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Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 21 October 1992, at 3 p.m.

President:

Mr. ABULHASAN (Vice-President)

(Kuwait)

- Elections to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other elections [16]
- (a) Election of twelve members of the World Food Council: Note by the Secretary-General
- (b) Election of seven members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination: Note by the Secretary-General
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(The President)

As a result, the number of candidates nominated from among the African States, the Eastern European States, the Latin American and Caribbean States and the Western European and Other States is equal to the number of seat allocated to each of those regions.

In accordance with paragraph 16 of decision 34/401, the Assembly may dispense with balloting when the number of States nominated from among the regions is equal to the number of seats to be filled.

I take that the Assembly wishes to declare those States elected members of the World Food Council for a three-year term beginning on 1 January 1993.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I further take it that the Assembly also wishes to declare the two candidates nominated from among the Asian States elected members of the World Food Council for a three-year term beginning on 1 January 1993?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I congratulate the States that have been elected members of the World Food Council.

Regarding the remaining vacancy from among the Asian States, the General Assembly will be in a position to act on it upon the nomination by the Economic and Social Council of Member States from that region.

I therefore propose that the Assembly keep this sub-item on the agenda of the forty-seventh session.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Assembly agrees to that procedure.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The Assembly has thus concluded this stage of its consideration of sub-item (a) of agenda item 16.

We shall now turn to sub-item (b) of agenda item 16, entitled "Election of seven members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination".

In accordance with General Assembly decision 42/318 of 17 December 1987, the Assembly elects the members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination upon nomination by the Economic and Social Council.

The Assembly has before it document A/47/402, which contains the nominations by the Economic and Social Council to fill the vacancies in the Committee which will occur as a result of the expiration on 31 December 1992 of the terms of office of Algeria, Argentina, Cameroon, China, Japan, Morocco and Sri Lanka.

(The President)

I wish to point out that the Spanish version of document A/47/402 contains an inadvertent error in the last line of paragraph 2: Venezuela is not a member of the Committee for Programme and Coordination and therefore its name should be deleted from the list.

The following States have been nominated by the Economic and Social Council:

Three African States for three vacancies: Egypt, Kenya, Togo;

Three Asian States for three vacancies: China, Japan, Republic of Korea;

One Latin American and Caribbean State for one vacancy: Nicaragua.

The number of candidates nominated from among the African States, the Asian States and the Latin American and Caribbean States corresponds to the number of seats to be filled in each of those regions.

In accordance with paragraph 16 of decision 34/401, the Assembly may, in elections to subsidiary organs, dispense with secret balloting when the number of candidates corresponds to the number of seats to be filled. Accordingly, may I take it that the Assembly wishes to declare those States nominated by the Economic and Social Council elected members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination for a three-year term beginning on 1 January 1993?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I congratulate the States that have been elected members of the Committee on Programme and Coordination.

May I take it that it is the wish of the Assembly to conclude its consideration of sub-item (3) of agenda item 16?

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 14

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

- (a) REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OF THE AGENCY (A/47/374);
- (b) DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/47/L.9/Rev.1)

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): This afternoon the General Assembly will begin its consideration of agenda item 14, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

In this connection the Assembly has before it a note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Agency (A/47/374) and a draft resolution contained in document A/47/L.9/Rev.1.

I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed at 5 p.m. this afternoon.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): I therefore request those representatives wishing to inscribe their names to do so as soon as possible.

I now invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Hans Blix, to present the report of the Agency for the year 1991.

Mr. BLIX (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)): In December this year the fiftieth anniversary of the world's first controlled nuclear chain reaction will be celebrated. The brilliant scientific feat of Enrico Fermi in Chicago has left a deep imprint on the world ever since. The development to which his discovery gave rise raised hopes at one stage for electricity generation "to cheap to meter". Later, it raised fears of the very extinction of humanity.

For five decades we have lived with the dual challenge of preventing the use of the atom for weapons and of exploiting its many peaceful uses. For most of its existence the United Nations has been inhibited in its actions by a cold-war stalemate, the essence of which was an ever spiralling nuclear arms race.

The IAEA was established 35 years ago to promote the peaceful of the atom for development and to verify that commitments to exclusively peaceful uses were respected. This has been in no small measure a successful operation, part of the reason being that the IAEA has had a high degree of practical East/West cooperation despite the cold war. The intergovernmental activities pursued in and through the IAEA have contributed to the evolution and world-wide use of a broad range of nuclear applications, including nuclear power plants generating some 17 per cent of the world's electricity. The activities of the IAEA have also constituted an important part of the international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The dual challenge which was presented by President Eisenhower in his "Atoms for peace" speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 1953 is still valid. Last month the General Conference of the IAEA left no doubt that it wished the Agency to meet vigorously both challenges. It urged the Agency to continue promoting the use of nuclear technology, inter alia, through work in the fields of nuclear safety and waste disposal and through the dissemination of numerous nuclear techniques in the fields of medicine, agriculture and industry. It the same time it welcomed the various measures taken in in the past year to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system as a part of the challenge to reduce the risk of a further spread of nuclear weapons.

When in my report today I devote the largest part to safeguards and non-proliferation, it is because so much new has occurred in this area in the past year, not because larger resources or efforts have been devoted to it than to the promotion of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

Thus, the two challenges of the early days of nuclear energy remain, but today's world is drastically different from that of the 1950s. Most importantly, we are moving into a world where, at long last, less resources will be used for military purposes, including nuclear arsenals — a development that favours non-proliferation. On the other hand, many new serious problems now face humanity. One of them, which has a bearing on nuclear power, is the need for growing energy production at a time when there is increasing concern about the effects upon the global climate of emissions of greenhouse gases, notably the carbon dioxide emissions that are associated with the use of all fossil fuels. I shall revert to this issue later.

At this point I should like to address the issue of non-proliferation and the IAEA's role in the efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Today the risk of military conflict between the great Powers is rapidly receding, and the consequences in the form of disarmament, including accelerated nuclear disarmament, are as visible as they are welcome. The easier cooperation between the great Powers is also helping to settle many long-standing local or regional conflicts. This new climate and the process of democratization in a number of countries are factors which favour non-proliferation. Let me cite some significant developments.

Argentina and Brazil have decided to open all their nuclear installations to IAEA inspection, and following the recent adoption of some amendments there is a very good chance that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - the Treaty of Tlatelolco - will come into force and make the whole of Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

South Africa has joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the IAEA has been invited to inspect all nuclear installations in that country. In this new climate, African States are renewing efforts to draft a treaty making Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has concluded the safeguards agreement required of it under the NPT, and the first inspections have taken place. China and France have joined the NPT, so that the Treaty is now supported by all the declared nuclear-weapon States.

In the Middle East, there is new hope that peace talks will lead to agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone or a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. At the General Conference of the IAEA last month a resolution was adopted without a vote noting the consensus support for such a concept and calling upon the Director General of the IAEA to continue consultations with Governments in the region and work on a model for safeguards verification. I shall do so.

A new wave of accessions to the NPT is coming, or expected to come, from States that formerly were parts of the Soviet Union: the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus and others. The IAEA is in contact with several of them in order to prepare for the application of IAEA safeguards.

All this augurs well for a successful conference in 1995 to extend the non-proliferation Treaty. However, some other elements would be of signal importance for achieving a universal commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States to non-proliferation and an unlimited extension of the NPT. An agreement through which a date for the cessation of all nuclear testing was accepted by all nuclear-weapon States would be such an element. It would signal that the world would no longer try out new and "better" nuclear weapons. Another

highly positive element would be an agreement on a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such an agreement would seem logical in a world moving towards nuclear disarmament — and perhaps not very burdensome in view of the difficulties which exist today in disposing of surplus weapons-grade material.

The foregoing considerations may seem too optimistic. Yet at no time since disarmament talks began has the political climate seemed more favourable than now for far-reaching agreements.

The safeguards system which the IAEA has now been operating for over 25 years was the world's first on-site inspection system. It has great merits, but also limitations. I shall discuss both, and I shall begin with some thoughts on the potential further use of the system in the context of nuclear disarmament.

