

**United Nations**  
**GENERAL**  
**ASSEMBLY**

**FORTY-SECOND SESSION**

**Official Records\***



**SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE**  
**23rd meeting**  
**held on**  
**Thursday, 12 November 1987**  
**at 3 p.m.**  
**New York**

---

**SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 23rd MEETING**

**Chairman: Mr. AL-KAWARI (Qatar)**

**later: Mr. GONZALEZ (Chile)**

**CONTENTS**

**AGENDA ITEM 33: POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA (continued)**

---

\*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned within one week of the date of publication to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee

**Distr. GENERAL**  
**A/SPC/42/SR.23**  
**17 November 1987**

**ORIGINAL: ENGLISH**

The meeting was called to order at 3:25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 33: POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA  
(continued)

Hearings (continued) (A/SPC/42/L.3 and Add. 1-19)

1. Mr. BALSLEV-OLESEN (Danchurchaid, Copenhagen) said that a broad spectrum of Danish non-governmental organizations were involved in the struggle against apartheid. Danchurchaid was a church organization which provided humanitarian assistance to the victims of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia primarily through churches and the national councils of churches. It also channelled assistance from the Danish Government to the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and was currently running a fund-raising campaign to support opposition to the apartheid régime.
2. In 1986, Denmark had been the first Western country to enact legislation on comprehensive sanctions against South Africa and Namibia. That legislation, which halted all trade between Denmark and South Africa, had resulted from the efforts of the Danish non-governmental organizations. Regrettably, the political and economic pressure on the apartheid régime had been weakened by the reluctance of the major Western European countries to enact similar legislation. For that reason, a number of Danish non-governmental organizations, together with similar organizations in other member countries of the European Community, were attempting to increase those countries' political and economic pressure on South Africa.
3. In Denmark, that initiative included the publication of documentation about the European Community's relations with South Africa and would culminate in a call by European non-governmental organizations for immediate action against the South African régime. That action would focus on declaring support for the establishment of a non-racial and democratic government in South Africa, a reaffirmation of the Community's commitment to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), acceptance of the legal status of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and measures to bring about the immediate lifting of the state of emergency, the release of all detainees and the withdrawal of military forces from the townships.
4. In order to achieve those goals the European Community should strive to further isolate South Africa by introducing a total ban on the import of coal and uranium from South Africa and Namibia and on loans and the export of oil to those countries. The European Community must also increase its assistance to the States Members of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and the front-line States to enable them to resist military and economic pressure from South Africa. Lastly, he stressed the need to provide more aid to the victims of apartheid and underscored the importance of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions to bring about the complete isolation of South Africa.

5. Congressman George CROCKETT said that he was speaking in an individual capacity presenting the views of two non-governmental organizations: the Congressional Black Caucus, composed of 23 black members of the United States Congress, and TransAfrica, which was the black American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean. In 1986 the Congress had enacted into law the Anti-Apartheid Act as a political and moral statement by the American people repudiating apartheid and all forms of "constructive engagement" with the South African Government. The Act banned the import of a wide range of South African products, the export of computers and technology to the South African army and police force and the granting of loans by United States companies to South Africa and investments in that country.
6. The Act also called for a number of measures, including the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of political prisoners, the free exercise of political rights, negotiations with all racial groups on the future political system and a halt to military activities against neighbouring States. The Reagan Administration had recently claimed that there had been no significant progress towards ending apartheid in South Africa and that sanctions had not worked. The Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica disagreed. Even limited sanctions by the United States and other Western countries had constituted a major factor in South Africa's recent poor economic performance and would have greater long-term effects. Authoritative sources had reported that for the third successive year in South Africa, capital flight was continuing, investments were stagnating, and overall growth was slowing. Accordingly, it was felt that the passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act had indeed contributed to those developments.
7. The Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica also disagreed with President Reagan's contention that the Act had been implemented fully and faithfully by the Administration. If the Administration had not violated the letter of the law, it had surely not adhered to its spirit. Indeed, in February 1987, the United States had vetoed a Security Council resolution on sanctions modelled on that very Act. Furthermore, President Reagan had refused to carry out those provisions of the Act which required him to recommend new sanctions in the absence of significant progress during the past 12 months towards ending apartheid and establishing a non-racial democracy.
8. The sanctions imposed by the United States affected only one third of its imports from South Africa and virtually none of its exports to South Africa; indeed, those exports, including strategically important equipment, had increased since the enactment of the Anti-Apartheid Act. The sanctions obviously needed to be strengthened. To that end, a number of bills had been introduced in Congress prohibiting investments, imports and exports, military co-operation with South Africa and investment in United States capital markets by South African mining interests.
9. It was hoped that United States sanctions would become part of a co-ordinated international effort to exert economic pressure on South Africa. He called upon the Security Council to adopt comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa and urged the United States Government to co-operate in that regard. Such

(Congressman Crockett)

sanctions might represent the last change for a non-violent end to the apartheid system.

