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Chairman: **Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (Zaire)**

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Statements were made by:

Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico)
Mr. Petrovsky (USSR)
Ms. Theorin (Sweden)
Mr. Hepburn (Bahamas)
Mr. Sastradidjaya (Indonesia)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): In keeping with the programme of work and the timetable adopted on 1 October, we are today embarking upon our substantive work. This morning the Committee will begin its general debate on all disarmament items on the agenda, namely, items 48 to 69. Before calling on the first speaker, I should like in a personal capacity to present a brief general assessment of the current international situation in the context of the subject we will be considering together.

It is generally recognized that the problems of arms limitation and disarmament are complex and deep-rooted, and no easy solutions have yet been found despite prolonged and arduous efforts to resolve them. Great patience, persistence and, above all, the necessary political will have been needed in order to make significant progress in this area.

The world has already benefited from the results of these efforts, which have taken shape in the form of various agreements on the bilateral, multilateral and regional levels. Nevertheless, we have not been able to make significant progress in solving particularly persistent problems, especially in the nuclear sphere.

(The Chairman)

Now, significant events are taking place at an impressive and even amazing speed, events that for the first time, and particularly following the Reykjavik meeting, will perhaps indeed bring to fruition what had always hitherto been only a hope for a world completely free of nuclear weapons. The agreement in principle reached between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to conclude a treaty on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles marks considerable progress in a process we hope will ultimately lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We must also hope that the new talks scheduled between those two States will lead to additional agreements, particularly in the area of strategic weapons. We also note with satisfaction that both parties have agreed to enter into comprehensive, step-by-step negotiations on nuclear tests. The positive results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe are another important step along the path towards confidence-building among States.

Those results and other new and encouraging new events we have witnessed in the international arena have reanimated the spirit of détente, and the international community must take this opportunity to adopt effective measures in all the areas covered by disarmament negotiations, including conventional weapons. It is therefore imperative not to return to old polemics or to the terrible confrontations of the past, but, rather, resolutely to try to open up new paths that can lead to better and better prospects for peace.

At a time when both super-Powers are about to make decisive progress in slowing the arms race, the other nations of the world should not merely stand on the sidelines. The new prospects for peace that can now be glimpsed must, on the contrary, inspire them to abandon the traditional attitudes that have often led them to resort to military means in order to ensure their security. We must

(The Chairman)

henceforth try to adopt constructive and concrete measures to strengthen our common security in a world in which we share a common destiny.

It is to be hoped that progress in bilateral negotiations will also yield positive effects in multilateral negotiations. In this connection, I believe that the positive events we are witnessing should be echoed in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. That Conference, the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, has already played a useful role. However, we know that if it were given the appropriate mandate to deal with the important items on its agenda it could more effectively work towards a fuller realization of its objectives.

Of course, the Conference on Disarmament has made considerable progress, particularly last year, towards the conclusion of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. However, for a long time it has made no new progress in other important areas. Thus, it would be desirable for the Conference to reach agreement on a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear testing and on a comprehensive disarmament programme, an area in which its competent subsidiary organ has already done useful work under the leadership of the Ambassador of Mexico, His Excellency Mr. Garcia Robles.

The risk of seeing the research and development programmes of the two main space Powers spread into outer space has now become a reality with our entry into the "Star Wars" era. We must make sustained efforts, especially within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, to prevent the arms race from being extended into a new environment and to ensure that outer space will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This year we are celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which was signed on 27 January 1967 and entered into

(The Chairman)

force on 10 October 1967. We must work to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

The regional scope of disarmament is taking on new importance. Many proposals have been submitted on this subject, some of which have been implemented. However, there are other proposals concerning regional disarmament that are still far from realization, and in particular those regarding the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. On the subject of regional disarmament, I should like to welcome the establishment of United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament at Lomé, in Togo, and at Lima, Peru.

Security, which is an essential factor of peace, has always been one of mankind's deepest aspirations. The pursuit of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, is a serious threat to international peace and security and deprives the international community of human and economic resources that are essential to its socio-economic development.

In this connection I should like to refer to a document setting forth the views of the African States on the question of the relationship between disarmament and development, a document that was distributed as an official document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. That document states:

"The release of additional resources through disarmament measures for the benefit of development should neither be conceived as a burden to be carried by a State or group of States, nor as a work of international charity. On the contrary, it should be a collective endeavour for the benefit of all, a necessary contribution that nations make together for the consolidation and preservation of the supreme common goal that is peace.

(The Chairman)

"It is, therefore, necessary to explore concrete ways and means of enhancing the disarmament process and to direct resources released as a result of disarmament measures towards economic and social development."

(A/CONF.130/4, paras. 15 and 16)

Thanks to our joint efforts, the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was held at New York in August and September of this year. It underscored the firm will of the international community to achieve the objectives of disarmament and development for the purpose of strengthening international peace and security and to promote prosperity. The Final Document of that Conference, and in particular its Programme of Action, contains a number of recommendations that we must all sincerely endeavour to implement.

The purpose of this Committee, the most representative of the multilateral bodies dealing with disarmament, is to contribute to the process that will, inter alia, lead to the elimination of the threat of war and, in particular, nuclear war, to put an end to the arms race, to find ways and means of halting nuclear testing and the increase of the military nuclear capability and to promote international security. Many proposals have been advanced to this end in recent years and again this year.

(The Chairman)

The time has now come for us to do everything within our means to translate those proposals into concrete measures. To do that, we must pledge ourselves to the priorities, objectives and principles set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which provides the international community with the necessary guide-lines to promote the cause of peace through disarmament.

At this session we are to decide the dates for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in 1988. The success of that special session will depend in part on the success of our work here in the First Committee. For that reason, too, it is up to us to contribute through sincere and concrete efforts to the solution of the most pressing problems of our time. In so doing, our Committee will no doubt make a constructive contribution to the success of the forty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): At the outset, I should like to convey to you, Sir, the Mexican delegation's congratulations and the satisfaction with which we welcome your unanimous designation as Chairman of the first Committee of the General Assembly, which has been assigned important items relating to disarmament and international security. Your brilliant record and the almost three years during which you have been the Permanent Representative of your country to the United Nations, which have corroborated your equally distinguished record as Permanent Representative of Zaire to the United Nations in Geneva, the headquarters of what has been called the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, guarantee success in the important task on which you are now embarking, in which you may of course be assured of the co-operation of the Mexican delegation.

We also wish to congratulate the other officers of the Committee.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

We are equally pleased to see in our midst once again Mr. Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; Mr. Safronchuk, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs; Mr. Komatina of the Conference on Disarmament; and Mr. Kheradi, the Secretary of the First Committee.

Of the eight items which, in addition to that on the adoption of the Chairman's annual report to the General Assembly, were on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for this year, I have selected four for discussion in this statement: a nuclear-test ban, the Comprehensive Disarmament Programme, the elimination of chemical weapons, and improving and rendering more effective the functioning of the Conference. I shall now proceed to make a brief analysis of those items in that order.

On 3 December of last year the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by the overwhelming majority of 135 votes in favour, resolution 41/46 A, entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". In that resolution the most representative organ of the international community recalled, among other things, that:

"... the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than 30 years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority";

and stressed that:

"... on eight different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In the same resolution the General Assembly, after reiterating "once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States", made an appeal:

"... to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular to the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1987 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions". (General Assembly resolution 41/46 A)

Heeding that appeal, the Mexican delegation, together with those of seven countries members of the so-called Group of 21 - Indonesia, Kenya, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia - submitted to the Conference a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1.

By adopting that draft the Conference would establish an ad hoc committee on the item for the purpose of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions. "For the purpose of" is a formula that can be given the most varied interpretations. For my delegation, it is an immediate objective; but for others - for example, the delegation of the United States, which has so stated on several occasions - it is a long-term objective. For that reason, if the draft mandate were to be adopted the Mexican delegation could state for the record its own interpretation. The United States or any other delegation could also make known its interpretation. In that manner we could adopt the draft mandate by consensus, without any of the delegations of States members of the Conference on Disarmament having to abandon their position.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Further, the draft states that the ad hoc committee would set up two working groups which would deal with interrelated matters: working group 1 would deal with the content and scope of the treaty, and working group 2 would deal with compliance and verification. It was therefore clearly stated that none of the aspects of this question would be left aside.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Unfortunately, despite the fact that just as at the 1986 session of the Assembly the vast majority of members were willing to support the mandate, it was not possible to reach consensus. It therefore seems necessary for the First Committee to reiterate this year in especially strong terms its previous calls for a solution to this problem, a problem to which the Assembly has repeatedly attached the highest priority.