Given adequate resources, IAEA safeguards could be employed to verify the peaceful storage or use of fissionable material that is recovered from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, if the world wants international assurances that such material is not going into new weapons. A cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes could also be verified by international safeguards. The safeguarding of enrichment and reprocessing plants, though a difficult task, is a problem to which much international work has already been devoted and a task which is already one of the IAEA's duties.

There could also be renewed consideration of the concept of so-called international plutonium storage - that is to say, arrangements under which the growing quantities of separated plutonium from the peaceful cycle and quantities of plutonium expected from dismantled weapons would be subjected to special controls, which would give additional assurances concerning

non-diversion and an exclusively peaceful use. The statute of the IAEA envisages a function of this kind for the Agency.

While the IAEA's safeguards system is a resource that could be more extensively used by the international community, its limitations, too, must be considered - and remedied. In a world of fewer weapons there needs to be great confidence that no State is violating commitments and secretly producing fissionable material for weapons or, indeed, making new nuclear weapons.

The case of Iraq showed that it was possible in a very closed and controlled society to mount a sizeable secret effort for the enrichment of uranium and for weapons development without this being detected by the safeguards system. What can be done and what is being done to minimize the risk of the same thing happening again in the future? Public discussion often focuses on forceful inspections. While these are important, it must be recognized that information on where and what to inspect is the first and basic requirement.

It is not possible for inspectors to visit and examine every building and basement in a foreign country, and random visits will not help very much. Inspectors must have access to information leading them to sites and installations of possible interest. In the case of post-war inspections in Iraq, relevant information about sites has been obtained, through the United Nations Special Commission, from Governments. In the strengthened safeguards system now taking shape in the IAEA, the information provided by the inspected State will be supplemented by other data, for instance data from other States concerning the export and import of nuclear material and certain types of equipment. Had such data regarding Iraq been available to the IAEA and analysed, it is probable that special explanations and visits would have been

requested by the Agency. Any data, whather obtained by the IAEA through its analysis of declared nuclear activities or from external sources, must obviously be critically analysed and assessed to avoid unnecessary suspicions and false alarms.

It must be recognized that there is a special difficulty in verifying the completeness of a nuclear inventory when the IAEA is given this task in respect of a nuclear programme which has been going on in a territory for a long time and has attained a certain size, as is at present the case in South Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and as will be the case in some countries which were parts of the Soviet Union.

In the case of South Africa, the General Assembly has requested the Director General of the IAEA to report on the completeness of the inventory of South Africa's nuclear installations and material. The Agency has carried out a large number of inspections of South African facilities and locations outside declared facilities. It has carried out an extensive audit of historical operating and accounting records and performed a large number of analyses. With the cooperation of the South African authorities, IAEA inspectors have been able to visit all the sites they asked to see - declared or not declared, military or civilian - and they have found no evidence that the inventory is incomplete. Nor is the IAEA in possession of any other information suggesting the existence of any undeclared facilities or nuclear material. Naturally, if relevant information were obtained suggesting the need for access to additional facilities, locations or data, the Agency would request such access. The report of the Agency on this matter has been transmitted to the United Nations.

A problem similar to the one I have described regarding South Africa is encountered in the verification of the initial inventory presented by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under the safeguards agreement which entered into force on 10 April this year. Here, only three inspection missions have been performed so far and much work remains. Certain steps taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have facilitated the task. Some original historical operating records have been provided for examination and analysis. Also, as in the case of South Africa, the Agency has been given a standing invitation to send officials to sites and installations regardless of whether they are included in the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Such invitations, if lived up to in practice, are of course useful. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has cooperated with us in organizing a visit by IAEA officials in September, and I expect prompt assistance will be offered in connection with a further visit. Over time, the acceptance of such visits and openness and assistance to them will help to create a record of cooperation and transparency.

A right of unimpeded access for inspectors to relevant sites and material is certainly of crucial importance when information is available suggesting the need for inspection of specific sites. In the case of inspections in Iraq, the United Nations and the IAEA have obtained the right of unimpeded access under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and an exchange of letters of 14 May 1991 between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Iraq. This right relates to any sites, installations, equipment, persons, or documents. In the case of routine IAEA safeguards inspections, rules exist which allow a recipient State to reject inspector designations and to subject

the visit of inspectors to visa requirements. Once a designation has been accepted or a visa issued, however, there is a right to visit.

I have repeatedly urgas that these restrictions be eliminated, that all Agency inspectors be accepted as the international civil servants which they are, and that they be exempt from visa requirements and allowed entry on the basis of a United Nations laissez-passer and a certificate indicating that they are coming on inspection duty. Some progress has been made towards abolishing visa requirements or issuing multiple visas or accepting inspectors without a special designation procedure; but much remains to be done to facilitate inspections.

In the past year the Board of Governors of the IAEA has confirmed the right of the Agency to perform special inspections when there are reasons to believe that installations or material which should have been declared have not been so declared. No use has yet been made of this right.

There is no doubt that in the case of Iraq the readiness of the Security Council to support the right of unimpeded inspection has been of great importance. It is reassuring that, in the summit statement of 31 January 1992, the Council emphasized the integral role in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty of fully effective IAEA safeguards and that the members of the Council declared that they

"will take appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by the IAEA." (S/23500, p. 4)

The relationship agreement of 14 November 1957 between the United Nations and the IAEA contains rules allowing prompt interaction between the United Nations, including the Security Council, and the IAEA. Any denial of access

for inspection or any other apparent violations could speedily be placed before the Council.

In the case of lraq, the IAEA has now performed 14 inspection missions, on which reports have been submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. In response to the first task laid down by the Council, that of mapping Iraq's nuclear programme, the Agency has been able over the past year to put together a picture that is relatively consistent and coherent. However, as the Iraqi authorities have refused to provide information on sources of foreign procurement and foreign technical advice, there could still be missing elements in the picture. Inspections must continue of any sites or objects that may be designated by the United Nations Special Commission on the basis of new information that may become available to it. Some elements of the long-term monitoring have already been phased in side by side with investigative inspections. Considering that Iraq's scientific and technical knowledge remains largely intact, such monitoring is clearly of great importance, the more so as the clandestine procurement network is still in place.

It must be kept in mind, on the other hand, that the vast infrastructure needed for any revival of a prohibited programme for the production of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material in Iraq has been destroyed or rendered harmless, reservation being made for the possible continued existence of undetected installations.

I now turn to the other side of the nuclear challenge, that of exploiting the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology for development in medicine, agriculture and industry. While at the time of Enrico Fermi's

experiment in Chicago 50 years ago, "nuclear" mainly meant research and science, the practical applications are now many and significant. Let me give a few examples. I mentioned that, today, 17 per cent of the world's electricity comes from nuclear-power reactors - slightly less than the 20 per cent that comes from hydro power. Today every third patient in industrialized countries is examined or treated by some nuclear-related method, either for therapy or diagnostic. Today, the cotton crop in Pakistan and the rice crop in Indonesia have been greatly boosted by the use of suitable mutagens, that is to say, new strains produced through mutations induced by irradiating seeds. Today, nuclear methods are used in animal husbandry to measure the efficiency of protein uptake from various locally available foodstuffs. Based on such measurements, optimum combinations of local feeding materials for buffaloes have been introduced in India and Indonesia, which has led to a dramatic increase in buffalo milk and meat production.

I shall not prolong this list of examples of nuclear techniques which help to maintain or restore health, boost industrial production and promote the production and preservation of food. I should underline, however - in view of the expectations of the Ric Conference on Environment and Development that all organizations in the United Nations family should contribute to the fulfilment of the Agenda 21 - that nuclear techniques have a remarkably wide use not only in development but also in the monitoring and protection of the environment. Let me give two examples of this.

Isotopes are a powerful tool in the fight against groundwater and soil contamination through excessive use of fertilizers. They allow precise

measurement of the amount of fertilizer that goes into the plant, so that the most appropriate fertilizer regime can be established for any particular agronomic system. Similarly, nuclear techniques allow the determination of the amount of nitrogen which different crop plants obtain from the soil. This has not only led to the development of better fertilizer strategies but also helped in the selection of the most efficient nitrogen-fixing plant varieties within each species, reducing the need for nitrogen fertilizer, to the benefit of the environment and the economy of the countries involved.

