routine verification procedures. It reiterated that its verification proposal had not been submitted on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis" and that it would welcome suggestions for ways to improve the procedures. It urged the Soviet Union to put forward a new proposal that would provide both a credible deterrent to a potential violator and the confidence necessary for an effective convention. The United States declared that its primary objective in the field of chemical weapons was the conclusion of a comprehensive convention and that the bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on the subject-matter were intended not to supplant, but rather to complement, the multilateral negotiations.

The Soviet Union stated that it favoured the earliest possible elimination of the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons as well as the industrial base for their production. It emphasized that such measures would be carried out under strict control, including international on-site inspections, in which it was no less interested than other countries. It acknowledged the importance of the question of inspection by challenge, noting that there already was understanding of the need to provide for such inspections in the convention so that ambiguous situations concerning compliance could be dispelled speedily. It supported realistic and constructive proposals to that effect. At the same time, it continued to criticize the United States proposals on verification, which, it asserted, had been designed to lead the negotiations to a deadlock. It criticized plans for deploying binary chemical weapons in Western Europe and supported the idea of establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. In a plenary meeting in April, it introduced a number of specific proposals for the paragraphs of a future treaty concerning the declaration, destruction and monitoring of chemical-weapon production facilities. The Soviet Union felt that the Conference's negotiations on chemical weapons in 1986 were marked by a business-like discussion geared to a final result—the preparation of the text of a future convention.

Bulgaria believed that the new Soviet proposals created a solid basis for the elaboration of an effective and realistic procedure for verification and took

²⁹ A/41/97, sect. IV.

³⁰ CD/732, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/685.

into account the interests of the other participants in the negotiations. Speaking early in the session, the German Democratic Republic shared that view and believed that the Conference was witnessing an honest desire on the part of numerous delegations to find a practicable and generally acceptable solution regarding the crucial on-site inspection issue. Poland observed towards the end of the session that there had been some conceptual *rapprochement* of positions regarding the question of inspection by challenge, which, however, was not sufficient for working out a mutually acceptable solution. It argued that the better the routine verification system, the less probable would be the need for inspection by challenge. Hungary took issue with two arguments in favour of producing binary chemical weapons, namely, that they stimulated disarmament negotiations on chemical weapons and that they strengthened deterrence. Having dealt extensively with questions relating to the link between the chemical industry and some of the problems under negotiation, it drew two conclusions: (a) that the viability and efficacy of the future chemical weapons disarmament régime could only be guaranteed by extending to the maximum possible the distance, or lag-time, that separated the acquisition of chemical-weapon capabilities from the eventual use of chemical weapons; and (b) that it was imperative and not unprecedented to apply certain restrictions on some activities of the chemical industry in order to bring about a viable chemical weapons disarmament régime.

In introducing the document it had submitted,³¹ the United Kingdom noted that its purpose was to establish a new basis for consensus on inspection by challenge. Such an inspection method had two roles: (a) to act as a deterrent to any contemplated violation of obligations and (b) to provide the basis for an inspection should that be required. A challenged State would be under obligation to demonstrate to others that it remained in compliance. However, in very limited circumstances there would be a right of refusal of direct inspection. In those cases the challenged State would be expected to propose alternative measures. The United Kingdom also made proposals for complementing *ad hoc* fact-finding with a system of international inspection on a random routine basis, combined with the international exchange of data. The United Kingdom hoped for a favourable reaction to its proposal and stated that in its view, it was up to the Soviet Union to decide whether negotiations could succeed in removing all chemical weapons or whether, by its own actions, it would call forth a legitimate and proportionate response from the West.

Canada welcomed the Soviet proposals on the destruction of stocks and of production facilities, but it held that agreement on some form of inspection by challenge was also needed to ensure that ambiguous situations could be quickly clarified. The Federal Republic of Germany noted that the Soviet Union had called for "a fresh look at things" and had shown greater flexibility on controversial issues, but it felt that there was a need for clarification of the Soviet attitude on important questions, including its position that an in-

³¹ See footnote 17.

spection by challenge should be carried out only with the consent of the party of which a request was made. France had similar questions in mind and held that the principle of international on-site verification must be accepted for the verification of non-production.

China urged that a chemical weapons convention be concluded at an early date and that, pending conclusion, all countries capable of manufacturing chemical weapons should pledge never to use them and to stop their testing, production, transfer and deployment. It considered the item on chemical weapons the most promising one on the Conference's agenda. However, it warned that if all countries concerned continued to stick to their respective positions on inspection by challenge, there would be no progress in the negotiations. In China's view, verification should be strict and effective and, at the same time, appropriate and rational. It believed that Pakistan's suggestions on the question represented a valuable effort to reconcile differing positions and deserved careful study. In introducing its working paper,³² Pakistan stated that it aimed at handling fact-finding at four different levels: (a) ambiguous situations in the implementation of a chemical weapons convention should be resolved through clarifications through bilateral consultations; (b) if a party had doubts about the compliance of another party but did not wish to approach it directly, it should have the right to seek clarification through the organization to be set up under the convention; (c) if that procedure did not satisfy the party's concern, it should be able to request the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to another State party to clarify the situation; and (d) in case of an established violation, a party could make a complaint which would have to be handled expeditiously to avoid removal or diffusion of evidence. Pakistan believed that the approach it suggested would provide for a graduated, but not necessarily rigid, framework for resolving doubts concerning compliance.

Algeria declared that a chemical weapons convention could only mean the total elimination of chemical weapons and could not possibly have a non-proliferation function or constitute any sort of obstacle to the chemical industry, which was the very foundation of development, particularly in agriculture. In Argentina's view, such a convention should have several essential elements: (a) a categorical prohibition of the use of chemical weapons; (b) provisions on the destruction of existing arsenals and production facilities and on the prohibition of the development and future production of such weapons; (c) suitable verification machinery in keeping with the scope and nature of the instrument. In addition, it should in no way be discriminatory or hamper the civilian chemical industry and international co-operation in the field. India rejected the view that the Conference could legitimately tackle, in a substantive way, only the issue of chemical weapons and that progress in that area alone could be cited as satisfactory evidence that it was in fact discharging its responsibilities. While India admitted that reasonable progress was being made with respect to chemical weapons, it was less optimistic than other delegations that an agreed convention could be presented to the General Assembly at its

³² See footnote 21.

forty-second session. Regarding the reports of useful bilateral super-Power exchanges on the subject, it regretted those Powers' tendency not to share the results of their exchanges with the Conference. Morocco commented favourably on the document Pakistan had submitted concerning fact-finding and stated that the proposal satisfied its requirements for effective verification. Sweden shared the view that if there were serious and well-founded suspicions of significant breaches of the provisions of the future convention, the party in question should be obliged to accept some form of on-site inspection without undue delay. At the same time, it would be important for provisions for such inspections to take into consideration the legitimate security interests of States and not to be used for purposes not directly connected with the convention.

In several statements, the Islamic Republic of Iran drew attention to allegations of use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq, which had led the Secretary-General of the United Nations to dispatch a mission of specialists to investigate the situation in February and March 1986. In their report³³ of 12 March 1986, the specialists unanimously concluded that Iraqi forces had on many occasions used chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Iran expressed the view that it would be highly beneficial to the activities of the Conference and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons regarding the verification aspects of the future chemical weapons convention if those bodies could have at their disposal the knowledge and experience obtained in connection with that mission and previous similar ones, carried out in 1984 and 1985. It suggested that the Secretary-General of the United Nations be requested to provide such information to the Conference. Australia, Canada, France, Japan, speaking on behalf of the group of Western States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States noted the report with great concern and strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons in contravention of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. They were also deeply concerned about the extended conflict between Iran and Iraq and stressed the urgent need for both countries to work for its early peaceful settlement.

Mr. Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom was appointed Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, which held 14 meetings from 19 February to 20 August. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations. At their request, the Conference decided to invite the representatives of the following States that are not members of the Conference to participate in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland (a non-Member of the United Nations) and Turkey.

In accordance with its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee continued the negotiation and further elaboration of a chemical weapons convention on the basis of the work accomplished in the previous years and during the inter-sessional period, as well as on the basis of new proposals submitted by delegations. The Committee decided to retain the basic structure of the envisaged convention that it had established in previous years, although discussions continued on where certain issues, including verification measures, would be placed under that structure:

³³ S/17911 and Add.1 and 2.

Preamble

- I. General provisions on scope
 - II. Definitions and criteria
 - III. Declarations
 - IV. Chemical weapons
 - V. Chemical weapons production facilities
 - VI. Activities not prohibited by the Convention
 - VII. National implementation measures
 - VIII. Consultative committee
 - IX. Consultations, co-operation and fact-finding
 - X. Assistance
 - XI. Economic and technological development
 - XII. Relation to other international agreements
 - XIII. Amendments
 - XIV. Duration, withdrawal
 - XV. Signature, ratification, entry into force
 - XVI. Languages
- Annexes and other documents

The Committee accepted the Chairman's proposal to set up three working groups to deal with the following specific aspects of the convention with a view to finding generally acceptable formulations for inclusion:

(a) Working Group A: article II (definitions and criteria) and article VI (permitted activities);

(b) Working Group B: article III (declarations), article IV (elimination of chemical weapons) and article V (measures on chemical weapons production facilities);

(c) Working Group C: article I (general provisions on scope), article VII (national implementation measures), article VIII (consultative committee) and article IX (consultation, co-operation and fact-finding). Working Group C was also responsible for the question of herbicides, and it was understood that it would, in addition, deal with the question of investigating allegations of use.

Working Group A held 18 meetings from 24 February to 6 August. It concentrated on developing lists of chemicals and elaborating the methods to which the listed chemicals would be subject under article VI of the convention. Among other things, the Group considered intensively key precursor chemicals and chemicals that are produced in large commercial quantities and can be used for chemical weapons purposes (dual-purpose chemicals). A common view emerged among the members of the Group that matters pertaining to articles II and VI should be considered in their interrelationship. Negotiations were also held on an annex concerning super-toxic lethal chemicals and what was called "especially dangerous key precursors" or, alternatively, "key components of chemical weapons systems". As in previous years, the socialist States adhered to the view that their identification should be based on the general-purpose criterion and toxicity, while Western States continued to emphasize the concept of risk which the various super-toxic lethal chemicals

would pose to the stability of the convention. The discussions established that the common system for monitoring listed chemicals should be data exchange. It was recognized that certain categories of chemicals might require a more stringent monitoring régime than others. The results of the Group's work were reflected in a draft article VI and three annexes, but it was understood that further work would be needed in order to reach mutually acceptable solutions to remaining differences. Consultations on draft article II revealed that it would be necessary to continue negotiations on it as well.³⁴

Working Group B held 17 meetings from 26 February to 6 August. In considering articles III and IV, the Group singled out broad issues of interest: (a) the elaboration of an order of elimination and (b) the organizational framework of the destruction of chemical-weapon stocks, including verification procedures. It was considered necessary to elaborate a method for comparing different categories of chemical-weapon stocks. Some delegations, including Belgium and China, introduced concrete proposals based on the concept of "stockpile equivalent". The comparison of lethal and harmful chemicals remained unresolved and in need of further consideration. Differences were to some extent narrowed down on article V. It was envisaged that the parties to the convention would immediately cease all activity in production facilities, declare their facilities within 30 days after the convention's entry into force and destroy them during a period of 10 years.³⁵

Working Group C held 16 meetings from 28 February to 1 August. It was able to agree on the text of an annex to article VIII concerning the envisaged consultative committee and of an annex to article IX dealing with procedures for requesting clarification. In some instances, the text in another annex to the latter article contributed to the narrowing down of differences on inspection by challenge, but that question continued to be perhaps the most difficult single outstanding problem. A possible way out of the situation was presented by the United Kingdom in its working paper,³⁶ but time did not allow for a thorough examination of that proposal. The Group agreed that further substantive work would be needed on the issue, as well as on the question of investigating allegations of the use of chemical weapons, which it also took up. Discussions on some other questions, including herbicides, were postponed due to lack of time.³⁷

In sum, the negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Committee and its Working Groups in 1986 revealed that basic differences of a political nature still persisted as obstacles to early conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. Some progress was made, but divergencies of view remained mainly in four areas: (a) declaration and monitoring of stockpiles; (b) elimination of production facilities; (c) prevention of the misuse of the chemical industry for chemical weapons production; and (d) inspection by challenge. Nevertheless, many delegations saw reason for optimism in the fact that the negotiations had been proceeding in a business-like atmosphere,

³⁴ See CD/CW/WP.138 and CD/CW/WP.150.

³⁵ See CD/CW/WP.139 and CD/CW/WP.151.

³⁶ See footnote 17.

³⁷ See CD/CW/WP.137 and CD/CW/WP.149.

free from polemics, and that the two major Powers were having parallel bilateral negotiations with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining problems. There was agreement that the momentum should not be lost and that inter-session work should be continued.

In its comments at the end of the session, the Soviet Union stated that the Conference's work in 1986 justified a certain degree of satisfaction and that the session's results were distinguished from those of previous sessions. It took a positive view of what it called the "general agreements" regarding the early and complete elimination of the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles. The United States deemed that the cautious optimism about the negotiations that it had expressed one year earlier had been justified and could again be expressed with respect to their future course. In particular, it looked forward to a serious consideration of inspection by challenge and a comprehensive proposal on the subject by the Soviet Union, which had expressed its acceptance of the concept.

France held that the proposal of the United Kingdom for a challenge-inspection régime met the necessary criteria and expressed its full support for it. Hungary, speaking on behalf of the group of socialist States, believed that recent proposals by the Soviet Union on the subject of chemical weapons had contributed to the business-like negotiations in 1986. It warned that rearmament with binary chemical weapons on the part of Western Powers might seriously impair the ongoing negotiations. Sweden felt that significant progress had been registered on a few issues, but many difficult problems remained. It considered that the organizational framework for negotiations on chemical weapons was well-balanced and robust and thus served the Conference well. China acknowledged the progress achieved during the session, but believed that delegations should not overlook the large amount of work that remained to be done in view of the differences on verification, particularly inspection by challenge.

On 28 August the Conference adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, which is an integral part of the report of the Conference.³⁸ An appendix³⁹ to the Committee's report reflected the stage of the negotiations on a convention at the end of the 1986 session; however, it was understood that the draft texts contained in it did not bind any delegation. The *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended to the Conference on Disarmament: (a) That the appendix to its report be used for further negotiation and drafting of the convention; and (b) That the reports of the Working Groups together with other relevant existing and future documents of the Conference also be utilized in the further elaboration of the convention.

The Conference also accepted the *Ad Hoc* Committee's recommendations that the Committee resume its work for a session of limited duration in January 1987; that consultations on specific issues be undertaken by the Chairman in

³⁸ See footnote 14.

³⁹ The appendix was based on appendix I of the previous year's report. See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr. 1)*, para. 96, appendix I. The 1986 appendix included new material produced during the session with respect to articles IV, V, VI, VIII, IX and annex IV to article IV.

the mean time in preparation for the resumed session; that open-ended consultations be held in November and December 1986; and that the *Ad Hoc* Committee be re-established at the outset of the Conference's 1987 session with its 1986 mandate.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

As in previous years, frequent reference was made by delegations to the question of banning chemical weapons during the general debate in the First Committee.⁴⁰

The United States considered that the 1986 negotiations on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament had been useful and that there had been progress regarding the draft "rolling text" of the chemical weapons convention. However, it held that it was more important to realize that a very considerable amount of work remained to be accomplished on issues of fundamental significance to the successful outcome of the negotiations. Foremost among them was verification of compliance, and in particular verification by challenge. The United States believed that an effective provision for challenge inspection, such as the one included in the draft convention it had proposed, was essential. It was deeply concerned about the continuing instances of violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and about the spread of the capability to produce chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union believed that the chemical weapons negotiations had already gone beyond the stage of identifying and comparing positions and that the time had come to take decisions. One of the most difficult problems still to be resolved was the question of the non-production of chemical weapons in the commercial, or civilian, chemical industry. It had decided to propose as a compromise that all chemicals be divided into four categories, each having a different régime governing limitation and verification. The Soviet Union also observed that the problem of developing procedures acceptable to all for on-site inspections by challenge had been the stumbling block in the negotiations. In that regard, it suggested that the proposal submitted by the United Kingdom be used as a basis for compromise. It also expressed its conviction that the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in Central Europe and the Balkans would help to rid the world of chemical weapons.

France stressed that the international community must bear in mind the threat posed by chemical weapons. In its view, the negotiations on a convention banning such weapons had been more active in 1986 than ever before and the fact that chemical weapons had been used several times in several regions of the world in violation of the Geneva Protocol had played a decisive role in that context. It felt that priority should be given in the Conference on Disarmament to the item on chemical weapons. France also supported the proposal of the United Kingdom regarding the question of inspection on challenge.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 40th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

The Federal Republic of Germany held, first, that the concept of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe did not provide for the destruction of those weapons, but only required their withdrawal beyond a certain geographical line. Secondly, in view of the high mobility of chemical weapons, the requirement of effective verification in and adjacent to a given zone could not be met satisfactorily. A regional arrangement would therefore not contribute to more security, and would, indeed, result in more distrust, instability and insecurity. Thirdly, in the opinion of the Federal Republic, negotiations on chemical-weapon-free zones would only divert attention from the essential aim of negotiating a global prohibition on those weapons.

Czechoslovakia emphasized the urgency of the chemical weapons negotiations and welcomed the fact that the drafting of a convention had reached a practical stage in which considerable progress was evident. In its view, States should refrain from any steps at odds with the purpose of finalizing the convention, particularly the manufacture of new forms of chemical weapons and their deployment on other countries' territories. It continued to believe that it would be useful to create chemical-weapon-free areas in Central Europe and the Balkans. Such comparatively simple agreements, it maintained, could help to remove the remaining barriers in the way of a global prohibition on chemical weapons and of their elimination.

Poland noted that the urgency of finally doing away with chemical weapons had been emphasized by including them next to nuclear arsenals in the Soviet programme of eliminating weapons of mass extermination before the end of the century, put forward in January 1986. Poland was among those members of the Conference on Disarmament that had submitted specific suggestions on the intricate verification problems, notably on-challenge inspection. While it seemed certain that the work on the convention was entering its final technical stage, a lot remained to be done.

In the same vein, Sweden acknowledged that during the year considerable progress had been made in the chemical weapons negotiations and that the conclusion of a convention was within reach, even though a number of both technically and politically complicated problems remained to be solved. One such issue was the formulation of measures to ensure that, without hampering peaceful industrial production, chemical warfare agents would not be produced in the chemical industry.

India noted that although the effort to ban the use of chemical and biological weapons dated back far before the birth of the United Nations, chemical weapons continued to be maintained in battle readiness in the arsenals of some countries and had been used on a large scale in warfare in the past two decades. It regretted that both biological and chemical weapons had not been banned at the same time. Significant progress had been made in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1986 and special responsibility for carrying that work forward rested with the States which had amassed large quantities of such weapons. India drew attention to some specific proposals that, in its view, served to detract from the main objective, such as those on

the control of transfers of chemical substances and the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones.

Speaking on the problem of compliance in connection with the chemical weapons convention, the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that if the right of verification of compliance were granted to every country, it might provide certain grounds for abuse. At the same time, subordinating that process to the consent of the countries subjected to verification would create practical impediments to the implementation of the convention. It held, therefore, that an international committee should make the final decision on the verification of compliance in each case and should give priority to the verification and destruction of stockpiles and of the means of providing chemical weapons to those countries identified as users.

Peru believed there was every reason to hope that a total and non-discriminatory ban on chemical weapons would soon be enshrined in a convention. It emphasized the importance of the aspect of verification, particularly the modalities for inspection by challenge. Further, it was of the view that if the negotiations on a convention failed, the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in appropriate regions would be the only alternative.

Five draft resolutions were submitted under the agenda item on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. One of them, which dealt with the Second Review Conference of the parties to the biological weapons Convention, is dealt with in chapter XIV. Of the four draft resolutions concerning chemical weapons, three were adopted and one was withdrawn by its sponsor.

On 28 October, Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons", which the German Democratic Republic introduced in the First Committee on 3 November. It stated that the basic concern of the draft was expressed in operative paragraph 2, by which the Conference on Disarmament was urged to intensify negotiations in order to submit a draft convention on the complete ban on chemical weapons to the Assembly at its forty-second session. The sponsors emphasized the need for extending international co-operation among chemical industries for peaceful purposes and held that an arms race in the field of chemical weapons should not take place, either quantitatively or qualitatively. They further welcomed the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on chemical weapons. The draft took note of proposals and initiatives on the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones in various regions. The German Democratic Republic informed the Committee that it was sponsoring another draft resolution on the subject, which was later introduced by Poland (see below), and considered that the two drafts complemented each other.

On 30 October, France submitted a draft resolution entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons" On 10 November, in a statement in the First Committee, it expressed the two main concerns it had in introducing the text: to formally mark the importance it attached to strict observance of

the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to stress the usefulness of inquiry procedures available to the Secretary-General in the case of alleged use of chemical weapons. In its view, the proliferation of chemical weapons had to be prevented pending conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. The draft therefore emphasized national measures for controlling the transfer of chemical substances and the need to bring about co-operation between the principal chemical-producing States in drawing up and publishing itemized lists of products that especially lent themselves to use in the production of chemical warfare agents. Noting that other delegations had had doubts about the appropriateness of emphasizing the strict monitoring of exports of such chemical substances, France explained that it was not its intention to establish a system that might appear unbalanced. After listening carefully to delegates' comments on the text, it felt that additional consultations were needed. Accordingly, it preferred not to put the draft to a vote at that time.⁴¹

On 30 October, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Zaire submitted a draft resolution entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons", which was later also sponsored by the Philippines. In introducing the draft the same day, the United States recalled that in both 1984 and 1985 the General Assembly had condemned by a large majority any and all use of chemical weapons and any other actions in contravention of existing international accords. Despite that condemnation, there had been instances of use. The United States held that such violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol made it necessary for the Assembly again to place on record its conviction that the use of chemical weapons must cease and that all nations must strictly observe existing international instruments and obligations in respect to chemical warfare. Another disquieting dimension of the erosion of restraint stemmed from the spread of those weapons. While in 1963 some 5 States had possessed a chemical weapons capability, currently 15 or more States were in that category. The draft would lend the support of the General Assembly to efforts to prevent the spread of chemical weapons. The United States hoped that the resolution would serve as a reproach to those States that had used chemical weapons and dissuade them from doing so again and that it would encourage nations to take appropriate action to restrict the export of chemicals with potential for use in chemical weapons. It also expected the draft to give an impetus to the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention to ban chemical weapons, which had the United States strong support.

Also on 30 October, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Viet Nam

⁴¹ See A/41/839, paras. 11-12.

submitted a draft resolution entitled “Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons”, which was later also sponsored by Ireland and Italy. It was introduced on 6 November by Poland, which observed that the 1986 debates in the First Committee had again demonstrated that the general concern over the threatening presence of chemical weapons had not diminished. That concern had been compounded by the fact that the work of the Conference on Disarmament had, in 1986, again fallen short of achieving the expected ultimate goal—the final elaboration of a draft chemical weapons convention. On the other hand, positive references had been made in the debates to the Conference’s progress in finding solutions to a number of major problems concerning the draft convention. Poland also noted that there had been pressing calls for a decisive effort to finalize the convention, with the time factor being stressed more than ever before. The draft resolution largely followed the pattern of previous traditional or consensus resolutions on chemical weapons, but some minor additions had been made. The sponsors hoped that it would be adopted by consensus and that it would provide the Conference with the support necessary to enable it to finalize its work on the global and total ban on chemical weapons as early as possible.

Eight States explained their positions on one or more draft resolutions at the time that they were approved by the First Committee. In addition, the United Republic of Tanzania made a general statement in that context, expressing concern at the proliferation of draft resolutions in the Committee, which, in its view, trivialized matters concerning the survival of mankind. It wondered why, for example, the sponsors of the drafts on chemical weapons had not agreed on a single text.

The Soviet Union noted that the work of the Conference on Disarmament on a ban on chemical weapons had reached a stage that required of States a responsible but careful approach to negotiations and the political will to facilitate early conclusion of a convention. Guided by that approach, it had put forward a number of proposals and believed that its efforts had broadened the basis for the adoption of mutually acceptable solutions. The Soviet Union held that the draft resolution introduced by the United States lacked balance and was at times actually tendentious. It preferred the drafts introduced by the German Democratic Republic and Poland, but to help consolidate the progress achieved on chemical weapons so far and to contribute to the creation of appropriate conditions for further progress, it supported all drafts on the item. However, it confirmed its negative attitude towards resolution 40/92 C and its provisions relating to the activities of a group of experts.

Cuba and Viet Nam supported the drafts introduced by the German Democratic Republic and Poland and abstained on the one introduced by the United States. Cuba supported chemical-weapon-free zones and believed that such measures were feasible in regions with a high concentration of chemical weapons. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, one had to consider not only the countries of the region, but also other countries that were close to it and possessed chemical weapons. It considered that the draft introduced by the United States represented a partial approach to the problem of chemical weapons and disregarded the obstacles placed in the way of the negotiations,

specifically the production of binary weapons. Viet Nam likewise referred to "the extremely dangerous binary weapons" and felt that the draft introduced by the United States failed to address one of the essential requirements for the complete elimination of the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, namely, that all States should refrain from any action that might impede that process. Furthermore, it held that the reference in operative paragraph 4 to establishing facts in cases of reports of the use of chemical weapons without defining the criteria for determining the authenticity or reliability of the origin of such reports invited the danger of the draft being misused for slanderous purposes or to create artificial obstacles to negotiations on the elimination of chemical weapons.

Australia, Greece and New Zealand abstained in the vote on the draft introduced by the German Democratic Republic and supported the other two. Australia held that the first-mentioned draft was deficient in that it singled out new types of chemical weapons for non-production and non-deployment when, in fact, those weapons would be covered by the new convention and would be subject to a strict verification system, to be negotiated as an integral part of the convention. Secondly, the draft, in specifying the prohibitions to be included in the scope of the convention, did not refer to the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons and was thus incompatible with the two other drafts. Thirdly, Australia adhered to the view that the problems involved in negotiating an equitable and verifiable treaty establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone, particularly in relation to verification of compliance with such a treaty, would be no less difficult than those involved in negotiating a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons. Speaking on the same draft, Greece stated that pending the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, it supported initiatives for the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones, specifically in the Balkans. It abstained in the vote on the draft, however, because, taking into account the stage reached in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, it felt that the wording of the operative part of the draft resolution would constrain the negotiating parties and therefore be counter-productive. For its part, New Zealand abstained on the draft introduced by the German Democratic Republic because of what it considered unbalanced references to the development and deployment policies of one of the major military alliances possessing large arsenals of chemical weapons. In its view, the draft also ignored the policies of the other major alliance that had led to the accumulation of extremely large stockpiles of chemical weapons. It also pointed out that the elements in the text with which it agreed were covered in the draft introduced by Poland, which was approved by consensus. Accordingly, New Zealand regarded the draft of the German Democratic Republic as both unbalanced and unnecessary.

Argentina and Brazil abstained on the drafts introduced by the German Democratic Republic and the United States and joined the consensus on the one introduced by Poland. Argentina did not support initiatives that could involve a discriminatory or partial approach, such as those that would create non-proliferation régimes or areas of limitation not covered by a convention. It held that no countries should be authorized to carry out international policing of the transfer of chemicals; only international and national means of veri-

fication created under the convention could monitor compliance with obligations undertaken by its parties. Brazil stated that it joined the consensus on the draft introduced by Poland as proof of its full support for the ongoing negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. It noted that the draft introduced by the German Democratic Republic favoured concepts such as that of chemical-weapon-free zones and singled out certain types of chemical weapons for restrictions, and it did not feel that those elements would facilitate negotiations. Finally, it believed that the draft introduced by the United States contained new formulations which would promote a régime which could end up having the same characteristics as those that “have taken shape thanks to the discriminatory operation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”

The three draft resolutions on chemical weapons which were put to a vote were all approved by the First Committee on 10 November and adopted by the General Assembly on 3 December.⁴²

The First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by the German Democratic Republic by a recorded vote of 83 to 12 (Western States), with 31 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 100 to 11, with 43 abstentions, as resolution 41/58 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which states that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament,

Convinced of the urgency of the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Emphasizing the need for the extension of international co-operation in the field of chemical industries for peaceful purposes,

Bearing in mind that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction would contribute to the achievement of this goal,

Stressing the continuing importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the earliest conclusion and implementation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Appreciating the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1986 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons and the progress achieved in negotiations,

Deeming it desirable for States to refrain from taking any action that could delay or further complicate negotiations and to display a constructive approach to such negotiations and the political will to reach an early agreement on the chemical weapons convention,

Emphasizing the need to stop a further increase of arsenals of chemical weapons and to

⁴² *Ibid.*, Plenary Meetings, 94th meeting.

refrain from the deployment of such weapons on the territories of other countries, as well as the necessity to withdraw chemical weapons deployed abroad to within the national boundaries of States to which they belong,

Expressing profound concern at decisions on the production of new types of chemical weapons, as well as at their intended deployment,

Welcoming the agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to accelerate the efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons,

Taking note of proposals and initiatives on the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones in various regions aimed at facilitating the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and at contributing to the achievement of stable regional and international security,

Welcoming the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which stresses the urgency of a chemical weapons ban,

1. *Reaffirms* the necessity for the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in order to submit a draft convention on the complete ban on chemical weapons to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

3. *Reaffirms its call* to all States to conduct serious negotiations in good faith and to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically from the production of new types of chemical weapons, as well as from deploying chemical weapons on the territory of other States;

4. *Appeals* to all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of such a convention;

5. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by the United States by a recorded vote of 108 to none, with 18 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 41/58 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/92 C of 12 December 1985,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington, on 10 April 1972,

Reiterating its concern over reports that chemical weapons have been used and over indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals, as well as over the growing risk that they may be used again,

Noting international efforts to strengthen relevant international prohibitions, including efforts to develop appropriate fact-finding mechanisms,

Recalling its resolution 40/94 L of 12 December 1985, in which, *inter alia*, it pointed out the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament,

Reaffirming its dedication to protecting mankind from chemical and biological warfare,

1. *Calls for* compliance with existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons, and condemns all actions that contravene those obligations;
2. *Strongly endorses* the ongoing efforts to ensure the most effective prohibitions possible on chemical and biological weapons;
3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to pursue vigorously and accelerate its negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction;
4. *Calls upon* all States, pending the elaboration of such a convention, to co-operate in efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons and in efforts to establish facts in cases of reports of such use, and to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the spread of chemical weapons.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by Poland without a vote. It was subsequently similarly adopted by the General Assembly, as resolution 41/58 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Taking note of the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by consensus on 26 September 1986, and in particular of article IX of its Final Declaration.

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which incorporates, *inter alia*, the report of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, and noting that following the precedents set in 1984 and 1985, consultations are continuing during the inter-sessional period, thus increasing the time devoted to negotiations,

Convinced of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. *Takes note* of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1986 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular appreciates the work of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the progress recorded in its report;

2. *Expresses again none the less its regret and concern* that notwithstanding the progress made in 1986 a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. *Urges again* the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1987 session, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, *inter alia*, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the 1986 mandate;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the results of its negotiations.

Conclusion

Member States of the Conference on Disarmament, socialist, Western and non-aligned alike, expressed the view that in 1986 significant progress was made in the negotiations in that body concerning a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. Some of them held that the negotiations had already advanced to a stage in which the problems had been identified and the time had come for taking decisions. Others pointed out that it was still important to realize that problems of great significance remained to be solved. Most of the argument still tended to centre around the question of verification by challenge, which was a central feature of the draft convention proposed by the United States in 1984. In 1986, a proposal by the United Kingdom which sought to establish a new basis for consensus on that question was supported by a number of countries, including France and the Soviet Union.

Among the other proposals concerning chemical weapons, the idea of chemical-weapon-free zones in Europe again attracted attention, with socialist States generally promoting the idea and Western as well as some non-aligned countries opposing it as a diversion from the main objective. The seriousness of the fact that chemical weapons had been used in recent military conflicts was underscored by a number of States, which called for the acceleration of the negotiations on the envisaged convention.

In 1986, as in previous years, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions, one of them by consensus and two, adopted by a vote, reflecting the divergent positions of groups of States. All three, however, urged the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

Introduction

THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction¹ was held in Geneva from 8 to 26 September 1986. The First Review Conference, which had been held in Geneva in March 1980, had stated in its Final Declaration² that a second review conference should be held at the request of a majority of States parties not earlier than 1985 and, in any case, not later than 1990. By resolution 39/65 D of 12 December 1984, the General Assembly noted, *inter alia*, that a majority of States parties to the Convention had requested that such a conference be held.

Until the year 1969, bacteriological (biological) weapons were dealt with by the international community together with chemical weapons; for instance, the use in war of both types of weapons was prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol,³ and they were both covered by the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948. The early efforts to prohibit chemical and biological weapons, up to 1969, are discussed in chapter XIII.

In 1969 the Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly a report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*,⁴ which contributed to the intensification of the

¹ General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex; for the text of the Convention, see *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5). See also appendix 1 of this volume.

² *Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document* (BWC/CONF.1/10), (Geneva, 1980), sect. II. The text of the Declaration is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XIV, annex.

³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

consideration of the subject by the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva. Among the initiatives made at the time was a draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare submitted by the United Kingdom.⁵

The following year, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of both chemical and biological weapons and on their destruction.⁶ Those States held that a separate approach to biological weapons would delay the solution of the question of chemical weapons and therefore both types of weapons should be dealt with together. However, the United Kingdom, the United States and several other countries favoured separate treatment. The United States announced that it was committed to effective control of both types of weapons but believed that a single instrument covering both was not feasible. It further believed that a ban on biological weapons alone could be achieved at an early date.

In 1971, agreement was finally reached on the separation of the two issues. The Eastern European States accepted separation as a first step towards the solution of the whole complex of problems and submitted a draft text of a convention⁷ to the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva. Subsequently, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, submitted identical drafts,⁸ and the text was annexed to the negotiating body's report to the General Assembly.⁹ In the Assembly, a majority of States expressed support for the draft biological weapons convention, many of them noting that it constituted the first measure of genuine disarmament in that it involved destruction of existing weapons. By resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, the General Assembly commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which was annexed to the resolution, and requested the depositary Governments—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—to open the Convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975, when, pursuant to its article XIV, 22 Governments had deposited instruments of ratification. By the end of 1986, 107 States were parties to the Convention.

The First Review Conference of the parties to the Convention, with 53 parties attending, was held in 1980, and it adopted a Final Declaration by consensus. The General Assembly, by a consensus resolution, noted that none of the Convention's articles concerning complaints to the Security Council, provision of assistance to a party exposed to danger, amendments or with-

⁵ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969* (DC/232), document ENDC/255/Rev.1; see also *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales. No. 70.IX.1), chap. 16.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 104, document A/7655.

⁷ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971* (DC/234), document CCD/325/Rev.1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, documents CCD/337 and CCD/338.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for 1971* (DC/234), annex A.

drawal had been invoked during the first five years of its operation, and welcomed the Final Declaration of the Review Conference.

At its regular session in 1982, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/98 C, introduced by Sweden, by which it recommended that the States parties to the biological weapons Convention hold a special conference as soon as possible to establish a flexible, objective and non-discriminatory procedure to deal with issues concerning compliance with the Convention.

In 1984, Norway informed the First Committee that it had proposed to the States parties to the Convention that a second review conference be held in 1986. Later, in introducing a procedural draft resolution on the subject, Norway announced that 58 of the then 100 States parties to the Convention supported the proposal. By the draft, adopted as resolution 39/65 D, the General Assembly noted that, following appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee was to be established prior to the Review Conference.

There was no substantive consideration of the question of biological weapons in the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament in 1986.

Work of the Preparatory Committee

In accordance with an agreement reached in the consultations noted in resolution 39/65 D, an open-ended Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference held one session at Geneva from 28 April to 2 May, with 58 States parties to the Convention participating.

The Preparatory Committee decided that the Review Conference should take place in Geneva from 8 to 26 September 1986. Regarding documentation, it decided to request the Secretariat to prepare a background document on compliance by States parties with all their obligations under the Convention, drawing on information to be provided by States parties, and, in that connection, it recalled the request of the First Review Conference that the background materials prepared for the Second Review Conference should include information on the implementation of article X, concerning co-operation in the peaceful applications of biotechnology. The Preparatory Committee also requested the Secretariat to make available the report of the Conference on Disarmament concerning negotiations it was conducting on a chemical weapons convention.

In addition, the Committee requested each of the depositary Governments to submit to the Review Conference information on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. The Committee further decided to invite other States parties to communicate their views on such developments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Preparatory Committee also approved the provisional agenda of the Review Conference, which was annexed to its report.¹⁰ In the course of the Preparatory Committee's consultations, it was agreed that the President of

¹⁰ BWC/CONF.II/1.

the Conference would be nominated by the group of non-aligned, neutral and other States. It was further agreed that the Review Conference would establish a committee of the whole, which would be chaired by a representative of Czechoslovakia; a drafting committee, which would be chaired by a representative of Western countries; and a credentials committee, which would be chaired by a representative of the non-aligned, neutral and other States. The Committee also decided on draft rules of procedure for the Conference.

Second Review Conference of the parties to the Convention

Participation and organizational matters

The Review Conference was convened on 8 September at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, with a total of 63 States parties¹¹ participating. In addition, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco and Sri Lanka, which had signed but not yet ratified the Convention, participated in the Conference without taking part in its decisions. One observer State, Algeria, which had neither ratified nor signed the Convention, and several non-governmental organizations also attended.

At its first plenary meeting, the Conference adopted its agenda, as recommended by the Preparatory Committee. The Conference also elected, by acclamation, Mr. Winfried Lang of Austria as its President. Later that day, it elected 20 Vice-Presidents, including representatives of the three depositary Governments and encompassing all political and geographical groups. The Conference established a committee of the whole, under the chairmanship of Mr. Milós Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, to undertake a review of the articles of the Convention, its preamble and purposes and to consider the question of a future review of the Convention. The Conference also established a drafting committee, chaired by Mr. Richard Butler of Australia, to undertake the task of preparing and submitting to the plenary meeting the draft final document of the Conference, including the final declaration. In addition, the Conference established a credentials committee under the chairmanship of Mr. D. D. Afande of Kenya.

In his opening statement, the President noted that one of the main functions of the Conference was to examine closely actual developments against the background of existing treaty provisions. If the Conference addressed itself honestly to all the questions which had been raised in recent years, it could in itself become a confidence-strengthening exercise. The general international climate had not been favourable to a buildup of trust among the States parties. The chief task before the Conference, therefore, was to clarify

¹¹ Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

existing uncertainties and to strengthen confidence in the Convention as a reliable instrument which had effectively eliminated the possibility of an arms race in at least one important area.

In his message to the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that the biological weapons Convention constituted the first and, so far, the only international legally binding instrument by which States parties had undertaken to prohibit and prevent the development, production and stockpiling of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Most importantly, they had also undertaken the obligation to destroy them or divert them to peaceful purposes. The Convention had, therefore, aptly been called the world's first disarmament treaty. It furnished an example of how mutually acceptable solutions could be found to most intricate international problems if States brought the requisite political will to the effort.

General debate in plenary meetings

In the course of the general debate, at between 9 and 15 September, many States, including the three depositary Governments, reaffirmed the significance of the Convention and called for its strengthening.

The Soviet Union recalled that the Convention was an integral part of a set of instruments limiting the arms race. It was the duty of all States, above all those bearing the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, to preserve and build upon the Convention. In the Soviet view, the Conference should indicate in its final document specific ways of reinforcing the Convention and implementing all its provisions effectively. The United States believed that, in the course of the review of the Convention, measures could be adopted to help provide assurance that permitted activities were not being used as a cover for prohibited activities. Such measures could be embodied in the Conference's final document. Since the use of biological and toxin weapons was repugnant to mankind, no effort should be spared in attaining the objective of completely excluding the possibility of their use. The United Kingdom stated that it had always taken a particular interest in the Convention and had given much thought to means of enhancing its authority. Reassurance in its efficacy was only possible if all States parties were willing to respond openly and fully to requests for information. All three depositaries expressed support for article X of the Convention, on the exchange of information on the peaceful development of microbiology.

Several socialist States underscored their view that the provisions of the Convention had been properly complied with and that no violation of obligations had taken place. Observing that the complaints and investigation provisions had not thus far been invoked, they expressed their conviction that the Convention had fully attained its objective. Thus, Hungary drew attention to the fact that during the 10 years the Convention had been in force, no State party had felt it necessary to set in motion the procedure provided for in articles V and VI, which concern consultation, verification of compliance and complaints procedures. Bulgaria rejected as entirely without foundation the

doubts which had been expressed regarding the satisfactory application of the Convention. In its view, such allegations were bound to impair the authority of the Convention. Mongolia felt likewise and urged that the final declaration of the Review Conference call on all States parties to continue to fulfil the obligations they had assumed. Poland held that the machinery for consultation and co-operation among the parties provided for in article V was sufficiently flexible to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention. It was, however, ready to consider any realistic and constructive ideas, based on the existing text of the Convention, which would lead to the improvement of that machinery.

A number of States expressed views on the need to improve the verification and complaints procedures. Argentina held that it would be advisable to develop a strictly impartial, objective and international method of verification which would guarantee the equal rights and obligations of all States parties as well as their right to participate. It considered the complaints procedures through the Security Council inadequate and believed, therefore, that national and international measures would have to be combined and problems solved at the appropriate level to avoid any political clash between States. Nigeria called for an arrangement that would separate the fact-finding stage of the complaints procedure from the stage of political consideration and decision by the Security Council. Subsequently, it submitted a proposal by which the Secretary-General would be empowered to initiate investigations through a consultative committee of experts appointed by him. The result of such an investigation would be conveyed to States parties and to the Security Council for consideration and decision.

China recognized that the Convention had certain drawbacks. Provisions for effective monitoring and verification measures were absent and there were inadequacies in the complaints procedure. In its view, all those issues could be resolved through consultations aimed at perfecting the Convention. Such efforts could also have a positive bearing on the current negotiations for a convention on chemical weapons.

Finland considered that the concern expressed over the inadequacy of the provisions of articles V, VI, and VII was justified and it was prepared to consider any suggestions which might strengthen them. However, as the First Review Conference had rightly pointed out, the provisions of article V provided a good deal of flexibility in dealing with any problems of compliance. Sweden discussed in detail what it regarded as the unsatisfactory nature of the provisions of those three articles and felt it important to reach an understanding on concrete procedures that could be applied under article V to make co-operation between States on fact-finding and control more effective. It suggested two possibilities that should be further explored: employing the services of the Secretary-General and addressing the question of more specific tasks for the consultative meeting that had been agreed upon at the First Review Conference.

Western States had similar concerns. Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom noted that those countries considered assurance of compliance crucial for creating confidence

in the Convention and strengthening its authority. France believed that political behaviour at variance with the spirit of the Convention was the major cause of the erosion of confidence and stated that it could not ignore certain allegations of the use of prohibited weapons. However regrettable it might be that the parties concerned had not seemed to do everything in their power to demonstrate their good faith, France recognized that the Convention laid down no procedure which would help to resolve the problem in such situations. Since a review conference did not have the power to amend the Convention, more limited and pragmatic solutions must be sought. France welcomed the fact that the idea of establishing control mechanisms had not been opposed. Consideration might be given to the introduction of international fact-finding procedures based on General Assembly resolutions 37/98 D and 39/65 E, concerning the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Towards the end of the Conference, when the general debate was over, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Soviet Union submitted in a plenary meeting a proposal according to which a consultative meeting at the expert level, open to all States parties to the Convention, would be convened in Geneva in March 1987 with the aim of working out and agreeing on decisions and recommendations concerning: (a) establishment of a group of scientific experts to study the latest biological developments of relevance to compliance with the Convention; (b) exchanges of data on biological research centres and epidemic diseases and exchanges of other information, with a view to strengthening the mechanism of compliance with the Convention; (c) broader co-operation among States in the peaceful development and uses of bio-sciences for the purpose of furthering socio-economic, scientific and technological advances; and (d) preparatory work for a special conference of the States parties to the Convention to draw up and adopt an additional protocol which would provide for measures to strengthen the system of verification of compliance with the Convention.

The provisions of articles I to III of the Convention, which set out prohibitions on substances and equipment and laid down actions to be undertaken by parties, generated considerable controversy, with some States asserting full compliance, yet others continuing to express doubts in that regard. The United States declared that it was in full compliance with its obligations under article I, but it believed that the Soviet Union had continued to maintain an offensive biological warfare programme and capability and had been involved in the production and use of toxins for hostile purposes in South-East Asia and Afghanistan. For its part, the Soviet Union stated that it had scrupulously observed its obligations under articles I, II, III and IV of the Convention. It did not possess any bacteriological agents or toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery. It had never transferred such weapons to allied States or third countries nor provided information concerning their development. It had no stockpiles of weapons of that kind outside its territory and did not carry out any development of such weapons on the territories of other States.

India's position was that the Convention had so far fulfilled its purpose with regard to article I. It recognized that the relatively quick adoption of the

Convention had been partly due to the limited military utility of biological methods of warfare at that time. The situation had since changed considerably and problems might emerge from the misuse of recent scientific advances. Pakistan noted that since article I did not define the prohibited types of agents and quantities, there was considerable scope for abuse. A very fine line divided research for peaceful purposes from research for military purposes, and in order to eliminate misunderstandings there should be greater transparency in research on biological agents. Countries engaged in such research should so inform the United Nations and open their laboratories to interested scientists.

China expressed the view that a potential for the development of new types of biological weapons was inherent in the new biotechnology. Against the background of an intensifying arms race between the super-Powers, that potential danger was attracting greater attention. China believed that current technological achievements still fell within the scope of the Convention's provisions and that it could, therefore, cover the development of modern science and technology. Subsequently, China submitted a proposal to the effect that the definition of toxins should be supplemented.

For its part, Ireland pointed out that article I permitted the development, production and stockpiling of biological agents or toxins for "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes". The Convention had, however, been drawn up before the development of genetic engineering, a field in which advances had been unexpectedly rapid. Although Ireland believed that recent developments continued to fall within the scope of article I, it recognized that they had led to fears of misuse which, whether justified or not, must be taken into consideration by the Conference. Czechoslovakia pointed out that new methods of turning non-pathogenic bacteria into virulent agents were open to the danger of misuse for military purposes, but in its view the Convention covered all the achievements of recent scientific and technological progress.