The item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament may be considered sui generis; unlike the other items on the 1987 agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on that subject had been submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-first session, not at the present, forty-second, session.

That is why the text of that report, unlike the texts of the reports of other ad hoc committees, was not included in the report of the Conference of Disarmament to the General Assembly (A/42/27). Rather, it is to be found in a separate document (CD/783 of 20 August 1987). But that did not prevent the Conference from accepting the recommendation in the report that the Ad Hoc Committee be re-established at the outset of the 1988 session of the Conference:

"with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament". (A/42/27, para. 91)

When, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, I introduced that report to the Conference on Disarmament on 27 August last, I said the following with reference to that recommendation:

"In order that the recommendation achieve its stated purpose, I consider it my duty to state unequivocally that it would be essential that some members of the Committee - and in some cases this means only one or two - change the

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

line of conduct they have been following during the year of work the Conference is now ending. That line of conduct resulted, among other things, in the 35 pairs of square brackets contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the Conference and transmitted to the General Assembly at its forty-first session - document CD/718 of 26 August 1986, which was the basis for our work - not growing fewer, but rather increasing to nearly three times that number; the draft text I am now presenting contains 97 pairs of square brackets."

As an illustration of the line of conduct to which I was referring, I cited the following example:

"In the second paragraph of the introduction to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, one delegation insisted in distorting the reference to paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, by omitting the reference of the necessity that 'the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated'. Of course, in the abstract that delegation could argue that in 1978 when that special session took place, there was a different Administration in its country. But it is impossible to understand - and even more so to justify - such a position given that the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1982 when the new Administration of the country in question had been in power for two years - adopted by consensus a Concluding Document, which contains the following passage:

'Member States have affirmed their determination to continue to work for the urgent conclusion of negotiations on and the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which shall encompass all

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and in which a new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated.' (A/S-12/32, para. 63)"

Moreover, in that same Concluding Document, which, I repeat, had been adopted by consensus, we read:

"The General Assembly was encouraged by the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the tenth special session as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action." (para. 62)

Along the same lines, less than two years ago, on 16 December 1985, the General Assembly adopted, also by consensus, its resolution 40/152 D, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", the first preambular paragraph of which reads as follows:

"Recalling that in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly called for the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated." (resolution 40/152 D, first paragraph of the preamble)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

What I have just said seems to me sufficient for an understanding that, as I said in Geneva, if the Ad Hoc Committee on this item is to be able to resolve outstanding questions and promptly conclude negotiations on the programme, it will be necessary for some members of the Ad Hoc Committee to change the line of conduct they followed in 1987.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

A little over 15 years ago, on 10 April 1972, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was opened to signature in London, Moscow and Washington. In the preamble to that instrument, the States Parties to it set forth their recognition that the agreement contained therein represented merely a first step towards the achievement of another, much broader step that was defined in Article IX of the Convention, as follows:

"Each State Party to the Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes." (Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex, article IX)

This is a difficult task, to which the Conference on Disarmament has justifiably devoted a great deal of time. Thanks to the efforts of all its members, its pace of work has speeded up considerably since 1984, when it was decided for the first time to grant the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons a real negotiating mandate, and the political will of its members has made it possible to surmount obstacles that had seemed insuperable.

We are now entering a decisive stage in the negotiations, one that has rightly been called crucial to the success of our work. In order to achieve our ambitious objective, it has been decided that the scope of the Convention should be as broad as possible. Consequently, we have identified seven basic activities that should be prohibited - the development, production, stockpiling, procurement, possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, those currently possessing

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

chemical weapons are thereby obliged to destroy their arsenals, as well as the installations where those chemical weapons were produced, thus giving the draft Convention its character as an authentic instrument of disarmament. There is general agreement with regard to those categorical provisions.

My delegation considers that appropriate verification machinery is essential if an international disarmament agreement is to function effectively in all its parts. The draft Convention on chemical weapons is of course no exception to this rule. Ambitious in its objectives, the draft we are preparing also establishes a very broad system of verification aimed at guaranteeing full compliance with all its provisions.

An independent international body set up by the Convention itself would be responsible for these delicate tasks. We consider this an optimal solution for guaranteeing the credibility of the instrument. As the Committee will recall, that was the method chosen by the Latin American States when, more than 20 years ago, they negotiated the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the operation of the organ established in that Treaty has been fully satisfactory.

The main organ of verification will be a consultative committee made up of all States parties. As the number of States parties is expected to be large, it has also been considered advisable to establish a subsidiary organ of the consultative committee, limited in composition, to be called the executive council. This would be formally subordinate to the first body and would carry out all its functions when the former was not meeting.

With regard to the difficult problem of decision-making, my delegation favours the adoption of the simple and unequivocal procedure of a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. We believe that requiring consensus would considerably hinder the work of the committee and the council since each of the parties would

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

thus have a right of veto, which it could exercise at all times and which would be detrimental to the smooth functioning of the Convention.

The year that will begin with the work specified in paragraph 13 of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which the Conference on Disarmament has sent to the General Assembly as an integral part of its own report, will be a crucial year for the preparatory work for the Convention. As a non-chemical-weapon State, Mexico attaches great importance to the conclusion of that Convention, since it would definitively eliminate that lethal category of weapons of destruction. Let us hope that 1988 will see the success of the efforts that began so many years ago in the negotiating body, which was then called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

The question of improving and rendering more effective the workings of the Conference on Disarmament has been under consideration since the multilateral negotiating body was set up. This year, in 1987, a new body was established for that purpose, which despite its small membership can be considered fully representative since two of its members are in the Group of 21, two in the Group of Western European and Other States, two in the Group of Socialist States, with China, the seventh member, acting as Chairman.

At its first meeting, the group considered two questions relating to the subsidiary organs of the Conference on Disarmament and the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The conclusions it reached on those two questions are summarized in its report to the Assembly, contained in document CD/WP.286. I shall therefore, by way of example, merely mention that with regard to the former of those two questions, the group has made the following suggestions, which could be most effective in preventing the very long debates we have had on the establishment of subsidiary organs and the formulation of their mandates.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In this connection, the Group of Seven proposed adopting the practice of establishing ad hoc committees on every agenda item, on the principle that it was not necessary for the Conference to re-establish committees at each annual session, since the resolution establishing them could empower them to continue their work until they had completed their task and on the principle that every ad hoc committee should adopt its own programme of work. If members of the First Committee agree with those views, it would be appreciated if they would make that agreement known in some of their statements.

Given the considerations I have presented regarding some of the main items dealt with in the report of the Conference on Disarmament, it is clear that unfortunately, to date, the multilateral negotiating body on disarmament has not been able to agree on a single draft convention or treaty on the item entrusted to it. Let us hope that the situation will be different next year, which will mark the first decade since it began its work.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Fortunately, the situation seems to be different with respect to bilateral negotiations between the two main nuclear Powers, whose high officials entrusted with foreign relations announced on 18 September that they had reached agreement, in principle, on the conclusion of a treaty on medium- and short-range nuclear missiles.

The importance and significance of that agreement led the leaders of the six countries members of the Initiative for Peace and Disarmament - Raul Alfonsin, Andreas Papandreu, Rajiv Gandhi, Miguel de la Madrid, Ingvar Carlsson and Julius Nyerere - to issue a Joint Declaration on 7 October, which reads as follows:

"The six nations authors of the Initiative for Peace and Disarmament warmly welcome the agreement in principle reached by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 18 September 1987 on the complete elimination of all medium-range and shorter-range land-based missiles. This is a historic first step towards the attainment of our common goal of total nuclear disarmament. We sincerely congratulate President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev for their efforts to reconcile their views.

"In our last joint statement dated 22 May 1987, on the third anniversary of our first initiative, we stressed that 'an agreement to eliminate all intermediate nuclear forces from Europe would be of considerable significance and would constitute the crossing of an important psychological threshold' within the framework of dialogue for nuclear disarmament. The significance of the agreement between the two super-Powers goes beyond its immediate goal. In historical terms, it will be the first agreement on the world-wide elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons, which in fact means reversing the trend that has hitherto prevailed in the nuclear-arms race.

"The hopes of the world are at present focused on the forthcoming summit meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Expressing the hopes of all the peoples of the world, we believe that it may afford an ideal opportunity for achieving the following important steps towards nuclear disarmament. It is especially urgent to reach agreements on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, on the cessation of all nuclear test explosions and on the prevention of the extension of the arms race to outer space. The recent agreement demonstrates that where the political will exists all obstacles can be overcome.

"We have always struggled for the attainment of total nuclear disarmament. We are determined to continue our efforts and to use all means possible to reach a more secure world, free from nuclear weapons."

