

FIRST COMMITTEE 7th meeting held on Friday, 16 October 1992 at 10 a.m. New York

# FORTY-SEVENTH SESSION

# **Official Records**

## VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Chairman:	Mr. ELARABY	(Egypt)
later;	Mr. PATOKALLIO (Vice-Chairman)	(Finland)
later:	Mr. ELARABY (Chairman)	(Egypt)

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Distr. GENERAL A/C.1/47/PV.7 28 October 1992

92-61502 2124V (E)

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 47 to 65; 68 and 142 and 67 and 69 (<u>continued</u>) GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS

<u>Mr. TÜRK</u> (Slovenia): As our delegation is speaking for the first time, we wish to congratulate you, Sir, and the other members of the Bureau on your election. We are convinced that your diplomatic abilities, your expertise and, above all, your wisdom guarantee the success of the First Committee's deliberations. It goes without saying that the delegation of Slovenia will extend to you its unreserved support and cooperation in this effort.

The changes that have occurred in the world since last year's session of the First Committee can be accurately described as historic. It is only correct to say that they have put practically all security- and disarmament-related questions into new perspective. The bipolar structure has practically vanished from international relations. A number of new States have emerged as a result of the exercise of the right of all peoples to equality and self-determination. This process has considerably expanded the United Nations membership and has put before the international community the task of integrating these new States into the appropriate structures developed to uphold international peace and security.

On the other hand, the world has witnessed a new dynamic pertaining to regional crisis and regional security in general. In some instances, and most particularly in the Balkans, this has resulted in an atrocious armed conflict - a conflict characterized by territorial claims on the part of the forces of aggression. This conflict has become one of the most difficult issues before the Security Council and other forums. Sanctions imposed on those responsible for aggression became and continue to be necessary.

# (<u>Mr. Türk, Slovenia</u>)

The international situation, seen as a whole, resembles in many respects Charles Dickens' description of the era of <u>A Tale of Two Cities</u>: "It was the best of times; it was the worst of times". However, this resemblance, whatever its artistic appeal, is not a good guide for our deliberations. Extremes are the most visible, yet not necessarily the most relevant features of international relations. Our analysis, on the other hand, must seek a thorough and comprehensive understanding of all relevant phenomena and thus lead to meaningful conclusions.

I should like to continue my statement by quoting a thought empashized in your introductory statement, Sir:

"The starting point for facing up to the current challenges, both in the area of moving forward on disarmament or in the area of maintaining international peace and security, is recognition by all States of the commonality of interest and the equality of rights and duties. That would make it possible to formulate and lay the foundations of the norms and principles that should govern international relations now and in the future". ( $\underline{A/C}, \underline{1/47/PV}, \underline{3}$ )

This basic postulate has, in the present circumstances, a number of implications, including these affecting the new States. All those implications relate the to disarmament and to the questions of international security in general. Let me mention some of them and begin with some thoughts concerning the broader questions of international security.

Some of the major tasks in the context of the maintenance of international peace and security relate to the prevention of tensions and crisis situations and to preventive diplomacy in general. This task - the

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task of developing preventive diplomacy - is essentially a political task pertaining to all, including all the principal organs of the United Nations. In our opinion, the General Assembly has an important role to play in this context.

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In our statement in the General Assembly, under the item "An Agenda for Peace", we elaborated on this in some detail. Let us recall at this stage that the Charter provides a comprehensive framework for preventive action by the General Assembly. Article 14 of the United Nations Charter provides for the possibility that the General Assembly recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation - and I emphasize the word "any" - regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. The provisions of Article 14 of the Charter enable the Assembly to address any political situation, regardless of origin, much before it deteriorates into an open dispute or even into a situation involving a threat to international peace and security. It is remarkable that the International Court of Justice, in an Advisory Opinion delivered in 1962, supported the view that the General Assembly may, while attempting to adjust such a situation, take any measure short of coercive action.

That Opinion should, I believe, be a source of inspiration in current thinking about preventive diplomacy and about the role of the General Assembly in that connection. Early referral of a sitution to an international forum should be considered as the central issue of preventive multilateral diplomacy and should be encouraged, even if it may look inappropriate from the standpoint of an individual State. Furthermore, only in the context of accepted commonality of interest, to use the Chairman's words, can that concept of early warning lead to productive results. Therefore, the discussions on early warning, which are so fashionable these days, should, in our opinion, be linked to the issue of early referral of any situation that may impair friendly relations among States to an appropriate international forum.

Another major area of international action for the maintenance of international peace and security relates to the expanding role of regional security mechanisms, including those designed to foster confidence-building measures. The experience recently gained within the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) has shown that time is passing fast and that new regional mechanisms on security and confidence-building measures aro necessary to meet the challenges faced in that region. Slovenia participated in the work prior to Helsinki Summit and at the Summit itself and supports the mechanisms designed in that process. Now our efforts are devoted to making those mechanisms effective in practice.

Turning to the questions of disarmament, the delegation of Slovenia wishes, first of all, to express its appreciation at the conclusion of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. We note with particular interest and satisfaction that the Convention contains detailed provisions on verification, including destruction verification, routine verification of the chemical industry and the challenge inspections, which are of paramount importance for creating the necessary confidence concerning compliance with the treaty provisions.

The Government of Slovenia will accord the necessary priority to this draft Convention among the treaties to be submitted to the Parliament for early ratification.

A number of important developments continue to take place with respect to nuclear-arms reduction. Slovenia welcomes the agreements reached among the Russian Federation and the United States in that regard, as well as the unilateral decisions concerning the moratorium on nuclear tests currently maintained by the United States, the Russian Federation and France. We would

welcome the continuation of that moratorium and, indeed, an understanding that it should lead to a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests.

We also recognize with satisfaction the progress made in the context of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which will soon be brought into force.