Most controversial - but also most interesting - is the question of how helpful nuclear power is and could be in generating the increasing amounts of electricity which the world will need without emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and thereby contributing to a possible global warming.

The Framework Convention on Climate Change which was signed at Rio seeks to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, but does not prescribe how this is to be done or set any targets concerning CO2 emissions or other greenhouse gas emissions. There is no doubt that global development will require the use of more energy, especially electricity, and that a dilemma is inherent in the circumstance in which an increased use of fossil fuels, today's dominant energy source, would set us on a collision course with the probable need to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. There is a growing awareness that the saving of energy and greater use of renewable sources of energy, like solar power and wind power, will be very inadequate responses to this dilemma.

There is also a growing awareness that the continued and, indeed, expanded use of nuclear energy is one of the few options at the world's disposal for increasing energy generation without significantly adding to

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(Mr. Blix, Director General, IAEA)

carbon dioxide emissions. It is worth some reflection that, if the world's 400 or so nuclear-power plants were to be closed and the electricity they generate wore to be produced instead from the burning of coal, there would be an annual increase of some 7 per cent in carbon dioxide emissions. Nuclear energy alone cannot solve the carbon dioxide problem, but that problem can hardly be solved without nuclear power.

It is still true, however, that the use or expanded use of nuclear power is opposed by a sizeable segment of public opinion in many countries, mainly for fear of radioactive releases from an accident or from the disposal over long periods of time of nuclear wastez.

Comparisons with the risks associated with the generation of energy through coal, hydro power, gas or oil are certainly relevant and should be carried out to provide a basis for rational discussion. However, we must be aware that the public might find damage to health and the environment through radiation less tolerable than injury through coal-mine accidents, the bursting of hydro dams or the explosion of gas cisterns. This is also the premise upon which extensive international co-operation is now taking place within and outside the IAEA to strengthen safety worldwide in the operation of nuclear power plants and in the disposal of radioactive waste.

In a year's time I hope a draft convention on nuclear safety will be ready, containing rules which will be legally binding on all States adhering to it. It is currently being negotiated within the IAEA, as recommended by the Rio Conference. The attainment of a nuclear safety culture embracing all countries operating nuclear power plants is also the objective of present efforts to assist countries in Eastern Europe to upgrade nuclear power plants or in some cases, where this may not be feasible or economic, to phase them out.

Agenda 21 of the Rio Conference contains a chapter on the safe and environmentally sound management of radioactive wastes. Let me report in this regard that a code of practice on the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste was adopted by the IAEA in 1990. While cases have occurred in which chemical wastes have been exported to developing countries, no such

case has been found involving radioactive wastes. I should add that, at the request of developing countries, experts sent by the IAEA have investigated several cases - and found chemical waste but not radioactive waste.

I should also report that intensified efforts are under way in the IAEA to work out a comprehensive series of internationally agreed radioactive waste safety standards which may form the basis of, or complement, national standards and criteria. It is reasonable to require that radioactive waste be disposed of with the same level of safety all over the world, and regardless of whether the wastes originate in military or civilian programmes.

If present efforts to ensure a uniformly high level of safety in the operation of nuclear power plants and in the disposal of radioactive waste around the world continue to be vigorously pursued within and outside the IAEA, I believe that the expanded use of nuclear power, which may become indispensable, may also become fully acceptable to most people.

Let me conclude with some comments not on the past year but on the long-term role of the IAEA. International organizations are mechanisms through which Governments jointly meet international challenges. I would submit that over the years the IAEA has been a useful and efficient tool of its member States.

The energy crisis focused attention on the practical and potential use of nuclear power and the role of the IAEA. The Chernobyl crisis led the IAEA to launch the concept and principles of a nuclear safety culture accepted and respected by all; in the environment crisis, the IAEA has been able to show that peaceful nuclear applications, including the use of nuclear power for electricity generation, are of crucial value both for the environment and for development; in the Iraqi crisis, the IAEA has helped the United Nations to neutralize the nascent nuclear weapon capacity.

The Agency is also learning the broader lessons of Iraq and strengthening the verification system in order to increase the probability that any violation will be detected and be dealt with by the Security Council, to which the IAEA reports in these matters.

As the IAEA is obliged to undertake increasing activities in the fields of technology transfers, nuclear safety and safeguards, the organization - like the United Nations - ought to be spared financial crises. This year we have been forced to reduce our activities in order to manage a shortfall of no less than 13 per cent of our budget, due to non-payment, in particular by a large contributor. Such financial crisis management in an organization inevitably undermines its capacity to address the serious issues it is asked to deal with.

The ongoing erosion of pay levels for our staff also reduces our ability to attract staff of the required calibre. I submit that more mileage will be obtained from the mechanisms that Governments create for our joint journey into the future if these mechanisms are adequately financially fuelled and managed by well-motivated and competent crews.

Lastly, I should like to express in this forum the thanks of the IAEA to the Government of Austria, which is an excellent host to all the international organizations located in Vienna.

The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Australia to introduce draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1 on the annual report of the IAEA (A/47/374).

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

The following countries have joined the 32 sponsors listed in document A/47/L.9/Rev.1: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Costa Rica, Latvia, Botswana and Turkey.

I should like to explain first that Australia is introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors because it was requested to do so by a number of interested delegations. We are not this year a member of the IAEA Bureau, the group that traditionally manages the draft resolution. However, we were a member of the Bureau in 1991 and we are strongly committed to the IAEA, its role and its future.

This year, unfortunately, there was no agreement in the Bureau about introducing a draft resolution on the IAEA. Obviously, there had to be such a draft resolution. In the circumstances, Australia was prepared to take on the task of introducing it, and there was no objection from this year's Sureau to our so doing. We have consulted widely, and we believe this draft resolution broadly reflects a common view.

The past year has been an important one for the IAEA. In all its areas of activity with regard to nuclear non-proliferation and strengthening the safeguards system, the year saw the signature of safeguards agreements by South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the initiation within the Board of Governors of a series of measures designed to strengthen the safeguards system.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Agency's safeguards systems together constitute the principal international assurance of the peaceful uses of Luclear energy. The safeguards system is fundamental to nuclear non-proliferation, and the measures initiated in 1991 are very encouraging, both for the future of the safeguards system itself

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

and its underpinning of nuclear trade and cooperation. We believe that the General Assembly should specifically launch the preparatory process for the NPT extension conference.

Nuclear safety is a key area of the IAEA's work. Safety standards are constantly being developed and upgraded by the Agency, not least in response to public perceptions concerning the benefits and risks associated with nuclear energy. Work has now commenced on an international nuclear safety convention, and in 1991 a document was published on the design deficiencies of certain reactor plants that provides a basis for operators and regulatory bodies alike to develop a programme for enhancing safety at these plants.

There have also been important developments in technical assistance and cooperation activities, where the potential benefits of nuclear technology continue to be demonstrated in a variety of applications. In addition to those mentioned just now by the Director General of the IAEA, there are other examples. The use of the sterile-insect technique has enabled the new-world screw worm fly to be eradicated from North Africa. That pest, which had become established in Libya, posed a threat to livestock throughout Africa and the Mediterranean. Other application techniques resulted in improved crop yields, improvements in nuclear-medicine capabilities, and greater interest in environmental monitoring.

Turning now to this year's draft resolution, we wish to note that it is substantially the same as the resolution adopted in 1991. In paragraph 4, we would emphasize the centrality of strengthened safeguards to international security, regional security and technical cooperation. In paragraph 5, we would draw attention to the Agency's actions in strengthening technical assistance and cooperation activities. In paragraph 6, we would emphasize that the Agency is continuing to do very valuable and dangerous work in Iraq, which we believe requires recognition by the General Assembly, arising as it does from the first blatant breach of an IAEA and/or non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement; and also that effective fulfilment of Security Council resolutions is essential for the continued effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime and the assurances it provides to all members of the international community.

