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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Confidence-building measures

Report of the Secretary-General

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\* A/35/150.

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 33/91 B, the operative part of which read as follows:

'The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Recommends that all States should consider on a regional basis arrangements for specific confidence-building measures, taking into account the specific conditions and requirements of each region;

"2. Invites all States to inform the Secretary-General of their views and experiences regarding those confidence-building measures they consider appropriate and feasible;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the views of Member States on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

"4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled 'Confidence-building measures'."

2. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Secretary-General submitted to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly a report (A/34/416 and Add.1-3) containing the views received as at 29 November 1979 from Member States concerning the question of confidence-building measures.

3. At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/87 B, the operative part of which reads as follows:

'The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Recommends that all States should continue to consider arrangements for specific confidence-building measures, taking into account the specific conditions and requirements of each region;

"2. Decides to undertake a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures, taking into account the answers received by the Secretary-General and relevant statements made at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

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"4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the work of the group of governmental experts to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

"5. Invites States which have not yet done so to respond to the request of the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 33/91 B and to acquaint the group of experts with their views and experiences through the Secretary-General;

"6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled 'Confidence-building measures'."

4. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Secretary-General transmits herewith the views received as at 14 August 1980 from Member States concerning the question of confidence-building measures. Further replies will be issued as an addendum to the present document.

## II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

### BULGARIA

/Original: Russian/

/30 April 1980/

1. The People's Republic of Bulgaria considers the basic goal of its foreign policy to be that of supporting efforts to strengthen peace and international security, preserve and deepen détente in international relations, and create a climate of trust and co-operation among States with a view to rapidly accomplishing the urgent task of curbing the arms race and adopting effective disarmament measures. The current development of international relations demonstrates once again that mutual trust and mutual understanding among countries, particularly in regions with a high level of military confrontation and a large concentration of armed forces and armaments such as the European continent, are of great significance for the success of these efforts. Measures for building confidence among States situated in such regions of the world can contribute significantly to the improvement of the political climate and the strengthening of international security and, to a certain extent, to progress in the sphere of détente as well. The role and significance of confidence-building measures for the success of efforts in this direction were confirmed in paragraph 93 of the Programme of Action set forth in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

2. On the basis of this position, the People's Republic of Bulgaria supported the confidence-building measures formulated in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe envisaging the prior notification of major military manoeuvres of land forces exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, the voluntary exchange of observers to attend military manoeuvres and the exchange of military personnel on a bilateral basis, including visits by military delegations.

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3. In recent years, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria, have made a number of proposals aimed at reaching specific agreements on the further development and expansion of confidence-building measures. These proposals have found clear expression in the official documents of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, particularly the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee adopted at Moscow in November 1978 (A/33/393) and the communiqués of the meetings of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs held in May 1979 at Budapest (A/34/275) and in December 1979 at Berlin (A/34/825).

4. The Warsaw Treaty countries are prepared to reach agreement on the following questions:

(a) Notification of major military manoeuvres conducted in the region defined by the Final Act in which the number of participating troops exceeds 20,000 rather than 25,000, such notification to be given one month, rather than three weeks, in advance of the start of the manoeuvres;

(b) Notification of movements in the region of land forces exceeding a total of 20,000 troops;

(c) Notification of major air force manoeuvres conducted in the regions;

(d) Notification of major naval manoeuvres conducted near the territorial waters of other participating States of the European Conference;

(e) Limitation of the scope of military manoeuvres to a total of 40,000 troops.

5. The Warsaw Treaty States have also expressed willingness to consider other proposals for confidence-building measures in Europe as well as their extension to the Mediterranean region if the countries in the southern part of that region so desire.

6. In addition, the People's Republic of Bulgaria has joined with other member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in proposing the conclusion by all the participants in the European Conference of a treaty in which they pledge not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another. The implementation of this proposal would significantly strengthen the political and legal basis for the observance in Europe of the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and would create additional safeguards for preventing military conflict on the European continent. The socialist countries have also expressed willingness to conclude an agreement providing that the NATO and Warsaw Treaty will not enlarge the membership of their respective alliances.