That is the text of the statement issued by the six leaders of the Initiative for Peace and Disarmament. Let us hope that the goal they are pursuing, one that is shared by all the peoples of the world, will be reached in the not-too-distant future, thanks to the development and fruition of bilateral and multilateral efforts such as those I have briefly mentioned in this statement.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation extends its greetings to you, Mr. Chairman, in your post and wishes you success in fulfilling your responsible task.

This year the work of the First Committee is getting under way at a critical moment. For what is perhaps the first time, there are tangible prospects for a breakthrough in the task of eliminating nuclear weapons, a task described as of the first priority at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. One year ago the General Assembly, in resolution 41/86 F, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament," once again unanimously confirmed that the ultimate goal was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and called upon the USSR and the United States, the two leading nuclear-weapon States, to arrive at agreement to reduce their arsenals at the earliest possible date.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

There is every justification for claiming that the United Nations has been able not only to identify the most important problem of our time and to indicate the way to its solution, but also that it has, through its decisions, provided impetus to that end. The support of the United Nations, as the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Comrade Eduard Shevardnadze, stated in the General Assembly, was for us an important moral and political factor at the Soviet-American talks at Geneva.

The decisions of the United Nations in favour of ridding our planet of nuclear means of destruction are convincing evidence of the vital importance of the cause of nuclear disarmament, a cause which, as stated by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, on 15 January 1986, and as reflected in the decisions adopted at the twenty-seventh Congress of our Party, was defined as constituting the main thrust of our foreign policy. Mr. Gorbachev's article of 17 September 1987 addressed to the General Assembly at its forty-second session contains our concept of a secure, nuclear-free world, a dream that is beginning to become reality. The world community now has before it concrete proposals submitted by the Soviet leadership for its discussion with regard to ways and means of establishing a comprehensive system of international peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter, one that would exclude nuclear intimidation and under which the security of all would be a guarantee of the security of each one.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

In its first statement in this Committee, the Soviet delegation is instructed to inform the States Members of the United Nations and members of this Committee what has been and is being done by the Soviet Union to comply with the bidding of the international community.

As is well known, at the talks between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, and the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Schultz, held in Washington from 15 to 17 September of this year, a number of important agreements were reached leading to a lowering of the nuclear threat and the beginning of the process of real nuclear disarmament.

For the first time in the whole history of the existence of nuclear weapons the major nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, succeeded in reaching agreement on the elimination of two classes of their nuclear arms, namely, medium-range and shorter-range missiles. That became possible largely thanks to the meeting at Reykjavik which opened up the prospects of a nuclear-free world and was a kind of harbinger of nuclear disarmament. The Reykjavik meeting set the Soviet-American talks on the right track and demonstrated the practicability of nuclear disarmament.

Of course a great deal remains to be done in order to realize fully the potential of Reykjavik. But we can already glimpse prospects not only with regard to medium-range and shorter-range missiles; we have seen movement also in the matter of banning nuclear tests. Very soon there will begin full-scale talks on this range of problems, and it is clear that our 18-month unilateral moratorium did not disappear without trace. It engendered hopes and strengthened the belief in the possibility of prohibiting tests.

We hope that the forthcoming summit meeting and the concluding of an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles will give a powerful impetus to the

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

search for and finding of solutions for the whole range of military and political problems and create favourable conditions for forming new concepts of security no longer connected with the strengthening and buildup of military might.

In a few days, in Moscow, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States Secretary of State will hold talks to finalize the work of the delegations of the two countries in Geneva. They will set out a concrete time frame for the United States-Soviet summit meeting in the autumn of this year for the signing of a treaty on medium-range and shorter-range missiles and for consideration of the whole range of questions involved in relations between the two countries. As a high priority at the Moscow meeting consideration will be given to the questions of reducing strategic offensive armaments, compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, progress in the area of conventional weapons, and the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons.

I should like to say something specifically about the Washington talks. To be frank, they were difficult, but we were confident of success. We were guided by the new political thinking, which is oriented towards co-operation, a search for agreement, and a mutually acceptable balance of interests. It was our belief that, in the nuclear space age, security could only be global, and in respect of relations between the United States and the USSR they could only be mutual and equal. Attempts to out-smart each other to achieve supremacy are fraught with the most serious consequences. That is simply unconscionable.

It would be of no advantage to us for the United States to enjoy a less degree of security than the USSR, because that would lead only to mistrust and give rise to instability. Similarly, in resolving questions with the United States we have never lost and will never lose sight of the security interests of all other peoples, including of course all European peoples.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Guided by the new political thinking, the Soviet Union, to achieve agreement on the elimination of the two classes of nuclear weapons - medium-range and shorter-range missiles - left aside the British and French nuclear arsenals and split the Reykjavik package. Although we preferred and - I will be frank about this - continue to prefer comprehensive solution to the questions relating to the reduction of armaments, to accommodate the wishes of the Asian States we gave our assent to the elimination of all our medium-range and shorter-range missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. We should also like to draw attention to the fact that we are destroying many more nuclear warheads than our American partners. Of course, the agreement achieved on the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons - medium-range and shorter-range missiles - is the result of accommodation and a common desire to find mutually acceptable solutions.

It was possible to reach agreement at the Washington talks by working out a compromise on the question of United States warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles. The American side agreed that all United States warheads for missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres would be covered by the elimination procedures agreed on between the USSR and the United States, that is - and I should like to emphasize this particularly - within the framework of a treaty. No exceptions for any part of these missiles or warheads, including warheads for the West German Pershing-1A missiles, will be made.

To be frank again, the settlement of this question would hardly have been possible without the support and assistance of our allies in the Warsaw Treaty, particularly the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. A positive role was also played by the statement of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Kohl. For its part, the Soviet side showed particular consideration for the special relations between the United States and that NATO ally.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

It will take some time to work out the final text of the treaty. It is necessary to come to agreement, at the level of experts, on a number of technical matters that are still outstanding and to translate into precise legal language the agreement reached, particularly with regard to the need for an effective verification system. With respect to the phasing of reduction, the American side proposed that the medium-range missiles be kept operational but that their number be proportionately reduced during the whole period of reductions.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

On our part, it was our desire that within one year from the date of entry into force of the treaty all missiles subject to destruction should be rendered inoperative, by removal of their nuclear warheads. Also, the precise timetable for reductions was left open, to be agreed upon later with due regard to all technical and environmental considerations, and with the involvement of experts in the framework of the bilateral Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons.

The Soviet and United States negotiators at Geneva were assigned the task of completing this work by 22 October, when the United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, will begin his visit to Moscow. The pace of work in recent days at Geneva gives us reason to believe that the delegations will be able to finish their work within the allotted time. As of today, four principal articles of a future treaty have been agreed upon. Specifically, agreement has been reached on the article concerning phasing the elimination of missiles. All in all, the treaty will consist of 16 articles. Broad efforts are currently under way, with particular attention focused on verification issues. There are, of course, technical difficulties, but we do not consider them to be insurmountable.

The Soviet side views the agreement on shorter-range and medium-range missiles - which in itself would have historical significance in terms of genuine nuclear disarmament - to be a mere beginning, as a kind of prologue to be followed up with further actions leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere by the end of the century. Above all, the very process of implementing the treaty will provide a wealth of unique experience and will help build up trust in all areas of international relations.

We believe too that the implementation of the Reykjavik decision on a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States of America, in the context of strict compliance with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, is of crucial importance.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

On the question of strategic offensive weapons, we have submitted some clarifications of our position, to accommodate the wishes of the United States: among other things, we proposed limiting the number of warheads in any of the components of the strategic triad to 60 per cent of the total number of the warheads of strategic offensive weapons. The meeting, however, did not reveal any new approaches in the United States position or any desire to find a common language. In fact, everything came back to a repetition of their previous positions, which had been stated many times at Geneva and which are unacceptable to the USSR because of their one-sidedness. The United States side insisted on sub-limits, on banning mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, and on including the Soviet medium-range Backfire bomber among strategic weapons, and it evaded serious discussion on the limitation of sea-based cruise missiles and other subjects.

In our view, the time remaining before the ministerial meeting can, and should, be used to move forward on this question also, the more so since all the concrete conditions for a solution undoubtedly exist.

At the talks we have made a number of specific proposals for maintaining and strengthening the anti-ballistic missile Treaty régime. Specifically, we suggested consideration of two options.

The first is agreement on a list of devices to be banned from outer space, irrespective of their purpose, if their technical characteristics exceed agreed parameters. The Soviet side stressed that with this approach appropriate devices with parameters below established limits could be introduced into outer space for any purpose, whether or not they were related to anti-ballistic missiles. Other research into space-based anti-ballistic missile systems would be confined to Earth-based laboratories. Relevant technical parameters for the devices to be banned from outer space were submitted to the United States side during the talks.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The second option is agreement on strict and scrupulous compliance with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty in the form in which it was signed and ratified. A serious violation of the Treaty by either side would give the other side the right to suspend reduction in its strategic offensive weapons.