Article X, concerning international co-operation for the peaceful use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, was also frequently addressed during the debate. In Nigeria's view, greater efforts were needed to implement that article because of the pressing health needs of the developing countries. China believed that the chief purpose of article X was to promote rather than hamper the peaceful use of biological agents and toxins. The exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information in the field of biotechnology should therefore be promoted. In Peru's view, the developing countries should enjoy preferential treatment in the broad exchanges of information and materials between parties mentioned in article X. The international community should show fairness and solidarity in using the resources released through biological disarmament by the more developed countries. Argentina hoped that the Review Conference would recognize the urgent need to set up a system of co-operation that would enable all States to profit from the application of scientific progress on an equal footing and facilitate the transfer of information, equipment, raw materials and knowledge to the benefit of the developing countries. Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic believed that the development of peaceful international co-operation

to take advantage of new biological findings, as called for under article X, was an essential means of strengthening the Convention.

Many delegations also commented on article IV, which stipulates that each party should, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take the necessary measures to implement the commitments under article I. A number of countries, including Finland, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands and Nigeria, announced that they had taken such measures. Hungary stated that the Convention was currently an organic part of its national legislation, in compliance with article IV. The Netherlands had enacted regulations for the implementation of article IV and had communicated the text to the United Nations. It believed that such openness about implementation could play a useful role in building confidence about compliance.

Work of the Committee of the Whole

The Committee of the Whole held eight meetings between 16 and 22 September to conduct an article-by-article review of the Convention. In that connection, a large number of proposals regarding various articles were submitted by States parties. The texts of all the proposals were reproduced in the annex to the report of the Committee of the Whole, which is an integral part of the Final Document.¹² A list of the proposals appears at the end of part II of the Final Document, which is reproduced as an annex to this chapter.

Concerning articles V, VI and VII, most delegations agreed that the verification of compliance and complaints procedures required improvement. Some considered that the establishment of flexible, objective and non-discriminatory procedures was of fundamental importance in strengthening respect for the Convention. Several stated that there were problems related to recent developments in biotechnology as well as to uncertainties connected with allegations of non-compliance that had not been resolved. Others considered those allegations groundless and held that any unfounded allegations undermined the Convention and were not in accordance with the provisions of article V.

Articles I, II and III again gave rise to a significant divergence of views. Delegations agreed that article I covered scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, but some of them expressed concern at problems which might emerge if there were to be misuse of scientific advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering. In connection with article II, the Conference noted with satisfaction the declarations that States having acceded to the Convention since the First Review Conference had made to the effect that they did not possess agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery prohibited under the Convention. Several delegations stressed that the provisions of article III should not be used to impose restrictions on the

¹² *Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document (BWC/CONF.II/13)* (Geneva, 1986). The Document consists of four parts; the report of the Committee of the Whole is found in part III.

transfer for peaceful uses of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials to States parties.

Some parties stated their belief that articles I and III had been violated by other States. One State party noted that its concerns also related to article II and that no satisfactory answer had been given to its repeated requests for clarification made on the basis of article V. The States concerned categorically rejected those accusations as completely unfounded, stressed that all questions had been answered and noted that no complaint had been lodged with the Security Council under the Convention.

Violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol were brought up in connection with the consideration of article VIII, which refers to the Protocol. Its validity was reaffirmed and many delegations reiterated that States parties which had not yet done so should consider becoming parties to the Protocol. In connection with article IX, by which States parties undertake to continue negotiations in good faith on a convention on chemical weapons, many delegations expressed regret that agreement on such a convention had not yet been reached and urged the Conference on Disarmament to speed up efforts to conclude the negotiations.

In the light of scientific developments in the field of biological agents and toxins with peaceful applications, the increasing importance of article X was stressed. Many delegations urged the adoption of specific measures for promoting the fullest possible international co-operation in that field. In their view, such measures should include a wider exchange of equipment, materials and information among States, increased technical assistance to the developing countries in the use of toxin and microbial agents for peaceful purposes, the establishment of adequate institutional means within the United Nations system and the full utilization of the possibilities of the specialized agencies and other international organizations.

Work of the Drafting Committee

After the Committee of the Whole had concluded its work on the article-by-article review, the Drafting Committee began to prepare a draft final document, including a draft final declaration. The Committee held six meetings from 22 to 26 September and intensive negotiations to arrive at a text acceptable to all, giving careful and thorough consideration to the various proposals put forward by delegations for inclusion in the final declaration. Three consultative groups were convened under the chairmanship of the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Norway, and Sweden, respectively.

The Drafting Committee concluded its task by submitting its report,¹³ which it had unanimously approved, to the plenary meeting of the Review Conference. The report contained the draft final document. In introducing it on 26 September, the Chairman of the Committee said that the report had

¹³ BWC/CONF.II/11.

been adopted after detailed and exhaustive consultations, during which delegations had made clear their commitment to the objectives of the Convention and their determination to ensure its implementation and strengthening.

In the preambular part of the draft final declaration, the States parties would recognize the continuing importance of the Convention, confirm their common interest in strengthening its authority and effectiveness, and appeal to all States to refrain from any action which might place the Convention in jeopardy.

Regarding article I, the Conference would affirm that the Convention unequivocally applied to all natural or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or methods of production. It would note statements by some parties concerning doubt about compliance with articles I, II and III in some cases and their belief that efforts to resolve those concerns had not been successful, and it would also note the statements by other parties that such a doubt was unfounded. The Conference would agree that a positive approach to questions of compliance in accordance with the provisions of the Convention was in the interest of all States parties and would serve to promote confidence among them.

In its review of article IV, the Conference would specify certain measures which could be enacted at the national level to prevent actions which would contravene the Convention. It would invite States parties to provide information on such measures to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

Taking into account the need expressed to strengthen implementation of the Convention's provisions, the Conference would, under article V, elaborate on the procedures to be followed in a consultative meeting. It would agree that such a meeting should be promptly convened upon the request of a State party and should consider any problems regarding the objective of the Convention or the application of its provisions, suggest ways and means of clarifying ambiguous or unresolved matters, and initiate appropriate international procedures, and it considered that States parties should co-operate with the consultative meeting. The Conference would further agree that the States parties would implement, on the basis of mutual co-operation, a number of measures to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and to improve international co-operation in peaceful biological activities. They would include:

1. Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national or international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or specialize in permitted biological activities directly related to the Convention.

2. Exchange of information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as regards type, development, place, or time of occurrence. If possible, the information provided would include, as soon as it is available, data on the type of disease, approximate area affected, and number of cases.

3. Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States Parties, as well as promotion of use for permitted purposes of knowledge gained in this research.

4. Active promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges for joint research on a mutually agreed basis.

The Conference would also agree that an *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts from States parties would be held in Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987 to finalize the modalities for the exchange of information and data. It would urge States parties, pending the results of that meeting, to apply the measures and report the data agreed upon to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, which would make it available to all States parties.

As for article VI, the Conference would note the need to further improve and strengthen procedures to enhance greater confidence in the Convention and would consider that the Security Council might, if it deemed it necessary, request the advice of the World Health Organization in carrying out any investigation of complaints lodged with the Council.

The Conference would reaffirm the importance of article VIII and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Moreover, noting the report of the Security Council of 12 March 1986 on the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq,¹⁴ the Conference would appeal to all States parties to the Protocol to fulfil their obligations under it. Regarding article IX, the States parties would urge the Conference on Disarmament to exert all possible efforts to conclude an agreement on a total ban on chemical weapons with effective verification provisions at the earliest possible date.

Under article X, the Conference would urge States parties to take specific measures to promote the fullest possible international co-operation in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins with peaceful applications. It would note that co-operation would be best initiated by improving institutional direction and co-ordination and would recommend that measures to ensure co-operation be pursued within the existing United Nations system. Accordingly, it would request the Secretary-General to examine ways of improving institutional mechanisms and urge a number of the specialized agencies of the United Nations to co-operate with him.

Finally, the Conference would decide, in the context of article XII, that a third review conference should be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States parties not later than 1991, to consider: (a) the impact of scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention; (b) the relevance for the Convention of the results of the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban; (c) the effectiveness of the provisions in article V for consultation and co-operation and the effectiveness of the co-operative measures agreed upon at the Review Conference; and (d) in the light of these matters and the provisions of article XI, whether or not further actions were called for to create additional co-operative measures in the context of article V, or legally binding improvements to the Convention, or a combination of both.

¹⁴ S/17911 and Add.1 and 2.

Concluding part of the Conference

Just before midnight on 26 September, the Review Conference concluded its work, adopting by consensus its Final Document¹⁵ as proposed by the Drafting Committee. The Document consists of four parts: part I: organization and work of the Conference; part II: Final Declaration; part III: report of the Committee of the Whole; and part IV: summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference. The text of the Final Declaration (which is reproduced in the annex to this chapter) reflects concerns voiced by many States parties during the general debate and in the Committee of the Whole. In some aspects, it provides more concrete guidance for the implementation of various provisions of the Convention than did the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference. As mentioned above, a list of all the proposals that were put forward is included in the Final Declaration.

At the time of the adoption of the Final Document, a number of States commented on it and the Conference in general. Most delegations considered the Second Review Conference a success. The Soviet Union stated that the Conference had proved that the Convention was still an effective arms limitation instrument. The Conference had displayed a constructive spirit, despite certain moves which it believed were prompted by a desire for confrontation. In its view, rapid effect should be given to the constructive ideas put forward during the Conference, particularly regarding the appointment of a group of technical experts and the organization of a special conference on a verification mechanism.

The United States welcomed the successful conclusion of the Conference. It stated that it had endeavoured to adopt an approach that was both critical and constructive, and it was in that spirit that it had made clear its conviction that the Convention had been violated. It noted that the Final Declaration reflected the grave doubts of several parties about compliance and that the Conference as a whole had stressed the need to deal seriously with compliance issues.

The United Kingdom also welcomed the successful outcome of the Conference and, in particular, the strong reaffirmation of the value of the Convention; the agreement on strengthening measures, which would be followed up on at an expert meeting in the spring of 1987; the recognition of the importance of the result of the negotiations on a ban on chemical weapons; and, lastly, the decision to convene a third review conference at an early date with a view to considering further strengthening measures and the possibility of legally binding improvements to the Convention.

China believed that the Conference had considered matters of crucial interest for the whole of mankind and that there was thus every reason to be satisfied with its results. It welcomed in particular the provisions adopted concerning the implementation of articles V and X.

India, speaking on behalf of the group of non-aligned, neutral and other States, stated that the Conference had displayed the necessary will to preserve

¹⁵ See footnote 12.

the main objectives of the Convention and to strengthen the régime established by it. It welcomed the adoption of the Final Declaration, which contained many positive elements, particularly regarding the implementation of article X.

In his concluding statement, the President of the Conference noted that one had to be fully aware of the particular features of the Convention and its review process when assessing the results of the Conference. The Convention was a treaty that was not only a disarmament measure, but also an important element in international humanitarian law, since it gave practical substance to the general prohibition of weapons that caused unnecessary suffering. At the same time, since it was highly dependent on the evolution of science, it should be a living organism, as it were, capable of adapting itself to the changing circumstances of scientific progress. The President believed that there was a prevailing feeling at the end of the Conference that the Convention was indeed alive and that its lifetime could be extended if its organs and mechanisms were strengthened and if confidence in its reliability could be reinforced.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

During the forty-first session of the General Assembly, a number of States addressed the question of biological weapons and commented on the Second Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention in the First Committee.¹⁶

The United States, while stressing its continued adherence to the Convention, restated its view that the Soviet Union had violated its terms. It again referred to the increased difficulties that advances in the field of biotechnology posed for verification and noted the fact that a number of countries had joined in expressing doubts about compliance with the provisions of the Convention. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, believed that the authority of the Convention, as the international norm against biological and toxin weapons, had been strengthened as a result of the successful conclusion of the Conference. None the less, the Twelve felt that more could and should be done. They hoped that the envisaged meeting of experts could take a step further the process of increasing confidence in the biological-weapons-control régime.

Norway attached particular importance to the measures on which the Conference had agreed in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and in order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities. France held that the measures adopted by the Review Conference to increase confidence in compliance with the Convention were only a first step, but a step in the right direction. New Zealand believed that the successful outcome of the Conference

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 32nd, 36th and 40th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

was a solid testimony to the value of review conferences of disarmament and arms-control agreements.

The Soviet Union welcomed the Conference's decision concerning the development of peaceful co-operation in promising areas of bacteriology. Czechoslovakia considered that the socialist States had demonstrated a constructive and frank position on the issues addressed at the Conference, including readiness to undertake far-reaching measures to establish control and verification of the Convention. Poland regarded the outcome of the Review Conference as positive, in that it had proved the possibility of constructive co-operation by States in the implementation and possible further development of their accepted obligations. The Byelorussian SSR believed that the success of the Conference would go a long way towards strengthening the Convention's régime.

Argentina expressed the opinion that the Second Review Conference had led to unexpectedly positive results. Together with a number of other disarmament meetings held in the course of 1986, it had contributed to the impression that the two major Powers were genuinely working towards a dialogue that would move them farther away from confrontation. India drew attention to the new dangers posed by chemical and biological agents when used for weapons purposes. Their potential lethality had increased enormously as a result of recent scientific and technological advances. It held that the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference had been significant in that it had strengthened the Convention's provisions relating to verification and international co-operation for the peaceful uses of genetic engineering and biotechnology. Pakistan hoped that the issue of biological weapons would be taken up in a serious and constructive spirit at a third review conference of the Convention and lead to the adoption of an additional protocol incorporating an improved verification and complaints machinery, which would be at once flexible, objective and equitable. In its view, the need for intensifying international co-operation in the peaceful uses of biological agents and toxins was of particular importance to the developing countries.

Thailand stated that it valued the Convention highly, because it provided a standard by which actions of alleged violators could be ascertained. It was convinced that measures such as information sharing, consultative meetings of experts and speedy international on-site inspection of alleged improper use of toxin agents would contribute to the effectiveness of the Convention. In connection with the introduction of the draft resolution on the subject (see below), Austria commented generally on the outcome of the Review Conference. It held that the delegations had displayed a high degree of flexibility and common willingness to restore confidence in the reliability of the Convention, a confidence which had been slowly eroding. The Conference had been faced with the demanding task of having to strengthen an ailing treaty régime without the possibility of major surgery. Seen in that light, the Review Conference had been most successful.

On 28 October, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hun-

gary, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Kenya, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution entitled "Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction". It was introduced in the First Committee on 29 October by the representative of Austria, who had been the President of the Conference. He pointed out that the draft, which was mainly of a procedural nature, took note in a general way of the results of the Conference and appealed to those States not yet parties to the Convention to adhere to it as soon as possible. The text also focused on the forthcoming expert meeting, which would finalize the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration. There was an informal understanding by which the *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts would be considered as a follow-up to the Review Conference, which implied that it would meet under the authority of the President of the Conference and that its costs would be borne by the States parties in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Conference. He expected that the *ad hoc* meeting would accomplish its task appropriately and thereby facilitate the full implementation of the confidence-building measures approved by the Conference.

On 6 November a revised draft resolution was submitted by the previous sponsors and Bhutan, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Peru and the United States, which were later also joined by India. In the revised draft, two operative paragraphs of the original draft were condensed into a new operative paragraph 2 (see below), thereby removing a direct reference to the envisaged *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts.

In commenting on the revised draft, Peru stated its belief that the new paragraph better reflected the interests of all the States parties to the Convention in the implementation of the provisions of the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference. It noted with optimism that the results of the Conference reflected the determination of the States parties to continue to perfect that multilateral instrument. The collective interest had been focused on the careful, rational use of genetic engineering, biotechnology, microbiology and other associated fields for peaceful purposes and especially for the benefit of the developing countries.

At the time that action was taken on the revised draft in the First Committee, three States made statements concerning it. Venezuela at first indicated that it would abstain because of the financial implications of the draft, of which it had been unaware. Responding to that statement, Australia expressed its view that the Second Review Conference had reached a conclusion of very considerable significance, not least because it was forward-looking and because it provided for further strengthening and development of the biological weapons Convention. In order to ensure the adoption of the draft by consensus, Australia suggested that action on it be deferred to allow for the necessary consultations. Venezuela then stated that it was aware of the importance of the draft and would be prepared to participate in its adoption without a vote

if the record would show that it had expressed reservations concerning the financial implications.

Explaining its position, the United States expressed its pleasure concerning the unanimous adoption of the revised draft. On the other hand, it restated its conviction that violations of the Convention had taken place and noted that the Conference as a whole stressed the need to deal with the compliance issue. The United States also expressed the hope that the measures intended to strengthen the norm against biological and toxin weapons established by the Convention would be fully implemented by the States parties and that they would lead to greater international transparency and openness with regard to the Convention.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 3 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 41/58 A.¹⁷ It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Convention,

Recalling its resolution 39/65 D of 12 December 1984, in which it noted that, at the request of a majority of States parties to the Convention, a second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention would be held in 1986,

Recalling that the States parties to the Convention met at Geneva from 8 to 26 September 1986 to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, were being realized,

Noting with satisfaction that, at the time of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, there were more than a hundred States parties to the Convention, including all the permanent members of the Security Council,

1. *Notes with appreciation* that on 26 September 1986, the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction adopted by consensus a Final Declaration;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of relevant parts of the Final Declaration;

3. *Calls upon* all signatory States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not yet signed the Convention to join the States parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention and to international confidence.

Conclusion

The Second Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention, held in 1986, was considered a success because, among other things, it unanimously adopted a Final Declaration in which the significance of the Conven-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 94th meeting.

tion was reaffirmed. Various views were expressed concerning the need to strengthen the Convention in general and its provisions on verification and compliance in particular. In the Final Declaration of the Conference, all States parties joined in reaffirming the importance of those aspects. The Conference also took a practical step to ensure the finalization of the modalities for exchanges of information and data by deciding to hold in 1987 an *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts devoted to that subject. As to the Final Declaration as a whole, in some aspects it provides more concrete guidance for the implementation of various provisions of the Convention than did the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference.

By its resolution 41/58 A, the General Assembly unanimously expressed its appreciation for the consensus adoption of the Final Declaration and called on the States that were not yet parties to the Convention to accede to it without delay in order to enhance international confidence in it.

ANNEX

Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction*

Preamble

The States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, having met in Geneva 8-26 September 1986 in accordance with a decision by the First Review Conference 1980 and at the request of a majority of States parties to the Convention, to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Convention are being realized:

Reaffirming their determination to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the continuing importance of the Convention and its objectives and the common interest of mankind in the elimination of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons,

Affirming their belief that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international peace and security, would not hamper economic or technological development and, further, would facilitate the wider exchange of information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents for peaceful purposes,

Confirming the common interest in strengthening the authority and the effectiveness of the Convention, to promote confidence and co-operation among States parties,

Affirming the importance of strengthening international co-operation in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all

* BWC/CONF.II/13/II.

actions contrary to the said principles and objectives,

Recognizing the importance of achieving as a matter of high priority an international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction,

Noting the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Appealing to all States to refrain from any action which might place the Convention or any of its provisions in jeopardy,

Declare their strong determination, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of microbial, or other biological agents, or toxins being used as weapons and reaffirm their strong support for the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their legal obligation under international law to implement and strictly comply with its provisions.

Article I

The Conference notes the importance of Article I as the Article which defines the scope of the Convention and reaffirms its support for the provisions of this article.

The Conference concludes that the scope of Article I covers scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

The Conference notes statements by some States parties that compliance with Articles I, II and III was, in their view, subject to grave doubt in some cases and that efforts to resolve those concerns had not been successful. The Conference notes the statements by other States parties that such a doubt was unfounded and, in their view, not in accordance with the Convention. The Conference agrees that the application by States parties of a positive approach in questions of compliance in accordance with the provisions of the Convention was in the interest of all States parties and that this would serve to promote confidence among States parties.

The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological developments, *inter alia*, in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States parties in Article I applies to all such developments.

The Conference reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production. Consequently, toxins (both proteinaceous and non-proteinaceous) of a microbial, animal or vegetable nature and their synthetically produced analogues are covered.

Article II

The Conference notes the importance of Article II and welcomes the statements made by States which have become parties to the Convention since the First Review Conference that they do not possess agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery referred to in Article I of the Convention. The Conference believes that such statements enhance confidence in the Convention.

The Conference stresses that States which become parties to the Convention, in implementing the provisions of this Article, shall observe all necessary safety precautions to protect populations and the environment.

Article III

The Conference notes the importance of Article III and welcomes the statements which States that have acceded to the Convention have made to the effect that they have not transferred agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery, specified in Article I of the Convention, to any recipient whatsoever and have not furnished assistance, encouragement or inducement to any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire

them. The Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive so as to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, national and sub-national levels.

The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials to States parties.

Article IV

The Conference notes the importance of Article IV, under which each State party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit or prevent any acts or actions which would contravene the Convention.

The Conference calls upon all States parties which have not yet taken any necessary measures in accordance with their constitutional processes, as required by the article, to do so immediately.

The Conference notes that States parties, as requested by the First Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs information on and the texts of specific legislation enacted or other regulatory measures taken by them, relevant to this article. ~~The Conference invites States parties to continue to provide such information and texts to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs for purposes of consultation.~~

The Conference notes the importance of

—legislative, administrative and other measures designed effectively to guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Convention within the territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State party,

—legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorized access to and removal of pathogenic or toxic material, and

—inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol and believes that such measures which States might undertake in accordance with their constitutional process would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention.

Article V

The Conference notes the importance of Article V and reaffirms the obligation assumed by States parties to consult and co-operate with one another in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.

The Conference reaffirms that consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

The Conference confirms the conclusion in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference that these procedures include, *inter alia*, the right of any State party to request that a consultative meeting open to all States parties be convened at expert level.

The Conference stresses the need for all States to deal seriously with compliance issues and emphasizes that the failure to do so undermines the Convention and the arms control process in general.

The Conference appeals to States parties to make all possible efforts to solve any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention with a view towards encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to. The Conference further requests that information on such efforts be provided to the Third Review Conference.

The Conference, taking into account views expressed concerning the need to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of Article V, has agreed:

—that a consultative meeting shall be promptly convened when requested by a State party,

—that a consultative meeting may consider any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention, suggest ways and

means for further clarifying, *inter alia*, with assistance of technical experts, any matter considered ambiguous or unresolved, as well as initiate appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter,

—that the consultative meeting, or any State party, may request specialized assistance in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention, through, *inter alia*, appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter,

—the Conference considers that States parties shall co-operate with the consultative meeting in its consideration of any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention, and in clarifying ambiguous and unresolved matters, as well as co-operate in appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

The Conference, mindful of the provisions of Article V and Article X, and determined to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence in the implementation of its provisions, agrees that the States parties are to implement, on the basis of mutual co-operation, the following measures, in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities:

1. Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national or international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or specialize in permitted biological activities directly related to the Convention.

2. Exchange of information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as regards type, development, place, or time of occurrence. If possible, the information provided would include, as soon as it is available, data on the type of disease, approximate area affected, and number of cases.

3. Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States parties, as well as promotion of use for permitted purposes of knowledge gained in this research.

4. Active promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges for joint research on a mutually agreed basis.

The Conference decides to hold an *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts from States parties to finalize the modalities for the exchange of information and data by working out, *inter alia*, appropriate forms to be used by States parties for the exchange of information agreed to in this Final Declaration, thus enabling States parties to follow a standardized procedure. The group shall meet in Geneva for the period 31 March-15 April 1987 and shall communicate the results of the work to the States parties immediately thereafter.

Pending the results of this meeting, the Conference urges States parties to promptly apply these measures and report the data agreed upon to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

The Conference requests the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs to make available the information received to all States parties.

Article VI

The Conference also notes the importance of Article VI, which in addition to the procedures contained in Article V, provides for any State party, which finds that any other State party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention, to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council and under which each State party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate.

The Conference notes the need to further improve and strengthen this and other procedures to enhance greater confidence in the Convention. The Conference considers that the Security Council may, if it deems it necessary, request the advice of the World Health Organization in carrying out any investigation of complaints lodged with the Council.

Article VII

The Conference notes that these provisions have not been invoked.

Article VIII

The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VIII and stresses the importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

The Conference reaffirms that nothing contained in the Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. Noting the report of the Security Council (S/17911), the Conference appeals to all States parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to fulfil their obligations assumed under that Protocol and urges all States not yet parties to the said Protocol to adhere to it at the earliest possible date.

Article IX

The Conference reaffirms the obligation assumed by States parties to continue negotiations in good faith towards an early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

All States parties participating in the Conference reiterate their strong commitment to this important goal.

The Conference notes with satisfaction the substantial progress made in the negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament during the period under review. The Conference also takes note of the bilateral talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on all aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Conference nevertheless deeply regrets that an agreement on a convention on chemical weapons has not yet been reached.

The Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament to exert all possible efforts to conclude an agreement on a total ban of chemical weapons with effective verification provisions by the earliest possible date.

Article X

The Conference emphasizes the increasing importance of the provisions of Article X, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins with peaceful applications, which have vastly increased the potential for co-operation between States to help promote economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress, particularly in the developing countries, in conformity with their interests, needs and priorities.

The Conference, while acknowledging what has already been done towards this end, notes with concern the increasing gap between the developed and the developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas. The Conference accordingly urges States parties to provide wider access to and share their scientific and technological knowledge in this field, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind.

The Conference urges that States parties take specific measures within their competence for the promotion of the fullest possible international co-operation in this field through their active intervention. Such measures could include, *inter alia*:

- transfer and exchange of information concerning research programmes in bio-sciences;
- wider transfer and exchange of information, materials and equipment among States on a systematic and long-term basis;

—active promotion of contacts between scientists and technical personnel on a reciprocal basis, in relevant fields;

—increased technical co-operation, including training opportunities to developing countries in the use of bio-sciences and genetic engineering for peaceful purposes;

—facilitating the conclusion of bilateral, regional and multiregional agreements providing on a mutually advantageous, equal and non-discriminatory basis, for their participation in the development and application of biotechnology;

—encouraging the co-ordination of national and regional programmes and working out in an appropriate manner the ways and means of co-operation in this field.

The Conference calls for greater co-operation in international public health and disease control.

The Conference urges that co-operation under Article X should be actively pursued both within the bilateral and the multilateral framework and further urges the use of existing institutional means within the United Nations system and the full utilization of the possibilities provided by the specialized agencies and other international organizations.

The Conference, noting that co-operation would be best initiated by improved institutionalized direction and co-ordination, recommends that measures to ensure co-operation on such a basis be pursued within the existing means of the United Nations system. Accordingly, the Conference requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to propose for inclusion on the agenda of a relevant United Nations body a discussion and examination of the means for improving institutional mechanisms in order to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. The Conference recommends that invitations to participate in this discussion and examination should be extended to all States parties, whether or not they are members of the United Nations and concerned specialized agencies.

The Conference requests the States parties and the United Nations Secretariat to include in the document materials prepared for the above-mentioned discussion of States parties, information and suggestions on the implementation of Article X, taking into account the preceding paragraphs. Furthermore, it urges the specialized agencies, *inter alia*. FAO, WHO, UNESCO, WIPO and UNIDO, to participate in this discussion and fully co-operate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and requests the Secretary-General to send all relevant information of this Conference to these agencies.

The Conference, referring to paragraph 35 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, stresses the importance of the obligations under Article X in promoting economic and social development of developing countries, particularly in the light of the United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, for the States participating therein, scheduled for 1987.

The Conference, to ensure compliance with Article X, also requests States parties and the United Nations Secretariat to provide information relevant to the implementation of the Article for examination by the next conference of States parties.

The Conference upholds that the above-mentioned measures would positively strengthen the Convention.

Article XI

The Conference notes the importance of Article XI and that since the entry into force of the Convention the provisions of the Article have not been invoked.

Article XII

The Conference decides that a Third Review Conference shall be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States parties not later than 1991.

The Conference, noting the differing views with regard to verification, decides that the Third Review Conference shall consider, *inter alia*:

—the impact of scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention,

—the relevance for effective implementation of the Convention of the results achieved in the negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons,

—the effectiveness of the provisions in Article V for consultation and co-operation and of the co-operative measures agreed in this Final Declaration, and

—in the light of these considerations and of the provisions of Article XI, whether or not further actions are called for to create further co-operative measures in the context of Article V, or legally binding improvements to the Convention, or a combination of both.

Article XIII

The Conference notes the provisions of Article XIII and expresses its satisfaction that no State party to the Convention has exercised its right to withdraw from the Convention.

Article XIV

The Conference notes with satisfaction that a significant number of States have ratified or acceded to the Convention since the First Review Conference and that there are now more than 100 States parties to the Convention, including all the permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Conference calls upon States which have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the Convention to join the States parties thereto thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.

The Conference makes an urgent appeal to all States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which did not participate in its work, to give their effective co-operation and take part more actively in the common endeavour of all the Contracting Parties to strengthen the objectives and purposes of the Convention. In this connection, the Conference urges all States parties that were absent to take part in the future work envisaged in this Final Declaration.

Article XV

The Conference notes the provisions of Article XV.

The following proposals were submitted to the Conference and considered by it; their full text is reproduced in the Final Document of the Review Conference.

Preamble—Cuba

Bulgaria
Finland
German Democratic Republic
Sweden

Article

I China
I German Democratic Republic and Hungary
I Ireland
Sweden
I-III Bulgaria and German Democratic Republic
I-IV United States of America
III Argentina
III Finland
IV German Democratic Republic
V Argentina
V Australia, Netherlands and New Zealand
V Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Norway, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom
V Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, and the United States of America
V Finland
V Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom

Article

- V Australia, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and United States of America
- V Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Turkey and the United States of America
- V German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- V Ireland
- V Sweden
- V-VI Pakistan
- V-VI Germany, Federal Republic of and the United Kingdom
- V-VI German Democratic Republic
- V-VI Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- VI Colombia
- VI Colombia
- VI France
- VI Nigeria
- VI Nigeria
- VI United States of America
- IX Poland, Bulgaria and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
- IX Sweden
- IX Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- X Argentina
- X Bulgaria
- X Czechoslovakia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- X Czechoslovakia and Poland
- X Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- X Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)
- X India
- X Hungary, Mongolia, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- X Pakistan
- X Peru
- X Poland
- X German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
- XI Ireland
- XI Sweden
- XII Sweden
- XIV Hungary

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

Introduction

THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE have been discussed in various United Nations forums, particularly in the General Assembly and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its subsidiary bodies, since the beginning of the space age in 1957. Those discussions have contributed to the conclusion of a number of international agreements concerning both military and peaceful aspects of the use of outer space.¹

Among such agreements, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, known as the partial test-ban Treaty, specifically prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space. According to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, known as the outer space Treaty, "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means" (article II) and the parties undertake "not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner" (article IV). Detailed norms for States are included in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies to ensure that the Moon and other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than Earth, are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The prevention of the militarization of outer space has become an increasingly significant objective for the United Nations because of the possi-

¹ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 8: 1983, chap. XVI. The following treaties are frequently cited in debates on the prevention of an arms race in outer space: (a) Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 1963 (United Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964); (b) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967 (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex); (c) Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 1972, known as the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13446); and (d) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1979 (General Assembly resolution 34/68, annex). The texts of the first, second and fourth agreements are reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5), and their status is given in appendix I of this volume.

bilities offered by rapidly advancing space technology. That need was reflected in the 1978 Final Document, which called for international negotiations to be held on the issue.² Three developments in 1981 were indicative of the growing sense of urgency. In that year, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.³ In addition, on a socialist initiative, the Assembly requested the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva to start negotiations on the text of such a treaty. Finally, by a parallel initiative of a group of Western States, the Assembly requested the Geneva body to consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements for preventing an arms race in outer space and to give priority to an agreement prohibiting anti-satellite systems.

Since 1982, the negotiating body has had on its agenda an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" However, it took three years to agree to establish a subsidiary body on the subject—although a majority of members advocated doing so—because of differing views over the formulation of its mandate. In 1983, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly its "Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space against the Earth" ⁴ Each political group submitted a draft resolution, but for the first time some narrowing of differences took place in that the Eastern European and Western drafts were not put to a vote, and a third one, initiated by Egypt and Sri Lanka, was adopted, again requesting the Conference on Disarmament to take action on the matter.

In 1984 the Conference was still unable to agree on the formulation of a mandate for an *ad hoc* committee. In his address to the General Assembly, President Reagan indicated that the United States was prepared to discuss a wide range of issues of concern to both it and the Soviet Union, including the militarization of space. Because of the divergent approaches to the question, no fewer than four draft resolutions were introduced. Again, however, only one was put to a vote, being adopted by 150 votes to none, with 1 abstention, as resolution 39/59. By it, the General Assembly reiterated its request to the Conference on Disarmament and urged the Soviet Union and the United States to initiate negotiations aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

In 1985, the question was more than ever before a major concern both within and outside the United Nations. On the multilateral level, the main development was the setting up of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament under the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", pursuant to resolution 39/59. The Conference requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee, as a first step, to examine, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the subject. In the General Assembly, four

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 80.

³ A/36/192, annex. The Soviet draft treaty is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, appendix VII.

⁴ A/38/194. The draft treaty, also submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 1984, is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, appendix VIII.

competing draft resolutions were again submitted, but only one, following revisions agreed upon in consultations, was put to the vote. It was adopted almost unanimously—151 votes in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions—as resolution 40/87. By such widespread support, the General Assembly sought to enable the Conference on Disarmament to intensify, as a matter of priority, its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. On the bilateral level, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Recognizing the importance of the bilateral approach to the issue, the Assembly, by resolution 40/87, also urged the two Powers to pursue their negotiations in a constructive spirit.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

During the Disarmament Commission's substantive session, several references to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space were made in the context of a general exchange of views in plenary meetings.⁵ The question was also considered in the context of agenda item 4 (see page 13), in close conjunction with nuclear questions. In spite of renewed efforts to make concrete recommendations on the item, including the outer space aspect, the Commission was unable to do so (see chapter VI).⁶

The Soviet Union reiterated that it opposed the development of space strike weapons, which it viewed as being no less dangerous and even more unpredictable than nuclear weapons. It had been asserted in the United States that it would take about 10 to 15 years, or even less, to determine the practical feasibility of developing and deploying space weapons, the Soviet Union noted. Moreover, it appeared that the experiment had been conceived in such a manner that "it would leave only the debris of such pillars of strategic stability as the 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty and other relevant agreements" The Soviet Union, therefore, proposed that nuclear weapons be eliminated within the same span of time as it would take to develop a "space shield", which the United States claimed was designed to counter nuclear weapons.

The German Democratic Republic condemned efforts to extend the arms race to outer space and, in the process, to destroy the existing military and strategic parity. States supporting that course and participating in plans to militarize outer space were assuming a serious responsibility, it stated. Similar views were expressed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainian SSR, Cuba and Viet Nam.

Yugoslavia viewed the fact that the two super-Powers were conducting a dialogue and negotiations on nuclear and outer space weapons as a sign that the voice of reason might ultimately prevail. China stated that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.

⁵ A/CN.10/PV.102-109, A/CN.10/PV.109/Corr.1 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*, sect. IV, para. 27 and annex I.

No country should develop, test or deploy space weapons in any form. An international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons should be elaborated as soon as possible.

A few Western countries referred to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in commenting upon the work of the Conference on Disarmament and the American-Soviet bilateral talks on nuclear and space weapons. In referring to the bilateral talks, New Zealand observed that difficulties in reaching equitable, balanced and verifiable agreements served to highlight the importance of preserving past achievements such as the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. Norway strongly supported the principal objectives of the bilateral talks, since it attached importance to reducing nuclear weapons substantially and to preventing an arms race in outer space.

In concluding statements, some countries regretted that lack of political will was preventing progress on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

The item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space was on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in 1986, as it had been since 1982. It was considered in plenary meetings during the periods from 3 to 14 March and from 30 June to 4 July. On 24 April, the Conference, "in the exercise of its responsibilities" in accordance with paragraph 120 of the 1978 Final Document, decided to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee under the agenda item, first established in 1985. The Conference mandated the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue to examine and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The decision also contained the following final paragraph:

The *Ad Hoc* Committee, in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, in 1985, and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1986 session.⁷

There were a number of new documents under the item, including a compendium of working papers put forward and statements made in plenary meetings, submitted by Canada;⁸ a working paper on terminology relevant to arms control and outer space, also submitted by Canada;⁹ a proposal on an international instrument to supplement the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, submitted by Pakistan;¹⁰ and a working paper on a draft definition of space strike weapons, submitted by Venezuela.¹¹

An extensive debate on outer space questions took place in plenary

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27)*, para. 90. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee appears *in extenso* under paragraph 90.

⁸ CD/732, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/678.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/716.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/708.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, document CD/709/Rev.1.

meetings.¹² A number of non-aligned and neutral countries reaffirmed their view that outer space was the common heritage of mankind and should be used exclusively to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all nations. In examining issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, they expressed concern that there was a very real threat that the military research and development programmes of the two major space Powers would be extended into outer space, leading to irreversible competition in the field of space weaponry. They emphasized that an arms race in outer space would undermine existing agreements relating to outer space and arms limitation, apart from jeopardizing the disarmament process as a whole. Accordingly, they stressed the urgency of the task of preventing the "weaponization" of space.

Egypt noted that the item had acquired increased importance with the United States announcement of its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was to establish a defensive anti-ballistic missile system in outer space. Egypt believed that the initiative was considered by the majority of States to mark a serious escalation of the arms race and to introduce into it completely new dimensions, with ominous political, economic and military implications. India remained unconvinced by arguments that defence against nuclear weapons was possible. It later pointed out that international law made no distinction between defensive and offensive weapons and that there was no defensive weapon that could not be used for offensive purposes. With a view to solving the verification problem in negotiating agreements to ban weapons in outer space, it called for readiness to accept full transparency in the development of national space programmes so that clandestine weapons development could be prevented. The Islamic Republic of Iran observed that no military or civilian object could escape satellite monitoring. The fact that such satellites were at the disposal of only a few countries was, in its view, a flagrant violation of the right of nations to privacy. Iran therefore urged the study of the issues involved in establishing an international satellite monitoring agency.

Sri Lanka considered that discussion of the existing legal régime for preventing an arms race in outer space was useful, but believed that the value of such analysis would be enhanced were it to be undertaken after the activities to be banned and the weapon systems to be outlawed had been identified. In introducing its working paper, mentioned above, Venezuela drew attention to the usefulness of the distinction between space objects that were genuine weapons and others which, while having a military character, did not actually carry out a weapons function. If the latter type became part of a weapons system, it could, if necessary, be considered a weapon. In its working paper, also referred to earlier, Pakistan called for all technologically advanced States, capable of using outer space, to adopt an international instrument to supplement the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty, as an interim confidence-building measure pending the conclusion of more comprehensive arrangements.

Socialist countries reiterated that they fully shared the view that outer space was the common heritage of mankind and that, consequently, its ex-

¹² *Ibid.*, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

ploration and use should be for exclusively peaceful purposes. They emphasized that the spread of the arms race to outer space would step up the arms race in other spheres and make reductions in nuclear arsenals impossible. They held that the key to preventing such a race lay in preventing the emergence of space strike weapons, including anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, space-based anti-ballistic missile systems and space-to-Earth weapons. In their view, such a prohibition would be an effective and secure way to prevent all possibilities for introducing weapons into outer space. They considered existing conditions suitable for banning such weapons and underlined the importance of maintaining relevant agreements, in particular, the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty.

The Soviet Union rejected assertions that the allegedly defensive nature of a space weapons system made it innocuous. It had no doubt that the United States SDI programme also possessed an offensive potential and that the construction of a so-called space shield was only meaningful as part of an aggressive design. In the Soviet view, even the formulation of the objective of developing a space-based anti-ballistic missile system, regardless of the stage of practical implementation, was contrary to the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. A major step in the direction of preventing an arms race in outer space could be taken by working out at the Conference an international agreement to ensure the immunity of artificial Earth satellites and to ban the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite systems, as well as to eliminate already existing ones. The Soviet Union outlined a three-stage programme which would lay the foundations of "Star Peace" by the year 2000.¹³ It would include, *inter alia*, setting up a world space organization for carrying out concrete projects of co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

Bulgaria was convinced that the task of preventing an arms race in outer space was intrinsically linked to the objectives of nuclear disarmament. In the East-West context, a buildup of strategic defence by one side was construed by the other side as an attempt to achieve strategic superiority. Czechoslovakia considered that efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space should be directed towards achieving a strict prohibition on the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons under appropriate verification, including access to laboratories.

Western countries, while sharing the concern about preventing an arms race in outer space, stated that outer space was not immune from utilization by existing weapons or military systems. Some such military activities had contributed to strategic stability and arms control and thus to the maintenance of international peace and security. Western countries continued to hold the view that, to begin with, common ground had to be established on which activities were to be permitted and which ones were to be prohibited in outer space. In addition, they considered that issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space could not be examined in isolation, but should be approached in the wider context of the global process of disarmament.

¹³ For details, see A/41/470, sect. II, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"

They stated that deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence systems was not an imminent event and that any deployment would have to be negotiated, given existing treaty obligations. They underlined the importance of a thorough examination of issues relating to verification of and compliance with existing and future international agreements.

The United States noted that much work remained to be done on the subject of outer space, although the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the item had in 1985 identified many of the critical issues. It did not accept the view expressed by the Soviet Union that the United States research programme on SDI would disrupt and destabilize the existing military balance. It believed that the Soviet Union itself was involved in strategic defence with programmes going beyond research. The United States further rejected the assertion that SDI was inconsistent with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty and considered that statements to that effect by the Soviet Union were designed to pressure the United States into making unilateral restraints on SDI. Both countries had recognized for many years, the United States considered, that offense and defense were inescapably interrelated and that deterrence involving both elements was essential to maintaining peace. It therefore believed that the two Powers had considerable opportunities for equitable co-operative measures in the field and recalled that the 1985 mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee provided for the consideration of existing and future proposals. The United States observed that despite SDI's potential to enhance stability and deterrence and despite the impossibility of verifying limits on research, the Soviet Union continued to insist that the American research programme be banned, although, in the meantime, it would presumably continue its own programmes directed towards strategic defence.

Among the other Western countries, France expressed its full preparedness to participate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee's discussions and recalled the various proposals it had made on the subject of outer space. It recognized that the United States and the Soviet Union had a particular responsibility for seeking verifiable agreements to limit the military use of space, but it stressed that the international space régime should not be the result of bilateral negotiations alone. The Federal Republic of Germany noted that such a régime was manifestly incomplete. In its view, a future multilaterally negotiated agreement should (a) provide for the legal immunity of satellites and (b) include a number of measures with a confidence-building effect.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart of Mongolia held 16 meetings between 25 April and 19 August. At their request, the Conference decided to invite the following non-member States to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

Following an initial exchange of views, the *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted a programme of work for the 1986 session that was essentially similar to the one adopted in 1985 and included the following points:

(a) Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

(b) Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

(c) Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee further agreed that it would give equal treatment and allocate the same number of meetings to each of those subjects. After completing its work, the Committee submitted a report that was incorporated integrally into the Conference's report to the General Assembly.¹⁴ The results of the Committee's work were summarized in the following conclusion to its report:

The *Ad Hoc* Committee, bearing in mind the task entrusted to it of examining and identifying issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, held a wide-ranging exchange of views which contributed to identifying and clarifying a number of issues and to a better understanding of the various positions. It was recognized that the legal régime applicable to outer space played a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment and the need to reinforce that régime was underlined. In addition, the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, was stressed. There was also recognition of the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. In this context, the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which states that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies", was recognized.

There was general recognition of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and readiness to contribute to that objective. Consequently, it was agreed that no effort should be spared to assure that substantive work on this agenda item will continue at the next session of the Conference. It was recommended that the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1987 session.¹⁵

Late in the session, Italy, speaking on behalf of the Western States, expressed the view that the *Ad Hoc* Committee had accomplished useful work in 1986 on, among other things, the elucidation of the existing legal régime in relation to arms control and outer space. It believed that the Committee was in need of more technical and other information and also of clarification of much of the terminology used, including the terms "weaponization" and "militarization", which were often used without being clearly defined. Some aspects, such as the issue of verification, had not yet received the attention they deserved. The Western States intended to encourage the Conference to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee under the existing mandate early in the 1987 session. Hungary, speaking for the socialist States, believed that the item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space was becoming increasingly urgent as the United States was pressing on with the creation and production of space strike weapons. The socialist States called on the Conference to start specific negotiations and were convinced that their proposals for banning such weapons and, as a first step, for drafting and concluding an

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27)*. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee appears *in extenso* under paragraph 90.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 90, sect. IV.

international agreement on ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites, banning the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite systems and eliminating existing systems would create a solid basis for a satisfactory solution. Algeria expressed its disappointment and frustration at the lack of progress on the item. It seemed to Algeria that members preferred to consider merely controlling the arms race in outer space rather than preventing it, while there was still time.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

Pursuant to resolution 40/87, the General Assembly had on its agenda the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" and a report of the Secretary-General¹⁶ transmitting the views of Member States on the possibility of enhancing international co-operation to prevent such a race and to promote the peaceful use of space. In the general debate in the First Committee,¹⁷ the item was addressed by numerous member States.

The Soviet Union stressed that the question of outer space was at the forefront of world politics and that all States should contribute to putting an end to the arms race on Earth and preventing its spread to outer space. In its view, the Reykjavik meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union had come to a standstill because of the position taken by the United States on two basic outer space questions, namely, SDI and the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty. The Soviet Union believed that SDI consisted in essence of space strike systems based on new physical principles. The crux of the matter was, in its view, that SDI could be used for attack purposes. It concluded, therefore, that the United States was trying to attain military advantage or supremacy. Although noting that the United States had made attempts to reassure the Soviet Union that it would at some point be ready to share its SDI secrets, the Soviet Union did not believe that would happen. Thus, if SDI were to come to fruition, it would have to respond to it. Moreover, the Soviet Union had concluded that the SDI programme, judging by its aims, which were the development, testing and deployment of systems and components of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile defence, including space-based elements and components, was in violation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. Those aims were explicitly prohibited by the Treaty, which was of crucial significance for strategic stability and international security. The Soviet Union felt that the first concern should be to preclude anything in the disarmament process that could undermine equality and to rule out any possibility of the development of new types of weapons that would ensure military superiority.

The United States recalled that at Reykjavik it had proposed that during a 10-year period the two sides eliminate offensive ballistic missiles so that at the end of that time there could be no fear of a successful first strike. During

¹⁶ A/41/470 and Add.1.

