



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24726
29 October 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 28 OCTOBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 28 October 1992 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, calling on the Security Council to revise its position and attitude towards Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 28 October 1992 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I

Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) stipulating, inter alia, that Iraq is to be deprived of certain types of weapons and imposing on it a strict prohibition with regard to their future production, the Security Council and other United Nations organs (the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) have been waging a ferocious and unparalleled campaign for implementation of this particular part of the resolution. Thus far, 45 inspection teams have visited Iraq, making scheduled or unannounced visits to hundreds of sites in all parts of the country and using for their inspection activities helicopters and means of surface transportation, and there have been since 12 August 1991 constant overflights of Iraq by the United States U-2 aircraft to supplement the activities of United States spy satellites.

Under strong pressure from the parties concerned in the Security Council and in response to their vehement and persistent propaganda campaigns against Iraq, the Special Commission and IAEA decided to destroy a large quantity of equipment and many buildings that it was claimed were used in the production of weapons prohibited by resolution 687 (1991). They did so despite the fact that Iraqi experts had demonstrated their possible use for civilian purposes and had even proved that they were being put to use for civilian purposes following the military aggression in the reconstruction of the country and in meeting the civilian needs of Iraqi citizens enduring the greatest suffering under the unjust blanket embargo imposed on them in August 1990 and maintained until today.

During this time, the Security Council has adopted a very large number of resolutions and statements containing the strongest and most hostile language directed against Iraq. The Government of the United States, together with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, has adopted a persistent policy of threatening to use military force against Iraq, issuing threats against its people, its leadership, its armed forces and its civilian installations.

Anyone who traces the course of events since resolution 687 (1991) was adopted on 3 April 1991 will discover that the most ferocious campaign in the history of the United Nations, using all means of intimidation, coercion and pressure, has been waged against Iraq with the aim of achieving the objectives set forth in that resolution.

For the sake of truth and for the historical record, we are here obliged to state that most of the inspection teams that have visited Iraq behaved in a hostile manner and proceeded to engage in effrontery, provocation and the contrivance of problems without regard for the sovereignty, dignity and

/...

security of the people of Iraq or for the scientific and technical facts relevant to the objectives set forth in resolution 687 (1991). For the most part, they have based their inspection plans not on scientific, technical and logical considerations but on the tendentious reports and data intended to provide a cover for biased and predetermined actions that were supplied to them by the intelligence agencies of certain States with well-known political designs against Iraq. Those States have used the teams' activities and certain of their members (of whom there have been many) in order to further those designs. The teams have behaved more like medieval inquisitions than technical inspection teams with well-defined objectives such as those set forth in resolution 687 (1991).

In a letter from its Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 6 April 1991, Iraq expressed its preliminary position with regard to the unjust resolution 687 (1991), which has no parallel among Security Council resolutions in the history of the United Nations. In concluding his letter, the Minister said:

"As Iraq makes its preliminary comments on the juridical and legal aspects of this resolution, so as to encourage men of conscience in the countries members of the international community and world public opinion to make an effort to understand the truth as it is and the need to ensure the triumph of justice, it has no choice but to accept this resolution."

Iraq has on many occasions expressed its readiness to cooperate with the Security Council, the Special Commission and IAEA in the implementation of resolution 687 (1991), just as it has also conveyed its acceptance in principle of future monitoring so that the Council may ascertain that the production of weapons prohibited by resolution 687 (1991) is not resumed. The Security Council is fully aware of the extent to which the obligations imposed on Iraq by resolution 687 (1991) have thus far been fulfilled, and we shall give particular attention to this matter in the third part of this letter.

The Security Council, which has waged such a ferocious campaign against Iraq for close to two years, has not, however, given any thought to devoting a single moment of its time to following up another essential part of resolution 687 (1991), namely that in which the Council:

"Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons".

This vital part of the resolution is of the Security Council's own making, but the Council has done nothing to follow it up at the very time the feverish pace of the arms race in the region is accelerating, including that for the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Disregard for this part of the resolution or failure to ensure its proper implementation would do serious damage not only to the concept of security and to the possibility of its establishment in the region but also to the security and sovereignty of other States in the region, among them Iraq.

