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A/CN.4/SR.1630

Summary record of the 1630th meeting

Topic:

International liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law

Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission:-

1980, vol. I

forms of aggression were not, however, germane to the topic under discussion, since resort to force could be lawful only to resist an armed attack.

33. Mr. Sucharitkul (*ibid.*) had also rightly said that the Commission's task was not to define the notion of self-defence, which, moreover, might vary even in internal law from one legal system to another. That was why he had proposed keeping to the definition of self-defence given in general international law and in the Charter and drawing the necessary conclusions in regard to State responsibility.

34. Mr. Quentin-Baxter (1627th meeting) had shown that the notion of self-defence, which had once existed only in internal law, had become one of general international law. As he had quite correctly pointed out, the notion of self-defence in international law was not yet exactly the same as in internal law because, although international law had already taken the decisive step of prohibiting the use of force except in self-defence, it had not yet taken the other step of entrusting the monopoly of the use of force to an institution of the international community, as envisaged in the United Nations Charter.

35. In conclusion, the Commission was in agreement on the point that it did not have to define self-defence and its conditions, nor amend, interpret or restate the Charter on that point. It should, however, base itself on the Charter in stating that, when a State had committed an act which would otherwise have been wrongful because it involved the use of armed force, the wrongfulness of the act was precluded if the State had acted in a state of self-defence.

36. He also thought that the Commission should base itself on article 30 in formulating the principle set out in article 34. He recognized, however, that there was some difference between those two articles because, as Mr. Ushakov had pointed out, countermeasures were not always lawful, whereas there was no doubt about precluding the wrongfulness of an act committed in a state of self-defence—or, if preferred, in exercising its "right" of self-defence.

37. He agreed about the insertion in the article of a reference to the Charter as a whole, rather than to Article 51 alone, although he still considered that the question of self-defence as such was dealt with only in Article 51 itself. There were, admittedly, other cases in which the Charter contemplated a lawful use of armed force; they were, however, cases not of self-defence but of countermeasures or sanctions taken against internationally wrongful acts and decided on by a competent body of the United Nations, and entrusted for enforcement to a State or group of States. If there was to be any reference to the Charter as a whole, therefore, the commentary to article 34 would have to indicate that the other cases in which the Charter allowed recourse to armed force concerned different notions and not self-defence as such.

38. Nor could he see any difficulty in the article containing a reference to general international law, in so far as the Charter had merely codified a principle already embodied in general international law. He considered that his task had been completed with draft article 34.

39. The CHAIRMAN, speaking on behalf of the members of the Commission, thanked Mr. Ago for the admirable work he had accomplished. He said that, if there were no objections, he would take it that the Commission decided to refer draft article 34 to the Drafting Committee.

It was so decided.[8]

40. Mr. SETTE CÂMARA (Judge, International Court of Justice) said he was glad to have been able to attend the present meeting of the Commission, at which Mr. Ago had concluded the presentation of his report on State responsibility, a report which represented such an important contribution to the Commission's work. He was also happy to have been able to appreciate at first hand the Commission's search for the best solutions in the codification and progressive development of international law. It was a source of great satisfaction to him and to all friends of the Commission to note the prestige and respect commanded by its work and to inform the Commission that its draft articles and deliberations were being used and quoted, particularly at the International Court of Justice. He wished the Commission a successful conclusion to the work of its present session.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

[8] For consideration of the text proposed by the Drafting Committee, see 1635th meeting, paras. 53–61.

1630th MEETING

Thursday, 10 July 1980, at 10.10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. C. W. PINTO

Members present: Mr. Barboza, Mr. Boutros Ghali, Mr. Calle y Calle, Mr. Díaz González, Mr. Evensen, Mr. Quentin-Baxter, Mr. Riphagen, Mr. Šahović, Mr. Schwebel, Mr. Sucharitkul, Mr. Tabibi, Mr. Thiam, Mr. Tsuruoka, Mr. Ushakov, Sir Francis Vallat, Mr. Verosta.

International liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law (A/CN.4/334 and Add.1 and 2)

[Item 7 of the agenda]

PRELIMINARY REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR

1. Mr. QUENTIN-BAXTER (Special Rapporteur)

said that before introducing his preliminary report (A/CN.4/334 and Add.1 and 2) he wished to express his view that it was important for the Commission's future that financial and other means should be made available, when necessary, for a special rapporteur to spend some time in consultation with the Secretariat. Otherwise the Commission might come to be regarded as too dependent on Governments or, at the other extreme, on the skills of the Secretariat, to which it left a great deal of its work.

2. Introducing his report, he said it was important that members of the Commission should take the warnings and disclaimers of the first two paragraphs seriously. He had not attempted in his preliminary report to marshall doctrine on the very wide topic before the Commission, although the extensive writings on it had been repeatedly consulted. The topic remained rather formless at that early stage, and a preliminary report must therefore aim at modest goals and be fairly compact.

3. He had considered that a broad outline of the topic belonged only to a first report, after there had been an opportunity for some feedback from members of the Commission. Hence his observations in the preliminary report related to a reduction of the size of the topic, rather than an enlargement of its treatment. He had been invited by the title of the topic to discuss the nature of a number of subjects that might be grouped under it. He believed that to seek a shortened form of heading would entail the immediate risk of falling into jargon, and although he had suggested at the end of the report (*ibid.*, para. 65) that the topic might be further limited and more concretely named, that was not to say that he disagreed in any way with the existing title. Indeed, the balance of that carefully established title was in itself very useful in trying to deal with the problems involved.

4. As to the nature of those problems, he pointed out that in the nineteenth century there had been hardly any areas in which the exercise of the rights of a State had tended to be in frequent conflict with the exercise of the rights of other States. The way in which States behaved had seldom involved a clash of rights, even though it might involve clashes of another kind, in the form of warfare. It was perhaps no accident that the principles with which the Commission was concerned in the topic under discussion had been articulated in relation to the law of neutrality, as appeared most clearly from the "*Alabama*" arbitration.[1] Other elements were perhaps also to be found in various aspects of the law relating to the treatment of aliens.

5. Municipal law had greatly changed, as had national societies at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the task of government had increased until it no longer consisted merely in maintaining law and order and the State had begun to assume a more paternalistic regard for the individual citizen. International society had, of course, not yet reached that state of integration where there was a real parallel with the change in national societies. Nevertheless, as international organizations increased in number and the representatives of States brought to the negotiating table their lifelong experience of principles applied in their own societies, that experience was beginning to be imperceptibly applied on an international scale. The process was taking place at a stage in the development of science and technology that exposed mankind to new dangers, increased the awareness of existing dangers and multiplied the choices available, while at every point setting a price on those choices. The complexity of the situation was very great; it required a balance between social, economic and cultural aspects and an awareness of the risk of exposing States at one level of development to principles which might not be applicable or acceptable to them, having been elaborated by States at a different level of development.

6. It had only been within the last twenty years that lawyers had begun intensively to discuss the principles needed to protect national and individual interests in a shrinking world, whose natural resources had become subject to enormous pressures, and in which it was not impossible that man-made dangers might become infinitely more serious than the disturbances of nature. Mankind was living in an era in which it had become possible to pollute the seas beyond redemption, to pollute the air to a point at which it caused serious human ailments and to heat up the planet by affecting the ozone layer with exhausts from industrial processes. There were two converging pressures at the scientific level and the level of government awareness, namely, the physical circumstances and the growth of international organization, which inevitably caused even lawyers accustomed to think of matters in an adversary context to pay increasing attention to the goals of interdependence. Even before a state of interdependence had been reached, States were considering how to order their bilateral and multilateral relationships in vastly more complicated areas. From that process there came lines of legal advance. Of particular interest in that respect were the works of C. Wilfred Jenks, in focusing international attention on ultra-hazardous regimes, and those of L. F. E. Goldie, in stressing that human experience in national societies had developed differing mechanisms which could be applied on an international scale to meet dangers which were for the first time being perceived as transnational dangers.