¹⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 34th and 46th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

that period, the United States and the Soviet Union would research strategic defence, staying within the limits provided for in the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. At the end of the period, each side would deploy its own defences. With the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, the purpose of the deployment would be to protect each side against cheating by the other and against third countries' acquiring ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. One of the major efforts which the United States had been engaged in at Reykjavik had been to explore and address Soviet concerns, notably, the concern that defensive systems could contribute to a first-strike capability. By proposing the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, the United States had shown the way to solve the problem. The United States noted that it had also repeatedly offered to share the benefits of strategic defence with the Soviet Union. The latter, however, had made a demand that in the end had prevented agreement, namely, placing additional restrictions on defensive research, which, in the American view, went beyond any interpretation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. Such restrictions would confine testing of space-based strategic defence systems to laboratories and would, the United States believed, have the effect of killing SDI. Also, the Soviet proposals did not make it explicit that, at the end of the 10-year period, both sides, or either side, would be free to deploy strategic defence systems. The United States was convinced that an agreement of the type advocated by the Soviet Union would close off a path to defence against nuclear missiles and remove the one guarantee against cheating and third-party attacks.

The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, reaffirmed that the Twelve attached great importance to both the bilateral Soviet-American talks and the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Conference on Disarmament. The work of the Conference, the United Kingdom stated, must complement the results of the bilateral talks; it must not prejudice them. Thus, the *Ad Hoc* Committee should aim to carry out its work in a realistic way. France held that, with or without SDI, the nuclear weapon would continue to be an essential factor in European and global security.

China warned that if the arms race in outer space were allowed to gain momentum, it would not only exacerbate the existing nuclear and conventional arms race, thus touching off a qualitative escalation, but would also make the world situation still more tense and turbulent. China stood for the demilitarization of outer space and held that the Conference on Disarmament should negotiate an agreement on the complete prohibition and total destruction of all outer space weapons. In order to create favourable conditions for the negotiations, it proposed that all countries with space capabilities refrain from developing, testing and deploying such weapons.

Sweden thought that attempts to develop advanced missile defences would accelerate the offensive arms race. It also held that a ban on anti-satellite weapons was urgent since both the Soviet Union and the United States had developed systems capable of attacking satellites. Thus, a ban on space weapons must include the destruction of existing anti-satellite systems. Sweden welcomed the fact that work on the prevention of an arms race in outer

space was going on in the Conference on Disarmament. That work must continue in 1987 in order to define, without delay, ways and means of strengthening international law in the field of outer space.

Argentina emphasized that the very highest interests of the international community lay in an absolute ban on the deployment of all types of weapons in outer space. It pointed out that there was a very great danger that the technologies being developed with a view to militarizing space could also be applied on land through the creation of land-based weapons based on them.

Nigeria warned that as a result of expanding space technologies, especially in the fields of communications, reconnaissance satellites, anti-satellite weapons and space-based ballistic missile defences, outer space might soon become an arena for an unbridled arms race. Pakistan stressed that everything must be done to halt and reverse that trend before technological developments made it an irreversible process. Far from providing effective protection against nuclear missiles, an attempt to set up a space-based defensive screen would only impart a fresh momentum to the arms race in both defensive and offensive weapons. In those circumstances, existing arms-limitation agreements would become irrelevant, the nuclear balance would be upset and the strategic environment would become less stable. It believed that new measures would be needed to banish that risk. Pending the conclusion of comprehensive agreements, interim measures should be adopted, particularly with a view to strengthening space law.

Following the general debate, four draft resolutions—all of them entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”—were considered by the First Committee.

On 27 October, China submitted a draft resolution, which it introduced on 5 November. It recalled that the item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space had been on the agenda of the General Assembly for five years, but that during that time the international community had failed to conduct multilateral negotiations on the issue. The most advanced countries were competing with each other in researching, testing and developing varieties of space weapons that, once deployed, would be very difficult to limit or ban. China stressed that the discussion of the question of outer space in the Conference on Disarmament had been focusing on existing international legal documents; it felt that the deliberations, to be useful, should be followed by negotiations on and the drafting of new documents for a comprehensive ban. It held that it would be advisable to conduct negotiations on the complete prohibition of all types of outer space weapons systems and the use or threat of force and any other hostile actions in outer space. By the draft resolution, the Conference on Disarmament would be requested to establish an *ad hoc* committee to negotiate relevant international agreements and the General Assembly would appeal to all States possessing outer space capabilities to refrain from developing, testing and deploying outer space weapons, so as to create conditions propitious for negotiations.

On 30 October, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution, which was introduced by Italy

on 5 November. By it, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, recall the obligation of States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from the threat or use of force in all environments, including outer space; urge the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the beginning of its 1987 session and to intensify substantive work on the subject; call on the Soviet Union and the United States to further intensify their Geneva negotiations in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on Earth, at drastically reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening international stability; and emphasize the necessity of preventing the erosion of relevant existing treaties. Italy stated that the draft was not intended to conflict with other resolutions on the subject; rather, it was an expression of a willingness to cooperate with a view to achieving consensus.

On 30 October, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR submitted a draft resolution, by which the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, recall the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities; call upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, (a) to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in space and (b) to adhere strictly to the existing legal restrictions and limitations on space weapons and to refrain from taking any measures aimed at developing, testing or deploying weapons and new weapons systems in outer space; stress the urgency of halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, dismantling the existing systems, prohibiting the introduction of new weapons systems and ensuring that the existing treaties on outer space, as well as the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty, were fully honoured; and request the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question in all its aspects and to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee with an adequate mandate with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate.

On 29 October, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe submitted a draft resolution. In its introduction on 3 November, Sri Lanka stressed the necessity of preventing an arms race in outer space. It recalled that, in recent years, the only resolution emerging from the General Assembly's deliberations on the question had been a non-aligned initiative. Since 1984, that single resolution had been adopted without any negative vote, by quasi-unanimity.

On 14 November, the 16 original co-sponsors and Cameroon, Ireland, Sweden and Venezuela submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later also sponsored by China, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Peru. The changes affected several preambular paragraphs. In the operative part, the only major change was in paragraph 10 (see below), which was condensed.

In introducing the revised draft on 17 November, Sri Lanka stated that

the sponsors' hope of achieving for the first time a consensus draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space had not been fulfilled, although the need for it had never been greater. It was still possible, however, to achieve the same result as in previous years: the adoption of a single draft resolution on the subject. With that objective in mind, the sponsors of the original draft had worked hard to elaborate a text that would be acceptable to all groups and preserve the basic principles of their own draft. The result was embodied in the revised draft, which, among other things, reaffirmed existing treaties relating to outer space and recalled the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities. While the importance of bilateral negotiations was recognized, the draft asserted the role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space.

On the same day, China announced that it would not insist on a vote on its own draft,¹⁸ since its position had in the main been reflected in the revised draft introduced by Sri Lanka, which it had decided to co-sponsor. China appreciated the efforts of non-aligned countries to arrive at a single text and stressed that the most important task was to reach agreement through negotiations on the complete prohibition and total destruction of space weapons. The various parties should, in the meantime, strictly observe existing international law on outer space. China called on all countries with a space capability to refrain from developing, testing and deploying space weapons, in order to create favourable conditions for the negotiation of an agreement.

Italy informed the Committee that the sponsors of the draft it had introduced would not press it to a vote,¹⁹ although it reflected their approach to the problem and they considered it valid and realistic. While reiterating their conviction that the Conference on Disarmament had a very significant role to play in the consideration of issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the sponsors looked forward to positive developments in the bilateral negotiations on the subject as well. They were willing to cooperate with a view to achieving consensus on the issue in the Committee.

The Soviet Union declared that to gain support for efforts to prevent weapons from reaching outer space, the socialist countries would not insist that their draft be put to a vote²⁰ and that they would support the draft introduced by Sri Lanka. Their own draft was the summation of their collective thinking and reflected also a number of views expressed by the non-aligned countries. They supported the appeal in the revised draft to all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain in their space activities from actions contrary to existing treaties.

Also on 17 November the First Committee voted on the revised draft resolution introduced by Sri Lanka. It first adopted operative paragraph 8 (see below) by a recorded vote of 116 to 1 (United States), with 12 abstentions (Western and associated countries). Then the draft resolution as a whole was

¹⁸ See A/41/837, paras. 5-6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 10-11.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 12-13.

approved by 130 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States).

In connection with the vote, Australia, which voted in favour of operative paragraph 8 as well as of the resolution as a whole, stressed the importance it attached to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It fully supported the measures being negotiated at the bilateral level by the Soviet Union and the United States. There were several measures, however, that could and should be considered in the Conference on Disarmament and the Conference should be enabled to continue its useful work in 1987. The draft would provide, Australia held, a solid basis for carrying out such work.

Italy, speaking also on behalf of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, stated that those countries voted in favour of the draft as a whole because they could support its general thrust. They abstained on operative paragraph 8 because it did not take due account of the substantive discussions which were taking place in the Conference on Disarmament and its wording tended to prejudge their outcome.

The representative of the United States explained that his delegation voted negatively on paragraph 8 because it did not believe that there was a basis for multilateral negotiations on outer-space arms control at that time. It also objected to the fact that, in the preamble, the Harare Declaration of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries²¹ was accorded a status comparable to that of resolutions. In its view, the Declaration was one-sided and biased with respect to vital security and disarmament issues. The American representative stated that his Government also took particular exception to the numerous critical references made to the United States by name in the Declaration. It noted with satisfaction, on the other hand, the work accomplished in 1986 by the Conference on Disarmament and its *Ad Hoc* Committee and supported continuation of the Committee's work.

On 3 December²² the General Assembly adopted operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 140 to 1, with 12 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to none, with 1 abstention, as resolution 41/53. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming further the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of

²¹ A/41/697-S/18392.

²² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 94th meeting.*

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99 D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983, 39/59 of 12 December 1984 and 40/87 of 12 December 1985 and the relevant paragraphs of the Political Declaration of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and, in particular, by the impending threat of the exacerbation of the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament,

Convinced that further measures are urgently needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recognizing that, in the context of multilateral negotiations for preventing an arms race in outer space, bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could make a significant contribution to such an objective, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Noting with satisfaction that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have continued since 1985 on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, and on their relationship, with the declared objective, endorsed in the joint statement of their leaders on 21 November 1985, of working out effective agreements aimed, *inter alia*, at preventing an arms race in outer space,

Anxious that concrete results should emerge from these negotiations as soon as possible,

Taking note of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question,

Welcoming the re-establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space during the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to continue to examine and to identify through substantive and general consideration issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

1. *Recalls* the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities;

2. *Reaffirms* that general and complete disarmament under effective international control

warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;

3. *Emphasizes* that further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;

4. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding;

5. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

7. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals including those presented in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1986 session of the Conference and at the forty-first session of the General Assembly;

8. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1987 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

9. *Urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

10. *Calls upon* all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to convey to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the wish of the Member States for the early completion of the Institute's study on disarmament problems relating to outer space and the consequences of extending the arms race into outer space;

12. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

14. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"

Conclusion

In 1986, the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space continued to be a major concern both within and outside the United Nations. Among its many aspects, the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities was particularly stressed in the year's debates in the disarmament forums. Attention also focused on the obligation of all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain from actions contrary to the existing treaties pertaining to outer space; the call for negotiation of new agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer

space; and the need to adopt measures to ensure the peaceful use of outer space.

The bilateral negotiations initiated in 1985 between the Soviet Union and the United States were accelerated in 1986, in accordance with the understanding reached by the two countries at the Geneva summit meeting in November 1985. The question of outer space dominated the Reykjavik meeting of October 1986 between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.

At the multilateral level, the relevant subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament was re-established in 1986. While in the view of Western States the *Ad Hoc* Committee continued to do useful work on the elucidation of the existing legal régime concerning outer space, socialist States stressed the increasing urgency of the issue and the need for specific negotiations. Non-aligned and neutral countries reaffirmed their view that outer space was the common heritage of mankind and underscored the necessity of preventing the militarization of space.

At the forty-first session of the General Assembly, four draft resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space were submitted, reflecting various views on the issue. As a result of consultations to reach agreement on a single text, a revised version of the draft submitted by a number of non-aligned countries was the only one put to a vote. Adopted by a large majority as resolution 41/53, it requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in 1987 and to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee on the item.

New weapons of mass destruction: radiological weapons

Introduction

THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EMERGENCE OF NEW WEAPONS of mass destruction was taken into account by the Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948, when it defined such weapons “to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above”¹ “Radioactive material weapons”, later known as radiological weapons, were not and, as of the end of 1986, are not known to exist; if produced, they would be intended to disperse radioactive substances, independently of nuclear explosions, for the purpose of causing injury to human beings.

After Malta brought up the subject in the General Assembly in 1969, the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva was invited to consider certain implications of radiological warfare and the possible military application of laser technology. However, that body at the time found it difficult to see the practical usefulness of discussing measures related to radiological warfare.²

The Soviet Union proposed the inclusion of an item entitled “Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons” in the agenda of the General Assembly in 1975³ and submitted a draft international agreement on the subject. As a result, the Assembly requested the Geneva body to proceed to work on an agreement. In 1977, the Soviet Union submitted a revised draft agreement,⁴ suggesting that, parallel to a general agreement, special agreements could be concluded among the parties on particular types of weapons. A list of types and systems of weapons to be prohibited would be annexed to the agreement and could be expanded as new developments occurred.

Basically, the Eastern European States have advocated a general prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, arguing that it is more difficult to eliminate weapons once they

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XV.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 31, 34-38, 120, 122 and 126, document A/10243.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, document CCD/511/Rev.1. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, appendix X.

are deployed than to ban their development and manufacture. Most of the Western States, however, hold the view that new scientific developments should be dealt with individually as they arise and appear to have a weapons potential, and that some potential new weapons of mass destruction which have been envisaged fall within categories that have already been identified and should be covered in that context. Both of these basic positions were incorporated into the 1978 Final Document.⁵

In the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, the positions of members have remained largely unchanged since 1978. Socialist member States have advocated the establishment of an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts to consider the question⁶ and have submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon⁷ and papers on infrasound weapons⁸ and potential types of weapons of mass destruction.⁹ In 1985, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal aimed at negotiations on the prohibition of any new kind of weapon of mass destruction immediately after it had been identified and the simultaneous introduction of a moratorium on its development.

In resolutions adopted each year, the General Assembly has, *inter alia*, requested the Geneva body to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and called upon the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily important States to make identical declarations renouncing the creation of new weapons of mass destruction. The Western States have not supported those resolutions on the grounds, among other things, that a general agreement would not permit clear definition of requisite verification measures. They favour, however, the holding of periodic informal meetings in the Conference on Disarmament to enable that body to follow the question adequately.

Meanwhile, the discussion on radiological weapons was revived by the United States in 1976. Concerned about the rapid accumulation of nuclear materials as a by-product of reactor operations, it suggested that the General Assembly consider reaching an agreement that would prevent their use. Since then, the radiological weapons aspect of the problem of new weapons of mass destruction has followed a course of its own. The Geneva body resumed its consideration of radiological weapons in 1977 and, in the same year, the United States and the Soviet Union began bilateral negotiations on the subject. The 1978 Final Document affirms that "a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"¹⁰

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 77.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, document CCD/564.

⁷ *Ibid.*, document CCD/559. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. X and appendix VIII.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, document CCD/575.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), document CD/35.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 76.

In 1979, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted to the Geneva body a joint proposal on major elements of such a convention.¹¹ Later that year, the General Assembly decided by consensus, on a joint initiative of the two countries, to call on the Geneva body to expedite a negotiated agreement on the text of a convention and to report the results to the General Assembly at its next session. In 1980, in order to finalize a draft treaty, the Geneva body established an *ad hoc* working group on radiological weapons, which has been re-established each year since then.

A new development occurred in 1981, when Sweden proposed that any convention banning radiological weapons also prohibit military attacks on civilian nuclear facilities, since the resulting dissemination of radioactive substances could cause mass destruction. While members of the group of 21 widely supported the proposal, members of other political groups objected to such a linkage on the grounds that it would both broaden the scope of the envisaged convention beyond its original mandate and introduce new implications to be addressed, thus prolonging and complicating the negotiating process.

Finding an acceptable way to cover both a ban on radiological weapons in the traditional sense and the prohibition of attacks against civilian nuclear facilities has since been the main problem in the efforts to negotiate a radiological weapons convention. In addition to the absence of consensus on the proposed linkage, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons has faced difficulties on such issues as defining the appropriate criteria for determining the scope of a prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities; defining radiological weapons; formulating treaty provisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and verification and compliance. Many delegations hold that Sweden's proposal for draft provisions of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and the release or dissemination of radioactive material for hostile purposes¹² provides the best negotiating framework to address all outstanding problems. Others continue to maintain that proposals aimed at resolving the question of prohibiting attacks in the context of prohibiting radiological weapons can only bring about a stalemate in both areas.

In 1985, as in previous years, the General Assembly adopted a resolution—40/94 D—on the subject, requesting the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals on the matter presented to it.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

The agenda item entitled “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons” was considered by the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr. 1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr. 1), documents CD/31 and CD/32.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/39/27)*, appendix II (CD/540), document CD/530. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chap. XVI.

Conference on Disarmament in plenary meetings¹³ during the periods from 14 to 18 April and from 4 to 8 August. Among the documents on the item presented to the Conference during the session were a working paper submitted by Argentina,¹⁴ dealing with the scope of the envisaged radiological weapons convention, and another one submitted by Pakistan,¹⁵ containing suggestions concerning the question of attacks on nuclear facilities.

At the beginning of the first part of its session, the Conference held informal consultations on a proposal to convene a group of qualified experts to identify any new types of weapons of mass destruction and to make recommendations on specific negotiations on them, as requested in resolution 40/90. That proposal was supported by the socialist States and many members of the group of 21. They maintained the view that the invention and deployment of any new kind of weapon of mass destruction would signify a serious danger to international peace and security. For their part, Western delegations stated that as no new types of weapons of mass destruction had been identified since 1948 and their existence was not imminent, the practice followed thus far—of holding informal meetings of the Conference from time to time—was the most appropriate one to deal with the item. No consensus could be reached on convening a group of qualified experts during the 1986 session. In that connection, a proposal was put forward to ban the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity was close to that of nuclear arms and other means of mass destruction.

The question of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction continued to be considered in plenary and informal meetings. In the course of the plenary debate, Argentina recalled that paragraph 77 of the 1978 Final Document recommended that the question be kept under continuing review in order to prevent scientific and technological progress in the military area from being channelled to hostile purposes, and it stated that the Conference should give appropriate treatment to the issue. Available data indicated that spending on military research and development was rising faster than military spending as a whole. Careful consideration of the question could help the international community to become aware of the direction and possible military applications of research and development conducted by the military alliances and particularly by the two super-Powers, which were responsible for four fifths of global spending on research. Argentina further restated its support for establishing a group of experts to assist the Conference in identifying new types of weapons of mass destruction that were being developed or that actually existed.

Speaking of the Conference's priorities, Canada expressed the view that the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction was a central task of the arms control and disarmament process. Romania stressed that tangible measures should be taken and recalled that resolution 40/90 requested the Conference to examine the problem with the aid of a group of experts.

The question of radiological weapons was discussed in considerably

¹³ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹⁴ CD/RW/WP.69.

¹⁵ CD/RW/WP.73.

greater detail in plenary meetings. Argentina believed that one of the most important issues to be solved was the scope of the envisaged convention, in other words, what was to be banned. In its view, a broad approach should be adopted to avoid shortcomings in the future instrument. Care had to be taken to avoid formulating an unequal treaty, one that would impede the application of technology which furthered economic and social development. In the working paper it had submitted, referred to above, Argentina argued that the appropriate point of departure in determining the scope of a convention would be the prohibition of radiological destruction, regardless of the method used. It further emphasized that the question of attacks against nuclear facilities fell within the framework of the prohibition of the dissemination of radioactive material for military or other hostile purposes.

Cuba referred to the view presented by some military scientists that certain functions for which chemical weapons had been developed could be carried out by radiological weapons, and it believed that such a possibility would increase the incentive to solve the problem of radiological weapons once a chemical weapons treaty was in force. Cuba also underlined the significance of preventing attacks on developing countries' nuclear facilities, since they depended on such installations for their development needs. Egypt and Indonesia shared that view. Egypt recalled that in the light of what had happened in its region, attacks against nuclear facilities were no longer a matter of mere speculation. Indonesia pointed out that the fact that many developing countries had low-capacity nuclear facilities in densely populated areas posed the further danger of the loss of a disproportionately large number of human lives. It therefore held that a radiological weapons treaty should include the principle that all peaceful nuclear facilities must be provided with protection. That idea was also included in the working paper submitted by Pakistan, referred to above.

Belgium continued to believe that the prohibition of radiological weapons could be separated from the prohibition of attacks against nuclear power stations. The United Kingdom stated that progress on a radiological weapons treaty had been stymied by the desire of some delegations to link the subject to the protection of nuclear facilities. It was ready to consider constructive suggestions to break the impasse.

Many delegations, including those of Argentina, Australia, Cuba, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka and the USSR, pointed out that their views on the importance of giving protection to nuclear facilities had been reinforced by the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Soviet Union, which had occurred in April.

Australia stated that the accident at Chernobyl had revealed the dangers inherent in the release of significant levels of ionizing radiation. As the consequences of a premeditated full-scale attack on a nuclear facility would be even more catastrophic, Australia hoped that the event had highlighted the urgency of concluding an agreement to prevent attacks on nuclear facilities. In addition to contributing to the prevention of unacceptable damage to human beings and their environment, it would help protect an already fragile ecology. IAEA's system of safeguards was, in Australia's view, the best available

means to determine whether or not a nuclear facility was of a peaceful nature. Japan considered that it was difficult to generalize on the basis of the accident at Chernobyl. Even before the accident, Japan had been aware of the possible consequences of uncontrolled and large-scale dissemination of radioactivity. Its position was that the Conference should reach agreement on prohibiting attacks on peaceful nuclear installations, but for the moment avoid the complicated task of trying to define quantitative thresholds of such facilities.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the accident at Chernobyl had underscored the urgency of not only nuclear disarmament, but also the banning of radiological weapons and the prevention of attacks against nuclear facilities. It believed that agreement on the latter two could be reached quickly enough, given a constructive approach. It found it inadmissible that various considerations, sometimes of a procedural nature, had hindered the solution of the substantive issues involved, and it rejected as untenable assertions about the academic and subsidiary character of those issues. In the Soviet view, the possibility of developing radiological weapons should be completely excluded, and peaceful nuclear facilities should be reliably protected against attack.

Romania believed that the Conference should proceed in a more specific manner, having held discussions and a general exchange of views on the question of radiological weapons. Romania, too, called for a generally acceptable formula to protect peaceful nuclear installations, as they—even if attacked by conventional weapons—could become the source of particularly dangerous radiation, equivalent to the effects of a genuine radiological weapon.

On 4 March the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons was re-established. As in previous years, it was mandated to conduct negotiations on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, the *Ad Hoc* Committee held 17 meetings between 7 March and 11 August. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations. At their request, the following States, which are not members of the Conference on Disarmament, participated in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland (a non-Member of the United Nations) and Turkey.

On 25 March the *Ad Hoc* Committee agreed to continue its work on the basis of the so-called unitary approach to the two major questions before it: the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. It further agreed to continue to consider both questions without dividing its work into two separate "tracks" and without giving priority to either of them, on the understanding that that decision was without prejudice to: (a) the final positions of delegations on a treaty or treaties as such; (b) the link between the above two questions; (c) delegations' positions on the appropriate manner of dealing with them; and (d) any other approaches and questions which might be presented.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee also decided that, as in the previous year, its programme of work would include the following issues:

- Definitions and criteria;
- Scope;
- Peaceful uses;
- Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- Compliance and verification.¹⁶

The Committee devoted six meetings to the exchange of views on all items included in the programme. On 21 April it decided to set up three contact groups on the issues of (a) scope and definitions, (b) peaceful uses and cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and (c) verification and compliance.

The Contact Group on scope and definitions held five meetings open to all delegations. Some elements of those issues were further elaborated, but a number of differences of view remained. The Contact Group on peaceful uses and the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament held three meetings. In the end, it was recognized that further work was needed, but that a good basis might be provided by the results achieved by the Contact Group. The Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on verification and compliance prepared a paper in order to facilitate consultations. The consultations contributed to the clarification of two points: (a) some delegations believed that there were basic issues in the area of verification and compliance to be resolved; and (b) further consideration was contingent upon the resolution of the issues of scope and definitions.

On 28 August the Conference adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons,¹⁷ which is an integral part of the report of the Conference. The *Ad Hoc* Committee concluded in the report that its work in 1986 had been useful in terms of the mandate entrusted to it. It was also clear, however, that considerable differences of substance and approach continued to exist with regard to both subjects under consideration. The Committee recommended that it be re-established at the beginning of the Conference's 1987 session and that the results of its work in 1986 be considered as a basis for its future work.

Late in the session, some delegations made statements in plenary meetings on the item concerning radiological weapons. Commenting on the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, Sweden observed that very little attention had been devoted to the question of a ban on radiological weapons, while intensive work had been carried out on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Although Sweden considered the issue relatively uncomplicated, some problems remained to be solved. One of them was the insistence of some delegations that nuclear facilities to be covered by the prohibition should be installations devoted to peaceful purposes; in the opinion of some, only facilities safeguarded by IAEA could be considered. Such an approach would mean that a number of installations in both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-

¹⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27)*, para. 102, sect. III.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 102. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee is reproduced *in extenso* under paragraph 102.

weapon States would not be covered, which was not desirable, considering that the aim was to prevent mass destruction as a consequence of attacks on nuclear facilities. Sweden had therefore proposed that a party could ensure protection by requesting that the facilities it wished to be covered by a prohibition be put on a register kept by the depositary of the future convention. Sweden expressed the hope that the matter could be solved during the 1987 session of the Conference.

Peru believed that there should be one single régime for both civilian and military facilities. Romania stressed the importance of the work on a radiological weapons treaty because of its preventive nature. Hungary reiterated the conviction of the socialist States that agreement on the item could be reached fairly rapidly, provided that all those involved adopted a constructive approach.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

In the course of the general debate¹⁸ in the First Committee during the forty-first session of the General Assembly, a number of States addressed the issues of new weapons of mass destruction and, specifically, radiological weapons.

Bangladesh pointed out that nuclear weapons were not the only weapons that could be used for mass destruction, as modern technology had developed non-nuclear arsenals that could result in horror of comparable magnitude. It referred to radiological, electro-magnetic, chemical and bacteriological weapons and urged that all effective measures be taken to prevent the danger of catastrophic results from the manufacture and acquisition of such weaponry.

The Byelorussian SSR recalled that for many years it had been devoting special attention to the question of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Military developments indicated that that question was not growing less relevant, but, on the contrary, becoming increasingly serious. It criticized Western countries for seeking military supremacy by relying on the most sophisticated modern military technology and its accelerated development. Efforts to ban existing weapons of mass destruction and to prevent the development of new types should be made in parallel with efforts to ban and eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons, since, the Byelorussian SSR assumed, negotiations on the latter group were not intended to leave a loophole for the production of the next generation of various types of weapons of mass destruction. With scientific knowledge at the advanced level that it was, the abuse of scientific and technological progress for military purposes, particularly in respect of weapons of mass destruction, would seriously upset the strategic balance. There was also a danger that the distinction between weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons would become blurred. To counter those tendencies, the Byelorussian SSR advocated a preventive

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 38th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

approach to the problem of new weapons of mass destruction.

Czechoslovakia held the view that the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction was a matter of some urgency. It believed that the work of the Conference on Disarmament in that area would be greatly assisted by appointing a group of qualified experts to identify such weapons and submit recommendations. It also favoured the imposition of a ban on the manufacture of non-nuclear weapons that were based on new physical principles and that, owing to their strike capacity, were analogous to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Among the delegations that spoke on the subject of radiological weapons, Spain noted that although the concept itself was shrouded in vagueness, there was no doubt that that type of weapon should be included among weapons of mass destruction. It was satisfied with the progress made in the work of the relevant *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Conference, but doubted that the drafting of a single document was the correct objective, since two very different issues were being dealt with. The provisions required in a prohibition of weapons designed to use radioactive contamination for military purposes would be very different from those in a prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations. The latter ban would require the establishment of specific rules concerning the conditions to be satisfied and the type of installations that could enjoy legal protection. In Spain's opinion, such protection was simply to prevent the dissemination of radioactivity into the environment and it must, therefore, be considered in as broad a context as possible.

Czechoslovakia believed that the urgency of imposing a ban on radiological weapons and of respecting the principles of the non-admissibility of armed attacks on nuclear power stations had recently become more obvious. Further talks on the subject in the Conference on Disarmament were needed before mutually acceptable solutions could be drafted. In speaking about the possibility of achieving a ban on radiological weapons, of safeguards for the security of nuclear installations and of reaching disarmament agreements in general, Hungary cited the two international Conventions on nuclear security that had been worked out under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in less than a month during 1986 as examples of what could be accomplished. That was clear evidence that even the most intricate technical problems could be tackled and solved if States had the political will to reach an agreement.

Sweden considered it essential that the hostile release or dissemination of radioactive material be prohibited, irrespective of the method applied. It therefore attached great importance to a prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities. Sweden further underscored, in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, the potential consequences of such an attack on any nuclear facility.

Cuba again pointed out that many of the functions intended for chemical weapons could be performed by radiological weapons and that the production of the latter category could be influenced by a ban on the former. While radiological weapons as such did not exist, there was a latent danger that they might be manufactured. Cuba reminded the Committee of the large quantities of radioactive residues in the world. It believed that the Conference on Dis-

armament must give priority to the question of the protection of nuclear facilities. At stake was the right of all peoples, particularly the peoples of the developing countries, to engage in the peaceful use of nuclear energy under safe conditions. The need for such protection was greater in those countries, as they generally lacked the military capacity to deter a potential aggressor.

Indonesia noted that ever since the accident at Chernobyl, there had been heightened concern not only about ensuring the safe operation of nuclear facilities, but also about the disastrous consequences of the release of ionizing radiation in the event of an attack. Any State with peaceful nuclear installations was vulnerable to such attacks or the threat of such attacks. Thus there were compelling reasons to include the question of the prohibition of attacks in a convention on radiological weapons. At the same time, the convention should not in any way stifle or circumscribe States' activities in developing the necessary technology and establishing peaceful nuclear facilities.

In the First Committee, three draft resolutions were submitted: one on the general subject of new weapons of mass destruction and two on the specific question of radiological weapons. The General Assembly took action on all three on 3 December.¹⁹

On 30 October, Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons", under the agenda item of the same name. The draft was later also sponsored by Benin, Burkina Faso, Mozambique and the Syrian Arab Republic. It was introduced on 10 November by the Byelorussian SSR, which expressed the view that the development of modern science and technology brought mankind face to face with the real danger of creating new forms of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, based on new scientific principles. The sponsors believed that after due consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, machinery should be set up to make it possible to keep developments under constant surveillance. Specifically, such matters could be considered by a group of experts convened periodically. If necessary, the Conference on Disarmament could recommend specific talks on new types of weapons that had been identified. In addition, all States should be willing, immediately following the identification of any new type of weapon of mass destruction, to commence negotiations on its prohibition and to simultaneously introduce a moratorium on its practical development. According to the draft, States should undertake efforts to ensure that ultimately scientific and technological achievements would be used solely for peaceful purposes. The Byelorussian SSR stated that it had drafted an informal compromise text, which included some of the formulations put forward earlier by Western delegations.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 94th meeting.

Also on 10 November, the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 102 to 1 (United States), with 30 abstentions.

In explaining the position of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom noted that the draft had a number of real problems which consultations had not been able to resolve. The Twelve continued to believe that there were no indications that new types of weapons of mass destruction were imminent. They would regard it as a serious development if any new kind of weapon of mass destruction were invented and deployed, and they wished the subject to be kept under regular review. However, in the circumstances, there seemed to be no need for such elaborate action by the Conference on Disarmament as that envisaged in the draft. In addition, the text suggested an extension of the definition of new weapons of mass destruction that went beyond that established by the United Nations in 1948 and subsequently endorsed in the 1978 Final Document. The Twelve considered the suggested formulation imprecise. For those reasons, they abstained in the vote.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 128 to 1, with 25 abstentions, as resolution 41/56. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976, 32/84 A of 12 December 1977, 33/66 B of 14 December 1978, 34/79 of 11 December 1979, 35/149 of 12 December 1980, 36/89 of 9 December 1981, 37/77 A of 9 December 1982, 38/182 of 20 December 1983, 39/62 of 12 December 1984 and 40/90 of 12 December 1985 concerning the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 39 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, according to which both qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are important for halting the arms race and efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements and that efforts aimed at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

Expressing once again its firm belief, in the light of the decisions adopted at the tenth special session, in the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting that in the course of its 1986 session the Conference on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons"

Convinced that all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Determined to prevent the creation, as a result of developments of modern science and technology, of weapons based on new physical principles and having a destructive capacity close to that of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

Taking into consideration the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question,

1. *Reaffirms* the necessity of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to keep constantly under review, with the assistance of a periodically convened group of experts, the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons;

3. *Calls upon* all States, immediately following the identification of any new type of weapon of mass destruction, to commence negotiations on its prohibition with the simultaneous introduction of a moratorium on its practical development;

4. *Once again urges* all States to refrain from any action that could adversely affect the efforts aimed at preventing the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

5. *Calls again upon* all States to undertake efforts to ensure that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

7. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its forty-second session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament"

On 27 October, Australia, Cuba, Hungary, Japan and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". In introducing it on 5 November, Cuba stated that the draft was in keeping with a similar one adopted the previous year without a vote. Among other things, it requested the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on radiological weapons with a view to promptly concluding its work. Cuba noted that the relevant *Ad Hoc* Committee had established a number of contact groups which had been very active. In the course of that exercise, greater clarity with regard to the positions of various countries had been achieved, and the substantive differences of approach that still persisted had been revealed. The re-establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee at the beginning of 1987 and the continuation of negotiations would make it possible to make greater progress.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. At the time that action was taken, two States explained their positions.

In joining in the consensus adoption of the draft, the United States wished to recall that its objective was an effective ban on radiological weapons. It was seeking to identify verification measures that would deter a potential violator and would enable parties to verify compliance with a radiological weapons ban. The United States substantive position was still embodied in the 1979 Soviet-American joint proposal on elements of a convention, as modified by the agreed compliance provisions introduced in 1983. It continued to believe that the question of additional legal protection against attacks on nuclear facilities should be considered separately from the question of a radiological weapons ban.

Mongolia held that the subject of radiological weapons had long been ripe for discussion and its solution was long overdue. The idea that it was a

secondary, purely academic matter should not be allowed to serve as a pretext for further delay. Recent events, particularly the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, had made the conclusion of an agreement a very urgent, high-priority task. That accident had shown the threat posed by the energy of the atom if it got out of control even temporarily. Mongolia noted that its approach to solving the problems of radiological weapons and of attacks on nuclear facilities was flexible. It was ready to agree to any kind of solution provided that there was no further delay, and it hoped for serious, business-like negotiations on the issues at the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore it supported the draft.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the text, also without a vote, as resolution 41/59 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/94 D of 12 December 1985,

1. *Takes note* of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1986 session that deals with the question of radiological weapons, in particular the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons;

2. *Takes note also* of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1987 session;

3. *Recognizes* that the work done by the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1986 was useful in terms of the mandate entrusted to it;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

5. *Also requests* that the Secretary-General transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents relating to the discussion of all aspects of the issue by the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"

On 30 October, Iraq submitted another draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", which it introduced on 5 November. It noted that the Middle East region was one of the most sensitive and volatile regions of the world for strategic, political and economic reasons. Any upheavals that occurred in it might drive the world to more tension or perhaps place it in a situation of serious confrontation. Iraq held, therefore, that Israel must agree to subject its nuclear installations to inspection by IAEA and give unequivocal guarantees that it would never again attack nuclear installations in the Middle East. In pointing out that the draft requested the Conference on Disarmament to reach an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities, Iraq drew attention to the fact that an attack against any nuclear facilities by any Power would undoubtedly have disastrous consequences that would know no geographical limits or physical precautions. (For discussion of another Iraqi initiative with largely similar content, see chapter X.)

Commenting on the draft submitted by Iraq, Israel stated that it was redundant, as there was another draft on the same subject (see above), intro-

duced by Cuba, on the lines of those which, in the past, had been adopted by consensus. In Israel's view, the only new element in the Iraqi draft was operative paragraph 1, by which the General Assembly would consider that the Israeli attack against the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iraq constituted an unprecedented danger which could have initiated radiological warfare. Israel considered the paragraph inaccurate and pointed out that the question of the Israeli attack had been exhaustively discussed in both the United Nations and IAEA.

On 6 November, Iraq submitted a revised draft resolution. In introducing it on 10 November, it indicated that changes had been made in the third preambular paragraph and that former operative paragraph 1 had become the new fifth preambular paragraph (see below).

Also on 10 November, the First Committee took action on the draft. First, in a separate vote, it approved operative paragraph 1 by a recorded vote of 75 to 4 (Central African Republic, France, Israel and United States), with 44 abstentions. It then approved the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 90 to 3 (France, Israel and United States), with 35 abstentions. Three States gave explanations of vote.

Australia and Venezuela explained their abstentions. Venezuela recognized the danger of the threat of a military attack on a nuclear installation, which it believed had clearly been demonstrated by the accident at Chernobyl. It also recognized that an attack on a nuclear installation might have repercussions that could be compared to the detonation of a nuclear weapon and questioned the statement that "military attacks against nuclear facilities . . . could be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons" (second preambular paragraph). Thus it also had doubts with regard to operative paragraph 1, in which the same statement was no longer couched as a possibility, but rather as an affirmation. It felt that such assertions could influence the work being carried out by the Conference on Disarmament on the matter. Australia stressed the possibility that radiological weapons could be brought into existence as a result of an attack against a nuclear facility and its hope that an agreement prohibiting such attacks would be concluded as soon as possible. Nevertheless, it felt obliged to abstain because of what it considered the lack of technical precision in operative paragraph 1. It continued to attach importance to the earliest possible conclusion of an international agreement on the prevention of attacks against nuclear facilities.

France explained its negative vote on the draft. It noted that no progress had been made in the negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons in recent sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, especially once those negotiations had been tied to "extraneous questions", such as a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities. Because that question did not, in its view, come within the purview of disarmament and should be dealt with in the framework of humanitarian law, France did not take part in the specific discussion on the subject and could not subscribe to the connection made in the second preambular paragraph and in operative paragraph 1 between radiological weapons and attacks against nuclear facilities. Nor could it go along with the appeal to the Conference in operative paragraph 2 to reach an agreement prohibiting

military attacks against nuclear facilities.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 111 to 3, with 38 abstentions, as resolution 41/59 I. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/99 C of 13 December 1982, 38/188 D of 20 December 1983, 39/151 J of 17 December 1984 and 40/94 D of 12 December 1985 on, *inter alia*, the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities,

Gravely concerned that military attacks against nuclear facilities, though carried out with conventional weapons, could be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons,

Recalling also that Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 prohibits attacks on nuclear electricity generating stations,

Deeply concerned that the destruction of nuclear installations by conventional weapons causes the release into the environment of huge amounts of dangerous radioactive material, which results in serious radioactive contamination,

Firmly convinced that the Israeli attack against the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iraq constitutes an unprecedented danger to international peace and security,

Recalling further International Atomic Energy Agency resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/409 of 1983, which urges all member States to support actions in international forums to reach an international agreement that prohibits armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes,

1. *Reaffirms* that military attacks of any kind against nuclear facilities are tantamount to the use of radiological weapons, due to the dangerous radioactive forces that such attacks cause to be released;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.

Conclusion

The situation in 1986 with regard to a general prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction remained much as it had in other recent years. Socialist States and many non-aligned countries continued to stress that if any new kind of such weapons was invented and deployed, it would constitute a serious danger to international peace and security. For their part, Western States held that there were currently no indications that new types of weapons of mass destruction were imminent; hence they considered that there was no need for new action by the Conference on Disarmament in the field. Thus, no consensus was reached on convening a group of qualified experts to identify new types of weapons of mass destruction and, if necessary, to recommend specific negotiations on them, as envisaged in resolution 40/90 of 1985.

As for the specific question of banning radiological weapons, which in the last few years has been discussed concurrently with the proposal to prohibit attacks against nuclear facilities, a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament continued negotiations without dividing its work into two separate "tracks" and without giving priority to either question. Considerable

differences of substance and approach persisted on both subjects. The General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the item in 1986; by one—adopted by consensus—it requested, as in previous years, the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons, with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, and by the other—adopted by a vote—it requested the Conference to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities.

P A R T F O U R

Consideration of conventional disarmament and other approaches

Conventional weapons

Introduction

THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS and armed forces was first addressed by the General Assembly during its sessions in the 1940s. While the parallel questions of nuclear disarmament and prohibiting weapons of mass destruction have dominated international disarmament efforts since the Second World War, less attention has been paid to conventional weapons. Yet all the military conflicts since 1945 have been fought with conventional, or non-nuclear, weapons and the global annual military expenditure on such armaments is estimated to account for over 80 per cent of the total annual military expenditure. While conventional war does not threaten the survival of mankind as could a nuclear war, its potential destructiveness has increased significantly with the development of ever more sophisticated conventional weapons.

For a number of reasons, the need for controlling the conventional arms race, without diverting priority attention from nuclear disarmament, has been increasingly emphasized in the 1980s. The escalating accumulation of conventional weapons, particularly in the two major military alliances, and the apparent nuclear parity between the alliances has led to a re-evaluation of certain of their military strategies. Other factors contributing to the new interest in conventional weapons have been the increasing number of transfers of arms; the high frequency of use of conventional weapons outside industrialized countries and their destructive and destabilizing effects, especially at the regional level; and the negative consequences of their excessive accumulation for the economies of States, particularly the developing countries and those that do not produce weapons. It has even been argued that the significant qualitative improvements in conventional weapons may blur the distinction, in terms of military effectiveness, between nuclear and conventional armaments. In addition, there is the possibility that an outbreak of conventional war involving nuclear-weapon States might lead to nuclear conflict.

No agreement has emerged as yet on how to pursue conventional disarmament. Several Western States and China have expressed the view that conventional and nuclear disarmament should be sought simultaneously. Other—mostly developing—countries consider that conventional disarmament does not warrant the same importance as nuclear disarmament, which,

in accordance with the 1978 Final Document,¹ should be given the highest priority in disarmament negotiations.

This chapter, like the chapters on conventional weapons and related matters in previous volumes of *The Yearbook*, covers three main elements, namely: (a) conventional weapons *per se*, their international transfer and discussion of efforts to limit them; (b) the so-called regional approach; and (c) an agreement on the prohibition of certain kinds of conventional weapons.

The submission to the General Assembly in 1984 of the expert study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces² was an important event in that it represented the first effort at comprehensive consideration of the subject. The same year, the Assembly invited all Member States to inform the Secretary-General of their views regarding it and, in 1985, 23 Member States responded.³ By resolution 40/94 C of the following year, the General Assembly invited further comments on the study and decided to include an item entitled "Conventional disarmament" on its agenda—for the first time since the inception of the Organization.

The regional approach is based on the assumption that it might be easier to find agreement on measures of conventional disarmament among States of the same geographical area than to find broad solutions with world-wide relevance. A comprehensive study on regional disarmament⁴ was submitted to the General Assembly in 1980. It took the view that the number of possible measures and the scope for regional initiatives in the field of conventional disarmament were virtually unlimited. The situation in Europe has attracted the most attention in the matter, because that continent has the world's largest concentration of armaments and armed forces. Some countries, however, hold the view that solutions do not lie in regional approaches. India, for one, has regarded any attempt to emphasize the regional over the global approach as "flawed", maintaining that the arms race must be addressed on a global basis. The General Assembly, by resolution 40/94 A of 1985, urged Governments, where the regional situation would so permit, to consider regional measures aimed at strengthening security at a lower level of forces through the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons.

On 2 December 1983, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its three annexed Protocols⁵ entered into force. The Convention and its Protocols provide for

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 20. The Final Document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

² A/39/348. The study has also been issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1, under the title *Study on Conventional Disarmament*. It is summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chap. XXV.

³ A/40/486 and Add.1.

⁴ *Study on all the aspects of Regional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2), para. 198.

⁵ A/CONF.95/15 and Corr.2, annex I. For the text of the Convention and its Protocols, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, appendix VII, or *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No.E.83.IX.5).

the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attacks by means of incendiary weapons, land-mines and booby traps, and prohibit entirely the use of fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body. As the first international arms regulation agreement to be negotiated at a United Nations conference, the Convention and its Protocols represent a significant step in efforts to prohibit or at least restrict the use of certain categories of weapons. By resolution 40/84, the General Assembly urged more States to accede to the Convention. As of the end of 1986, 25 countries had deposited instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General (see appendix I).

While many States reaffirmed in 1985 their conviction that nuclear disarmament must be accorded clear priority, a considerable number of them also stressed the need to give serious and—in the view of many—increased attention to the conventional weapons aspect of the arms race and to limit conventional armaments. But in several parts of the world conventional weapons continued to be used in conflict, with their attendant toll in human life and destruction of property.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

In the course of a general exchange of views in the Disarmament Commission,⁶ several references were made to conventional armaments, largely in a regional context. There was no agenda item devoted exclusively to the subject, but under item 4, part (b) (see page 13), the Disarmament Commission was called upon to consider and elaborate a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

China stated that along with reductions in nuclear arms, there should be drastic reductions in conventional arms. Conventional arms, moreover, should be used only for self-defence and not to threaten the security of other countries.

With reference to the Vienna Talks,⁷ the Soviet Union recalled that the socialist countries had advanced a number of proposals on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Recently, on 18 April, in Berlin, the Soviet Union had put forward a major new initiative that envisaged that all ground forces and tactical aviation deployed from the Atlantic to the Urals would be considerably reduced and that theatre nuclear weapons would be reduced hand in hand with conventional armaments. The Byelorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR emphasized the importance of the Soviet proposal. The German Democratic Republic stated that that initiative complemented the Soviet Union's programme for the liquidation of all nuclear weapons. It held that those who made agreement on the programme of nuclear disarmament dependent on a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments should respond in a positive way. Czechoslovakia and Poland attached particular significance to the Soviet proposal and thought that it constituted a sound basis for a mutually acceptable solution. Hungary hoped that Western

⁶ A/CN.10/PV.102-109, A/CN.10/PV.109/Corr.1 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

⁷ The Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe opened in November 1973.

countries would show willingness to embark on serious negotiations. Romania stressed the elimination of nuclear weapons as the central goal, but made clear that it supported measures aimed at substantial reductions in conventional weapons and military budgets as well.