7. The Warsaw Treaty countries have proposed the convening of a conference on questions of military détente and disarmament in Europe at which the subjects for discussion could be measures for building confidence among States in Europe as well as measures aimed at lessening the concentration and reducing the numbers of armed forces and armaments on the continent. The socialist countries have put forward

a proposal calling for the conference to be held in stages and for confidence-building measures to be considered at the very first stage of the conference. They have also expressed willingness to reach agreement on the order of priorities and procedure for the consideration at appropriate stages of the conference of specific measures to reduce military confrontation and promote disarmament in Europe.

8. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is convinced that implementation of the proposals by the Warsaw Treaty countries aimed at preserving and deepening détente, building confidence among States and promoting disarmament on the European continent will serve as a useful example for the creation of favourable conditions for the solution of these problems in other regions as well, taking into account their specific conditions and requirements.

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

/Original: English/

/9 April 1980/

1. Proceeding from the necessity of continuing the policies of international détente and strengthening international peace and security in conditions of co-operation and confidence among States, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic encourages all steps that could facilitate the achievement of that objective. Confidence-building measures agreed upon by States can play a significant role in the reduction of international tensions and in extending the political détente to include also the military sphere, facilitating thus progress in the field of disarmament, in keeping with the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

2. Accordingly, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic encourages the consideration of proposals for confidence-building measures submitted in various fora. At the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic initiated the adoption of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament which, among other things, "solemnly calls upon all states ... to conduct disarmament negotiations in good faith on all priority items concurrently, including appropriate confidence-building measures, with a view to ensuring achievement of a decisive breakthrough in the sphere of disarmament". The Declaration also "urges all States ... to exert determined efforts to expedite measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States ...". It is the position of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic that it is necessary not only to conduct negotiations on confidence-building measures, but also to strive for their practical implementation.

3. The measures agreed upon at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975 represented a step forward in the process of creating

an atmosphere of confidence in the European continent and indeed helped, to a certain degree, to consolidate and to further develop the results achieved in the process of international détente. The implementation of these measures in the relations among European States in the past period of time has provided a solid foundation of practical experience from which, in Czechoslovakia's opinion, it is necessary to proceed in the further consideration of this question. On its part the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in its relations with other European countries, adheres strictly to and applies all the provisions of the Final Act of the all-European Conference, including those relating to the notification of military manoeuvres and the participation of observers from other States in such manoeuvres, as well as to exchanges of military personnel in the form of delegations and visits.

4. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is of the view that the agreed confidence-building measures that currently exist should be further elaborated and expanded while taking into account the current international situation.

5. Of an extraordinary significance for the improvement of the atmosphere and the strengthening of peace in Europe and throughout the world are, in this connexion, also other proposals submitted by the Warsaw Treaty countries which, in fact, represent a complete peace programme for Europe.

6. A step of fundamental importance would be made by concluding an agreement proposed by the Warsaw Treaty countries, in which all States participants in the CSCE would undertake not to be the first to use against each other either nuclear or conventional weapons. The conclusion of such an agreement, representing a sort of a non-aggression pact, would guarantee in practice the observance of the principle of non-use of force in international relations and would provide a durable safeguard against a military conflict arising in the continent of Europe. The Warsaw Treaty countries also propose to reach an agreement on the non-expansion of the military and political groupings in Europe which would be of considerable importance for the strengthening of the stability and confidence in the relations among European States.

7. The preservation of an atmosphere of confidence among the European States requires, as a matter of necessity, that the historically established balance of power in Europe not be disturbed. The decision adopted by the NATO countries in December 1979 on the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in the territories of some Western European States leads to the direct result of disturbing the balance of power and thus to a destabilization of the political and military conditions in Europe. At the same time this decision undermines the basis for negotiations on this type of weapons and on their mutual reduction. If such negotiations are to be initiated, it is necessary for the NATO countries to revoke their decision of December 1979 or officially to suspend its validity. In that context the United Nations General Assembly, in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, "urges all States ... to strive consistently for the repudiation of all concepts which are based on military intimidation and policies of acting from a position of strength and which lead to the intensification or perpetuation of the arms race and the further accumulation of armaments".

