

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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LETTER DATED 20 JULY 1992 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING
A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT BUSH ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
INITIATIVE, ANNOUNCED BY HIM ON 13 JULY 1992, AS WELL
AS TWO RELATED FACT SHEETS ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE

I have the honour to forward to you the attached Statement by
President Bush on the non-proliferation initiative, announced by him on
13 July, as well as two related Fact Sheets issued by the White House.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to register this Statement
and the attached Fact Sheets as official documents of the Conference on
Disarmament, and to have them distributed to all member delegations and
non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Representative of the
United States of America to
the Conference on Disarmament

FACT SHEET

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
Kennebunkport, Maine

13 July 1992

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

A few weeks ago President Boris Yeltsin and I agreed to the most far-reaching reductions in nuclear weaponry since the dawn of the atomic age. Yet even as our own arsenals diminish, the spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to United States national security interests and world peace. In a world in which regional tensions may unpredictably erupt into war, these weapons could have devastating consequences.

That is why this Administration has fought so hard to stem the proliferation of these terrible weapons. We look back with pride on a solid record of accomplishment. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has grown. The Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group have broadened their membership and expanded their controls against trade useful to the development of missiles and chemical and biological weapons. We have toughened our non-proliferation export controls, and other nations have followed suit. We have seen remarkable progress in building and strengthening regional arms control arrangements in Latin America, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East.

Yet we need to do more. The demand for these weapons persists and new suppliers of key technologies are emerging. Export controls alone cannot create an airtight seal against proliferation. In an era of advancing technology and trade liberalization, we need to employ the full range of political security, intelligence, and other tools at our disposal.

Therefore, I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our non-proliferation efforts in the years ahead, and directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

While these steps will strengthen the barriers against proliferation, success will require hard work and, at times, hard choices. The United States, however, is committed to take a leading role in the international effort to thwart the spread of technologies and weapons that cast a cloud over our future.

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The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
Kennebunkport, Maine

13 July 1992

NON-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVE

Noting that "the potential spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to US national security interests", the President today announced a comprehensive initiative to bolster American efforts to stem the spread of these capabilities and to discourage any use of such weapons. The initiative seeks to integrate new and existing policies in an overall framework to guide United States non-proliferation policy in the years ahead.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

First, the United States will build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them.

Second, the United States will focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean Peninsula.

Third, United States non-proliferation policy will seek the broadest possible multilateral support, while continuing to show leadership on critical issues.

Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue through the entire range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, regional security, export controls, and other tools available.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

Nuclear materials

- Nuclear materials production. The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia to take similar actions, such as those proposed in the May 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative. The United States will seek further multilateral support for concrete measures to discourage production or acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, or other areas where they would increase the risk of proliferation.

Multilateral actions

- . Compliance with international non-proliferation norms. The United States will take into account other countries' performance on key international non-proliferation norms in developing its cooperation and technology transfer relationships, and will consult with friends and allies on similar approaches.
- . Enforcement of international non-proliferation norms. The United States will consult with friends and allies on international actions to be taken against serious violations of non-proliferation norms, e.g., the transfer of any weapon of mass destruction or key weapon facilities, violation of safeguards agreements, or confirmed use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Actions could include United Nations Security Council embargoes or inspections, assistance to victims of attacks by such weapons, extradition agreements, or immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly contributed to proliferation.
- . Support for special inspections and weapon destruction. The United States will examine, in consultation with friends and allies, establishment of multilateral funding efforts to support special inspection regimes where necessary and to help States destroy existing weapon stockpiles.
- . Harmonization of export controls. The United States will promote harmonized non-proliferation export control lists and enforcement, including an agreement among suppliers not to undercut one another's export restraint decisions.

Regional efforts

- . Targeted approaches. The United States will continue to focus special efforts on the dangers of proliferation in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and on the Korean Peninsula, including efforts to achieve confidence-building measures, inspection regimes, and other economic, political, and security-related measures.
- . Former Soviet Union. The United States will continue to work with authorities from Russia and the other new States toward the following objectives:
 - Implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and, when opened for signature, the Chemical Weapons Convention.
 - Effective internal accounting and physical protection against theft or diversion of nuclear-related materials and equipment.
 - Effective export controls on chemical, biological, nuclear and missile technologies consistent with existing multilateral regimes, including appropriate laws and regulations, as well as education of exporters and customs and enforcement officials.

- Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear warheads, and effective controls over nuclear-weapon material.
- Creation of opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful endeavours.
- Consideration of requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying Russian biological weapons facilities or in converting these facilities to production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, provided Russia is in full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Global norms

- . Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States reaffirms its commitment to see a CWC concluded this year, and calls on all nations to commit to become original signatories.
- . NPT and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993.
- . International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States will work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and will support needed increases in the safeguards budget.
- . Biological Weapons Convention. The United States will continue to urge universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention and increased support for the confidence-building measures agreed by the parties at the 1991 Review Conference.
- . Missile Technology Control Regime. The United States reiterates the call of the MTCR Partners for all Governments to adopt the MTCR Guidelines as part of their national policy.

Intelligence

- . Non-proliferation Center. The Intelligence Community, including the newly-created Non-proliferation Center, will increase support to international non-proliferation regimes and seek to enlarge the pool of experienced, well-trained experts committed to the non-proliferation mission.

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EXISTING NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS

- . Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the past year, China, South Africa, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other new parties brought NPT membership to 149. France will soon be a party. In the START Protocol signed in Lisbon, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States.
- . International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA confirmed its right to conduct "special inspections" at undeclared nuclear facilities. Argentina and Brazil reversed longstanding positions to adopt full-scope IAEA safeguards. After years of delay, North Korea finally complied with its NPT obligations to ratify an IAEA safeguards agreement and accept IAEA inspections.
- . Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In April 1992, the 27 NSG members agreed to extend nuclear export controls to dual-use items, and to require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.
- . Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR expanded its membership to 22, updated its export control list, and agreed to extend its focus to any missile intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction. China, Argentina, and Israel have pledged to observe the MTCR guidelines.
- . Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). Under EPCI, the United States expanded its export controls to cover all 50 identified chemical weapons (CW) precursors, dual-use equipment relevant to chemical and biological weapons production, whole chemical plants, and knowing assistance to chemical or biological weapon or missile programmes.
- . Strengthened National Export Controls. Several suppliers have strengthened their domestic export control laws and enforcement mechanisms. Several countries have adopted laws or regulations similar to our EPCI, which restrict assistance by their citizens to nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile programmes.
- . Australia Group. The Australia Group expanded its membership to 22 nations, and followed the United States lead in EPCI by expanding its export controls to cover the 50 chemical weapon precursors as well as CW-related dual-use equipment. The Group has just adopted a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment.

- . Middle East Arms Control Initiative. In May 1991, the President launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers - the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. In October, the five agreed to observe guidelines of restraint in conventional transfers and to information exchange. In May 1992, the five agreed to interim guidelines for exports related to weapons of mass destruction. Under the Middle East peace process, 23 delegations (including Israel and 12 Arab States) gathered in Washington in May 1992 to discuss regional security and arms control.

- . United Nations. The United Nations Special Commission and the IAEA have carried out 39 inspections in Iraq, identified and begun to destroy tens of thousands of chemical munitions, destroyed missile-production equipment and over 150 missiles, revealed an extensive nuclear weapons programme, and oversaw destruction of nuclear weapon-related facilities.

- . Latin America. In addition to adopting full-scope IAEA safeguards, Argentina and Brazil joined with Chile to ban chemical and biological weapons in their countries.