The nuclear potential in its diverse forms continues to present the major problem of international security and, therefore, disarmament measures in that domain should continue to be an important priority. Slovenia concurs with the view that nuclear non-proliferation represents one of the main tasks in this context. Slovenia has announced its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In fact, that Treaty was among the first multilatreal treaties to be acceded to by Slovenia after it became an independent State. Slovenia wishes to be part of the broad movement of States, including the newly independent States, which support the idea of nuclear non-proliferation as a matter of universal importance. Moreover, as a country with a relatively developed system of peaceful uses of nuclear energy - which peaceful uses include nuclear research and a nuclear-power plant on our territory - and as an environmentally conscious State, Slovenia is interested in the scrupulous observance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

We are looking forward to the NPT Review Conference to be convened in 1995, and we hope that it will further enhance the general régime of nuclear non-proliferation. We emphasize the need to enhance the general régime of nuclear non-proliferation. Why enhancement instead of simple extension? We believe that the post-cold-war period provides a unique opportunity for a fresh look into the concept of nuclear non-proliferation, which could be made ever more comprehensive and be linked to an accelerated process of reducing

nuclear arms. The years remaining before the 1995 Review Conference could be used towards that end.

While we welcome the encouraging developments in the fields of chemical and nuclear weapons, we believe that more vigorous action is needed for the reduction of conventional weapons. An excessive build-up of conventional arms represents a real threat and calls for effective action at both the global and regional levels.

It is encouraging indeed that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms has been established and that a relevant report on the subject has been put before the General Assembly by the Secretary-General. The idea of transparency in conventional armaments was thus considerably promoted and a new path opened.

An additional method that should be contemplated in the field of the reduction of conventional arsenals concerns its regional and sub-regional dimensions. The CSCE process has opened some promising avenues in that regard, and new initiatives should be considered as welcome. Slovenia has already proposed, within the CSCE framework, the establishment of a zone of reduced armaments in the Balkans, which is currently beset by one of the most atrocious armed conflicts in recent history. While Slovenia is in no way involved in that conflict, it continues to be aware of the need to develop a series of guarantees that will make the war-plagued Balkans region a safe and stable part of Europe soon after the present armed conflict is brought to an end. It is not too early to start thinking about the necessary arrangemnts for the future: indeed, one must bear in mind that a basic cause of the present armed conflict was precisely the excessive build-up of conventional arms in former Yugoslavia. That build-up was designed in a different political and strategic constellation and was permitted and - alas -

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encouraged to become an instrument of aggresion perpetrated by the former Yugoslav Army and its political allies, first against Slovenia, then against Croatia, and now against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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To Slovenia, the lesson learned in the armed conflict in the Balkans is clear: In this post-cold-war era, it has become necessary to pursue with vigour and determination the path of regional disarmament and arms reduction in order to decrease and possibly eliminate the imminent danger of the existing arsenals becoming a source of political tension or even outright military conflict.

Let me conclude with the following thoughts. The recent achievements in disarmament, in particular the significant cuts in nuclear arms and the draft Convention on chemical weapons, are encouraging and indicate a profound improvement of the international environment, which has become propitious for further action. There are many tasks ahead, including those in the field of conventional arms and in particular those at the regional and subregional levels. Sustained progress in the field of arms reduction and disarmament is a vital prerequisite for the maintenance of international peace and security and should therefore be pursued with vigour and determination. In addition to this, and perhaps most importantly, the General Assembly should be able to devise, in accordance with its responsibilities defined in the Charter, new and practical approaches to the issue of preventive diplomacy, and should try to make a meaningful contribution in that regard.

Peace cannot be safeguarded through a narrow perspective confined to the deployment of peace-keeping forces. A broader programme is needed. Let us strive to work out such a programme.

<u>Mr. IBAÑEZ</u> (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and the other officers of the Committee on your elections. My delegation pledges its full cooperation in the conduct of your work.

In the wake of new political and economic realities, changed threats to security, and the evolving nature of national and international security, the Security Council, meeting for the first time at the level of Heads of State or Government, issued a joint declaration in which it rightly defined the great challenge ahead as the simultaneous pursuit of peace and development. Hopes were raised at the time for new, complementary approaches to world problems; issues of security and development were linked more closely to one another, on the basis that no single aspect could be treated in isolation. Peru welcomes this trend and is fully propared to contribute to its consolidation. The community of nations must face the challenge and seize this unique opportunity before it fades away.

Last June, Member States welcomed the Secretary-General's report "An Agenda for Peace" and his proposals for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, and post-conflict peace-building. Recently, President Bush announced the start of consultations on the merits of convening a special meeting of the Security Council to consider these proposals. Peru is convinced that the time is ripe to implement a complementary "agenda for development" in order effectively to fulfil the function of collective responsibility embodied in Article 55 of the Charter. Chapter III of the Secretary-General's latest report on the work of the Organization sets forth the elements of such an agenda.

Economic reform and its associated problems have emerged as a central factor for international security, inextricably linking the destinies of all nations. The difficulties of this period of transition have proved to be far greater than had earlier been believed. That is the background against which the delegation of Peru wishes to examine the issues of disarmament and international security at this critical time of economic and political

change. Never has there been a clearer need for an integrated approach. An agenda strengthening the links between peace and development is urgently needed if we are to address the fundamental issues of disarmament, security, and development through bold multilateral action. Peru shares the view that there is no other forum more suited to this all-encompassing task than the First Committee. The Committee should engage without delay in the promotion of effective, development-oriented disarmament.

Disarmament - especially nuclear disarmament and the containment of proliferation - remains the overriding interest and a key element of the integrated approach to peace, security, and development. In sharp contrast with the period following the Second World War, the chances of a global military confrontation are significantly lower today; but global instability is distressingly greater. A supposedly positive atmosphere of international security and encouraging prospects for peace-keeping may be overshadowing a persistent stalemate in multilateral disarmament and disguising the weakness and vulnerability of multilateral efforts towards disarmament. Peru joins those nations that believe that there is now a greater common responsibility to confront this situation. Member States ought to recognize that the growing imbalance between issues of disarmament and security and issues of development threatens to marging lize the developing countries. To overcome the current frustrating stalemate we must adopt efficient disarmament measures.

Present-day realities highlight the need for international cooperation and coordination in matter; of disarmament. To question the need for the United Nations to play a leading role in disarmament efforts casts doubt on the Organization's ability to build an authentically multilateral cooperative

system. To dispel such doubts, all Member States must contribute to strengthening the system. Let us continue to organize rationally the work of this session and to expand consensus.

True, we have been witness to numerous positive developments, but they are insufficient. Our optimism is therefore tempered by concern. Minimum deterrence is not impossible, but the global nuclear arsenal remains as potentially destructive as ever. Peru is deeply committed to the goal of universal applicability of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. It welcomes the important recent accessions to the Treaty but reiterates the need to include some leading developing countries.