Canada considered that the response to the Western proposals put forward at the Vienna Talks had been far from adequate, which cast doubt on whether the other side was serious about seeking an agreement in that forum.

Nigeria referred to the huge losses in human lives and resources caused by the conventional arms race and appealed to the two super-Powers to facilitate successful deliberations in the Disarmament Commission. Bangladesh urged that the issue of conventional disarmament be given priority attention. It believed that the phenomenal growth in the conventional arms race, the development of high-technology conventional weapons and indiscriminate arms sales reflected the United Nations failure to act firmly on the question. Immediate steps were needed to redress the situation. The 1984 United Nations study on various aspects of the conventional arms race (mentioned above) had called for urgent and serious consideration, Bangladesh noted.

Denmark felt that a follow-up to the study was important and necessary. It therefore proposed that the question of conventional disarmament be considered as a specific agenda item at the 1987 session of the Disarmament Commission and stated that it would put forward a draft resolution to that effect at the forty-first session of the General Assembly.

After the general exchange of views, item 4 was considered in a contact group, open to all delegations, under the chairmanship of Mr. Miguel A. Alborno of Ecuador. The Contact Group, which held eight meetings between 7 and 21 May, worked on the basis of the document entitled "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4", contained in the 1985 report of the Disarmament Commission.⁸ It also had before it a working paper entitled "Basic issues of nuclear and conventional disarmament", submitted by a group of socialist States.⁹ While the Contact Group made encouraging progress in resolving outstanding issues and arrived at agreed formulations for several recommendations, it was unable to reach consensus on a complete set of recommendations. Therefore, it recommended that the Commission continue its efforts in 1987.

The subject of conventional weapons was addressed in some of the recommendations that the Contact Group discussed and included in the compilation annexed to the Commission's 1986 report to the General Assembly.¹⁰ According to one of them, pending comprehensive measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, States should co-operate to develop a comprehensive set of measures for the prevention of nuclear war and all armed conflict. A wide array of confidence-building measures, to be negotiated in appropriate frameworks for regional or global application, could be included.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/40/42), annex I.*

⁹ A/CN.10/81.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42), annex I, recommendations 16 and 17 (sect. I) and 2 (sect. II).*

Another recommendation stated that nuclear and conventional weapons and military forces should be reduced in a mutual, balanced and verifiable manner in regions where their concentration had attained dangerous levels. According to yet another recommendation, the qualitative development and the growing accumulation of conventional weapons in many parts of the world added a new dimension to the arms race, especially among States possessing the largest military arsenals. Therefore, conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

In concluding statements, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, and the United States expressed disappointment at the results of the work on item 4 and felt that a completely fresh approach should be considered. The German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria believed that some progress had been made on the question of nuclear and conventional disarmament. Mexico condemned what it saw as attempts on the part of some States to use negotiations in the Disarmament Commission to erode prior agreements on aims and purposes in the field of disarmament.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

Since the Conference on Disarmament did not have an item on conventional weapons and conventional disarmament on its 1986 agenda, those issues were addressed, as in previous years, in connection with general comments at plenary meetings.¹¹

The Soviet Union recalled proposals put forward by General Secretary Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 regarding reductions in conventional weapons and armed forces.¹² The statement advanced the idea of banning the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity was close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction. Among other measures proposed by the Soviet Union were: (a) reductions in the armed forces of States, above all the permanent members of the Security Council and States connected with them by military alliances; (b) a freeze, beginning with the numerical level of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States, including those stationed outside their national borders; (c) reductions on a mutual basis in the armed forces and armaments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Central Europe; and (d) limitations on sales and transfers of conventional weapons. Czechoslovakia announced that the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization had held a high-level meeting in Budapest in June 1986¹³ and had appealed to all European countries, the United States

¹¹ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹² *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. I, document CD/649, sect. I. The statement was also circulated as a General Assembly document (A/41/97).

¹³ See *ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/700 and Corr.1. The communiqué was also circulated as a United Nations document (A/41/411-S/18147 and Corr.1 and 2).

and Canada to proceed to a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments that would apply to the whole territory of Europe. The proposal detailed stages and the size of reductions, weapon types and other specific aspects, including both national and international verification procedures.

Canada welcomed both proposals and a statement on the same subject made by NATO on 30 May¹⁴ as developments significant for negotiating reductions in levels of conventional arms. In Canada's view, they reflected a growing, reciprocal awareness that conventional arms reduction was a necessary element in the broad effort to reduce arsenals of all types. France stated that the conditions under which it would agree to join in a nuclear disarmament process included, *inter alia*, significant progress in correcting conventional imbalances, particularly in Europe. The Netherlands declared that such imbalances accounted for the nuclear dimension of Western security policy in that part of the world. It hoped that in other regions as well conventional arms control and disarmament would be actively considered, and it looked forward to suggestions on how to address the matter in the Conference on Disarmament.

The United States likewise restated its view that disparities in the balance of conventional forces contributed greatly to the need for a nuclear deterrent. Conventional conflict risked escalating to nuclear conflict; therefore, it held, it was time the international community devoted more of its attention to conventional arms control. The United States warned against entertaining artificial distinctions between the role of the various categories of weapons: nuclear weapons as such had not created impulses in the minds of men, and their existence should not obscure insights into the root causes of war.

The German Democratic Republic took exception to the view that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization would gain superiority in the conventional field in the event of nuclear disarmament. Instead, it stated, those countries were striving for progressively lower levels of armaments, based on the principle of equality and equal security. Hungary, Poland and Romania expressed their support for the proposals of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Among the non-aligned countries that referred to the Soviet proposal, Pakistan found encouraging the references to conventional disarmament in Europe contained in it, but felt that the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament required further elaboration. Pakistan noted that there was concern among NATO countries at what they considered the Warsaw Treaty Organization's conventional military preponderance in Europe, and it expressed the belief that any serious disarmament endeavour in the East-West context would have to address that question in a mutually satisfactory manner. But since security was not something concerning the two alliances exclusively, a global approach would have to recognize and develop appropriate solutions

¹⁴ Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Halifax, Canada, 29 and 30 May 1986, published in *NATO Communiqués 1986* (Brussels, NATO Information Service).

for other parts of the world. Such a comprehensive approach was, in Pakistan's view, essential to making nuclear and conventional disarmament agreements a realistic possibility.

The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the opinion that the reduction of conventional forces and weapons should receive equal attention in parallel with nuclear and chemical disarmament. Although weapons of mass destruction posed a serious threat to the survival of mankind, it still had to be borne in mind that large parts of military budgets, particularly those of third world countries, were spent on conventional weapons. Pointing out that certain conventional weapons kept abreast of weapons of mass destruction in sophistication and lethality, Iran demanded that their indiscriminate use be condemned by the United Nations and that the Conference on Disarmament pay more attention to conventional disarmament.

Addressing the question of a link between disarmament and development, Peru stated that developing countries could wait no longer for the military Powers to begin a disarmament process. Their problems were qualitatively different and the arms race was a more excruciating alternative to development for them than it was for developed countries. That was the basis of the previous year's Peruvian initiative on conventional disarmament at the regional level, adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 40/94 A, and of Peru's unilateral decision to reduce military expenditures in order to channel those resources to development and to foster a greater climate of confidence in the region. That decision did not seek to divert attention from efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, but directed Peru's own efforts towards conventional disarmament, which was an immediate problem for it and within its own power to resolve.

China briefly expounded the view that, along with reductions in nuclear arms, there should be a drastic reduction in conventional weapons. The conventional arms of all countries should be used only for self-defence, not for threatening the security of other countries.

Several delegations referred to regional efforts in the field of conventional arms limitation and disarmament in Europe, particularly in connection with the follow-up of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). An important element of that process, they felt, was the ongoing Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (which had opened in January 1984) and the Vienna Talks. The Federal Republic of Germany noted that the mandate for the Stockholm Conference, agreed to at Madrid in 1983, was based on the perception that limitations and reductions in conventional forces in Europe would be facilitated by—and must therefore be preceded by—concrete confidence-building measures. It was consequently important to make determined efforts at Stockholm to produce substantive improvements in the confidence-building provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Progress in Stockholm and at Vienna could be an essential preliminary to more extensive arms control efforts to eliminate the conventional imbalance in Europe. With that in mind, NATO had advocated that bold new steps be taken towards strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe through increased openness and the

establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels, and they had set up a task force to examine how to attain those objectives.¹⁵

Austria, a non-member, believed that there was currently a greater awareness of the interdependence of nuclear and conventional disarmament. In its view, what it called “the spirit of Helsinki” had created the right intellectual and moral atmosphere in which the question of how to arrest the arms race could be answered. Confidence-building and disarmament were two processes that had to move in parallel to avoid the logical fallacy that the lack of confidence prevented disarmament and the lack of disarmament prevented confidence.

The Soviet Union denied that it and its allies did not want a dialogue on conventional weapons and were concentrating all attention on nuclear disarmament. It wanted early tangible results in the Vienna Talks and had proposed cuts in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe that were important in their own right and would also contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The United States and the United Kingdom expressed disappointment with regard to the Vienna Talks, noting that hopeful reports of prospects for progress had been dampened by the realization that verification continued to be an important obstacle.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

During the forty-first session of the General Assembly, a large number of Member States addressed the issue of conventional weapons in their statements during the debate in the First Committee.¹⁶

Many States expressed increasing concern over the fact that, since 1945, more than 150 wars had been fought with conventional weapons, resulting in at least 20 million deaths and immense destruction. Greece believed that disarmament was a multidimensional process and the danger of nuclear war was but one side of the coin. Destruction of human life was caused essentially by conventional weapons, and their destructive capacity had been increasing steadily. Hence, Greece supported efforts to bring the numbers of conventional weapons down to the lowest possible level, taking into account the security interests of all States, and believed that substantial reductions would lessen the risk of nuclear war. Denmark thought that the successful conclusion of the study on conventional disarmament and the reaction to it had accentuated the role of the United Nations in that field. The study was the first attempt to produce an overall presentation of a complicated subject, and, in Denmark’s view, a natural next step would be for the Disarmament Commission to proceed to consider the matter on the basis of the recommendations and conclusions of the study. Italy held that conventional disarmament was a

¹⁵ Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control, 30 May 1986, in *NATO Communiqués 1986* (Brussels, NATO Information Service).

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 34th and 37th, 44th and 48th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

universal problem, which should be confronted in a more serious and concrete way than the Assembly had so far done. In its view, there was no doubt that the problem of nuclear-arms reduction in Europe was inextricably linked to the problem of conventional disarmament, to the point that lack of adequate progress in the latter would sooner or later hamper further progress in the former.

Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom stressed that they welcomed the increased importance placed by Member States on the need to achieve worthwhile and verifiable measures of conventional arms limitation and disarmament. Nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament remained one of the highest priorities for the Twelve, but they noted that conventional weapons had been and continued to be used in many parts of the world, causing terrible destruction and massive casualties. The Twelve considered that conventional arms control and disarmament constituted a subject for consideration by the United Nations.

The Soviet Union believed that the movement towards genuine security through disarmament required that, along with the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces should be agreed upon. The problem was urgent, because some characteristics of conventional weapons almost made them weapons of mass destruction. Together with its allies, the Soviet Union had put forward concrete proposals for very substantial cuts in armed forces and armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, under very far-reaching control measures. The objective was to reduce significantly the level of military threat on the continent.

The Byelorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Ukrainian SSR likewise emphasized the need for radical cuts in armed forces and armaments. Bulgaria noted that the conventional arms race was being conducted at the global level and encompassed all countries and regions. Conventional weapons consumed the better part of the world's military expenditures. Even more alarming prospects had been created by the qualitative advance in the development of conventional weapons, their increased sophistication, accuracy and destructive power. The stockpiling of conventional armaments had often been justified as a means of strengthening stability by raising the nuclear threshold, but, in fact, it might only serve to increase the danger of nuclear conflict. Accordingly, Bulgaria advocated significantly reducing conventional weapons and armed forces.

As a European country, Czechoslovakia stressed the importance of efforts to limit the arms race in Europe. That would, in its view, facilitate a global solution as well. While recognizing the priority of nuclear disarmament, Romania considered it was necessary to formulate a complex programme of disarmament that would encompass the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons and a substantial reduction of conventional weapons.

Austria called attention to the fact that conventional weapons had become a destabilizing factor and called for measures to ensure a global equilibrium of forces at the lowest possible level of armaments. Finland considered that conventional disarmament should be pursued in parallel with nuclear disarmament. The possibility that nuclear-weapon States could be drawn into a local

conflict would thus be reduced. Finland held that further work on the issue, based on previous studies, could be undertaken within the United Nations and that special attention should be devoted to verification in conventional arms limitation.

Yugoslavia stated that the termination of the nuclear-arms race was the primary task, but that one should not lose sight of the danger inherent in the conventional arms race, which was continuing at an accelerated pace, particularly between the countries with the largest arsenals. It maintained that the General Assembly should devote full attention to the question. Malaysia expressed concern over the escalating race in both nuclear and conventional arms and stressed that the world was threatened not only by nuclear annihilation, but, more immediately, by limited local wars and conflicts involving mainly conventional weapons.

Zambia considered that the United Nations should not overlook or minimize the real danger inherent in conventional warfare while it sought to halt the nuclear-arms race. Nepal felt that conventional disarmament deserved concerted attention because, among other things, conventional weapons absorbed four fifths of all military expenditures. Too often the funding for such weaponry drained away precious resources required to meet the urgent social needs of the populations of developing countries.

Colombia had no doubt that the adoption of effective measures for conventional disarmament was of vital importance to efforts to reduce the danger of war. It considered that the traffic in arms, especially the illicit traffic, increased international friction and brought with it the risk of exacerbating already tense situations. Uganda believed that the question of conventional disarmament should be considered together with the question of nuclear disarmament. It added that the sale and transfer of conventional weapons caused great concern in the developing world. Aside from being a drain on scarce resources, conventional weapons influenced national and regional conflicts, and hence affected national and regional peace and security.

China noted the increased interest in conventional disarmament. While it regarded nuclear disarmament as the top priority, it cautioned that the importance of conventional disarmament should not be overlooked. In a nuclear age, there was no insuperable barrier between conventional and nuclear war. Should a conventional war break out in an area with a high concentration of both categories of weapons, it could escalate into a nuclear war.

A number of States expressed reservations about focusing on the question of conventional disarmament. India stated that sometimes efforts were made to divert attention from nuclear disarmament by focusing on the expenditures for conventional weapons that developing countries were incurring, although their scale of expenditure could not be compared with that of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. Developing countries, too, had to meet the costs of national security and to have a modicum of conventional preparedness, as they lived in a highly militarized world dominated by military alliances. While admitting the legitimacy of the growing concern about conventional disarmament, Nicaragua had similar reservations about what it considered the tendency to place conventional disarmament in the wrong context and to

examine it from the wrong perspective. In its opinion, the adoption of disarmament measures in the conventional field must be based, as affirmed by the Declaration of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Harare in September 1986,¹⁷ on full respect for the principles of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

Regional conventional disarmament was addressed by a number of States. The United Kingdom affirmed that the Twelve supported efforts in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well as Europe, which could contribute to a favourable atmosphere for regional disarmament. Côte d'Ivoire felt that the establishment of a climate of peace and security at the regional level could help slow down the accumulation of conventional weapons. Pakistan considered that the arms race was not always fuelled by the East-West conflict, but was often the result of efforts by powerful regional countries to dominate their smaller neighbours. Bolivia urged countries producing conventional weapons to reduce their sales to the third world, and it reiterated its support for regional initiatives designed to achieve disarmament in Latin America.

Sweden noted that the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe had shown that when there was a common purpose, multilateral negotiations could bring about concrete and positive results. The Document of the Conference, it believed, marked an important step. Sweden expected that the CSCE follow-up meetings in Vienna would decide to proceed to the next stage: disarmament proper. The United States welcomed the agreement reached in Stockholm, stating that it could contribute to greater security in Europe and to improved relations, particularly between East and West. The militarily significant and verifiable measures adopted at Stockholm constituted, in its view, a substantial advance over those contained in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The United Kingdom noted that the Stockholm agreement was the first security agreement signed since 1979 by nations from both the East and the West—an observation also made by the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom declared that the Twelve would seek to build on the agreement both in the field of arms control and, more widely, within CSCE. The Soviet Union stated that the results of the Stockholm Conference had proved that, even in a complex situation, agreement could be reached, provided there was political will to do so. A foundation had been laid for new agreements on a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

Six draft resolutions dealing with conventional weapons were put before the First Committee, and five were adopted by the General Assembly on 3 December.¹⁸

On 29 October, Denmark submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conventional disarmament". On 10 November, it slightly revised the draft and, on 12 November, submitted a further revision with minor changes in operative

¹⁷ A/41/697-S/18392, annex, sect. I.

¹⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 94th meeting.

paragraph 2 (see below).

In introducing the draft on 4 November, Denmark recalled the 1984 study and the views that Member States had submitted on it, which were contained in two reports of the Secretary-General.¹⁹ It then observed that increased concern for conventional disarmament had characterized statements at the two previous sessions of the General Assembly. Denmark felt that the United Nations should play an important role in that process and proposed that the Disarmament Commission consider the question at its 1987 session on the basis of the study's recommendations and conclusions, as well as all other relevant existing and future proposals, with a view to identifying possible measures. It also suggested that the Department for Disarmament Affairs prepare an analysis of the views received from Member States regarding the study.

On 13 November the First Committee approved without a vote the draft resolution in its second revised version.

On that occasion, four States explained their positions. Three had reservations regarding the request made to the Disarmament Commission in operative paragraph 2. Democratic Yemen explained that it did not obstruct consensus, because it was its understanding that the draft in no way prejudged the work of the Commission or implied acceptance of all the study's recommendations. Both India and Indonesia believed that the Commission's current agenda could accommodate the request and that there was no need to add a separate item. In a generally worded statement applying to all the drafts before the Committee at that time, Cuba expressed the belief that conventional disarmament was a part of a process leading to general and complete disarmament and would be facilitated by real progress in nuclear disarmament. Conventional disarmament could not be considered separately from the priorities of nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Denmark without a vote, as resolution 41/59 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/94 C of 12 December 1985, in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a report for the General Assembly at its forty-first session containing further views of Member States received regarding the *Study on Conventional Disarmament*,

Recalling the many statements made at its fortieth session in which growing concern was expressed by Member States regarding the conventional arms race and in which the importance also of conventional disarmament measures was reiterated,

Recalling also the consideration by the Disarmament Commission at its 1986 session of its agenda item 4 (b) concerning nuclear and conventional disarmament and the wide support expressed by Member States for greater attention to be given to conventional disarmament,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General containing further views received from Member States regarding the *Study*,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare for the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session in May 1987 a compilation of the views received from Member States regarding the *Study on Conventional Disarmament*;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to consider, at its forthcoming session in 1987,

¹⁹ A/40/486 and Add.1 and A/41/501 and Add.1 and 2.

the question of conventional disarmament, fully taking into account the recommendations and conclusions contained in the *Study*, as well as all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of conventional arms reductions and disarmament, and to report on its deliberations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament"

Two of the draft resolutions before the First Committee dealt with conventional disarmament in its general and regional aspects.

On 30 October, China submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conventional disarmament" In introducing it on 4 November, China stated that while nuclear disarmament should assume the greatest urgency and highest priority, the need for conventional disarmament should not be overlooked, as the conventional arms race undermined world peace and the security of States. It felt that the increasing international interest in the question provided a good basis for further efforts by the international community to reach agreements on conventional disarmament. The issue had many aspects, including regional initiatives, arms transfers and the question of the reduction of military budgets. In certain regions conventional weapons and military forces were highly concentrated, thereby not only directly aggravating tension, but also constituting serious obstacles to achieving nuclear disarmament. The purpose of the draft was to clarify certain basic principles of conventional disarmament.

Also on 30 October, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale" In introducing it on 5 November, Peru pointed out that the draft sought to update resolution 40/94 A, adopted the previous year by a large majority, without a negative vote. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft reaffirmed the importance of efforts to limit and gradually reduce armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of general and complete disarmament, while operative paragraph 2 expressed the General Assembly's support for all regional endeavours.

On 10 November the sponsors of the draft introduced by Peru submitted a revised version, later also sponsored by Liberia, with a new operative paragraph 2 (see below).

On 13 November, China made additional comments on the draft it had introduced. First, it stressed that nuclear and conventional disarmament should be carried out simultaneously and should complement each other. Secondly, while conventional disarmament was being carried out, consideration should be given to the different circumstances of different countries.

On the same day, the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by China by a recorded vote of 125 to none, with 2 abstentions (India and Iraq), and the draft resolution introduced by Peru by a recorded vote of 114 to none, with 6 abstentions. In connection with the votes, a number of States explained their positions on one or both of the drafts.

Among the eight States that explained their votes in favour of both,

Australia believed that the high priority justifiably attached to nuclear disarmament should not preclude promoting conventional disarmament, and it pointed out that the emphasis on the former had the effect of somewhat diluting recognition of the concurrent priority that should be attached to the latter. It also expressed reservations concerning the possibility of achieving durable results through unilateral disarmament. Belgium supported the concept of disarmament at the regional scale, but it could not fully endorse statements placing the responsibility for halting the arms race on the militarily significant States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, nor the wording regarding the priority assigned to nuclear disarmament.

Brazil restated its view that conventional disarmament measures and agreements should parallel progress in other fields, in accordance with the priorities established in the 1978 Final Document. In its view, conventional disarmament was a global task and regional approaches might be of help, provided they were freely agreed upon and worked out by the parties directly concerned.

France stated that the wording of operative paragraph 3 of the draft introduced by China would have been more appropriate if there had been no mention of the two major military alliances, while in the draft introduced by Peru, the emphasis in operative paragraph 2 on priority for nuclear disarmament did not reflect the balance achieved in the 1978 Final Document. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that neither exclusive emphasis on nuclear disarmament nor exclusive preoccupation with conventional disarmament would be appropriate. Measures in both fields were needed and must be equally applied, as recognized in the 1978 Final Document. The United Kingdom welcomed the increased emphasis given to the conventional arms race and the possibilities for balanced and verifiable measures of conventional disarmament.

The Soviet Union recalled the appeal addressed to NATO at the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in June, as well as the results of the Stockholm Conference. It held that an agreement should be reached speedily on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Central Europe and hoped that a reduction in weapons and forces in the Asian and Pacific regions could also be effected. Addressing the draft introduced by China, the United States underscored two points: (a) it was necessary to redress what it considered the conventional-force imbalance in Europe as progress was made in nuclear-weapons reductions; and (b) the NATO States were pursuing in earnest negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

India abstained on the draft introduced by China and voted for that introduced by Peru. It considered that the first draft would detract from the accepted priorities in disarmament. In its view, if conventional disarmament was to be pursued in a regional context, it should be on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and should take into account the characteristics of each region.

The Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam abstained on the draft introduced by Peru and voted for that introduced by China. The former

State expressed its commitment to regional and international peace and security, declaring that no State with a major military arsenal should resort to the use of force against other countries, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Viet Nam stated that regional measures of conventional disarmament could not play a useful role in strengthening peace and stability if they were not incorporated into a political process and outside threats were not removed. In its view, the draft introduced by Peru failed to address those two requirements.

On 3 December the General Assembly took action on the two draft resolutions. The draft introduced by China was adopted by a recorded vote of 150 to none, with 2 abstentions (India and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), as resolution 41/59 G. The draft resolution introduced by Peru was adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 7 abstentions, as resolution 41/59 M.

In connection with the vote in the Assembly, Ghana explained its abstention on the resolution introduced by Peru. While believing that regional conventional disarmament could be a useful basis for global disarmament, it considered that meaningful regional disarmament depended upon an accepted balance of mutual responsibility and obligations on the part of the States in the region or subregion. It also held that the maximum co-operation and support of third parties were essential for a successful regional disarmament initiative.

Resolution 41/59 G reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and particularly its paragraph 81, which provides that together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, and which stresses that States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions,

Also recalling that the same document declares, *inter alia*, that priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces, and that it stresses that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently,

Further recalling that the same document states that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority, and that real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis,

Aware of the dangers to world peace and security originating from wars and conflicts fought with conventional weapons, as well as of their possible escalation into a nuclear war in regions with a high concentration of conventional and nuclear weapons,

Also aware that with the advance in science and technology, conventional weapons tend to become increasingly lethal and destructive,

Believing that resources released through disarmament, including conventional disarmament, can be used for the social and economic development of people of all countries, particularly the developing countries,

Bearing in mind its resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981 and the *Study on Conventional Disarmament* conducted in accordance with that resolution,

Bearing in mind also the efforts made to promote conventional disarmament and the related proposals and suggestions, as well as the initiatives taken by various countries in this regard,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance of the efforts aimed at resolutely pursuing the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament;

2. *Believes* that the military forces of all countries should not be used other than for the purpose of self-defence;

3. *Urges* the countries with the largest military arsenals, which bear a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, and the member States of the two major military alliances to continue negotiations on conventional disarmament in earnest, with a view to reaching early agreement on the limitation and gradual and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons under effective international control in their respective regions;

4. *Encourages* all States, while taking into account the need to protect security and maintain necessary defensive capabilities, to intensify their efforts and take, either on their own or in a regional context, appropriate steps to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security;

5. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to consider, at its substantive session in 1987, issues related to conventional disarmament;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament"

Resolution 41/59 M reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/94 A of 12 December 1985, by which, *inter alia*, it urged Governments, where the regional situation so permitted and on the initiative of the States concerned, to consider and adopt appropriate measures at the regional level with a view to strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces through the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, under strict and effective international control, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and of the self-determination of peoples, in conformity with the Charter, and taking into account the need to ensure balance in each phase and to avoid impairing the security of any State,

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 40/94 A of 12 December 1985 relating to conventional disarmament on a regional scale;

2. *Reiterates* the primary responsibility of the militarily significant States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, for halting and reversing the arms race, and the priority assigned to nuclear disarmament in the context of the advances towards general and complete disarmament;

3. *Expresses its firm support* for all regional endeavours, as well as unilateral measures, directed to strengthening a climate of mutual confidence that will make possible regional agreements on arms limitation in the future;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to make available to the interested Governments, upon their request, such technical services and assistance as may be useful in measures of conventional disarmament on a regional scale;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale"

On 29 October, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution entitled "Confidence-building and conventional disarmament", which was later also sponsored by Greece.

In introducing it the same day, France stated that a number of countries had emphasized their interest in the results of the Stockholm Conference and wanted to highlight the importance of its conclusions and the advantages it offered for both European participants and all other States. France pointed out that the draft was not intended to supplant other texts on the subject nor to give a rigid definition of any exclusive, fundamental link between confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament. Its purpose was pragmatic. It was understood that every region had its own peculiarities and that there could be no question of mechanically transposing the Stockholm conclusions to other regions. By the draft, the General Assembly would invite all States to draw on the Conference's achievement in any way that could be useful to them, from the point of view of both confidence-building measures and prospects for conventional disarmament.

Two other draft resolutions pertaining to the Stockholm Conference were before the First Committee. On 30 October, Sweden submitted a draft entitled "Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe", which was adopted as resolution 41/86 L and is dealt with in chapter II. Also on 30 October, Poland submitted a draft entitled "Confidence-building and conventional disarmament in Europe" However, as a result of consultations, it joined France and Sweden in submitting on 17 November a revised version of the draft introduced by France, under the new title "Confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament" The revisions contained a number of changes in the preambular and operative paragraphs. On 18 November, France orally further revised one preambular and two operative paragraphs. The same day, Peru orally proposed an amendment calling for the addition of a new thirteenth preambular paragraph (see below), which was accepted by the sponsors. In introducing the revised draft, France pointed out that it should be considered in the context of general and complete disarmament. By the text, the General Assembly would fully take into account special regional situations and bring to the attention of Member States the political and practical measures adopted at the Stockholm Conference.

The same day, at the time that action was taken on the draft introduced by France, Poland noted with pleasure that the results of the Stockholm Conference had met with wide approval throughout the world. Accordingly, it considered it highly desirable that the general appreciation felt should be expressed by a General Assembly resolution elaborated in the same spirit of consensus that had characterized the Conference itself. As a result of intensive co-operation with France and Sweden and with all the CSCE countries supporting their efforts, Poland stated, it had been possible to produce a useful compromise draft, and it would not insist on putting its own draft to a vote.²⁰

On 18 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by France, as orally revised and amended, by a recorded vote of 98 to none, with 22 abstentions (non-aligned States).

Several States explained their positions in connection with the vote.

²⁰ See A/41/840, paras. 36-37.

All the Member States participating in the CSCE process voted in favour. Among them, five explained their positions. Czechoslovakia felt that confidence-building measures were very important and welcomed the achievement of a joint text reflecting in many respects its own views. The Federal Republic of Germany stressed the interrelationship between stability in Europe and in other regions. It urged Member States to give the draft, which it considered fully compatible with the 1978 Final Document, the widest possible support. Italy agreed with the general thrust of the text, which stressed the positive role of the CSCE process and the Stockholm Conference for Europe and the world. Sweden considered that the draft reflected and developed the principles adopted at Stockholm and contained important observations and recommendations of a general character. The United States noted its support for the draft in a statement mainly addressing the draft introduced by Sweden.

Six other States that voted affirmatively explained their positions. China, Ethiopia and Japan all cautioned that since regions differed from one another, there was—in the words of Ethiopia—“no single global prescription on confidence-building measures”. Japan specifically referred to the situation in the Asian-Pacific region as being both politically and militarily quite different from that in Europe. Mongolia attached importance to confidence- and security-building measures and felt that they could be adopted and implemented in all regions of the world, including in Asia and the Pacific. Nigeria considered that the draft contained references extraneous to the Document of the Stockholm Conference. It voted in favour on the understanding that the text dealt with conventional weapons and excluded all elements of nuclear weapons. In proposing its oral amendment, Peru stated that it agreed in principle with the draft, but suggested that an express reference to the 1978 Final Document should be made. Moreover, it regretted that the sponsors had agreed to delete a reference to the regional approach to disarmament.

Among those abstaining, Afghanistan and Democratic Yemen welcomed the progress made at the Stockholm Conference, but noted that some of the measures referred to in the draft were not applicable to all regions of the world. Algeria pointed out the specific situation of the countries of the third world and stressed that initiatives of conventional disarmament such as those taken in the European context would be inoperable and perhaps even prejudice the desired results, when applied to a region such as southern Africa. Brazil stated that disarmament was above all a global task, which should focus on the armed forces and conventional weapons of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant ones. Although the draft contained some positive elements, Brazil considered that it implied a dangerous shift of emphasis away not only from disarmament in Europe, but also from nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war—the issues that, in its view, had highest priority on the agenda of the Committee.

India explained that it could not support the draft resolution because it extrapolated from the Stockholm Conference, introducing elements that went beyond what was discussed there. Moreover, it felt that some of the formulations contained language used in the context of military blocs in Europe and feared that increased emphasis on conventional disarmament could only

deflect the Committee's attention from the accepted priorities of disarmament. While fully supporting the efforts to consolidate peace in Europe, Viet Nam abstained because the draft contained a number of provisions that might prejudice the purposes and nature of confidence-building measures in regions other than Europe.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 21 abstentions, as resolution 41/59 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Determined to achieve progress in disarmament,

Recalling the obligation for States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and recalling the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the achievement of increased security and stability in Europe through a balance at lower levels of armed forces and conventional weapons as an objective of great importance,

Reaffirming the importance of continued efforts to build confidence, to lessen military confrontation and to enhance security for all,

Stressing that confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities will contribute to these objectives,

Mindful of the positive role that the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has for consolidating security and co-operation on that continent and in the whole world,

Noting the agreed aim of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe to undertake in stages new effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament,

Convinced that military forces should not exceed levels necessary for all States to protect their security,

Conscious of the need for a broad and comprehensive approach to security, taking into account the specificity of regional environment,

Convinced that efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and furthering disarmament are in the common interest of all States,

Considering that the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be pursued, aiming, in Europe, at a balance at a lower level of armaments, within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, under strict international control,

Affirming further that agreement on and implementation of confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to promoting openness in the field of military activities, to the creation of a climate of confidence in international relations and to preparing for progress in disarmament,

Bearing in mind the principles of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. *Believes* that there is need for strengthening stability and security at a lower level of forces by the verifiable limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament and by an increased openness in this context;

2. *Notes* that conventional disarmament is part of the wider objective of general and complete disarmament and that measures designed to achieve regional disarmament with the concurrence of all States concerned can play a useful role in reducing tensions and strengthening security;

3. *Believes also* that increased confidence can improve the basis for effective, adequate and effectively verifiable measures of conventional disarmament aimed at enhancing the security of all States and that the implementation of such disarmament measures can, in turn, result in increased confidence;

4. *Welcomes* the concrete, militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable measures adopted on 19 September 1986, within the framework of the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, covering the whole of Europe and designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities;

5. *Considers* that, by their scope and their nature as well as by their full implementation, these measures will be an important contribution to the strengthening of confidence and security throughout Europe, thereby promoting international peace and security;

6. *Highly appreciates* the agreement reached at Stockholm as a valuable example of finding solutions to important problems of a military nature;

7. *Expresses* the hope that after the adoption of confidence- and security-building measures at Stockholm, steps will be agreed upon in order to make further progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament in Europe;

8. *Invites* all States, with full account to be taken of specific regional conditions, to consider the achievement of lessening confrontation by confidence- and security-building measures, which contribute to reducing the danger of surprise attacks, diminishing the possibility of misunderstanding or political pressure through the use of military strength and reducing misinterpretations that could worsen crises and eventually lead to conflict.

On 30 October, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects". In introducing it on 5 November, Sweden stated that the fact that the Convention and its three Protocols had entered into force in 1983, less than three years after adoption, was an encouraging indication of the international community's desire to develop humanitarian law in the field and to give effect to it. The draft noted the possibility, laid down in article 8 of the Convention, for reviewing the scope and operation of the Convention and its Protocols and for future international standard-setting relating to other categories of conventional weapons that were not covered. In that context, Sweden considered that some categories of weapons, like incendiary weapons, sea mines, and laser weapons for anti-personnel purposes, should be closely followed. The draft urged those States which had not yet done so to accede as early as possible so that the instruments might ultimately obtain universal adherence.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

In connection with the voting, Mongolia explained its position. It considered that the Convention should serve as an effective instrument for limiting armaments and should facilitate negotiations for further steps to limit or prohibit other forms of conventional weapons. In its view, that possibility was being hindered by foot-dragging on the part of many States—including nuclear States—in ratifying the Convention. Mongolia believed that they should heed the appeal contained in operative paragraph 3 of the text.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 41/50. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 35/153 of 12 December 1980, 36/93 of 9 December 1981, 37/79 of 9 December 1982, 38/66 of 15 December 1983, 39/56 of 12 December 1984 and 40/84 of 12 December 1985,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Reaffirming its conviction that general agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its fortieth session,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that an increasing number of States have either signed, ratified, accepted or acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981;

2. *Further notes with satisfaction* that, consequent upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in article 5 of the Convention, the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto entered into force on 2 December 1983;

3. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence;

4. *Notes* that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the annexed Protocols, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General as depositary of the Convention and its three annexed Protocols to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"

Conclusion

In 1986, an increasing number of States expressed concern over the problem of conventional weapons and pointed to the necessity of conventional disarmament, although most of them continued to accord priority to nuclear disarmament. They noted the fact that since the end of the Second World War, more than 150 conflicts had been fought by conventional weapons and that 80 per cent of the annual global military expenditure was allocated to conventional armaments and armed forces. Reflecting the growing interest of States in the subject, a separate agenda item entitled "Conventional disarm-

ament'' was considered by the General Assembly for the first time since the creation of the United Nations. It was felt that the Organization should devote greater attention to the issue and seek the reduction of conventional weapons.

The General Assembly adopted five resolutions on matters related to conventional weapons. By resolution 41/59 C, adopted without a vote, the Assembly requested the Disarmament Commission to consider at its 1987 session the question of conventional disarmament on the basis of the recommendations and conclusions of the 1984 study on the subject. Also without a vote, the Assembly adopted resolution 41/50, urging States to accede to the Convention on excessively injurious conventional weapons. Three resolutions were adopted, on which some States abstained but none voted negatively, on conventional disarmament in general, on conventional disarmament on a regional scale, and on confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament.

While no specific agreements were signed on the reduction of conventional weapons or on conventional disarmament during 1986, the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe could mark the beginning of a process of disarmament in Europe, the continent with the largest concentration of conventional and nuclear weapons.

Reduction of military budgets

Introduction

SEVERAL PROPOSALS ON THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS, based on the conviction that such measures would facilitate the disarmament process and help release resources for economic and social development, were made in the General Assembly during the 1950s and 1960s.¹ In 1973, a proposal submitted by the Soviet Union led to the adoption of resolution 3093 A (XXVIII), by which the Assembly called upon the permanent members of the Security Council to reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent and to designate a portion of the funds thus saved for the provision of development assistance to developing countries. The other permanent members of the Security Council opposed the proposal for various reasons. On the basis of resolution 3093 B (XXVIII), initiated by Mexico, the Secretary-General appointed a group of qualified experts to prepare a report on questions concerning the Soviet proposal.² While recognizing the benefits of reducing military expenditures, the report dealt with the problems of arriving at a generally acceptable conceptual definition of military budgets and of developing a standardized system of measuring and reporting the military expenditures of States. By initiating other studies and surveys on the subject in the following years, the General Assembly sought to develop such a standardized system.

In 1978, the Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting. In 1980, the Panel submitted a report³ in which it found the proposed instrument for the standardized international reporting of military expenditures feasible and recommended a further study of the problems of comparing military budgets as well as those likely to arise with respect to verification.

At its 1980 session, on the basis of resolution 34/83 F of 1979, a Romanian initiative, the Disarmament Commission began to examine the possibility of concluding agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures. By resolution 35/142 A, the General Assembly requested the Commission to continue its deliberations and to identify and

¹ The proposals are discussed in *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 6.

² *Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.1.10).

³ *Reduction of Military Budgets: International reporting of military expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.1.9).

elaborate on the principles that should govern further actions of States in that respect, keeping in mind the possibility of incorporating them into a suitable document at an appropriate stage. Having considered the report of the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting, the Assembly also adopted resolution 35/142 B, proposed by Sweden, by which it recommended that all Member States use the instrument⁴ to report their military expenditures each year to the Secretary-General. At the same time, it requested another expert study to further refine the reporting instrument in the light of suggestions received and to propose solutions to problems of comparing and verifying military expenditures; the study was submitted to the Assembly in 1982.⁵ Pursuant to one of its recommendations that consideration be given to constructing price indexes and purchasing-power parities for the military expenditures of States in order to facilitate valid comparisons among them, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake the proposed exercise, with the assistance of qualified experts and the voluntary co-operation of States.

The dual approach to the problem of reducing military budgets, which the United Nations has used ever since 1980, is incorporated into resolutions 35/142 A and B. It consists of parallel efforts by the Disarmament Commission, on the one hand, to identify and elaborate principles for freezing and reducing military budgets and by the General Assembly, on the other, to broaden participation of Member States in the standardized reporting system. As of the end of 1985, neither objective had been reached, although there had been some progress towards the latter.

The Disarmament Commission continued its work on principles in 1984 and 1985 on the basis of a working paper⁶ prepared by the Chairman of its Working Group during the 1983 session, but was unable to arrive at a consensus. In 1985 there was a slight increase in the number of States reporting their annual military expenditures, a fact welcomed by the delegations advocating use of the system. However, Western and socialist States continued to adhere to widely different positions on whether the reporting exercise, by increasing transparency and openness in military affairs, would lessen mutual mistrust and thus make agreement on reductions more likely, or whether it would constitute a diversion from the actual task of reducing military expenditures. Also, in 1985, the latest expert report,⁷ which dealt with the task of constructing military price indexes and purchasing-power parities, made a further contribution to the refinement of the reporting system.

⁴ The "Instrument for standardized international reporting of military expenditures", which is in the form of a matrix, is discussed and reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chapter XX and its annex III; it has remained essentially similar since that time.

⁵ *Reduction of Military Budgets: Refinement of international reporting and comparison of military expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.4).

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, annex XIII.

⁷ *Reduction of Military Budgets: Construction of military price indexes and purchasing-power parities for comparison of military expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.2).

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986

At its substantive session in May, the Disarmament Commission, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 40/91 A, had on its agenda an item on the reduction of military budgets consisting of two sub-items: concrete steps to be undertaken by States to that end and the finalization of principles to govern such actions. (For the full wording of the item, see page 13.)

A number of States addressed the subject in the general exchange of views in plenary meetings.⁸ Many speakers recalled that by resolution 40/91 A, the General Assembly had requested the Disarmament Commission to finalize during its 1986 session the principles to govern the actions of States in the field of freezing and reducing military expenditures and hoped that it would be possible to do so.

Romania stressed the urgency of freezing and reducing military expenditures within overall measures to halt the arms race. It pointed out that while the adoption of relevant principles might be regarded as a somewhat limited undertaking, it would nevertheless be an important contribution, since it would mark a turning-point in the positions of States regarding a pressing problem. The Soviet Union stated that some countries were reluctant to become engaged in the reduction of military budgets, but believed that the time had come to make a choice between disarmament and military appropriations. The German Democratic Republic urged member States to focus on the issue and to give attention to releasing resources for the benefit of developing countries. It did not think that it was useful to concentrate on transparency and comparability, which would divert attention from urgent problems that had to be solved.

China welcomed the fact that one group of States had shown some flexibility in its general approach to verification—an attitude that, it hoped, would be conducive to reaching an agreement on the principles regarding the reduction of military budgets.

The Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, emphasized that they submitted annual figures on their military budgets, as requested by the General Assembly. They believed that the priority objective should be to gain sufficient acceptance of the existing reporting instrument and to increase the number of States participating in the reporting exercise. Japan considered the United Nations standardized instrument to be an extremely useful tool for understanding the actual military expenditures of States and for making the necessary comparisons. Norway stressed that wider participation by States from different geographic regions and with different budgetary systems would contribute to increased confidence between nations and thus facilitate future efforts to achieve an international agreement on the reduction of military budgets.

Ghana believed that it was in the interest of all to conclude an agreement that would bring about a halt to further increases in military expenditures and lead to their subsequent gradual reduction. In its view, the two military blocs should show greater commitment by adopting a flexible attitude and should

⁸ A/CN.10/PV.102-109, A/CN.10/PV.109/Corr.1 and A/CN.10/PV.101-109/Corrigendum.

continue to talk with each other in order to forge common ground for negotiations. Ghana believed that a judicious combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures, as set out in resolution 40/152 O, should be employed. The procedures should be non-discriminatory and should not in any way interfere in the domestic affairs of participating States.

Pakistan stressed that the practical and technical difficulties impeding the formulation of generally acceptable guidelines for balanced reductions in military expenditures should not be underestimated. It underlined its position that the freezing and reduction of military budgets could only follow a prior consensus on the method by which they might be equitably compared. That was a highly complicated problem, and experience had shown that it was not amenable to any easy solution. A great deal of patient and laborious effort and prolonged deliberations in a favourable political climate would be necessary to arrive at a consensus.

Nigeria and Brazil believed that reductions in military expenditures should start with the nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the two super-Powers. Nigeria appealed to those Powers to exercise self-restraint, pending the conclusion of an internationally verifiable agreement. Brazil hoped that the differences of opinion that had prevented progress in the past would subside, thus permitting the Commission to conclude its work on the item. If the stalemate continued, it suggested, the matter should be referred to the General Assembly, which might then request the opinions of Member States on alternative courses of action.

On 6 May the Disarmament Commission decided to establish Working Group I to deal with the item. The Group held 10 meetings between 7 and 21 May under the chairmanship of Mr. Gheorghe Tinca of Romania. It based its discussion on a working paper entitled "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets"⁹ After achieving consensus on contested formulations for all paragraphs except two, the Working Group decided to merge the two into one. As a result, it produced a text with only paragraph 7 in brackets, signifying that no agreed formulation had been achieved for it, while consensus existed on the other 14 paragraphs. The text read as follows:

1. Concerted efforts should be made by all States, in particular by those States with the largest military arsenals, and by the appropriate negotiating forums, with the objective of concluding international agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets, including adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties. Such agreements should contribute to genuine reductions of armed forces and armaments of States parties, with the aim of strengthening international peace and security at lower levels of armed forces and armaments. Definite agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures are assuming special importance and should be reached within the shortest period of time in order to contribute to the curbing of the arms race, alleviate international tensions, and increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/40/42), annex II.*

2. All efforts in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures should take into account the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2).

3. Pending the conclusion of agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures, all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, should exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures.

4. The reduction of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis should be implemented gradually and in a balanced manner, either on a percentage or on an absolute basis, so as to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage, and without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security and sovereignty and to undertake the necessary measures of self-defence.

5. While the freezing and reduction of military budgets is the responsibility of all States to be implemented in stages in accordance with the principle of the greatest responsibility, the process should begin with those nuclear-weapon States with the largest military arsenals and the biggest military expenditures, to be followed immediately by other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States. This should not prevent other States from initiating negotiations and reaching agreements on the balanced reduction of their respective military budgets at any time during this process.

6. Human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

7. [The text of this paragraph is still under consideration. Alternative formulations for this paragraph are appended to this document.]

8. Armaments and military activities which would be the subject of physical reductions within the limits provided for in any agreement to reduce military expenditures will be identified by every State party to such agreements.

9. The agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures should contain adequate and efficient measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that their provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties. The specific methods of verification or other compliance procedure should be agreed upon in the process of negotiation depending upon the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

10. Unilateral measures undertaken by States concerning the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to favourable conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures.

11. Confidence-building measures could help to create a political climate, conducive to the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. Conversely, the freezing and reduction of military expenditures could contribute to the increase of confidence among States.

12. The United Nations should play a central role in orienting, stimulating and initiating negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, and all Member States should cooperate with the Organization as among themselves, with a view to solving the problems implied by this process.

13. The freezing and reduction of military expenditures may be achieved, as appropriate, on a global, regional, or subregional level, with the agreement of all States concerned.

14. The agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets should be viewed in a broader perspective, including respect for and implementation of the security system of the United Nations, and be interrelated with other measures of disarmament, within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The reduction of military budgets should therefore be complementary to agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament and should not be considered as a substitute for such agreements.

15. The adoption of the above principles should be regarded as a means of facilitating meaningful negotiations on concrete agreements on the freezing and reduction of military

budgets.¹⁰

On 23 May, the Disarmament Commission adopted the report of Working Group I. In the light of the progress achieved, it decided to transmit the set of principles to the General Assembly and to recommend that unless another solution was achieved, the Commission should continue its discussion the following year with a view to reaching an agreed text on paragraph 7, taking into account the proposals of various delegations.