7. There were those who inevitably tended to part company with the traditionalists and saw in law no easy means of responding to the more complicated factual situation; they believed that reliance must be placed on voluntary efforts in the sphere of policy, and that only thereafter could the law guide and circumscribe the new developments. The question then arose

[1] See. J. B. Moore, *History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party* (Washington, D.C., 1898), vol. I, pp. 653 *et seq.*

what part lawyers should play in regard to the formation of policy. Some believed that what they had to place at the disposal of the international community was not so much inherited doctrine as the techniques of their profession and their ability to work with social and physical scientists and other experts. He believed, however, that the question went much deeper and demanded a blending process, since the dividing line was not sharply drawn between matters of law and matters of policy. Even at the time of the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1958), for which the Commission had been a major initial source, there had been the beginnings of that newer technique in which lawyers and biologists had worked together on formulas to meet legal and policy needs.

8. It was often difficult for lawyers deeply engaged in working with policy-makers to feel an attachment to inherited doctrine equal to theirs, whereas lawyers who believed that international law must always depend on a perceived line of advance from classical doctrine had difficulty in moving into a different world. In regard to such a topic as that under study, it was often said that State practice had not developed to a point where rules could be extrapolated from practice—a point of view which seemed to him to be rather forlorn and to condemn lawyers perpetually to follow rather than lead. The essence of the topic under consideration had to do with that conundrum.

9. On the relationship between those two extremes, a great deal of guidance was to be had from the rules of State responsibility. He believed that it had not yet begun to be appreciated in the larger legal community how great a contribution the distinctions made in those rules could offer in helping to clarify thoughts about the new problems. For the Commission, however, distinguishing between primary and secondary rules had become a matter of habit, even though the terms were not used in any dogmatic sense and it was recognized that they were abstractions.

10. The question was often asked whether injurious consequences were a necessary ingredient of a wrongful act, and even the most basic distinction between liability in lawful acts and in wrongful acts was somewhat clouded. In the view of many international lawyers, injurious consequences were a necessary ingredient in both cases. He believed, however, that wrongfulness itself supplied the element of injurious consequences, so that it was the primary rule, the rule of obligation, that must prescribe an element of injury. If there was a liability that arose without wrongfulness, it could arise only because legal obligation attached such a liability to the consequences of a particular act. By that approach to the subject the Commission had discovered a key which the majority of writers had not yet found, and the subject of liability arising without wrongfulness tended to be thought of as an alternative system of responsibility.

11. In 1973, when defining the boundaries of his topic,[2] Mr. Ago had been careful not to prejudice such future developments. But many international lawyers had been, and continued to be, rather frightened by the notion that while the world was for the first time constructing the essence of responsibility, there might be a completely different set of rules which did not conform to any of the norms being developed. They had the feeling of moving away from everything that had been slowly established and having nothing to put in its place but the acceptance of new policies. But on the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary rules made in the Commission's work, the device making it possible to put these matters into proportion became clear. A responsibility arose in international law through wrongfulness, and secondary rules were then applicable, or arose out of primary obligations. That distinction made it possible to leave behind the doctrinal difficulty of the notion that traditional secondary rules of responsibility had to be stretched and distorted.

12. There remained, however, other difficulties that were equally serious, including the notion that responsibility for lawful acts was in itself a kind of paradox. The idea that if something was not permitted by law it was wrongful to do it, and that if it was permitted, one was accountable only to oneself, was so basic that it caused many international lawyers to be sceptical about the title of the topic under consideration. There were those who feared that such a line of thought might tend to cheapen the concept of wrongfulness and make it easier for States to disregard their obligations by maintaining that those obligations arose without the intervention of wrongfulness. In fact, the opposite was true, and the areas in which obligation arose out of lawful acts were areas in which the only alternative would have been prohibition. The scheme of liability in respect of lawful acts was above all a scheme which, so far as possible, allowed States to pursue a diversity of rights and to reconcile those rights with the minimum resort to prohibition. In the circumstances of the modern world, it was almost self-evident that such a process must continue, in order to avoid prohibitions becoming so onerous that respect for the law might be weakened.

13. It seemed fairly clear that the topic of liability for acts not prohibited by international law was something that belonged to the current era, and if lawyers were not to restrict themselves to the job of describing what other people had ordained, they must look beyond the regime of right and wrong to the regime of lawful acts.

14. The question had to be asked, what limits there were to that process. Should it be said that in every circumstance every injury might give rise, at the international level, to a new legal relationship between

[2] *Yearbook ... 1973*, vol. I, pp. 5–6, 1204th meeting, paras. 6–10.