Nuclear testing continued to decline in 1991, furthering the trend begun in 1988. Consistent internal and international pressure has proved important in promoting a comprehensive test ban. It would be highly regrettable if the Conference on Disarmament again failed to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear-test ban. The community of nations would then be obliged to consider the merits of resuming the Amendment Conference with regard to the Moscow Treaty. The loss of central control of the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union is another matter of serious concern.\*

Mr. Patokallio (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

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By contrast, prospects for the accessions of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to the Tlatelolco Treaty, as well as France's acceptance of Additional Protocol I, are most encouraging.

World military expenditures continued their downward trend in the same percentages of 1989-1990, although with significant regional variations. However, that lower expenditure is not yet linked to a significant build-down of forces, and in some cases it seems to be inflicting damage to economic development without any wealth being transferred for development assistance. Moreover, the decline in military expenditure is related to domestic economic factors, and the so-called peace dividend remains as elusive a promise as ever.

Limited wars - more than 30 in 1991 - are a matter of growing concern and are of particular geopolitical significance. They also underline the fact that the new sources of conflict are not yet fully understood by the international community and that an altered military strategy and doctrines and less-sophisticated arms are required. Regional organizations should assume a greater role in the promotion of disarmament, peace and security. Peru will continue to work diligently in the field of regional disarmament, especially conventional disarmament, and towards stopping proliferation both at the regional and multilateral levels. Unilateral reduction initiatives have a dynamic influence in the disarmament process as a whole, but they are not enough. Multilateral complementarity is essential.

Regional coordination for disarmament is a key element of the global endeavours towards peace and secutiry. There have been some important initial developments in this field. The Organization of American States (OAS) has for the first time ever adopted a resolution on arms control and security and has

established a working group on its implementation. In Europe bloc rivalry is being replaced by a more inclusive view of arms control. These regional initiatives will have to be encouraged so as to enable them to yield effective disarmament measures in the near future. The updating of the vital national security and strategic interests and priorities of the concerned countries has been a determining factor for this revolutionary change in regional perceptions of disarmament and security.

In the specific case of Latin America and the Caribbean, we must recognize the contribution the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development has continued to make since its creation, facilitating a better understanding of problems and promoting cooperation and confidence-building between States. The long-awaited Convention on chemical weapons is now complete, and a draft resolution on it will be approved at this session of the General Assembly and shortly thereafter the Convention will be open to signature. Universal adherence to this new international régime is a critical factor for its future success. Peru will be an original signatory.

Despite this historic landmark, the overall picture shows that the phenomenon of proliferation is emerging as a new and disappointing structural characteristic. Very briefly, I will simply mention the historic first steps in the Middle East, in the political evolution in South Africa and in the continuing inter-Korean dialogue as positive signs. By contrast, the unstable situation in Eurasia related to the fragility of the structures that emerged at the end of the cold war is a matter of particular concern because of its potential implications for international stability and security.

Peru is completing, with great expectations, an extraordinarily difficult period of transition towards developing a prosperous economy. In that

connection, it has reduced its military expenditures by more than 50 per cent in the past three years. Simultaneously, Peru continues with determination and the growing support of its people the fight against the most violent terrorist group known today, which has inflicted devastating damage to the national economy and the population.

<u>Mr. BATIOUK</u> (Ukraine): I should like first to congratulate you, Sir, the Chairman and all the other officers of the Committee on your elections and express to you the best wishes of the delegation of Ukraine in the performance of your important and challenging tasks.

Our time, one rich in hopes and marked by rapid change, presents us with a truly historical opportunity for a radical review of the concepts and practices guiding States on the international scene, including their approaches to the arms control issue. This issue is extremely difficult, for it requires irreversible changes in the old world order, which many had regarded as divinely ordained.

Now, it is necessary to complement the important accords in the field of disarmament and arms limitation that were elaborated during the years of global confrontation and the permanent threat of a military conflict with new instruments that may be concluded in view of new opportunities provided by the present-day situation.

Departing from confrontation and cold-war thinking, we believe that agreements on arms control and disarmament will play a crucial role, for they may, in addition to realizing new and interesting ideas, also provide solutions for old but still important problems. In our view it is necessary to give a multilateral character to these efforts and to utilise fully the United Nations mechanism, which will provide the needed level of trust and consolidate confidence in the feasibility of disarmament.

The delegation of Ukraine is convinced that further progress in securing nuclear disarmament should continue to be one of the top priorities in our efforts directed at arms limitation. In June 1990 we in Ukraine made known our firm intention to get rid of the nuclear weapons deployed on our territory and to adhere in the future to the three non-nuclear principles: Not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons.

We are pleased to note that the course followed by Ukraine to attain non-nuclear status found support in the world. Simultaneously, however, we noted that there is a certain misunderstanding and that sometimes attempts are made to distort our policy on these crucial issues. In this connection, we would like to reiterate once more that Ukraine has made up its mind and made its choice. We voluntarily undertook to eliminate hundreds of nuclear devices - to eliminate all of them - to rid ourselves of the legacy of the USSR, despite the huge expenses, including financial ones, related to that decision. Contrary to some sensational news reports, Ukraine never deviated from that course.

Having taken that line, we naturally have the right to count on clear international assurances for our national security against any possible threat of force or use of force from any nuclear State. I think that the Committee will take a new approach in considering the problem of guarantees, in view of the apparent shifts taking place in the world as a result of the USSR's disintegration into sovereign States.

We believe that the real process of real eliminating nuclear weapons began with the conclusion of the Traaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and was accelerated by the signing of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. We associate hopes for the successful implementation of these Treaty provisions with the Lisbon Protocol signed this year by Ukraine and other parties. Ukraine thus has demonstrated to the entire world its responsibility and its commitment to eliminate the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory.

We have also initiated the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START) ratification process, which will facilitate the liquidation at an early date of strategic nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine.

A substantial reduction in conventional weapons in Europe has rendered obsolete defence concepts that were based on the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons. It has created favourable conditions for bringing about far-reaching unilateral initiatives for tactical nuclear-weapon reduction. We welcome the implementation of such unilateral measures, in particular the declarations on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, and believe that they can be continued in a sustainable process of nuclear disarmament within the framework of a multilateral mechanism with the participation of all nuclear States.

On 6 May this year, Ukraine completed the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from its territory, with the aim of dismantling and liquidating them under effective control, thus confirming its commitment to fulfil the international obligations it has accepted.