With either option both sides would undertake not to exercise the right to withdraw from the anti-ballistic missile Treaty for at least 10 years, thus ensuring the strategic stability necessary for the 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive arms.

With either of the options we have proposed, both sides would continue to comply with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty even after the 10-year period. They would hold talks on the anti-ballistic missile defence problem as a whole in the light of the strategic situation existing at that time, including the 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive arms.

Substantive discussion of urgent measures related to the maintenance and strengthening of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty régime could be initiated at the meeting between the Soviet Minister of Defence and the United States Secretary of Defense within the framework of the Soviet-United States Standing Consultative Commission at Geneva. The proposal to hold such a meeting has been communicated to the United States side. Unfortunately, the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, has reportedly shown no interest in such a Geneva meeting.

An important concrete outcome of the talks was an agreement to begin, even before 1 December 1987, full-scale step-by-step talks with the ultimate purpose of totally banning nuclear tests. We attach particular importance to the fact that this objective has been singled out by the United Nations as a priority for both bilateral and multilateral efforts.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

It has been agreed that Soviet-United States negotiations on this matter will take place in a single forum. As a first step, the two sides will reach agreement on verification measures which will permit ratification of the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-United States treaties on limiting underground nuclear explosions, and will proceed to formulate further interim limitations on nuclear testing. To those ends, joint experiments will be conducted to improve verification methods at the test sites of the two countries.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

At the same time - and I want particularly to stress this point in this Committee - the Soviet side continues to deem it possible to reach agreement on an immediate cessation of all nuclear explosions. As an initial step, we have proposed to the United States that agreement be reached on a substantial limitation of the yield of explosions - for example, to one kiloton - and of their number, to four a year.

The agreement just concluded on setting up nuclear risk reduction centres constitutes a positive development in the evolution of Soviet-United States relations and a step towards building confidence and reducing the threat of war.

Of fundamental significance is the reaffirmation, in the preamble to the agreement on those centres, of an agreement reached at the summit level that a nuclear war must never be fought and can never be won.

It is stipulated that at this stage such centres will be used to transmit notification of launches of ballistic missiles in connection with the Soviet-United States agreements already in force. Subsequently, provided there is agreement by the two sides, and with due regard for the achievement of further arms limitation agreements, the list of notifications can be expanded.

An in-depth exchange of views with the American side is taking place over the entire range of issues related to the early prohibition of chemical weapons and work on a convention on the subject is being accelerated, in accordance with United Nations decisions. In particular, we have put forward a broad programme of measures to promote confidence and openness in this area, including proposals for a bilateral exchange of data on the military chemical potentials of the USSR and the United States of America and on the verification of that information by means of on-site inspections prior to the signing of a convention.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

We believe that these proposals, together with the recent Soviet initiatives with regard to a ban on chemical weapons, will make it possible to find solutions to all the key problems related to the conclusion of a convention.

Here, as in the matter of nuclear weapons tests, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which has been dealing directly with these problems, plays an extremely important and responsible role. It has also been working on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

At the Soviet-United States talks in Washington, a great deal of attention was paid to the question of stepping up work on a mandate to initiate talks on reductions of troops and armaments in Europe. Regrettably, we have failed to agree on a formula with regard to the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons as one of the subjects for future negotiations. It is our view that the consideration of that category of weapons - that is, tactical nuclear weapons - within the framework of the negotiations is entirely logical and justified.

On the whole, the outcome of the talks in Washington has shown that the goal set by the United Nations of ensuring security through disarmament is taking precise shape. Agreement in principle has been reached on the first measure in history providing for the physical elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons.

This has proven the ability of States to break with the vicious logic of the arms race, to harmonize and assume obligations in the interests of international security and jointly to opt for moderation and self-restraint in the most sensitive area related to national security.

The doubts of the sceptics about the possibility of building a nuclear-free world have been dissipated. There should be neither pause nor delay in erecting the edifice of a nuclear-free world. It is our firm intention to ensure

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

uninterrupted progress so as to enable mankind to enter the twenty-first century without the fear of nuclear, chemical or any other kind of annihilation.

We view the intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement and the other Soviet-United States accords I have mentioned as important elements in the supporting structure of peace, which rests on the foundation of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the ABM Treaty and other extremely important arms limitation measures. This is precisely the basis of the comprehensive system of international peace and security that is being shaped right now.

The agreements reached demonstrate the historic truth and strength of the policy of reason and common sense, that very policy which was formulated by the United Nations at the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in the recommendations of this Committee. Along with the entire world community, the Soviet Union hopes, and is convinced, that these agreements will put an end to the period of stagnation in the field of disarmament and will trigger a chain reaction in all areas of arms limitation and reduction. What is needed to translate this certainty into reality are further vigorous efforts by each and every one of us and the weight of the authority of the United Nations General Assembly at this forty-second session.

The Soviet delegation intends to share with the Committee in subsequent statements its thoughts with regard to the role of the United Nations in the process of disarmament.

Ms. THEORIN (Sweden): Let me first, Sir, on behalf of my delegation, congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. It is with great pleasure that we welcome a representative from Africa in the Chair, and we are convinced that your well-known diplomatic skill as well as your

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

important experience in disarmament matters, including the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, will assist us in guiding the hectic work of this Committee to successful results.

As Francis Bacon said long ago,

"Hope is a good breakfast, but it is a bad supper."

Today we have good reason for hope. Less than a month ago, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed in principle to eliminate land-based intermediate-range nuclear weapons. A major agreement on nuclear disarmament, not just on arms control or limitation, would demonstrate a new trend - perhaps the beginning of a new era in international relations. If so, it will be an agreement of historic significance.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

In the past disagreements over disarmament have embittered relations between the super-Powers and precluded urgently needed co-operation between them. Agreements on the same issues should now be a means of co-operation on contemporary problems that range from regional conflicts to the preservation of the natural environment we share, from actions against world-wide poverty to the prevention of nuclear war. The agreement we expect President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to sign this year can be of particular significance in helping to bring about further disarmament. Indeed, it must do so if it is to become a turning-point and not just an exception in a long history marked by failure.

This is obvious from the mere fact that it will leave untouched the greater part - in fact, some 97 per cent - of existing nuclear arsenals as well as 100 per cent of other weapons of mass destruction and of conventional forces. It is necessary to go further.

The immediate bilateral disarmament agenda should include major reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals, already agreed in principle, purposeful negotiations on reductions in the remaining categories of nuclear weapons, irrespective of their mode of deployment and decisive steps towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in space.

The other nuclear Powers must also join the process. It is indeed a process from which no State can be excluded, as the security and even the survival of all is at stake.

Nuclear disarmament will not detract from, but underline, the importance of conventional and chemical disarmament. In those fields as well, progress requires the constructive and committed participation of the major military Powers, and the rest of us have both the right and the obligation to contribute.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

Bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other, as the General Assembly has concluded. The work in favour of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is a good illustration of this. In 1987 the five nuclear-weapon States have all tested nuclear weapons. They have done so in defiance of massive international opinion and in disregard of the position of an overwhelming majority of sovereign States.

International developments illustrate the importance of preventing nuclear-weapons proliferation. The goal of a multilateral, comprehensive test-ban treaty is as urgent as ever. This has been repeatedly emphasized, by the six-nation Initiative, inter alia.

Nor would agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals make a test ban any less important. On the contrary, an end to testing would be an important means of ensuring that agreement on nuclear disarmament will not rapidly be outflanked by the unbridled development of new generations of nuclear weapons.

The two main nuclear Powers have recently announced that they will begin negotiations with a view to ultimately ending all nuclear testing. This is a positive development, but the mandate for those negotiations seems to treat a complete test ban as merely a distant goal. That is not acceptable. Any agreement that leaves room for continued testing is clearly insufficient. The time has come for a definite end to all nuclear testing.

Agreements must include a clear commitment to reach a comprehensive test ban at an early, specified date. They can be steps in the right direction only if reductions are militarily significant, imposing real constraints on the ability of the parties to develop nuclear weapons at will. It is important, furthermore, to avoid allowing such steps to give rise to new uncertainties about compliance. The United States and the Soviet Union should be called upon to report to the

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

Conference on Disarmament on the progress of their negotiations. Only in that forum can a multilateral test-ban treaty be negotiated and concluded.

