

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.100
20 February 1963
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDREDTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday 20 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

(Sweden)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de MELO FRANCO
Mr. R. L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. J. F. M. BELL
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. HAMID
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL
Mr. A. S. MEHTA
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU
Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. R. HOSZOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Baron C. H. von PLATEN
Mr. S. LOFGREN
Mr. ULF ERICSSON

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. L. I. MENDELEVICH
Mr. B. I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. J. K. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. D. E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the one-hundredth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I have asked to speak today because I want to make a frank appraisal of where we stand on what we consider the most important issue at present before us: a nuclear test ban treaty. As you have indicated, Madam Chairman, this is our one-hundredth plenary meeting; it is therefore an appropriate occasion to take stock.

We have now heard the views of a number of the members of this Conference. This means that we have a group of speeches on which to judge past progress and on which to estimate the course of future action. We shall today hear further statements which will also be helpful towards that end. However, what I find as a result of our past one and a half weeks of work is disappointing. It is true that we appear to be closer together than we have been at least since November 1961. We are at the same time, however, in danger of having a perhaps more difficult gulf to bridge; for, as our positions in some regards have come closer, the gulf between them seems to have deepened. As a result, the last step across this gulf appears difficult to take. Taking this last step to agreement requires the good will and effort of both sides. It is something that can only be done together.

Today it is necessary for me to leave here for Washington to keep a long-standing engagement. However, I expect to return to this Conference early next week. Before leaving I wish quite simply but earnestly to reaffirm the desire of the United States for an effective nuclear test ban treaty. Let there be no mistake about it, the United States is in Geneva to negotiate such a treaty. We are willing and we intend to engage in give-and-take negotiations on all major issues which must be agreed upon if we are to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban.

As an earnest of its good intentions the United States has already done the following things. First, it suggested and participated in private bilateral and trilateral talks in New York and Washington in an attempt to work out the remaining differences between the two sides; second, it made clear its position on the remaining issues to be settled regarding on-site inspection and an effective detection network -- issues which it believes must be generally agreed at this stage of our negotiations; third, it indicated in private talks its flexibility and its willingness to consider such positions as the Soviet Union might put forth on key issues of the negotiations.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

As specific tokens of good intent in these negotiations, the United States and the United Kingdom have:

- (a) reduced substantially their requirements on an annual quota of on-site inspections;
- (b) agreed to remove their previous requirement that nationally-manned control posts should be subject to international supervision and control;
- (c) agreed, provided the Soviet Union will supply data concerning the capability of its own national stations and will reaffirm its agreement of last summer to build new national stations where these are needed, to consider reducing to seven the number of automatic stations they believe will be needed on Soviet territory;
- (d) agreed to accept reasonable figures on the extent of the area subject to inspection; and lastly
- (e) indicated their willingness to reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union regarding particularly sensitive military installations which might be located in an area to be inspected.

These moves are not those of a State intent on avoiding a nuclear test ban so that it may continue underground nuclear tests. The initiatives offered by the United States and the United Kingdom, and the note of flexibility with which they have entered this round of discussions, should convince the delegations here that we wish to negotiate a treaty in good faith. Thus far our initiatives have met with no response from the Soviet Union. I reluctantly conclude that the Soviet Union, rather than the United States and the United Kingdom, is intent on avoiding agreement.

Nevertheless, in an important and incisive series of questions raised in a statement made on 18 February by the United Arab Republic representative (ENDC/PV.99 pp.9 et seq.) a real contribution was made towards furthering our work. As part of our stocktaking I wish today to comment on some of his questions. We hope other delegations round this table also will be prepared to give their comments on those questions.

One question concerned the progress made during prior test-ban talks towards an understanding on certain technical issues. As I pointed out in my statement at our last plenary meeting, considerable progress was made in test-ban discussions until November 1961 on a number of technical and politico-technical issues which must be solved if we are to agree on an effective nuclear test-ban treaty draft. True, there

(Mr. Foster, United States)

were certain notable exceptions on which the Soviet Union and the Western Powers had not reached agreement. However, any apparent measure of agreement was overturned by the Soviet Union proposals on 28 November 1961 (GEN/DNT/122).

If the Soviet Union were to agree to advance its position from where we were in November 1961, the conclusion of the representative of the United Arab Republic that the difficulties ahead are smaller than one would think would be true. However, the Soviet Union now refuses to discuss anything but its own proposals for numbers of on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations, numbers to which it insists the West must agree before anything else is done.

Another question which the representative of the United Arab Republic posed involved several items. First he asked:

"Is not the acceptance of two or three inspections per year tantamount to admitting that they can be made consistent with a State's national security and that they need not necessarily represent harmful interference?"

(ENDC/PV.99, p.12)

To this question we reply "Yes", since we believe that acceptance of on-site inspection is consistent with a State's national security and that inspection, per se, does not represent "harmful interference".

The representative of the United Arab Republic then asked whether it would not prove possible to accept a larger number of visits under the same security arrangements. To this question also we reply in the affirmative, since we believe that there is no intrinsic security disadvantage associated with on-site inspections, because we are willing to agree on properly-safeguarded arrangements.

Next, the question was asked whether the acceptance of the principle of inspection of only a fraction of unidentified events does not tacitly admit that acceptance of a smaller fraction should not very much affect the general picture of the deterrent effect of on-site inspection. Within reason we can agree that this question too might be answered in the affirmative. But there is a fraction below which it will affect deterrence, and unfortunately the Soviet position is below that fraction, as are the Soviet numbers.

As a part of the second series of questions, we were asked also whether acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection was not really all that the West needed, because only a small number of inspections would provide an adequate deterrent. To this we

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can reply that we feel that the eight or ten on-site inspections which we have asked for are indeed a small number and should provide an adequate deterrent. It is true that for the past several months preceding the exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy the United States and the United Kingdom asked the Soviet Union on many occasions to accept once again the principle of on-site inspection and thereby re-establish a common basis for our negotiations. On many occasions we indicated also that we believed that acceptance in principle of on-site inspection would open the way to an agreement on an end to all nuclear tests.

We believed for several reasons that, if the principle of on-site inspection were accepted by the Soviet Union, negotiations could be concluded. First, the Soviet Union had opposed on-site inspection because, it claimed, such inspection facilitated espionage. Once it accepted again the principle of on-site inspection, however, we concluded that the question of numbers within reasonable limits which the West had proposed would make little difference to the Soviet Union, since the argument about espionage was not principally concerned with the number of inspections. Secondly, we also felt that the question of the modalities under which inspections should be carried out would present little problem if the Soviet Union honestly agreed to the principle of on-site inspection. Our own positions on those issues provide a mutually-acceptable basis for agreement, particularly in the light of past Soviet positions, which in many cases were identical to our own.

The United Arab Republic representative's third series of questions was concerned with a quotation from Chairman Khrushchev's letter (ENDC/73) of 19 December 1962, in which the Soviet leader indicated his willingness to accept two or three on-site inspections a year if that were necessary. The United Arab Republic representative then asked: "When should on-site inspection be necessary in practice?" (ENDC/PV.99,p.14) That question is, of course, one to which the United States has been trying to elicit a Soviet response since the beginning of the meetings in New York and Washington. Unfortunately we have been unable to determine Soviet views on when on-site inspection might be necessary in practice. On this question the United States and the United Kingdom have made clear their position in some detail to the representative of the Soviet Union. I should like to set it out for the Committee once again today.

The United States and the United Kingdom believe that national detection networks assisted by automatic seismic stations will detect and locate annually a number of

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seismic events whose origin cannot be determined from seismic readings alone. Located events will be those whose signals have the characteristics of waves from earthquakes or explosions, are consistent in time and are recorded at a sufficient number of detection stations to establish the approximate position and time of the seismic event. Secondly, we indicated that some events might be discarded from that group of located events on the basis of certain characteristics which can be determined from seismic records. Finally, events which have been located and which have not been discarded through the employment of agreed criteria, which I have just described, would be inspected if selected by the other side. No military purpose lies behind our suggestion that the other side should choose the events eligible for inspection; we have indeed already made it clear that we are willing to conclude arrangements to exclude sensitive areas.

That system of inspection was implied, if not clearly supported, by the Soviet Union when in 1960 it officially proposed the use of inspection quotas (GEN/DNT/PV.234). We do not know now whether the Soviet Union still supports that point of view or whether it has another proposal to make on the subject. We await Soviet comments and proposals on this important problem of determining when inspections will be necessary in practice.

Finally, I have noted that the representative of the United Arab Republic proposed in his statement several procedures which we might consider employing in our further work towards a nuclear test ban treaty. My delegation has carefully examined those proposals. In our judgement any of the three proposals would be a suitable means for ensuring future progress. We are prepared to accept any one of them in order that our work may move ahead speedily and not, as the Soviet representative professes to fear, become bogged down in endless technical detail. Acceptance by the Soviet representative of any one of those procedures would be a heartening sign to the Conference. I urge the Soviet representative to give careful consideration to those proposals and to ask his Government to do the same. In addition, I ask that he provide us with answers to the questions which the United Arab Republic representative has so carefully and thoughtfully formulated. It is my hope that in this way we may be able to discover a wider area of common ground than exists at present and, as a result, may be able to reverse our current somewhat pessimistic analysis of the present situation.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I assure my fellow representatives that I will keep in touch with the proceedings of this Conference during the period for which I shall have to be absent. On my return to Geneva I shall be prepared to continue our energetic efforts to achieve the goal of an effective nuclear test-ban treaty.

MR. LALLU (India): Since this is my first intervention in this series of resumed meetings, may I take this opportunity of welcoming all the new representatives who are assembled here and of expressing my confidence that they will all give us of their very best, so that we can reach agreements at this Conference. May I also welcome -- although he is not here at this particular moment since he is arriving today -- Mr. Barrington? His presence will be greatly appreciated because of his long association with this matter. If I may say so, he and I have campaigned together in this field for a dozen years; and it will be of great value to have him back in our midst.

I should like to say a special word about our co-Chairmen. The delegation of India is very glad indeed to have Mr. Kuznetsov and Mr. Foster as the co-Chairmen of this series of meetings of our Conference. Here I believe I am not divulging a secret, because I am sure that it has already reached their ears. It is this. We always respect their seriousness, their determination of purpose and their devotion to the cause of peace. We know and expect that their presence here will lead to real results. We are very glad indeed that they are in our midst.

It is almost a year since this session of the Conference started, and we do not yet have a single agreement to give to the world. We should like to express the hope and confidence that this series of meetings may result -- we would hope even before the first year is completed -- in at least one agreement which we can give to this world of ours, which has suffered for too long under the threat of insecurity and devastation.