8. A climate of confidence can also be strengthened by unilateral measures, particularly those that would reduce the level of military confrontation in sensitive areas, while taking into account the interests of maintaining one's own security. Of extraordinary importance in that context is the unilateral reduction of armed forces and armaments by the Soviet Union in the territory of the German Democratic Republic by 20,000 soldiers, 1,000 tanks and a considerable amount of other military technology, which reduction is to be completed in 1980.

9. The Warsaw Treaty countries, including Czechoslovakia, are ready to agree on a number of other specific confidence-building measures, e.g. on the adoption of a mutual commitment not to undertake military exercises involving more than 40 to 50 thousand soldiers and on mutual notification of not only military manoeuvres but also movements of ground forces comprising more than 20 thousand soldiers. As is known, a number of other proposals remain valid.

10. The Warsaw Treaty countries are proposing to convene a conference on questions of military détente and on disarmament in Europe which would also consider both confidence-building measures among States as well as steps aimed at reducing the concentration and the manpower of the armed forces and armaments in the continent of Europe. These questions could be considered in stages while agreement is reached on concrete measures. The first stage of the conference should concentrate on confidence-building measures.

11. As for the consideration of confidence-building measures on a global scale, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is of the view that it would apparently be useful to proceed from the experience gained in the elaboration and implementation of such measures in Europe where the process of political détente and its extension into the military sphere was started, while taking into account the specific needs and conditions in each geographical region as well as the existing political situation. In that respect the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is ready to co-operate with all other countries.

PERU

/Original: Spanish/  
/10 July 1980/

1. Peru, a peace-loving country which scrupulously observes the principles of the United Nations Charter and the other generally recognized principles of international law, which believes that the present international situation is characterized by tensions and potential crises that seriously endanger the peace and security of all States and that international society could none the less be organized on just and sound foundations, considers that the implementation of confidence-building measures is urgent and appropriate.

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I. Concepts to be borne in mind

2. It might be stated, without intending to offer a definition claiming to be complete and unalterable, and given that the concept of confidence should be the subject of sustained research with a view to clarifying its scope and attributes, that in the international sphere confidence will be the factor that enables States to conclude that their unquestionable rights and fundamental interests - independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, development - are being threatened in a way that amounts to a danger that they will be violated or attacked.

3. Confidence, therefore, presupposes at least the absence of open hostilities and a minimum of faith in the behaviour of others.

4. The psychological essence of the concept, the fact that it is bound up with different historical experiences, with the individual country's perception, with the diverse strategic, political, economic, social and cultural circumstances prevailing in various regions of the globe, must be duly taken into account.

5. Consequently, confidence, or its absence, cannot be one and the same for all States. It cannot have a constant and similar value in all circumstances and cannot finally be built up solely by measures which seem specifically directed to promoting it.

II. Factors which affect confidence

6. Confidence cannot be dissociated from the general outward behaviour of States. The perpetration by any State of acts incompatible with the provisions of the United Nations Charter or the continuation of policies of that nature militate against the establishment of confidence. Conversely, the enduring and consistent observance of the provisions of the Charter establishes confidence.

7. In a complex and varied world, mistrust is not the same for everyone and its causes are not the same. The possibility of nuclear war produces one kind of mistrust and the possibility of a bilateral conflict another. The mistrust that leads to the accumulation of military force and equipment is one thing; another is the response to acts of intervention, coercion or pressure. The mistrust grounded on ideological and political confrontation is one thing; that bred by underdevelopment and international economic injustice another. One kind is based on armed frontier clashes; another on the policies of States not necessarily contiguous, towards each other: acts of terrorism, destabilization or intervention. Yet another kind of mistrust is that which causes unjust situations - general or specific, widespread or localized, long-standing or recent - to continue. Mistrust usually goes hand in hand with resentment and tension; it may build up to a crisis or be generalized in paralysis, be disguised or overt, but its effects are the same: difficulty in reaching reasonable and equitable agreements; acceleration of the arms race, which, in turn, generates more mistrust; continued existence of critical situations; absence or inadequacy of systems and programmes of international co-operation; intensification of military preparations and attitudes, and so on.