Both technical and political progress has recently been recorded in the field of test-ban verification. Achievements in that vital area should be consolidated and further developed.

As bilateral negotiations get under way, it is ever more urgent that the Conference on Disarmament be allowed to assume its responsibilities in carrying out substantive work on a multilateral test-ban treaty.

Sweden urges all other States genuinely committed to a test ban to consider the possible implications of bilateral negotiations for the role of the multilateral forum. Will it be pushed aside? Will it fall into oblivion? Will it, as was the case with the partial test-ban treaty, be asked to sign and ratify a ready-made product of modest disarmament value devised in closed sessions? Will procedural procrastination continue to stall the work of the Conference on Disarmament? If so, the dogmatism of a few, a very few, will have exacted a heavy toll. At this session of the General Assembly steps should be taken to make sure that such an unfortunate development is avoided.

Bilateral and multilateral efforts should also complement each other in preventing an arms race in space. Outer space is the province of all humanity. All States stand to gain from its peaceful use, all to lose from its militarization.

The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and other disarmament and arms-limitation treaties must be safeguarded. An arms race in space, in particular if it provokes competition between offensive nuclear and so-called defensive systems, may in a short time blow apart the little, but yet important, protection offered to us by existing arms-limitation agreements. It is the main responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent this from occurring.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

The General Assembly should urge the two to reach an early agreement on concrete measures to this end. It should furthermore reiterate its request to the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The analysis of legal and technical matters undertaken by the Conference has promoted a better understanding of the issues involved. The focus of its work must nevertheless be to examine proposals and initiatives put forward. The development of anti-satellite weapons is a potential threat to the vital national interests of many States. In pursuing the matter of a global anti-satellite prohibition due consideration should be given to all measures to control or constrain anti-satellite developments. Any measure agreed on for restricting the possibility of carrying out anti-satellite missions in a reliable way may reduce crisis instability and thus benefit international security.

Naval armaments and disarmament have attracted increased international attention, and correctly so. A simple look at the map explains why Sweden, for its part, attaches high importance to such matters. My country is situated in the North Atlantic area. It is situated between two international bodies of water, the North Sea and the Baltic, and it has a coastline as long as the United States east coast from the Canadian border to Key West. As is widely recognized, the north European and North Atlantic area is the subject of increasing strategic interest on the part of the two major military alliances. A continued naval arms race would have negative consequences for security and stability, inter alia, in the north European and North Atlantic area.

The activities of navies are wide-ranging, from coastal patrol to intervention in distant conflict, from self-defence to global Power projection, from protection of vital economic and other interests to violation of the fundamental rights of

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

others. They include age-old gunboat diplomacy as well as nuclear deterrence. The major maritime Powers maintain naval forces ready for deployment in distant areas. Naval units often operate off the coasts of other countries and even penetrate their territorial waters. Today, every fourth nuclear weapon is earmarked for naval deployment. Such weapons threaten to bring the nuclear-arms race to all parts of the world. The principle of freedom of navigation allows the nuclear Powers to move those nuclear weapons across the seas and oceans and to deploy them off almost any coastal point of their choice. Indeed, they frequently do so as a matter of routine.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

The great number of tactical nuclear weapons on board warships has largely been overlooked. One reason is the policy pursued by nuclear-weapon Powers neither to confirm nor to deny the presence of any nuclear weapons on board any particular ship at any particular time. Whatever the justification for this practice might have been, it creates legitimate and increased public concern in many countries, especially when warships of nuclear-weapon Powers, in accordance with international law, make use of the right of innocent passage through those countries' territorial waters or call at their ports. A growing international public opinion considers this practice both arrogant and incomprehensible. Indeed, the policy neither to confirm nor to deny does not build confidence among States; quite the opposite. While naval visits are intended to be confidence-building, the practice is in fact confidence-blocking and should be abandoned.

Naval nuclear weapons acquire additional relative importance with the prospect of agreements on land-based nuclear arsenals. The significance of such agreements would indeed be much reduced if sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles were to replace the land-based weapons to be eliminated. The earnestness of the declared intention ultimately to eliminate all nuclear weapons could really be called into question.

Limitations on sea-borne nuclear missiles should be agreed to, bilaterally between the major nuclear Power or otherwise. Tactical nuclear weapons should be brought ashore. Negotiated restraint measures on navigation with vessels carrying nuclear weapons on board is another matter to be explored.

Though regrettably one of the major nuclear Powers has chosen not to take part, a valuable discussion on naval armaments and disarmament took place this year in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Sweden notes particularly the recognition in the Commission that conflicts at sea could have harmful effects for

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

the freedom of navigation and other peaceful uses of the sea, and that the maintenance of that freedom is an important objective for all neutral States vis-à-vis an ongoing conflict.

Judging from the work in the Disarmament Commission, the negotiation of confidence-building measures at sea may be an area in which there is common ground to be explored. The Conference on Disarmament should be entrusted with the task of negotiating concrete measures to increase world-wide security at sea. One such measure would be a multilateral agreement on the prevention of naval incidents. Such an agreement complementing, not replacing, existing bilateral agreements of a similar nature could enhance safety at sea while upholding the traditional freedom of navigation.

In order to achieve more openness in naval matters in general, other confidence-building measures on a global or regional level could be contemplated. Among these are prior notification of major naval activities, invitation to observe naval exercises and manoeuvres of a certain size, and exchange of information on such matters.

Sweden focused on the importance of naval confidence-building measures and disarmament in its reply to the Secretary-General on the occasion of the second special session on disarmament in 1982. A year later we introduced the General Assembly resolution that brought about the United Nations study on the naval arms race. In our view, the study has been useful both in drawing attention to the topic and in promoting further action. The next check-point should be the forthcoming third special session on disarmament.

Serious negotiations on naval nuclear disarmament are overdue. Naval forces are not independent of other military forces. They should be seen in their general military context. Attention should be given to nuclear and conventional aspects.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

To summarize, these are some of the measures that in my Government's view should be considered: the practice of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on board any ship should be abandoned; limitations on sea-borne nuclear missiles should be agreed to and all tactical nuclear weapons should be brought ashore; the legitimate claim of coastal States to reasonable seaboard security should be confirmed; the freedom of navigation and other peaceful uses of the sea should not be infringed by military activities; a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea should be concluded; and confidence-building measures at sea should be negotiated.

The absolute character of nuclear weapons makes nuclear disarmament an absolute priority. Although other weapons of mass destruction may not threaten to obliterate human civilization, they could cause casualties fully comparable with many types of nuclear weapons if used in densely populated areas.

Chemical weapons have not yet been relegated to history. Their recent use increases our concern that they are instruments of the present and the future, not of the past only.

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has made steady progress towards a ban on all chemical weapons. Delegations have, through flexibility and constructive action, demonstrated their commitment to a chemical-weapons convention. Most of its elements are in place; however, some technically and politically complicated matters still remain to be solved by the negotiating parties.

The most recent report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contains an extensive 80-page draft text of a convention which in many respects is hardly recognizable compared with the first draft of 1984. It registers substantial progress also on some of the most difficult questions dealt with in the negotiations, even if complete agreements have not yet been arrived at. Significantly, the report includes in an appendix a text on the state of affairs,

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

as seen by the Chairman, on challenge inspection - an indispensable element of a system for ensuring compliance. Growing interest in organizational questions and practical matters of importance for the implementation of the convention shows that States are eager to prepare for its entry into force in the fairly near future.

The area of chemical weapons is shrouded in a cloud of secrecy. At this advanced stage of negotiations the lack of adequate information on the composition and size of chemical-weapon stocks is a major problem. The recent invitation by the Soviet Union to international negotiators is therefore a welcome development. It is our hope that this will foster a process of increased openness. Such a process would enhance the prospects for a rapid and successful conclusion of the negotiations.

It is crucial that the major military Powers manifest a common interest in working out a fully verifiable and truly comprehensive convention. This common interest will be no less important in the final stage of the negotiations. There are no insurmountable political obstacles to a convention on chemical weapons. If all parties demonstrate the necessary combination of determination and flexibility, the arduous work of the negotiators may soon be crowned with success.

Conventional weapons and forces consume some 80 per cent of world military expenditure; they have been used to kill some 25 million persons - children, women and men - in the last four decades. Without conventional disarmament all efforts for international and regional security will be jeopardized.

The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly last year testify to a common interest in pursuing disarmament also in the field of conventional weapons - through bilateral, regional and global arrangements. The increased attention paid to the topic is appropriate indeed; it will not compromise the priority goal of nuclear disarmament but will rather add to the force and credibility of its

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

pursuit. Last May the United Nations Disarmament Commission fell short of reaching agreement on this new agenda item; however, a good basis has been laid for the Commission's continued work.