10. The Reverend Jesse JACKSON said that the struggle to eradicate racism in its many institutionalized forms had commanded the energy and commitment of millions of people. The most consistent trend had been the struggle of peoples in the third world to end colonialism and organize their economic, political and social systems on the basis of population, resources, experience and the global economy. Colonial Powers had exploited people and resources, depleted minerals and talent, leaving the newly-emerging nations in debt, with little or no infrastructural development, with an uneducated, ill-fed, ill-housed, unprepared populace and a bankrupt national treasury.

11. The developed nations had had the opportunity to form bonds of mutual respect with the new nations, bonds of economic interdependence and mutually beneficial development. Sadly, the misguided policies of Ronald Reagan had caused the United States to lose its moral authority in the world. It had chosen its allies on the basis of distance from the Soviet Union rather than human rights and economic justice.

12. The challenge of contemporary times was to end once and for all the "Fourth Reich" of South African apartheid and its terrorism against its own people, as well as its military actions against neighbouring States.

13. South Africa's strategy was the total economic and political subjugation of southern Africa and the undermining of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) as a vehicle to develop independent trading routes from southern Africa to the rest of the world, an aim in which it had largely succeeded. As long as South Africa could maintain its military and economic stranglehold over the members of SADCC, the effects of international sanctions against the apartheid régime would be limited.

14. That destabilization programme was accompanied by yet another component of South Africa's strategy - a carefully designed, aggressive propaganda campaign to convince the world that apartheid was being reformed.

15. One of the most significant developments in the United States was the passage of the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act, which reflected a clear repudiation of President Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement". However, the Administration's policy had not changed. In anticipation of that attitude, the Act mandated comprehensive sanctions against South Africa unless certain conditions were met within one year. The year was up and the conditions had not been met: the apartheid system had not been ended; the state of emergency had not been repealed; the black trade unionists and political prisoners had not been released; the black majority was not allowed to form political parties; and the military action against neighbouring States had not been ended.

(Reverend Jackson)

16. The Reagan Administration, acting on behalf of the Botha régime, was proposing to introduce a bill to restrict the movement of representatives of ANC and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in the United States. The debate on that issue was to begin shortly in the United States Senate. The United States people must defeat that proposed legislation, which was contrary to its constitutional right to be informed.

17. Consequently, the United States must impose comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa, a policy embodied in draft legislation introduced by Mr. Dellums, a Congressman from California. There were serious loopholes in the 1986 Act: for instance, firms sometimes used third-country labels. The enactment of the Dellums bill and the election of a new administration committed to carrying out the law of the land would enable the United States to reclaim some of the moral authority lost under the Reagan Administration.

18. A national policy towards South Africa must be part of a global strategy to end apartheid. He himself had a comprehensive approach to end the brutality and ignominy of apartheid. There must be a summit meeting of front-line States, in which the European Economic Community would also participate, in order to organize a co-ordinated policy to merge their combined economic and political forces to defend themselves against South African aggression. There must be sanctions, but they were only a tactic and not a comprehensive strategy. The world must support the further development and stabilization of SADC in order to provide alternative trade possibilities to break the South African hegemony in the region. The front-line States must be given the military security to defend themselves against South African invasions. Finally, the United States, with the other industrialized countries, must negotiate aggressively a complete South African withdrawal from Namibia and Angola. It must be made clear that failing such withdrawal, United Nations peace-keeping forces would intervene.

19. The foregoing demonstrated the need to implement a Jackson doctrine for international affairs and foreign policy from a United States perspective. The foreign policy should be based on three fundamental principles: strengthening international law and enhancing the credibility of the International Court of Justice; demanding and supporting self-determination and enjoyment of human rights for all peoples of the world; promoting economic development for all third-world nations.

20. In some measure, those principles were embedded in the ideals to which the United States people aspired. Africans must be seen as allies, customers and partners in human development. An African-American energy, environment and economic alliance similar to his idea for a Pan-/merican energy security alliance for the Western Hemisphere must be developed as a national policy. The overall course was clear. On the day after Veteran's Day, the memory of the millions of men and women who had died in the name of freedom and justice must be honoured by fighting for the freedom of those who had yet to taste its sweetness.