We commend this draft resolution, which has attracted a broad sponsorship, to delegations. It is a balanced text and seeks to be responsive to the needs and interests of all IAEA members. Above all, it is in our

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common interest to see the maintenance and strengthening of the IAEA and the protection from the proliferation of nuclear weapons its activites provide. To support this draft resolution is to support that objective.

Mr. GAJDA (Hungary): The annual report for 1991 of the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted to the General Assembly
and the introductory statement to the Assembly by the IAEA Director General,
Mr. Hans Blix, reflect very well the results of dedicated work aimed at
fulfilling the objectives enshrined in the statute of the IAEA 35 years ago.

The overall activities of the Agency have remained faithful to the noble ideas
of its founders: to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy all over the
world and to serve, through its safeguards activities, the cause of
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These have been and remain the
fundamental tasks of the Agency.

The maintenance of an appropriate balance in its activities has always been a major prerequisite both for the general support IAEA enjoys on the part of its member States and for its growing international prestige. Hungary continues to believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency plays a pre-eminent role in all its fields of activity and is firmly convinced that the latest developments in international relations open up new possibilities for the Agency and at the same time pose new challenges for it.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA safeguards system together constitute an important international guarantee of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We have witnessed important new developments indicating the overall strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this context, we view the following as encouraging factors: the accession of China and France to the NPT; the

conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements with South Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; the steps towards full-scope safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, the good prospects of bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force in the near future; and the declaration of full-scope safeguards as a common policy for nuclear exporters. We expect the States parties to the NPT to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA without any delay and hope that similar steps will soon be taken by other States not yet parties to the Treaty. It is the firm and definite position of the Hungarian Government that the newly emerging States cannot serve the fundamental interests of their own peoples and the global interests of peace, security and development unless they become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty without any undue delay. The recent accession of Estonia and Lithuania to the Treaty and the conclusion of the respective safeguards agreements by them are promising signs in this respect. At the 1995 NPT extension Conference, where we shall strongly argue for the indefinite extension of the Treaty, we should like to see these positive measures further strengthened.

In view of the renewed global interest in nuclear non-proliferation, the IAEA safeguards system continues to be of crucial importance. Hungary has always accorded high priority to the continuous improvement and strengthening of that system. Now, after Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and when the IAEA safeguards system faces new challenges owing to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it is imperative to increase the ability of the safeguards system to detect any possible undeclared nuclear activity and to render the safeguards system capable of carrying out its activities - whose scope has widened - with respect to declared nuclear facilities. We commend the initiative taken by the Director General in

encouraging us to reflect together on possible ways to strengthen the present system while making it less costly. We have supported the action of the Board of Governors with regard to special inspections, the provisions for furnishing early design information, and the application of the universal reporting system on nuclear exports and imports.

I should like to recall in this regard that a few weeks ago my Government announced its readiness to provide information on a voluntary basis to IAEA on all its nuclear export and import activities. Let me also reiterate my Government's intention to continue to participate in the Agency's efforts to improve the reliability and transparency of IAEA safeguards.

Also in this context, I wish to refer to one particular issue: the designation of safeguards inspectors. Many member States, in response to the repeated appeals of the Director General, have introduced simplified procedures for designating inspectors, and we are of the view that the time has now come for the IAEA to develop a widely acceptable policy on this question. The respective provisions of the agreed text of the draft Convention on chemical weapons could serve as a guideline for IAEA to develop, adopt and apply such a policy. Let me note here, in passing, that the Agency could - and, I feel, should - offer its advice and assistance to the soon-to-be-established preparatory committee and later to the new chemical weapons organization to help it in the early phases of its evolution.

The IAEA secretariat deserves credit for the excellent work done, sometimes under very difficult local conditions, in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). The results of the 14 on-site inspection missions have proven that the concerns of the international community about the Iraqi nuclear programme were well-founded, and the resolute international action against such a violation of Treaty obligations was justified. The remaining questions about the Iraqi nuclear programme are to be clarified. The mandate given by the Security Council regarding the long-term monitoring activity to verify Iraq's compliance with the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions remains an essential task for the Agency.

The issues of nuclear safety have always been high on the agenda of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Recently, a broad set of international and bilateral programmes was launched, with the participation of various international organizations and the highly industrialized countries, to provide assistance in the field of nuclear safety to Central and Eastern European countries. We believe that the long experience of IAEA cooperation with these countries, as well as the professional knowledge the Agency has accumulated, are of great value and should be used in a proper way. In this context, we welcome the efforts to avoid duplication in providing safety-related assistance and to increase the effectiveness of such assistance. We lend our support to the Agency in creating appropriate mechanisms for its active participation.

Hungary appreciates the Agency's work in promoting the necessary legal basis for the strengthening of nuclear safety. Significant preparatory work has been launched by the IAEA to elaborate a nuclear-safety Convention.

Although the national authorities are, and should remain, responsible for the safe operation of nuclear facilities, there is no doubt that an international commitment by the participating States to the provisions of such a Convention would be an important step towards improving nuclear safety all over the 'world. In this connection, my Government is extremely concerned about the need for adequate physical protection of nuclear materials, and is doing everything in its power to prevent Hungary from becoming the scene of illegal transit of nuclear materials. At the First Review Conference of the States Partice to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, we noted, therefore, with satisfaction, the increased number of States Parties to the Convention, as well as the positive outcome and successful work of the Conference.

We are also pleased to note that the international legislative framework for nuclear liability has been strengthened by the entry into force of the Joint Protocol to the Vienna and Paris Conventions, elaborated and adopted with the active participation of the Agency.

The Hungarian Government highly appreciates the Agency's work in the field of technical assistance and cooperation. International cooperation has been vital for the development of our nuclear industry, research and education. It has not only contributed to achieve the present, widely recognized high standards in nuclear sciences but also made our institutions capable of transferring our knowledge and experience to countries less developed in the nuclear field. Our intention is unchanged: to remain a correct and competent partner as a donor and recipient country in the future too.

In 1991 the net generation of electricity from our nuclear power plant represented almost one half - 45.8 per cent, to be precise - of Hungary's total production of electricity. This is a convincing figure, underscoring the importance of nuclear energy for our economy. In spite of the excellent operational record of our nuclear power plant, we are continuously reassessing and updating the nuclear safety and operational practice of the plant. In this activity, we continue to rely on the Agency's cooperation. Apart from the traditional services, like the missions of the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) and of the Analysis of Safety-Significant Events Team (ASSET), we encourage the secretariat to broaden its services to the member States in such vital fields as spent fuel management and radioactive waste disposal.

In conclusion, I wish to express our appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Hans Blix, and his staff for their excellent work during the previous year.

Mr. HOU Zhitong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese delegation has listened very carefully to the statement made by Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and has studied the Agency's annual report seriously. Over the past year, the Agency has done a great deal of work, and made positive efforts in such important fields as safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear safety. We are satisfied with these results.

The promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is an imperative task for the Agency. Nuclear energy, as a clean and reliable alternative source of energy, has broad prospects. Many countries, particularly the developing countries, need urgently to develop nuclear energy in order to develop their economy and protect the environment.

(Mr. Hou Zhitong, China)

Therefore, we hope the Agency will make a greater contribution to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The implementation of safeguards with a view to preventing nuclear proliferation is another important mission of the IAEA. In order to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is necessary to make the acceptance of IAEA safeguards a precondition for international nuclear energy cooperation. The Agency has done much work in this field, and has accumulated rich experience, continuously improving the safeguards regime and making it the universally acceptable measure against nuclear proliferation.