By taking practical steps to bring about the total elimination of nuclear arms in Ukraine, we seek at the same time to make it impossible to use against other States the weapons that are temporarily on our territory. It is to

this end that we have reserved the right of control over the non-use of nuclear weapons from our territory against other States. That right is already ensured by appropriate technical measures. While strategic nuclear forces remain on its territory, Ukraine will consistently try firmly to guarantee their non-use and subsequent destruction.

The issue of a complete prohibition of nuclear tests has tremendous importance in terminating the qualitative nuclear-arms race. For a long time political considerations blocked the achievement of a multilateral agreement on a comprehensive test ban. Regrettably, the Conference of States parties to the 1963 Moscow Treaty, convened in January last year to discuss amendments to this Treaty, could not agree on a document acceptable to all. Nevertheless, it provided an impetus for future efforts and initiatives which, we hope, will result in a complete ban on underground nuclear testing as well.

In the interest of making irreversible the process of nuclear disarmament that is already under way, vigorous steps for strengthening the nuclear-arms non-proliferation regime are called for. Ukraine has always been committed to the principles of non-proliferation, and it welcomes the expansion of the circle of States participating in the non-proliferation Treaty, thus enhancing its universal character.

In conformity with its non-nuclear option, Ukraine will join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and will place its nuclear plants under International Atomic Energy .gency (IAEA) safeguards, even before becoming a party to the Treaty. We support the further strengthening of various elements of the non-proliferation regime, including the safeguards system. We hope that the activities being implemented within the framework of the IAEA will lead to positive results in that respect.

Ensuring effective international control over proliferation of the most destructive and other advanced types of weaponry, nuclear materials, missiles and missile technology has become an extremely urgent problem. Ukraine is prepared to take part in coordinated international measures to prevent the export of technologies, materials and know-how for the manufacturing of mass-destruction and destabilizing types of weapons.

Ukraine has consistently supported efforts to establish nuclear-free zones and zones of peace and cooperation in various regions of the world, and believes that the establishment of such zones is conducive to developing good-neighbourly relations and strengthening confidence between States and friendship between nations. We have always been responsive to proposals to create such zones, including in European subregions. We believe that in addition to such initiatives, we, together with other interested States, can also consider the idea of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Black Sea region.

In the Agreement signed on 3 August this year by Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the principles of the formation of Ukraine's and the Russian Federation's navies on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet, both States declared the desirability of pursuing a policy aimed at turning the Black Sea into a nuclear-free zone and a zone of peace and cooperation. The fulfilment by the navies of the Black Sea States of tasks related solely to ensuring the security and protection of their frontiers would be in full conformity with such a policy. This, in turn, would contribute to minimizing naval-force concentrations in the Mediterranean as well.

Ukraine welcomes the completion of the development of a global and comprehensive Convention on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

which will at last create a real opportunity for humankind to eliminate the threat of use of this barbaric means of mass destruction.

Our country has stated repeatedly that it has no chemical weapons or facilities for their production on its territory and does not intend to manufacture such weapons. We are ready to sign the Convention, and we support the appeal to all States to ensure that the prohibition of chemical weapons acquires a universal nature. Accordingly, Ukraine has joined the sponsors of draft resolution  $\lambda/C.1/47/L.1$ , and we are convinced that we will be able to overcome any remaining problems at an early stage and set about signing the Convention.

We also believe that the practical purpose of putting the Convention into effect is closely related to the issue of strengthening and expanding the arrangements directed at preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons and at the effective investigation of any cases involving their alleged use.

The Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is undoubtedly the direct result of the Conference on Disarmament. This forum has provided new evidence of its ability to participate actively in laying down the foundations of world peace and security. Its extensive experience must be fully taken into account when attempting to resolve other arms-limitation and disarmament issues.

Ukraine would like to see on the 1993 agenda of the Conference on Disarmament such issues as confidence-building measures that encourage nuclear disarmament; the elaboration of effective guarantees to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of radiological weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction; and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

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The question of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament has already been raised in our Committee. In the present-day situation it becomes particularly urgent. We should like to take this opportunity to confirm traine's interest in becoming a State member of the Conference on Disarmament as soon as the membership of the Conference is expanded.

Given its military and political capability and vast cmperience in solving disarmament problems, including nuclear ones, Ukraine could make a considerable contribution to the success of the work of the Geneva forum.

Ukraine attaches much importance to regional disarmament and armament-control measures. Achievements in this area at the regional level, in conjunction with bilaters, and multilateral negotiations, can promote global efforts in disarmament. We consistently support the effective limitation of conventional armed forces on the European continent to ensure greater stability and security in Europe with a lower level of armamer 3.

Together with other States on the continent, we are facilitating the coming into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and we regard it as a far-reaching, comprehensive regional arrangement for the control of armaments. Ukraine made many efforts to enable the Treaty to take effect within the shortest time possible, so that it would be implemented by all parties, irrespective of the changes that some of its signatory States have undergone.

We are firmly convinced that the limitations of armed forces personnel agreed upon during the negotiations of 29 States in Vienna will substantially strengthen stability in Europe by eliminating the capability for unexpected attack and large-scale offensive operations. In addition to the agreement on the new set of measures to strengthen confidence and security contained in the

Vienna Document, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe lays a foundation for a new structure of security on that continent.

In the light of specific measures on disarmament enacted and implemented in Europe, the idea of establishing a United Nations regional disarmament centre in Europe is appealing to us. Such a centre can monitor the development in the field of regional disarmament, engage in the elaboration of confidence- and security-building measures and implement disarmament agreements in new areas. Consequently, it could meet the informational and educational demands of United Nations Member States in the field of disarmament and coordinate regional activities within the framework of the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign.

Following the declaration of its independence, Ukraine began to forge its approaches to issues of security, taking into account new realities and the new political environment in Europe. Ukraine's national interests require the further strengthening of the role of non-military factors of security and stability. With reference to the European continent, this means, specifically, confidence-tuilding and collective actions aimed at the prevention of conflicts.

In this respect, we consider the European institutes for maintaining and strengthening peace - first and foremost the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) structures - to be key elements for a new European system of collective security. We see the continuation of the European process and the active participation of Ukraine in it as significant factors of our national security.