Concern has been expressed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission about the rapid development of new and exceedingly indiscriminate and inhumane conventional weapons. For instance, the development of laser for anti-personnel battlefield purposes is by no means remote; such technology, with the main effect of blinding the adversary, is already at hand. The use of laser weapons designed to cause permanent blindness would be in clear contravention of the fundamental principles of the law of warfare.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

The international community should consider a ban on the use of laser weapons for such purposes, as well as on the development and production of weapons designed for that purpose. Sweden will continue to consult on this matter with interested delegations.

Stability and security in Europe, where the two major military alliances directly face each other, are essential for world security. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) is an indispensable forum. Sweden welcomes the intention expressed by members of the two alliances of beginning negotiations on conventional disarmament to be conducted within the CSCE framework. Those negotiations should be closely linked to and carried out simultaneously with negotiations in which all 35 States further develop confidence- and security-building measures. The purpose of the negotiations is to strengthen security by establishing military stability and balance at a substantially lower level of forces than obtains at present.

The Stockholm Conference achieved considerable results in the field of verification. Sweden has long emphasized the need for adequate verification and is encouraged by a growing convergence of views on verification matters. Good headway has been made by the Disarmament Commission this year, and the Commission should continue to build upon what has been achieved.

An important matter to consider is how to make optimal use of the United Nations system in international verification of disarmament agreements. Development of that role is likely to benefit both verification and the United Nations itself. Interesting ideas have been presented, including ideas on United Nations machinery for international verification of compliance.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

One issue for the international community to look into is the question of international arms transfers. Such transfers have reached alarming proportions. The issue should be studied in its full political and economic context. States seek to acquire the means they consider necessary to exercise their inherent right of self-defence in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In the light of regional and other efforts to reduce the level of armaments, major suppliers and recipients should, however, explore ways of restraining the international transfer of arms. States could to that effect improve their national legislation and means for control and implementation. Planning for conversion from military to civilian production could be encouraged. The practicability of international registration of major transfers could also be looked into.

A month ago, the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development adopted by consensus its Final Document. That was a victory for multilateral work in the fields of both disarmament and development. The Final Document points to the benefits of conversion. From now on, all States will consider reviewing conversion, studying and planning for conversion, making known to their own peoples and to other countries the benefits of conversion and their experiences in finding solutions to problems connected with it.

As the Final Document clearly states, disarmament and development are two of the most urgent challenges facing the world today. They are priority concerns of the international community, in which all nations - developed and developing, big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear - have a common stake. The United Nations' involvement with disarmament and development and the relationship between them is rooted in the Charter of the United Nations itself.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

The Conference paid attention to the long-standing issue of openness concerning military budgets as a means of building confidence and facilitating agreed reductions of military expenditures. It appears that international support for the principle of openness has grown. In order to create a comprehensive data base on global and national military expenditure, all States should report their military budgets to the United Nations.

As the Final Document reiterates, the world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour, or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order: it cannot do both.

Through the consensus achieved at the Conference, 149 States are committed not only to pursue disarmament and development but also to let development reap the fruits of disarmament. This is not least important today, when the realization of international disarmament has become a more likely prospect.

The Final Document is not a vacuous declaratory statement; it contains a comprehensive Action Programme which envisages a series of measures, both national and international. Last, but not least, in keeping with the Action Programme, the relationship between disarmament and development is to be kept under periodic review by the General Assembly.

There will be an important opportunity for this at the forthcoming third special session devoted to disarmament, to be convened in 1988. That special session will take place at a crucial point in time. It could become a major event in multilateral disarmament. Pending questions of the exact time and length of the session should be solved during the present General Assembly session. As events are unfolding, the special session might be able to register significant progress in nuclear disarmament. But its main purpose should not be to register, but to generate progress.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

The international community must take advantage of the encouraging trends and the political momentum. This is all the more important at a juncture when in parallel with positive political developments, developments in the field of weaponry give rise to serious concern.

Sweden welcomes the outcome of the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee. The agenda envisaged for the special session will make possible a substantial and forward-looking discussion of the international situation and concrete measures of disarmament. Our objective should be not to revise, but to reinforce and supplement the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, a landmark in the disarmament process, in the light of the latest developments and today's realities.

Steps to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear weapons must have the highest priority at the coming special session. However, issues such as the naval arms race, chemical weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, conventional disarmament and verification should also be highlighted.

The situation calls for rapid action. The third special session devoted to disarmament could, ten years after the first special session on disarmament, begin a decade of new efforts and new measures of disarmament and arms limitation and of a new kind of relations between States, based upon a commitment to seek security in co-operation.

The purpose of international disarmament is international security. Its purpose is also national security. Swedish efforts for international disarmament are an important factor in our overall security policy. They serve to promote our own national security by reducing international tension and lessening the risk of open conflict inherent not only in the existence of fundamental political differences but also in the very existence of the arms race.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

The international community has repeatedly stated its conviction that the arms race runs counter to the interests of all of us. It has yet to draw the practical conclusions from this. But there is a glowing, and growing, light of hope to be seen. We can see it in the prospect of a first nuclear-disarmament agreement, of global chemical disarmament, of negotiations to reduce conventional forces, and of a first step towards the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons.

We can see it glowing and growing in the eyes of those who have helped make it possible by refusing to surrender to the powerful force of an escalating arms race.

Hope is a good breakfast, but it is a bad supper. Indeed, for supper we need more, and something more substantial, than just hope.

Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas): I do not recall the author of this interesting anecdote, which I feel is perhaps directed to the chairmen of committees and working groups. It goes like this:

"One of the hardest things to learn is when to pay attention to what people say about us and when to disregard what they say about us, for there is always a streak of truth in the most unfair criticism, and usually something false in the most sincere compliment."

Let me simply say, Sir, that the Bahamas delegation is pleased to see you at the helm of our deliberations and that you can count on our support.

The late Pauli Murray - author, lawyer, civil rights activist, feminist and priest - set the tone for my statement today. The following verse is taken from one of her poems, entitled "Dark Testament and Other Poems", where she says:

Hope is a crushed stalk
 Between clenched fingers.
 Hope is a bird's wing
 Broken by a stone.
 Hope is a word in a tuneless ditty -
 A word whispered with the wind,
 A dream of forty acres and a mule,
 A cabin of one's own and a moment to rest,
 A name and a place for one's children,
 And children's children at last.
 Hope is a song in a weary throat."

In one of my previous statements in this Committee, I likened my expressions of concern about the seriousness we attach to the true meaning of general and complete disarmament to John the Baptist's lament of a "voice ... crying in the wilderness". I pondered deeply the wisdom of speaking in yet another debate

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

without having anything new or constructive to contribute. It was from Pauli Murray's autobiographical account of her experiences in trying to combat racial and sexual discrimination that I received encouragement. She does not talk about the arms race per se but she manages to describe the same kinds of frustration and hopelessness that I felt in echoing hollow expressions on the political, social and economic issues before this International Organization. The question of the arms race is only one aspect of the whole agenda but it is no doubt the most paradoxical of all in that it produces a sense of ambivalence in the minds of those who would wish to see less rhetoric and more action.

Disarmament is different from natural disasters and resource deficiencies in that the power to act resides exclusively with man. But this dramatic fact has produced more despair than hopefulness. Although we live in an age when mankind yearns to be in total control of his destiny, destruction rather than progress seems to be the course of action. This contrast is so evident that one wonders whether it would not be more advantageous to be at God's mercy rather than at man's.

When one begins to relate the documented costs of the arms race, the need for general and complete disarmament becomes all the more urgent. But it seems that little attention is being given to these costs which, besides continuing to escalate at a frightening pace, underscore the waste of natural resources. Despite the view that insight into the unprofitable madness of the arms race is being gained by more and more people, there has, to date been only token progress towards halting and reversing the arms race.

We must ask ourselves why this is so and who is to blame for the stalemate or the real lack of progress. In this connection, my delegation cannot but concur with the perennial phrase that appears in many of our resolutions, that

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

"while the responsibility for stopping the arms race lies with all States, the major task remains that of the two super-Powers."

If cold war tension has characterized the attitudes of the super-Powers since the end of the Second World War, it seems that today competitive antagonism is a more apt term. One would have to deduce that such a shift in attitudes suggests a further link in the cumulative process of heightening the danger of a nuclear war.

Although there would seem to be obvious differences in the language of the super-Powers, in this nuclear age they are more alike than not in fundamental ways. Nowhere is the similarity more obvious than in military budgeting and in the production of new and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. It would seem that there is in the competition a preference for the concept of "better dead than defeated", even though it is a well known fact that the words "victory" and "defeat" are meaningless in a nuclear war.