In concluding statements in plenary meetings, a number of members welcomed the fact that it had been possible to make progress on the item. It was felt, however, that an even more flexible approach from all the parties concerned would be needed to overcome the final obstacle.

The Chairman of the Disarmament Commission stated that the progress made by Working Group I was indisputable and encouraging. Only a few years earlier, he said, such a degree of consensus on many of the key provisions of the principles for the reduction of military budgets, including the principles regulating verification, would not have been conceivable. He felt that in an area where disarmament philosophy was evolving quickly, delegations should take a more mature view of the important principles relating to military information and comparability of military budgets. As a result of the Working Group's accomplishment, the agenda item had largely been disposed of, and it would be returned to the Commission with a narrower focus.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

Only a few delegations addressed the question of military expenditures in the plenary meetings¹¹ of the Conference on Disarmament in 1986.

Kenya noted that both developed and developing countries were spending a substantial part of their resources on the manufacture and purchase of arms, and yet the effects of military expenditures on national and international economies were of great concern to developing countries. It reiterated the observation, made in the United Nations study "The Relationship between Disarmament and Development",¹² that the world could either continue to pursue the arms race or move consciously towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development; it could not do both. Peru recalled its unilateral decision to reduce military outlays and its efforts to bring about a South American regional agreement to limit spending on arms purchases. Romania stated that the heavy burden placed on nations by the continuous increase in weapon capability made it imperative to rechannel resources being used for non-productive, destructive goals towards economic and social purposes. It believed that any unilateral initiative to reduce military budgets and

¹⁰ The set of principles and the alternative texts for paragraph 7 are reproduced in the report of Working Group I, which appears in *ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42)*, under paragraph 28. In the present volume, the alternative texts are not reproduced.

¹¹ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹² United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1.

armed forces by States belonging to NATO or the Warsaw Treaty Organization would be beneficial and politically significant. Zaire expressed the view that the proliferation of nuclear weapons generated world military expenditures, which were some 25 times higher than the total amount available for development assistance. Every minute, \$1.5 million was being spent for military purposes.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

In accordance with its resolutions 40/91 A and B of the previous year, the General Assembly had an item on the reduction of military budgets on the agenda of its forty-first session. In considering it, the Assembly had before it the report of the Disarmament Commission, discussed above; a report of the Secretary-General containing the views of a number of Member States on the study concerning the construction of military price indexes and purchasing-power parities for comparison of military expenditures;¹³ and the latest report of the Secretary-General entitled "Military expenditures in standardized form reported by States: report of the Secretary-General",¹⁴ which contained replies from 20 countries.

The debate in the First Committee¹⁵ continued to highlight, as in other recent years, the growing concern of States over the adverse impact that increased military spending had on international security and global economic and development prospects. The question was frequently addressed in connection with conventional and regional disarmament (see chapter XVII) and the relationship between disarmament and development (see chapter XIX).

Many non-aligned countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Bhutan, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Qatar, Togo and Uruguay, voiced their great concern over annual military expenditures, which had reached the level of nearly \$1 trillion. In speaking on behalf of the Group of African States in connection with Disarmament Week, Benin stated that it was regrettable that so much money should be wasted every year for the refinement of weapons of war and engines of destruction, while people in Africa, Asia and other parts of the world were dying of hunger, millions of human beings were deprived of essential needs and the great majority lived below recognized health standards. The Dominican Republic stressed that the arms race imposed heavy burdens on the international community as a whole and especially on the developing countries. The endless spiral of military expenditure had a significant effect on national budgets and was particularly harmful to the social and economic

¹³ A/41/482. Replies were received from: Australia, Finland, Netherlands (on behalf of the States members of the European Community), Norway, Philippines, Sweden and United States.

¹⁴ A/41/622 and Add.1 and 2. Replies were received from: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*. 3rd to 32nd and 41st meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

plans of nations. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya considered that the growing military expenditures, whether on nuclear or conventional weapons, had increased tension in the world and jeopardized international peace and security. Those expenditures equalled or exceeded the entire world debt in one year. If the human and material resources used for military pursuits were released, they would contribute significantly to improving the standard of living for millions of people.

Malta believed that the massive expenditure on the production of nuclear armaments could better be used to alleviate the economic and social ills of the developing world. Kenya strongly shared the view that the gradual reduction of military budgets, on a mutually agreed basis, particularly by the major military spenders, would be a step forward. It would help curb the arms race while enhancing possibilities of releasing badly needed resources to meet the national requirements of both developed and developing countries and to provide development assistance.

The Soviet Union proposed that an international fund for assistance to developing countries be established, after an agreement on a real reduction in the military spending of States had been achieved. A portion of the resources saved by members of military alliances and other industrialized countries would be transferred to the fund. It further proposed that the parties to disarmament agreements indicate the amount of resources thus released and the proportion to be allocated for development assistance. The Soviet Union was ready to start negotiations on the principles of transferring part of the funds freed in the process of disarmament to assist the developing countries, including the establishment of appropriate international machinery.

The German Democratic Republic supported the Soviet Union's proposals and stated that it was the position of the Warsaw Treaty States that disarmament measures must be followed by appropriate reductions in the military spending of States. It believed that the progress achieved in the Disarmament Commission in elaborating principles for freezing and reducing military budgets had been facilitated by the flexible approach of the socialist States. If other States gave up demands that data should be exchanged prior to and irrespective of substantive negotiations and that military budgets should be made comparable, it would be possible to finalize the set of principles soon. Bulgaria stated that the diversion of economic resources—material, financial and human—from the civil to the military sector of the economy had grave socio-economic consequences for all States.

Romania considered that a comprehensive programme of disarmament should include a substantial reduction of military budgets and that such a measure could lead to an increase in the human and material resources available for economic and social development programmes. It was prepared to undertake a 5 per cent reduction in its weapons, troop strength and military expenditure until the end of the year.

Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom stated that no one would dispute that military budgets were absorbing far too great a proportion of the world's resources, placing a heavy burden on the economies of all countries. However, Governments

charged with determining the level of defence expenditure were aware of those factors when considering priorities in allocating resources. In looking for mutually acceptable ways to reduce military budgets, the Twelve had taken an active part in the work of the United Nations on that subject. The United Kingdom noted the progress in the Disarmament Commission, to which the Twelve had contributed by various compromise formulations, but believed that much work remained to be done to finalize the draft principles at the Commission's 1987 session. In addressing the relationship between disarmament and development in another statement on behalf of the Twelve, the United Kingdom declared that any evaluation of the impact of global arms expenditure must start from a reliable data base. The need for transparency and reliable data was apparent in both the disarmament and the development fields.

When referring to the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany expressed the view that, in building confidence in their regions, the countries outside Europe should ensure maximum transparency in their military capabilities and activities. The United Nations should also encourage greater transparency, especially regarding military budgets. Many more countries should participate in the standardized system for reporting military expenditures, whose importance the Federal Republic stressed. In its view, obtaining greater transparency of international arms transfers was another important task of the United Nations. A register containing details of arms imports and exports by all countries could facilitate the monitoring of arms flows and help to solve the problem of excessive armaments worldwide.

On 30 October, Romania submitted a draft resolution entitled "Reduction of military budgets". In introducing it in the First Committee on 3 November, Romania stated that the rapid increase in military expenditures continued to be a most serious concern to a growing number of States. Along with the negative effects of the arms race on international peace and security, such expenditure contrasted with the poverty that existed in many countries. In general, the draft reproduced the basic ideas contained in previous similar resolutions, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly. Recalling the fact that in 1986 the Disarmament Commission had nearly finalized the set of principles on the freezing and reduction of military budgets, the General Assembly would recommend the principles in their present form to Member States so that they might consider them in the context of new developments and new initiatives. Convinced that it would not be possible to arrive at consensus on the one principle that was outstanding before the 1987 session of the Commission, Romania called for a brief interruption in that body's consideration of the matter and hoped that attempts would be resumed at the following session of the General Assembly.

On 11 November, Austria, Colombia, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Nigeria, Romania, Senegal and Sweden submitted a revised draft resolution, of which Uruguay later became a sponsor, containing a number of changes in the preambular and operative parts. The Disarmament Commission's text on

principles (see page 348), which had been annexed to the original draft, was deleted in the revision. The following day, Romania stated that at the suggestion of a number of delegations, it had re-examined its proposal and made the necessary changes. Among other things, the revised text took into account the proposal that the Disarmament Commission be given another chance to resolve the one remaining principle. The sponsors understood that the Commission would take fully into account the limited nature of its mandate, calling for the elaboration of only one paragraph.

Also on 12 November, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution without a vote. In connection with the action on the draft, three States explained their positions.

Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom reaffirmed their view that all countries had a mutual interest in finding ways to reduce military expenditure while maintaining undiminished security. The Twelve found the progress achieved by the Commission gratifying, but noted that it remained incomplete until the outstanding issues were resolved. They considered that the Commission should not shy away from the final hurdle in front of it, and they therefore particularly welcomed the recommendation that the discussion of the item be continued at the Commission's 1987 session.

The Soviet Union stated that it had, together with other socialist countries, consistently sought a reduction of military expenditures. It regretted that it had not been possible to reach a full agreement in the Commission on the set of principles because some countries continued to demand that comparability and transparency of military expenditures be a prerequisite for negotiations on their reduction. The Soviet Union was convinced that there was an urgent need to achieve practical agreements on the real reduction of military expenditure and believed that if such an agreement were achieved, an international fund could be set up to render assistance to developing countries.

India stated that it did not believe that all Member States were equally responsible for the very high level of global expenditure on the arms race. Since it was the few militarily significant States that accounted for the overwhelming proportion of world military expenditure, the reduction of military budgets was primarily their responsibility.

On 3 December¹⁶ the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, without a vote, as resolution 41/57. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,

Reaffirming once again the provisions of paragraph 89 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities for the reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 94th meeting.

to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that the freezing and reduction of military budgets would have favourable consequences on the world economic and financial situation and might facilitate efforts made to increase international assistance for the developing countries,

Recalling that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, all Member States unanimously and categorically reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as well as their solemn commitment to it,

Recalling also that, in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second United Nations Disarmament Decade, it is provided that during this period renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources thus saved to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries,

Recalling further the provisions of its resolution 34/83 F of 11 December 1979, subsequently affirmed in its resolutions 35/142 A of 12 December 1980, 36/82 A of 9 December 1981, 37/95 A of 13 December 1982, 38/184 A of 20 December 1983, 39/64 A of 12 December 1984 and 40/91 A of 12 December 1985, in which it considered that a new impetus should be given to the endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditure, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Considering that the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

Noting that the Disarmament Commission, at its substantive session in 1986, agreed upon the above-mentioned principles except one, on which various alternatives were proposed by Member States,

1. *Declares again its conviction* that it is possible to achieve international agreements on the reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;

2. *Appeals* to all States, in particular to the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

3. *Reaffirms* that the human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" and, in this context, to conclude, at its substantive session in 1987, its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets, and to submit its report and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

5. *Draws anew the attention* of Member States to the fact that the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets could contribute to harmonizing the views of States and creating confidence among them conducive to achieving international agreements on the reduction of military budgets;

6. *Urges* all Member States, in particular the most heavily armed States, to reinforce their readiness to co-operate in a constructive manner with a view to reaching agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets"

Also on 3 December, a related draft resolution entitled "Objective in-

formation on military matters”, introduced by the United Kingdom on 31 October, was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 41/59 B. It is discussed in chapter III.

Conclusion

In 1986, the issue of the reduction of military budgets was discussed by the Disarmament Commission and by the General Assembly at its forty-first session. In the debate, many Member States expressed growing concern regarding the increasing level of world military expenditures, referring to their adverse impact on international security and global economic and social development. It was widely accepted that resources freed by disarmament should be reallocated for social and economic needs, particularly in the developing countries. While there was continued emphasis on the need to increase the number of States reporting their military expenditures through the United Nations standardized reporting system, disagreement on the question of transparency and reliability of data continued—although apparently somewhat subdued in comparison with that of previous years.

After six years of consideration, the Disarmament Commission reached agreement during its 1986 session on a set of principles to govern actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets, except for one principle, concerning transparency, for which various alternatives were proposed by the member States. Many delegations found the progress encouraging. In accordance with resolution 41/57, the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly will again deal with the reduction of military budgets in 1987.

Relationship between disarmament and development

Introduction

SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, there has been a recognition that disarmament and development are two vital issues facing the international community. In its efforts to achieve its separate goals in the field of disarmament and development, the Organization has progressively become involved with the relationship between them. The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations declares the intention "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples" Article 26 of the Charter refers to the "establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources" In Article 55, reference is made, *inter alia*, to promoting "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development" with a view to the "creation of conditions of stability and well-being"

The General Assembly recognized, by resolution 380 (V) of 1950, that it was necessary for the international community to "reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of the under-developed areas of the world" Year after year since then, the Assembly has returned to the subject in one form or another. Expressions of concern over the continuing military expenditures, calls for diverting resources released through disarmament for socio-economic development, and interest in examining the various issues raised by the relationship between disarmament and development have all contributed to a growing United Nations involvement. The subject received more frequent attention after the economic case for disarmament was strengthened by arguments to the effect that resources, however defined, are far from infinite and that their global military consumption is a factor in national and international economic prospects.

A number of United Nations studies¹ have been undertaken on the relationship between those two major issues and related questions, and Member States have submitted proposals on the institutionalization of that relationship. In a number of resolutions,² the Assembly has expressed its concern for reducing and restraining military expenditures and for creating greater possibilities for reallocating released resources to socio-economic development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

The growing United Nations involvement with the relationship between disarmament and development has resulted in various recommendations by the General Assembly that broadly fall into three categories: (a) those defining ultimate goals and objectives, (b) those addressed to intermediate measures and (c) those articulating immediate concerns.³

Statements of ultimate goals and objectives are found, for example, in proposals concerning the release of resources for purposes of socio-economic development through general and complete disarmament under effective international control; resolution of security-related conflicts and conflict situations with a view to removing the underlying causes for the escalating arms race and military expenditures; and conclusion of specific measures of arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with well-defined priorities contained in a comprehensive disarmament strategy.

Recommendations for intermediate measures include proposals such as those aimed at reducing military budgets; making requisite preparations to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes, especially to meet urgent social and economic needs, in particular in developing countries; and seeking greater understanding and awareness of the complex issues covered by the subject of the relationship between disarmament and development through more accurate and reliable information and analyses.

Recommendations articulating immediate concerns include proposals such as those for the establishment of a disarmament fund for development financed from budgetary savings related to the implementation of disarmament measures, from a levy on armaments or from voluntary contributions.

At its tenth special session, in 1978, the General Assembly mandated a comprehensive study on the relationship between disarmament and development, which was completed in 1981.⁴ That study started a new stage in

¹ *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.62.IX.1); *Economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16); *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1); *Economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1); *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1); and *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.2). Studies on the reduction of military budgets are referred to and discussed in the preceding chapter.

² Between 1946 and 1985, the Assembly adopted 59 resolutions relevant to the subject of the relationship between disarmament and development. Included in that number are resolutions concerning the reduction of military budgets.

³ A/CONF.130/PC/INF/5.

⁴ *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1); the study is summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, chap. XXI.

United Nations efforts in the field, coinciding with growing concern about the deterioration of global economic and social conditions, coupled with an escalation of the arms race. A major conclusion of the study was that the arms race and development were in a competitive relationship and that the world could either continue the arms race with characteristic vigour, or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards more stable, balanced socio-economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It could not do both. The study addressed several recommendations to both Member States and the United Nations system.

In 1981, the General Assembly unanimously commended the study to the attention of all Member States and invited them to inform the Secretary-General of their views on the study itself and its recommendations prior to the special session on disarmament in 1982. Most responses, especially those of the developing and Nordic countries, urged immediate follow-up action along the lines of some of the recommendations. Some Western States expressed doubts about the prospects for follow-up action. Reservations were also expressed regarding the idea of establishing an international disarmament fund for development. The Eastern European countries had reservations about the recommendation that additional information on military outlays be provided.

At its regular session in 1982, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/84, which resulted, *inter alia*, in a system-wide United Nations involvement with the subject of the relationship between disarmament and development. The resolution recommended follow-up action by the United Nations system and by Member States. The Secretary-General was requested to take appropriate administrative action with a view to incorporating an interrelated perspective on disarmament and development into the programmes and activities of the United Nations system. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was requested to undertake an investigation of the modalities for establishing a disarmament fund for development. Member States were urged to consider appropriate measures in accordance with relevant recommendations of the 1981 study. The General Assembly also decided, by the same resolution, that the general question of the reallocation and conversion of resources from military to civilian purposes should be included in its agenda at agreed intervals, starting with the fortieth session, in 1985.

Subsequently, in 1983 and 1985, the Secretary-General submitted reports⁵ to the General Assembly that emphasized that there was, within the United Nations, continuing system-wide interest in the subject of the relationship between disarmament and development. The investigation carried out by UNIDIR⁶ was completed in 1984. In 1985, Sweden submitted to the General Assembly a study that it had carried out nationally to examine the

⁵ A/38/436 and A/40/618 and Corr.1.

⁶ *Establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development*, Geneva, UNIDIR, 1984 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.84.0.2). The report was prepared with the guidance of a steering group comprising members from Brazil, France, Norway, Pakistan, Romania and Senegal. Four technical studies by experts were also carried out under the project.

problems and prospects of conversion from military to civilian purposes.⁷ The subject of conversion was also included in the agenda of the 1985 session of the General Assembly.

In the meantime, in an address to the General Assembly in 1983, President François Mitterrand of France stated that it was necessary to return to the origin of military expenditures, namely, the link between military and economic insecurity that characterized the world. He also reiterated the proposal made by France on two previous occasions to establish an international disarmament fund for development. He suggested that political action, in pursuit of the objective, should be taken in two stages. At the first stage, as early as possible, there should be a meeting on the problem posed by the link between disarmament and development and on the creation of an international fund. At the second stage, representatives of the States participating in that meeting could set themselves the task of preparing a United Nations conference, open to all Member States. That preparatory meeting could define an initial series of targets to be reached for transfers for the benefit of development. President Mitterrand also said that "when the major military Powers have announced their agreement, France is ready to host such a Conference in Paris"

In 1984, the issue of holding an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development was discussed intensively by the Disarmament Commission and by its working group established to deal with the item. In the course of its work, discussion centred around two proposals concerning the possible structure of its report.

A draft proposed by France, India and Norway recommended that the General Assembly, at its next session, decide to convene an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development under the auspices of the United Nations, preceded by thorough preparations. It envisaged three main purposes for the conference: (a) a review of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects; (b) an examination of the impact of continuing military expenditures upon the world economy and the international economic and social situation; and (c) a consideration of ways and means of giving concrete expression to the idea of channelling a significant part of the resources for military purposes to socio-economic development, particularly of the developing countries.

The proposal of a group of Eastern European States, introduced by Mongolia, would have the Commission reaffirm that only the implementation of specific arms limitation and disarmament measures would release substantial resources that could then be reallocated for development purposes. Accordingly, the Conference on Disarmament should accelerate its negotiations with a view to concluding international agreements on all items of its agenda and all Member States should take account, during those negotiations, of the importance of ensuring that resources thus released would be used to promote the well-being of all people and to improve economic conditions in the de-

⁷ I. Thorsson, *In Pursuit of Disarmament: Conversion from Military to Civil Production in Sweden. Special Report* (Stockholm, Liber Allmänna Förlaget, 1985), vol. 2.

veloping countries.

The United States, for its part, recognized the need to respond to the pleas for development assistance. It believed that security and stability were important for stimulating development and acknowledged the possible role of effective disarmament.

A draft report, which the Chairman of the Working Group had prepared in consultation with the delegates from France, India and Norway and some of the sponsors of the draft introduced by Mongolia, was adopted by the Group. The discussions in the Commission showed that while the relationship between disarmament and development was, in principle, accepted by all, there was no agreement on the ways and means of implementing it effectively. The original French proposal linking the purpose of an international conference primarily to the idea of an international disarmament fund for development did not constitute the basis for a consensus, as several delegations had reservations about the outcome of such an exercise. The consensus on the Working Group's report, incorporated into the report of the Disarmament Commission,⁸ was reached once the scope and purpose of the envisaged international conference was broadened to include "all the various aspects and dimensions of the relationship between disarmament and development", as suggested in the draft submitted by France, India and Norway.

At its 1984 session, the General Assembly, by resolution 39/160, adopted by consensus, decided to convene an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development. It also decided to set up a preparatory committee for the Conference, composed of 54 members,⁹ to formulate and submit to the General Assembly at its next session consensus recommendations on the provisional agenda, procedure, place, date and duration of the Conference.

The first session of the Preparatory Committee was held in New York from 29 July to 9 August 1985. Representatives from 52 States members of the Preparatory Committee participated in it. The Committee elected Mr. Muchkund Dubey of India as its Chairman. At the request of the Committee, the Secretariat prepared draft provisional rules of procedure, which, as amended, were recommended by the Committee for adoption by the Conference. The Secretariat also made available to the Committee a preliminary list of United Nations documents relevant to the subject of the relationship between disarmament and development.

In its report to the General Assembly, adopted by consensus, the Pre-

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/39/42)*, para. 27.

⁹ In accordance with resolution 39/160, paragraph 3. the President of the General Assembly, after consultations with the Chairmen of the regional groups, appointed the following countries to be members of the Preparatory Committee: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, USSR, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

paratory Committee recommended:¹⁰ (a) that its mandate be renewed to have at least one and, if necessary, two more sessions in 1986 to make substantive preparations for the Conference; (b) that favourable consideration be given to holding the Conference in Paris in June and July 1986 and due attention also be given to the statement of President Mitterrand during the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly; (c) that in conformity with resolution 39/160, the Conference be held at a high political level; (d) that the Secretary-General be requested to designate as early as possible a secretary-general for the Conference; (e) that the Secretariat prepare a number of background papers and documents for the Preparatory Committee, drawing on the United Nations system, a panel of eminent personalities, and acknowledged experts in the field of disarmament and development, and bearing in mind the need for updating available information and for analysis in the light of the latest developments. The Committee also reached agreement on the provisional agenda for the Conference, which it included in its report.

In 1985, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 40/155, initiated by France and co-sponsored by 52 Member States from both industrialized and developing regions and from different political groups, by which it decided to convene in 1986 the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The Assembly endorsed the report of the Preparatory Committee and decided that the Conference would be held in Paris from 15 July to 2 August.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1986

As before, the question of the relationship between disarmament and development was not a specific item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in 1986, but some member States commented on its significance in plenary meetings.¹¹ During the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, it became evident that the International Conference, scheduled to begin in July, would be postponed. (See next section.)

China stated that the problem of how to correctly handle the relationship between national defence and economic construction was of high importance to it. Over the years, it had concluded that it was best to concentrate on economic development and gradually improve the standard of living and, on that basis, to strengthen its defence capabilities step by step. In Cuba's opinion, it was a crime against humanity to assign important financial, scientific, technical and human resources to the manufacture of instruments of death and destruction at a time when millions of people were suffering from various effects of underdevelopment. The Islamic Republic of Iran held that the Conference on Disarmament should devote a part of its activities to the study of how the military buildup adversely affected development and to the establishment of criteria for channelling the resources saved through arms re-

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 51 (A/40/51)*, sect. III, paras. 10-23.

¹¹ CD/732, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

ductions to development, particularly in the third world. Peru expressed similar views.

Algeria regretted that the link between disarmament and development had never been debated in the Conference on Disarmament. It found it even more regrettable that the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development had been postponed. It attributed those facts to the tendency to see all problems from a single perspective—that of controlling the arms race. In its view, the disarmament-development linkage would imply, first, a healthier international environment, which would enable all countries, particularly the poorest, to devote the bulk of their national resources to their development. In the second phase, the demand for the restructuring of the international economic system would, instead of causing insoluble problems, be shared by all. In the third phase, a disarmament for development fund could be established as a means of giving concrete form to the basic principle of international solidarity.

India also emphasized the importance of the linkage and appealed to all nations to participate in the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. Sri Lanka looked forward to the Conference and believed that United Nations studies on the subject had had the cumulative effect of establishing that the link between disarmament and development was viable for all countries. The German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union criticized the United States for undermining the United Nations decision to hold the Conference.

The United Kingdom held that the relationship between disarmament and development should be considered in the fuller context of security, disarmament and development, in which security was the key issue. It believed that the current level of global military spending was excessive, but that the problem was more complex than sometimes admitted, because the external threat that States felt they were confronted with required an adequate practical response. For its part, Sri Lanka pointed out that the security crisis which affected the survival of mankind involved militarizing economies and diverting scarce resources from the satisfaction of basic needs. The envisaged Conference offered a chance to retard, if not halt, that diversion.

Work of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, 1986

The second session of the Preparatory Committee was held in New York from 1 to 11 April. In accordance with operative paragraph 6 of resolution 40/155, the session was open to all States. Ninety-eight States participated in the session, as well as Observers from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Bank. The United States did not

participate and informed the Secretary-General that it did not plan to attend the Conference.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, as contained in its report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session,¹² the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, prepared a number of background papers based on available information. Those papers¹³ were meant to facilitate the substantive preparation of the Conference, and they were prepared by the Department for Disarmament Affairs in close consultation with the Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation and the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, as well as other units of the Secretariat and the United Nations system. The papers dealt mainly with the three substantive items of the provisional agenda of the Conference and were widely referred to and quoted by delegations during the deliberations. The Committee also had before it a detailed report¹⁴ by the Secretary-General of the Conference on the status of preparations.

Most of the second session of the Preparatory Committee was devoted to a consideration of the three substantive items on the provisional agenda of the Conference, namely:

8. Review of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions.
9. Examination of the implications of the level and magnitude of the continuing military expenditures, in particular those of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for developing countries, and elaboration of appropriate recommendations for remedial measures.
10. Consideration of ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries.¹⁵

The purpose of substantive discussions during the second session of the Preparatory Committee was to identify elements that could be included in a draft final document of the Conference. France introduced a document¹⁶ containing proposals for the Preparatory Committee. Following an exchange of views, the Chairman presented a working paper on the possible contents of a draft final document.

¹² See footnote 10.

¹³ The papers, issued under the title "Relationship between disarmament and development", are: A/CONF.130/PC/INF/3 (a compilation of agreed formulations); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/4 and Corr.1 (a bibliographical survey of recent literature); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/5 (an overview of United Nations involvement); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/6 and Corr.1 (review of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/7 (implications of the level and magnitude of the continuing military expenditures); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/8 and Corr.1 (ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures for development purposes); and A/CONF.130/PC/INF/9 (an overview of events in the field since 1981).

¹⁴ A/CONF.130/PC/INF/10 and Corr.1.

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 51 (A/40/51)*, sect. III, para. 11.

¹⁶ A/CONF.130/PC/1.

The comments on the Chairman's working paper concentrated on its structure, format and contents. It was generally held that the draft should contain an introductory section of a declaratory nature. Views were also expressed about the substance of the draft, based on the three substantive items of the provisional agenda. There were some suggestions about the nature of proposals to be included. The Committee agreed that more substantive preparations were needed before a draft of the final document of the Conference could emerge.

Ninety States participated in the third session of the Preparatory Committee, which was held in New York from 2 to 13 June. The Secretariat submitted to the Committee a number of additional background papers prepared by acknowledged experts, ILO and the World Bank.¹⁷ The Committee also had before it the text of the joint declaration unanimously adopted by the Panel of Eminent Personalities in the Field of Disarmament and Development, which had been convened by the Secretary-General of the Conference in accordance with resolution 40/155 and had met in New York from 16 to 18 April.¹⁸ A paper proposing elements for inclusion in a final document was submitted by the German Democratic Republic on behalf of Eastern European countries.¹⁹ The Committee also heard a detailed statement by the Secretary-General of the Conference informing it that all the assignments entrusted to the Secretariat by resolution 40/155 had been completed.

The third session of the Committee began with some misgivings about its outcome, both on procedural and substantive matters. The procedural issue arose from the letter of 22 May 1986 addressed to the Secretary-General by France,²⁰ in which the host Government for the Conference expressed its wish for the postponement of the Conference to 1987.

Initially there was also a lack of agreement on substantive matters. For most delegations, including non-aligned, Nordic, socialist and some Western countries, the Committee had made adequate preparations to go ahead with the Conference in 1987, if not in 1986 as scheduled. The United Kingdom and France, however, stressed the need for adequate political preparations as a factor in postponing the Conference. Some Western delegations, for instance, Canada, took the position that differences over the substantive issues

¹⁷ A/CONF.130/PC/INF/12 (military spending and economic structure, with reference to centrally planned economies); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/13 and Corr.1 (military spending and the development process); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/14 (military spending and economic structures, with special reference to market economies); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/15 (disarmament and employment—prepared by ILO); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/16 (cross-sectoral analyses of military expenditures and capital formation, productivity, economic growth and competitiveness); and A/CONF.130/PC/INF/18 (prospects for developing countries, 1986-1995—prepared by the World Bank).

¹⁸ A/CONF.130/PC/INF/17 and Corr.1. The Panel consisted of: Ibrahim Hilmy Abdel-Rahman (Egypt), Tamas Bacskai (Hungary), Oleg T. Bogomolov (USSR), Gamani Corea (Sri Lanka), Edgar Faure (France), Alfonso García Robles (Mexico), Lawrence Klein (United States), Pei Monong (China), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), Raúl Prebisch (Argentina), Walter Scheel (Germany, Federal Republic of), Agha Shahi (Pakistan), Janez Stanovnik (Yugoslavia) and Inga Thorsson (Sweden). Oleg T. Bogomolov did not attend the meeting, but agreed later to the text of the declaration.

¹⁹ A/CONF.130/PC/4.

²⁰ A/CONF.130/PC/3.

for the Conference had been exaggerated.

Most of the work at the third session of the Preparatory Committee was carried out in an open-ended consultative group of the Chairman, which held nine meetings between 4 and 11 June, in an effort to get broad agreement on the format and content of a draft final document for the Conference. On the basis of the generally favourable reaction to the background papers prepared for the Preparatory Committee and to the joint declaration by the Panel of Eminent Personalities, the Chairman made an attempt to identify agreed elements for the document. The outcome of that work was reflected in the annex of the Committee's report to the General Assembly,²¹ which contained elements adopted by consensus at a plenary session on 13 June. It was agreed that the elements would serve as the basis for the elaboration of a final document of the Conference. Specific proposals submitted by delegations on ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries, would be the subject of further consideration.

The Committee held an exhaustive debate on a possible postponement of the Conference to 1987 and on its specific dates and venue. Those wanting the Conference to be held in 1987 insisted that the recommendation to the General Assembly be worded in such a way as to avoid any further postponement. In its report to the General Assembly, the Committee stated the following:

In view of the fact that the Conference could not be held in Paris as scheduled, and considering that in any event it was too late to make alternative arrangements for the Conference to be held at another venue on the scheduled dates, the Committee recommended to the General Assembly to decide at its resumed fortieth session to postpone the Conference to 1987, and, at its forty-first session, to fix the specific dates in 1987 and the venue for the Conference.²²

The Committee further recommended that the General Assembly at its forty-first session decide to convene one more session of the Committee before the Conference.

On the basis of the above-mentioned recommendation, the resumed fortieth session of the General Assembly adopted, on 20 June 1986, decision 40/473, by which it postponed the Conference until 1987.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

At the forty-first session of the General Assembly, the question of the relationship between disarmament and development was discussed mainly in the First Committee.²³ Several delegations expressed their disappointment at the postponement of the Conference and stressed the importance of holding it in 1987. Many referred to the substantive inputs made by the background papers

²¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 51 (A/41/51)*, annex.

²² *Ibid.*, para. 31.

²³ *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 32nd and 38th to 48th meetings.

submitted to the Preparatory Committee and the unanimous declaration by the Panel of Eminent Personalities.

France recalled its initial proposal to establish an effective link between security, disarmament and development and noted that the work of the Preparatory Committee had revealed difficulties in laying the groundwork for a consensus that could lead to concrete measures. The lack of agreement on substantive items and its concern for the best possible conditions for the success of the Conference had made France call for a postponement. Reaffirming its interest in the subject, France suggested that the Conference be held either within the framework of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1988, or in 1987. France believed that the Conference would, if held in 1987, be somewhat different from the one initially suggested. In any case, the Conference would launch a process in which France would participate by making precise proposals.

The United Kingdom, in statements made on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, pointed out the complexity of the relationship between expenditures on armaments and the problem of development at the global and national levels. The Twelve were looking forward to a keen examination of all aspects of the relationship between disarmament, development and related issues of security. They shared the concern at the high level of military expenditure in the world, which placed a heavy burden on all States and was difficult to reconcile with the unacceptable conditions in which a significant proportion of the world's population lived. Because of that concern, they favoured early negotiation of balanced and verifiable arms limitation and disarmament measures. They wished to point out, however, that disarmament measures would not automatically lead to savings, particularly in the short term, and that the question of reducing the levels of armaments and military expenditures should be discussed generally by the Conference. The Twelve hoped that there would be universal participation in the Conference, which they expected to take place in 1987. They also hoped that further detailed preparatory work would allow for a well-ordered and substantive discussion and would—more importantly—make the Conference a successful manifestation of international co-operation.

Italy expressed its satisfaction at the work done so far by the Preparatory Committee, noting that it had been able to agree on a number of elements that would provide a good basis for drafting the final document of the Conference. Italy believed that there was still need for further preparatory work and that the final document should address the question of the reduction of arms and military expenditures, a step which could be achieved through disarmament agreements and other means, including regional and subregional security arrangements and economic co-operation and integration. Ireland expressed concern at the increasing diversion of scarce material resources to armaments and at the inexorable rise in military expenditures. In view of the intolerable strain that placed on the less developed countries, Ireland hoped the Conference would take place as soon as possible and would command the universal participation of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union stated that reallocating material resources and intel-

lectual and technical potential to development was an inalienable associated measure in its disarmament proposals. It suggested the establishment of an international fund for assistance to developing countries, once agreement was reached on a real reduction in the military spending of States. In its view, disarmament agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, would release funds, and a portion of the resources saved by members of military alliances and other industrialized countries participating in such agreements could be transferred to the fund. The Soviet Union declared its readiness to start negotiations on the principle of transferring part of the savings to development, including the establishment of appropriate international machinery.

The German Democratic Republic declared that the Conference would be helpful in identifying the implications of the arms race for the international economic situation and could consider ways and means of releasing through disarmament measures additional resources for peaceful and creative purposes. The funds thus saved were not to be allocated to other military purposes, but to economic and social development. The German Democratic Republic stressed that the socialist States favoured the elaboration of concrete measures in the final document of the Conference and maintained that disarmament measures must be followed by appropriate reductions in military spending. It regretted that the Conference had been postponed, although preparations had reached a high level. Expressing support for the Soviet proposal on an international fund for assistance for developing countries, the German Democratic Republic held that disarmament agreements should stipulate the amount of resources released and the proportion to be allocated to assist developing countries. It felt that negotiations should be started on the principles to govern such transfers and on the establishment of an appropriate mechanism.

In addressing the effect of increasing military expenditures upon the world economic and social situation, particularly in the developing countries, Poland stated that the call for disarmament was being more and more forcefully underscored by the dire need for development. It regretted that a full-fledged discussion of those problems and the elaboration of solutions had been prevented because of the unwillingness of some States to hold the Conference as originally scheduled, in 1986, and it supported its convening in 1987. Romania dealt extensively with the negative effects of military expenditures upon international peace and security, the global financial and economic situation and, in general, all aspects of social life. The preparations for the Conference had shown, in Romania's opinion, that development and the maintenance of security could be achieved only if resolute measures aimed at arms reductions and disarmament were adopted.

Bangladesh stressed the crucial nature of the issue. Although Member States had differing views on it, an overwhelming majority agreed that there was a linkage between disarmament and development. In the opinion of Bangladesh, freeing resources for development through disarmament would create an international atmosphere favouring economic uplift and would reduce inter-State acrimony. It believed that emphasis on achievements for development at national levels would reduce the potential for domestic con-

flicts and alleviate the need for armaments to maintain order. While disarmament would create positive factors for development, the reverse was also true. It hoped that societies could learn to accept that disarmament was not a myth and that development was a necessity. It welcomed the joint declaration by the Panel of Eminent Personalities as a useful contribution to the work of the Conference.

Nigeria recalled that the adverse impact of armaments and the arms race on development had been documented in several studies commissioned by the United Nations. The relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development remained basic and had high priority in disarmament considerations. Nigeria commended the outcome of the Preparatory Committee's work and regretted the postponement of the Conference. Peru deplored the non-participation of a major Power. In Peru's opinion, what was at stake was reaching agreement on formulas to place disarmament and development in the context of overall security, in both its military and non-military aspects. Indonesia made clear that disarmament and development could be perceived only in that context. Those twin goals, regarded by Indonesia as parallel and distinct processes, would have to be approached in an integrated manner.

Egypt noted that the relationship between disarmament and development was becoming all the more urgent, given the relentless spiral of military expenditures. States should put forward concrete proposals and take measures in that area, keeping in mind the interrelationship of the triad of security, disarmament and development. It believed that the Assembly should formulate definitive guidelines and lay the necessary groundwork to complement the work of the Preparatory Committee, so that the Conference could, in 1987, reach practical agreements leading to the freeing of both human and material resources for development. Egypt then recalled its proposal that any arms control or disarmament agreement contain provisions to allocate the resulting savings to economic and social development, especially in the developing countries. Such a recommendation by the Conference would be a step in the right direction.

Sweden advocated promotion of a mutually reinforcing relationship between disarmament and development. It stressed that resources squandered in the military sector must be put to constructive use for development purposes and noted that from the very beginning it had strongly supported the Conference.

China attached great importance to the Conference and noted the widespread attention which it had attracted in the international community. It held that progress in achieving disarmament and development would benefit peace and security, and the consolidation of peace and security would serve efforts towards disarmament and development. It regretted that the Conference had been postponed.

In late October, the Bureau of the Preparatory Committee communicated to the Chairman of the First Committee its unanimous proposal that the First Committee recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of a decision to hold the International Conference in New York from 24 August to 11

September 1987. Subsequently, the Chairman of the First Committee informed the Committee that he had received two proposals from interested delegations and that he would hold consultations with a view to determining whether the Committee might be in a position to produce a single text acceptable to all. He requested the Committee to hold in abeyance formal discussions on the issue so as to enable him to arrive at a common text. No objections were raised to that procedure.

On 11 November the Chairman of the First Committee submitted a draft decision entitled "International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development" In introducing it on 14 November, he stated that the consultations on the question had been permeated by a spirit of constructive co-operation in order to maintain the consensus reached on convening the Conference in 1987. The final stage of the preparatory process should be used to ensure optimum success for the Conference.

At the same meeting, the First Committee approved the draft decision without a vote and three States explained their positions.

The United States placed on record the fact that it had not participated in the Committee's action on the draft decision. It stated that it would not participate in the Conference or in the preparatory activities for it. It questioned the procedural method by which the matter had been dealt with in the First Committee.

India referred to the importance given by the United Nations to the issue of the relationship between disarmament and development and reminded the Committee of the work accomplished by the Preparatory Committee. It considered that a historic opportunity would be provided by the Conference and expressed its hope for high-level participation, both in terms of quality and of political level. With regard to the goal of the Conference, it stated that its objective was not to raise unnecessary controversy nor to apportion blame for engaging in escalating arms expenditure, but to analyse in a constructive spirit the full social and economic implications of such expenditure.

France welcomed the consensus reached concerning the organization of the Conference and expressed its gratitude to the Chairman and to the delegations for the work they had done. Stressing the importance of the event and its complexity, France emphasized again the significance of the preparations. In that connection, it announced that it would address a substantive contribution to the Secretary-General of the Conference and invited other Member States to do likewise.

On 4 December²⁴ the General Assembly adopted the draft decision recommended by the First Committee, without a vote, as decision 41/422. It reads as follows:

At its 96th plenary meeting, on 4 December 1986, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, and on the basis of the recommendations contained in the report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and in conformity with its decision 40/473 of 20 June 1986, decided:

²⁴ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 96th meeting.

(a) To hold the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987;

(b) To convene the Preparatory Committee for one more session from 21 April to 1 May 1987;

(c) To request the Member States and the Secretary-General of the Conference, based on the information in the report of the Preparatory Committee concerning the results so far achieved in the substantial and organizational preparation for the Conference, to continue and intensify their participation in the final stage of the preparatory process, especially in making available their views and proposals on substantive issues, in order to ensure the best possible success of the Conference.

Conclusion

In 1986, the United Nations efforts to achieve the separate goals of disarmament and development and its involvement with the relationship between those two issues continued. By resolution 40/155 of 1985, the General Assembly had decided to convene in 1986 an international conference on the subject. The Preparatory Committee for the Conference held its second and third sessions in 1986, during which it identified elements that could be included in a draft final document of the Conference. However, during the third session, in June, France expressed its wish to have the Conference postponed. The Committee recommended to the General Assembly that it decide at its resumed fortieth session to postpone the Conference to 1987. On the basis of that recommendation, the resumed session of the Assembly, also in June, adopted a decision on the postponement.

At the forty-first session of the General Assembly, several delegations expressed their disappointment at the postponement of the Conference and stressed the importance of holding it in 1987. They expressed satisfaction at the work done so far by the Preparatory Committee, which, they felt, provided a good basis for drafting the final document of the Conference. Others stressed that there was a need for further preparatory work. Many of them welcomed the joint declaration of the Panel of Eminent Personalities as a useful contribution to the work of the Conference.

The General Assembly decided to hold the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987 and requested Member States to intensify their participation in the final stage of the preparatory process. In statements welcoming the consensus reached concerning the organization of the Conference, the complexity of the subject-matter and the significance of the preparations were emphasized. The United States, however, announced that it had not participated in the decision and would not participate in the Conference.

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING A ZONE OF PEACE in the Indian Ocean was included in the agenda of the General Assembly in 1971 at the initiative of Sri Lanka and, subsequently, the United Republic of Tanzania.¹ The item was entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", and its consideration led to the adoption of resolution 2832 (XXVI), by which the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the airspace above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. The Assembly also called upon the great Powers to enter into consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting the further escalation of their military presence there and eliminating from the area all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations aimed at the implementation of the Declaration whereby (a) warships and military aircraft would not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against any littoral or hinterland State; (b) the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations would be ensured; and (c) international agreement would be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

In 1972, the General Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia, to study practical measures to achieve the objectives of the Declaration. The number of members in the Committee has been increased, at various subsequent dates, from 15 to 48. Its composition in 1986 is given in the following section.

Since 1973, the General Assembly has usually considered the question of the Indian Ocean in connection with the annual reports of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. In 1974, the Assembly requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultation with a view to convening a conference on their region. In 1975, it noted that they had reached agreement

¹ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. XI.

in principle on such a conference and invited all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate with the *Ad Hoc* Committee. In 1977, the Assembly requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to make preparations for a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States as a step towards convening the expected conference. In the following year, the Assembly decided to hold such a meeting in 1979. That Meeting recommended² the convening of a full conference on the Indian Ocean and enumerated principles of agreement for the implementation of the Declaration.

Accordingly, the Assembly decided in 1979, by resolution 34/80 B, to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981 at Colombo, Sri Lanka, and to enlarge the *Ad Hoc* Committee further, inviting the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users to serve on it and participate in its work, particularly in the context of the preparation for the Conference. In 1980, the Assembly requested the Committee to finalize its preparations and to set the dates for the Conference.

The persistence of two basic approaches to the convening of the Conference has hitherto prevented the *Ad Hoc* Committee from fulfilling that mandate. Most delegations, including those of non-aligned and Eastern European States, hold the view that the *Ad Hoc* Committee should proceed without delay to practical preparations for the Conference, with the aim of holding it as soon as possible. The Western States, however, maintain that it is still premature to contemplate convening the Conference and that the Committee should instead concentrate on the further harmonization of views, as well as on the elaboration of a mutually acceptable set of principles on which an Indian Ocean zone of peace might be based. Those States also stress that the convening of the Conference would not be appropriate without an improvement in the political and security climate in the region. Because of this difference in approach, the General Assembly has had to postpone the Conference each year.

In 1985, some progress was achieved with regard to identifying the substantive issues to be discussed and the appropriate ways of dealing with them, and the procedural questions of the Conference's provisional agenda, rules of procedure, participation, stages, level of representation and draft final document. By establishing an open-ended working group, the Committee created a mechanism to facilitate further consideration of those issues. By resolution 40/153, the General Assembly requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference in 1986, in order to allow it to open at Colombo at an early date soon thereafter, but not later than 1988, and to seek the necessary harmonization of views on remaining issues.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45 and Corr.1).*

Consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1986

By resolution 40/153, the General Assembly requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean³ to hold three preparatory sessions in 1986. However, pursuant to decision 40/472 of 9 May 1986, adopted by the General Assembly at its resumed fortieth session, two of the sessions were merged. Accordingly, the Committee held only two sessions: the first, from 24 March to 4 April, and the second, from 14 to 25 July. At the conclusion of its work for the year, it adopted by consensus its report to the General Assembly,⁴ containing, *inter alia*, a draft resolution for adoption by the Assembly.

The main task of the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1986 was to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean. In the course of its sessions, the Committee held an exchange of views on specific organizational aspects related to the preparatory process, such as a draft framework for the provisional agenda, draft rules of procedure, participation, stages of the Conference, level of representation and a draft final document. Views were also exchanged on major outstanding issues of substance with the objective of harmonizing them.

Non-aligned and Eastern European countries were in favour of convening the Conference at Colombo not later than 1988, as called for in resolution 40/153. A number of them stressed that obvious progress had been made in some areas of preparatory work and that progress in others depended on the exercise of political will on the part of some members of the Committee.

India stated that some further work was needed in order to reach full agreement on the provisional agenda as well as the draft rules of procedure. It stressed that progress on such questions as stages of the Conference, level of representation, documentation and arrangements for any international agreement that might ultimately be reached could not be expected unless Committee members displayed the necessary political will. It added that the introduction of pre-conditions and extraneous considerations could only be counter-productive.

Sri Lanka was of the view that the provisional agenda for the Conference could be completed by the Committee prior to the Conference and that a certain degree of finality had been achieved concerning the draft rules of procedure, though some major issues had yet to be settled. It expressed the opinion of the non-aligned States that the Conference would need the participation of the littoral and hinterland States as well as of the permanent members of the Security Council, and it stated that the participation of other States

³ The composition of the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1986 was: Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/41/29)*.

was also being considered. As for the question of stages, the non-aligned States were of the view that the Conference would be the stage at which modalities and machinery for establishing the zone of peace would be formulated.