Evidently, it is a complicated and demanding task for the IAEA both further to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to implement the safeguards. The Chinese delegation is of the view that the Agency's two functions should be assigned equal weight. Neither can be neglected, and still less can the two be pitted against each other; otherwise, the further development of the IAEA would inevitably be affected. China supports the Agency's work in safeguards. At the same time, we also believe it is impermissible to allow the use of any excuse to infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of any country, especially the developing countries, in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(Mr. Hou Zhitong, China)

Yet what should be noted here is the fact that some people put disproportionately heavy emphasis on the prevention of nuclear proliferation while overlooking and misrepresenting the legitimate demands of the developing countries for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some individual countries even go so far as to restrict such cooperation under the pretext of preventing proliferation, in an attempt to monopolize nuclear technology and nuclear energy. Undoubtedly, such a practice not only affects the economic and social development of developing countries but is also of no help to international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Therefore, the tendency should be rectified.

It is known to all that China's consistent policy has been not to advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation nor to help other countries develop nuclear weapons. China's nuclear export strictly abides by the following three principles, namely, assurance for peaceful purposes, acceptance of the IAEA's safeguards and no retransfer to a third country. China has officially acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. China has taken an active part in the international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, signing, from 1980 to 1986, intergovernmental agreements for nuclear energy cooperation with 11 countries. Recently, China and the Islamic Republic of Iran signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the future China will, as always, follow that policy, further develop its international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and make its contribution to enabling nuclear energy to render more service to mankind.

Mr. HAJNOCZI (Austria): At the outset, I should like to express Austria's deep appreciation for the work of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its highly competent staff.

This has been a particularly challenging year, in which the IAEA has performed very well. The examplary manner in which Director General Hans Blix has been conducting the work of his Agency merits our gratitude and respect.

The Austrian Government has always held the view that on the way towards a nuclear-weapon-free world a non-profileration regime is an essential step and that the IAEA has an indispensable role to play in that regime. We are glad to note that the regime has been broadened in important regards.

France and China have acceeded to the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nuclear-weapon States, so that all nuclear-weapon States in the terms of that Treaty have now become parties to it. South Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have joined the Treaty and concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

We also appreciate that the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have declared their intention to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. We are looking towards 1995, when the NPT Review Conference will give us an opportunity to renew our faith in the need of this Treaty for a peaceful world order and to remove its time limits.

The non-proliferation regime has also been greatly strengthened by the important developments that have taken place in Latin America in that respect. The full-scope safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil and the Agency is an important step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America in accordance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

(Mr. Hajnoczi, Austria)

The importance of an effective verification regime with regard to the obligations of the non-proliferation Treaty has been highlighted by Iraq's failure to live up to its obligations under the Treaty and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The close collaboration between the Agency and the Security Council in this matter has resulted in the implementation of measures that were the necessary consequence of Iraq's gross breach of international obliquations.

The Director General and his staff have earned our admiration for their excellent performance in implementing the tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council.

The IAEA will continue to play an important part in the process of making the NPT obligations effective and ensuring that nuclear development will not be used for other than peaceful purposes.

The activities of the IAEA are essential for rebuilding international faith in the workability of a non-profileration regime.

When the term "nuclear energy" is used, it is sometimes - and erroneously - equated with nuclear power. But as everyone who follows the activities of the Agency knows, there are many non-power uses of nuclear energy, and the IAEA's promotion of these is viewed as particularly significant by many countries. Any assessment of the role of the IAEA has to bring out the fact that the use of nuclear energy in the fields of medicine, science and technology is raising the standards of living worldwide.

That distinction is important for Austria, whose Parliament, on the basis of a referendum held in 1978, has adopted legislation forbidding the use of nuclear-fission energy for the purpose of power production in Austria.

(Mr. Hajnoczi, Austria)

It is a policy of the Austrian Government to make this decision known to other members of the international community and to inform them of the reasons that have led to it in the hope that our example will be followed by other States, especially our neighbours.

But whereas views on nuclear-power production differ, there can be only one view regarding the necessity of making nuclear plants as safe as possible so long as they exist. Austria, therefore, welcomes the activities of the IABA in this respect, and particularly those concerning nuclear plants in Central and Eastern Europe. There is today a much wider awareness of the dangers arising from the continued existence of those reactors and of the need for urgent corrective action.

It is not surprising that in an international organization of 113 States different views should be held on the order of priority of its aims. Some of its objectives will find general acclaim, while others will be a matter of disagreement.

That fact, however, does not prevent us from appreciating, especially in the light of the past year's experience, the importance of the IAEA as an essential part of the organized international community in its search for peace.

Mr. GOUDIMA (Ukraine): First of all, my delegation would like to express its appreciation to Mr. Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to his staff for their excellent work in the period under review.

The report submitted to the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly by the International Atomic Energy Agency contains detailed information concerning the activities of this organization in 1991. In the period under

(Mr. Goudima, Ukraine)

review the IAEA was operating against the background of the dramatic changes in the world pursuant to the emergence of many new members of the international community and to the development of a new model of relations between States.

with the political situation in the world changing for the better and the end of confrontation in relations between formerly antagonistic States, there is every reason to believe that mankind can enter the new millennium with the threat of nuclear war left behind. In these conditions the role of the IAEA is of special significance, as the Agency is designed to promote international cooperation in the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy, to monitor its use, ensuring that it is not used for military purposes, and to render practical assistance within its competence to developing countries as well as to countries in transition.

Of special relevance today is the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The delegation of Ukraine commends the IAEA for its role in implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this connection, I remind the Assembly that Ukraine, which recently celebrated the first anniversary of its independence, bases its policy on non-participation in military blocs and observance of the three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Ukraine has resolutely set out on the road to non-nuclear status and takes consistent measures to reach this goal. In May 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Ukrainian territory. On our insistence, Ukraine exercised effective control over the process of dismantling the nuclear weapons withdrawn from our territory.

After signing the Protocol to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in Lisbon on 23 May 1992, Ukraine pledged to ratify the Treaty in the very near future and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear State. The Ukrainian Government submitted the required documents to the Verkhovna Rad, the country's Parliament, for consideration, and we hope that the decisions on the ratification and the accession of Ukraine to these Treaties will be taken soon.

Our delegation deeply appreciates the Agency's activities on the implementation of its safeguards, which assume particular significance in the framework of the nuclear disarmament process. We also support the Agency's efforts to develop further the system of comprehensive safeguards.

Intensive work is under way in Ukraine on matters that form the basis of the non-proliferation regime, such as creating a national accounting and control system for nuclear materials, improving the physical protection of such materials and developing a control system for nuclear imports and exports. As we lack the necessary competence and means, however, we would be most grateful to other countries and to the Agency for assistance in creating the organizational and technical conditions that would allow us to accede to the NPT as soon as possible and to conclude an agreement on safeguards with the IAEA. As this work will require some time, our Government has confirmed its readiness to put under the Agency's safeguards immediately Ukraine's nuclear installations used for peaceful purposes. We are satisfied that a proper solution to this question was found at the last session of the IAEA's governing body.

The member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States have signed an agreement entitled "The Main Principles of Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy". The agreement, which has already come into force, is based on the principles of non-proliferation. As a party to the agreement, Ukraine has endorsed the proposal to convene the first coordinating meeting of the competent bodies of the participating countries.

Ukraine commends the Ajency's efforts to strengthen international cooperation in the field of nuclear and radiation safety. Mr. Blix, Director General of the IAEA, was absolutely right in stating at the 1991 session of

the Agency's General Conference that there was a real need to transform international activity in the field of nuclear safety into an international regime. It is evident that a serious accident at any nuclear power station today would discredit the very idea of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. That is why the IAEA efforts to work out the fundamental principles of nuclear and radiation safety and to create a coordinated programme of cooperation in this field are entirely justified. In this regard, we support the Agency's endeavours to elaborate a convention on nuclear safety and to review the main safety standards of radiation protection, and we hope that this work will soon be completed with the adoption of relevant documents.

Ukraine is involved to the fullest possible extent in the creation of an international nuclear safety regime. The consequences of the tragedy at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in April 1986, which affected our peoples and territories and those of neighbouring States, are still deeply felt in Ukraine. A complex of measures to diminish the consequences of the accident is being implemented by the Ukraine Government, although current political and economic transformations have no doubt affected the efficiency of this work. We take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the world community for understanding and assistance in dealing with these problems.