States, or were there automatic limits that could be applied? It was the tendency of doctrine to suggest that there was really no distinction to be made in terms of exceptional and ordinary risks, although it was, of course, true that in all activities of a State that were in some degree harmful, the harm might extend beyond the international borders of the State. The *Lake Lanoux* arbitration (see A/CN.4/334 and Add.1–2, para. 50) had shown that a distinction could be made between a normal user and an abnormal user of land, and that situation might well be regarded in terms of what was tacitly accepted by States in their mutual relations. There was clearly no one point at which a State could tell its neighbour that damage had reached the stage where it must stop. It was only where dangers reached the point at which they were perceived to require special action that new principles could be brought into play.

15. The Commission would recall that when dealing with the question of exhaustion of local remedies in relation to State responsibility, Mr. Ago had been unwilling to say that the rule applied only to cases arising within the territory of States. It might well be that if damage was caused transnationally in some accidental way that might normally occur within a State, there might be nothing wrong in leaving the injured person to the resources of the law of the country in which the injury was caused, and raising the matter to the level of discussion between States only if that law proved inadequate in its application to the case.

16. However, the situation with which the Commission was concerned was that in which activity inside a State, or activity by its ships, aircraft or expeditions, caused damage in areas beyond its national jurisdiction. In some instances it was useful, for practical purposes, to distinguish cases in which national controls were complete, and resort to rules of the kind being considered was not needed—as for instance in the case of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw, 1929). But the Commission's concern was with the opposite case—that in which loss or injury was suffered in a country having no control over the action which had caused that loss or injury. The principle there was surely one of the most fundamental principles in international law, namely, that when a State used its own advantages or resources it should at the same time take care not to hurt the resources of another State.

17. In the modern age, there was no automatic way of determining what constituted harm or of applying the principles of the law to practical situations. That, in a sense, was precisely the question with which the Commission was concerned. The characteristic response of States was to deal with such matters without resorting to the concept of wrongfulness. In the archetypal case of space objects, for example, some States had reached a stage of technological development at which they were able to engage in an activity which was not particularly dangerous, and was undoubtedly for the general good of humanity in terms of the advancement of scientific knowledge, but which nonetheless involved the possibility of loss. In such cases, standards of care were not really in question, since it was in the nature of the activity concerned that the utmost care would be exercised. But it was not unreasonable to hold that the duty of care incumbent on States undertaking such an activity required them, in consultation with the other members of the international community, to establish a regime to regulate such situations. In that area, the duty of due diligence was of a higher standard than was normally required; there was nothing extraordinary in that, for in certain respects the duty of care for one's neighbour must involve absolute liability.

18. What did add to the complexities of the situation was the multiformity which operated within a single legal rule. In that connexion, he had referred in paragraphs 34 *et seq.* of his report to the *"Lotus", Corfu Channel, Fisheries* and *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases, all of which indicated an awareness of the new and practical problem of drawing a dividing line between the duty owed to other States and the freedom of a State within its own territory. Those cases also showed that the emphasis on sovereignty, which was still jealously guarded by the law, had never been relaxed, although the principle *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas* was the necessary corollary to sovereignty. Great principles of law, such as the rule of the mean low-water mark, had had to be referred to other, more general criteria in their application to particular cases; and rules had had to take account of social and economic considerations and of the realities of the modern world. It was not so strange, therefore, that the principle *sic utere tuo* had been applied to serve the functions of the modern community.

19. It was of the essence of his thesis that while the problems should be considered primarily in the light of developments in the use of the physical environment, the principles involved, far from being new, were old and established principles to be found throughout the law. In that connexion, he had noted in foot-note 127 of his report that M. Sørensen, in his Hague lectures in 1960, had drawn a parallel between the law relating to treatment of aliens and that relating to good neighbourliness. He had also noted, from the Commission's debates on State responsibility and the preclusion of wrongfulness, that it believed that the preclusion of wrongfulness did not extinguish the responsibility or liability that could arise out of a new legal relationship created as a result of action taken by a State even under the stress of *force majeure*, fortuitous event, distress or state of necessity. The notion of care had thus developed far beyond the point when it had been viewed solely in terms of an action and its consequences. Rather, it sprang from a sense of community or interdependence, so that if the action of one State seriously affected another, even uninten-

tionally, a form of legal relationship was created between that State and its innocent victim. There were rights and obligations distinct from the question of wrongfulness that arose out of a primary rule and had to be regulated.