Bulgaria maintained that the provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure had already been agreed upon and that the remaining questions could be solved, given the proper political will. In its opinion, there was general agreement that the Conference should be held in stages and that the level of representation should be appropriate for a high-level political forum. The nature of the final document should be decided by the Conference itself, although its broad outlines could be considered in the Committee, Bulgaria added.

The German Democratic Republic noted that the provisional agenda had already been accepted in part and that there had been a positive reaction to the proposal to hold the Conference in stages. It observed that there was an emerging feeling that the Conference should be open to any Member States of the United Nations that wished to take part—in addition to the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users.

The Soviet Union stated that the goal of convening the Conference at Colombo would be to normalize the situation in the Indian Ocean region by creating a zone of peace. Its success would be an important step in establishing a system of international security to cover all areas of the world. The Soviet Union was of the view that the Committee had already achieved considerable progress in its preparatory work for the Conference in such areas as the provisional agenda and the draft rules of procedure. It noted that the proposal for holding the Conference in stages had met with broad understanding, and it advocated participation by all Member States.

China pointed out that the situation in the region of the Indian Ocean was continuing to deteriorate and that it was therefore urgent to hold the Conference, which had been delayed because of the lack of political will on the part of the military Powers in the area. Before the Conference could be held, China believed, views must be harmonized and the preparations must be completed.

Western States continued to stress that amelioration of the prevailing political and security climate in the region was essential for the Conference's success. They were also of the view that the activities of the Committee had no direct impact on the situation in the region and that the mere act of convening the Conference would not automatically lead to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region.

Australia emphasized the need for thorough preparation, which, in its opinion, implied a satisfactory agreement on all questions of procedure and in-depth consideration of political, security and economic questions. It maintained that the *Ad Hoc* Committee had always avoided going into the substance of those questions, although they had been touched on in various documents. In that connection, it referred to the proposal that it had submitted with other

Western countries in 1982,⁵ stating that it might serve as a basis for harmonizing views. In its opinion, the Committee should adopt a two-pronged approach. In preparing for the Conference, it should work to achieve a harmonization of views on outstanding substantive issues. In planning its future work, it should seek to reflect realistically the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean and, in that light, assess accurately the likelihood of holding a successful Conference in the near future. Stressing that States of the Indian Ocean region should make their own decision regarding its future, Australia objected to general participation in the Conference and did not agree with the view that the Conference would be the first stage of a multi-stage process.

France observed that considerable progress in some areas of preparatory work had been achieved largely because they pertained to procedural and organizational matters. The agreement on such texts was, however, provisional and should not preclude further discussion. It also held that members should take note of the differences of view within the Committee regarding the nature of the Conference and pay attention to the changes that were needed in the Committee's work.

The United Kingdom stated that a superficial solution to questions of organization and procedure would in no way contribute to the success of the Conference. It maintained that it was useless to deal with questions of organization and procedure in the abstract, without taking into account the realities concerning substantive issues. It believed that it was hardly possible to dissociate those two categories of questions, which were closely interdependent and interrelated. The *Ad Hoc* Committee risked deceiving itself and Member States of the United Nations if it chose that course of action without knowing what the precise task of the Conference would be. It suggested that, in the light of the financial situation of the United Nations, the Committee should find a way to make the most use of the available resources.

The United States expressed the view that the Conference on the Indian Ocean should be the culmination of a process to fulfil the aspirations of the people of the region. For it to be a success, there had to be some degree of improvement in the political and security climate in the region. The United States would participate in the Conference if there were some chance of success and if the aspirations of the people of the region could be fulfilled. It believed that the Chairman should hold informal consultations on how best to proceed.

In 1986, the Committee for the first time convened its open-ended Working Group, which it had established in 1985. The Group initially examined matters related to its mandate and then embarked on a discussion of substantive issues. In the view of its Chairman, Mr. Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, its immediate task was to identify substantive issues relating to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, to expand and elucidate those issues and to facilitate agreement on them. In that connection, the Chairman sug-

⁵ "Proposal for a set of principles on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" (A/AC.159/L.44).

gested that the seven informal topics identified by the *Ad Hoc* Committee in June 1980,⁶ namely, geographical limits, foreign military presence, nuclear weapons, security, peaceful settlement of disputes, the use of the Indian Ocean by foreign vessels and aircraft, and other matters, could provide a useful basis for organizing consideration of substantive issues in the Working Group. That approach was generally accepted by the members of the Working Group, but some, for example, India, felt that the list needed to be supplemented with new categories. The German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union believed that the list should include confidence-building measures.

The Chairman of the Working Group also drew up a list of some of the documents that were already before the Committee; it was his understanding that new proposals or working documents submitted by delegations would be made available to the Group to assist it in its consideration of substantive issues. In order to facilitate the work of the Group, he introduced an informal paper based on documents before the Committee and entitled "Elements which might be taken into consideration during the subsequent preparation of a draft final document of the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean, as called for in General Assembly resolution 39/149". Although all delegations agreed that discussion in the Working Group should be conducted in a structured manner, only the non-aligned and socialist States accepted the paper as a suitable basis for discussion. They stressed its importance and suggested annexing it to the Committee's report. Western States also expressed their appreciation for the Chairman's efforts, but stated that more fundamental questions needed to be addressed first. In their view, given the importance of other documents before the Committee, it would not be appropriate to single out only one of them to be annexed to the Committee's report.

During its second session, in July, the Committee began consideration of its report to the General Assembly at its forty-first session. On behalf of non-aligned members of the Committee, Sri Lanka submitted a draft of a resolution⁷ for inclusion in the report. By the draft, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, request the *Ad Hoc* Committee, bearing in mind the urgency arising on account of the political and security climate in the region, to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference in 1987, in order to facilitate its opening at Colombo not later than 1988. The Assembly would also emphasize that full and active participation in the Conference by the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users, as well as their co-operation with the littoral and hinterland States, was essential for the success of the Conference. In addition, it would renew the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and request it to intensify its work. Finally, it would request the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit a report to the Conference on its preparatory work as well as a full report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the implementation of the resolution.

In the opinion of Western States, the draft resolution did not reflect the realities that had existed in the *Ad Hoc* Committee for many years. Subse-

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/35/29)*, para. 21.

⁷ A/AC.159/L.71, annex.

quently, an open-ended group of "friends of the Chairman" began meetings with the task of elaborating a text acceptable to all members of the Committee. Following intensive negotiations to reconcile divergent points of view on the question of the Conference and issues related to the Committee's mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted a compromise text of the draft resolution and the report as a whole. By the revised draft, the General Assembly would request the *Ad Hoc* Committee, taking into account the political and security climate in the region, to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference during 1987 in order to enable the opening of the Conference at Colombo at an early date soon thereafter, but not later than 1988, to be decided by the Committee in consultation with the host country, with a clear understanding that if preparatory work was not completed in 1987, serious consideration would be given to ways and means of more effectively organizing work in the *Ad Hoc* Committee to enable it to fulfil its mandate.

Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegation of the Non-Aligned Countries to the General Assembly at its forty-first session

The ministers and heads of delegation of the non-aligned countries met in New York on 2 October. In the final communiqué of the meeting,⁸ they reaffirmed the vital need for non-aligned countries to take the necessary measures to promote the implementation of the decisions contained in the political and economic declarations and programme of action adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare, from 1 to 6 September 1986.⁹

Regarding the question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the heads of State or Government who participated in the Harare Conference reaffirmed the determination of non-aligned States to continue their efforts to achieve the goals contained in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and as considered at the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in July 1979, as well as at the subsequent meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean. They reiterated their conviction that the presence in the Indian Ocean area of any manifestation of great-Power military presence, foreign bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction conceived in the context of great-Power rivalries constituted a flagrant violation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. They viewed with alarm and great concern the continuous escalation of great-Power military presence in the Indian Ocean area, including the expansion and upgrading of existing bases and the search for new base facilities, as well as the establishment of the new military command structures of the great Powers against the express wishes of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and other non-aligned countries. They emphasized that those activities endangered the in-

⁸ A/41/703-S/18395.

⁹ A/41/697-S/18392.

dependence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful development of the States in the region. The heads of State or Government expressed their full support for the 1971 Declaration and urged its early implementation. They also noted that, notwithstanding the efforts of the non-aligned States, the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean had been inordinately delayed because of the obstructionist attitude adopted by some States. They urged the United Nations *Ad Hoc* Committee to complete its preparation for the Conference strictly in accordance with its mandate. The heads of State or Government resolved to continue their endeavours to ensure that the Conference would be held at Colombo at the earliest possible date, but not later than 1988. In that context, they called for full and active participation in the Conference by all the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users, as well as co-operation by those States with the littoral and hinterland States, which was essential for the success of the Conference.

A similar declaration on the question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was included in the final documents of the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi, from 16 to 19 April 1986.¹⁰ In addition, the Ministers noted the commencement of work by the open-ended Working Group of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and urged all non-aligned members of the Committee to participate actively in the deliberations of the Working Group.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

On 29 October, the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean¹¹ was introduced in the First Committee by its Chairman, Mr. Nissanka Wijewardane of Sri Lanka. He pointed out that by the draft resolution included in it, the General Assembly would maintain that the Conference at Colombo should open not later than 1988, as discussed above, and would call for the full and active participation and co-operation of all the permanent members of the Security Council, the major maritime users and the littoral and hinterland States. The Chairman believed that “given the necessary will and other things being equal”, the spirit that pervaded the *Ad Hoc* Committee would enable it to discharge its mandate fully.

In the debate in the First Committee,¹² a number of delegations, mainly non-aligned and Eastern European States, made general comments on the subject, supporting the idea of holding the Conference on the Indian Ocean and establishing a zone of peace in that region. For example, Bangladesh was of the opinion that the implementation of the 1971 Declaration would ensure a peaceful environment in the region. It requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue its efforts to ensure that the Conference would be convened not later than 1988. Recognizing the crucial role of the Indian Ocean to many users,

¹⁰ A/41/341-S/18065.

¹¹ See footnote 4.

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 32nd, 36th and 45th meetings.

it stressed that the success of the effort would require the co-operation and assistance of not just the littoral States, but also the major maritime Powers, the hinterland States and the permanent members of the Security Council.

In connection with the adoption of the draft resolution, a number of delegations explained in more detail their positions on the issue and commented on the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

The German Democratic Republic expressed its concern over plans for increased militarization of the Indian Ocean region and, particularly, for involving it in efforts to militarize outer space. That would entail threats to the security and independence of non-aligned littoral and hinterland States, as well as strategic threats to other States. In view of the situation, it considered it more imperative than ever to convene an international conference to transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. It held that the *Ad Hoc* Committee had laid a solid foundation for holding such a conference within the time-frame specified in the draft.

Sri Lanka noted that the situation in the Indian Ocean area continued to be tense because of developments gravely affecting the independence and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States as well as international peace and security. In addition, the continued military presence of the great Powers gave a special urgency to the need to achieve the objectives of the 1971 Declaration. Sri Lanka regarded the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean as an essential step towards implementing the Declaration. Reviewing the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, it recalled that much had been done with regard to procedural matters and believed that many unresolved questions, such as rules of procedure and the level of participation, could be finalized. With regard to the substantive issues, it maintained that, with political will, their consideration could be advanced and completed in 1987 to the extent required for a fruitful and meaningful Conference. In that connection, it stated that the discussion in the Committee's open-ended Working Group had helped to identify those areas on which further negotiations were required and to catalogue them in a more systematic fashion. Sri Lanka and other non-aligned countries would, if the need arose, consider seriously the implications of operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution (see below), including the possibility of more effectively organizing work in the *Ad Hoc* Committee to enable it to fulfil its mandate. It stressed, however, that in the opinion of the non-aligned States, the provisions of the paragraph neither involved change in, nor derogation from, the existing mandate of the Committee.

India attached great importance to the early convening of the Conference, feeling it would be a step towards implementing the 1971 Declaration. It believed that the Conference, to be successful, should be attended by the great Powers, major maritime users and the littoral and hinterland States meeting in a spirit of constructive co-operation. It urged the States concerned to display their political will and to co-operate actively in the task of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

Democratic Yemen noted with regret that the Committee was unable to fulfil its mandate because of the obstacles created by some Western countries.

Nevertheless, it expressed the hope that in 1987 the Committee would be able to fulfil its mandate and complete its preparatory work. That task would require the full and effective participation and co-operation of all the permanent members of the Security Council, the major maritime users and the littoral and hinterland States, Democratic Yemen observed.

The Soviet Union stated that the Indian Ocean was being transformed into a zone of armament, which inevitably undermined the security of the littoral and hinterland States of the region and other parts of the world. In its opinion, the critical and difficult situation in the Indian Ocean made it urgent to convene the Conference, and it was ready to work towards an agreement with the United States and other major naval Powers to freeze and substantially reduce all military activities there. It emphasized the need to comply with the timetable for holding the Conference that had been set out in resolution 40/153 and was confirmed in the new draft. The Soviet Union maintained that the *Ad Hoc* Committee had done a great deal of work towards discharging its mandate and believed that, given political will on the part of all members of the Committee, it would be possible to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean within the scheduled time.

Ethiopia expressed the view that the draft highlighted the precarious and deteriorating condition of security in the Indian Ocean region and the urgency of convening the international Conference. It maintained that the conversion of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace was not the responsibility of the littoral and hinterland States alone and that all maritime users of the Indian Ocean, as well as those in favour of securing a zone of peace, should take an active part in that endeavour.

Australia stressed that the Conference must be preceded by thorough preparation, which, in its view, had to include detailed examination of issues of substance as they related to regional peace and security. It recalled that during the preparation of the report, some members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee had felt strongly that there was a need to look closely and constructively at the way in which the Committee worked. Acknowledging that progress had been slow, Australia stated that the continuing adverse political and security climate in the region simply meant that the establishment of a zone of peace must await the amelioration of at least some of the problems confronting the area. It maintained that zones of peace could not be imposed nor regarded as a means of solving regional problems. Their establishment should flow from a situation of relative peace, security and stability and should serve to reinforce that situation.

Pakistan believed that the security of the littoral and hinterland States was central to the concept of a zone of peace and that it had two aspects: first, the threats emanating from within the region, and, secondly, the threats arising from foreign military presence in the region, including the territories of the littoral and hinterland States. In its opinion, extensive military activity, deployment or buildup in the vicinity of the region also constituted an extraregional threat to the security of the littoral and hinterland States. It hoped that the Conference on the Indian Ocean would focus on all those aspects

and define appropriate commitments and obligations on the part of both the regional States and the extraregional Powers.

Pointing out that the Indian Ocean and its natural extensions had a certain importance for the Arab region, Iraq urged that it be turned into a zone of peace and that the Conference be held at the earliest opportunity.

On 14 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution, as recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, without a vote. On 4 December¹³ the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 41/87. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979, 35/150 of 12 December 1980, 36/90 of 9 December 1981, 37/96 of 13 December 1982, 38/185 of 20 December 1983, 39/149 of 17 December 1984, 40/153 of 16 December 1985 and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its decision, taken at its thirty-fourth session in resolution 34/80 B, to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo during 1981,

Recalling also its decision to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area and progress made in the harmonization of views, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening,

Recalling further its decision, taken at its fortieth session in resolution 40/153, concerning the convening of the Conference at an early date not later than 1988,

Recalling the exchange of views in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean in 1986.

Noting the exchange of views on the adverse political and security climate in the region,

Noting further the various documents before the *Ad Hoc* Committee,

Convinced that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering that any other foreign military presence in the area, whenever it is contrary to the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps towards the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

Considering further that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation and agreement among the States of the region to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Calling for the renewal of genuinely constructive efforts through the exercise of the political will necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 96th meeting.

Deeply concerned at the danger posed by the grave and ominous developments in the area and the resulting sharp deterioration of peace, security and stability which particularly seriously affect the littoral and hinterland States, as well as international peace and security,

Convinced that the continued deterioration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area is an important consideration bearing on the question of the urgent convening of the Conference and that the easing of tension in the area would enhance the prospect of success being achieved by the Conference,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and exchange of views of the Committee;
2. *Takes note* of the discussions on substantive matters in the Working Group established in accordance with the *Ad Hoc* Committee's decision of 11 July 1985;
3. *Emphasizes* its decision to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace adopted in 1971;
4. *Notes* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee has been unable, during its four weeks of work in 1986, to complete preparatory work relating to the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean, and urges the Committee to continue its work with vigour and determination;
5. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee, taking into account the political and security climate in the region, to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean during 1987 in order to enable the opening of the Conference at Colombo at an early date soon thereafter, but not later than 1988, to be decided by the Committee in consultation with the host country, with a clear understanding that if preparatory work is not completed in 1987 serious consideration will be given to ways and means of more effectively organizing work in the *Ad Hoc* Committee to enable it to fulfil its mandate;
6. *Emphasizes* that the Conference called for in resolution 34/80 B and subsequent resolutions and the establishment and maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace require the full and active participation and co-operation of all the permanent members of the Security Council, the major maritime users and the littoral and hinterland States;
7. *Decides* that preparatory work would comprise organizational matters and substantive issues, including the provisional agenda for the Conference, rules of procedure, participation, stages of the Conference, level of representation, documentation, consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreements that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the preparation of the draft final document of the Conference;
8. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee at the same time to seek the necessary harmonization of views on remaining relevant issues;
9. *Requests* the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to consult the Secretary-General at the appropriate time on the establishment of a secretariat for the Conference;
10. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions, and requests the Committee to intensify its work with regard to the implementation of its mandate;
11. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to hold two preparatory sessions in 1987 each of a duration of two weeks for completion of preparatory work;
12. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the Conference a report on its preparatory work;
13. *Requests* the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue his consultations on the participation in the work of the Committee by States Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Committee, with the aim of resolving this matter at the earliest possible date;
14. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-second session a full report on the implementation of the present resolution;
15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the provision of summary records, in recognition of its preparatory function.

Conclusion

In 1986, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean continued its preparatory work for the Conference on the Indian Ocean, exchanging views on the Conference's provisional agenda, rules of procedure, participation, stages, level of representation and its final document. The Committee's open-ended Working Group, after examining matters related to its mandate, embarked on a discussion of substantive issues relating to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

The work of the Committee revealed again that the positions of States on the question of the convening of the Conference had not changed. Non-aligned and Eastern European countries were in favour of convening the Conference at Colombo not later than 1988. In that connection, they emphasized that progress had been made in some areas of preparatory work and that progress in other areas depended on the political will of some members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Western States continued to stress that an amelioration of the prevailing political and security climate in the Indian Ocean region was essential for the success of the Conference. They were also of the view that the activities of the Committee had no direct impact on the situation there and that the mere convening of the Conference would not automatically lead to the creation of a zone of peace in the region.

By resolution 41/87, the *Ad Hoc* Committee was requested to complete the preparatory work for the Conference during 1987, taking into account the political and security climate in the region, in order to enable the opening of the Conference in Colombo not later than 1988. If the preparatory work were not completed in 1987, the Committee would give serious consideration to ways and means of organizing its work more effectively to enable it to fulfil its mandate.

P A R T F I V E

Information and studies

World Disarmament Campaign and observance of Disarmament Week

Introduction

THE IMPORTANT ROLE WHICH WORLD PUBLIC OPINION CAN PLAY in efforts to promote the cause of disarmament was underlined by the General Assembly in the 1978 Final Document.¹ It was declared that in order for an international conscience to develop and for world public opinion to exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States. The week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, was proclaimed as Disarmament Week, a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.

In 1980, the Secretary-General was requested by the General Assembly to carry out a study on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations. The study,² submitted to the Assembly in 1981, emphasized the importance of raising public awareness of disarmament issues and stressed the need to involve as many segments of the world's population as possible in support of disarmament.

The questions involved in a campaign were widely discussed by the Preparatory Committee for the twelfth special session. At its opening meeting on 7 June 1982, the Assembly took a formal decision to launch the World Disarmament Campaign under United Nations auspices. During the session, the Secretary-General presented a report³ outlining a programme for the Campaign that focused on (a) the extension of United Nations means of communication with the world public, the media and non-governmental organizations; (b) systematic co-operation with national and international non-governmental organizations that could stimulate public understanding; (c) special events such as Disarmament Week; and (d) a publicity programme for the Campaign itself. He recommended that the information materials produced for the Campaign be distributed as widely as possible through United Nations information centres and other regional offices. As only some of the projected activities could be carried out by using resources from the regular

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 15, 99-107 and 123. The Final Document is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

² A/36/458.

³ A/S-12/27.

budget of the United Nations, the extent to which the entire programme could be implemented would depend on the availability of extrabudgetary funds. The Secretary-General stressed that the World Disarmament Campaign could succeed only through a concerted effort by the United Nations and its system of agencies and programmes, Member States and the concerned public.

Having considered the question at length,⁴ the Assembly agreed on a text defining the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign, which was annexed to the special session's Concluding Document.⁵ Recognizing the need for additional human, financial and material resources to carry out an effective campaign, the Assembly urged the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities of redeploying existing resources. Furthermore, it recommended the establishment of a trust fund for the Campaign through voluntary contributions from Member States, non-governmental organizations, foundations, trusts and private sources.

Later the same year, the Secretary-General submitted a report⁶ concerning the general framework of the Campaign, based on the text adopted by the Assembly at the special session, and the programme of activities for 1983. The report set out the primary purposes of the Campaign as follows: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. It further stated that the Campaign would focus primarily on five major constituencies—elected representatives, the media, non-governmental organizations, educational communities, and research institutes—and that it should be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner. The General Assembly approved the general framework and programme of activities outlined in the report and decided that during its following session there should be a pledging conference for contributions from Member States. Accordingly, the First United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was held during the 1983 Disarmament Week.

In 1985, the Campaign, *inter alia*, organized three conferences or meetings at the regional and subregional levels. In addition, new publications, some in languages other than the official ones, were produced for both adults and young people, specialized constituencies and the general public. During Disarmament Week, the Third Pledging Conference for the Campaign was convened in New York. As in previous years, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions on the Campaign and one on Disarmament Week. Resolution 40/151 G, which concerned the establishment of a regional centre for peace and disarmament in Africa, was adopted without a vote. A number of abstentions on the other two resolutions concerning the Campaign reflected differing opinions about some of its aspects, although Member States expressed support for the Campaign as such. By resolution 40/151 B, the Assembly decided to hold a fourth pledging conference for the Campaign in

⁴ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XXI.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, annex V; the Concluding Document is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix I.

⁶ A/37/548.

1986, and by resolution 40/151 D, it reaffirmed the usefulness of further carrying out Campaign activities that contributed to the creation of a favourable climate for disarmament. Resolution 40/152 E expressed appreciation to all States and organizations for their active participation in Disarmament Week and stressed the important role of the mass media in acquainting the world public with the aims of Disarmament Week.

In 1986 there was no substantive discussion on the Campaign in either the Disarmament Commission or the Conference on Disarmament.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

During the general debate at the forty-first session of the General Assembly,⁷ several statements were made regarding the World Disarmament Campaign. A detailed discussion of the subject, as well as of Disarmament Week, took place in the First Committee.⁸

World Disarmament Campaign

Pursuant to resolution 40/151 B of 16 December 1985, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report⁹ on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign for 1986 and on the programme contemplated for 1987. The Secretary-General reported that Member States had sought to further the goals of the Campaign by developing their own projects and co-operating with the United Nations in implementing its programme. In that regard, they had organized disarmament-related meetings or had hosted meetings sponsored by the United Nations. They had also produced disarmament information materials and had facilitated the dissemination of such materials to constituencies of the Campaign.

The Campaign's programme of regional seminars in 1986 had included a regional conference held in Tbilisi, USSR, attended by some 60 participants. In addition, two meetings had been held in Italy: an expert meeting in Erice, in which 30 governmental and non-governmental experts participated, and a symposium in Florence, which approximately 12 high-level governmental experts attended.¹⁰ The report indicated that several other Member States or non-governmental organizations had expressed an interest in acting as host or co-operating with the Department for Disarmament Affairs in organizing such events. The report noted that the Campaign's programme of activities had continued, although in a more limited manner due to financial constraints. Available resources for the activities had been noticeably reduced because

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 32nd and 94th and 96th meetings.

⁸ *Ibid.*, First Committee, 3rd to 39th and 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

⁹ A/41/554.

¹⁰ The symposium in Florence was organized and held after the Secretary-General's report (A/41/544) had been submitted to the General Assembly.

smaller amounts of voluntary contributions had been pledged to the Trust Fund. As a result, it had been necessary to make adjustments in various projects. For instance, measures to cut the cost of information materials had led in some cases to discontinuing the production of certain publications in non-official languages, reduced print-runs, or postponement of the production of Campaign materials. The report indicated that a survey conducted by the Department among the Campaign's constituencies to evaluate its materials had shown that they were reaching their audience and served as a vital source of information to the most diverse groups. The report also pointed out that several Member States and interested non-governmental organizations had made an extra effort to financially assist the Department for Disarmament Affairs in implementing the programme of activities of the Campaign. For example, those involved in the regional events mentioned earlier had provided funds for transportation, accommodation and conference facilities. In line with its mandate, the Department of Public Information had continued to give wide coverage to United Nations disarmament activities. The report also dealt with special events, the publicity programme for the Campaign and the participation of United Nations information centres and field offices.

During the debate in the First Committee, a number of delegations stressed the importance of the World Disarmament Campaign and of public opinion in fostering disarmament. New Zealand stated that a comprehensive inquiry into public attitudes carried out as part of a review of its defence policies showed very clearly that New Zealanders were concerned about the state of the arms race and indicated a strong desire for their Government to work harder for disarmament. The inquiry's finding also showed that fully 92 per cent of New Zealanders believed that the country should promote disarmament through the United Nations. New Zealand asserted that the level of concern reflected the conviction that the search for agreements on disarmament and arms control must not be left just to the major Powers; small countries must also make their voices heard. Venezuela believed that all States could and must help to increase the pressure applied by international public opinion for the adoption of agreements to curb the arms race and reduce the weapons possessed by the super-Powers and others. It also stated that United Nations disarmament studies contributed to greater public awareness of the problems of the arms race.

Several speakers made statements welcoming the establishment of the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.¹¹ Cameroon attached importance to the Centre as a forum for two-way communication in disarmament, first, among African countries and, secondly, between the region and the international community. It said that through the Centre's activities in connection with the Campaign, efforts would be made to develop public understanding and support in that region for the United Nations disarmament objectives. At the same time, the African public would have the opportunity to express its concerns and views regarding the prospects for peace in the region. Cameroon stressed Africa's growing interest in the subject and noted

¹¹ For details, see the Secretary-General's report on the Centre (A/41/660).

that during 1986 alone several major conferences and seminars on peace, disarmament and development had taken place throughout the continent. Liberia stated that the creation of the Centre could contribute to the continuing search for all possible ways and means of promoting peace and progress in Africa and provide a valuable forum for promoting greater understanding of African realities and interests in disarmament. According to Togo, the countries of Africa must face the challenge of trying to maintain peace and security without weakening their economies by dissipating limited resources on defence. It considered the creation of the Centre an attempt to meet that concern.

Canada cited the World Disarmament Campaign's regional conference in Tbilisi as an example of activities that would prove crucial in promoting agreement on and implementation of arms control and disarmament measures. The League of Arab States, an Observer, stated that the World Disarmament Campaign was extremely important because it helped mobilize world public opinion for disarmament and increasingly influenced practical policies adopted by the international community. For that reason, the Campaign must be supported and encouraged.

Peru expressed gratitude for the unanimous decision of the foreign ministers, ministers and heads of delegations at the twelfth regular meeting of the Latin American Council, held in Lima in October 1986, to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take action to establish in Lima a regional centre for peace, disarmament and development. It also expressed gratitude for the welcome given by countries in the region to the Peruvian initiative and for the designation of Lima as the site for the headquarters of the future centre.

In accordance with resolution 40/151 B, the Fourth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Conference was convened on 28 October, with 67 delegations participating. In his opening statement to the Conference, the Secretary-General pointed to the regrettable decline in voluntary contributions, which had necessitated adjustments in the programme of activities for 1986. He added that the same would have to be done in 1987 if adequate funding was not forthcoming. He stressed the importance of Member States' active commitment and material support. The President of the Pledging Conference, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of China, emphasized the world-wide concern felt about the international situation and the need for world-wide disarmament. He stated that in order to succeed, the Campaign would need additional pledges of financial support from Governments.

The pledges made at the Conference or at other times during the year were earmarked as follows among the Campaign, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

	<i>World Disarmament Campaign</i>	<i>UNIDIR</i>	<i>African Disarmament Centre</i>
Australia	\$A 30,000	\$A 20,000	
Austria	\$US 10,000		
Canada	\$Can 25,000	\$Can 25,000	
Cuba	\$US 5,000		
Germany, Federal Republic of		DM 10,000	

	<i>World Disarmament Campaign</i>	<i>UNIDIR</i>	<i>African Disarmament Centre</i>
Finland	50,000 Fmk (subject to parliamentary approval)		
Greece	\$US 10,000		
Indonesia	\$US 5,000		
Norway			\$US 10,000
Saudi Arabia	\$US 10,000		
Senegal			\$US 1,000
Seychelles	\$US 300		
Sri Lanka	\$US 5,000		
Sweden	100,000 SKr		
Togo			7 million CFAF
USSR		200,000 roubles	

Cameroon, China and Peru informed the Conference that their pledges would be announced at a later date.

In its Final Act, the Conference stated that the Secretary-General would keep a list of pledges until 31 March 1987, when the list would be issued. Subsequently, the General Assembly adopted resolution 41/60 B (discussed below), which provided for a fifth pledging conference for the World Disarmament Campaign.

On 29 October, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities" In introducing it on 3 November, Bulgaria stated that the sponsors sought to contribute to the more effective implementation of the goals of the Campaign. It noted that there were some new elements in the text compared with the previous year's. First, operative paragraph 3 reflected the view that mass peace and disarmament movements had become an important factor in international affairs and could no longer be disregarded. They showed that broad strata of the world public were aware of the realities of the nuclear and space age and could contribute to a new political approach necessitated by those realities. Operative paragraph 4, by which the General Assembly would urge all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States, to take into consideration the main demands of the mass peace and disarmament movements in formulating their disarmament policies, stemmed logically from operative paragraph 3. The other new element in the draft, contained in operative paragraph 6, was recognition of the need for more active involvement of children and youth in the activities of the World Disarmament Campaign, in order to enhance its impact and effectiveness.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 80 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 35 abstentions.

In connection with the vote, Australia, which voted in favour, explained that it supported those aspects of the draft resolution which bore directly upon

the Campaign, but held that the draft also contained elements that were unnecessary or contentious or both. It asserted that the call in operative paragraph 4 for the Soviet Union and the United States to inform the Secretary-General annually of actions each had taken in certain fields had little or nothing to do with the Campaign. It believed that the text would have been vastly improved if that extraneous material had been left out. Japan stressed that its abstention should not be construed as in any way implying that it did not appreciate the importance of the Campaign. Japan recognized its significance and would continue to do so. However, it found the draft's overall tone biased and subjective and therefore abstained. Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom noted that operative paragraph 7 invited Member States to ensure a flow of "accurate information" and "to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information". In the view of the Twelve, that was a blatant call for censorship and should be unacceptable to all Member States that shared the democratic tradition of freedom of speech. The Twelve also viewed with concern the idea of involving children for political purposes, no matter how worthwhile those purposes might be.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 114 to 3, with 36 abstentions, as resolution 41/60 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Aware of the growing public concern at the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and its negative social and economic consequences,

Noting with satisfaction the successful implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign and its positive impact on the mobilization on a large scale of world public opinion on behalf of peace and disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 36/92 J of 9 December 1981, 37/100 H of 13 December 1982, 38/73 F of 15 December 1983, 39/63 A of 12 December 1984 and 40/151 D of 16 December 1985,

Welcoming the voluntary contributions made to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund to carry out the objectives of the Campaign,

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General on the progress and implementation of the programme of activities of the Campaign,

Convinced that the United Nations system, Member States, with respect for their sovereign rights, and other bodies, in particular non-governmental organizations, all have their role to play in achieving the objectives of the Campaign,

Expressing its satisfaction over the great number of various activities carried out within the framework of the Campaign in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament,

1. *Reaffirms* the usefulness of further carrying out actions and activities that are an important manifestation of the will of world public opinion and contribute effectively to the achievement of the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign and thus to the creation of a favourable climate for making progress in the field of disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

2. *Reaffirms also* the importance of carrying out the Campaign in accordance with the priorities in the field of disarmament established in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, taking into account that the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the adoption of effective measures for nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority;

3. *Calls upon* Governments of all States to recognize and respect the mass peace and

disarmament movements as an important factor of current world politics contributing to the promotion of a new political approach required by the realities of the nuclear and space age;

4. *Urges* Governments of all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, in formulating their policies in the field of disarmament, to take into account the main demands of the mass peace and disarmament movements, in particular with regard to the immediate cessation and prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, with a bilateral moratorium by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on all nuclear explosions being the first step towards this end, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its termination on Earth, and invites them to inform the Secretary-General annually on the actions taken to that end;

5. *Recommends* that, in carrying out the Campaign, due regard should be given to important dates and anniversaries related to international peace and security;

6. *Considers* it necessary, the future of mankind being at stake, that more attention should be paid to the active involvement of children and youth in Campaign activities;

7. *Invites once again* Member States to co-operate with the United Nations to ensure a better flow of accurate information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, as well as actions and activities of the world public in support of peace and disarmament, and to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in implementing the programme of activities of the Campaign, to give wider publicity to the work of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament, paying due attention, in particular, to the proposals of Member States and the action taken thereon;

9. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

On 29 October, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Campaign", which was later also sponsored by Romania. In introducing the draft on 10 November, Mexico recalled the Secretary-General's statement of 24 October 1984, in which he stressed the importance of world-wide participation and adequate funding for the Campaign. Mexico stated that those that had not yet announced any voluntary contribution to the Campaign would have a new opportunity to do so at a fifth United Nations pledging conference.

On 11 November the draft was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 114 to none, with 9 abstentions (Western States). In connection with the vote, three States, all of which abstained, explained their abstentions.

France noted that by operative paragraph 4 the Assembly would express regret that most of the States with the largest military expenditures had so far not made any financial contribution to the Campaign. France drew attention to its effort regarding information on disarmament and the promotion of that cause. Furthermore, it believed that the donation it had made to UNIDIR constituted a very important contribution to the Campaign. The Federal Republic of Germany abstained with reluctance, as from the outset it had supported the Campaign. It regretted that the text failed to reflect two principles upon which the Campaign rested: voluntary participation and universality. It called upon the sponsors to take into account its reservations in the future. The Netherlands agreed with the Campaign's objective, but held that its activities sometimes tended to mobilize public opinion in a certain direction. It asserted that emphasis should be placed in the Campaign on the availability

and accessibility of United Nations disarmament material, for which no additional funds and/or voluntary contributions seemed to be necessary. It indicated that it was not prepared at that moment to contribute financially to the Campaign, because it had doubts about its effectiveness.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 144 to none, with 9 abstentions, as resolution 41/60 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in paragraph 15 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it declared that it was essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation and stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

Recalling also its resolutions 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, 36/92 C of 9 December 1981, 37/100 I of 13 December 1982, 38/73 D of 15 December 1983, 39/63 D of 12 December 1984 and 40/151 B of 16 December 1985, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General of 17 September 1981, 11 June 1982, 3 November 1982, 30 August 1983, 4 October 1985 and 19 September 1986,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 19 September 1986 on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign by the United Nations system during 1986 and the activities contemplated for 1987, as well as its main financial aspects,

Having also examined the part of the report of the Secretary-General of 6 October 1986 dealing with the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies relating to the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, as well as the Final Act of the 1986 United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign, held on 28 October 1986,

1. *Reiterates its commendation* of the manner in which, as described in the above-mentioned reports, the World Disarmament Campaign has been geared by the Secretary-General in order to guarantee "the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war";

2. *Recalls* that, as was also agreed by consensus in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, it is likewise an essential requisite for the universality of the Campaign that it receive the co-operation and participation of all States;

3. *Endorses once more* the statement made by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the 1984 United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign to the effect that such co-operation implies that adequate funds be made available and that consequently the criterion of universality also applies to pledges, since a campaign without world-wide participation and funding will have difficulty in reflecting this principle in its implementation;

4. *Reiterates its regret* that most of the States that have the largest military expenditures have not so far made any financial contribution to the Campaign;

5. *Decides* that at its forty-second session there should be a fifth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, and expresses the hope that on that occasion all those Member States that have not yet announced any voluntary contribution will do so;

6. *Reiterates its recommendation* that the voluntary contributions made by Member States to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund should not be earmarked for specific activities since it is most desirable that the Secretary-General enjoy full freedom to take the decisions he deems fit within the framework of the Campaign previously approved by the General Assembly and in exercise of the powers vested in him in connection with the Campaign;

7. *Notes with appreciation* that the Secretary-General has given permanent character to his instructions to the United Nations information centres and regional commissions to give wide

publicity to the Campaign and, whenever necessary, to adapt, as far as possible, United Nations information materials to local languages;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-second session a report covering both the implementation of the programme of activities of the Campaign by the organizations of the United Nations system during 1987 and the programme of activities contemplated by the system for 1988;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "World Disarmament Campaign"

On 30 October, Benin, on behalf of the Group of African States, submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa" and introduced it in the First Committee on 10 November. By the draft, the General Assembly would thank the Member States and the international, governmental and non-governmental organizations that had already contributed towards the functioning of the Centre and again appeal to them for voluntary contributions.

On 11 November the draft was approved by the First Committee without a vote.

In a statement after the vote, Japan explained that it had joined in the consensus adoption on the understanding that such centres would be financed by existing resources and voluntary contributions and thus would not place an extra burden on the regular budget.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 41/60 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/151 G of 16 December 1985,

Taking note of the report of the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi from 16 to 19 April 1986, in which the ministers reaffirmed the need to strengthen the role of regional bodies in mobilizing support for the World Disarmament Campaign and the realization of its objectives and, in that context, welcomed the establishment at Lomé of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa,

Taking into consideration the report of the Secretary-General of 15 October 1986,

1. *Welcomes* the establishment on 1 January 1986 of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa;

2. *Also welcomes* the promptness with which the Secretary-General has taken the necessary administrative steps to ensure the functioning of the Centre, and requests him to continue to give the Centre all necessary support;

3. *Thanks* Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations that have already made contributions towards the functioning of the Centre;

4. *Again appeals* to Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations to make voluntary contributions to the Centre;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the implementation of the present resolution.

On 30 October, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America", which was later also sponsored by the Bahamas and Ecuador. In introducing it on 5 November, Peru stated that the

draft resolution sought the widest possible dissemination of information and unhampered access by the public to a broad range of information on disarmament issues and the dangers of the arms race. The sponsors saw the establishment of a Latin American regional centre as a relatively modest step, bearing in mind the serious financial difficulties faced by the United Nations. It was their intention to take maximum advantage of the resources currently available to the Organization, including its infrastructure in Lima. They understood that basic support for the Centre would be provided by voluntary contributions from Member States and from interested governmental or non-governmental organizations. In view of the non-controversial character of the draft resolution, the sponsors hoped that the Committee would approve it by consensus.

On 12 November, the sponsors of the original draft, later joined by Guatemala, submitted a slightly revised version, which was introduced by Peru. Peru agreed that United Nations staff appointed to manage the Centre would do so in accordance with criteria established with appropriate flexibility and that necessary additional secretarial staff would be provided by the Peruvian Government. The cost of rents and the maintenance of the premises added to the existing United Nations Information Centre in Lima would also be covered by the Government, whereas the overhead cost would be covered by the United Nations. Peru intended to contribute 200,000 intis to launch the initial phase.

The Director of the Budget Division of the Office of Financial Services clarified that the funding for the creation of the Centre would come from voluntary contributions. He stated that to the extent that the activities were considered complementary to the work of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, the Secretariat would assist in the establishment of the Centre and, during the initial stages, assign staff on a periodic basis to help ensure that it was properly set up. Besides that involvement, and perhaps an exchange of technical data and materials, the Centre would be financed by voluntary contributions and would not be charged to the regular budget.

On 13 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

Two Western States made statements in connection with the vote. Australia joined the consensus on the draft resolution but harboured some concerns about the establishment of regional centres. It seemed to it that their functions, particularly the dissemination of information, duplicated those being carried out by the United Nations Secretariat. It supported the idea that such centres served to use non-convertible, local currency contributions to the Campaign more efficiently. However, it was concerned that significant proportions of available Campaign funds might, in the future, be channelled into duplicate administrative and overhead costs for the maintenance of regional centres. Its preference was for the Secretariat to allocate Campaign funds where they were most needed and most effective. The United States supported regional approaches to arms limitation, but it had serious concerns about the establishment of new United Nations institutions away from Headquarters. It had been able to support the two initiatives, one in Africa and the other in Latin

America, that the First Committee had just acted upon, because the draft resolutions indicated clearly that both regional Centres would be supported solely by voluntary contributions from Member States and on the basis of existing resources. It expected that the two Centres would be supported equally.

On 3 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 41/60 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 39/63 J of 12 December 1984, in which it requested the Secretary-General to provide assistance to such Member States in the regions concerned as might request it with a view to establishing regional and institutional arrangements for the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, on the basis of existing resources and of voluntary contributions that Member States might make to that end,

Mindful of the Lima Communiqué adopted by the Latin American Council of the Latin American Economic System at its twelfth regular meeting, held at Lima on 16 and 17 October 1986, in which the foreign ministers, ministers and heads of delegation of the Latin American and Caribbean countries reaffirmed their support for the establishment at Lima of a United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take the necessary steps,

Reaffirming its resolutions 37/100 F of 13 December 1982, 38/73 J of 15 December 1983 and 39/63 F of 12 December 1984 on regional disarmament,

Bearing in mind resolution 40/151 G of 16 December 1985, which established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa,

1. *Decides* to establish, as at 1 January 1987, in accordance with resolution 39/63 J on the World Disarmament Campaign, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America, with headquarters at Lima, on the basis of existing resources and of voluntary contributions that Member States and interested organizations may make to that end;

2. *Decides also* that the Centre shall provide, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities of the Member States of the Latin American region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, and for the promotion of economic and social development through appropriate reutilization of available resources, and shall co-ordinate the implementation of regional activities in Latin America under the World Disarmament Campaign;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures to ensure the establishment and functioning of the Centre, including, to that end, the possible utilization of the existing United Nations infrastructure at Lima with a view to the full employment of available resources;

4. *Invites* Member States and interested organizations to make voluntary contributions to the Centre;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the implementation of the present resolution.

Disarmament Week

In accordance with resolution 40/152 E, the Secretary-General submitted in 1986 a report containing replies received from 11 Governments, as well as relevant units of the Secretariat, United Nations information centres and international non-governmental organizations on their activities to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week.¹²

¹² A/41/492 and Corr.1.

On 29 October the First Committee held a special meeting to commemorate Disarmament Week, during which statements were made by the Chairman of the Committee, the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and representatives of the five regional groups.

The Chairman of the First Committee stated that the observance of Disarmament Week provided an opportunity for all Member States and for all peoples to recall their joint commitment to preserve peace in the world, to eliminate the danger of the nuclear annihilation of mankind and to promote détente and co-operation among all peoples. He believed that the results of the Reykjavik meeting between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States had provided a significant impetus for the multilateral disarmament process and hoped prospects for a breakthrough in that process would continue.

The President of the General Assembly attached particular importance to the summit meetings in 1985 and 1986 and called on the Soviet Union and the United States to ensure that proposals that were on the table were further negotiated and concluded. While noting that the attainment of a world free of arms seemed more remote than it was four decades ago, he felt that the arms limitation process had gained a momentum that should be sustained.

The Secretary-General noted that possibilities for significant progress on arms limitation and reduction existed. He welcomed the agreement reached in Stockholm on confidence-building in Europe and stated that efforts must be devoted to the gradual reduction of both nuclear and conventional armaments.

The representative of Benin, speaking on behalf of the African Group of States, stressed the importance of the relationship between disarmament, security and development and expressed regret at the postponement of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. He called upon the international community to exert pressure on South Africa to renounce its nuclear capability and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Speaking on behalf of the Asian States, the representative of Japan stated that although no agreement had been reached at the Reykjavik meeting, the Group felt that considerable understanding over a wide range of issues had emerged between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Group called on the two super-Powers to continue negotiations to make real progress towards disarmament.

The representative of the Byelorussian SSR, speaking on behalf of the Group of Eastern European States, made proposals concerning the observance of Disarmament Week. The socialist countries also called on Member States to implement measures to end the arms race and ensure peace and security.

Speaking on behalf of the Latin American States, Mexico asserted that the Treaty of Tlatelolco was a significant step towards general and complete disarmament. The Group stressed the close relationship between disarmament and development and noted that progress in the former would greatly help in the realization of the latter.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, speaking on

behalf of the Group of Western European and Other States, expressed concern over the stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons around the world, but felt encouraged by the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations on arms reduction and disarmament and by the outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

On 30 October, the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Department of Public Information co-sponsored the annual NGO Forum at Headquarters, with the theme "What hope for the future? An assessment of recent developments in the field of disarmament." The panellists were Ambassador Victor L. Issraelyan of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Donald S. Lowitz of the United States and Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin of Sweden, with Mr. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, opening the discussion. The Forum was attended by representatives of non-governmental organizations concerned with disarmament, members of delegations and the Secretariat. In observance of Disarmament Week in Geneva, the Geneva Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs organized an exhibit featuring various aspects of multilateral disarmament efforts. Another exhibit was organized by the United Nations Information Service, which highlighted the International Year of Peace and issues related to disarmament and development. Disarmament Week was also observed by various events organized in different parts of the world.

On 29 October, Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "Disarmament Week", which was later also sponsored by Mozambique. In introducing it on 31 October, Mongolia stated that for the past 10 years, Disarmament Week had been an integral part of world action to make the public aware of the need to halt the nuclear-arms race and to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. Noting that the draft resolution contained essentially the same elements as those of previous years, Mongolia expressed the hope that the text would receive broad support from the members of the Committee.

On 11 November the Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 89 to 1 (United States), with 22 abstentions (Western and associated States).

In explanation of vote, Finland stated that it voted in favour because it supported the main thrust of the draft—to mobilize public support for disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany and France abstained because they could not accept the call on specialized agencies or on IAEA to disseminate information about matters outside their spheres of competence. Japan recalled that it had expressed concern about some of the formulations in resolution 40/152 E the previous year and had cautioned that if the trend to deviate from consensus language continued, it would be forced to reconsider its position. Since it felt that the current draft represented further deviation and the new language in the second and fourth preambular paragraphs appeared misleading, it abstained in the vote.