The results of the International Chernobyl Project, addressed in the annual report of the IAEA, have elicited considerable interest in our country and abroad. While those results have been evaluated in various ways, we consider it important to note that the IAEA did a good job of implementing a project on such a scale within a short time. We feel, however, that the project did not fully and adequately reflect a number of problems caused by Chernobyl. These problems might form the basis of the Agency's Chernobyl-related activities in the future.

In the Agency's programme of activities for 1993-1994 we found only one subprogramme - entitled "Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident" - directly related to the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. A number of other important scientific and technical issues that fall within the competence of the Agency, such as the problems of long-life radiation contamination, methods for decreasing the radiation background of large territories and the influence of low radiation doses on biological objects, were not included. We feel that given the complex and diverse problems raised by Chernobyl, as well as the Agency's enormous experience and potential, it could more fully participate in solving these problems.

I should also like to draw attention to the problem of the shelter over the damaged fourth block of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, known as the "Sarcophagus". As its current condition gives every reason for anxiety, an international contest has been announced to find the best possible solution to the problem. We hope that experts from many countries of the world will participate.

I should now like to say a few words about the problems of Ukraine's nuclear energy industry, which is in a difficult condition. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, its multiple scientific, technical and productive ties were disrupted; the centralized system of management and supervision of the safety of nuclear installations ceased to exist. A national system to ensure the safe transportation of radioactive substances is needed. This is important, not only for us, but for others, since fresh and processed nuclear fuel is transported through Ukrainian territory to Russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. We have inherited particularly complicated problems in treating processed nuclear fuel. New conditions in

(Mr. Gondina. Ukraine)

the nuclear energy complex have made it necessary to reassess the problems of the nuclear fuel cycle of Ukraine as a whole.

To overcome these difficulties we need well-coordinated assistance from industrially developed countries. We are also interested in assistance from the IAEA in creating in Ukraine the regime for nuclear regulation that has been developed, as well as in solving other problems relating to nuclear activity in our country.

In conclusion, I should like to stress again that Ukraine supports the multifaceted activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and will promote in every way possible the accomplishment of the exceptionally important tasks that the Agency faces today.

Mr. DAHA (Pakistan): My delegation wishes to join those who have expressed sympathy and condolences at the loss of life and property in Colombia as a result of the recent earthquake in that country.

I should like to begin my statement by extending on behalf of the delegation of Pakistan its felicitations to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for his important statement regarding the activities of the Agency for the year 1991. Before proceeding to offer our comments on the IAEA report for 1991, we would like to take this opportunity to commend Mr. Blix and his colleagues for their exemplary dedication and commitment to the work of the Agency and to its objectives and responsibilities.

Most developing countries suffer from an acute energy shortage and need to mobilize all resources, conventional and nuclear, in order to overcome power shortages and escape from poverty and underdevelopment. Nuclear energy has a particularly important role to play in overcoming power shortages in countries like Pakistan which are deficient in fossil fuels. Pakistan is, therefore, committed to the development of nuclear power to meet its growing energy requirements. We have also been pursuing various programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in other fields such as agriculture and medicine. At the same time, Pakistan remains deeply committed to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and will continue its efforts at global and regional levels in pursuance of this objective.

Pakistan has always atcached great importance to the objectives and activities of the IAEA, particularly to the assistance provided by the Agency to member States, including Pakistan, in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. This has made an invaluable contribution to our development efforts.

The assistance provided to the developing countries by the Agency in assessing their need for nuclear power is highly commendable. The application of nuclear technology in the fields of food, agriculture, livestock, medicine and physical sciences has proved to be extremely useful in the efforts of the developing countries aimed at attaining socio-economic development. In this context one of the Agency's major successes in 1991 was the eradication of the screwworm flies from North Africa.

We note from the Agency's report that DDT dissipates 30-40 times faster in tropical environments than in temperate regions, suggesting that it could perhaps be used in certain developing countries. However, in our view, while DDT is certainly an economic and readily available aid to agricultural production, it must not be overlooked that once it enters the food chain it is capable of causing genetic changes in human beings.

Pakistan greatly appreciates the continuing efforts of the IAEA to help strengthen the infrastructure for the planning, establishment and safe operation of nuclear-power projects in the developing countries through intraregional and international training courses and technical assistance projects.

The Agency's efforts in promoting nuclear safety world wide are commendable. The nuclear-safety colloquium held every year since 1985 during the General Conference provides an invaluable opportunity to review and exchange ideas on current safety issues and future programmes. Pakistan recommends that this event which has proved its usefulness should be continued on a regular basis. Similarly, the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme, which was initiated by the Agency in 1983 to assist member States in reviewing the operations of their nuclear-power plants, has proved to be of great benefit. Pakistan is also appreciative of the efforts being made by the

Agency to extend the Assessment of Safety Significant Events Teams (ASSET) services to all member States. In our view these missions would definitely contribute to the improvement of the operational satety of nuclear-power plants.

The Agency's recent programme to upgrade the safety of nuclear-power plants in the former USSR and Eastern Europe is highly noteworthy. We expect that the Agency will take suitable initiatives for upgrading safety, refurbishing and extending the useful life-span of the other ageing nuclear-power plants in developing countries as well.

In recent years, nuclear-reactor accidents have underlined the essential need for the proper maintenance and repair of nuclear reactors. Yet in certain cases essential spare parts are not being provided for reactors even when they are under Agency safeguards. This situation is totally unjustified and requires urgent redress. We call upon the supplier States to provide full maintenance coverage for the reactors provided by them.

We commend the Agency's efforts in convening a meeting of experts with a view to arriving at an international nuclear-safety convention. There should indeed be certain minimum binding international standards for nuclear safety. However, nuclear safety is, and should remain, the responsibility of national regulatory authorities. The Agency's safety-related services to member States such as the OSART, ASSET, the Waste Management Advisory Programme (WAMAP) and the Radioactive Waste Management Safety Standards (RADWASS) missions can be of tremendous help to national regulators, and member States could be encouraged to make further use of these missions.

We would suggest that the Agency, in providing various safety-related services to its member States, should make increased use of the experts

available from developing countries in order to benefit from their familiarity with and knowledge of the facilities in question.

Pakistan has actively sought to promote an international agreement prohibiting attacks against all nuclear facilities. In this connection, I would mention that Pakistan and India have ratified the agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. In our view such agreements will enhance nuclear safety.

Pakistan has always adhered to and will continue to lend its fullest support to the Agency safeguards. We have time and again reaffirmed, at the highest level, our commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In efforts to keep the world free from the scourge of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has been calling for the total prohibition of nuclear testing. Pakistan has, in addition, made several proposals to keep our region free of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly since 1974. Last year, the Prime Minister of Pakistan called for consultations among the United States, the Russian Federation, China, India and Pakistan to ensure nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis.

We are encouraged by the positive response by the United States, Russia and China to the Prime Minister's proposal. We hope that India will also respond positively. This proposal reflects our sincere commitment to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation.

I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate Pakistan's full support for the development of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. It is our earnest hope that the Agency, in keeping with its charter and mandate, will assign top priority to this objective. This has become all the more important as developing countries are faced with increasing resistance from some States in their efforts to obtain technology for the development and advancement of their peaceful nuclear-energy programmes.

The General Assembly, in its resolution 32/50, has categorically affirmed that

"All States have the right, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, to develop their programme for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs". (resolution 32/50, para. 1 (b))

The resolution also clearly states that:

"All States, without discrimination, should have access to and should be free to acquire nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy". (resolution 32/50, para. 1 (c))

Pakistan believes that all States Members of the United Nations should abide by these principles, in order to check and reverse the negative trends impeding international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology.

There is a growing realization in the world today that, along with energy conservation, increasing reliance on nuclear energy is vital for limiting and controlling the "greenhouse effect". There is consequently a growing resurgence of interest in many countries in increasing the share of nuclear power in their national power-generation programmes. Under the circumstances, it is all the more important that the benefits of nuclear power be made technically and economically accessible to energy-starved developing countries without discrimination.