20. The conclusion to be drawn was that it was both necessary and possible, having regard to doctrine and existing State practice, to draw up general rules for a regime of responsibility or liability for lawful acts. Although it could not be said that the regime was self-limiting to the case of the physical environment, there were good practical reasons for applying such a limitation once the basic principles were clear and some preliminary conclusions had been reached about the nature of the regime.

21. Another way of stating the nature of the regime was to recognize that States had a duty not only to observe the rules regarding wrongfulness, but also to act in such a way that they did not run the risk of acting wrongfully. The regime of responsibility or liability for lawful acts stemmed from a duty to avoid wrongfulness, and not necessarily from a duty to agree with all the other parties concerned on the exact point at which wrongfulness occurred. He was always reminded in that context of Judge Lauterpacht's dictum that, if States were not careful, they might cross the imperceptible line between arbitrariness and wrongdoing. That was undoubtedly how lawyers would see events throughout the contemporary world.

22. A high-level meeting in 1979 of all European countries, the United States of America and Canada, organized by the ECE, on the protection of the environment had stressed the need to take concerted measures to deal with the consequences of long-range trans-boundary air pollution, and had recognized that only an increased standard of vigilance would suffice (A/CN.4/334 and Add.1 and 2, para. 5). It had thus gone some way towards raising the standard of care, which was a function of the primary obligations to which secondary rules could not set limits. The meeting had, however, avoided the question of liability, which was perfectly natural in the face of the complexities involved. No State wanted to commit itself in advance to some doctrinaire rule that could produce totally unforeseen results. Generally, however, it was not so much a matter of refusing to deal with the question of liability as of a feeling that it should be dealt with elsewhere, and preferably not in a specific context. Even an organization such as UNEP, which was so active and well supported by the international community, found that it was not well placed to discuss the issue since its activities were not centred round legal issues and it did not report to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.

23. Referring specifically to the report, he said that chapter I dealt with general considerations, including the growth of environmental pressures and the difficulty experienced by States in approaching the question of liability. As noted in the report, that question would have to be dealt with eventually on the basis of the concordant practice of States, and it was clearly the Commission's task to assist States in that regard.

24. In the second part of chapter I, he had dealt with the use of terms, paying special attention to the distinction between "liability" and "responsibility" (which applied only in English). In his view, those terms would only be acceptable if it was made perfectly clear that no distinction was being created which was not reflected in the other working languages.

25. In chapter II, he had traced the relationship between the regime of lawful acts and the regime of wrongfulness. Since every obligation could be broken, every regime of obligations had, in the final analysis, to be referred to the regime of State responsibility for wrongful acts. But a regime which laid down detailed rules that could be easily observed, and whose observance could be easily determined, would constitute a major step forward in differentiating the principle *sic utere tuo*.

26. In chapter III he had dealt with the topic in terms of the limitation of sovereignty, in order to show the modern tendency to give full weight to the sovereignty of independent States but at the same time to balance that principle, as in the Corfu Channel case, against the principle *sic utere tuo*.

27. In chapter IV, he had endeavoured to show that much of the hesitancy of States had nothing to do with doctrine, but derived from their concern that commitment in advance to any scheme of legal principle would prejudice the legal outcome. At the same time, the Commission might reasonably be expected to take account of multiformity within a regime of liability for lawful acts, to give every encouragement to States to draw up their own regimes for particular situations, and to stress the obligation of States to their neighbours, and indeed to the whole international community, when their actions within their own territory affected those neighbours or that community. States should not be able to shield themselves from a finding of wrongfulness merely by taking no action at all and by asserting that the rules of State responsibility were not wide enough to extend to their case. They had a duty to foresee problems and to recognize the legitimate interests of other States. They also had a duty to seek to reach agreed solutions, as the *Lake Lanoux* case suggested, although they were not required to sacrifice their right to make final determinations about matters falling within the control of their own country.