/...

All the facts indicate that Israel possesses a large arsenal of nuclear and chemical weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and this has been confirmed by many well-known studies and reports and has been the subject of numerous resolutions adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly and IAEA. It is also firmly established that Israel is constantly strengthening and expanding this arsenal with direct assistance from the Government of the United States, the leader of the ruthless campaign against Iraq inside and outside the Security Council.

There are also daily reports that convey disturbing news of very large arms deals being made by Iran with many countries for the purpose of obtaining long-range missiles and missile technology for their production inside Iran, strengthening its arsenal of chemical weapons and developing its capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The reports, the most significant of which include reports from Western sources, even affirm that Iran is endeavouring to obtain or has perhaps already actually obtained nuclear warheads ready for use.

These facts not only raise in an acute form the question of the double standards the Security Council applies in the resolutions it adopts but also confirm the selective and biased approach that the same Council pursues in dealing with the various parts and sections of these resolutions, and particularly with regard to resolution 687 (1991). While everything relating to the denial to Iraq of the weapons prohibited by resolution 687 (1991) is given high priority in the Council's agenda and in its resolutions and procedures, the Council deliberately disregards that vital part of the resolution that relates to other countries in the region, and it leaves the way open to Israel and Iran in particular to strengthen their arsenals of weapons of mass destruction.

This reality thoroughly discredits the basis given by the Security Council for the adoption of its peculiar and unjust resolution 687 (1991) and of the other peculiar and unjust resolutions it has adopted against Iraq. It reveals, with unambiguous clarity, that the real driving force behind the adoption of this and other resolutions was not action supported by the Charter or the claim made in the preamble to the resolution that the Council was acting to maintain security and stability in the region. The true motive was rather that of destroying a particular Arab country, namely Iraq, depriving it of the means of defending itself, destroying its industrial capacities even in civilian fields, blockading it by land, sea and air, killing its people by depriving it of food and medicine, and plundering its assets deposited overseas. This has been done on the basis of an imperialist policy determined primarily by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which have used the Security Council as a tool for this policy with a view to restoring their control over the region and plundering its enormous oil wealth. While the facts concerning the relations of alliance and collusion between the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France and the Government of Israel have been known to all for decades past, there is abundant evidence to indicate that conniving and suspicious deals and transactions between the Governments of these three countries and the Government of Iran are also going on. This is confirmed by the indifferent

/...

attitude they have assumed towards the de facto control exercised by the Government of Iran over islands in the Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates, while it was these same three countries that mounted the swiftest and largest political, diplomatic, propaganda and military campaign since the Second World War against Iraq because of the Kuwait issue. They did not in that crisis leave any room, however small, for its resolution by diplomatic means, and they did not accept any discussion short of Iraq's immediate and unconditional accession to their will. In contrast, there is at present no interdiction or abstention with regard to the diplomatic handling of the problem of the islands in the Gulf, despite the fact that Iran, a foreign and non-Arab country, is imposing de facto occupation and reinforcing it with ongoing measures.

From the experience of the past two years, it has become evident to all fair and objective observers that the stark fact is that the situation with respect to peace and stability in the region is now much worse than it was before Iraq was attacked by the coalition in January 1991 under the cloak of Security Council resolution 678 (1991) and that that situation is continuing to deteriorate and to bespeak dire consequences.

While we bear in mind the importance of dealing with the obligations imposed on us under resolution 687 (1991), as stated in the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq of 6 April 1991, we affirm the foregoing facts and we affirm in particular that the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) in the biased and extreme manner observed during the past two years has rendered no service to the region in terms of strengthening its security and stability. It has, on the contrary, opened wide the way to a dangerous disequilibrium in the balance of forces in the region and to the emergence of serious threats to its security and stability such as to prompt its inhabitants and those in the outside world interested in its affairs to adopt an extremely pessimistic view of its future. This reality should be subjected to examination, as quickly as possible, in an objective manner that is not subject to the whims and personal considerations of the rulers who became embroiled in the said policies, and such examination should remain aloof from the narrow, short-term interests of certain governments that are seeking deals with which to cope with financial crises or current elections but which thereby risk forcing an important and sensitive region to enter into very dangerous labyrinths. Iraq is prepared to participate in such an examination in a spirit of responsibility and with a genuine desire to ensure balance, security and stability in the entire region.