We believe that an equitable balance should be maintained between the funds allocated by the Agency for technical assistance and those provided for safeguards. The regulatory and promotional functions of the IAEA are indeed complementary. We support the Agency's proposals for improvements in its safeguards applications and procedures. We hope these improvements will be effected, as far as possible, through streadining and enhancing efficiency and not through the diversion of resources from the equally vital objective of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Moreover, as in the case of nuclear safeguards, the technical assistance activities of the IAEA should also be financed through a predictable and assured source of funding.

Pakistan is pleased to join in supporting the draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. KRASULIN (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian):

The Russian delegation would like, first of all, to express its gratitude to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the comprehensive presentation of the Agency's report for 1991, which gives us a fairly full picture of the broad and varied activities carried on by IAEA for the benefit of the entire international community.

Today those activities are taking place against the backdrop of radical changes in the world. For all its complexity, the emerging new situation is objectively leading to the enhancement of the role and potential of central agencies for international cooperation, including such an important international organization as IAEA. Our country will continue to provide IAEA with the necessary support in all areas of its activities, thereby strengthening the Agency's authority and influence.

We find very timely the broad spectrum of IAEA programmes for studying and resolving such important problems as current and future technology for nuclear power and its fuel cycle, the handling of radioactive waste, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the physical protection of nuclear materials. We commend the work done by the Agency to ensure nuclear and radiation safety, and we feel that it is necessary to help raise that safety to the highest level, both in our own country and throughout the world.

Unquestionably, a key activity of the Agency is convincing the world community that the nuclear materials and installations under the control of IAEA are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. I would especially like to mention in this connection that a great deal of work is being done by IAEA in Iraq in pursuance of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

Under new conditions - and this was also confirmed, in particular, during the general debate at this session of the General Assembly - foremost among multilateral efforts are the problems of ensuring non-proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and strengthening the existing non-proliferation regimes. A major effort here is aimed at strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and making it a universal agreement of unlimited duration, and we view this as the main goal of the Conference on the Treaty, to be held in 1995.

Russia welcomes the fact that China, France, South Africa and a number of other countries have acceded to the NPT and that Argentina and Brazil have assumed appropriate obligations in the area of safeguards.

It is significant that not only is an active process under way to make the Treaty universal, but also some of its particular provisions, such as its important Article VI, which contains obligations regarding disarmament measures, are being implemented. A convincing example of such progress and a radically new step in the area of weapons monitoring was the agreement reached at Washington by the Presidents of Russia and the United States on further substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. That agreement represents a logical extension of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Arms and the Lisbon Protocol to it. It has become a practical reflection in the military sphere of the radically new pattern of relations between Russia and the United States and of a different role for those two Powers in the world. For the first time, a joint understanding has been built not on the basis of arithmetical equality but on the basis of reasonable sufficiency. This circumstance is of significance as a matter of principle, and we hope that it will have a positive effect on the position of other nuclear Powers and on the strengthening of strategic stability and international security as a whole.

Russia considers it essential that the disintegration of the former

Soviet Union should not lead to any complications of the situation with regard
to non-proliferation. It is of fundamental significance in this context that

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have undertaken to accede to the NPT as
non-nuclear States.

At the present time, as we see it, all true supporters of a non-proliferation regime must intensify their joint efforts to the maximum, so as to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading all over our planet. In that respect, pursuant to the decree issued by the President of Russia on 27 March 1992, nuclear exports from our country to non-nuclear States will in future be carried out only on condition that those States place all of their nuclear activity under the control of IABA. It is also in that light that we view the agreement of a number of countries which are nuclear suppliers to introduce a unified monitoring mechanism for the export of dual-purpose articles.

Russia regards as a priority area of the Agency's activity the monitoring of the peaceful use of atomic energy and the improvement of the Agency's system of international safeguards. In our opinion, the Agency has substantial capacity for further improvement in this field, and we welcome its recent decisions along those lines. We are convinced that in order to strengthen the regime of nuclear non-proliferation, it is necessary to have safeguard measures and nuclear-facility-inspection programmes that are adequate to cope with the level of today's scientific and technical progress. Russia is prepared to make its contribution to the solution of that important problem.

In the light of the genuine progress made in nuclear disarmament, the further reconciliation of the positions of various countries in the matter of limiting nuclear tests, to the point of their total cessation, takes on increased importance. Russia advocates making an immediate start in drafting an international agreement on the subject, with the participation of all States. Russia's moratorium, which was recently extended to 1 July 1993 by a decree of President Yeltsin, France's halting of its tests and the recent decision taken by the United States demonstrate that approaches to the problem are changing in a constructive way.

In the current favourable situation, it is important to give new impetus
to progress towards banning nuclear tests and to intensify efforts in the
search for universally acceptable and effective practical resolutions to
existing problems in this sphere.

The United Nations should continue to consider questions relating to the further improvement of the regime of safeguards for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Russia's position as the Soviet Union's successor as a Member of the United Nations and a member of the Security Council and as

a party to international agreements confirms the statement made by the Soviet representative in the Security Council on 17 June 1968 with regard to so-called positive safeguards. We also see some value in having the General Assembly recommend that the Conference on Disarmament should encourage the efforts of the special committee on safeguards in order to stimulate the search for universally acceptable practical solutions in that sphere. For example, more comparable, even if not identical, formulas for so-called negative safeguards for non-nuclear countries could be drafted.

In our view, the United Nations and IAEA are capable of making a substantial contribution to the creation of effective international machinery for monitoring the production and export of fissionable materials. In particular, the General Assembly could support the rapid preparation of an international agreement to end the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials. We advocate the immediate inclusion of problems of this type in the negotiations.

The Russian Federation welcomes the decision of the United States that, in order to promote nuclear disarmament, it will forgo the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. For its part, the Russian Federation confirms its intention to continue the programme of shutting down its remaining facilities for producing weapons-grade plutonium. Our proposal to the United States to begin negotiations immediately on the supervised cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of weapons also remains open.

With regard to IAEA's multifaceted activities, we should like to point out that in the main, the Agency has indeed resolved major problems in such areas as promoting the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and

providing technical assistance. Accordingly, we take a favourable view of the enhancement of activities in respect of the comparative assessment of various sources of electrical energy from the standpoint of the environment, economy and safety. We also support the activities of the Agency in connection with nuclear power generation and its fuel cycle, nuclear safety, the handling of radioactive waste, the International Nuclear Information System (INIS), technical assistance and other areas of interest to all Member States. Of special significance in our view is the great effort that the Agency has made and is continuing to make for an international assessment of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. The eradication of those consequences and the safe operation of nuclear power plants continue to be at the focus of the Russian Government's attention.

Support for IAEA presupposes that financial obligations to the Agency will be met. Between September of this year and March 1993, Russia, despite its economic difficulties, will pay \$12 million in partial settlement of its debt to IAEA.

In conclusion, the delegation of the Russian Federation would like once again to express its approval of the IAEA report for 1991. In commending the Agency's activities, we associate its success with the effective work of its secretariat and its Director General, Mr. Hans Blix.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I should like, on behalf of the European Community and its member States, to thank Mr. Blix and the staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for their work over the past 12 months. The period since the last IAEA report to the General Assembly has been one of great activity, and we should like to express our appreciation of the role that the Agency has played in it.

Of all the Agency's activities over the past year, none has been more important or more visible than the efforts, made under the relevant Security Council resolutions, to uncover and render harmless Iraq's nuclear-weapons programme, which was pursued covertly over a considerable period in flagrant breach of the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and safeguards obligations. We are grateful to the Director General and his staff for the painstaking and determined way in which they have pursued their tasks, notwithstanding persistent and wilful deception and obstruction from the Iraqi authorities. We are confident that they will continue to demonstrate the same dedication.

In this context the Community and its member States reiterate the demand contained in resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/579 of the IAEA General Conference, which was adopted on 25 September 1992, that Iraq immediately and fully comply with all its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the Agency and under relevant Security Council resolutions, including the requirement, under Security Council resolution 707 (1991), that it submit a full, final and complete declaration of Iraq's nuclear programme, including all information called for by Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The information that Iraq has provided to date has been seriously lacking, and a number of important lacunae still exist - most notably on procurement, enrichment and weaponization. The Community and its member States hope that Iraq is in no doubt about the resolve of the international community to pursue this issue to a satisfactory conclusion.