We are here to achieve agreements on general and complete disarmament. That is the mandate given to us by the United Nations General Assembly. But there is a logic of events; and the logic of events at this moment is such that it gives a clear priority to the question of a test ban. This logic is generated mainly by resolution 1762 A (ENDC/63), passed at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In that connexion I should like to point out that when the

report (ENDC/68, and Add.1,2) of this Committee under that resolution was considered at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the Assembly took note of the report and said that he was sure the Assembly would observe with gratification that this Committee had given priority to this question during the negotiations resumed on 26 November 1962, which is when we resumed during the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. Then he added:

"I am sure that I speak for the Assembly when I express the hope that similar priority will be accorded to this question in future sessions of the Committee and that the Committee will intensify its efforts to reach agreement." (A/PV.1200,(provisional),p.56)

A second factor which gives priority to the consideration of the test-ban issue is the recent exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev in December 1962 and January 1963, which are now before us as important documents of this Conference (ENDC/73, ENDC/74).

Before I return to those profoundly important documents -- profoundly important not just in a philosophical sense but because of the sound, practical wisdom and approach which they embody -- I should like to set completely at rest this question of priority, because, regrettably, there is a certain impression which has been created, I believe unwittingly, that there is a tendency to push this important question to one side and to consider other matters at this juncture.

I believe that that is not the case. I believe that both sides -- and at the moment I am leaving out of account the non-aligned delegations because our position in this matter is so clear that it need hardly be reiterated -- have clearly affirmed the pre-eminence of priority which they attach to the test ban issue. In this connexion I should like to quote brief passages from two statements, in the order in which they were made, at the ninety-seventh meeting held on 14 February 1963. First I should like to read from the statement made by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Kurka, who represents one side. He said:

"We share fully the opinion which was expressed at our ninety-sixth meeting by the representative of Mexico ..."

and then Mr. Kurka quoted these words of our colleague, the representative of Mexico, with which he said he fully agreed:

" -- to achieve the aim to which we are committed: an effective agreement which will put an end to nuclear weapon tests and halt the armaments race, as the first essential steps" --

(Mr. Lall, India)

I repeat, "as the first essential steps" --

"to make thermo-nuclear war impossible and to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.97, p.7)

Therefore Mr. Kurka, speaking for one side, has attested that these are the first essential steps which must be taken, and we accept that position.

I should then like to quote briefly from what was said by the other side. I turn briefly to the speech made on the same day by my colleague and neighbour on my left -- I speak of the left literally and not metaphorically -- Mr. Cavalletti, who said:

"But in the scale of urgencies the problem of tests is of outstanding importance and in my view heads the list." (ENDC/PV.97, p.13)

Therefore we have it clearly from both sides that this is the problem of first priority at our meetings here.

I shall not quote further, but certainly the Minister of State of the United Kingdom -- whose continuing interest in our Conference we are very glad to see and to have -- has expressed the opinion that the time is ripe for movement forward and that we are better placed than we were before. The leader of the Soviet delegation has said that this is a ripe question and that this is an occasion which should not be lost.

I now return to the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, because I should like to draw a point from them which I believe has perhaps not been drawn in the statements which have been made. I should like to highlight the essential basic reason which both these two great leaders have given for progress in regard to a test-ban treaty. I should like to draw attention to what Mr. Khrushchev said in this connexion in his letter dated 19 December 1962. He said:

"The Soviet Union does not need war. I believe that war holds out no bright prospect for the United States either. ... A thermonuclear holocaust will mean vast numbers of casualties and tremendous suffering for the people of the United States as for the other peoples of the world. To prevent this from happening, we must, on a basis of complete equality and due consideration for each other's interests, develop peaceful relations between us and resolve all controversial questions by means of negotiations and mutual concessions.

(Mr. Lall, India)

"One such question, with which the Governments of our countries have now been concerned for many years, is the conclusion of an agreement concerning the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests." (ENDC/73, p.2)

Mr. Kennedy, the President of the United States, said in reply:

"There appear to be no differences between your views and mine regarding the need for eliminating war in this nuclear age. Perhaps only those who have the responsibility for controlling these weapons fully realize the awful devastation their use would bring." (ENDC/74)

The point is that the basic reason why this correspondence opened and dwelt upon the issue of banning nuclear weapon tests was that those two great leaders, who know the full range and scope of the devastation that would be caused by the use of nuclear weapons, said, "Let us take a step to put an end to this". That basic fact remains unaltered. No matter what the fluctuations of the world picture, no matter what sombre colours may appear in that picture -- and we have heard from one side at least that there are sombre colours, but that is one view and we do not want to enter into discussion on the point -- that basic fact remains that the shifting nature of the world picture was not the reason given by Mr. Khrushchev for entering into this phase of our negotiations. The reason given was that we are in a nuclear age which could devastate us and that we must take steps now to put an end to that; the first step we should take is that of a test ban.

I submit to both sides with great respect that that argument is an argument of pre-eminent weight which cannot be shifted, which cannot in one whit be whittled away by any changes, no matter how unfortunate those may be, no matter how much any side might regret them, in the current world situation at any given juncture. The argument subsists; it is this argument which brought together Mr. Foster and Mr. Tsarapkin in the discussions which took place in Washington and in New York; it is this argument which gives priority to this issue today, and it is that point which I wish to stress as I turn to other elements of the question.

Where do we stand at this present juncture? I do not wish to summarize the position; it has been most ably, clearly and frankly summarized on several occasions notably, today, by Mr. Foster, the representative of the United States, whose contribution cannot but be most helpful to effective progress towards agreement in this field. However, I should just like to say a few brief words.

(Mr. Lall, India)

We all know that there is now an agreed basis on all points of principle. A second element in the situation in which we stand is the "chicken and egg" element to which our colleague from the United Arab Republic drew attention in his most thoughtful and valuable contribution at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.99, p.17). Do we decide the quota of inspections and automatic seismic stations first, or do we spell out in some detail the constituent elements and appurtenances of the system? That is the "chicken and egg" part of our situation.

A third element is that we have two different approaches now to the question of resolving the issue of the numbers of inspections. I am bound to remark that much less has been said on the issue of the numbers of automatic seismic stations -- and in this case the less said the better, because I believe the less said means that that issue is not regarded as so intractable as the other issue of numbers. That is the conclusion I am bound to draw from the fact that so much less has been said about it.

May I take briefly first the "chicken and egg" element: that is to say, do we fix numbers or do we look at details first? Let me say very frankly that the delegation of India appreciates the position of both sides. One side we find sees the possibility even of a trap in too many details -- perhaps endless details -- at this stage. It sees them both as time-consuming and as a possible means or even a device for producing a new constellation of figures for inspections and seismic stations. The other side, on the other hand, feels that there would be little value in a mere figure, even if agreed, until there was agreement upon what was being counted or enumerated by the figure -- that is to say, what was the substance of inspection.

On the question of the "chicken and egg" element, we should like to offer certain suggestions for the consideration of both sides. First, we would suggest that it might be agreed by both sides that there is no question at all of giving prior attention to the full range of details involved. In that connexion we welcome the movement which is taking place in that direction, and I should like to draw attention to what was said at our last meeting and to quote from Mr. Foster's statement then:

"We agree with the Soviet Union that the major features of a test ban agreement ought to be worked out first, and that it should then be a relatively easy task to fill in the details." (ENDC/PV.99, p.21)

I repeat: he said it should "then be a relatively easy task"; he did not say "first", but "then".

(Mr. Lall, India)

We would suggest that the thought contained in Mr. Foster's statement might be pursued now by both sides to the limits of its agreed applicability; that is to say, there should be a cutting-away of any of those ensnaring tendencies which one side fears might lead to a long peregrination in the jungle of detail. That we suggest could be done in the spirit of the remarks which have been made by Mr. Foster and to which I have referred.

Secondly, once that were done, the remaining issues thus reduced to an agreed minimum might be brought together on the basis of simultaneity of consideration, thus avoiding the "chicken and egg" element. In our view, those minimum issues might include the number of inspections, the triggering and area of inspections, the number of inspectors, the composition of inspection teams, and the number of automatic seismic stations. If such a list could be agreed, then, we suggest, the co-Chairmen might be able very quickly -- even in the course of an afternoon by exchange of views on those four or five matters -- to reach agreement on all those points, at least tentatively, and to refer them to this Committee. Alternatively, they might wish to meet in a smaller group such as the Sub-Committee, if they preferred. A little later in this statement we shall suggest another procedural possibility which might be taken into account.

I turn now to the question of numbers -- the "numbers game". I do not want to get involved in that game; I am not very good at numbers. But I should like to add a few remarks to the very thoughtful suggestions made by our colleague, Mr. Hassan. The present confrontation is as follows: one side feels that on-site inspections, up to a certain number, are an essential element in a properly-safeguarded test ban treaty and are a basic requisite if national security is to be adequately safeguarded. The other side, on the other hand, feels that no on-site inspections are really essential and that this has become a political issue to which it makes concession, and it explains that it is in fact adopting as a concession the position of the other side as it has understood it to be.

Those are the two positions. Again, I would say we fully appreciate the validity of those positions, and the point I should like to make is that we should all accept both those positions -- that is to say, we should not ask either side to alter its approach. Those are absolutely fair positions. The United States is perfectly entitled to maintain that it must have a system which safeguards its

(Mr. Lall, India)

national security. The Soviet Union is perfectly entitled to maintain that the right approach to this issue now is entirely political. We do not see that there should be any difficulty in our accepting both approaches. Indeed, if I may say so, it is quite natural that countries should look at these matters from different angles of vision, and if we are to have practical co-existence in our world, then co-existence of different approaches must be accepted as a basic minimum premise in our world. It would be absolutely impossible to expect all countries to look at all issues in the same way. So we have no quarrel with either approach; in fact, we respect them both and would respectfully suggest to the two sides that they do likewise -- that is, accept the validity of each other's approach in this matter.

As to the number itself, we agree with Mr. Hassan that there is no talismanic number, no magic number on which agreement can be reached; but we do believe that with diligent negotiations each side could satisfy the requirements of its own chosen way of approach and the two sides could come to a commonly-acceptable figure. That is what we believe would result from negotiation.

My third point, which is a corollary or tailpiece to the previous point, is that it is obvious to all of us that the difference between the two sides in this matter of numbers is now very small. It is not of the order of twenty or twenty-five which it was once. I would submit that, if it were as large as that, an exchange of criteria could have been very helpful in assisting the search for an agreed short range of figures. Now, however, when a short range of figures already exists, wisdom and statemanship in negotiation must be drawn upon, we feel, in order to find a solution. It is not only that the letters from the two leaders, to which I have referred, have affirmed belief in negotiation and mutual concession; but, as if they wished to emphasize this point, to reiterate it, to highlight it, to make it sink into our minds, both Mr. Foster and Mr. Kuznetsov, our two co-Chairmen, have drawn our attention to other statements made by Mr. Kennedy and by Mr. Khrushchev reiterating their belief in this method of solving such issues as this. I should like to draw attention to those statements.

I turn to document ENDC/PV.96, the record of our opening meeting, and in the order of the statements I turn first to the statement by Mr. Foster in which he read to us the message of the President of the United States at the re-opening of this Conference. Mr. Kennedy said:

(Mr. Lall, India)

"The difficulties in reaching such an agreement can only be resolved if all parties face them in a spirit of willingness to negotiate -- if there is a genuine spirit of cooperation coupled with a firm resolve to reverse the present dangerous trend of the arms race." (ENDC/PV.96, p.8)

Mr. Kuznetsov also drew attention to a very recent statement by Mr. Khrushchev, and this is what, we are told, Mr. Khrushchev said very recently to the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union:

"Let wisdom triumph over senselessness. Let the method of negotiation in order to settle contentious issues in international life for all time replace the dangerous methods of trials of strength." (ibid., p.24)

So both our co-Chairmen have reiterated that this is the method by which agreement could be reached, and we would request them to apply just that method which has been reiterated and in which faith has been re-affirmed by the two Heads of Government.

Before I close, I should like to make two or three additional submissions. One is that we would suggest that, if there is difficulty of any kind in reaching an agreed figure in the matter of inspections, then why should not both sides agree that the treaty should contain a clause providing for the reconsideration of the number of on-site inspections after a period of one year, which number should be changed only if both sides agree? That is to say, the treaty is not to be temporary; it will be firm and permanent, and the number of inspections will be there and will not be altered unless both sides agree. The point here is that if science makes further advances in the next year or in the next two years, then change in the number can be made; but there is to be no change or alteration of the treaty, there is to be no setting back of the treaty, the treaty itself is permanent. A change in numbers would be made only if it were agreed upon by both sides.

Secondly, on the question of the number of automatic seismic stations, on which very little has been said -- and we are glad that only a little has been said on it -- reading the exchange of letters between the two leaders it just occurs to us that perhaps there could be a parity of relationship between the number of seismic stations and the number of seismic areas. Perhaps that could be considered by both sides. As we see it, that would provide a certain flexibility, a certain logic, because, so far as we can understand, what has been agreed is the location

(Mr. Lall, India)

of certain automatic seismic stations in certain seismic areas. Some of the seismic areas have been excluded. We wonder whether those seismic areas need be excluded. We suggest that consideration as a possibility.

I have just one more point before I close. I referred to the sombre colours in the contemporary world picture which change but which seem to exist at the moment. What conclusion ought we to reach from this picture? Certainly not that because the colours are sombre we should try to avert doing something to reach agreement here, particularly in the issue of a test ban. We were very heartened to see what Mr. Kuznetsov said on 18 February on this matter. He said -- and this is a very important point:

"All this only confirms again and again the thought shared by the overwhelming majority of delegations here in this Committee namely, that we cannot delay to carry out measures which would reverse the trend of events in the direction of reducing the threat of a nuclear war ..."

(ENDC/PV.99, p.31)

In other words, what Mr. Kuznetsov was saying was that this situation should spur us on to reach agreement. We entirely agree with him in that matter. If we are to take into account sombre colours of the kind portrayed, then I suggest that for the sake of balance we should take into account certain other relevant factors; and I should like to draw attention extremely briefly to three other matters which I think we should take into account. These are three out of a very large number.

First, we should take into account the Geneva Declaration by members of the International Scientific Community, to which the representative of Poland drew attention at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.99, p.9). If we were to take that declaration into account, that would mean redoubling our efforts.

Secondly, we should take into account another paper which we have received from Accra, in Africa, which asks us to redouble our efforts and in which there is this sentence:

"The whole world is watching your deliberations with keen interest, hopeful that at the reconvened Conference ingenious polemics will give way to genuine negotiations and that the reconvened Conference will not suffer the fate of too many other conferences that have preceded it".

That is from the Accra Assembly Secretariat.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Finally, I think it appropriate that we should take into account a paper written by several Swedish scientists and published in Nature, an extremely authoritative British publication, on 19 January 1963. The paper deals with the effects of strontium-90, and the scientists point out that previously -- that is to say, up to this point -- scientists have studied chiefly the effects of substituting strontium for calcium in bones, resulting in bone cancer and other bone diseases. That has been the field of concentration of the study of the effect of strontium-90. However, these brilliant Swedish scientists have been looking at other effects of the exchange which takes place due to strontium-90 being present in the atmosphere, and they point out that calcium is also normally present in blood, in cells generally, and specifically in chromosomes, which carry the genetic heritage. Since strontium can substitute for calcium in chromosomes, the Swedish investigators have argued that strontium-90 could get incorporated into the chromosomes of sex cells and cause difficulties to our genetic heritage. After carrying out wide experiments they have concluded from the data, and from other related data not described in that particular paper, that their tentative hypothesis was supported by the facts.

We all know that if once tests start they lead to other tests. Incidentally, I may say that we are grateful that, although there has been one announcement of a test since the beginning of the year, for a time there has been a lull and no tests are being carried out at present. We hope that lull will continue, but we do know that if there are tests they do generate other tests, and then we get this problem. And, as I say, only a month ago the Swedish scientists showed that strontium-90 not only creates bone cancer and bone diseases but also has genetic effects.

So we appeal to both sides to negotiate on this issue. Many suggestions have been made. I would only add one procedural suggestion, as I said I would. It is that we might perhaps, if the co-Chairmen agreed, have one or two informal meetings of this Committee, which might help us to move forward. If they do not want to meet to negotiate in a small forum, then let them do it in this forum. But let us explore all procedural possibilities and get agreement on this matter.

Lij IMRU (Ethiopia): First I should like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation of the kind words of welcome addressed to me by members of the Committee. I am aware of the great responsibility entrusted to us, and of the hope and expectation that the work of this Committee has awakened in the hearts and minds of men troubled by the hazards of the armaments race and by the nightmare of a nuclear war. In a world divided by deep ideological conflict, the equilibrium that is achieved in a balance of nuclear forces whose power of devastation is being constantly increased and perfected cannot afford mankind the security for which it yearns. We therefore have the responsibility of finding effective measures of disarmament to free mankind from the predicament in which it finds itself.

I also fully appreciate the amount of work already undertaken by all delegations in an attempt to seek a lasting solution to the intricate problems that confront us in the field of general and complete disarmament. If a significant step in the long journey towards full disarmament has so far eluded us, it is not for lack of perseverance but because age-old suspicions cannot be overcome overnight. Ancient countries like my own, with long memories that stretch back for centuries, can appreciate the effort that members of this Committee have made to engender trust among nations and to overcome the differences that prevail. We should not be discouraged by apparent lack of success, but should heed the eloquent words spoken by the representative of Mexico at the resumption of our deliberations on 12 February (ENDC/PV.96, pp. 5 et seq.)

I should like also to thank the representative of Italy for the kind words he spoke concerning Mr. Alamayehu. I shall be happy to transmit the message to him. Mr. Alamayehu has requested me to convey to all delegations his gratitude for the co-operation and good will afforded to him during his term as leader of our delegation.

The Ethiopian delegation has studied with care the statements made by the nuclear Powers and the proposals and points of view of the representatives who have already spoken. It associates itself with the determination, widely expressed, to make headway in the task entrusted to this Committee: first, by solving the remaining problems that divide the nuclear Powers on the question of a test ban treaty; secondly, by consideration of measures that would alleviate tension; and

(Lij Imru, Ethiopia)

thirdly, by making progress on the difficult problem of general and complete disarmament. It is evident to our delegation that, unless measures to lower tension are agreed to and a test ban concluded, the obstacles to general and complete disarmament will prove insurmountable. We therefore support all delegations that have given priority to those questions.

I should like to say a few words on measures that would lessen tension and engender trust. One of those measures is the creation of nuclear-free zones. Our Government has tirelessly advocated the concept of a nuclear-free zone in Africa. We are confident that all African countries will accept and promote that objective. We should also be happy to see other countries of the world adopt it for their own regions. We have no doubt that, if nuclear-free zones multiply and encroach especially upon sensitive areas, tension between the nuclear Powers will be significantly eased and a measure of relief and trust engendered. That would be a significant contribution to the arduous task of achieving general and complete disarmament.

One cannot exaggerate the need for agreed measures to reduce the risk of war, and our delegation is prepared to give full consideration to concrete proposals for that purpose. There have been suggestions that a non-aggression pact between the parties to the Atlantic and Warsaw alliances would have a salutary effect upon prevailing tensions. Our delegation would urge that members of the two alliances should give careful consideration to the advantages such a pact would yield in the search for a comprehensive, lasting and reliable programme of disarmament.

I come now to the urgent problem of a permanent and effective treaty banning nuclear tests. We support the contention of several delegations which have already stated that without a test ban treaty it would be difficult to foresee fruitful discussions in other fields of disarmament. The reasons why priority should be given to a test ban treaty have already been effectively argued in a number of meetings of this Committee. I shall therefore resist the temptation to tread ground that has been adequately and ably covered.

Suffice it to say that the recent historic exchange of correspondence between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev (ENDC/73,74) focuses our attention on this urgent problem. Both eminent leaders, in the statesmanlike attitude they have adopted towards this problem, also give it the priority and urgency it deserves.

(Lij Imru, Ethiopia)

We hope that their efforts will be crowned with success here in Geneva. Indeed, nothing should deter our efforts to bridge the narrowing gap that still stands in the way of full agreement. In this connexion the clear and constructive proposals advanced by Mr. Hassan (ENDC/PV.99, pp.15 et seq.) should be given full consideration.

For our part we refuse to believe that there is a wide and unbridgeable gulf between the positions of the nuclear Powers. We regret that the discussions recently undertaken by them in New York did not result in an agreed treaty to ban all types of tests and thus once and for all terminate the armaments race. This Committee has the weighty responsibility to see to it that this opportunity does not slip by. The world situation at present urgently requires that a stop be called to the armaments race. The international situation in the nuclear field is likely to become more complicated with other nations joining the armaments race. If the nuclear Powers cannot agree to a treaty to ban nuclear tests and do not exert their considerable influence in leading other nations into creative competition in peaceful endeavours, all may be lost. Therefore it is imperative to find a way out of the impasse in which we find ourselves.

The matters at issue are the number of automatic seismological stations, the annual quota of on-site inspections, and the features of the inspection machinery to be established, together with its terms of reference. The principal difference is between three and eight, for both the automatic seismological stations and the annual quota of on-site inspections of events that might cause appreciable concern. My delegation proposes that a minimum of three on-site inspections a year, with the possibility of increasing this number to an agreed maximum figure of eight on-site inspections, depending on the inspection arrangements that were formulated and agreed upon, could provide a reasonable basis for further negotiations. Such a basis for negotiations would allay any apprehensions that the United States representatives might have that the on-site inspection quota and system would not have a significant deterrent value. It would also allay any anxieties the Soviet Union might have that inspection visits could be used for non-agreed purposes.

The important thing is to resume the negotiations in a context wherein the vital interests of both parties would be protected in subsequent negotiations. A test ban treaty could be elaborated dealing with all aspects of a test ban and including quotas of on-site inspections per annum from a minimum of three to an agreed maximum of eight.

(Lij Imru, Ethiopia)

The maximum number would of course depend on the extent of inspection arrangements, and it might well be less than eight. I should like to state that we should not be over-concerned with figures. Numbers should not be an obsession. We must not lose sight of the forest in our preoccupation with the trees. After all, the main value of the treaty lies in the firm international obligation it imposes and the degree of trust it generates.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): As the name of Sweden is next on the list of speakers, I hope my colleagues will now allow me to change into my role of Sweden's representative.

Many delegations have already expressed a warm welcome to our new colleagues. Most delegations have also expressed their concern about the impasse in which our Conference seems to have found itself on reconvening. The Swedish delegation wants in all brevity to join preceding speakers in these two kinds of introductory remarks. My delegation also fully endorses the view that the Conference must concentrate its immediate efforts on the test ban issue. That does not mean, of course, that we want to disregard other aspects of the disarmament problem; but first things must come first. So today I shall speak only on the subject of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The Swedish delegation is gratified to know that earlier endeavours at this Conference and, not least, at the private negotiations between the major nuclear Powers during the recess have led us close to a constructive agreement. But we must also confess to a growing sense of frustration if days and weeks go by without the pertinent details of the treaty being worked out and the seal attached to the negotiated terms of an agreement. The present uncertainty or even bewilderment about the functions of the Conference might then turn into worried questions to ourselves concerning how useful our presence here is.

The test ban issue is clearly the primordial one for our negotiations, if for no other reason than that it is the one that can with a fair degree of safety be said to be ripe for a speedy solution. But it is also one of relative simplicity in the complex of proposals to stop the armaments race and reduce world tensions. Most other contemplated measures have to find the narrow passage between the two main criteria inscribed in the Joint Statement (ENDC/5) and thereafter in our mandate: the Scylla

(The Chairman, Sweden)

of retaining the military balance, and the Charybdis of finding an acceptable control system. A test ban has only one of them to sail past, that of control, as there can be no question of upsetting the military balance by a measure that does not involve any change.

The test ban issue is simpler than most others in the sense also that it so evidently is a matter of mutual, yet identical interest of the great Powers. Those converging interests are to be found on several levels.

First, both sides already possess well-developed nuclear delivery systems with over-kill capacity. Further testing in other areas of nuclear armaments might, to be sure, yield results, but neither side can reasonably hope to obtain more than a temporary edge over the other.

Second, any such rather macabre gains tie up very large amounts of economic resources and human skills which are urgently needed for peaceful progress and development.

Third, there is an ominous risk involved in the competition to develop small nuclear weapons intended for battlefield use. If such weapons should become generally included in the regular equipment of low-level units in the future, they will obviously be under the physical control of local commanders. They might be triggered by accident or because of failing communications. Their deployment on one side would call forth a corresponding development on the other side, thus causing an accelerated dissemination of nuclear weapons within the military establishments.

Finally, risks of a political nature must loom even larger, aggravated as they become with the passage of each day: that is, nuclear weapons will spread to more and more countries which might acquire or independently produce them. If the test ban issue is as yet fairly manageable in the sense that there are but a few political Powers which will have to bend their wills together, this is a propitious circumstance which seems to be quickly disappearing.

Those are some of the reasons in favour of a prompt decision to stop the tests. There is also, of course, the over-riding general reason that a test ban would be hailed with relief by an overwhelming majority of mankind and would, I think, change the political atmosphere of the world immensely.

But the Swedish delegation, as well as others round this table, has a further specific reason for wishing to see signs of positive decisiveness on the test ban issue.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

We want to get a real opportunity to do our part by being allowed to make appropriate concrete contributions to the many-faceted problems involved.

Representatives of the nuclear Powers may say that we shun our responsibilities and evade the central issue if we do not divulge our inner feelings regarding the quota of inspections. But we believe that our views can have little impact on this score. We sincerely consider, as did the representative of the United Arab Republic in his speech at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.99, p.16), that the great Powers must determine what number of inspections seems satisfactory as a deterrent. However, as soon as the green light is given -- or, if the main negotiators so desire, even earlier -- there are a number of practical matters which must be studied and settled outside the two or three problems which appear to be the present crux of an agreement. For example, there are decisions to be made on optimal instrumentation; the selection of seismic stations, not just inside but also outside the territories of the nuclear Powers; the arrangements for adequate data transmissions; the proper means and methods for the analysis of data, and so forth. All these are time-consuming tasks which are unpolitical in nature and might well be performed at an early pre-ban stage. There are also questions of a more administrative character, still totally a-political, such as the place for the seat of the central agency, the proper contacts with existing international scientific and technical networks, and so forth. Some of these matters may well be settled directly by the major nuclear Powers concerned, but other matters would no doubt benefit by the co-operation also of other States, or might even stand in need of such co-operation.

Some matters of that kind were mentioned in the opening statements by the United States and the Soviet Union chiefs of delegation reporting on the recent negotiations in Washington and New York (ENDC/PV.96, pp.10 et seq., pp.15 et seq.), and continued in some detail during later meetings. They gave us a lead as to which tracks should be pursued. Let me mention a few specific questions where an immediate, or fairly immediate, invitation to practical co-operation with States outside the narrow circle of nuclear Powers would seem appropriate and advantageous.

Evidently much attention has been given to an exchange of lists of seismic stations which should supply a regular, continuous flow of data for test ban monitoring. If I am interpreting Mr. Foster aright he talked about "Such selected stations in each other's territory" (ibid., p.10) -- I repeat, "in each other's

(The Chairman, Sweden)

territory" -- which would form the basic network. It seems to me, however, that to ensure more effective data-gathering a number of stations in other countries ought also to be added to the overall system.

The selection of suitable locations is a difficult and time consuming process, but a cursory survey shows promising regions in many places outside the territories of the nuclear Powers. From a survey of such geologically specially promising locations for seismic stations I should like to mention, from among the countries represented round this table, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic; but others are available in even closer vicinity to the nuclear Powers. Thus it would seem expedient to start now selection of the sites of co-operating stations outside the territories of the nuclear Powers. For that purpose one would have to contact the international scientific unions and, of course, the governments concerned.

The suggestions just made refer most directly to stations in seismically-quiet areas. For the monitoring of the multitudinous earthquakes in seismic areas local networks are required. For these tasks we do have a rather unique opportunity opened up by resolution 912(XXXIV) of the Economic and Social Council meeting last summer on "International Co-operation in the Field of Seismological Research," which was unanimously endorsed by all Member States of the United Nations by a decision at the last session of the General Assembly. The resolution aimed at expanding and re-equipping existing stations in seismic regions and at the establishment of an earthquake-warning system. An inter-governmental conference on this matter is planned to take place in 1964, and preparations for this conference are now being made. This presents us with a timely opportunity to join forces in order to improve the observation system whether for earthquakes or for man-made explosions, a rare opportunity which I submit should not be missed.

The addition of extraneous detection posts will facilitate control of the test ban. This favourable result will be the more accentuated if free co-operation between geophysical institutions is ensured. It would help to save the control system from the petrification that might otherwise be a consequence of its political origin and purpose. In our opinion the ideal would be to make the data flowing from the control system completely accessible to all experts in the field. In fact, one

(The Chairman, Sweden)

should turn the whole approach round and, rather as a primary goal, seek to further develop the seismic data-gathering system which is to be extended for ordinary scientific purposes, and then just tap it for control purposes at certain convenient places. In this way one could secure the continued co-operation of all the scientists concerned and confine the scientific confrontation with political decisions to a specially-established pipeline from the general scientific data flow. In view of the current plans for a world seismic data centre, the ideas being discussed for associated regional centres as well as the incipient general assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, I dare suggest that an ad hoc committee should be set up to investigate the combined approach just outlined.

So much for detection, but the evaluation of the seismic recordings would also benefit from this — if I may use the expression — civilian approach, because an open system would ensure the mutual criticism of all scientists in the field and would thus also provide a constant check on the methods employed and the conclusions drawn at the centre.

My colleagues will recognize that the Swedish delegation has on several occasions intervened to suggest that the scientific co-operation which will necessarily accompany a test ban should be initiated as early as possible. The other non-aligned delegations have voiced the same request. On this ground I venture to reiterate the suggestion I made earlier that certain steps, such as the setting up of the international scientific commission on an interim basis, be taken immediately. As practical experience shows how difficult it is to recruit prominent scientists on an international basis at short notice, I hope it will not be considered unduly pressing to suggest that plans for the recruitment of a nucleus of a scientific commission be initiated at once. As the commission is envisaged as an impartial and not a bilateral one, the non-aligned countries perforce take an active interest in its creation.

I have dealt at some length with a few scientific aspects of a test-ban control. In matters such as these we think it highly advisable to co-plan and co-operate with the international scientific unions concerned. The Swedish delegation has approached the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) on this matter, and we understand that ICSU is ready to consider such co-operation if that be the unanimous desire of our Committee.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

Any delay would mean a delay in the effective functioning of the control system. The Committee will recall that, according to the 1958 Committee of Experts (EXP/NUC/28) and also to the draft treaty (ENDC/30) of 18 April 1961, the control system would only be completed after six to eight years. In the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty (ENDC/58) of 27 August 1962 much more flexible arrangements were proposed, but even so the control system would only become effective six to twelve months after the entry into force of the treaty, not just after its signing.

Examples could be multiplied of the cases in which we believe that contributions from the non-nuclear, non-aligned countries might be of some assistance and in which our participation in certain deliberations might tend to make them less polarized. But of course the most urgent thing is to proceed with the final negotiations on a test ban.

We are fully aware that important steps forward have recently been taken, initiated by the exchange of correspondence between the leaders of the two major nuclear Powers and continued during the private negotiations. We would quite understand if a short interval were now needed in order to rearrange plans for more detailed agreements so as to bring them into line with the new positions of principle. Whether such further negotiations take place as a continuation of those private talks or in other forms, our Committee must, I think, expect to hear a positive signal that the agreement is well on its way within a fairly short time — a few weeks or, should we say, not later than the spring equinox.

We certainly hope that by then the main negotiating parties will have clarified their positions on the verification quota and agreed on all other points still under debate or remaining unclear. We believe as little as do other delegations that the difference between three inspections and eight, or even one between two and twenty, could constitute an insurmountable obstacle in the way of a final treaty, particularly since there must be many alternatives available for submission to the scrutiny of practical considerations. Some have been mentioned here only today by other delegations. I am thinking of further possibilities which the parties will no doubt come to examine, if they have not already done so — for example, the possibility of some kind of sliding scale of inspections between the numbers three and eight, as those are the numbers suggested by the different sides, perhaps starting with three inspections during the first year and gradually stepping up the number during

(The Chairman, Sweden)

subsequent years. Or there might, on the contrary, be reason to start with some higher number and move downwards, motivated by the hope that mutual confidence would increase with time. Or again the quota might be tied to a longer time-period than a year. Those are just some of the possibilities, which must exist in abundance.

The main thing to remember is that failure to negotiate, failure to compromise, failure to agree, would not be easily understood by the world outside the nuclear club.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): May I be permitted to associate myself with those who have expressed the hope that the second hundred of the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee which is now beginning will lead us to success and that the Committee will fulfil the main task entrusted to it by the United Nations, that of preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament in the shortest possible time?

Today the Soviet delegation has listened with interest to the statements made by the representatives of India, Ethiopia and Sweden. We shall study the considerations they have put forward. About the statement made by the United States representative I should like to say a few words later on.

As we see it, the course of the debate in the Committee confirms the view that it is essential to take urgent measures which would help to reduce the threat of a thermo-nuclear war. The urgency for taking measures to reduce the threat of war is dictated by life itself, by the actual situation which has now come about in the world as a result of the intensification of the arms race, and particularly as a result of the steps which are being taken by certain States in the direction of further intensifying this race. In analysing the concrete state of affairs characterizing the world situation, and the arguments adduced by the representatives who have spoken here and with whom we have exchanged views outside this conference room, we come to the conclusion again and again that the first and most urgent of the measures which could really help to reduce the threat of a nuclear war would be the assumption by States of an obligation not to use foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Everything that is happening in the world, everything that has been referred to here in the Committee, strengthens our conviction that the adoption of the draft declaration on renunciation

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the Soviet Union (ENDC/75), would be an important step in the right direction, a great and useful deed. This measure could also become the turning-point towards the improvement of international relations. Taking all this into account, we consider that at this stage of the negotiations in the Committee, during the general debate, it may be helpful if the Soviet delegation sets forth a number of considerations in connexion with our proposal.

First of all, we should like to explain how and why this proposal originated. It came into being as the result of an analysis of recent international events and as the result of a study of the deployment of military forces and of that disposition of the most powerful strategic weapons of the sides which has now come about in the world. This deployment is characterized by the fact that, whereas one side is keeping its most powerful weapons and the strategic means of their delivery exclusively on its own territory, the other side is stationing such weapons not only on its national territory, but is using for this purpose military bases spread almost all over the world on the territory of foreign States.

According to certain reports in the press, the United States now has over 2,000 military bases of all kinds, located on the territories of dozens of foreign States; moreover, the disposition of these bases speaks for itself. United States military bases on foreign territories form, as it were, two gigantic strategic semi-circles, encompassing from the south and from the north the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other socialist States in Europe and Asia. The southern semi-circle of United States bases begins at one end in the Azores, then passes through Spain, Italy, Libya, Greece and Turkey, and then through Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, continues through South Vietnam and South Korea, and includes military bases on Okinawa and Taiwan and in Japan. The northern semi-circle consists of United States military bases on the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Iceland and Greenland, and the Joint United States-Canadian military installations on the territory of Canada.

The location in peacetime of large numbers of United States military bases on foreign territories situated many thousands of kilometres from the territory of the United States of America is undoubtedly an abnormal phenomenon, which has no

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

precedent in the history of mankind. Not only the socialist States, against which all these bases are directly aimed, but also many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, are well aware of the threat to their security and to universal peace which is entailed in the system of foreign military bases on the territories of other States. The actual historical experience of a number of States members of our Committee is so eloquent in this respect that it is hardly necessary for us to go into any special explanations. It will suffice to refer in this connexion to the statement published quite recently, on 10 November, in the United States journal Nation:

"The fact is — regardless of how we may see our bases"—that is to say, United States bases — "to establish bases on the border of another State must inevitably be considered a provocative act".

In the light of this, there should be no doubt that it would be desirable in the interests of universal peace and security to ensure the most rapid elimination of the whole system of foreign military bases on the territories of other States. But we approach this question as realists and say that, although the best thing would be to put an end to the system of foreign military bases on the territories of other States immediately, yet if the Western Powers are not prepared to do so, let us agree to eliminate forthwith the most dangerous elements of this system, and it will be possible to do the rest in the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

What is it in the system of foreign military bases on the territories of other States that is most dangerous from the standpoint of the interests of universal peace? There can be no doubt that the most dangerous element is the stationing on foreign territories of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and, of course, of the nuclear warheads and bombs for the delivery of which these strategic means are designed. Specifically, we are referring to United States medium-range Thor and Jupiter missiles now located on the territories of the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey; to the B-47 and B-52 strategic bombers based on air-fields in the United Kingdom, Spain, Okinawa, Japan and several other countries; and to aircraft carriers carrying nuclear bomber aircraft which use the ports of Italy, Greece and a number of other States.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

And, of course, we are also referring to atomic submarines carrying Polaris missiles fitted with thermo-nuclear warheads. It is precisely these submarines that have recently been acquiring an increasing significance in the system of locating United States strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons outside the boundaries of the national territory of the United States, particularly in connexion with the United States-United Kingdom agreement at Nassau and the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. For instance, it is known from a statement made by Mr. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States, that before 1 April of this year three United States submarines with Polaris missiles will be sent to the Mediterranean. As we can see, this is only a beginning.

It is quite impossible to explain the stationing of these types of weapons in foreign territories either by the interests of United States security or by the interests of the security of their allies in whose territories they are located or based.

With regard to the security of the United States of America, we should like to stress first of all that no one is threatening the United States. Moreover, the United States has in its own territory armed forces which, according to the statements of leading United States officials, will suffice to deal with any, even the most important, military tasks. The Secretary of Defense of the United States recently boasted that the armed forces of the United States -

"... could still destroy the Soviet Union without any help from the deployed --outside the boundaries of the United States-- tactical air units or carrier task forces of Thor or Jupiter IRBM's."

This is a quotation from page 29 of a statement by the Secretary of Defense before the United States House Armed Services Committee on 30 January 1963.

One could hardly speak more clearly about the aggressive plans of United States military strategists. In this connexion we should also like to stress the conclusion which follows from this statement and is made by the Minister of Defense, namely that the stationing in foreign territories of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons is not at all necessary for the security of the United States.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Furthermore, what can be said about the security of the States in whose territories these United States weapons are located? Can anyone assert that the security of the United Kingdom has become more solid since the naval base at Holy Loch has been used by United States submarines with Polaris missiles? We know from the Press that hundreds of thousands of British people think otherwise and demand the immediate elimination of the Holy Loch base. Perhaps Italy feels safe now that Jupiter missiles have been stationed on its territory? If so, then why are the Italian people demanding the removal of these missiles from the territory of their country? And why is such a widespread movement now developing in Italy against the establishment in Italian territory of naval bases for submarines with Polaris missiles, which are intended to replace the Jupiter land bases?

It is well known, and the Soviet Government has never made any secret of it, that strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons and these weapons themselves stationed in foreign territories will, like magnets, attract retaliatory nuclear blows if war is unleashed against the Soviet Union or its allies. And there is hardly any need to mention again the power of such a retaliatory blow. How, then, is it possible, if one appraises the situation sanely, to speak of the security of States being strengthened as a result of stationing United States strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on their territories?

We should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that there are countries in the world, including allies of the United States, which have a more realistic approach to the question of strengthening their security. In this connexion we have in mind the example of Iran, whose Government recently assumed, as is well known, an obligation not to allow the establishment of foreign missile bases on Iranian territory. If we were to reason as certain representatives of the Western countries do in our Committee, we should have to believe that the security of Iran has been weakened as a result of this wise step by the Iranian Government. But in fact the contrary is the case, for now that Iran is not endangered by the stationing on its territory of foreign missiles for the delivery of nuclear weapons, its security has been ensured much more reliably and the international situation of this country has been greatly strengthened. It would be useful for certain others to ponder the experience of Iran.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Therefore the stationing on foreign territories of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons is in no way connected with ensuring anyone's security. That being so, it is obvious that the purpose of this stationing is altogether different, and this cannot fail to put us on our guard, to arouse suspicion and mistrust in relations between States and to increase international tension. We can say quite frankly that, in the present circumstances, the presence of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons increases international tension and is a serious threat to the cause of peace.

We deem it necessary to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that a further worsening of the international situation in connexion with the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territories entails far-reaching and dangerous consequences. Indeed, if one side stations its most powerful weapons in foreign territories, aiming them at the vital targets of the other side, which also has the most modern weapons at its disposal, the resulting situation gives rise to a direct threat of a crisis in the relations between the nuclear Powers and a threat of military conflict between them. If we are to speak about this, we must recall that quite recently one of the international crises nearly led to a world thermo-nuclear war, with all its inevitable consequences for the peoples.

But the fact that this crisis in the relations between the nuclear Powers was successfully settled by peaceful means does not mean that such an outcome will be achieved always and in all cases. As you know, in the present-day world, where many international problems are unresolved, there will be attempts by the advocates of a policy "from a position of strength" to set the nuclear Powers against each other and to embitter the relations between them. A part in this may also be played by the accidental factors which have been referred to here, despite the declaration that the ultimate order to use atomic weapons will be given by the Supreme Commander.

We cannot exclude the possibility that, in the state of nervousness engendered by international tension and lack of confidence, a fatal role may also be played by the psychical instability of some officer responsible for launching a missile or for sending out a strategic bomber. You probably have not forgotten how, at the end of 1961, in the tense situation created by the Western Powers in response to the Soviet Union's proposal for the conclusion of a German peace treaty, General Power, who was

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in command of the United States Strategic Air Force, sent into the air hundreds of bombers with nuclear weapons on board merely as the result of a misinterpretation of radar readings. This case is very significant. It must also be taken into account that many military bases on foreign territories are situated thousands of kilometres from the national command centres and that, in the event of an interruption of communications, the local commanders of the bases will have to act on their own responsibility.

Those are the considerations which prompted the Soviet Government to raise before the Committee the question of the need to reach agreement forthwith on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

It can be said quite categorically that if States assume the obligation not to station strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territories, and if they fulfil this obligation, the world will become much more peaceful and the threat of a military conflict between the nuclear Powers will be reduced appreciably. The withdrawal of the most powerful weapons from the foreign territories in which they are now located will dispel much of the suspicion which, in the present circumstances, the other side cannot help feeling in respect of the intentions of the United States and its allies. After the withdrawal of foreign strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the countries where they are now stationed will be in a position no longer to fear that their territories may become the target of a retaliatory nuclear blow. If submarines with nuclear missiles and strike aircraft carriers no longer visit foreign ports, if installations for launching medium- and long-range missiles are no longer located on foreign territories, and if bombers with nuclear loads are no longer based on foreign airfields, the possibility of an accidental outbreak of war will decrease considerably. At the same time, no harm will be done to the security of all States, or to any particular country; their security will be strengthened.

The general relaxation of international tension as a result of renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons will undoubtedly facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament. It will then be much easier to proceed to dismantle the military machines of both sides.

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Taking into account all these considerations, the Soviet delegation appeals to ~~the members~~ of the Committee to proceed as soon as possible to consideration of the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75).

Today we should like to dwell upon another important question upon the solution of which depend to a great extent the improvement of the international situation and the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and mutual understanding. We are referring to the question of concluding a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77).

Four and a half years ago, on 11 June 1958, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union stated in a message to the President of the United States:

"We consider ripe for solution the problem of the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between the member States of the Warsaw Treaty and the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The conclusion of such a pact would by no means disrupt the relationship existing between the forces of both groups, and it would be immensely useful. The international situation would acquire a necessary element of stability and appeasement. The peoples will see that the strongest military States have reached Agreement and do not want war. It is hardly necessary to say that the threat of war would be reduced at once, because it is obvious that a new war in Europe, and not only in Europe, could in present conditions only be a consequence of conflict between the two main groups of States."

The views expressed by the Head of the Soviet Government at that time are still fully valid. Moreover, it seems to us that the present situation demands with even greater urgency than in the past the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States belonging to the two opposed military groupings. It is precisely for this reason, so we understand, that the representatives of many States members of this Committee have expressed themselves in favour of the conclusion of such a pact. The representatives of all the socialist countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty have spoken from this standpoint. Representatives of the non-aligned States in various

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continents - Brazil, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and others - have also spoken in favour of concluding a non-aggression pact. We do not doubt that the representatives of other non-aligned States members of this Committee also support this noble idea.

So far the representatives of the Western Powers have not expressed any definite view on the proposal for the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between the Warsaw Treaty States and the NATO States. However, we should like to believe that they too will not oppose the accomplishment of this important measure aimed at consolidating peace. Certain statements by leading statesmen of the Western Powers on this question seem to justify that supposition. We have in mind, above all, the statement of the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, in his message to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, dated 27 October 1962, that the United States Government would be quite prepared -- I quote -- "to discuss a détente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact ..." and consider any useful proposals. It is also well known that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, has referred more than once to the possibility and usefulness of concluding such a non-aggression pact.

Taking into account all the afore-mentioned statements, one cannot but come to the conclusion that the time has come to submit for the Committee's consideration a draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. On the instructions of the Soviet Government we are submitting such a draft, and we request the Secretariat to circulate it as an official document of the Committee (ENDC/77).

What, in our view, should be the main obligations of the States parties to such a non-aggression pact? In our opinion the main, determinant obligation is that which is laid down in article 1 of the draft pact:

"1. to refrain from attack, the threat or use of force, in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, against one another or in their international relations in general."

It may, of course, be said that this obligation does not go beyond the scope of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We do not dispute this; it is true. But what does this show? It merely shows that it will be all the easier for

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each of the States belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Alliance or to NATO solemnly to confirm this obligation and, on the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the very fact of its confirmation by the most powerful States of today will be interpreted everywhere as a serious pledge of their intention to maintain peace. Suffice it to say that the parties to the Warsaw Treaty on the one hand and the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on the other include all the States which have nuclear weapons at their disposal. Outside these two groups there are no nuclear Powers. We must also point out that the armed forces of these two military groups are directly opposed to each other and that in such regions as Central Europe they are actually neighbours, a situation which makes the danger of a clash between them particularly great.

In view of these circumstances it can be considered beyond dispute that the maintenance of peace depends above all upon the relations between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. If a military conflict were to break out between these two groups, nothing could prevent a world-wide thermo-nuclear war. However, if the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty assume before all mankind an obligation not to attack each other, this will result in a considerable relaxation of international tension and the consolidation of peace. This will also greatly facilitate the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Important obligations are also provided for in articles 2 and 3 of the draft non-aggression pact. Article 2 says that all disputes that may arise between States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty shall be resolved by peaceful means only, through negotiations between the parties concerned or the other means for the pacific settlement of international disputes prescribed by the United Nations Charter. Article 3 provides that if situations affecting the interests of both sides are likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security, the States parties to this Pact shall consult together with a view to taking and implementing such joint measures as may, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, be considered appropriate for the peaceful settlement of such situations.

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In other words, the intention is to create a kind of mechanism not only for the pacific settlement of international crises but also for preventing them from arising. This, of course, is of very great importance from the point of view of normalizing international life and improving the international situation. For all, or nearly all, the international crises of recent years have been connected precisely with the existence of contentious questions and the emergence of dangerous situations in the relations between States members of the two main military groups existing in the world.

The Soviet Government suggests that no specific time-limit should be set for the duration of the non-aggression pact between the two groups of States. We think that it would be best to agree that this pact and the obligations deriving therefrom should remain in force as long as the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty are in effect. However, we do not think that this pact would be eternal. We should like to believe that a time will come when not only the socialist countries but also the Western Powers will come to the conclusion that it would be advisable to disband both these military groups and to liquidate them completely.

The debate which has taken place in the Committee shows that most or all of the members attach great importance to the earliest and fullest possible discussion in the Committee of the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. We also are of the opinion that this is a very important question and, as we have pointed out more than once, we consider that all the necessary conditions for its settlement are now at hand, taking into account the constructive steps taken recently by the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegation intends to state its position on that question at the next plenary meeting of the Committee, but at present I should like to say a few words about the statement made today by the representative of the United States.

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It is to be regretted that on this occasion also the representative of the United States has expressed no desire to take advantage of the existing favourable conditions in order to help forward in deed the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on the cessation of all types of nuclear weapon tests. He has again made an utterly unjustified attempt to lay the responsibility for the delay on the Soviet Union. This is not in accordance with the truth, if one analyses the course of the negotiations and the positions of the sides. Who in fact is now refusing to seek for ways to reach an agreement? If we take the main question which now prevents us from making progress -- the question of the number of inspections -- the picture is perfectly clear and it is not to the credit of the position of the Western Powers.

Our Western partners suggested two or three as an acceptable number of inspections. The Soviet Government, having carefully considered this question, decided to take an important step towards meeting the position of the Western Powers. It agreed to on-site inspection and agreed to the number which had been suggested. It was natural to expect that, all the obstacles having been removed, we would then be able, in a very short time, or at any rate in no longer a time than was indicated today, for instance, by the representative of Sweden, to prepare and sign an appropriate agreement. But now the Western Powers are insisting on a new figure. They name a figure of eight or ten and at the same time they think it right that the other side should agree to this, and they do not consider their position to be in the nature of an ultimatum, although in fact it is, of course, a manifestation not only of an inflexible position but of an ultimatum-like approach to a question upon which it seemed we had already reached agreement.

If their purpose is to protract the negotiations, if their purpose is to take advantage of the Soviet Union's constructive position in order to bargain for the greatest possible number of inspections, then we can say straight out that nothing will come of this except delay. Flexibility, in our opinion, should help towards finding ways of solving outstanding issues as quickly as possible. But if one takes flexibility to mean, and calls flexibility, an approach which leads the Committee away from solving the main issues, then we are opposed to such flexibility, we are opposed to such an approach.

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Many delegations in their statements have touched on the question of the organization of the further work of the Committee after the conclusion of the general debate. As we have already reported to the Committee at one of our meetings, we agreed with the representative of the United States to meet together as the two co-Chairmen, and to prepare recommendations taking into account the views expressed by the delegations. Now, however, I should like to put forward my views on the question of procedure in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.

Being anxious to make the Committee's work as efficient as possible, we suggest that, after the completion of the exchange of views in plenary meetings on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the Committee's attention should be concentrated on the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons and on the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. We consider that due attention should also be given to the question of creating nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world. We should prefer that the questions be dealt with in plenary meetings of the Committee, but we are prepared to consider also other views, if there are any.

We have, of course, no objections to the views put forward today by the representative of India on procedure, in regard to holding a certain number of informal meetings on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Naturally the Committee should give the most serious attention to consideration of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. Agreement on and the implementation of separate measures are bound, as is generally recognized, to facilitate the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the accomplishment of the main task before the Committee — the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I hope not to detain the Committee too long. I should like to refer once again to the question of nuclear tests, but before doing so I should like to take up one or two points made by the leader of the Soviet delegation both in his speech this morning and in what he said in his last few speeches to the Committee. I think it is necessary to reply, very briefly, to certain allegations which he has levelled against the West. I would say to him that those allegations are unjustified and unnecessary, but, having been made and repeated, they require a brief but firm rebuttal.

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I should like to deal first of all with references to NATO made by our Soviet colleague in the past and inherent in a good deal that he had to say in the early part of his speech this morning. As the Soviet Union and its allies of course know, and as everyone else here knows, NATO is not and has never been an offensive organization. The text of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, for example, makes it perfectly clear that NATO is a purely defensive alliance which threatens no one and which will never, never be used for aggression. We all know -- and I do not need to labour the point -- that NATO arose as a defensive alliance against Russian expansion at a time when the Western Powers had drastically reduced their armed forces from the levels of the last war but when the Soviet Union had at that same time maintained its forces at a very high level. Until such time as we achieve a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the first task of any defensive alliance -- whether it be NATO, whether it be the Warsaw Pact -- is to maintain and improve its defensive capability.

Mr. Kuznetsov, in the speeches he has made up to today, apparently does not agree. I would remind him here that other people responsible for the defence of the Soviet Union do appear to agree with me. Perhaps he would recall what Marshal Malinovsky was reported in Pravda to have said on 9 May last year:

"The Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union unanimously welcome the measures of the Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government to strengthen the defensive capability of our homeland and intensify the power" -- mark that phrase, "intensify the power" -- of the Soviet armed forces".

He went on to say:

"We now have at our disposal this military might which is safely guarding the security interests of our homeland".

Mr. Kuznetsov this morning sought to quote certain United States authorities speaking of United States ability to annihilate the Soviet Union. But of course our Soviet colleagues and others round this table will recall that Chairman Khrushchev himself has on occasion reminded us of how very few of his large nuclear weapons would be needed entirely to destroy the United Kingdom, just as he has warned certain of our NATO colleagues with regard to their own countries. So those references

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are certainly not one-sided, and of course we all know that the Soviet Union holds on its own territory sufficient medium, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and medium-range bombers to devastate the whole of Western Europe. Those particular weapons are directed only at Western Europe, for they do not have the range to reach the United States or any other part of the American continent. In those circumstances I really do not think that Mr. Kuznetsov is entitled to object if the NATO Alliance has felt it necessary to improve its own defensive posture and capability, taking into account developments in military technology.

Mr. Kuznetsov referred this morning to the Holy Loch base in Scotland and seemed to imply that there were many people in Britain who would like to see it removed. I would tell him that the vast majority of the people in Britain think it a very necessary safeguard as long as Soviet armaments remain at their present level. But I would say to him that when we have reached agreement with him and when we are able to dismantle all bases, both home and foreign, I shall be as happy as he to see the Holy Loch base go at the same time as bases within the Soviet Union directed at Britain also are dismantled. This, you see, is not a matter of foreign bases alone, if a domestic base in the Soviet Union can threaten Britain in exactly the same way as he claims the Holy Loch base threatens the Soviet Union.

In the same way the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force should be seen in its proper perspective. The United States representative and I have both pointed out that our respective Governments are firmly against the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of States not now possessing them, and we have also both emphasized that our Governments continue to adhere to the Irish resolution 1665 (XVI) adopted by the General Assembly in 1961. The proposed NATO multilateral force is entirely consistent with our well-known and long-standing policy regarding the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

While dealing with these matters relative to NATO, I should like also to express my regret that the Soviet representative has seen fit more than once since we re-convened to launch into an irrelevant propaganda tirade against Western Germany, a country which, like my own, is a member of NATO. The Federal Republic of Germany is a peaceful and loyal member of NATO and is not planning any aggressive policy against anybody. I really think it does not help to keep reiterating these charges which we have heard from our Soviet colleague.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Mr. Kuznetsov today has proposed and has indeed submitted the draft (ENDC/77) of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. This matter is, of course, already on the agenda for consideration in the Committee of the Whole, and I think that is probably the appropriate place in which it should be considered. I would tell him that I shall study with the greatest interest the draft he has submitted, and that my Government is certainly not opposed to the conclusion of an agreement of non-aggression between the signatories of the two pacts if it will prove helpful. But this can be only one of the measures with which we concern ourselves. As to the stage at which we deliberate on it, I noted that Mr. Kuznetsov at the end of his speech, talking about procedures, recommended that after the conclusion of the general debates we should consider this matter and also the other draft declaration (ENDC/75) which he submitted last week as the next topics on the agenda. That, presumably, is another example of the flexibility of the Soviet Union in discussing matters — that naturally their own topics are always placed first.

I would say to our Soviet colleague in regard to the previous declaration which he submitted last week, and to which he has referred again at some length this morning, that I am perfectly willing to discuss it — of course, we can discuss any matters put forward by member States here — but, again, this is a matter which I should have thought would clearly have come within the cognizance of the Committee of the Whole. As regards its substance, I can only tell him that I see no reason to vary the comments which I made (ENDC/FV.96, pp.29 et seq.) immediately after he tabled the declaration and with which he did not seem wholly satisfied.

However, let us discuss these matters in detail at the appropriate time, and maybe he will be able to persuade me better of the virtue of some of the proposals. I am always willing to learn. But I do think that we should discuss these matters designed to reduce tension in a proper and orderly manner, and that we should do so in a manner which takes account of the various matters which have been put forward from both sides. I would urge that one of the earliest ought to be the one which a number of States have referred to, namely, the ideas for reducing tension, reducing the risk of war due to miscalculation. That, above all others, I would have thought is one which was self-evident in the value that it could bring having regard to the experiences of recent months. So let these matters be discussed by the co-Chairmen,

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and let us have decisions about the best way in which we can discuss them, but I would not accept that necessarily we should always consider first only the matters put forward by the Soviet Union.

If I may revert to the matter on which I had intended to speak mostly this morning, in relation to nuclear tests, I want to pick up one or two points particularly related to the very interesting speech which we heard from the representative of the United Arab Republic at our last meeting. It is quite true, as Mr. Hassan suggested then (ENDC/PV.99, p.12), that there was not enough progress in the informal talks held in Washington and New York during the recess. In fact, I think we are justified in saying that the talks were terminated on the initiative of the Soviet Union because the West could not accept without amendment the Soviet proposals contained in the correspondence between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. As our United States colleague said at our last meeting (*ibid.*, p.20), it was a real surprise to us when we were told that the Soviet proposals were not negotiable, that we must accept the Soviet offer of two to three inspections a year and three automatic stations, and that, before accepting that offer, we should not be allowed any insight into the manner in which on-site inspections would be initiated and carried out or into the equipment and operation of automatic stations. So we came back here to some extent disappointed and a little frustrated, but we certainly did not return here in a mood of hopelessness. On the contrary, we still think that the re-acceptance by the Soviet Union of the principle of on-site inspection opens up more possibilities of agreement than have existed for a long time.

When he did eventually come to deal with the question of nuclear tests our Soviet colleague spoke this morning of the West's having in fact suggested two to three inspections; he said the Soviet Union accepted that and therefore we should now be able to agree. Well, he knows perfectly well that is not the case. The matter has been expounded with absolute clarity, and I am sure all other delegations around this table are fully cognizant of what the West did propose -- and, indeed even if the Soviet Union had been under that misapprehension it would be strange if it still were, because as early as in President Kennedy's reply to Premier Khrushchev the matter was made abundantly clear (ENDC/74, p.2).

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

This, then, is the position: that the Soviet Union re-accepts the principle of on-site inspection; and with this in mind we are anxious to find the best way in which we can move forward. The best way forward may well depend on the procedures that we adopt, and I was therefore particularly interested in the procedural suggestions made by our colleague from the United Arab Republic at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.99, pp.15 et seq.). Our United States colleague has dealt with the points of substance which Mr. Hassan put forward. I should just like to say something about the procedures, and I would say straight away that as far as the United Kingdom is concerned we do not exclude any of the suggestions that our United Arab Republic colleague put forward. If the Soviet representative says that one of those proposals offers the best way forward, then we are willing to consider it. But it might be useful if, very briefly, I said a word about each of the proposals in turn.

Mr. Hassan suggested first that the nuclear parties might submit new draft test ban treaties incorporating their ideas and formulations. Of course, on the Western side we did submit a new draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) last August which incorporated all our latest ideas, but since then some of our ideas have been developing, and I do not think it would be altogether out of the question for us to incorporate the modifications in those ideas on paper, and possibly submit a revised draft treaty. What we should want to know, of course, is whether that would help us forward in our negotiations with the Soviet Union, and the answer to that can only come from our Soviet colleagues.

Next, Mr. Hassan suggested that working papers might be produced setting out the background to or the outline of our thinking on the various problems involved in the test ban question. Now, as he said, that has been done on several occasions already, mainly by the West. I do not think there is at the moment any particular problem which demands immediate treatment in that way, with the possible exception of the construction and operation of automatic seismic stations. But here again my Government is very ready to co-operate in this way if the Soviet Government thinks it would be useful and would help us forward.

Thirdly, our United Arab Republic colleague suggested that, if we could not arrive immediately at agreement on a quota number for inspections, we might for the time being put that question on one side and proceed with the discussion of other pertinent and relevant problems, in the hope that this might lead us nearer to

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agreement on the quota question. Several representatives have this morning made very interesting comments in that regard. The Chairman herself made several very practical suggestions on other questions which we could usefully consider, and she put forward once again a practical proposal designed to make use of the effective scientific knowledge which already exists in different countries of the world. (Supra, pp.25 et seq.) And we have had various other very interesting suggestions from our Indian and Ethiopian colleagues as well. It is possible that we could make progress in that way.

As members of the Conference will be aware, the Western delegations have frequently suggested some such procedures as those, and in the past I have certainly supported suggestions in that regard made by our present Chairman. My delegation is certainly ready to follow suggestions of that kind. We have always said that we would take up whichever of the problems our Soviet colleagues wished to discuss first and try to reach agreement on them, but that if agreement were not possible in a certain area, then we should be prepared to put that problem on one side and proceed to the next, in the belief that agreement in one area could lead us towards agreement in another. In this way we have offered to take up the questions of an international commission, detection systems, and, of course, inspection.

Now at this particular moment we seem closest to agreement on the detection problem, and I think that was made clear by our Indian colleague this morning. But we are still furthest apart on inspection, not now because the principle of inspection is not accepted, but because we cannot get the discussion moving on the modalities of inspection. The establishment or otherwise of an international commission has for the time being assumed less importance in our discussions. However, we remain equally ready to discuss any of those problems in detail and in depth. All we say is that we cannot accept as a prior condition of their discussion the Soviet figures which have been put before us; and I hope we are not going to have a lot of talk about who is responsible for putting forward ultimatata. That really does not seem to me to be a very helpful argument to put forward. I should think that representatives around this table know perfectly well just how flexible the West has been, and that we have made it quite clear how flexible we are. I hope our Soviet colleague will not seek to make out that there is any question of ultimatata in any of the attitudes we have taken up. Indeed, if he does think that, then it is for him to test us out.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

If he thinks we are absolutely rigid, let him come forward with a further offer and see how we respond. I think that is a fair suggestion to put to him.

Reverting to the question of procedures, I would say that for our part we are perfectly prepared to give the assurance referred to by our United Arab Republic colleague in the passage in his speech at our last meeting in which he said, among other things:

"The other party should dispel any lingering fears and seek to give assurance that surprise deterrent visits would not have, and could not be made to have, other ulterior significance." (ENDC/PV.99, p.16)

What we ask is that the Soviet Union should, as Mr. Hassan suggested, reassure us:

"... that the number of the quota of inspections which it suggests would be really meaningful, and that it would act as an effective deterrent against violation." (ibid., p.16)

We entirely agree with the representative of the United Arab Republic that:

"Both parties need to assure one another that practicality rather than politics is the driving force behind their proposals." (ibid.)

We have always tried to comply with these very necessary assurances. We can only do so by means of detailed discussion, in which we propose inspection, the manner in which inspection should be carried out, and the safeguards which may be offered to a host country against espionage. I do not underrate the fears which our Soviet colleagues have expressed in this last regard, and we are very willing to look at any means of safeguards on this particular point.

Since at the moment I am mainly talking about procedure and the way to move forward, I do not propose to go into details -- and certainly not at this hour -- on the questions posed in the speech of the representative of the United Arab Republic on the matters of substance. In any case they have, as I have already indicated and as we have heard, been dealt with already this morning by the representative of the United States. There is no way in which I could improve on what he has said on that this morning. But I do think that these questions -- to which we have given, and are prepared to give, full answers -- together with the questions which the representative of the United States posed at our last meeting, must be answered to the satisfaction of everyone if we are going to get agreement. We cannot side-step

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these questions. If they are to be answered, they must be replied to in some forum. They could be answered here in plenary meeting; they could be answered in the nuclear Sub-Committee; they could be dealt with at informal talks, as has been suggested by more than one representative this morning; they could be brought forward in fresh draft treaty texts put forward to this Conference; or they could be dealt with in memoranda. However, the point is that the questions have been posed, and they must be answered.

We are prepared to adopt any of the methods that have been suggested. We are prepared to give our views fully, as, in most cases, I think it can safely be said that we have already done on any of these questions; and we are prepared to do so in any forum which the representative of the Soviet Union chooses. Let him choose. If the representative of the Soviet Union is not ready to do the same, then I do ask him to explain to us in more detail why he feels obliged to adopt this attitude.

I must comment that I thought it significant this morning, when everyone else was concentrating on this matter, that he did take our minds off this point and on to other matters once more. I think it must be evident that everyone here feels there is the possibility of an agreement on this particular issue. We all feel that if we could solve this it might help us forward enormously with our other problems. Therefore I welcome the concentration on this subject, and I was surprised that the representative of the Soviet Union spent so much time on other matters this morning. However, as I say, if he is not ready to go into these matters in any of these ways, do let him tell us why he feels obliged to adopt this attitude. I assure the representative of the Soviet Union that we will listen to him with every sympathy, and that, if we are convinced, we will do our level best to meet him. What we want is an agreement; and we want an agreement at this session. The Western Powers have been flexible and are flexible. We are only too anxious to talk and to negotiate. I do not think I can say more than that.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I regret having to take additional time. However, I must do so because of my great regret at certain of the comments made by the representative of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I should like to touch very briefly on three points where I think we should again make our position clear. The first point -- although the representative of the United Kingdom has already touched on it -- is the official position on figures in the Western representatives' references to on-site inspections. But, while there has been much speculation, I think it is perfectly clear that the official numbers put forth by the United States and the United Kingdom were expressed in President Kennedy's letter of 28 December 1962 (ENDC/74); and in no official manner have they ever been two to three on the part of either of our delegations.

As to the introduction of a proposal for a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact, again this has been referred to by President Kennedy in his letter to Chairman Khrushchev dated 28 October 1962, but in an entirely different context. It is true that in past discussions at this Conference the Soviet delegation has proposed that the Conference should discuss the matter here, and the United States has not been enthusiastic about that for reasons which I shall mention. I shall not, however, because of those reasons, comment on that proposal, which has now been put forward in the form of a draft (ENDC/77); but I should like to mention the reasons why we lack enthusiasm. It is not only because many of the countries which would be directly affected by such a pact are not represented at this table; it is also because at this table there are a number of countries which have no part in the European alliances; and, perhaps more importantly, the proposed pact does not actually bear on disarmament. It might, however, raise questions with regard to the political and security arrangements of Western Europe.

I think it was the intention of President Kennedy, in mentioning this in the letter to which I referred, that it might well appropriately be brought up in such other environment. Certainly there is no objection on the part of the United States to such discussions in that proper frame of reference. None the less, I shall of course report to my Government the submission of this draft, and we shall have comments to make on it later.

The third point on which I feel I must speak concerns the procedural suggestions of the representative I had considered to be my co-Chairman (Supra, p.41). It seems to us that in putting forward these matters, which have been referred to as the "unilateral desires of the Soviet Union", it might have been better -- and it has certainly been our practice -- to discuss them at meetings of the co-Chairmen,

(Mr. Foster, United States)

where procedures have normally been recommended to the full Conference. While we do not object to discussing these or other matters, we have felt that in the Committee of the Whole or in the plenary meetings there should be a balance between the subjects discussed -- a balance between those subjects which we for our part believe have significance and those which, equally perhaps, the Soviet Union believes to have significance. Therefore I hope that, before we take any action on such suggestions, it will be possible for the co-Chairmen to meet and to discuss, in order to proceed with an orderly and logical discussion of the matters of great concern to this Conference.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should merely like to make a few brief comments on the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, and to reply to the last remarks of the representative of the United States. First, the nature of the North Atlantic Treaty. The aggressive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty is not altered by the repeated efforts of Mr. Godber to depict this aggressive organization, quite unjustifiably, in a different light. Listening to Mr. Godber, it would appear that NATO is making great efforts, is striving to help bring about disarmament, and is striving not to whip up the armaments race. However, those are merely words, but the facts show that NATO and the States parties to this Treaty are basing their policy on the armaments race and are intensifying this race.

We must note that this process has been especially speeded up in recent times. For the members of the Committee this is hardly a point which requires proof. NATO came into existence as a result of the aggressive policy of the Western Powers, a policy which recognized only force in dealing with contentious issues and considered that such issues could only be resolved by the use of force. All the measures that were taken by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries were only counter-measures. The Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed and is proposing today that both treaties should be annulled. But the Western Powers have refused and still refuse to do so. The Soviet Union is now proposing a step towards improving the relations between the countries adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty and those adhering to the Warsaw Treaty, namely the conclusion of a non-aggression pact (ENDC/77). In submitting this proposal, we were guided by the desire really to take a serious step and to facilitate thereby the solution of other problems also. We hope that the

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representatives of the Western Powers will give these proposals their careful consideration.

But what has been said today by Mr. Foster in regard to a non-aggression pact causes us some concern. How is it possible to put forward today, as an argument against the consideration and conclusion of a pact, that all the members of NATO are not present here? If we were to approach matters from that standpoint, we should not be able at all to consider a single disarmament measure or any measure relating to disarmament, because we should hardly find even a single measure which would affect only the countries represented here. After all, we do not raise such a question when, let us say, we consider the problem of general and complete disarmament, or when we talk about partial measures. Let us assume that we have agreed to consider such a question as the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world. Are all the representatives of these regions present here? Certainly not. Therefore such an argument seems at least to be groundless.

Even more groundless is the remark that the conclusion of such a pact would not help to improve the situation, and would not help to place the security of Europe on a firmer basis. It would seem, on the contrary, as we have understood hitherto, that when States improve their relations and assume definite obligations to solve all problems by peaceful means, this should help to improve the situation and greatly strengthen security. I should therefore like to appeal to the representatives of the Western Powers to study the Soviet proposal without preconceived opinions and to start out with the aim of making the necessary contribution to the common cause of the maintenance of peace.

Now a few words regarding bases. In reply to our proposal (ENDC/75) that we should consider the question of not using foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, Mr. Godber tried to put before us an entirely different question and to confuse the issue. If I understood him correctly from the rapid interpretation, I cannot but express surprise that Mr. Godber sees no difference, it appears, between foreign military bases and national armed forces. How could one understand such a proposal as, say, that the United Kingdom should eliminate United States strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons and that, in exchange for this, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries should completely disarm? How is it possible at all to think of such an approach if we are really trying to some extent to find a common language rather than

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

artificially to inflate questions on which, it seemed, we no longer had anything to argue about. Do we really have to start an argument in order to define what constitutes a foreign military base on alien territory? Is this concept not yet quite clear? If it is not quite clear to Mr. Godber, I think we can find some extra time and explain to him why two quite different matters must not be confused.

As regards procedure, I should like to tell you, Mr. Foster, that I have broken no rule or understanding between us. I think that the two co-Chairmen will certainly have to meet afterwards and prepare recommendations in the light of the views which have been expressed here. However, you cannot deprive me of the right to speak here as the representative of the Soviet Union and not as co-Chairman. I raised no objection when, for instance, the representative of the United States said that he thought the Committee of the Whole should be reactivated. I made no comment at the time. So allow me, too, to enjoy the elementary rights of a representative of a sovereign State.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The United States representative in stating just now that he was not enthusiastic about discussing or negotiating a non-aggression pact between the parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (Supra, p.50), said that he lacked enthusiasm because in particular this proposal of the Soviet Union contained no disarmament measures -- as he put it, did not actually bear on disarmament. If that is correct and if he did express himself in those terms, as I believe he did, I should like to ask whether some other measures proposed by the Western representatives, especially by the United States, are disarmament measures. For instance, can one say that a measure designed for "the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications" (ENDC/70) is a disarmament measure? Certainly not. It is a measure under the terms of which we could continue to arm, continue the arms race, and at the same time take steps to prevent war breaking out by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications. We therefore consider that all measures, particularly such measures as a non-aggression pact between the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the countries parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, should be discussed, since they certainly reduce the risk of war.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

I should also like to note that Mr. Godber referred in his speech to the Warsaw Treaty as a defensive alliance (Supra, p. 42). We, however, as the Soviet Union representative has just pointed out, cannot describe NATO as a defensive organization. It is an aggressive organization, and we will go on saying so whenever necessary.

I venture also to take this opportunity of wishing Mr. Foster a safe journey to the United States, and of saying that we hope that on his return he will bring us some really concrete proposals regarding the situation which has arisen here in the negotiations for the cessation of nuclear tests, on which the Western countries lay such stress and from which the whole world desires a result.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one-hundredth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mrs. A. Myrdal, Ambassador and representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, India, Ethiopia, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Bulgaria.

"The delegation of the Soviet Union tabled the draft ^{1/} of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 22 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.