II

We have already referred to the atmosphere of hostility against Iraq that was fabricated in connection with the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and that has been maintained without regard for the destruction and ruin inflicted on Iraq in the military campaign waged against it by the United States and more than 30 other countries. Among the consequences of that campaign were the destruction of electric power stations, oil refineries,

/...

communications centres, bridges and roads and government and other buildings, all of which had a far-reaching impact in the first months following the aggression on the practical ability of the Iraqi authorities to meet all of the requirements of the inspection teams that began their work of implementing section C of resolution 687 (1991) in the period 15-21 May 1991. In this charged and biased atmosphere, the Security Council adopted resolutions for which there would have been no practical need had the attitude towards Iraq been objective and fair and free of political objectives. In this atmosphere, measures were also imposed on Iraq that were prompted and instigated by certain States for the purpose of increasing the political pressure on it and threatening its sovereignty and national security. I cite by way of example the following:

1. Resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)

On 15 August 1991, the Security Council adopted its resolution 707 (1991) condemning Iraq's so-called violation of and non-compliance with its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991) and under its safeguards agreement with IAEA. It did so in order to justify the series of stringent measures set forth in the other operative paragraphs of the resolution, which constitute a violation of Iraq's sovereignty. One example to that effect is that resolution 707 (1991) provides that the Special Commission and IAEA should be allowed "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect". It also provides that they should be allowed "to conduct both fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all relevant purposes including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics without interference of any kind and upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Special Commission, and to make full use of their own aircraft and such airfields in Iraq as they may determine are most appropriate for the work of the Commission." It further determines "that Iraq retains no ownership interest in items to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless". Security Council resolution 715 (1991), adopted on 11 October 1991, approves the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of IAEA for future ongoing monitoring, which include very stringent and intrusive restrictions and terms and reflect the approach embodied in resolution 707 (1991). The provisions contained in these two resolutions reveal the most dangerous and crudest aspects of the intentions of the parties that had planned the vicious campaigns preparing the atmosphere in the Council for their adoption, after all Iraq had done to meet the obligations imposed on it by resolution 687 (1991). It is therefore essential for the Council to conduct a radical review, on a basis of justice and fairness, of the terms and provisions of these two resolutions.

2. The helicopter issue

At the beginning of July 1991, the Special Commission asked for two Iraqi helicopters so that it could use them as means of transportation for one of the inspection teams in the western zone. For technical reasons at that time,

/...

Iraq was unable to comply. Instead of endeavouring to understand the considerations of the Iraqi side, on 10 July 1991 the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission requested that three German helicopters should be used for this purpose. Iraq objected to such use, explaining that the safe and comfortable means of surface transportation it had provided the inspection teams were such that there was no practical need to use helicopters and stating its caveats with regard to the use of non-Iraqi helicopters in the country. The Special Commission nevertheless insisted on its request, the matter became enveloped in an atmosphere of loud media uproar, and military threats were made against Iraq. Confronted with this situation, Iraq offered to make available Iraqi helicopters for the purpose in question, but the Special Commission, which had requested Iraqi helicopters a few days before, insisted on using the German helicopters, stating at the time that their utilization would be of short duration and would perhaps last for no more than two months. To avoid aggravating the problem, Iraq agreed to permit the German helicopters, and they arrived in the country. The temporary use of these helicopters then became transformed into a situation that has persisted up to the present.