During the year, there have been more welcome highlights, which have reinforced the non-proliferation regime. China and France have acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. This means that all five permanent members of the Security Council are now parties to the Treaty.

We also welcome the positive developments towards nuclear non-proliferation in Latin America, in particular the steps taken by various countries in the region towards bringing into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the signing of a fullscope safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil and the Agency. We are following with interest the implementation of this agreement as well as the agreement concluded last year between the Agency and the South African Government. We are also following with interest the work being conducted by the Director General to identify possible model safeguards agreements for the Middle East, and we welcome the widespread consensus of support for his efforts expressed by last month's General Conference.

We welcome, too, the ratification by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its safeguards agreement with the Agency. We look to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea fully to implement this agreement as soon as possible. In this context we also look forward to full implementation of the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The Community and its member States have long attached the highest priority to the continuing task of improving and strengthening the whole safeguards system. Proposals by the Twelve have helped to shape discussion of how this can best be done. We welcome in particular the reaffirmation of the Agency's right to conduct special inspections. We are also working out the best way to meet the Director General's request to extend the information reported to the Agency by voluntarily providing additional information on the production of concentrates, on inventories of nuclear materials and on international transfers of sensitive equipment.

We must emphasize the importance of the Agency's pressing on with its fundamental study of possible alternative safeguards regimes. In the same context we attach great importance to the agreement between the Director General and European Communities Commissioner Cardoso E Cunha on a new partnership between the Commission and the Agency safeguards departments to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. We see the repartnership as a vital opportunity, not only to secure the full implementation of Information Circular 193 in a way which respects the responsibilities of both sides, but also to refocus resources on areas where safeguards can make the greatest contribution to non-proliferation.

We should not lose sight of what has been achieved during the past year in the Agency's more directly promotional functions - for example, in developing non-power uses of nuclear energy, where many examples of fine work could be quoted. Recognition is also due to the high level of continuing work in supplying technical assistance.

Concerning nuclear safety generally, the Community and its member States note with satisfaction that agreement has been reached on the formulation of safety fundamentals. This will be a basic document. The Agency's review teams have also expanded the practical enhancement of nuclear safety world wide. The increased number of requests for Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions and Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team (ASSET) missions is the clearest evidence of their value.

Last year the Community and its member States welcomed the start of a step-by-step approach towards the establishment of an international nuclear safety régime. As the instigators of the Conference on Nuclear Safety, held in Vienna in September 1991, we continue strongly to support the conclusion of

a nuclear safety convention. We would see such a convention as an important contribution to raising the general level of nuclear safety world wide and to creating a harmonized international approach to all aspects of nuclear safety. We are pleased to note that a group of experts has started work on a nuclear safety convention, and take the view that their activities should be completed as soon as possible. The Community and its member States are committed to playing a positive part in its negotiation and in the continuing discussions, based on current international nuclear safety experience, of the means of implementing it.

The Community and its member States also recognize the contribution of the Agency in assisting the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in their efforts to improve nuclear safety. We wish to continue our close cooperation with the Agency in the development of its technical assistance programmes in the area. Similarly, we support the call by the Economic Summit in Munich for the international community to contribute to the financing of an urgent programme aimed at improving the safety of nuclear installations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We welcome, too, the agreement among the Group of 24 that stronger coordination of these efforts is required and that the resulting machinery will look to the Agency for advice.

Last December the European Energy Charter was signed in The Hague. The Community and its member States are grateful for the help which the Agency has so far given in the negotiation of the nuclear protocol to the Charter. We look forward now to quick conclusions to the Charter's basic agreement and nuclear protocol on principles governing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the safety of nuclear installations.

In conclusion, I should like once again to express, on behalf of the Community and its member States, gratitude to the Director General and his staff for having maintained over the last year such a high level of professionalism in their work. We are sure they will continue to keep up these standards in the years to come.

AGENDA ITEM 148

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES: DRAFT RESOLUTION A/47/L.8

The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey to introduce draft resolution A/47/L.8.

Mr. AKSIN (Turkey): The eruption of Mount Pinatubo that began in June of last year has turned out to be a major natural disaster whose effects will be felt for many years in the Philippines.

As a result of the eruption of a volano that had remained dormant for many centuries, some of the most fertile agricultural areas of central Luzon have been turned into wasteland. Many thriving cities, towns and villages have been devastated by thick layers of volcanic dust that settled on a vast area surrounding Mount Pinatubo. Roads have been cut and infrastructure has been destroyed.

The eruption resulted in much loss of life and extensive material damage. Close to a million people have been displaced. When the monsoon rains arrived they caused the volcanic dust on the slopes of the mountain to descend into the lowlands in the form of huge mud slides. It looks as though this condition will recur for a number of years, turning this catastrophe into a continuous, unfolding disaster, with painful consequences for the victims and for the Philippine economy.

The Government of the Philippines must be commended for the urgent measures it has taken to alleviate the suffering of the victims. However, given the magnitude of the calamity, it is clear that the national efforts by the Philippines will not suffice. There is a pressing need for international assistance by Governments as well as other organizations.

It is in response to this need that I have the honour to introduce, on behalf of the 61 sponsoring countries, draft resolution A/47/L.8, entitled "Emergency Assistance to the Philippines".

In addition to the sponsors listed in the document, the following countries have joined in sponsoring the draft resolution: Afghanistan, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jamaica, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the Sudan, Spain, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States of America and Viet Nam.

This draft resolution is made up of five preambular and three operative paragraphs.

Under the draft resolution, the Assembly would call upon the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the relevant organs and organizations of the United Nations system and in close collaboration with the Government authorities, to assist in the rehabilitation efforts of the Government of the Philippines. It would also request all States and international organizations to extend, on an urgent basis, further support to the Philippines in ways that would alleviate, for the duration of the emergency and the ensuing rehabilitation process, the economic and financial burden borne by the Philippine people.

This draft resolution is an expression of international support and solidarity for the victims of the disaster and demonstrates our readiness to contribute morally and materially towards their rehabilitation. Its adoption will set the stage for mustering international support to assist the people and Government of the Philippines. I am confident that the General Assembly will adopt the draft resolution by consensus.

Mr. FERNANDEZ PITA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): My country, which has traditional historical and cultural ties with the Philippines, has the honour of being a sponsor of draft resolution A/47/L.8, entitled "Emergency assistance to the Philippines". My Government wishes to stress how important the draft resolution is for the people and the Government of the Philippines, which has been afflicted by various types of natural disasters in recent years.

The adoption of this draft resolution would give important support to the efforts the Government and people of the Philippines are making to help the country recover from these disasters.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the Assembly that there are two additional sponsors of the draft resolution: Bangladesh and Sao Tome and Principe.

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/47/L.8.

May I take it that the Assembly decides to adopt it?

<u>Draft resolution A/47/L.8 was adopted</u> (resolution 47/7).

Mrs. ESCALER (Philippines): On behalf of the Government and people of the Philippines, I should like to express our most profound appreciation to, first of all, the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations for his perceptive and sympathetic introduction of the draft resolution just

(Mrs. Escaler, Philippines)

adopted; to the representative of Spain and the delegations of 63 Member States for their sponsorship of the draft resolution; to you, Sir, and the other officers of the General Committee for the speedy and favourable consideration of our request for inclusion of the present item on the agenda; and to all the members of the Assembly for having joined the consensus on the resolution.

Echoing Ambassador Aksin's remarks, the Philippines takes the resolution and its adoption today by acclamation as an unequivocal expression of international support for, and solidarity with the disaster victims and the Filipino nation. This magnanimous action of the Assembly will give positive encouragement to my Government and people to intensify our efforts to provide relief and emergency assistance to the peoples affected.

The process of rehabilitating the shattered lives of numerous communities, given the continuing nature of the calamity, will be long and arduous. Yet, with unwavering international support, which the Assembly expressed today, we know that we shall overcome.

The PRESIDENT: May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 148?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.