28. Mr. RIPHAGEN said that, like the Special Rapporteur, he had been struck by the inherent paradox in the title to the subject. He was even inclined to ask why a State should be held liable to make good the injurious consequences of its conduct if it was not obliged to abstain from such conduct in the first place. It might seem that the magic word "equity" supplied

the answer, but the use of that word by a lawyer was, in a certain sense, a *testimonium paupertatis*. Since the distribution of natural, human and technological resources throughout the world was far from equitable, the introduction of that notion lacked conviction. The concept of equity as a basis for liability resulted in a somewhat half-hearted approach, since the rules neither prohibited nor permitted a certain line of conduct, but, in effect, combined such conduct with a mandatory obligation to make reparation for any injurious consequences.

29. It seemed to him that the law's intermediate position had its origin in two phenomena. First, so far as nature itself was concerned, territorial frontiers between States were determined in a very arbitrary manner. Secondly—and again the forces of nature were involved—there might well be an element of hazard in the chain of causation linking the conduct of or in one State with the effects for or in another State, for which hazard none of the States concerned could be blamed. Indeed, without the active intervention of that element of hazard, there would be no reason for not prohibiting the conduct in question at the outset.

30. In cases where those two phenomena were both present, it would seem that a duty should be imposed to consult and negotiate on preventive measures, with a view to limiting the risk, as well as on equitable risk allocation in the event that damage occurred. As was clear from State practice, States were often willing to consult and reach agreement on preventive measures, but generally did not wish to accept liability for the consequences when the agreed measures had not been taken. Nor were States willing to accept that, where such measures had been taken, any degree of liability was excluded. In other words, they were not normally willing to accept an absolute link between agreed preventive measures and liability. The same applied in municipal law, where legislation frequently provided that prior authorization was required for certain activities, but neither that legislation nor the authorizations given or refused under it were deemed conclusive for the purpose of establishing liability under civil or common law.

31. In his view, liability, or even a degree of liability, for the injurious consequences with which the Commission was concerned was no more than the counterpart of what he would term the "internalization" duty, namely the duty of each State to take care that the activities within its frontiers did not, as a result of the irresistable forces of nature, adversely affect another country's interests.

32. The forces of nature, of course, likewise operated within the territory of a State, a fact often recognized in municipal law. Consequently, there were other intermediate solutions under international law which fell short of either total prohibition or total freedom of conduct, and those solutions were reflected in State practice. For instance, there were certain international rules relating to matters dealt with under municipal law that imposed an obligation on the State to frame and apply its municipal law in such a way that equal protection was accorded to the interests situated in the territory of that State and to similar interests situated in another State. Other international rules went a step further and provided that the procedural protection guaranteed under municipal law to persons whose interests were threatened by the conduct of another should also be extended to "foreign" persons; that was known as the principle of equal access. That rule was sometimes even applied to remedies available under municipal law, such as compensation.

33. In that connexion, it was clear that, to the extent that municipal law accepted the "polluter pays" principle, the effect of the extension of its application to foreign interests and foreign persons would be very similar to the consequences of liability for injurious consequences. Indeed, that principle was the counterpart of the "internalization" duty.

34. He therefore felt very strongly that the topic should be limited to the type of situation he had described. He also considered it necessary to explore the question of degrees of liability and risk allocation, and to give some thought to the other intermediate solutions ranging between freedom and prohibition.

35. He had not at that stage formed any clear idea about the general rules that could be drafted, even in the limited field of the physical environment, but no doubt the Special Rapporteur would provide the Commission with the necessary guidance. He considered that some overlap with Mr. Schwebel's topic (the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses) was unavoidable, but he was not concerned about any overlap with his own topic (State responsibility), since the central idea of sharing resources and liability fell outside its scope.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

1631st MEETING

Friday, 11 July 1980, at 10.10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. C. W. PINTO

Members present: Mr Barboza, Mr. Boutros Ghali, Mr. Calle y Calle, Mr. Díaz González, Mr. Evensen, Mr. Quentin-Baxter, Mr. Reuter, Mr. Riphagen, Mr. Šahović, Mr. Schwebel, Mr. Sucharitkul, Mr. Tabibi, Mr. Thiam, Mr. Tsuruoka, Mr. Ushakov, Sir Francis Vallat, Mr. Verosta.