Over a very short time the positive steps taken at the bilateral and multilateral levels have *confirmed* the role of disarmament as a key instrument in efforts to consolidate peace and security. That triumphant spirit of

cooperation provides us with unprecedented favourable opportunities in a number of disarmament matters. Such an atmosphere substantially facilitates our Committee's efforts to hold a constructive dialogue that would result in spec\_fic arrangements and solutions. The Ukrainian delegation expresses its hope that the Committee will seize the favourable opportunities it has before it.

<u>Mr. JARAMILLO</u> (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): At the outset, allow me to congratulate Mr. Elanaby on his election as Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session. His ample experience and able leadership will ensure the success of our endeavours. Similarly, I am pleased to extend my congratulations to the other officers of the Committee and to acknowledge the invaluable support of the Secretariat in the work we are now undertaking. I avail myself of this opportunity to offer a warm welcome to the new nations that have joined us in this forum.

History has granted us the privilege of defining a new era. For the first time in several generations, the peoples of the world are working in quest of a common future, based on the principles of equality and cooperation. Our responsibility is to create with clarity and decisiveness a new order that will be synonymous with development and democracy.

None the less, the multiple forces that are re-emerging after years of forced inaction lend a sease of urgency to the effective control of arms production and transfers. Today the excessive accumulation and proliferation of arms are engendering new regional arms races and fratricidal wars. The conflicts, both ongoing and latent, overwhelm the international community's capacity to respond coherently and judiciously.

The post-cold-war world understands that collective international security depends on the democratic participation of the family of nations. This globalization process must necessarily extend to the sphere of disarmament, since the impulse towards democracy has not put aside the polices and concepts of militarism. Today many countries are capable of producing arms of great destructive capacity. According to reports by respected specialized agencies, it is estimated that by the year 2000 some 40 nations will possess the necessary technology to produce nuclear arms and their delivery systems. At present at least 16 developing countries are developing or can deploy one- or two-stage ballistic missiles. Putting a halt to proliferation must be our priority.

The developing world's decreasing dependence on imported arms and military technology will force the great Powers to abandon arrogant discriminatory policies, but not before a unique opportunity for forging a climate of confidence and cooperation has been missed. At a time when the Organization is endeavouring to define the parameters and instruments that will consolidate a true international democratic community, disparity and discrimination in disarmament matters can only be counter-productive and evoke for many countries the spectre of interventionism. We will be forced to speak of the "new world chaos" if a handful of countries insist on setting themselves up as guardians of an international security that they themselves define according to their own selfish interests and prop up with an unbridled and irresponsible arms trade.

Today confidence-building policies, procedures and attitudes are essential. The instruments and mechanisms we design must be universal.

Therefore, although in principle the delegation of Colombia is in favour of the Register of Conventional Arms, I assert that in so far as it provides transparency to some at the expense of others, rather than contributing to the creation of an auspicious climate for general and complete disarmament, it will encourage and justify the efforts of many nations to develop an endogenous arms-producing industry.

We trust that the Register will develop into a cornerstone of confidence building. However, we already have clear guidelines about arms transfers on which we must base our efforts. As stipulated in resolutions 43/75 I, 46/36 H and 46/36 L, administrative laws and procedures regarding official policies for the aquisition and transfer of arms must be studied and fostered at a national level. We attach great importance to the subsequent harmonization of the measures nations adopt, in order to create an international model for conduct in this field. Only in that way can we lay the basis for an effective international policy on arms transfers. This will contribute to improved control of arms transfers on a global level and halt illicit arms transfers.

The vertical proliferation and qualitative development of nuclear weapons threaten the implicit principle of nuclear non-proliferation, which grants negative security assurances to non-nuclear States. The development of "micro-nukes", "mini-nukes" and "tiny-nukes" opens a terrifying dimension in the arms race, and could even weaken what we have achieved to date in non-proliferation and reduction. These qualitative developments could even blur the traditional differentiation between nuclear and conventional arms. Now that the justification for the concept of deterrence has ceased to exist, the continued presence of nuclear arms can be interpreted only as a potentially offensive posture.

The increasing sophistication of armaments illustrates the patent impossibility of establishing or maintaining non-proliferation regimes that would uphold a fictitious status quo. With the end of the cold war we are approaching a new era, in which geopolitical fragmentation will find a tragic

echo in the dissemination of arms of increasing destructiveness and precision. These weapons will be designed specifically for use in conflicts in the so-called third world, and the shadow of Hiroshima, the outstanding deterrent factor of the cold war, is reappearing, this time at the mercy of volatile and unpredictable circumstances.

We consider it essential to create a legal instrument on negative security assurances, particularly in the light of our ongoing negotiations on non-proliferation. In this context, the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons warrants careful reflection and study.

Recent developments show that there is a will to move forward in the founding of true collective security. <u>Inter alia</u>, the welcome decision of certain nations to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of a number of nuclear Powers to observe a nuclear-test moratorium, along with the gradual consolidation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, give us grounds to believe that weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and nuclear, could some day be considered anachronistic in a world truly committed to the construction of a lasting peace.

After long years of concerted determination, the draft Convention on chemical weapons has been crafted, marking a historic milestone in disarmament efforts and becoming a beacon that should guide our endeavours.

At the presidential summit meeting held at Cartagena in 1991, Colombia, along with the other Presidents of the Andean countries, announced its intention to be one of the original signatories of the Convention on chemical weapons. None the less, we affirm that the frame of reference of disarmament

must be broadened to include conventional arms and the production of and trafficking in such arms, both legal and illicit. These arms are the true instruments of death and terror that destabilize many nations. They undermine our efforts to strengthen security and progress in this new chapter in history.

The security of developing countries is doubly affected by the excessive accumulation of conventional arms: in their social and economic growth as a result of the diversion of scarce resources to weapons, and in their military security because this phenomenon fuels local and regional conflicts.

Arms heighten the severe problems of this new era: ethnic and religious rivalries; the awakening of nationalisms that threaten territorial integrity; drug trafficking; and terrorism. The process of conventional disarmament on the regional scale must therefore be universal both in its geopolitical scope and in the arms it encompasses. All States must undertake it as a matter of priority, especially the greatest military Powers. It must be based on universal instruments that guarantee transparency and effective control of arms production and transfers. Only then can we take a first step forward towards the eradication of the illicit arms trade, a phenomenon that fosters violence and crushes the political, social and economic achievements for which developing countries work with courage and sacrifice.