In 1965, I made reference to the late Mrs. Alva Myrdal's candid book The Game of Disarmament. I find that the following quote is even more relevant today:

"There are many invidious effects to living in a weapons culture. The acquisition of more and more arms, with its built-in trends towards a continuing arms race, contributes to a strengthening of the military in the domestic affairs of all countries. When dictators and oppressors take and keep power, they rely upon their military might, on weapons stored and soldiers trained to use them. The installation of military régimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America is among the prominent features of our time. The present-day power of generals and colonels is clearly related to procurement of arms, which is often a direct result of military aid. And for policing such a nation, ordinary weapons such as tanks and machine guns count. Weapon development makes it ever easier for the few to dominate the many, thus constituting a crisis for democracy as well."

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

The super-Powers have nevertheless shown their concern at the crazy spiralling of the arms race in their recent memorandum of understanding to ban certain medium- and shorter-range missiles. These agreements on arms limitations are extremely positive decisions which augur well for attaining the goal of general and complete disarmament. But given the state of affairs, this welcome agreement is only a drop in the bucket, and my delegation hopes that there will be early follow-up agreements regarding stockpiling, verification, confidence-building measures, nuclear-weapon-free zones and comprehensive test bans, to name a few.

Of course the "Rome-was-not-built-in-a-day-" theory could apply here, but we are dealing with an issue that is much more sensitive and therefore merits accelerated action.

I should like to digress a moment to express my appreciation to the Deputy Minister of the Soviet Union for the information he presented in his statement regarding inter alia the negotiations taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject of the nuclear arms race. My delegation awaits the account of the United States delegation in due course.

In an effort to balance the responsibility to which I referred earlier, militarily significant States as well as developing countries produce their own alibis for contributing to the escalating arms race. On the surface their claims may be justifiable, but they are no less accountable for the mess in which the universe is embroiled. Militarily significant States need to shake off the desire to imitate the super-Powers, and developing countries need to turn their attention to the building of other infrastructure, rather than overspending on military budgets which at best only promote a false sense of security.

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

What is most important, to developing nations in particular, is that we do not speak out of both sides of our mouths. We cannot have our cake and eat it too. We cannot straddle the fence. We cannot take sides in the super-Power struggle. These crutches can only help to exacerbate tension and heighten the chances for lack of agreement on important security matters. Fortunately, our deliberations follow several stages and often depict our mood. The current controversy focuses on disarmament and development.

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

A final document on this theme was produced at our recent Conference showing a definite link between disarmament and development and making clear that one need not be held hostage to the other. In our deliberations we conjured up all sorts of monsters that prevented us from achieving the true purpose of the exercise, namely, recognition of the need for interdependence if we are to live in a world that is not totally dependent on arms for its security.

Yet I cannot help but wonder how long it will be before this burning issue becomes a passing fancy. My delegation joins the cry that disarmament cannot be possible in a hostile atmosphere, hether it be between the super-Powers, between regions or between two nations. Let us make no mistake: the fall-out - and no pun is intended here - touches us all.

Another alarming fact is that in our highly technical society we tend to overlook the human factors involved in manning all of the technology required for operating an armed world. Risks of accidental disasters cannot be ruled out, as there have been numerous threats from machinery carrying nuclear arms. The sophistication of the new weapons of destruction calls for sane operators. For example, reports of the growing abuse of drugs and alcohol by military personnel who handle these sensitive equipments can only add to the fear we must feel about the senseless escalation of the arms race.

What those dangerous procedures call for is strategy. One of the specific mandates of this Committee is to develop ways and means to halt and reverse the arms race. It would seem that the recent plethora of reports by advisory boards, disarmament conferences and special sessions of international bodies, disarmament campaigns by non-governmental organizations and the many resolutions adopted in the past, as well as those being drafted for the current and future sessions, constitute an attempt to respond to some of the voices and questions raised over

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

the years. In some ways they tend to allay our fears and even make us complacent. As an example of this, we can observe that, in all of the existing conflicts, cease-fire agreements are tenuous. Wars rage on because opponents are convinced that victory is power. It is clear that wars are not fought so that peace may prevail, but rather, that little effort is made to acquire peace beforehand. What is even sadder is that, in times like these, loss of lives and destruction of property are seemingly viewed as secondary. What comes through this hardness of heart is that everyone regards peace as theoretical rather than practicable until they are denied it through someone else's act of aggression.

In this regard I cannot help but reiterate here the urgent need for streamlining the work of the Committee, and indeed the agenda of the General Assembly as a whole. It would be superfluous for me to go into detail about the recommendations and suggestions on rationalization that have been discussed ad nauseam in this Committee. Suffice it to say that if we begin our work earlier in the session, allow more time for informal discussions than for general debate, expand the "clustering" concept by combining similar themes for simultaneous debate and action, decrease the number of resolutions, particularly in respect of the omnibus texts, and make firm recommendations to stagger innocuous items that have been on the agenda for a long time, without unduly affecting the sensibility or arousing the ire of any representative, we could well be on the road towards setting the stage for serious and concerted efforts by all actors in strengthening our hope that measures taken over the years to bring an end to the competitive arms race, inter alia, would be implemented, thereby nullifying the conviction that interests are nothing more than other voices crying in the wilderness.

Mr. BASTRADIDJAYA (Indonesia): I should like first of all, on behalf of the delegation of Indonesia, to extend to you, Sir, our sincere congratulations on your election as Chairman of our Committee. We are fully confident that your

(Mr. Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

dedication to disarmament and your skill in multilateral diplomacy will lead our work to a successful conclusion. I should also like to extend our felicitations to the other officers of the Committee and to pledge our co-operation to them in the discharge of their duties.

As the First Committee begins consideration of the agenda items there is cause for a sense of renewed optimism. The convening of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was an important milestone in giving practical expression to the multidimensional link between those two urgent challenges and brought into sharp focus both the military and the non-military threat to national and international security. We were encouraged by the adoption, by consensus, of a final document providing a sufficiently solid base and a broad framework for concerted action.

As a result of strenuous and determined efforts in the Conference on Disarmament, the prospects for a convention on chemical weapons appear brighter now than at any time in the past. Yet another source of encouragement is the long-awaited announcement that bilateral negotiations on a ban on nuclear testing are to resume shortly.

Of particular importance is the impending agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the dismantling of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Such an accord would carry profound implications, not only for Europe, but also for Asia and beyond, thereby contributing a measure of stability and security. Although these forces constitute only 5 per cent of the total nuclear arsenals, and many difficult questions are yet to be resolved, the advanced stage of negotiations none the less demonstrates a determination to achieve meaningful arms limitation and reduction. It is to be hoped that an intermediate-range

(Mr. Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

agreement, which will be the first ever elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons, would be the harbinger of the further gradual reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. In this connection my delegation welcomes the information on the Soviet-United States accord just given the Committee by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Petrovsky.

While these are reassuring signs they have not fundamentally changed the stark realities facing the international community. Although we were heartened by the commitments undertaken at the summit meeting held in 1985 between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to accelerate their bilateral negotiations on the most crucial issues of strategic and space arms, those discussions appear hardly to have gone beyond the preliminary stage. Those who hoped for militarily significant reductions in existing or planned strategic weapons systems, or even for a slow-down in the introduction of new and more dangerous technologies, have thus little grounds for satisfaction. New technologies looming on the horizon promise more advanced weapons of greater versatility and more devastating in their annihilating capabilities. Even past agreements, which merely codified existing military strategies and policies, are increasingly being questioned as regards their significance and durability. Concurrently, the role of the Conference on Disarmament in contending with urgent issues of global concern has been transformed from one of multilateral negotiations to that of a deliberative forum leading to the diminution of its responsibility and competence. Meanwhile, global military expenditures are approaching the staggering amount of \$1 trillion per annum. As a result, the ongoing efforts, welcome as they are, have not led to tangible progress on a reduction in the number and destructive capacity of strategic nuclear armaments.

(Mr. Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

It is clear that what is now of critical importance is that the momentum generated by recent initiatives should not be allowed to dissipate; rather, it should be nurtured and built upon so as to enable us to move forward with a sense of urgency and responsibility. New impetus should be given to many other critical issues which have been bogged down in indecisive negotiations for years. We therefore welcome the prospect of a summit meeting between the leaders of the two major Powers with a view to reinvigorating the objectives which they have set for themselves in Geneva.

For more than three decades the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban has been accorded priority. It is self-evident that such an agreement would make a singular contribution to arresting the development of new weapons or refining those already deployed; it would also constitute a litmus test of the nuclear Powers' commitment to work for far-reaching nuclear-disarmament measures. Yet serious and substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban have been excruciatingly slow and in fact have long been held in abeyance, ostensibly owing to concerns related to the question of verification. However, such assertions cannot any longer be sustained as there are no credible technical or scientific impediments to the monitoring of compliance through existing national means of verification. There are also the possibilities provided by on-site inspection, the establishment of a global seismic monitoring network and an international seismic data exchange system. Hence, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is now a realistic, attainable objective that brooks no further delay.

My delegation has also noted with interest the attention now being focused on verification in the context of its relevance to future bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements. It constitutes an essential element, not only for the promotion of arms-limitation agreements, but also a crucial component in their

(... Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

implementation. However, the formulation of modalities for a verification system depends primarily on the purposes, nature and scope of the agreements, and may therefore involve different procedures and techniques. The role of the United Nations in this area, especially in providing assistance, advice and technical expertise, and in offering facilities for compiling and managing a verification data base should be fully explored. In this connection, it is essential to address some of the fundamental aspects including, inter alia, the criteria for workable standards, a clear definition of the interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as the legal, technological and financial implications attendant upon the establishment of an international verification agency.

Great strides have been made in science and technology attesting to mankind's ingenuity and affecting every sphere of human activity. Regrettably, however, the capacity for sustained research and development in these fields has been concentrated in a few highly industrialized countries to the exclusion of the vast majority of States and, to an unconscionable degree, directed towards military purposes rather than meeting the pressing socio-economic needs of the world community. Nowhere is this use of technological prowess more apparent than in the ongoing efforts to militarize outer space, a development that has added a new dimension of grave importance to disarmament.

Instead of utilizing outer space for the common benefit of mankind and in the interest of all countries, outer space is on the verge of being transformed into the ultimate strategic theatre, in utter disregard of existing commitments, especially the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. This question cannot be the exclusive concern of the space Powers, because such activities could result in a quantum leap in resources expended on armaments and lead to an escalation of the arms race in both offensive and defensive weapons, thus rendering the threat of

(Mr. Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

nuclear war ever more likely. Such arbitrary use of outer space would affect the security interests of the non-aligned and neutral nations and would have a critical effect on their ongoing programmes of peaceful satellite communication, especially on those of States located subjacent to the geostationary orbit.

Unless the major Powers adhere strictly to the existing legal restrictions and limitations on space weapons and refrain from taking measures aimed at developing, testing and deploying weapons and weapon systems in outer space, there is little doubt that the last frontier of human endeavour will soon be turned into a new battleground. Over and above those, there is an imperative need for new and far-reaching measures. The anti-ballistic missile Treaty should be reinforced in the context of recent technological advances, including provisions to prohibit anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The goal of a comprehensive ban on space weapons and the promotion of outer space activities exclusively for peaceful purposes call for a substantive examination of the issues involved leading to effective and practical negotiations and agreements.

The heightened interest in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is fully exemplified by the coming into force of the Rarotonga Treaty for a South Pacific nuclear-free zone and the ongoing efforts of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. Such zones provide viable means for the non-nuclear-weapon States to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their territories and to help extricate the regions from the entanglement of the competing strategic interests of the major Powers.

In that context, the agreement reached in principle among the States members of ASEAN has been given further impetus by the substantial progress made on the draft treaty for the establishment of such a zone. After its submission to the

(Mr. Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

forthcoming ASEAN Summit Meeting, Indonesia hopes that a favourable recommendation will set the stage for its presentation to the other regional States and to the nuclear Powers for their concurrence and endorsement. As all the nations of South-East Asia are signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), this common denominator augurs well for the success of this initiative. It is particularly desirable for our region, which has a long history of endemic conflicts and instability, as well as external involvement. Indonesia believes that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would also constitute a positive step in lessening tension and fostering co-operation on other wider regional issues.

My delegation views with increasing concern the continued escalation of great Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean and its vicinity, a region adjacent to South-East Asia. Such developments cannot but give rise to heightened tensions which carry with them ominous implications for the security of the littoral and hinterland States. As a littoral State, Indonesia is fully aware of the potent threat that this poses for a strategically located region such as South-East Asia. While we recognize the right of all States to utilize the ocean in the context of commercial, trade and development co-operation, by the same token we see no justification for use of the Indian Ocean as a theatre for strategic competition. In our view, the interrelated complex issues concerning the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean can best be addressed and resolved through the early convening of the International Conference on the Indian Ocean with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the other major maritime users so essential for its success.

(Mr. Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

In the same context, further consideration of the question of the naval arms race in the Disarmament Commission pursuant to a report by a group of experts has resulted in a fruitful exchange of views on possible measures of naval disarmament. Those discussions have confirmed that the naval arms race, although part of the global arms race, nevertheless displays certain particular characteristics worthy of a more focused and specialized scrutiny by the international community. A consensus has also emerged on the need for measures to prevent the harmful effects of conflicts at sea on the navigational rights of non-belligerents and the importance of the freedom of navigation for all States.

(Mr. Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

Equally important is the wide concurrence of views that confidence-building measures, both at the global and the regional level, are especially suitable for negotiation and agreement. In that regard, specific recognition was accorded to such subjects as the extension of existing measures to the seas and oceans, prior notification of naval activities, the limitation of such activities and the exchange of information on naval matters. On the basis of the progress made thus far, my delegation believes that the resolute pursuit of confidence-building measures would constitute a solid foundation for the consideration of significant reductions in conventional and nuclear naval arms and armed forces.

As regards non-nuclear issues, my delegation notes with satisfaction that the successful conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons is no longer a distant goal, but is a distinct possibility. Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament have reached a positive stage owing in large measure to a greater convergence of views on the remaining issues of non-production, fact-finding and the organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee. But major questions, including those relating to definitions and to the modalities for safeguarding chemical industries for peaceful purposes, as well as a host of technical and legal problems, need to be resolved to justify our optimism about the prospects for an early conclusion of a ban on chemical weapons. Despite the political and technical complexities involved, Indonesia believes that, given flexibility and mutual accommodation, it could still be possible to conclude a convention on chemical weapons in time to coincide with the convening of the third special session on disarmament in 1988.

Since the reconstitution of the Conference on Disarmament no acceptable framework has been found for negotiations on the priority issues. Consequently, that unique representative forum for the democratization of disarmament questions has continued to face serious obstacles. The fact of the matter is that during the

(Mr. Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

past eight years of its existence the Conference has not produced a single disarmament agreement. The consistent efforts of the Group of 21 to resolve the stalemate through compromise proposals have been repeatedly rebuffed. That immobility stands in stark contrast to the international community's pressing calls for sustained collective effort to avert the acutely perceived danger of nuclear war and to terminate the frantic nuclear-arms race.

That unacceptable state of affairs can be remedied only when all members of the Conference on Disarmament exercise their right and duty to participate in the negotiations that so fundamentally affect their security. For disarmament negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral, have too often been held hostage to the vicissitudes of great-Power relations. The Conference on Disarmament offers the only viable means for mitigating the impact of their differences and contentions in areas unrelated to disarmament efforts. As the only authoritative multilateral organ for disarmament negotiations, its role must be strengthened, not weakened, if the problem of nuclear weapons is to be dealt with as a global question.

The decision to convene a third special session on disarmament reflects the profound sense of urgency with which we all view the incalculable consequences of the ongoing arms race. The special session will provide an unparalleled opportunity to reaffirm, reinforce and supplement the principles and the Programme of Action adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and will thereby facilitate concrete collective action through constructive dialogue and negotiations to resolve the outstanding issues. My delegation pledges its full co-operation in achieving those goals.

(Mr. Sastradidjaya, Indonesia)

I should like, in conclusion, to mention the World Disarmament Campaign, which has rendered an invaluable service by providing balanced, factual and objective information on the implications of the arms race for the future of mankind. The experience gained from the Jakarta and Beijing meetings, held respectively in 1986 and 1987, has shown that the Campaign has proven to be an effective instrument for reaching out to world public opinion and stimulating greater understanding and support for United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament. Objective criteria should be devised with regard to the venue, and to participation by non-governmental organizations to enhance further the effectiveness of the Campaign.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): In accordance with the decision taken by the officers of the Committee, the list of speakers in the general debate on all disarmament agenda items will be closed tomorrow, Tuesday, 13 October, at 6 p.m.

I wish also to note that during the general debate I shall make an effort to announce at the end of each meeting the delegations scheduled to speak at the following meeting. In that connection, at the next meeting of the Committee, which is to be held tomorrow at 10 a.m., Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament, will introduce the report of the Conference. The other speakers at tomorrow morning's meeting will be the representatives of Poland, Canada, Romania, Denmark speaking on behalf of the 12 States members of the European Economic Community, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.