On 4 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by

a recorded vote of 123 to 1, with 23 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the escalating arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, which represents a serious threat to the very existence of mankind,

Stressing the vital importance of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, ending the nuclear-arms race, bringing about disarmament for the maintenance of world peace and creating a comprehensive system of international peace and security,

Emphasizing anew the urgent need for and the importance of wide and continued mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, in all its aspects,

Taking into account the aspirations of the world public for halting the arms race on Earth and preventing it in outer space and for eliminating nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the new initiatives to this end,

Mindful of the world-wide mass anti-war and anti-nuclear movement,

Recognizing the important role of the mass media in mobilizing world public opinion in support of disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction the broad and active support by Governments and international and national organizations of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Recalling the recommendations concerning the World Disarmament Campaign contained in annex V to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the recommendation that Disarmament Week should continue to be widely observed,

Recalling also its resolutions 33/71 D of 14 December 1978, 34/83 I of 11 December 1979, 37/78 D of 9 December 1982, 38/183 L of 20 December 1983, 39/148 J of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 E of 16 December 1985,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up measures undertaken by governmental and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to all States and international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their energetic support of and active participation in Disarmament Week, in particular in holding the 1986 Disarmament Week in close connection with the celebration of the International Year of Peace;

3. *Expresses serious concern* over the continued escalation of the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, and the imminent danger of its extension into outer space, which gravely jeopardizes international peace and security and increases the danger of outbreak of a nuclear war;

4. *Stresses* the important role of the mass media in acquainting the world public with the aims of Disarmament Week and measures undertaken within its framework;

5. *Invites* all States, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme for Disarmament Week, prepared by the Secretary-General;

6. *Invites* the relevant specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to intensify activities, within their areas of competence, to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, and requests them to inform the Secretary-General accordingly;

7. *Also invites* international non-governmental organizations to take an active part in Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken;

8. *Further invites* the Secretary-General to use the United Nations mass media as widely as possible to promote better understanding among the world public of disarmament problems

and the objectives of Disarmament Week;

9. *Requests* Governments to continue, in accordance with resolution 33/71 D, to inform the Secretary-General of activities undertaken to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 33/71 D, to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-second session a report on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

Conclusion

Although financial constraints limited the World Disarmament Campaign's activities to some degree in 1986, it continued to generate interest around the world and to receive support from its constituencies. Three major meetings, organized within the framework of the Campaign by the Department for Disarmament Affairs, were held during the year: a regional conference in Tbilisi, USSR, a meeting of experts in Erice, Italy, and a symposium in Florence, Italy. Disarmament Week was again observed throughout the world in order to foster the objectives of disarmament. In New York, the Fourth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was convened during the Week.

The Assembly adopted five resolutions in 1986, including one on Disarmament Week. The two resolutions on the World Disarmament Campaign relating to regional centres in Togo and Peru were adopted without a vote. Despite some reservations about the wording of the other two resolutions, Member States expressed general support for the Campaign.

Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Introduction

AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION, in 1978, the General Assembly decided to establish an advisory board of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies to be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation.¹ At its twelfth special session, in 1982, the Assembly discussed possible activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, but was unable to achieve definite results on the matter. At its regular session later that year, by resolution 37/99 K, section III, it requested the Secretary-General to revive the Advisory Board, which had not met in 1982, and to entrust it with the following functions:

(a) To advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies and research in the area of arms limitation and disarmament carried out under the auspices of the United Nations or institutions within the United Nations system, in particular on the integration of a programme of such studies with a comprehensive programme of disarmament, once this had been established;

(b) To serve as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR);

(c) To advise the Secretary-General on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign;

(d) At the specific invitation of the Secretary-General, to provide him with advice on other matters within the area of disarmament and arms limitation.²

In 1983, the Secretary-General appointed 22 members to the revived Board; and in 1984, two more. At its two sessions each year, the Board mainly dealt with the disarmament studies in general, the work and draft statute of UNIDIR,³ the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign and the situation in the area of disarmament.

In the First Committee in 1983, several member States considered that the Board should be given sufficient opportunity to review proposals for studies and that it would be more effective if the sponsors of proposals would seek the views of Member States and the Board before the General Assembly

¹ For details regarding the establishment of the Advisory Board, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XXV.

² A/38/467; the Secretary-General's 1983 report on the Advisory Board contained certain reformulations of the language of his note of the previous year.

³ For details concerning the statute, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 8: 1983, chap. XXII. and vol. 9: 1984, chap. XXIV.

was asked to vote on them. The First Committee also considered the draft statute of UNIDIR as proposed by the Advisory Board in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR. On its recommendation, the General Assembly decided to return the draft statute to the Board for further clarification.

In 1984, by resolution 39/148 H, annex, the Assembly approved a revised version of the UNIDIR statute, submitted by the Board of Trustees. In that connection, three Western States did not agree to the system of mixed funding—through both voluntary contributions and the regular budget of the United Nations—which was incorporated into the statute. In its report that year, the Advisory Board recommended that the Assembly request the Secretary-General to prepare a study on the implications of deterrence for disarmament and the arms race.

In 1985, in the course of its deliberations on the situation in the area of disarmament, the Board discussed the subject of nuclear winter. Although divergent views were expressed by members of the Board, the sense was that whatever the reliability of the assessment, the risk of nuclear winter was sufficiently large to constitute yet another compelling reason to avoid nuclear war and to proceed with significant reductions in nuclear weapons. The Board held a thorough exchange of views on the subject of the studies. The discussion will continue, as the Board will submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-second session, as requested by resolution 40/152 K. In accordance with the statute of UNIDIR, the Advisory Board, in its capacity as the Institute's Board of Trustees, considered and approved the report of the Director of the Institute on UNIDIR's activities in 1985 and recommended it for submission to the General Assembly. The Board also considered and adopted the proposed work programme and proposed budget estimates for 1986.

Sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1986

In 1986, the Advisory Board held its fourteenth and fifteenth sessions from 5 to 9 May and from 22 to 26 September in New York, under the chairmanship of Mr. Omran El-Shafei of Egypt. The members of the Advisory Board are listed in annex I of this chapter.

In accordance with the Board's functions, the discussions held during its two sessions were mainly devoted to: (a) United Nations studies on disarmament; (b) implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign; (c) the situation in the area of disarmament; and (d) the work and budget of UNIDIR (the Board discussed this in its capacity as Board of Trustees of the Institute). The activities of the Board during the year are summarized in the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.⁴

⁴ A/41/666.

United Nations studies on disarmament

At both its sessions, the Board continued to consider the matter of studies with a view to preparing a comprehensive report on the subject for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-second session, as requested by resolution 40/152 K.

In the course of its discussions, the importance of achieving an agreed study report was emphasized. At the same time, it was noted that in certain cases where consensus might not be possible, it was necessary to ensure that the report reflected all points of view. The careful selection of subjects for study and the matter of costs were regarded as being of special importance. The Board reiterated its long-standing view that, while not presuming to censor study proposals, it should be in a position to examine them before submission to the Assembly.

The Board held an exchange of views on the study on deterrence, which it had initiated. Members generally felt that their recommendations concerning the conduct of the study had been fully taken into account. However, the opinion was expressed that the study had not exhausted the subject, as it contained the views of only a limited number of experts. The Board considered the study as being of particular value, as it addressed a difficult political issue in a highly informative and balanced manner, and it hoped that the General Assembly would recommend that the study be given the widest possible distribution. (For a discussion of the study and resolution 41/86 R, see chapter XXIII.)

Implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign

In accordance with its functions, the Board discussed the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign. It took note of the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the implementation of the programme of activities of the Campaign in 1986.⁵

During the subsequent exchange of views, members of the Board expressed much satisfaction at the manner in which the Campaign was being conducted, in particular in the balanced, factual and objective way in which it presented information. The Board welcomed the Campaign's programme of organizing and holding regional conferences and seminars and referred specifically to the regional conference held in Tbilisi, USSR, in May and the seminar in Erice, Italy, in April.

The Secretariat informed the Board that despite voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund, the Campaign had not been able to escape the effects of the current financial crisis, and it assured members that every effort was being made to pursue the Campaign's aims within the constraints imposed. The Board expressed the hope that the projects and programmes envisaged for 1987 would be implemented as far as possible.

⁵ A/41/554.

On the basis of a background paper prepared by the Secretariat, the Board held an exchange of views on the nature and involvement of non-governmental organizations in the Campaign and its policy towards their representatives' attendance at its discussions. The Board reaffirmed its established practice of exchanging views with representatives from the co-ordinating bodies of the non-governmental organizations. Those representatives attended a meeting of the Board's session in September, at which they commented favourably on the conduct of the Campaign and noted that some of their suggestions in previous years had led to valuable improvements. They emphasized that regional conferences were successful undertakings and hoped that a more sustained network of non-governmental organizations would be fostered in and around those events. Members of the Board expressed their recognition of the value of the efforts made by the non-governmental organizations and felt that their involvement in the Campaign had reached a new dimension.

Situation in the area of disarmament

In the course of the Board's discussion on the situation in the area of disarmament in general, a number of members expressed cautious but hopeful optimism that, although the Soviet Union and the United States were still separated on certain major issues, there were possibilities for progress on them. Others were more pessimistic and drew attention to the fact that virtually nothing had been achieved in the field of disarmament since the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, in 1978. The postponement of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was noted with regret by some members.

The Board expressed satisfaction at the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which they regarded as a good indication of how it was possible to achieve progress if the necessary political will was present.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

In accordance with UNIDIR's statute, the Board considered and approved for submission to the General Assembly the Institute's report on its activities.⁶ (For an outline of UNIDIR's work in 1986, see annex II.) The Board also considered and approved the draft programme of work and the proposed budget of the Institute for 1987.⁷ In the light of the comments and recommendations made by the Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), and recognizing the serious financial situation of the United Nations as a whole, the Board made certain changes to the Institute's draft programme of work and reduced significantly its proposed

⁶ A/41/676, annex.

⁷ A/41/666, paras. 33-40.

budget. It also recommended a subvention from the regular budget of the United Nations but, in view of the financial situation, recognized that the level should be the absolute minimum of support needed by the Institute to discharge its responsibilities.

As requested in paragraph 12 of resolution 40/87, the views of Member States on the UNIDIR study project entitled "Disarmament: problems related to outer space" were conveyed to the Advisory Board.⁸ With Member States' replies before it, the Board held extensive discussions on two versions of the draft report prepared by the Institute. The Board decided that the Institute should reconvene a meeting of the Steering Group of Experts and the authors of both versions in order to finalize the study, taking into account the guidance provided by the Board and the views received from Member States. (For a brief description of the project, see annex II to this chapter.)

In its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, the Board addressed at length the matter of the absence of the Director of the Institute with particular reference to the effect of his absence on the proper functioning of the Institute. Many members noted the serious impairment caused to the work of UNIDIR and felt that the consequences were particularly critical at the current stage of the Institute's development. The Board agreed to give the Secretary-General every support in his efforts to find a solution satisfactory to all concerned.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

In the course of the debate in the First Committee,⁹ some member States referred to the role of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, especially when discussing the subject of United Nations disarmament studies and the work of UNIDIR. In addressing those subjects, the Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Advisory Board and the note of the Secretary-General transmitting the report on the activities of UNIDIR.¹⁰

The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, welcomed the fact that the Advisory Board had continued to discuss United Nations studies in the field of disarmament in general, taking into account the General Assembly's request to submit a report on the subject to it at its forty-second session, in accordance with resolution 40/152 K. It noted that several States had already responded to that request by submitting their views to the Secretary-General.¹¹ The United Kingdom also emphasized that the Advisory Board had an important role to play as a co-ordinating clearing-house for studies. Poland noted a desirable increase in the scope and intensity of the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, particularly in its role of establishing a link between the United

⁸ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1986, chap. XV and chap. XXIII, annex II.

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Committee*, 3rd to 48th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹⁰ A/41/666 and A/41/676, annex.

¹¹ A/41/421 and Add.1 and 2.

Nations and non-governmental organizations and in providing guidance to UNIDIR.

Commenting on the work of UNIDIR, the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the Twelve, noted that the Advisory Board in its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR had reached agreement on a number of proposals regarding the Institute's programme of work and budget, which took account of the serious financial situation of the United Nations as a whole. Poland emphasized that the study on problems related to outer space undertaken by UNIDIR had progressed. It hoped that its early completion would provide Member States with the authoritative, accessible information they required on the many serious implications of the "weaponization" of outer space.

On 28 October, France, Norway and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations disarmament studies", which was later revised and adopted as resolution 41/86 C. By it, the General Assembly invited the Member States that had not yet done so to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and proposals concerning United Nations disarmament studies and requested the Secretary-General to transmit their replies to the Advisory Board and to the Assembly in 1987. (See chapter XXIII.)

During the deliberations in the First Committee, a number of delegations commented on the circumstances of the absence from his post of the Director of UNIDIR and the impairment that caused to the work of the Institute.

On 30 October, Australia, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sweden and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution entitled "Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research" In introducing it on 6 November, Australia noted that the Secretary-General had brought to the attention of the world community the fact that the Director of UNIDIR, Mr. Liviu Bota, had been absent from his post for several months. The Secretary-General and the Advisory Board had reported on the serious effect that Mr. Bota's absence from his post had had on the Institute's work. The draft expressed concern at that effect, and its fundamental objective was to see that the work of UNIDIR was restored to its normal level.

On 12 November, Australia, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Samoa, Sweden and the United Kingdom submitted a revised draft, by which the General Assembly would fully support the efforts being made by the Secretary-General, the Advisory Board and Member States to rectify the situation and call upon the Government concerned to co-operate with such efforts. In introducing the revision on 17 November, Australia stressed that the sponsors firmly believed it to be in the interest of all to see the integrity and independence of the Secretariat of the United Nations protected. Australia emphasized that it was for that reason alone that it sought a decision of the First Committee on the matter, a decision which would, fundamentally, enable the Secretary-General to pursue his quiet diplomacy with those concerned in order to see the problem solved.

Other delegations, however, expressed a different opinion. Hungary felt that the main thrust of the draft had nothing to do with disarmament measures, a position which, it held, was indirectly proved by the fact that the same

question was allocated for discussion in the Fifth Committee. Romania declared that the draft resolution and the problem were devoid of any connection with the problems of disarmament and international security, to which the work of the Committee should be dedicated.

In the procedural exchange that followed, Romania moved that the Committee not take a decision on the matter. The motion was rejected by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 42 to 38, with 22 abstentions. Romania then introduced amendments that it had submitted on 13 November. The amendments would make significant changes in the revised draft: by them, the Assembly would, *inter alia*, express concern about the continuing absence of UNIDIR's Director and its serious effect on the work of the Institute and call upon all concerned to co-operate in finding a satisfactory solution. The proposed amendments were adopted by two recorded votes in the Committee: four paragraphs were adopted together by a vote of 36 to 31, with 36 abstentions, and a fifth paragraph was adopted by a vote of 41 to 28, with 33 abstentions.

After the voting on the amendments, Australia, on behalf of the original co-sponsors, announced that the draft resolution as amended had been fundamentally changed and was no longer acceptable to them.

The First Committee then took action on the draft resolution as revised and amended. It was rejected by a recorded vote of 34 to none, with 54 abstentions.¹²

Conclusion

In 1986, the Advisory Board continued its substantive consideration of the subject of United Nations studies on disarmament, taking into account the request of the General Assembly to prepare a comprehensive report on the matter for submission at the forty-second session. It also held a thorough exchange of views on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign and, in that context, commented favourably on the factual, objective and balanced way in which it presented information.

In its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, the Board discussed the absence from his duties of the Director of UNIDIR and noted the serious impairment that had caused to the work of the Institute. It agreed that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be given every support by the Board in his efforts to find a solution satisfactory to all concerned.

In accordance with the statute of UNIDIR, the Board considered and approved the report of the Institute on its activities in 1986 and recommended its submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session. Recognizing the financial situation of the United Nations as a whole, the Board made certain changes to the Institute's draft programme of work and reduced the proposed budget.

¹² See A/41/842, paras. 55-62.

On the basis of two versions of a draft report of UNIDIR on disarmament problems related to outer space and of relevant views received from Member States, the Board held substantive discussions on the matter and decided that the Institute should reconvene a meeting of the Steering Group of Experts and the authors of both versions in order to finalize the report.

ANNEX I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

- Oluyemi Adeniji, Ambassador, Ministry of External Affairs, Nigeria
Hadj Benabdelkader Azzout, President of the Court of Auditors, Algeria
Rolf Björnerstedt, Chairman, Governing Board of the Alva and Gunnar Myrdal Foundation, Stockholm, Sweden
Oleg N. Bykov, Deputy Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences, Moscow, USSR
James E. Dougherty, Professor of Politics, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia, United States
Omran El-Shafei, Assistant Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt
Constantin Ene, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania
Edgar Faure, Member of the French Academy and Member of the Senate, France
Alfonso García Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament
Ignac Golob, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
A. C. S. Hameed, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lanka
Björn Inge Kristvik, Director General, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Liang Yufan, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations
Ronald Mason, School of Molecular Science, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
Akira Matsui, Adviser, Japan Atomic Energy Forum, Japan
William Eteki Mboumoua, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cameroon
Manfred Mueller, Professor, Institute for International Relations of the Academy of Political Science and Legal Studies, Potsdam, German Democratic Republic
Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Ambassador of Argentina to France
Maharajakrishna Rasgotra, formerly Foreign Secretary to the Government of India
Friedrich Ruth, Ambassador, Federal Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, Federal Republic of Germany
Amada Segarra, Visiting Professor, Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations, Guayaquil, Ecuador
Agha Shahi, Professor Emeritus of International Relations to Universities in Pakistan, Pakistan
Tadeusz Strulak, Ambassador, Deputy Director of the International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland
Liviu Bota, Director of UNIDIR, is an *ex officio* member of the Advisory Board when it is acting in its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR.

ANNEX II

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*

Introduction

The proposal to establish an international institute for disarmament research was put forward by the President of France at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, in 1978. UNIDIR was established at Geneva in 1980 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). In 1982, the General Assembly, by resolution 37/99 K, decided that UNIDIR should function as an autonomous institution working in close relationship with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and that the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should function as its Board of Trustees and draft a statute of UNIDIR on the basis of its existing mandate. The Assembly also invited Governments to make contributions to UNIDIR. The statute of UNIDIR was approved by the General Assembly by its resolution 39/148 H of December 1984, and it became effective 1 January 1985.^a

UNIDIR's purpose is to undertake independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. Disarmament research is an integral part of disarmament efforts. According to article II of its statute, the Institute's work aims at:

(a) Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States and towards the economic and social development of all peoples;

(b) Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;

(c) Assisting ongoing negotiations on disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;

(d) Carrying out more in-depth, forward-looking and long-term research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved, and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

UNIDIR takes into account relevant recommendations of the General Assembly and works on the basis of the provisions of the 1978 Final Document. UNIDIR carries out its research projects within the Institute or commissions individual experts or research organizations. The Director of UNIDIR reports annually to the General Assembly on the activities of the Institute. As discussed above in this chapter, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies functions as UNIDIR's Board of Trustees.

UNIDIR has a fellowship programme to enable scholars from developing countries to do research on disarmament and related international security issues at the Institute. In 1986 UNIDIR had three visiting fellows from: Cameroon, China and the United Republic of Tanzania.

Throughout 1986 the effective functioning of the Institute was seriously impaired by the involuntary absence of its Director, Mr. Liviu Bota, who did not return from a visit to Bucharest in December 1985. The discussion of the matter in the Board of Trustees is reflected in the Board's report.^b A description of the consideration by the First Committee appears in this chapter.

On 1 October 1986, Professor Hubert Thierry, Deputy Director since 1981, retired from his functions and was succeeded by Professor Serge Sur, Professor of International Law at the University of Nanterre, Paris X.

* Text contributed by UNIDIR.

^a For details on the origin of UNIDIR, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, chap. XX and annex II, and vol. 7: 1982, chap. XXIII and annex II.

^b A/41/666.

Publications completed in 1986

China's concept of security^c

"On China's concept of security", a monograph produced by Song Yimin, Senior Researcher of the Institute of International Studies of Beijing, gives an up-to-date view of China's policy in the field of security. The basic concept of security as it is analysed in Chinese political thought and the Chinese perception of the security environment are studied.

Prevention of the arms race in outer space^d

"Prevention of the arms race in outer space" a monograph prepared by V.S. Vereshchetin, Deputy Director of the Institute of State and Law of the Soviet Union, presents an overview of the rules pertaining to military activities in outer space. The study describes specific prohibitions and limitations of the military uses of outer space and differences in the interpretation of certain provisions of international law.

Programme of work for 1986

Disarmament: problems related to outer space

A study on outer space, conducted with the help of a multinational advisory panel of experts, is under preparation. It deals with the prospects and consequences of an arms race in outer space and the means to prevent it. It consists of four chapters: the current uses of outer space and their military implications; the technological and conceptual challenge of newly contemplated space weapons intended to destroy ballistic missiles; legal aspects of arms limitation in outer space; and arms limitation and disarmament negotiations. Publication is envisaged for the second half of 1987.

The war of the satellites: the stakes for the international community

"The war of the satellites" analyses the threat to satellites and identifies the possibilities of establishing a legal régime to safeguard and protect them. It is divided into four parts: the threat to satellites; a comparison of the United States and Soviet ASAT systems; the legal régime of outer space; and recommendations regarding legal principles, confidence-building measures and an international space agency. Publication is envisaged for the first half of 1987.

Disarmament and development: some practical suggestions to overcome the present deadlock

A three-part study on disarmament and development is being prepared. The first part analyses the relationship between disarmament and development from the point of view of security. The second part is devoted to a critical examination of propositions advanced during the past 30 years and to the identification of motives that have impeded consensus regarding the question. In the third part, concrete measures are proposed for reallocating military resources to aid development and humanitarian tasks. Publication is envisaged for the first half of 1987.

Arms-transfer dependence

A project on arms-transfer dependence analyses conventional arms transfers, delineating what implications arms transfers have for creating or reinforcing politico-military dependence among States. It does not single out any suppliers or recipients in case studies, but presents a conceptual framework for evaluating what structure of arms imports and exports is conducive to dependence. Empirical data are provided, where available and appropriate, to substantiate the theoretical views. Publication is envisaged for the second half of 1987.

^c United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.86.0.1. 40 p.

^d United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.86.0.2. 26 p.

The verification issue in United Nations disarmament negotiations

A monograph under preparation focuses on political aspects of verification, covering the following disarmament issues as they have been discussed in the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor bodies: general and complete disarmament; cessation of nuclear testing; nuclear non-proliferation; prohibition of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed; and chemical and biological weapons. The approaches of the nuclear Powers are given individual consideration. Three sections are devoted to the approaches of neutral and non-aligned countries, socialist States, and Western States, respectively. Publication is envisaged for the second half of 1987.

A synoptical analysis of central strategic terms

It is important to determine the degree of similarity existing between the strategic doctrines of the major Powers. For conceptual and linguistic reasons, there are fundamental differences in seemingly identical strategic concepts, mainly between the United States and the Soviet Union. Certain key strategic terms used in American, Chinese, English, French and Soviet strategic doctrines are examined with regard to their conceptual and linguistic implications in a synoptical analysis being prepared.

The international nuclear non-proliferation régime

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons demonstrated that the objectives embodied in the Treaty still exert a powerful influence on the conduct of States, both parties and non-parties. In addition to examining the overall interest of States in restraining the spread of nuclear weapons, both horizontal and vertical, "The international nuclear non-proliferation régime" discusses non-proliferation from many points of view. It is being prepared for publication in summer 1987.

The relationship between security and development in North Africa

A project is being carried out to evaluate the relationship between disarmament and development in the regional framework of North Africa. The region and individual States are described, from geographical, economic and politico-military perspectives, and conceptions of security and development are presented.

Confidence-building measures in Africa

"Confidence-building measures in Africa" evaluates the relevance of such measures in that region. It shows that the military and security situation in Africa is different from that in Europe, which accounts for differences in the role of confidence-building measures in relations between the States of the two continents. In Africa, appropriate measures may be necessary and desirable in some situations to reduce apprehensions and to facilitate the management and resolution of conflicts.

Pilot project of a computerized disarmament data base

In October 1986, UNIDIR started a pilot project of a computerized disarmament data base, financed by a contribution from the Government of Japan. The funding provides for a project duration of three years (until October 1989). The first subject file to be established in 1987 will cover the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

United Nations disarmament studies programme

Introduction

AUTHORIZED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, United Nations disarmament studies are carried out by the Secretary-General with the assistance of experts and consultants appointed by him. Since the early 1960s, they have been prepared for a twofold purpose: (a) to assist the negotiating process through the analysis of specific disarmament questions related to negotiations in progress and (b) to provide information which may facilitate better understanding of the problems of the arms race and approaches to disarmament. In 1985, the General Assembly reaffirmed by resolution 40/152 K the value of United Nations studies as a useful means by which important issues in the field of arms limitation and disarmament could be addressed in a comprehensive and detailed manner.

This chapter deals with developments in the area of studies in 1986. During the year, only one study, that on deterrence, was concluded. The elaboration of two studies requested of the Secretary-General by the General Assembly in 1985, one on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, and the other on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, was deferred because of financial difficulties. In 1986, the General Assembly once again requested the Secretary-General to carry out the two studies and to submit them to it at its forty-third session. No new studies were requested.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986

A number of delegations addressed the question of United Nations studies either in general or by referring to specific studies during the debate in the First Committee.¹ The Committee had before it the replies that 20 Member States had communicated to the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 40/152 K, containing their views and proposals on how the work of

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 41st meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

the United Nations in the field of disarmament studies could be further improved.²

Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom expressed their view that studies conducted under United Nations auspices should be clearly related to specific practical objectives and that the First Committee should show restraint in commissioning new studies, which in any case should be the subject of proper consultation. It added that the Advisory Board had an important role to play as a co-ordinating clearing-house for studies. Finland recalled that the 1975 United Nations study on nuclear-weapon-free zones³ had, among other things, analysed the verification problems connected with such zones. It felt that there were many specific questions, including those relating to verification of zonal arrangements, that could benefit from further study. Finland also considered that more work on the issue of the conventional arms race, which had been addressed in a 1984 study,⁴ could be undertaken in the United Nations on the basis of previous studies and the Disarmament Commission's report on confidence-building measures.

Venezuela believed that United Nations studies had fulfilled an important function, particularly as they contributed to greater public awareness of the problems of the arms race and disarmament. It observed that in the majority of cases, the reports had been adopted by consensus; if that was impossible, other means should be used to reflect the varying points of view. The Byelorussian SSR stated that the main criterion of the usefulness of United Nations disarmament studies should be the extent to which they promoted the early adoption of practical disarmament measures.

On 28 October, France, Norway and the United Kingdom submitted in the First Committee a draft resolution entitled "United Nations disarmament studies", later also sponsored by Cameroon, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal. In introducing it on 31 October, the United Kingdom stated that the draft was similar to resolution 40/152 K, by which the General Assembly had invited Member States to submit their views and proposals on how the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament studies could be improved. It had also invited the Advisory Board to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-second session. The United Kingdom believed that studies could and did make an important contribution to a balanced and comprehensive examination of issues in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and that a thorough appraisal of the subject would greatly benefit from the widest possible cross-section of views of Member States. The purpose of the 1986 draft was to encourage those

² A/41/421 and Add.1 and 2. Replies were received from: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, India, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands (on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community), Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, USSR and United States.

³ *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects: Special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7).

⁴ *Study on Conventional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1).

States that had not yet done so to submit their ideas. On 7 November, the sponsors submitted a slightly revised draft.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft without a vote. In that connection, India explained its position. It reaffirmed the value of studies as a useful means by which important issues in the field of disarmament could be addressed in a comprehensive and detailed manner. It expected that the appraisal would be conducted with a view to enhancing the value and relevance of the studies and to further improving their content.

On 4 December⁵ the General Assembly adopted the revised draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 41/86 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/152 K, adopted by consensus on 16 December 1985,

Noting the related discussions that have taken place in the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies during 1986,

1. *Reaffirms* the value of United Nations disarmament studies and the need for a thorough appraisal of the subject;
2. *Takes note with appreciation* of the views of Member States contained in the report of the Secretary-General;
3. *Invites* those Member States that have not yet done so to communicate to the Secretary-General, by 1 April 1987, their views and proposals on how the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament studies can be further improved;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the replies received in 1987 to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;
5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "United Nations disarmament studies"

In accordance with resolution 37/99 J of 13 December 1982, the Secretary-General had established a group of governmental experts to carry out a comprehensive study on the scope, role and direction of the military use of research and development. In May 1985, the Chairman of the Group had informed the Secretary-General that it had not been possible for the experts to reach agreement on their draft report as a whole, although there was disagreement on only one sentence. No further action on the matter was taken by the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

On 30 October, Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive study on the military use of research and development" In introducing it on 10 November, it stated that the situation was unique: a major United Nations study was not available because, at the last moment, one single sentence could not be agreed upon. In its view, the study was important and highly topical, as it contained the valuable input of experts from the five permanent members of the Security Council, their allies and a number of non-aligned countries. Sweden considered that the study's availability as a document of the General Assembly would assist Member States in their further endeavours to understand the impact of research and development on arms limitation and disarmament, as well as to prevent a qualitative arms race. By

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Plenary meetings, 96th meeting.*

the draft, the Secretary-General was therefore requested to present the available material with an indication where consensus could not be reached.

The same day, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 116 to 1 (United States), with 17 abstentions.

The United States explained that although it shared the sponsor's disappointment that the study could not be completed, it believed that the elaboration and adoption of study group reports should be governed by the essential principle of consensus among members of the group. The draft ran counter to that basic position. The United States also held that none of the parts of a document could be regarded as finally agreed until all of them had been agreed.

Among those abstaining, two States explained their positions. The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom both felt that making the study available would establish an unhelpful and dubious precedent. The Soviet Union pointed out that the fact that the area of disagreement was narrow did not give the study any particular status. The United Kingdom stated that it was broadly content with the study, but felt that the procedure suggested in the draft would be tantamount to allowing a selective application of agreed ground rules and was therefore unreasonable. The fact remained that there was no agreed report.

On 3 December⁶ the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 137 to 1, with 17 abstentions, as resolution 41/59 H. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling resolution 37/99 J of 13 December 1982, by which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on the military use of research and development, with a view to preventing a qualitative arms race and to ensuring that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes,

Recalling also resolution 39/151 F of 17 December 1984 by which it took note of the progress report of the Secretary-General and requested the Secretary-General to continue the study and to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General containing a letter from the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on Military Research and Development informing the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, that the Group had continued the efforts to reach agreement on its draft report but that, although the area of disagreement was narrow, it had not been possible to reach agreement on the draft report as a whole;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to present available material with an indication where consensus could not be reached.

Study concluded in 1986 and action by the General Assembly

Study on deterrence

By its decision 39/423 of 17 December 1984, the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to prepare a study entitled "Deterrence: its implications for disarmament and the arms race, negotiated arms reductions

⁶ *Ibid.*, 94th meeting.

and international security and other related matters'' and to submit the final report to it at its forty-first session.

The decision was based on the recommendation of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.⁷ The mandate for the study provided that it should be conducted on an in-depth, objective basis, that all schools of thought and points of view should be explored and reflected by their respective advocates and that the report should, therefore, give full expression to differing views and their supporting arguments without attempting to arrive at joint conclusions and recommendations. The General Assembly also recommended that the study should be carried out by a small group of governmental experts reflecting a geographical and political balance.

Consequently, eight experts, representing Argentina, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Sweden, the Soviet Union and the United States, were appointed to carry out the study. A list of the experts appears in the annex to this chapter. The Group of Governmental Experts held three sessions, two in 1985 and one from 10 to 21 March 1986, with Mr. K. Subrahmanyam of India serving as Chairman.

The study was unanimously endorsed by the members of the Group of Experts. By a letter dated 30 April, the Chairman of the Group transmitted the study to the Secretary-General for submission to the General Assembly as his report. It was submitted to the Assembly, annexed to the report of the Secretary-General,⁸ on 23 July.

To discharge its mandate, the Group of Experts established a general framework for the study, which included individual and, in some cases, joint contributions reflecting various analyses and opinions of the theme. Part one of the report comprises the individual contributions as they were revised and resubmitted to the Group in the light of its discussions. Part two presents a brief summary of the different arguments and counter-arguments on the individual papers contained in part one. Part three contains a compilation of the respective points of view of the experts expressed in their own words. Part three of the study is summarized below by highlighting some of the points made by each group of experts.

According to the experts from the NATO countries, military deterrence, in the most general sense, is the dissuasion of one adversary by another from undertaking hostile military action by convincing him that such an action would be unsuccessful or too costly, since it would incur military counter-action. The West relies not only on punitive or nuclear deterrence, but also, and very importantly, on conventional denial deterrence and on a range of non-military as well as military deterrents. Beyond that, the West has always emphasized the political context of deterrence: Western strategy is predicated upon both the prevention of war by deterrence and credible defence and the pursuit of a political dialogue aiming at a more stable and co-operative East-West relationship.

⁷ A/39/549, paras. 5-7.

⁸ A/41/432, annex. The study was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.2.

What is distinctive about deterrence in the nuclear age is that the overt use of nuclear weapons by either of the principal nuclear States against the other would almost certainly result in enormous damage to both and, perhaps, in an ecological catastrophe for civilization.

Western deterrence is entirely defensive politically and prohibits military offensive action. It rejects a first-strike strategy and proscribes strikes against population centres; regards parity of second-strike capabilities rather than superiority as the principal measure of strategic sufficiency; stresses crisis stability, based on the mutual incapacity of East and West for a rational first strike, as the basic requirement of mutual deterrence; disavows a war-winning strategy; and plans as carefully as possible to limit the use of force, including nuclear force, so as to hold open the option of rational war-termination through intra-war deterrence.

In the Western view, the very existence of nuclear weapons imposes novel constraints on the super-Powers and their allies with respect to taking actions that might lead to a military encounter, because both know that such an encounter would incur inordinate risks of suffering unacceptable damage. In this sense, mutual deterrence is the existential result of the nuclear armament of the principal East-West adversaries.

In the Western view, the arms race cannot be literally stopped as long as the political sources of the competition for military strength persist. It can, however, be usefully curbed and rechannelled if both adversaries will pursue the standards of mutual deterrence rather than a first strike or other counter-force advantage linked to a war-winning strategy.

The experts from the Warsaw Treaty countries underline that the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty do not base their foreign policy or their security on concepts of nuclear deterrence. The essence of their security policy lies in the prevention of war by political means and peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with all States irrespective of their social systems. In their view, the concept of nuclear "deterrence" came into being and has been formulated, developed and implemented by the United States and its allies essentially in the course of the post-war period.

In the view of the Warsaw Treaty countries, there are different schools of thought behind the general doctrine of deterrence, but all of them are characterized by the drive for military superiority, instigating a nuclear or other arms race and increasing the threat of war. Contrary to its allegedly defensive character, the essence of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is imposition of one's own will on other States through recourse to a policy of strength—the superior might of nuclear weaponry, combined with other modern means of destruction, and the threat of inflicting incalculable damage for political purposes. To this end, States following this doctrine try to upset the existing military equilibrium to make "credible" the threat of use of their military force. The understanding that a nuclear war can have no winners has not led to the abandonment of that concept and the related weapons programmes by their authors.

The very fact that the Warsaw Treaty Organization possesses a powerful defence will inevitably be perceived by its opponents as a deterrent. The

socialist experts stress that the military equilibrium under current circumstances is a peace-preserving factor. The Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization have based their military strategy and tactics on the conviction that there will be no winners in a nuclear war and that any military conflict can potentially lead to nuclear war. Forced to maintain their military capability at the necessary level, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty strongly oppose any further growth in the stockpiles of weaponry, especially nuclear weapons.

The socialist experts argue that mankind has succeeded thus far in keeping the peace and not falling into a nuclear war in spite of, not owing to, the concept of deterrence. Since the deterrence concept can prosper only in conditions of international tension, it leads to the worsening of the international situation and deterioration of the world political climate.

In the view of the experts from the non-aligned countries, deterrence constitutes dissuasion of one adversary by another from undertaking hostile action—military or otherwise—by persuading him that such an action would risk being unsuccessful or too costly. Nuclear deterrence as practised between the nuclear-weapon Powers is different from other forms of deterrence, since in that case both the aggressor and the victim of the aggression are bound to suffer unacceptable levels of damage, irrespective of the decisions on the battlefield.

In the non-aligned view as expressed by the experts, while there is no doubt that nuclear weapons have contributed to deterrence, it is difficult to prove that nuclear weapons are the sole factor in the exercise of deterrence. They also point out that the arms races of the prenuclear era inevitably ended in wars and the resolution of the question of the hierarchy of power. In the nuclear era, such a resolution through war is ruled out. Deterrence calls for a visible adversary to be deterred and nuclear deterrence has resulted in a situation where the dominant Power can express its superior status only through a buildup of weaponry, deployment of its forces worldwide and exercise of coercive diplomacy all over the world.

The experts from the non-aligned countries feel that arms control is inherently an unstable process in an era of accelerated technological development, since it attempts to develop a balance with respect to the weapons in existence, while new weapons are under development. Disarmament and nuclear deterrence are antithetical and disarmament is possible only after the doctrine of deterrence based on armaments is given up. They further feel that the claim that deterrence has contributed to 40 years of peace in Europe can be neither proved nor disproved. It can also be claimed that nuclear weapons have induced as much self-deterrence as deterrence in the adversary. They consider that nuclear deterrence may contribute to a stability of sorts in the industrialized world, but it is a dangerous world.

The experts from the non-aligned countries argue that the vicious circle of nuclear deterrence and adversarial political relationship has to be broken. They list three major approaches to restructuring deterrence: (a) nuclear deterrence will continue, but nuclear weapons will be made impotent and obsolete by defence-dominant technology; (b) nuclear weapons will be

eliminated in a phased manner, but deterrence based on non-nuclear factors will continue; and (c) nuclear weapons will be outlawed.

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In the general debate in the First Committee, a number of delegations referred to the question of deterrence in the context of the study. Thus, Colombia expressed the view that deterrence had brought the world to the edge of general nuclear war and that the development of military technology, under the concept of deterrence, had converted deterrence from the defensive concept it was into a threat of mutual suicide. It quoted the report to underscore its belief that if an East-West nuclear conflict occurred in Europe, the rest of the world would suffer. Colombia agreed with the statement in the study that any form of nuclear proliferation was an invalid strategy or form of deterrence for the third world.

In commenting on the report, Poland stated that the concept of both conventional and nuclear deterrence had a destabilizing impact on international relations, as it led to a constant increase in the level of military confrontation and to greater difficulty in concluding even partial disarmament agreements. In its view, nuclear deterrence was particularly dangerous because it stimulated both the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear arsenals, objectively increasing the risk of nuclear war. It also enhanced the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while it did not ensure against the outbreak of an accidental nuclear war caused by either human or mechanical error. Further, even a hypothetical balance of force based on the concept of deterrence would have no stabilizing influence on the international situation and would bring no guarantees of security. The doctrine also caused military balance to be achieved at ever higher levels and the number of accumulated weapons to grow incommensurately with the aims they were supposed to serve.

The Netherlands referred to the study in the context of the relationship between disarmament and security. It noted that "the paradox of the concept of nuclear deterrence" had played a key role in preserving peace in Europe over the past 40 years. It was precisely because nuclear weapons were so destructive that they made war unthinkable and served to prevent it. In its view, the merits of the concept were appropriately highlighted in the study.

On 30 October, India submitted a draft resolution entitled "Study on deterrence" In introducing it in the First Committee on 5 November, India noted that the draft, with the concurrence of the delegations of all countries whose experts had participated in the preparation of the study, would request the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. At that time, Cuba explained its position. It pointed out the procedural nature of the draft and noted that the study gave a full picture of

all the views on deterrence. Although some regarded deterrence as a guarantee of peace and security, Cuba believed that nothing could be further from the truth. It held that deterrence had emerged as a result of the policy of those who had acquired nuclear weapons as a means of intimidating others, and that it was tantamount to guaranteeing the security of a few to the detriment of the security of all. In its view, there was no alternative to nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence was an extremely dangerous concept, as mentioned in the final communiqué of the Eighth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September.⁹

On 4 December¹⁰ the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 41/86 R. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision 39/423 of 17 December 1984, by which it requested the Secretary-General to prepare a study under the title "Deterrence: its implications for disarmament and the arms race, negotiated arms reductions and international security and other related matters",

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General containing the study,

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and the Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Study on Deterrence which assisted him in the preparation of the study;
2. *Commends* the study to the attention of all Member States;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution.

Studies originally initiated in 1985

Study on the climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter

By resolution 39/148 F of 17 December 1984, the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to compile and distribute as a document of the United Nations appropriate excerpts of all national and international scientific studies on the climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, published before 31 July 1985. Pursuant to that request, the Secretary-General had submitted to the Assembly a report to which an extensive compilation of 114 pages was annexed.¹¹ After the debate in the First Committee, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 40/152 G, by which it expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the compilation of excerpts and noted that the conclusions contained in it clearly showed that international efforts to carry out further systematic research were necessary. It had thereupon requested him, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts, to carry out a study on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter. However, because of the financial difficulties of the United Nations, the Secretary-General decided to defer the study to 1987.¹²

⁹ A/41/697-S/18392.

¹⁰ See footnote 5.

¹¹ A/40/449 and Corr.1 and 2.

¹² A/40/1102, annex IV, para. 7 (m).

On 30 October, Bangladesh, India, Mexico, Pakistan and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter" In introducing it in the First Committee on 10 November, Mexico referred to the conclusions of some of the studies compiled by the Secretary-General, which in its view confirmed that nuclear winter and other climatic effects of nuclear war posed an unprecedented danger to all nations. By the draft, the General Assembly would express its regret that, because of the current financial crisis of the United Nations, the Secretary-General had had to defer to 1987 the meeting of the Group of Consultant Experts called for in resolution 40/152 G. It would once again request him to carry out the study, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts, and to transmit it to the Assembly in due time for its consideration at its forty-third session.

On 10 November the sponsors submitted a slightly revised draft. The First Committee approved it on 12 November by a recorded vote of 119 to 1 (United States), with 10 abstentions (Western and associated States).

In connection with the voting in the First Committee, two States explained their positions. The United States pointed out that its negative vote in no way signified that it considered the issue of the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, to be unimportant. On the contrary, it believed that the issue merited intense study by qualified investigators and that such studies should be pursued in a dispassionate way, free of political overtones. It felt that that would be difficult in the proposed study. In addition, the draft had financial implications that also contributed to its decision to cast a negative vote. Nevertheless, the United States would continue to study the critical problems involved in the matter. While voting in favour of the draft, Japan expressed its view that it was most important that such studies be conducted in a balanced, objective and scientific manner and that a clearer and correct understanding of the matter based on scientific findings and analysis be obtained and brought to the attention of the general public.

On 4 December¹³ the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 140 to 1, with 10 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 H. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, after referring specifically to the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, it declared, in paragraph 18, that removing the threat of a world war—a nuclear war—is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Noting that the conclusions of some of the studies compiled in the report of the Secretary-General, in conformity with resolution 39/148 F of 17 December 1984, confirm that nuclear winter and other climatic effects of nuclear war pose an unprecedented peril to all nations, even those far removed from the nuclear explosions, which would add immeasurably to the previously known dangers of nuclear war, without excluding the possibility of all the Earth being transformed into a darkened, frozen planet, where conditions would be conducive to mass extinction,

Recalling that, by its resolution 40/152 G of 16 December 1985, the General Assembly recognized the necessity of systematic research on the subject and requested the Secretary-General

¹³ See footnote 5.

to carry out a study on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, and to transmit the study to the Assembly for consideration at its forty-second session,

1. *Reiterates its appreciation* to the Secretary-General for the compilation of excerpts of scientific studies on the climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, prepared in accordance with the request made in its resolution 39/148 F;

2. *Regrets* that, owing to the current financial crisis of the United Nations, the Secretary-General had to defer to 1987 the meeting of the Group of Consultant Experts to Carry Out a Study on the Climatic and Potential Physical Effects of Nuclear War, including Nuclear Winter, requested in its resolution 40/152 G;

3. *Once again requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Group of Consultant Experts chosen by him, bearing in mind the advisability of wide geographical representation and of their qualifications in a broad range of scientific fields, to carry out a study on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, which will examine, *inter alia*, its socio-economic consequences and would take into account the Secretary-General's report and the source documents from which the compilation was prepared, together with any other relevant scientific studies;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the study to the General Assembly in due time for consideration at its forty-third session, in 1988;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter: report of the Secretary-General"

Study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures

By resolution 40/150 of 16 December 1985, the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to bring up to date, with the assistance of a group of qualified consultant experts and making appropriate use of the capabilities of UNIDIR in a consultative capacity, the report entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*,¹⁴ taking into account the significant developments that had occurred since the preparation of the report. However, because of the financial difficulties of the United Nations, the Secretary-General had to defer until 1987 the updating of the report.¹⁵

In the First Committee a number of States referred to the economic and social consequences of the arms race. The issues which they addressed in that connection have been discussed in chapters XVIII and XIX. Only Nigeria referred to the studies on the subject. It stressed that social and economic development in all its ramifications was recognized as a vital objective of the Organization, and pointed out that the adverse impact of armaments and the arms race on development had been documented in several United Nations studies.

On 30 October, Romania submitted a draft resolution entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" In introducing the draft on 6 November, Romania noted that the debates during the session had highlighted the grave concern of an overwhelming majority of States regarding the arms

¹⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.2.

¹⁵ A/40/1102, annex IV, para. 7 (f).

race and military spending and their consequences for the economic and social development of people in developed and developing countries alike. It believed that Member States should take into account not only their interests, but also the effects of their decisions on the economic and social situation of other countries and on international peace and security as a whole, when deciding on their military budgets. Therefore, it considered that there was a need to update the report in question.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 119 to 1 (United States), with 13 abstentions.

The United States explained that its opposition was based, as in the previous year, on its conviction that an update of the report in question was both unnecessary and financially unwarranted, and that nothing had taken place in the intervening year to alter its position on the matter.

Among those States that abstained, two explained their positions. Australia stated that it was deeply concerned about the economic and social consequences of the arms race and had contributed in a major way to improving understanding of that phenomenon through participating in United Nations studies on the subject. However, it abstained in the vote mainly out of concern to see the best use made of the Secretariat's scarce human and financial resources in preparing for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. In addition, it considered that it was no simple matter to assess the economic and social consequences of the arms race and that it was unfair to ask the Secretariat to undertake such a task. The United Kingdom believed that the report should not be updated until after the International Conference, because the documentation prepared for the Conference and its decisions would be of direct relevance to a review of the study. In that way it would be possible to avoid a duplication of work and to better utilize valuable resources.