The arms bazaar grows. New participants join in; new producers and products appear. Regional arms races, stimulated by the greed of the leading arms producers, distort the legitimate self-defence perceptions of many countries and encourage national production. In order to keep their industries economically viable and to emerge from recession, producer

countries increase their supplies to the international arms market. And developing countries' transition from import substitution to export promotion strategies increases the pressures on this market, which becomes more competitive as it shrinks. And thus the inexorable vicious circle progresses, generating the arms races which will shape the world of tomorrow. Geoeconomics joins geopolitics in fostering proliferation.

We speak of a new world order. The connotations of hope and renewal these oft-evoked words still contain will become a mirage should arms continue to be the universal language of men. The Secretary-General has noted that history has granted us a unique opportunity to achieve the great objectives of the Charter. The qualitative development of arms and their vertical and horizontal proliferation are a formidable obstacle that renders that promising future elusive. In this room we speak of instruments of destruction. May the consciousness of death truly commit us to life.\*

<sup>\*</sup> The Chairman returned to the Chair.

Mr. SALIMI (Afghanistan): At the outset, allow me to express my warmest felicitations, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly. I am fully confident that the work of the Committee will bear fruitful and shining results under your wise guidance.

I also take the liberty to record my appreciation for the energetic and tireless work of your predecessor, Mr. Mroziewicz, the former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations.

I deem it necessary here to express the sincere and warmest gratitude of my delegation to the United Nations, other international organizations, and all countries that have extended their support and assistance to the heroic mujahed nation of Afghanistan in its 14 years of holy war aimed at obtaining peace and security in the country and at forming an independent, Islamic, and non-aligned State in Afghanistan. Our thanks also go to those who have fully supported the newly established Islamic State by providing immediate relief assistance to the war-stricken people of Afghanistan.

The 14 years of jehad of the heroic nation of Afghanistan on the one hand, and the liberation struggle of the Islamic movements and other nations and the emergence of a series of reforming changes in the former Soviet Union on the other hand - which put an end to the remnants of authoritarian regimes, terminated the polarization of military political blocs and subsequently changed the political map of the world - are, taken as a whole, factors that have assuaged the fear of cold war in world public opinion and that bode well for international security and peace and international cooperation based on mutual trust and confidence.

# (Mr. Salimi, Afghar, tan)

The First Committee begins its work at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly at a time when the role and authority of the United Nations as a prestigious world Organization for safeguarding and strengthening international peace and security and settling international and regional conflicts have increased considerably. The arms race has been replaced by a race for disarmament. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed in July 1990, is the result of almost a decade of tireless work by the entire international community as a whole and the United Nations in particular. Decisive achievements have been made in disarmament and significant arms-elimination truaties have been signed in this regard. In a word, all these positive changes that have occurred in our world - including the agreement reached at the June summit meeting between the United States and the Russian Federation on cuts in their nuclear arsenals - have created a sound ground for complete disarmament, international security, and everlasting peace.

My delegation is of the opinion that the main desires of the international community as a whole and the United Nations in particular aiming at the realization of such objectives of complete disarmament and international security as the settlement of conflicts through peaceful means; the reduction of military budgets; a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; the use of high technology for the purpose of disarmament; the establishment of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world; the prevention of an arms race in outer space, on the seabed, the ocean floor, and in the subsoil; conventional disarmament; disarmament and development; the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) and radiological weapons, and so on - have not been fully realized.

The question of preserving peace and promoting disarmament is deeply rooted in the minds of all people on our planet. Defending peace and eliminating destructive weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, in all continents is not only the responsibility of all States, but also the individual task of all inhabitants of the world.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan is of the opinion that the United Nations, which is enjoying an increasing role in the realization of peace and international security and in the settlement of regional conflicts and disarmament - in close cooperation with international, non-governmental, and governmental organizations that are inspired and supported by peoples and are playing a significant role at the present stage - should intensify its activities in the implementation of relevant United N\_tions resolutions aimed at ensuring the goal of complete disarmament. This high objective can be achieved only if Member States cooperate in the implementation of the relevant resolutions and decisions of this world body.

My delegation believes that no country can build for itself an island of security and prosperity in one corner of the world with a wall of missiles, while the rest of the world burns in the flames of war. We think that we should not give the concept of security a dual character by dividing the world into nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon countries.

My delegation fully supports all initiatives to establish a comprehensive system of collective security, the core of which would consist of eradicating the nuclear threat, eliminating the danger of confrontation, bridging the wide gap between the developed and developing countries, and ensuring a balance of economic interests among all States built upon humanitarian values and the accepted principles of international haw, thus creating mutual confidence and a world in which people are safe and secure.

### (<u>Mr. Salimi, Afghanistan</u>)

Military expenditure is another concern which has to be dealt with. In our view, major reductions in military expenditure should release considerable funds which would contribute to solving the serious problems - for instance, those of development - faced by mankind.

My delegation believes that the theory of armament instead of development should be replaced by the principle of disarmament for socio-economic development. We support a freeze and reduction in military expenditure so that the resources thus released can be used for development activities, strengthening regional and international economic cooperation, with due attention to the particular economic and social problems of the least developed and geographically disadvantaged countries.

From our point of view, in the sphere of multilateral action, the progress made in this regard has been particularly encouraging. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990, has provided an important instrument for setting up a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, armaments, and equipment in Europe at lower levels than ever before, which augurs well for the possibility of concluding agreements on conventional armed forces in other parts of the world.

My Government believes that no effort should be spared towards preventing the stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space, the exploration and use of which should be conducted only for peaceful goals for the benefit of all countries and safeguarding international peace and security.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, as one of the signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, welcomes the accession to the Treaty this year of the Republics of Slovenia, Uzbekistan, France, and Azerbaijan, and calls upon all countries of the world that have not joined the Treaty to do so. In our view, it will establish an atmosphere conducive to

the use of advanced nuclear technology in the interests of humankind, and work against the proliferation of such weapons to other countries of the world.

The spread of n \_lear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon countries is also seen as another main cause of instability in the world. The emergence of the so-called mini-nuclear Power is of grave concern and a threat to the peace, security and stability of various regions of the world, which can have unpredictable consequences. We deem it necessary to use all means available to achieve disarmament and to create nuclear-free zones.