21. The Reverend Franklyn RICHARDSON (National Baptist Convention, USA) said that the South African Government had persistently blocked peaceful channels for blacks to request changes in the political system, by denying Africans the vote in national elections, refusing to negotiate with recognized black leaders, forbidding large public meetings and banning individual leaders without trial. The Government had even prescribed what could be said at certain religious gatherings of funerals.

22. South African church leaders, joined by trade unionists, teachers and members of community organizations, had called for change through comprehensive mandatory sanctions. At a meeting in Washington, the President of the National Union of Mine Workers of South Africa, had recently called on the freedom-loving world community to impose such sanctions. The National Baptist Convention was working to ensure that American firms pulled out of South Africa. All companies operating in South Africa had to pay a levy of 50 per cent of their taxable income in South Africa and provide any products and services requested by the Government, including the military and the police. United States computer companies controlled over 50 per cent of the South African market and provided critical technology, and United States oil companies controlled some 40 per cent of the South African petroleum market, providing petrol to the military and the police.

23. Comprehensive sanctions were already effecting United States support of apartheid. The international oil embargo had forced the South African Government to pay a premium of about \$10 billion for petroleum products over the past 12 years. The withdrawal of flagship companies was as much a blow to South Africa's prestige as a form of economic pressure. The pragmatic South African business community was pointing to sanctions and international isolation as a prime reason for the need to end apartheid.

24. The National Baptist Convention, USA represented almost 8 million people and 33,000 churches and its leaders had been the founders of the civil rights movement. Black Americans understood from experience the sufferings of the oppressed people of South Africa. The newly-formed Coalition on South Africa, which wanted United States black church leaders to call for businesses to stay in South Africa, was outside the mainstream, especially of the black church, in the United States. His own and many other national denominations had argued in favour of strong sanctions against South Africa and had written to United States corporations demanding to know why they were continuing their involvement with apartheid. The religious community considered sanctions to be not only an effective way of helping to end apartheid but also one of the most peaceful ways of ending the escalating civil war in South Africa.

25. Mr. SMITH (Washington Office on Africa) said that right-wing forces in the United States were working to further apartheid through legislation in the United States. Despite the passage of the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act, the conservative movement was mobilizing to undermine the sanctions and secure support for South Africa's regional aggression. A large number of bills had been introduced to win support for South Africa's war against the peoples of southern Africa. That was all part of an effort to implement the so-called "Reagan doctrine", aimed at slowing the sanctions movement, providing legitimacy for the South African colonial

(Mr. Smith)

administration in Namibia, discrediting liberation movements, particularly ANC and SWAPO, the front-line States and the SADCC countries, providing political recognition and military support to the UNITA rebels in Angola and the RENAMO terrorists in Mozambique, and imposing sanctions against Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

26. By exploiting loopholes in the Anti-Apartheid Act, the United States continued to import raw materials from South Africa, thereby allowing Pretoria to evade the impact of such sanctions. Financial loopholes were likewise exploited, permitting "business as usual" between South Africa and the United States.

27. The Reagan Administration's representative to the United Nations had blocked the international implementation of sanctions very similar to those in the Anti-Apartheid Act, despite the fact that the Act stated that the United States must work with the international community to co-ordinate the sanctions.

28. The American right-wing had been especially active over the past year in attempting to discredit the liberation movements. Attempts had been made to restrict travel by ANC so as to prevent it from making its case heard in the United States.

29. The regional strategy of the American right-wing was to ensure American support for UNITA and RENAMO, to frustrate the economic independence of southern African States from South Africa by denying aid to SADCC and to stall Namibian independence by linking it to Cuban troop withdrawal and legitimizing the "interim" Government imposed in Namibia by South Africa. Anti-communist sentiment ran high in the United States, and the right-wing had discovered that it had simply to whisper the words "anti-communist freedom fighters" and dozens of Congressmen would join it in supporting South African-backed terrorism.

30. At the same time, American policy-makers, clinging to their limited world-view of East-West confrontation, had ignored the human tragedy in Angola, where hundreds of thousands had become refugees and thousands of children had starved. By refusing to recognize that the Cubans were in Angola at the invitation of its Government to help the Angolan people against South African and UNITA aggression, the right-wing re-enforced the fiction that UNITA was a group of "freedom fighters" seeking independence from the communist bloc, instead of acknowledging that it was really a South African-supported rebel group fighting a proxy war of destabilization. Covert American military aid had been won for the UNITA guerrillas, and attempts had been made to remove Angola's most-favoured-nation status and to prohibit any loans or investments in that country.