3. The United States U-2 spy-plane

In August 1991, the Special Commission informed Iraq that it had decided to conduct aerial surveys over Iraqi territory for the purpose both of identifying any additional inspection sites and of ensuring ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991) at either declared sites or those designated by the Special Commission. Iraq was informed that United States aircraft would be used, flying from Saudi Arabia: if Iraq did not approve such flights, they would be escorted by military aircraft for their protection. Although Iraq objected to this request, both because the aircraft designated for this intrusive and quasi-military task would not fly any higher than the satellites continuously performing surveillance of Iraq and because the choice of a United States aircraft gave rise to suspicions that the mission would be carried out for purposes other than those declared by the United Nations, the Special Commission paid no heed to Iraq's objection. The Special Commission proceeded to draw up a regular programme of flights and to operate that programme, on an obligatory basis, in accordance with a procedure whereby the Iraqi side was notified of the dates of such flights and acknowledged receipt of such notification. The Special Commission subsequently announced that the United States U-2 spy-plane would be used for this purpose, despite the fact that the selection of this single-seat aircraft violated the undertaking previously given by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in his letter dated 15 May 1991 concerning the Special Commission's privileges and immunities in Iraq. Under the terms of that letter, "the Government of Iraq may in each case designate an observer to accompany the team taking the aerial photography".

The issue of the helicopters and the U-2 aircraft was explicitly raised at the meeting between the Security Council and the Iraqi delegation under Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz held on 11 and 12 March 1992. The Iraqi

/...

delegation indicated that the use of such aircraft, being the property of foreign States, was not in fact designed to meet the declared objectives of inspection and technical observation but instead for the purpose of gathering intelligence on behalf of certain Governments which are endeavouring to undermine the internal situation in Iraq and, disgracefully, to eliminate its national leadership. These, indeed, are among the declared objectives of those Governments.

Our many letters addressed to you, together with established facts, confirm that the activities of the helicopters and the United States U-2 aircraft have, for the most part, been directed towards such objectives.

In this connection, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, spoke as follows at the meeting of the Security Council held on 11 March 1992:

"We have a right here to raise doubts and apprehensions. For how are we to interpret the fact that we have seen this aircraft conduct around 15 flights over Baghdad alone, each flight lasting three to four hours; and that this operation was repeated several times within one month earlier this year? Why is it that we fail to choose another aircraft, from an impartial State, to operate from an Iraqi airfield with an Iraqi pilot accompanying its crew, in order that we may be satisfied that the operation will be carried out to accomplish the objectives of resolution 687 (1991) and not political or intelligence objectives threatening Iraq's security? How long will these extraordinary measures continue? Does not the basic principle of respect for Iraq's sovereignty and security call for the determination of a reasonable period for these suspect reconnaissance operations to be brought to an end? It is imperative, therefore, that this subject be discussed in a serious and fair manner." (S/PV.3059)

The time has come for the Security Council to review these unjust decisions and measures, which threaten the security and sovereignty of Iraq, and to make balanced practical arrangements with the Iraqi side in order to exclude biased political and intelligence-related factors, to keep the issue in a scientific and technical context related to the objectives of resolution 687 (1991) and to ensure that each measure has a specific time-frame. While affirming its readiness to maintain objective and constructive cooperation with the Security Council for the purpose of making such arrangements, Iraq expects a new style of treatment from the Security Council, based on objectivity, fairness and understanding of these legitimate considerations. It also expects the Council, in its dealings with Iraq, to distance itself from the particular political influences and biased objectives of certain Governments. The adoption of such a course by the Security Council will be welcomed by the Iraqi side and will strengthen the foundations of constructive cooperation between the two parties.

We do not believe that it is right for the Security Council - as an institution with specific declared purposes - to push matters in directions which do not fulfil the objectives for which the Council was established.

/...

Nor, irrespective of the aims of certain members of the Council to which we have already referred, do we believe that it is right for the Security Council to push matters in directions which neither it nor Iraq initially desires or chooses.