Among those voting in favour, Japan explained its position. It stated that in response to resolution 40/152 K, it had submitted its views on streamlining the United Nations work in disarmament studies, including the updating of reports, and it hoped that due regard would be paid to its views and those of other States.

On 4 December¹⁶ the General Assembly adopted the resolution by a recorded vote of 138 to 1, with 11 abstentions, as resolution 41/86 I. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/150 of 16 December 1985,

Regretting that, owing to the financial difficulties of the United Nations, the Secretary-General had to defer until 1987 the updating of the report entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*, requested in paragraph 1 of resolution 40/150,

Deeply convinced that, in undertaking further measures that might be required to face the financial difficulties of the Organization, due attention should be given to the pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about the problems created by the arms race and

¹⁶ See footnote 5.

of the need for disarmament, which is of vital interest to all peoples and for which the United Nations has a central role,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring up to date the report entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* under the conditions provided in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of its resolution 40/150;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit the updated report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session and to inform the Assembly at its forty-second session on the progress achieved in implementation of the present resolution.

Follow-up of recent disarmament studies

The follow-up in 1986 on the study on conventional disarmament, which was concluded in 1984, is reported in chapter XVII, together with the text of resolution 41/59 C; the follow-up on the study on all aspects of regional disarmament,¹⁷ concluded in 1980, also appears in chapter XVII, together with the text of resolution 41/59 M; the follow-up on the study on the relationship between disarmament and development,¹⁸ concluded in 1981, is reflected in chapter XIX, together with the text of decision 41/422; and the follow-up on the study on the naval arms race,¹⁹ completed in 1985, is reported in chapter III, together with the text of resolution 41/59 K.

Conclusion

Only one study, concerning the concept of deterrence, was concluded in 1986, while the elaboration of two studies, one on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, and the other on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, was deferred due to the financial difficulties of the United Nations. No new studies were initiated in 1986, but the General Assembly once again requested the Secretary-General to carry out the two studies deferred from the previous year. With regard to the report on the military use of research and development, which a group of experts had drafted in 1985 but on which they had been unable to agree, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to present available material and to indicate where consensus had not been reached.

The General Assembly reaffirmed, by resolution 41/86 C, the value of the United Nations disarmament studies and the need for their thorough appraisal. It invited those Member States that had not yet done so to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and proposals on the studies. During the debate, a number of States expressed their support for the studies, stating that they contributed to greater public awareness of the problems of the arms race and disarmament. Others reiterated their reservations and asked for restraints

¹⁷ *Study on all the aspects of Regional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2).

¹⁸ *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1).

¹⁹ *The Naval Arms Race* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.3).

in commissioning new studies because of their increasing cost and the continuing financial difficulties of the United Nations.

ANNEX

**Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Study on Deterrence:
its implications for disarmament and the arms race, negotiated arms reductions
and international security and other related matters**

Julio César Carasales, Argentina
Ahmed Fakh, Egypt
Manfred Müller, German Democratic
Republic
Robert E. Osgood, United States

K. Subrahmanyam, India
Ulf Svensson, Sweden*
Henning Wegener, Federal Republic of
Germany
Vitaly V. Zhurkin, USSR

* For personal reasons, the expert from Sweden could not continue his work with the Group after its second session, and he did not submit a written paper.

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

Actions taken in the period 1 January to 31 December 1986

The following list shows action taken,^a if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 1986 with regard to the arms regulation and disarmament agreements for which full information is provided in the second edition of the publication entitled *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.^b The appendix also includes, for the first time, information with respect to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature in 1985. No relevant agreements were concluded or opened for signature during the period 1 January to 31 December 1986.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification of the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France^c

NEW PARTIES: Afghanistan —9 December 1986 (a)

Benin —9 December 1986 (a)

Democratic Yemen—9 December 1986 (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 110

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

^a Accession is indicated by (a) and succession by (s). Instruments of ratification, accession or succession may be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L) and/or the United States of America (W) or other depositaries, as applicable.

^b *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

^c In a communication to the depositary Government dated 27 October 1986, the Government of Australia stated the following:

“Whereas on the twenty-second day of January One thousand nine hundred and thirty, the Government of Australia acceded, for and on behalf of Australia and subject to a reservation, to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva on the seventeenth day of June One thousand nine hundred and twenty-five;

“The Government of Australia having reconsidered its reservation now hereby withdraws the same for and on behalf of Australia.”

NEW PARTIES: Republic of Korea—28 November 1986 (*a*)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 33

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

SIGNED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Argentina—14 November 1986 (L)

17 November 1986 (M)

21 November 1986 (W)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 115

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Bangladesh—14 January 1986 (L) (*a*)

17 January 1986 (W) (*a*)

24 January 1986 (M) (*a*)

Benin —19 June 1986 (M) (*a*)

2 July 1986 (L) (*a*)

7 July 1986 (W) (*a*)

Sri Lanka —18 November 1986 (M) (L) (W)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 87

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

TREATY—NEW SIGNATORIES: none

NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I—NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II—NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 31^d

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

^d Total includes Brazil and Chile, which have not waived the requirements set out in article 28, and the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols.

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Malawi —18 February 1986 (L) (a)
19 February 1986 (W) (a)
4 March 1986 (M) (a)
Colombia — 8 April 1986 (W) (a)
29 April 1986 (M) (a)
30 April 1986 (L) (a)
Yemen Arab Republic—14 May 1986 (L)
Trinidad and Tobago —30 October 1986 (L) (W)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 136

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Benin — 2 July 1986 (L)
7 July 1986 (W)
Jamaica—30 July 1986 (M) (L) (W)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 77

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Grenada —22 October 1986 (L) (a)
Sri Lanka —18 November 1986 (M) (L) (W)
Belize —20 October 1986 (L) (s)
25 November 1986 (W) (a)
Bahamas —26 November 1986 (L) (a)
Saint Lucia—26 November 1986 (L) (s)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 107

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Pakistan—27 February 1986 (a)
Benin —30 June 1986

Republic of Korea— 2 December 1986 (a) ^c

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 51

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Pakistan—27 February 1986 (a)

Australia— 7 July 1986 (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 7

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 25

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITARY: Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation

TREATY—SIGNATORIES: Australia — 6 August 1985
Cook Islands — 6 August 1985
Fiji — 6 August 1985
Kiribati — 6 August 1985
New Zealand — 6 August 1985
Niue — 6 August 1985
Samoa — 6 August 1985
Tuvalu — 6 August 1985
Papua New Guinea—16 September 1985
Nauru —17 July 1986

PARTIES: Fiji — 4 October 1985
Cook Islands—28 October 1985
Tuvalu —16 January 1986
Niue —12 May 1986
Samoa —26 October 1986
Kiribati —28 October 1986
New Zealand—13 November 1986
Australia—11 December 1986

^c With the following statement:

“It is the understanding of the Government of the Republic of Korea that any technique for deliberately changing the natural state of rivers falls within the meaning of the term ‘environmental modification techniques’ as defined in Article II of the Convention.

“It is further understood that military or any other hostile use of such techniques, which could cause flooding, inundation, reduction in the water-level, drying up, destruction of hydrotechnical installations or other harmful consequences, comes within the scope of the Convention, provided it meets the criteria set out in Article I thereof.”

PROTOCOL 1—SIGNATORIES: none
PROTOCOL 2—SIGNATORIES: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—15 December 1986 ✓
PROTOCOL 3—SIGNATORIES: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—15 December 1986 ✓
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 8

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1986 (s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

State	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons §	Treaty of Rarotonga
Afghanistan	r		s r	s		s r	s r	s r	r		s	
Albania												
Algeria												
Angola												
Antigua and Barbuda					s r	r						
Argentina	r	s r	s r	s r	s		s r	s r			s	
Australia	r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r
Austria	s r		s r	s r		s r	s r	s r		s r	s r	
Bahamas												
Bahrain												
Bangladesh												
Barbados	r		r	s r	s r							
Belgium	s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r		s	
Belize												
Benin	r	s r	r	r		s r	s r	s r	s r			
Bhutan	r		r									
Bolivia	r	s r	s	s r	s r	s r	s	s r	s			
Botswana			r	s		s r	s r	s				
Brazil	s r	r	s r	s r	s r		s	s r	s r			
Brunei Darussalam												
Bulgaria	s r	r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	
Burkina Faso	r		s	s r		s r						

Burma	S	r	r	S	S	S
Burundi	S	S	r	S	S	
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	S	r	r	S	r	S
Cameroon	S	S	S	r	S	
Canada	S	r	r	S	r	S
Cape Verde	r	r	r	r	r	r
Central African Republic	r	S	r	r	S	
Chad	S	r	S	r		
Chile	S	r	r	r	r	S
China	r	r	r	r	r	S
Colombia	S	r	S	r	S	r
Comoros						
Congo				r	r	r
Cook Islands**						S
Costa Rica	S	r	S	r	S	r
Côte d'Ivoire	r	S	r	S	r	S
Cuba	r	r	r	r	r	S
Cyprus	r	S	r	S	r	r
Czechoslovakia	S	r	S	r	r	S
Democratic Kampuchea	r			r	S	r
Democratic People's Republic of Korea*				r		
Democratic Yemen	r	r	r	S	r	r
Denmark	S	r	r	S	r	S
Djibouti						

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1986 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons §	Treaty of Rarotonga
Dominica						I						
Dominican Republic	I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I				
Ecuador	I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I			S I	
Egypt	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S	S	I		S	
El Salvador	S		S I	S I	S I	S I	S	S				
Equatorial Guinea						I	S					
Ethiopia	S I		S	S	S I	S I	S I	S I	S			
Fiji	I		I	I	I	I	S I	S I				S I
Finland	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S I	
France	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S	S	
					(A.P. I&II) (A.P. II)							
Gabon		S I				I		S				
Gambia	I		I	S		S I	S	S				
German Democratic Republic	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S I	
Germany, Federal Republic of	S I	I	S I	S I	S	S	S I	S I	I			
Ghana	I		S I	S		S I	S I	S I	S I			
Greece	S I		S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	I		S	
Grenada					S I	I		I				
Guatemala	I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S	S I	S I	S	I	
Guinea						I	S					
Guinea-Bissau			I	I		I	I	I				
Guyana				S							S	

Haiti	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Holy See*	r		S		r			S	
Honduras	S r	S	S r	S r	S	S r			
Hungary	r	r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Iceland	r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S	S
India	S r	r	S r	S r	r	S r	S r	S	S r
Indonesia	r	S r	S		S r			S	
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	S r	S	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S	
Iraq	r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S	S	
Ireland	r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S
Israel	r	S r	S r						
Italy	S r	r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S
Jamaica	r	S	S r	S r	S r	S r	r		
Japan	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	r	S r
Jordan	r	S r	S		S r	S r	S r	S r	
Kenya	r	r			S r		r		
Kiribati**					r				S r
Kuwait	r	S r	r	S	S r	S r	r		
Lao People's Democratic Republic	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	r
Lebanon	r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S	S r	S	
Lesotho	r	S		S r	S r	S r	S r		
Liberia	r	S r		S r	S r	S	S	S	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	r	S r	r	S r			r		
Liechtenstein**					r				S
Luxembourg	S r	S r	S	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1986 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons §	Treaty of Rarotonga
Spain	S I	I	S I	I				S I	S I		S	
Sri Lanka	I		S I	S I		S I		S I	S I			
Sudan	I		S I			S I	S				S	
Suriname					S I	I						
Swaziland			I			S I	S I					
Sweden	S I	I	S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	I		S I	
Switzerland*	S I		S I	S I		S I	S I	S I			S I	
Syrian Arab Republic	I		S I	I		S I	S		S			
Thailand	S I		S I	S I		I		S I				
Togo	I		S I	S		S I	S I	S I			S	
Tonga**			I			I						
Trinidad and Tobago	I		S I	S	S I	S I						
Tunisia	I		S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I			
Turkey	S I		S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S		S	
Tuvalu**						I						S I
Uganda	I		S I	I		I			S			
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic			S I	S I			S I	S	S I		S I	
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S I	S
United Arab Emirates					(A.P. II)							(P.2 & 3)§§
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S	

United Republic of Tanzania	r	s r	s	s					
United States of America	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s
Uruguay	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s	r	s r
Vanuatu									
Venezuela	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r			
Viet Nam	r	r	r	r	r	r	r	r	s
Yemen	r	s	s r	s r	s	s	s	s r	
Yugoslavia	s r	s r	s	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Zaire		s r	s	s r	s r	s r	s		
Zambia		r	r	r					
Zimbabwe									

NOTE: This table updates, to 31 December 1986, information contained in the Secretary-General's report "Status of multilateral disarmament agreements" (A/41/644) of 30 September 1986. The report is prepared for each regular session of the General Assembly pursuant to resolution 36/92 H of 9 December 1981.

* Non-member States maintaining permanent observer missions to the United Nations.

** Non-member and non-observer States belonging to specialized agencies or the South Pacific Forum.

† State has not waived the requirements under article 28 of the Treaty.

‡ A.P. means Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

§ All States ratifying the Convention so far have given notification of their acceptance of Protocols I, II and III.

§§ P. means Protocol to the Treaty of Karotonga.

Activities of the United Nations Environment Programme related to disarmament*

Introduction

The Declaration on the Human Environment, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in June 1972 and endorsed by the General Assembly, clearly states in principle 26 that:

Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons.

Since the creation of UNEP, its Governing Council has adopted a number of resolutions, and also some of the activities of UNEP are related to that principle for the enhancement of the environment. A brief review of such resolutions and activities is given in this appendix.

Resolutions and reports

A. *Effects of weapons on ecosystems*

The United Nations Conference on Desertification, held in 1977, adopted resolution 4, concerning the effect of weapons of mass destruction on ecosystems. It noted that the use of chemical and biological weapons during wars was one of the factors contributing to desertification in certain parts of the world and that those factors were most seriously felt in developing countries, including those which were currently engaged in armed struggle for independence and those which had recently achieved independence through armed struggle. It condemned the use of any techniques that cause the desertification of the environment and denounced the effects of destructive weapons and practices on the ecosystems of all countries. The use of chemical and biological weapons which destroy or diminish the potential of ecosystems and are conducive to desertification was also condemned and the prohibition of the use of poisons in water as a weapon of war was demanded. Resolution 4 of the Desertification Conference was endorsed by General Assembly resolution 32/172. In implementation of the resolution, UNEP and the former United Nations Centre for Disarmament prepared a study on the effect of weapons of mass destruction on ecosystems. On the basis of that study, the Secretary-General presented a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session^a (A/33/259, annex II).

B. *Remnants of war*^b

The problem of material remnants of war has been the subject of several decisions of the UNEP Governing Council and the General Assembly since 1975. At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly requested UNEP to undertake a study of the problem of the material remnants of wars,

* Text contributed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

^a *UNEP Studies*, vol. 1, "The effects of weapons on ecosystems", by J. P. Robinson of the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Brighton, England. (Published for UNEP by Pergamon Press.)

^b For further details of action taken on this subject, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 8: 1983, appendix III.

particularly mines, and their effects on the environment, and to submit a report on the subject. The Governing Council of UNEP, in April 1976, authorized the Executive Director to proceed with the study. In 1977, the report entitled "Material remnants of wars and their effect on the environment" was submitted to the General Assembly.

In 1981, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report entitled "Problems of remnants of war", and the Assembly requested him to continue his contacts and consultations with Member States in order to find ways and means of solving the problem, including the possibility of convening a conference under the auspices of the United Nations. The views of all States were sought by a letter from the Executive Director of UNEP on behalf of the Secretary-General and a report on the replies was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. The Assembly thereupon requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Executive Director, to prepare a factual study on the problem of remnants of war, particularly mines. The study entitled "Explosive remnants of conventional war", prepared by a group of experts within the framework of a joint UNEP/SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) programme of studies on military activities and the human environment, was submitted to the General Assembly in 1983.

At that session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution by which it requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to continue to seek the views of States on the recommendations contained in the study and to intensify his efforts to urge the States concerned immediately to conduct bilateral consultations with the aim of concluding agreements for the solution of that problem, it being understood that the legitimate right of the affected developing countries to full compensation for damages due to them should be ensured; and called upon all States to co-operate with the Secretary-General in carrying out the tasks requested of him so as to enable him, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report on the results of his consultations and endeavours with the States concerned.

On 17 December 1984, at its thirty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 39/167, which, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with UNEP and other organizations of the United Nations system, within their mandates, to collect all information on expertise and available equipment so as to evaluate, on request, the actual needs of the developing countries in their efforts to detect and clear material remnants of war, and to submit a detailed and comprehensive report on the implementation of that resolution to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

On 17 December 1985, at its fortieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 40/197, by which, *inter alia*, it requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to continue his efforts with the countries responsible for planting the mines and the affected developing countries in order to ensure the implementation of the relevant resolutions and to submit a detailed and comprehensive report on the implementation of the 1985 resolution to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

C. *Pernicious effects of the arms race on nature*

The General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session, in October 1980, adopted, by a recorded vote of 68 to none, with 47 abstentions, resolution 35/8, on the historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations, and asked UNEP to prepare a report on the pernicious effects of the arms race on nature and to seek the views of States on possible measures to be taken at the international level for its preservation. A summarized version of a study on the subject was submitted to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982.

D. *State of the world environment*

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its seventh session, in May 1979, decided to include the topic "Environmental effects of military activity" in the report on the state of the environment. In pursuance of that request, the publication *The State of the World Environment: Selected Topics* included a chapter on the environmental effects of military activity (chapter V).

The UNEP report *The World Environment 1972-1982*, prepared with the main objective of

assessing the state of the world environment a decade after the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, included a chapter on peace and security (chapter 16).^c

E. Hostile use of environmental modification techniques

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fifth session, in May 1977, took note of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques annexed to General Assembly resolution 31/72 of 10 December 1976, and requested Member States to facilitate exchanges of information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes (UNEP/GC/102(V)).

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its eighth session, adopted decision 8/7, section (a) of which was entitled "Provision for co-operation between States in weather modification". In paragraph 1 of that decision, the Governing Council decided, *inter alia*, that weather modification should be dedicated to the benefit of mankind and the environment.

The issue of environmental modification techniques is one of the activities included in the joint UNEP/SIPRI programme of studies on military activities and the human environment. A symposium on the legal and technical aspects of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was held in co-operation with UNIDIR in April 1984.

F. Military activity and the environment in the context of the System-Wide Medium-Term Environment Programme (SWMTEP)

In its decision 9/10 (B), the UNEP Governing Council approved, on a provisional basis, the structure and objectives of SWMTEP.

The Governing Council of UNEP, meeting in a Session of Special Character in May 1982, adopted resolution I, which drew attention to the fact that the continuing increase in the production of weapons of mass destruction and the development of new types of chemical and bacteriological weapons not only posed a major threat to the environment and to life on Earth, but also competed for limited resources that could be better used for constructive purposes. At the same session, the Council approved resolution III, on arms and the environment, which appealed to Governments and the world community as a whole to do the utmost to halt the arms race and thereby prevent a major threat to the environment.

The structure of SWMTEP was approved by the Council by decision 10/13 of 31 May 1982. This structure included chapter XV, on the arms race and the environment (UNEP/GC/10/7 and UNEP/GC/11/7), which indicated, *inter alia*, the following activities that UNEP could implement in co-operation with other agencies: preparation of reports on possible effects of military activity on the environment, examination of the issues of ecologically important areas in relation to potential damage of military activity, analysis of existing treaties in relation to environmental effects of military activities, study of the use of natural resources for military activities, etc.

Some of the above-mentioned activities are considered in a joint programme of studies on military activities and the human environment that UNEP has with SIPRI. In 1985, as part of that programme, SIPRI published three books:

- (a) *Environmental Warfare: A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal*;
- (b) *Herbicides in War: The Long-Term Ecological and Human Consequences*;
- (c) *Explosive Remnants of War: Mitigating the Environmental Effects*.

In addition, in October 1985, SIPRI and UNEP held a seminar on the theme "Global resources and international conflicts", which has led to the publication, in 1986, of a fourth book.

(d) *Global Resources and International Conflicts: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policies and Actions*.

^c *The World Environment 1972-1982*. A report by UNEP. Edited by M. W. Holdgate, M. Kassas and G. F. White and co-ordinated by E. El-Hinnawi, Tycooly International, Dublin, 1982.

G. Ozone research and monitoring

UNEP organized a meeting of experts designated by Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations at Washington, D.C., in March 1977. The outcome of the meeting was an agreed World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer. Following the recommendations contained in the Plan of Action, the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL) was set up. It was composed of representatives of the international agencies and non-governmental organizations participating in implementing the Plan of Action, as well as representatives of countries with major scientific programmes contributing to it.

The Committee has met eight times to review progress made in implementing the Plan of Action, identify deficiencies and make recommendations for future work. An assessment of ozone depletion and its impact was made by the Committee at each meeting. Members also reported on ongoing and planned research work carried out by their countries or organizations relevant to the Plan of Action. The assessment, reports and recommendations made at the meetings of the CCOL are published regularly in the *UNEP Ozone Layer Bulletin*, an eighth edition of which was published in 1984.

UNEP is supporting a Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project meant to provide advice to member States, to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone.

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its ninth session, in May 1981, adopted decision 9/13, section B of which is entitled "Protection of the ozone layer". In paragraphs 1 and 2 of that decision, the Governing Council decided, *inter alia*, to initiate work on the elaboration of a global framework of a convention for the protection of the ozone layer. It further decided to establish an *ad hoc* working group of legal and technical experts which should report, through the Executive Director of UNEP, to the Governing Council on the progress of its work.

The Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, convened under UNEP auspices in Vienna from 18 to 22 March 1985, reached final agreement on a new global framework convention, to be known as the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The Convention, which was opened for signature on 22 March 1985 and will enter into force after ratification by 20 States, represents the result of three years of preparatory negotiations and drafting work by a UNEP group of legal and technical experts. Its purpose is to prevent depletion of the atmospheric ozone layer, Earth's protective shield against ultraviolet radiation and a vital component of our climatic system.

H. Radiation from nuclear explosions

Artificial radioactive material from nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere has been the cause of widespread contamination of the environment. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) ⁴ has regularly assessed the exposure to which the population of the world has been subjected as a result of the atmospheric nuclear tests.

⁴ *Genetic and Somatic Effects of Ionizing Radiation*. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 1986 Report to the General Assembly, with annexes.

Activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization related to disarmament*

Research and publications

A. In compliance with resolution 13.1.3 (a) (iii) and (iv), adopted by consensus at the 23rd session of the General Conference of UNESCO (Sofia, Bulgaria, November 1985) and in the framework of its programme on the study of the causes and consequences of the arms race and of its effects in UNESCO's fields of competence (23 C/5 approved subprogramme XIII.1.2), this Organization, in co-operation with the International Social Science Council and non-governmental organizations, is preparing a survey of research activities in the social and human sciences. It will cover activities already carried out or in progress, both within the United Nations system and international, regional or national institutions, in education, science, culture and communication, in the field of disarmament, including activities relating to the causes and consequences of the arms race and the relationship between peace, security, development and disarmament.

At the same time, UNESCO is compiling a directory of the institutions, including those of the United Nations system, which conduct research on all disarmament questions as defined above, together with a bibliography of the studies completed or currently being carried out by them.

Furthermore, in 1986, UNESCO examined with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), in consultation with non-governmental organizations and learned bodies, ways and means to improve the use of UNESCO's information media for the more effective dissemination of the studies and information relating to disarmament.

These consultations, which will be continued in 1987, have already improved procedures of mutual information. They have also helped to avoid duplications.

The above-mentioned survey, directory and bibliography will be available in autumn 1987. It is envisaged to annex them to the *UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies*, vol. IX (1988).

B. There has been good progress in the preparation of the *Yearbook*, which is published in co-edition by UNESCO and Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, United States. Three volumes, 1985, 1986 and 1987, will be published in 1987.

—Volume V (1984) of the *Yearbook* appeared in 1986. It is divided into three sections dealing with questions of race and ethnicity, disarmament, and procedures for settlement and multilateral negotiations. There is a useful annotated bibliography on multilateral negotiations and third-party roles.

—Volume VI (1985) of the *Yearbook* is concerned with the Second World War and attempts to provide an overview of both the causes and the wide consequences of that conflict. The volume, enriched by articles from third world countries, shows the extent of the war, a war centred in Europe but also involving a vast theatre in the East. The military confrontations in

* Text contributed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

these centres spilled over into ever wider sub-centres, including North Africa and South Asia, and thus revealed the deeper and more permanent problems of colonization and decolonization. Eleven eminent historians and political scientists with different perspectives have contributed to this issue.

—The 12 papers published in volume VII (1986) of the *Yearbook* were presented at an international symposium on ‘‘The different interpretations of the causes and consequences of conflicts’’, organized on behalf of UNESCO by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and held at Refsnes Gods, Moss, Norway, from 6 to 9 November 1985. Five of the papers are historical in nature, dealing with landlord domination in nineteenth century Ireland, peasant conflicts in pre-revolutionary Russia and China, European anti-Semitism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and labour revolts in the Caribbean in the 1930s. The other seven contributions discuss current conflicts, combining analysis and prescriptions for possible interventions. The topics treated are: plural society and conflict, ethnic violence, human rights and early warnings, social conflict in South Africa, conflict situations in newly independent African countries, inter-Maghrib co-operation and international responses to conflict.

—Volume VIII (1987) will highlight the impact of the arms race on education, science and technology, culture and communication; the arms race, the arms trade and technology transfer in the developing countries; the arms race and the process of national reconstruction in developing countries.

Each volume ends with a brief outline of UNESCO’s activities to promote peace and international understanding. It also outlines some of the many activities undertaken in the fields of peace and disarmament research, at both international and regional levels, by institutions such as the United Nations University, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), the Pugwash Movement and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and provides information received from specialized national institutions.

C. Two other publications for teachers were prepared:

—A book entitled *The Teaching of Contemporary World Issues* was published in English, French and Spanish and translated into Russian. The book is intended for classroom teachers as well as for teacher training. It furnishes concrete ideas and practical suggestions for teaching about major issues facing the world today, notably, peace, disarmament, international understanding and co-operation, development, human rights and fundamental freedoms.

—The manuscript of *A Teacher’s Handbook on Disarmament Education*, prepared on the basis of the outline developed by the World Congress on Disarmament Education (Paris, 1980), was finalized and will be published in 1987. The *Handbook* will represent the first attempt made in the world literature on disarmament education to provide teachers with background knowledge concerning the specificity of aims, principles, content and forms of disarmament education as a distinct field of studies within the framework of international education.

Meetings in 1986

—In January an international consultation of eminent scientists and specialists in the social and human sciences and in higher education took place in Athens, Greece. It considered ways of improving educational action so as to provide students, particularly future researchers and those destined for positions of responsibility, with the necessary knowledge of problems relating to peace and respect for human rights and the rights of peoples, as well as the dangers of nuclear war.

—On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of UNESCO and in observance of the International Year of Peace, UNESCO convened a European meeting of students taking part in the Associated Schools Project in Paris, from 3 to 6 November, on the theme ‘‘UNESCO, International Understanding and Peace’’. Over 60 students from some 25 countries participated in the meeting, which resulted in an appeal stating that: ‘‘Now it is our task to find means for peace, disarmament, the abolition of discrimination and effective respect for human rights.’’

—In the framework of the plan for the development of education for understanding, co-operation and international peace, the International Year of Peace and follow-up of International Youth Year, an international meeting of rural youth from 30 countries was organized from 6 to 12 November in Accra, Ghana, to initiate reflection and action of young people in order to

promote peace, disarmament and development.

—On 16 and 17 December, UNESCO convened a round-table for the celebration of the International Year of Peace in UNESCO's fields of competence; the activity was attended by 17 eminent persons. The group placed emphasis on the United Nations system and UNESCO as keystones of the multilateral system of co-operation. Attacks on the United Nations system were viewed as assaults "on the very foundation on which modern peace is built". The Round-Table called for an "active" definition of peace: "Peace does not exist where there is poverty, hunger, increasing desertification and unemployment." The participants went on to note that: "Spiritual and ethical values which stress the common destiny of humankind play an important role in the maintenance of peace." Concluding that "education for peace" is a "global and ongoing process", the Round-Table called for UNESCO to strengthen its efforts "in the eradication of stereotypes in textbooks" and in focusing scientific research "on major problems such as famine, malnutrition and poverty"

UNESCO Prize for Peace Education

The 1986 UNESCO Prize for Peace Education was awarded to the celebrated Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire, who for the past 40 years has worked with unflagging determination and devotion to provide literacy training and education for the poorest groups in the population—thereby enabling them to take an active part in the struggle against poverty, the eradication of which is one of the key conditions for the establishment of lasting peace.

The aim of the prize, created in 1981 thanks to a donation from the Japan Shipbuilding Industry Foundation and awarded annually, is to promote all forms of action designed to "construct the defences of peace in the minds of men". The award is given for a particularly outstanding example of activity designed to alert public opinion and mobilize the conscience of mankind in the cause of peace, in accordance with the spirit of the constitution of UNESCO and of the Charter of the United Nations.

Miscellaneous

In 1986 Sweden and Australia were approached about setting up two pilot projects to prepare teaching materials on the relationship between peace, disarmament, security and development for training teachers working in literacy and adult education programmes.

Activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations related to disarmament*

Freedom from hunger is one of the basic objectives of FAO's work. FAO is making efforts to raise the levels of nutrition and the standard of living of people all around the world. It is also striving to better the condition of the rural population. These objectives and efforts of FAO are linked closely with peace and disarmament.

While the world continues to devote vast resources to armaments, efforts to help people in their fight against poverty, hunger and malnutrition are suffering from severe resource constraints. More than two billion people live in absolute poverty and about half a billion are suffering from malnutrition. In addition, a growing number of people are being affected by natural and man-made calamities. World-wide military spending, which now stands around \$1 trillion a year, has registered a yearly increase of about 5 per cent, in real terms, over the last few years. The value of international trade in arms, which is rising every year, exceeded the value of trade in grain in 1984. Since armaments and development efforts both demand large inputs of human and material resources and since resources are limited, an increase in armaments can only signify a corresponding drying up of resources for development. Disarmament could release the much-needed resources for development in order to change the quality of life on Earth. In this respect, disarmament continues to be a matter of great concern to FAO, an international agency responsible for the development of the food and agricultural sector.

The World Food Conference, held in Rome in November 1974, adopted a resolution calling upon participating States to take the necessary measures to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations pertaining to the reduction of military expenditures for the purpose of development, and to allocate a growing proportion of sums so released to the financing of food production in developing countries and the establishment of reserves to deal with emergencies.

FAO continues to disseminate information on the consequences of ever-increasing expenditures on armaments and the relationship between disarmament and development. In his various statements, the Director-General of FAO has also drawn attention to this subject. An article entitled "Hunger and Peace: Making the Connection" was published in an issue of the FAO publication CERES in 1986. This article discussed the basic relationship between disarmament and the removal of hunger and poverty from the world.

* Text contributed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Activities of the World Health Organization related to disarmament*

During 1986 the WHO Management Group on the Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services, established by the Director-General to follow-up resolution WHA36.28 as well as United Nations General Assembly resolutions 34/58 and 40/10, focused on the preparation of a second extensive report to be submitted to the Fortieth World Health Assembly, in May 1987. The first report on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services was prepared by the International Committee of Experts in Medical Sciences and Public Health to Implement Resolution WHA34.38 and was published in 1984.

The WHO Management Group held four meetings in 1986 to discuss recent developments.

The second report will deal with the following issues: (a) an update of the physical effects of nuclear war; (b) the climatic effects which have come to light since the first report was published; (c) acute effects of radiation, i.e., the "LD50" for which a review is made of the lethal dose of radiation in the light of the Hiroshima experience, as well as the effect of radiation damage on the immunological systems of survivors; (d) nuclear war scenarios—an update of those presented in the first report in the light of new developments in weapons and further analysis of existing data; (e) an analysis of the research on the possible psychological effects of both the threat of nuclear war and the aftermath of nuclear bombing; (f) health problems in the short term (the immediate aftermath of a nuclear explosion), with particular emphasis on the management of casualties and the related organization of health services; and (g) the intermediate and long-term health effects of the physical and social environment on survivors.

The report will be presented in two parts—the first part being a synthesis of the information concerning the issues outlined above, and the second containing the working papers prepared by members of the WHO Management Group on those issues.

* Text contributed by the World Health Organization (WHO).

Activities of the World Meteorological Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

WMO is not directly involved in questions of disarmament. Some of the activities of the Organization, however, have some relevance to article III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex) and the understandings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating thereto.^a A brief review of such activities in 1986 is given below.

World Weather Watch programme

The World Weather Watch is the basic programme of WMO. Its primary function is the real-time provision of meteorological data, analyses, short- and medium-range forecasts and extended-range weather outlooks to WMO members, according to their specific needs. It should be noted that the World Weather Watch programme contains the following provision:

The World Weather Watch shall be used only for peaceful purposes, due account being taken of the national sovereignty and security of States, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the spirit and traditions of the World Meteorological Organization.

The World Weather Watch is divided into three essential elements:

- (a) The Global Observing System (GOS), consisting of facilities and arrangements for making observations on land, at sea, from aircraft and meteorological satellites;
- (b) The Global Data Processing System (GDPS), consisting of meteorological centres with arrangements for the processing of observational data;
- (c) The Global Telecommunication System (GTS), consisting of telecommunication facilities and arrangements for the rapid and reliable collection and distribution of meteorological information.

Since 1984, the World Weather Watch programme has supported the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, established by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1976, by providing for the regular exchange of seismic data on the GTS.

Weather modification

The main objective of the WMO Weather Modification Programme, which was confirmed by the Ninth Congress of WMO (1983), is to enable WMO to provide sound scientific and technical advice to its members on the planning, implementation and evaluation of economically beneficial, intentional weather modification projects. Highest priority has been given to precipitation enhancement and hail suppression. Falling also within the scope of the programme are tropical cyclone moderation, lightning suppression and fog dispersal, as well as unintentional weather modification on the cloud and mesoscales.

* Text contributed by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

^a See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), appendix IX.

WMO maintains and periodically publishes a "Register of national weather modification projects", which summarizes world-wide activities in weather modification. A "Review of the current status of weather modification" is also kept up to date and published. This information is regularly sent to the secretariat for the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

Ozone research and monitoring

The implementation of the WMO Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project has taken on added significance in the light of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the recent discovery of Antarctic ozone decrease. The project is co-ordinated with UNEP and other international programmes and with a large number of national programmes.

The main activities of the WMO project are the improvement of ozone data quality in the WMO world-wide network, modernization and strengthening of the network itself, acquisition of ancillary data for better ozone retrievals, investigation of the linkage between ozone change and climate change, facilitating data exchange and the organization of periodic international assessments of the state of ozone research.

World climate

The World Climate Programme, established by the Eighth World Meteorological Congress (1979), is one of the major programmes of WMO. The objectives of the programme are to:

—Aid nations in the application of climatic data and present knowledge of climate to the planning and management of all aspects of man's activities;

—Improve the present knowledge of climate to determine the predictability of climate and the extent of man's influence;

—Provide the means to foresee future changes of climate, and warn of potential man-made changes that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity.

The overall work is distributed among four component programmes:

—The World Climate Data Programme (WCDP);

—The World Climate Applications Programme (WCAP);

—The World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) (conducted jointly by WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU);

—The World Climate Impact Studies Programme (WCIP), the activities of which are carried out by UNEP in close co-operation with WMO.

The World Climate Programme is of very wide scope, and the planning and implementation of the wide-ranging activities demand co-operation with many other international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

List of resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session, held from 16 September to 19 December 1986 (including voting)

*Reference
in text*

Resolutions on disarmament questions

- 41/45 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

194

Adopted by a recorded vote of 145 to none, with 7 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Argentina, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, France, Guyana, Mali

41/46 Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions

Resolution A

163

Adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey

Resolution B

165

Adopted by a recorded vote of 127 to 3, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi

41/46 Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, (cont.) Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey

41/47 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

165

Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to 1, with 15 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France

Abstaining: Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, China, Cuba, Guatemala, India, Israel, Malawi, Nicaragua, Portugal, Sudan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

41/48 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

202

Adopted without a vote

41/49 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

Adopted by a recorded vote of 107 to 3, with 41 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Seychelles, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia

41/50 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 343

Adopted without a vote

41/51 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 179

Adopted by a recorded vote of 106 to 18, with 25 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic.

* The delegation of Sao Tome and Principe subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

41/51 (cont.) Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Burma, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Greece, Grenada, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Malawi, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay

41/52 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 180

Adopted by a recorded vote of 149 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, India, United States of America

41/53 Prevention of an arms race in outer space

Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to none, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: United States of America

41/54 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/88 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests

166

Adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to 3, with 26 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Re-

41/54 (cont.) publics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey

41/55 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

Resolution A—Implementation of the Declaration

197

Adopted by a recorded vote of 150 to none, with 5 abstentions,^b as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: France, Israel, Malawi, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution B—Nuclear capability of South Africa

198

Adopted by a recorded vote of 139 to 4, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin,

^b The delegation of Mauritania subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

41/55 (cont.) Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal

41/56 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

315

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to 1, with 25 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

- 41/56 *Abstaining:* Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chad, Chile, Denmark, France, (cont.) Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- 41/57 Reduction of military budgets 354
Adopted without a vote
- 41/58 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
Resolution A—Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 279
Adopted without a vote
Resolution B—Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons 259
Adopted by a recorded vote of 100 to 11, with 43 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Grenada, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
- Resolution C—Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons 260
Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 14 abstentions,^c as follows:

^c The delegations of Cyprus and India subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain.

- 41/58 (cont.) *In favour:* Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* None
- Abstaining:* Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Congo, Cuba, Ethiopia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nicaragua, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia
- Resolution D—Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons 261
- Adopted without a vote*
- 41/59 General and complete disarmament
- Resolution A—Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons 317
- Adopted without a vote*
- Resolution B—Objective information on military matters 67
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 26 abstentions,^a as follows:*
- In favour:* Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,

^a The delegations of Cyprus, Ethiopia and the Islamic Republic of Iran subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain.

41/59 Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Oman, Poland, Seychelles, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam

Resolution C—Conventional disarmament

334

Adopted without a vote

Resolution D—Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament

69

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to 16, with 19 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Paraguay, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay

- 41/59 Resolution E—Confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament
(cont.)

341

Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 21 abstentions,^e as follows:

In favour: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, India, Iraq, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Resolution F—Nuclear disarmament

110

Adopted without a vote

Resolution G—Conventional disarmament

337

Adopted by a recorded vote of 150 to none, with 2 abstentions,^f as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic

^e The delegation of Cyprus subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

^f The delegation of Bhutan subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

41/59 Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao
(cont.) People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania,
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sur-
iname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zam-
bia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: India, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Resolution H—Comprehensive study on the military use of research and
development

417

Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to 1, with 17 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Bu-
rundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus,
Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bis-
sau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Re-
public of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nica-
ragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome
and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tun-
isia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia,
Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Ger-
many, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Viet Nam

41/59 Resolution I—Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use
(cont.) of radiological weapons

319

Adopted by a recorded vote of 111 to 3, with 38 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela

Resolution J—Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements 70

Adopted without a vote

Resolution K—Naval armaments and disarmament 72

Adopted by a recorded vote of 153 to 1, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,

41/59 (cont.) Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: India

Resolution L—Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

118

Adopted by a recorded vote of 148 to 1, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution M—Conventional disarmament on a regional scale

338

Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 7 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,

41/59 Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Viet Nam

Resolution N—Notification of nuclear tests

167

Adopted by a recorded vote of 130 to 1, with 22 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: France

Abstaining: Angola, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,

41/59 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
(cont.) Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zimbabwe

Resolution O—Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of
disarmament

25

Adopted without a vote

41/60 Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special
Session of the General Assembly

Resolution A—World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities

393

Adopted by a recorded vote of 114 to 3, with 36 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Rwanda, Singapore, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay

Resolution B—World Disarmament Campaign

395

Adopted by a recorded vote of 144 to none, with 9 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece,

41/60 (cont.) Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution C—Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures 44

Adopted by a recorded vote of 155 to none, with no abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Resolution D—United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

41/60 Adopted without a vote
(cont.)

Resolution E—Freeze on nuclear weapons

116

Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 to 12, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, China, Iceland, Japan, Spain

Resolution F—Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

134

Adopted by a recorded vote of 132 to 17, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and

41/60 Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan

Resolution G—Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament 45

Adopted without a vote

Resolution H—United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament 46

Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to 1, with no abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: None

Resolution I—Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/151 C on a nuclear-arms freeze 116

Adopted by a recorded vote of 139 to 12, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Bur-

- 41/60 kina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
- Abstaining:* China, Iceland, Netherlands, Spain
- Resolution J—United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America 398
- Adopted without a vote*
- 41/61 World Disarmament Conference 88
- Adopted without a vote*
- 41/86 Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session
- Resolution A—Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 112
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 88 to none, with 56 abstentions,* as follows:*
- In favour:* Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar,

* The delegations of Costa Rica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Sao Tome and Principe subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour; the delegations of Niger, Panama and Zimbabwe had intended to abstain.

41/86 Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, (cont.) Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Resolution B—Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 131

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 17, with 10 abstentions,^h as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ireland, Israel, Samoa

^h The delegation of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of the Netherlands had intended to vote against; the delegation of Costa Rica had intended to abstain.

- 41/86 Resolution C—United Nations disarmament studies 416
(*cont.*)
Adopted without a vote
- Resolution D—Disarmament Week 401
Adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to 1, with 23 abstentions,¹ as follows:
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* United States of America
- Abstaining:* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- Resolution E—Report of the Disarmament Commission 27
Adopted without a vote
- Resolution F—Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament 108
Adopted by a recorded vote of 130 to 15, with 5 abstentions,² as follows:
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

¹ The delegation of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

² The delegation of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

41/86 Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Denmark, Greece, Israel, Japan, Spain

Resolution G—Prevention of nuclear war

132

Adopted by a recorded vote of 134 to 3, with 14 abstentions. as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

* The delegation of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

41/86 *Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of*
(cont.) *Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,*
Spain, Turkey

Resolution H—Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter

423

Adopted by a recorded vote of 140 to 1, with 10 abstentions,¹ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution I—Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

425

Adopted by a recorded vote of 138 to 1, with 11 abstentions,^m as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,

¹ The delegation of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

^m The delegation of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

41/86 Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution J—Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

32

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 18 abstentions,^a as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution K—International co-operation for disarmament

47

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 19, with 9 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist

^a The delegation of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

41/86 Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Paraguay, Sweden

Resolution L—Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

49

Adopted without a vote

Resolution M—Report of the Conference on Disarmament

30

Adopted by a recorded vote of 133 to 3, with 17 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

41/86 *Against:* France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
(*cont.*)

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Spain, Turkey

Resolution N—Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

113

Adopted by a recorded vote of 140 to none, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution O—Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session

50

Adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to 13, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,

41/86 (cont.) Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain

Resolution P—Report of the Conference on Disarmament

31

Adopted by a recorded vote of 101 to none, with 50 abstentions,^o as follows:

In favour: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Zaire

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Resolution Q—Verification in all its aspects

53

Adopted without a vote

Resolution R—Study on deterrence

422

Adopted without a vote

^o The delegation of Zambia subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegations of Ecuador and Uganda had intended to abstain.

41/87 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 382
Adopted without a vote

41/93 Israeli nuclear armament 205
Adopted by a recorded vote of 95 to 2, with 56 abstentions,^p as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zaire

Decisions

41/421 Comprehensive programme of disarmament 82
Adopted without a vote

41/422 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development 370
Adopted without a vote

Resolutions on related questions

41/11 Declaration of a zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic 211

^p The delegation of Lesotho subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

41/11 Adopted by a recorded vote of 124 to 1, with 8 abstentions,⁹ as follows:
(cont.)

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal

41/12 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security

206

Adopted by a recorded vote of 86 to 5, with 55 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: El Salvador, Honduras, Israel, Saint Christopher and Nevis, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Baha-

⁹ The delegations of Afghanistan, Democratic Kampuchea, the Dominican Republic, Liberia and Zaire subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

41/12 mas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
(cont.) Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial
Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Gren-
ada, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Lux-
embourg, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Gren-
adines, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zaire

41/35 Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa

Resolution B—Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist ré-
gime of South Africa

200

Adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 16, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Finland, Greece, Japan, Lesotho, New Zealand, Samoa, Swaziland, Sweden

Resolution C—Relations between Israel and South Africa

200

Adopted by a recorded vote of 102 to 29, with 26 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia,

41/35 Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire

Abstaining: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Burma, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Nepal, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Swaziland, Uruguay

Resolution H—Concerted international action for the elimination of *apartheid*

200

Adopted by a recorded vote of 149 to 2, with 5 abstentions,^r as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

^r The delegation of Lesotho subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

- 41/35 *Abstaining:* Côte d'Ivoire, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Lesotho,
(cont.) Malawi
- 41/36 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 224
Adopted without a vote
- 41/88 Question of Antarctica
Resolution A 210
Adopted by a roll-call vote of 94 to none, with 12 abstentions,⁵ as follows:
- In favour:* Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* None
- Abstaining:* Austria, Belize, Canada, China, Fiji, Ireland, Luxembourg, Peru, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Turkey, Venezuela

- Resolution B 211
Adopted by a roll-call vote of 96 to none, with 12 abstentions,⁶ as follows:

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic

⁵ During the course of the roll-call vote the following delegations announced that they were not participating: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

The delegation of Uruguay subsequently advised the Secretariat that had it been present it would not have participated.

⁶ During the course of the roll-call vote the following delegations announced that they were not participating: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay.

41/88 Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, Canada, China, Fiji, Ireland, Luxembourg, Peru, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Turkey, Venezuela

Resolution C

211

Adopted by a roll-call vote of 119 to none, with 8 abstentions,^a as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Austria, Canada, Fiji, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Turkey

41/89 Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region

73

Adopted without a vote

^a During the course of the roll-call vote the following countries announced that they were not participating: Australia, Belgium, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

- 41/90 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

74

Adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 1, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

- 41/91 Need for result-oriented political dialogue to improve the international situation

74

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to 1, with 33 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet So-

* The delegation of Uruguay subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

41/91 cialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela

41/92 Establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security 75

Adopted by a recorded vote of 102 to 2, with 46 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

41/212 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Resolution A 227

Adopted without a vote

Resolution B 227

Adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to none, with 28 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aus-

* The delegations of Colombia and Lesotho subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

41/212 tria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana,
(cont.) Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa
Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea,
Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran
(Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Maur-
itius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri-
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America



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