31. One of the most insidious aspects of the right-wing campaign for RENAMO and UNITA was a recent attempt to improve the image of those terrorist organizations through public relations in the black American community. The right-wing had also been attempting to block United States aid to the southern African nations seeking economic independence from the apartheid régime.

(Mr. Smith)

32. The recent increase in such anti-southern African activity meant that the anti-apartheid movement must broaden the focus of its efforts to include the entire southern African region, because if it concentrated on South Africa alone, it would allow the pro-apartheid forces to help South Africa maintain its regional dominance and dilute the effectiveness of sanctions. The international anti-apartheid movement must monitor efforts to evade sanctions and must work to achieve mandatory and comprehensive sanctions that were consistently applied.

33. United States media coverage of the struggle for freedom in southern Africa had been scant since 1986, the American press having censored itself for fear of South African retaliation, and it was the fore up to the anti-apartheid movement to keep the public informed on the situation there.

34. Many prominent members of the United States Congress had stated their full support for comprehensive sanction against the apartheid régime. The American right-wing was well organized in the United States to support South Africa's immoral policies in southern Africa, but there was also another America which over the past few years had raised its voice, and many had demonstrated and gone to jail for their opposition to apartheid and the United States Government's support for the racist régime. The majority of the American people would intensify their support for the struggle for justice in southern Africa if they were provided with accurate information, and that was one of the goals towards which the Washington Office on Africa was working.

35. Ms. HOWARD (National Conference of Black Lawyers) said that since its founding 18 years earlier, the National Conference had supported the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and identified with the victims of institutional racism. Her organization lent its support in every possible way to the true representatives of the South African people and the cause of freedom. The Pretoria Government had become infamous because of its use of preventive detention as a means of silencing the political voice of the majority in South Africa. As if taking its cue from Pretoria, the United States Congress had passed in 1984 the Bail Reform Act, which allowed states to keep persons indicted on criminal charges under preventive detention without bail and was being used to silence dissent in the United States. Two members of the Puerto Rican anti-colonial movement were currently in their twenty-seventh month of incarceration in New York under the Act while indicted on charges of terrorism. Those men were not criminals but courageous political activists who dared oppose the United States presence in Puerto Rico. The National Conference would continue to work with the oppressed blacks in South Africa in support of their struggle for freedom.

36. Mr. González (Chile) took the Chair.

37. The Reverend Evelyn BUSH (Azania Support Committee) said that the African people were answering the divine call for liberation from the evil domination of their oppressors. God had always supported the oppressed, and had never asked them to compromise with unrepentant evil-doers. The African people had experienced oppression at the hands of numerous colonialist nations. Those evil foreign Powers



(Reverend Bush)

had been unable to decimate it, and had all been overthrown. There was thus every reason to be optimistic about the liberation of South Africa.

38. Her Committee shared the resolve of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) to: unite the African people everywhere into one national front on the basis of African nationalism; fight for the overthrow of white domination and respect for the right of self-determination for the African people; work for the establishment of an Africanist socialist democracy; promote the educational, cultural and economic advancement of the African people; and promote unity among African peoples, wherever they might be. Achievement of those goals would liberate all African people, who would not sleep until their resolve had been implemented.

39. The oppressors who ordered all true African Christians to endorse and thus abet the crimes of totalitarian States used a State-oriented theology to maintain evil dominance. The god of the State was the anti-Christ, who must be overthrown by the African people. State theology used the notion of "law and order" to determine what was just or unjust. It used the word "communist" to brand anyone who rejected its insidious concepts in order to intimidate the oppressed masses. However, African people world-wide knew that the god of the State was a god of oppression. The State in South Africa even used God's name blasphemously in the preamble to its new apartheid Constitution. It also committed heresy by proclaiming that God sanctioned apartheid.

40. Africans throughout the world were weary of a church theology which criticized apartheid but failed to curb the violence of the oppressors. In its so-called liberal stance, church theology sought reconciliation between black and white. Africans would not accept a semblance of justice whereby reform was determined by the oppressor and offered as a concession. They would rather eradicate racial and economic oppression by any means necessary, violent or non-violent, and then establish systems of government and justice which worked for the common good of African people and all people throughout the world. African freedom fighters had a deep conviction that the God of compassion was on their side in the liberation struggle. They were told to love their enemies, and the most loving Christian act they could perform was to restore peace and justice to the world. They would not be diverted from that resolve by promises of a peace prize or even by the release of some leaders. In the names of the dead freedom fighters, they declared Africa for Africans.