4. Prohibition of Iraqi flights north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd parallel

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have arrogated to themselves the right to launch an assault on Iraq's sovereignty and flagrantly to interfere in its internal affairs. Without any justification under the Charter or the precepts governing relations between States, and in the context of a tendentious media campaign filled with false allegations, these three States imposed a ban on activity by any Iraqi aircraft north of the 36th parallel with effect from 6 April 1991. The three aforementioned States even went so far as to reject our request to resume civilian flights to Mosul, a city whose population is - and has been throughout history - overwhelmingly Arab, simply on the grounds that it lies within the area drawn by the pens of those countries' military personnel. They also turned down our request to use helicopters at Mosul for the evacuation of injured persons and emergency cases of a humanitarian nature.

These States then took identical measures in southern Iraq, imposing without justification a ban on Iraqi flights south of the 32nd parallel.

Iraq is aware that these measures were not taken on the basis of a Security Council resolution. However, it wishes to register with the Council a vigorous protest against the autocratic actions of hegemonistic States which claim, by virtue of their membership of the Security Council, to be endeavouring to help the Council to achieve its objectives of peace and security. It calls on the international community to condemn those actions and to show solidarity with Iraq by urging their rejection and the accordance of respect for Iraq's absolute sovereignty over its territory and airspace. These States' behaviour, and the measures taken by them against Iraq, are incompatible with a number of Security Council resolutions which affirm respect for Iraq's sovereignty and independence. Such behaviour and outrageous autocratic measures entirely undermine the legitimacy of the resolutions so long as the Security Council itself fails to address this issue.

III

Security Council resolution 661 (1990) was adopted on 6 August 1990 in connection with Iraq's compliance with resolution 660 (1990), adopted on 3 August 1990. Until the date of the military aggression against Iraq on 17 January 1991, the question of the embargo against Iraq remained linked to compliance with resolution 660 (1990).

However, after the military aggression against Iraq, influential members of the Security Council - and particularly the United States - imposed fresh

/...

conditions for lifting the embargo which they incorporated into resolution 687 (1991).

This tightening of the terms imposed on Iraq clearly demonstrates an essential fact which has been gradually revealed with the passing of time, especially since the end of the military aggression against Iraq and the end of the Kuwait issue. The truth is that the campaign of hostility against Iraq, including all the elements which both preceded and followed 2 August 1990, did not derive from the Kuwait issue but from a decision taken by the Government of the United States, in conjunction and by agreement with the United Kingdom and France, and with direct and indirect participation by Israel, both to destroy the military force which Iraq had built up - for defensive purposes - in conditions of defence against the Iranian aggression and to wreck the achievements of Iraq's resurgence and scientific, technological and economic progress. This decision was taken because the United States, the Western countries and Israel saw Iraq's achievements in this regard as a violation of the status they had planned for the Middle East region, whereby the region was to be kept weak and underdeveloped, constantly at the mercy of Israeli military supremacy and under the direct or indirect domination of the United States and its Western allies, in order to ensure their control of oil resources and absolute power to determine the uses, commercialization and pricing of oil, as well as their ability to dictate trends and the level of development in the region and Third World countries in such a way as to prevent other parties from choosing any alternative.

This fact has been vividly demonstrated in the provisions of resolution 687 (1991) and of the subsequent resolutions adopted by the Security Council, and in the obligatory aggressive attitude to Iraq, in all its continuing forms and phases, ever since the end of the military operations.

At this stage we must register the fact that certain permanent members of the Security Council asserted, both before and during the military aggression, that their position with respect to all the forms of prohibition and sanctions mentioned in resolution 661 (1990) and others depended on Iraq's attitude to resolution 660 (1990).

At the talks in Moscow between Mr. Tariq Aziz, at that time Deputy Prime Minister and also Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on 18 and 21 February 1991, Mr. Gorbachev affirmed that a clear declaration by the Iraqi leadership of compliance with resolution 660 (1990) would automatically invalidate resolution 661 (1990) and lead to removal of all the sanctions imposed on Iraq under that and other resolutions so far adopted.

This is evident in the plan announced by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on 22 February 1991 and approved by Iraq, which included the following provisions:

1. Iraq agrees to implement resolution 660 (1990), i.e. to withdraw unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.