My delegation fully supports all endeavours aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America, creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, eradicating nuclear weapons from the European continent, and keeping Africa a non-nuclear continent, or elsewhere as is deemed necessary.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan is of the opinion that efforts to turn the South Pacific and South-East Asia into nuclear-free zones, and thus to create such a zone on the Korean peninsula, are of great importance and will result in the establishment of a reliable security system and strengthen the international regimes for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

From our point of view the elimination of chemical and radiological weapons and the banning of the production and development of new types of weapons of mass destruction are among the basic and serious tasks facing mankind.

To document our commitment in this regard, we have already welcomed the Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, which will be signed at Paris in January 1993, and we are a sponsor of the draft resolution on that Convention that has been proposed by Canada, Germany and Poland.

In conclusion, I should like to say that one of the necessary prerequisites to disarmament, as I stated before, is to build international confidence between the major nuclear Powers. Regional confrontations and conflicts have a negative impact on the level of confidence in the world. Taking this fact into account, we should seek ways and means to achieve a just and peaceful solution that would accomplish that objective, so as to eliminate hotbeds of tension in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, as a peace-loving country, follows a golden principle in its foreign policy: "Do not itself be either a source of danger and threat for others or the target of danger and threat from others", and it welcomes all decisions that may be taken by the First Committee at this

forty-seventh session of the General Assembly during its current meetings aimed at seeing complete disarmament materialize and at achieving international security and peace.

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to assure you, Mr. Chairman, and the other officers of the Committee, of our full cooperation in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to the Committee.

May God Almighty bestow ever-greater success on all the Committee's participants. Help comes from God.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): At the outset, I should like to express my congratulations to you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. My delegation is confident that the Committee will benefit greatly from your vast diplomatic skills and knowledge of international affairs. I have had the privilege of working with you both here and in Geneva, and I have come to know and to respect you as a fine specimen of the great school that is Egyptian diplomacy.

In another vein, I use this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to express the heartfelt condolences of my delegation in connection with the catastrophic effects of the devastating earthquake that beset your country.

To return to the work of the Committee, my congratulations also go to the other officers of the Committee. In addition, I submit that all of us are aware of how much we owe your predecessor, Ambassador Robert Mroziewicz of Poland, who guided the proceedings of the Committee last year in such an inspired manner. From this place, I salute also the Director of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, and the respected Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Sohrab Kheradi.

Today I am speaking in my capacity as Chairman of the panel of governmental technical experts established under General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, "Transparency in armaments".

On 9 December 1991 the General Assembly adopted the resolution on "Transparency in armaments" by a vote of 150 to none, with 2 abstentions. On the basis of that resolution the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms was established as from 1 January 1992. Member States are requested to report pertinent transactions relating to the calendar year 1992 not later than 30 April 1993.

The establishment of the Register on Conventional Arms is a major step forward in the attempts of the international community to come to grips with the security problems of the post-cold-war era. Indeed, developing transparency is an essential requirement in trying to prevent destabilizing accummulations of arms in different regions of the world. The value of the Register rests in its use as a political measure to build confidence. Transparency helps to rectify the misconceptions that fuel fear and mistrust. Obviously, the utility of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms will depend on the number of States that actually contribute to it. Adequate development of the Register and related efforts can proceed successfully only on the basis of the widest possible participation.

In order to help Member States in making their reports, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to set up a panel of governmental technical experts, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to elaborate the technical procedures and to make any adjustments to the annex to resolution 46/36 L necessary for the effective operation of the Register. In addition, the panel was asked to prepare a report on the modalities for early

expansion of the Register by the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production. The panel consisted of represantatives of all geographical regions and of both those who import and those who export equipment covered by the Register.

During the first part of this year the panel held three demanding sessions at which complex and fundamental issues pertaining to national and international security were discussed. Often, views and perceptions differed. Unavoidably, all sides had to make compromises to maintain momentum towards the overall political objectives set by the General Assembly. In the end, it proved possible to achieve a balance between the security concerns of States in the industrialized world and those of States in the industrializing world. That satisfactory outcome was due both to the representative character of the panel and to the flexible instructions given to its members.

I take great pleasure in introducing today the report (A/47/342) on the Register of Conventional Arms as a consensus report. This is a signal achievement, not only in terms of the report's substance but also in terms of the wider implications of the consensus for sustaining the momentum as the subject matter is addressed in other forums in the future. In my view the report presents a solid foundation for wide participation in the Register. Future developments in this area will much depend on the use Momber States make of this new facility.

I should like to go through some of the main features of the report. Chapter I contains a clear set of technical procedures for the operation of the Register, among them a standardized reporting form. The adjustments were made to the seven categories of equipment the transfers of which are to be entered on the standardized reporting form. Chapter II offers some suggestions for early expansion of the scope of the Register. Chapter III, the final section of the report, deals with the resource implications for the maintenance of the Register. The two appendices to the report are: General Assembly resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991; and the standardized forms for reporting international transfers of conventional Arms, both the export form and the import form.

I shall now review the first task of the Panel: the elaboration of technical procedures and the making of adjustments to the annex of last year's resolution 45/36 L mecessary for the effective operation of the Register.

Paragraphs 9 to 13 contain the report's description of arms transfers. Describing an international arms transfer is not as easy as it might seem. The difficulties are rooted in the many and varied national practices in exporting and importing weapons. For this reason the Panel did not attempt to draw up a precise definition but set out a general description which would cover most relevant cases.

Of most interest is the shape of the actual seven categories of equipment the tranfers of which are to be registered. Though adjustments had to be made, the categories survived relatively unscathed. The categories, taken together, constitute the scope of the Register. The adjustments made as a result of the negotiations are the centre-piece of the Panel's work.

In category I, "Battle tanks", there is no change from the annex to resolution 46/36 L.

In category II, "Armoured combat vehicles", there are two notable changes: first, the reduction of the gun calibre from 20 millimetres to 12.5 millimetres and, secondly, a broadening of the category to include armoured combat vehicles which launch any type of missile, instead of only anti-tank missiles.

In category III, "Large-calibre artillery systems", there are only minor linguistic adjustments.

The wording of categories IV, "Combat aircraft", and V, "Attack helicopter", has been modified to make clear that transfers of reconnaissance and electronic-warfare versions of these aircraft and helicopters are to be reported. For combat aircraft, transfers of versions designed for suppression of air defence are also to be reported.