### III. Relationship and meanings

8. There is a patent interrelationship between the causes of mistrust and the way in which mistrust itself impedes or complicates the overcoming or elimination of those causes.
9. Consequently, a specific, concrete or sectoral approach to building up confidence is unthinkable, because confidence depends on a combination of circumstances and its characteristics vary.
10. It must be agreed that every State must implement, or refrain from implementing, a great many actions and policies if it is to inspire confidence in other States.
11. This seems to be the opinion of a great many Governments from all geographical regions which have submitted their views on confidence-building measures.
12. Without trying to summarize the wide variety of factors mentioned by Governments, it must be pointed out that many of them emphasized the crucial significance of the following elements in building or eroding confidence: observance of or failure to observe the principles of the United Nations Charter and other principles of international law, and compliance with the provisions of the Charter; progress in disarmament negotiations or continuation and acceleration of the arms race; concentration of military forces and equipment or relatively modest forces in frontier areas; behaviour of States throughout history; type of strategic planning; compliance with international agreements; willingness or reluctance of States to be forthcoming on military questions; prospects or difficulties in international co-operation for economic and social development; political consultation and co-operation or absence of dialogue; nature of bilateral and multilateral relations; greater, lesser or unchanged frequency of military manoeuvres and their site, extent and character; progress in settling disputes or their continuation or aggravation; nature of the monitoring of disarmament or arms limitation agreements; and so on.
13. As can be seen, the foregoing topics are of a general nature and cover a broad range of activities of States, individually or collectively, and they relate to many of the factors that build up or destroy confidence. They should therefore be adequately considered, studied and evaluated in the global context and in the specific context of each region.
14. Other Governments, however, mentioned more concrete aspects or even identified some extremely specific ones. Once again, without intending to summarize them, the following can be cited: conclusion of an agreement among the European States on prior notification of important military manoeuvres; non-expansion of military and political groupings; reaffirmation of principles such as the inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by force, compliance with agreements entered into, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal and external affairs of States; establishment of the new international economic order; signing of a treaty renouncing the use of force in

international relations; negotiation of a treaty which would commit each of the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use them; exchange of observers of manoeuvres; establishment of observation posts and special lines of communication; publication of information on military budgets; undertaking not to station new troops on the territories of other States; dismantling of foreign military bases; establishment of zones of entente or peace, or nuclear-weapon-free zones; prohibition of large-scale military movements or manoeuvres in frontier areas; offers of assistance (in manpower and equipment) from armed forces in case of natural disasters; elimination of political propaganda in debates on disarmament; strengthening of monitoring systems; prevention of terrorist activities; reduction of activities of military alliances, their simultaneous dismantling, and so on.

15. Here again, it can be seen that the positions of States differ on what must be done to build confidence. All the measures suggested, and others, must be considered, studied and evaluated.

#### IV. Comprehensiveness of the measures

16. Since, obviously, there is no single cause of mistrust, it is impossible to hold that confidence-building measures are of only one type.

17. Confidence, as we have sought to show, reflects a set of interrelated factors which must not be lost sight of, because to do so would mean overlooking the varied origins of mistrust and the plurality of approaches needed to overcome it.

18. A measure or policy which may be of great significance for building confidence in a particular region is not necessarily equally effective in another region with different characteristics. Another measure might be significant in the context of reviewing intentions to use conventional weapons, but its effect might be reduced or even nullified by what the countries involved considered to be one or more other parties' strategy of using nuclear weapons.

19. Certain actions, although ostensibly not aimed at building confidence, in fact provide considerable impetus to that end. Conversely, a measure which is supposed to be specifically directed towards building confidence may lose its significance when it is used to conceal an increase in military preparations or as a substitute for other actions and policies which should be actively pursued.

20. It would be wrong to limit the concept of confidence-building measures to certain actions involving the military or para-military aspects of inter-State relations. Although these aspects are important - and in some regions with a very high concentration of military strength they may be predominant or even indispensable - it must be borne in mind that the military is one aspect of the international position of States, but by no means the only one.

21. As some Governments have pointed out, any measure, undertaking or policy which builds confidence is essentially political in nature; this represents a comprehensive - and, in the view of the Government of Peru, correct - approach to or concept of the nature of confidence-building measures.