41. Mr. BRAITHWAITE (United States Peace Council) said that the United States Peace Council was affiliated with the World Peace Council in Helsinki, and was a leader in both the national and international anti-apartheid movements. The Council had published and circulated pamphlets on the struggles in South Africa, Namibia and Angola. It had organized demonstrations at South African missions, solicited signatures for petitions to free Nelson Mandela, brought pressure to bear for sanctions and divestment, printed and distributed the Freedom Charter and participated in joint actions with other anti-apartheid groups. It recognized that the struggle for peace was inextricably linked to the liberation struggles of the peoples of the developing world. The goal of the peace movement was to accelerate

(Mr. Braithwaite)

the isolation of the apartheid régime and sweep it into the dustbin of history. That historic mission was being carried out, inter alia, by ANC and SWAPO, despite a memorandum of the United States National Security Council stating that Africans would never achieve freedom without the help of whites.

42. Without the material support of its international connections, chief among them the United States and the United Kingdom, apartheid would already have been eliminated. Those countries assisted South Africa, because the region was of major importance in the global struggle between the forces of social progress and social blight. The region's raw materials were plundered for use in the manufacture of weapons which later served to mutilate the local people. Moreover, as part of its strategy to contain the spread of socialism, the United States had assisted South Africa in developing nuclear technology.

43. The anti-apartheid movement in the United States had the awesome responsibility of reversing existing national policies. To that end, it was necessary to intensify the divestment campaign, to appeal for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, to call upon Washington to abide by the numerous United Nations resolutions against apartheid and to force South Africa to release all political prisoners, to end assistance to UNITA, and to recognize ANC and SWAPO as the legitimate representatives of the South African and Namibian peoples. In addition, it must increase the demonstrations in front of South African missions and commercial offices and bring additional pressure to bear upon Congress to reject right-wing attempts to pass legislation declaring that ANC and SWAPO were terrorist organizations, and restricting their representatives from travelling freely. Moreover, the United States Congress should support legislation introduced by members of the Congressional Black Caucus in favour of the freedom fighters.

44. The greatest challenge was to persuade millions of people to participate in anti-apartheid campaigns until the authorities in the United States discontinued their overt and covert aid to the apartheid régime. The Council wished to assure its comrades in the front-line States of its wholehearted support and of its determination not to rest until victory was achieved.

45. Mr. CHIKANE (South African Council of Churches) said that the state of emergency in South Africa was becoming permanent. It was reinforced by restrictions on the press and was meant to silence the legitimate voice of the South African people. Although the apartheid régime spoke of reform and law and order, the pillars of apartheid remained intact: race classification laws, the Group Areas Act and other acts and the tricameral Parliament. The apartheid régime had responded to the South Africans' resistance through repressive measures: the state of emergency, detention, prison, proceedings against the opponents of apartheid and attacks on the peoples' organizations, particularly trade unions. While the army and police protected the white population, which constituted 18 per cent of the total, they did not defend black people in the townships.

46. The Government's strategy aimed to remove the legitimate leaders of the people, create a political wasteland, then set in motion a pacification process and

(Mr. Chikane)

talk about constitutional development and negotiations, so that the world would believe that changes had occurred. The South African leaders understood negotiation to mean talking to people who had already agreed with them. Those who had tried to negotiate with the Government were now in detention. Indeed, the régime was afraid of negotiating lest it lose white power. The call to renounce violence prior to holding negotiations was unacceptable.

47. The South African churches recognized the difficult pastoral questions raised by the fact that increasing numbers of church-goers were joining the armed struggle as a last resort. As apartheid was heresy, the South African Council of Churches had resolved to call into question the moral legitimacy of the South African régime as a basis for challenging its de jure legitimacy. It recommended to member churches that they should question their moral obligation to obey unjust laws, and called upon them to support the structures recognized by the people as their authentic, legitimate authority in the eyes of God.

48. He hoped that the international community would respond morally to the brutalization in South Africa by agreeing to impose sanctions. He appealed to Governments to make a declaration against apartheid and a commitment to remove the apartheid régime. The people in the townships knew who was impeding their struggle for liberation, and hoped that such countries as the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany would change their policies.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.