/...

2. The withdrawal shall commence on the day following a cease-fire encompassing all military operations on land, at sea and in the air.

3. Forces shall be withdrawn within 21 days, including withdrawal of forces from Kuwait City within the first four days.

4. Immediately upon completion of the withdrawal of forces from Kuwait, the causes which gave rise to the adoption of the other Security Council resolutions shall be deemed to have lapsed, and those resolutions shall therefore no longer be valid.

5. All prisoners of war shall be released within three days of the cease-fire and the cessation of military operations.

6. Supervision and monitoring of the cease-fire and withdrawal of forces shall be undertaken by observers or peace-keeping forces as determined by the Security Council.

However, the Soviet Security Council representative very quickly contradicted the position previously adopted by Gorbachev on 22 February 1991 when, on 3 April 1991, he voted for resolution 687 (1991), which added fresh conditions with respect to the economic embargo. China, on the other hand, maintained its position by abstaining from the vote, as it had done in the case of resolution 678 (1990).

Paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) linked the question of lifting the ban on oil imports from Iraq to its application of section C of the resolution, as follows:

"Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above [i.e. arrangements for the compensation fund programme] and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above [i.e. the disarmament paragraphs], the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect."

As Iraq progressively discharged the obligations imposed on it under, inter alia, section C of resolution 687 (1991), it called - without success - for a full or partial removal of the ban on Iraqi oil exports, with a view to meeting the basic civilian needs of the Iraqi people.

On 23 January 1992 the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a letter to which he annexed a comprehensive report containing a documented factual review of all those obligations imposed on Iraq under resolution 687 (1991) that had so far been discharged. In that letter, he requested the lifting of sanctions against Iraq as well as a meeting on the subject between the Security Council and a high-level Iraqi politico-technical delegation. The final part of the letter read as follows:

/...

"Iraq calls upon the Security Council to look deeply and objectively into this matter, away from the political objectives sought by certain countries. Iraq also invites the Security Council to appoint a mission consisting of members with no special political pretexts or objectives against Iraq, to examine these facts and present its conclusions to the Council. Iraq is ready to receive any such mission interested in conducting an on-the-spot investigation of the facts. Iraq is also prepared to dispatch a high-level delegation to New York to discuss these facts with the mission proposed herein, and submit Iraq's views and position before the Security Council." (S/23472)

The meeting actually took place on 11 March 1992, when the head of the Iraqi delegation, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, delivered a comprehensive address to the Council covering essential aspects of the obligations imposed on Iraq under resolution 687 (1991) which had already been discharged. In addition, at the meeting held the following day, on 12 March 1992, he replied to statements and questions raised by members of the Council.

The Iraqi delegation requested that the sanctions against Iraq be lifted and stressed the fair and realistic principle whereby, regardless of any difference of opinion over the extent to which the obligations imposed on Iraq under resolution 687 (1991) had been discharged, no one could deny that the proportion of fulfilled obligations was high. In his address to the Council on 11 March 1992, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said the following:

"In spite of all that has been fulfilled in the context of implementing the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), the Council has not budged an inch in its position on the question of the embargo. Nor has the Council taken into consideration adherence to the United Nations Charter and international law in respect of the rights of the civilian population."

He went on to address the members of the Council as follows:

"You, members of the Council, ask Iraq to implement this and comply with that, and Iraq has been fulfilling its obligations month after month. We have submitted to the Council a comprehensive, factual report on what has been fulfilled, and have expressed our willingness to cooperate on sound bases emanating from the United Nations Charter and from the principles of justice and fairness.

"What obligations has the Council, for its part, fulfilled towards the people of Iraq? The answer is none whatsoever. Even when the Council adopted a resolution formally, and theoretically, allowing Iraq to export limited quantities of oil in order to be able to pay for food and medical purchases, the Council included, both in the resolution itself and in the implementation plan, an endless list of preconditions, all of which infringe upon Iraq's sovereignty and security: preconditions which constitute flagrant interference in Iraq's internal affairs and which stem from ill-intended political objectives. The Council has imposed further preconditions which practically prevent Iraq from meeting its people's needs for food and medicine." (S/PV.3059)

/...