22. Consequently, none of the many forms of international linkage which to some extent directly or indirectly build confidence among States, whether or not they are neighbours, should be excluded.

23. It must be borne in mind that although consideration of confidence-building, as a topic, is relatively new, its meaning and significance are age-old. Naturally, as stated earlier, any study of the prospects for confidence-building, not only to avoid conflicts but also in order to establish relations which are more in keeping with the real needs of all nations and all mankind, requires the concentrated and continuous attention of the international community.

V. Matters to be included in the studying of confidence-building measures

24. Confidence-building measures form a substantial part of activities to strengthen international peace and security and bring about disarmament.

25. They must reflect the characteristics of the international situation and, consequently, be general or more specific, immediate or continuing, bilateral, regional or multilateral, political, military, economic and legal, frontier-related or non-frontier-related, and allow for other possible descriptive categories.

26. Factors which favourably or adversely affect confidence must be identified.

27. Due significance must be attached to regional efforts to secure political co-operation with a view to peace. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, at its Helsinki meeting, adopted some measures which were designed to build confidence. The objectives and purposes of the Ayacucho and Washington Declarations amount primarily to an effort to strengthen regional confidence. Resulting from and promoting the spirit of peace in the region, these declarations aim to foster regional co-operation for the peace, well-being and development of Latin America, and represent a central factor in building confidence in the region.

28. The arrangements for economic integration clearly embody confidence-building elements. This is demonstrated in a number of regional agreements in various parts of the world. In the Andean Group, the progress of economic integration is now being accompanied by the harmonization of political positions with a view to strengthening international peace and security. The Heads of State of the member countries of the Andean Group decided, under the Cartagena Agreement in 1979, to establish political machinery for co-operation on the basis of a pluralist approach to regional peace and co-operation.

29. The study must cover the effects of aggression, colonialism, neo-colonialism, interventionism, domination, dependence, hegemonism, and political, economic and financial pressure or coercion; and also respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; the freedom of States to control their natural resources; and respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all States and for the principles of non-intervention and of refraining from the use or threat of force in international relations. The aspiration and the right of States to complete security, including economic security, and the need for international co-operation for development must be borne in mind.

30. In the light of the foregoing, concepts of national security based on aggressive attitudes or acts of intimidation, arms races and striving for economic and/or political domination or hegemony, whether at the regional or world level, must be discarded.
31. Contacts should be encouraged among armed forces professionals at various levels: visits of officers, exchanges of speakers, fellowship-holders and delegations.
32. Measures concerning the scope, site and notification of manoeuvres in the regions in which this is applicable.
33. The significance of bilateral or subregional agreements which foster proposals and projects for co-operation.
34. The use of armed forces in cases of natural disasters and in joint co-operation projects in the field of health and other projects of a humanitarian nature which may be identified.
35. The implementation of joint economic development projects: hydroelectric, irrigation, industrial, etc. especially in frontier areas. Such projects not only promote co-operation and development but also strengthen the feeling of interdependence and community by excluding the possibility that countries might decide to destroy in warfare what they have built together in peace. Their significance as a means of confidence-building should be carefully assessed.
36. Use of the United Nations as a forum for the continuing consideration and promotion of confidence-building measures which, it should be stressed, must take into account the varied origin and nature of mistrust.
37. Confidence-building must start from a minimum of faith among States; its machinery must reflect the particular conditions and requirements associated with the mistrust which is to be overcome, whether at the bilateral, regional or world level.
38. Other measures or policies, general or specific, which may be identified now or in the future.
39. In conclusion, the Government of Peru believes that the consideration and development of confidence-building measures should be a permanent process; that States should in good faith take advantage of all opportunities to explore, by legitimate means which are consistent with sane international coexistence, every avenue of confidence-building, whether through measures which in a particular situation or region are deemed to be suitable for this purpose or through other measures which, without aiming at this specific purpose, clearly result in building confidence.
40. In present circumstances, confidence-building is a priority task of the international community which cannot ignore all that it has itself already agreed upon with a view to bringing about coexistence among the human species in general, mutual respect, tolerance and co-operation.