In category VI, "Warships", the lowering of the tonnage threshold to 750 tonnes extends the scope of this category to ensure coverage of all corvettes. There were proposals to lower the threshold further, or even to eliminate it, but in the end Panel members agreed on an extension to include vessels below the 750-tonne threshold which are equipped to launch missiles or torpedoes to a range of at least 25 kilometres. This compromise was intended to meet concerns in particular regions.

In category VII, "Missiles and missile launchers", the Panel reached consensus on the exclusion of ground-to-air missiles from the Register. Concerns expressed about the possible modification of remotely piloted vehicles into cruise missiles led to the inclusion of those vehicles of this type that are capable of delivering a weapon to at least 25 kilometres.

One of the major outcomes of the Panel's work was the establishment of the standardized reporting form. The most difficult issue was the question whether models or types of equipment being reported should be designated. This was one of those issues on which the tension between transparency and military security was most evident. This question drew attention to inequalities between importing countries and those whose arms requirements are met entirely from indigenous production. For instance, a country that imports its entire holding of air-to-air missiles would in the course of time reveal its total holding and thus, by inference, its sustainability in combat. The reporting-form requirement for designation has been drawn up in such a way as to distinguish it from the reporting of the other data. The purpose here was to acknowledge the flexibility which some States need; the underlying idea is to encourage the widest possible participation.

All in all, the Panel was successful in designing a form which is easy to fill in. Data should be submitted to United Nations Headquarters in New York on the standardized reporting form, taking account of the Panel report by 30 April annually. Member States that do not have anything to report should file a "nil report". This requirement is intended to promote the accuracy and reliability of the computerized database which will store the reported data.

In addition to providing data on imports and exports of arms through the standardized reporting form, Member States may decide to submit to the Secretary-General information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production, and relevant policies. The Panel report states that the reporting of this information is voluntary and that Member States may

do it in any form they wish. The Office for Disarmament Affairs will maintain in its computerized database a running index of the background information submitted, by country, data and title.

The Secretary-General's annual consolidated report to the General Assembly will be a compilation of the reports by Member States on the standardized reporting form. Furthermore, it will contain an index of the background information submitted by Member States.

The three paragraphs on access to the Register are quite relevant from the viewpoint of democracy. Resolution 46/36 L states:

"The Register shall be open for consultation by representatives of Member States at any time". (resolution 46/36 L, annex, para. 4)

This notion of consultation, analogous to consulting a dictionary, should not be confused with the process of diplomatic consultation between Member States. Arduous in-depth discussions led to amendment of the title of this portion of the report to "Access to the Register". A further improvement is that not only the duties and rights of the Member States and the Secretariat but also those of the public are clearly outlined in the text of the report.

I now come to section II of the Panel report, which deals with the modalities for early expansion of the Register.

#### (<u>Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands</u>)

Last year's resolution contains clear provisions on how the continuing operation of the Register will be reviewed. A group of governmental experts will be convened for this purpose in 1994. That same group will examine the further development of the Register. It is for that 1994 expert group to decide its own agenda. Therefore, and in conformity with its mandate, the Panel did not, in essence, go further than offering ideas which may be taken up by the governmental experts in 1994 and possible other future forums. The possibilities mentioned in the Panel report are without prejudice.

The Panel's deliberations on the modalities for inclusion of data on military holdings and procurements through national production provided quite some food for thought. The long list of questions reflects the widely varying views on what constitute "armed forces", "military holdings", and "procurement through national production". In addition, the question was raised as to whether a legal approach should be adopted defining armed forces as those which take up combatant status in time of war. Another important question is whether military holdings should be reported to the Register on the basis of the same categories of equipment as for arms transfers. Quite a few interesting aspects of the notion of "national production" were brought to the fore; for instance: should data be reported in values? Should procurement be regarded as procurement from any national production facility, whatever the arrangement might be? Should data on procurement through national production relate to equipment ordered by or only that actually delivered to the armed forces, however defined?

I shall now briefly touch on section III of the Panel report. This section contains estimates provided by the Secretariat of the resources required to operate the Register. The value of this part of the report is that it will help to ensure that the new and demanding responsibilities of the

Office for Disarmament Affairs for the adequate management and operation of the Register are taken into account properly in future budgetting. This is important in an era when the hatchet is out on the size of the Secretariat.

Both as a consequence of earlier economies and as a result of the need to ask personnel of the Office for Disarmaments Affairs to carry out other important tasks not directly related to the work of that Office, the staff of the Office for Disarmament Affairs has recently been depleted by six members. This must give rise to serious concern as to the Office's ability to operate and maintain the Register.

I come now to follow-up action. The Panel members look forward to the Report's receiving a clear endorsement by the General Assembly. I intend in due course to convene a meeting of potential sponsors with a view to bringing an agreed draft resolution to the First Committee. Together with cther interested delegations, I have given some thought to possible elements for such a draft resolution. I invite interested delegations to contact my own delegation, which will provide them with a copy of my proposed draft and note their names so that we can ensure that they are invited to my meeting. In my view, the draft resolution ought to reflect, inter alia, the paramount importance its sponsors attach to an effective, functioning, and therefore adequately supported Register. In view of existing concerns about the precarious resources currently allocated to the United Nations disarmament secretariat, the priority to be given to this task needs to be stressed. It is my impression that early agreement on the text of a draft resolution is within reach. In the meantime, I call on all delegations to consider becoming sponsors of the draft resolution.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere respect for and deep gratitude to my fellow Panel members for their dedication, determination and ingenuity. It was a unique privilege to chair this Panel. I would be at fault if I did not mention the great professionalism displayed by the Secretariat members that assisted the Panel. Finally, I have to recognize the valuable contribution of the two consultants.

The ball is now in the court of the Member States. Endorsement of the consensus report of the Panel will lay a solid foundation for its future use and expansion. The material to build that future will have o come from the Member States. This can only mean that wide participation is essential to the future success of the enterprise the international community has entered upon under the code name "transparency in armaments".

Coming from a seafaring nation, I should like to wind up with a nautical metaphor. The ship designed and constructed last autumn has been successfully launched. What is required now is to steer a safe course. I say "safe" because we will have to avoid many shoals and reefs. We have aboard a crew that is globally representative. Greater security is our port of call. The transparency exercise and the Arms Register, between them, offer a viable means of reaching that destination. From this, it follows that transparency is not an end in itself. It also follows from this that we can only arrive at our destination if all crew members - that is to say Member States - live up to their constituents.

# The meeting rose \_ 12,10 p.m.