The Iraqi delegation urged the Security Council to reconsider that position and to adopt a fair and just stance.

However, the Council persisted in ignoring Iraq's legitimate requests, maintained its sanctions policy and adopted further iniquitous resolutions and measures.

The experience of continued sanctions against Iraq over the past two years, particularly if account is also taken of the wide-ranging destruction wrought by the military aggression on all civilian infrastructure, civilian and industrial centres and public facilities on the pretext of implementing resolution 687 (1991), in effect means the commission of genocide against the people of Iraq. Legal and moral responsibility for this crime lies with those who joined in the adoption of these unjust resolutions and with those members of the Security Council - each according to his deeds and his intentions - who remained silent in the face of continuing sanctions, their consciences unmoved by the tragic and bitter suffering of the Iraqi people. There is no doubt that the major responsibility for this crime rests on the shoulders of the Government of the United States, of those who, with it, instigated and took part in the military aggression against Iraq and of those who still abet and demand the maintenance of sanctions.

The imposition of sanctions on Iraq in this manner has led to a rise in the monthly death rate of children under five years of age from 712 for the period from August to December 1991 to 3,895 in February 1992. For children over five years of age, the rate rose from 1,833 to 6,149 between the two periods cited. Deaths among children under five years of age rose by 667 per cent between May 1989 and the end of May 1992, while deaths among people over fifty years of age rose by 231 per cent over the same period.

Sanctions have also caused Iraqi students to be deprived of many teaching and education requirements. In addition, the Iraqi people has been subjected to harsh and bitter suffering as a result of the shortage of foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies. There has been a decline in the level of all forms of services, and many medical products and essential everyday items are unavailable.

Despite the meagreness of the resources still available to it under the conditions of the economic embargo, Iraq has tried to use those resources to meet some of the people's essential everyday requirements. However, the Sanctions Committee, each of whose members - very oddly - effectively enjoys a right of veto, has at the prompting of certain States adopted biased and shameful positions in refusing to approve the purchase by Iraq of many such urgent civilian requirements. I should like to refer in this regard to the letters addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 27 June 1992, 26 June 1992, 7 August 1992 and 20 September 1992, listing examples of the requests rejected by members of the Council and the Committee. These facts, as we place them on the record, represent a stain on the history both of the United Nations and of those countries.

/...

The Sanctions Committee has either refused or suspended the delivery to Iraq of, for example: heaters for maternity hospitals; water purification supplies; medical equipment; fabrics; men's and women's clothing; school notebooks; pencils; pencil-sharpener; rulers; anti-malaria chemicals; colouring pencils; spare parts for water purification equipment and reconstruction of the medical vaccine plant; leather for shoe production; water pumps; steel and plastic for water pipes; ten bread ovens; razor blades; plastic containers for hospitals; glass for hospitals; cotton for medical purposes; spare parts for agricultural machinery; agricultural tools; electric lamps; spare parts for refrigerators; water pipes; fluorescent bulbs; cotton textiles for sanitary clothing; textiles for the production of bedcovers; children's bicycles; fire-fighting supplies; soya bean oil; and adhesive products for medical belts.

The time has come to end this squalid operation whereby genocide continues to be committed against an entire people.

The Security Council is urged to review its position and attitude towards Iraq, a founder Member of the United Nations and an ancient country which was the cradle of civilizations and has made distinguished contributions to human civilization.

In connection with our call on the Security Council to act in this way, we shall shortly send a further factual report on the extent to which the obligations imposed on Iraq under resolution 687 (1991) have been discharged, as a follow-up to our action on 21 January 1992 and to the meeting between the Iraqi delegation and the Security Council held in March 1992.

Iraq is prepared, as it was in March 1992, to examine and to present this report directly to the Special Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Security Council.

Iraq reminds the Council of its responsibilities.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq
