CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. E.L.M. BURNS (Canada)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. E. HOSANNAH
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. LUKANOV
	Mr. G. GHELEV
	Mr. D. TEKHOV
	Mr. G. YANKOV
Burma:	Mr. James BARRINGTON
	U HTOON SHEIN
Canada:	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
	Mr. S.F. RAE
	Mr. R.M. TAIT
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. ZEMLA
	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. J. BUCEK
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
Ethiopia:	Ato S. TEFERRA
India:	Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
	Mr. A.S. MEHTA
	Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO
	Mr. G.R. SAPRA
Italy:	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
	Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
	Mr. S. AVETTA
	Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:	Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. Manuel TELLO
Nigeria:	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
Poland:	Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
	Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Romania:	Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
	Mr. E. GLASER
	Mr. C. UNGUREANU
	Mr. M. IONESCU
Sweden:	Mr. P. LIND
	Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
	Mr. C.G. EKLUND
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
	Mr. I.G. USACHEV
	Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV
	Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
	Mr. A. OSMAN
	Mr. M. KASSEM
	Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM
United Kingdom:	Sir Paul MASON
	Mr. J.M. EDES
	Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:	Mr. A.S. FISHER
	Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
	Mr. D.S. MacDONALD
	Mr. R.A. MARTIN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the 174th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LIND (Sweden): The Swedish delegation wishes to speak today on a subject which, in effect, straddles the subject of general and complete disarmament and that of collateral measures. Such must often be the case if we regard the collateral measures as stepping-stones to disarmament. Moreover, my remarks will relate mainly to a topic on which much attention has been focused during several previous Thursday meetings: the reduction of military budgets.

It has seemed to my delegation that our Conference must have a clearer view of how to tackle the connexion between measures of "economic disarmament" through reduction of military expenditures, at present undertaken unilaterally or recommended for formal agreement, and those disarmament measures which directly envisage a freezing or reduction of armaments but which indirectly must have the effect also of lowering military expenditures; for, as Mr. Blusztajn, the representative of Poland, stated on 5 March 1964, these two sets of measures "supplement one another" (ENDC/PV.172, p.7).

How are these two approaches to be handled in our deliberations? Are they really to be treated separately, on the one hand by our discussing the question of budgetary reductions without concerning ourselves with what actual disarmament measures they relate to, and on the other hand by our discussing specific disarmament measures and leaving their effects on the budgets outside the problem; or should we attempt to combine in some more organic way these two lines of reasoning?

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will not stop at merely raising these general questions -- related closely as they are to our methods of work and to our agenda -- but I will attempt to take us a little further in our joint thinking about what the link between those two approaches might be, and at the same time to point to what my delegation believes to be a useful way of combining our interest in them.

A short flash-back to some statements made during this session of our Conference will clarify what is our point of departure. Thus, in introducing the more detailed exposition of the proposal to freeze the production of nuclear delivery vehicles, the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, stressed

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that such a freeze "would permit significant reduction of military expenditures" (ENDC/PV.162, p.20). The argument has also been amplified by, inter alios, our colleagues from Burma (ENDC/PV.161, p.6), Italy (ENDC/PV.160, p.31), and Nigeria (ENDC/PV.159, pp. 13, 14).

Turning to another aspect of the problem, Mr. Tsarapkin, the representative of the Soviet Union, said on 20 February 1964 in one of his elaborations of this theme:

> "A substantial reduction of military budgets would have far-reaching positive consequences, both political and economic". (ENDC/PV.168, p.18)

Mr. Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic, stressed in his intervention on 25 February that the reduction of military budgets --

> "... would have a beneficial effect on a number of problems relating to our work here, especially those aggravating the international situation". (ENDC/PV.169, p.34)

The economic and social consequences following disarmament were the point of departure for Mr. de Castro, the representative of Brazil, in the pleas he made for what he termed "collective economic security" (ENDC/PV.166, p.7). Indeed, as was pointed out by the delegation of India through Mr. Nehru on 27 February 1964 --

> "... disarmament and development are closely interrelated, and both are essential for the strengthening of peace." (ENDC/PV.170, p.30)

The Swedish delegation has from the early stages of our work been interested in yet another aspect of disarmament measures and their budgetary effects: the possibilities of gaining information about the extent to which disarmament is really effectuated. When speaking on 28 January 1964, Ambassador Myrdal said:

> "One of the most promising leads for the whole question of indirect, inoffensive control consists simply of increasing the internationally-available knowledge about changes in economic allocations for military purposes -- without any hint of interference with the dispositions within each nation". (ENDC/PV.160, p.25)

That is also in line with the thinking behind the relevant parts of the treaty drafts on general and complete disarmament before us in the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add. 1, 2, 3) and Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) versions respectively. The approach is to some extent similar but also to some extent significantly different. The United States draft seems to be content to verify ex post that certain agreed disarmament measures have resulted in a decrease in

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military expenditures. One might say that the budgetary savings would be a concomitant of other disarmament measures and that the reports which are to include an itemization of military expenditures would rather serve purposes of control. In the Soviet draft, cuts in the military budgets have a more independent place in the disarmament scheme. But the Soviet plan also extends the requirements of control quite far, envisaging, among other things -- already in stage I -- that financial inspectors of the international disarmament organization should have free access to the records of the central financial institutions of the States parties to the treaty concerning the reductions in budgetary appropriations resulting from specific disarmament measures agreed upon.

At present we are far from the stage envisaged in the draft treaties. However, when in the actual situation unilateral reductions in allocations for military purposes are announced, with still greater ones not being excluded, it is in a way regrettable that there is no international disarmament organization to report to. In the meantime, I venture to submit, it would be extremely useful if we could start to study more closely the possibilities of using the information which is available on budgetary movements in order to enable us to follow -- indirectly and unobtrusively -- what is happening in the disarmament field. In so doing we might also contribute to the preparation of fact-finding machinery to be utilized when more important disarmament measures are to be implemented.

As you, Mr. Chairman, reminded us last week (ENDC/PV.172, p.11), the idea of using budgetary control as a method of verifying the observance of an agreement in the field of disarmament is not a new one. During the preliminary work of the disarmament conference in 1932 here at Geneva, a careful study was made of that subject and a standard model was constructed in order to make possible a survey in a simple and comprehensive form of the military expenditures of all countries, irrespective of differences in the construction and presentation of their budgets (CONF.D. 158).

Since 1932 the conception and the scope of defence costs have been considerably widened, and we must obviously now tackle the problem from somewhat new angles and make new studies. As stated by Mrs. Myrdal in her intervention on 28 January, the Swedish delegation believes that --

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"... the question of verification, if related to suggestions of reductions of military expenditure, opens an interesting field for co-operative study without any necessity to institutionalize a system of control". (ENDC/PV.160, p.24)

I would suggest that this Committee should first discuss the need to study, or rather to "monitor", the trends of military expenditures; and subsequently we should set up a working group to study these problems further, and/or we should seek the co-operation of United Nations groups that may already be dealing with related matters. Pending the results of such studies, it might be useful to examine whether it would be worth while to make some interim arrangements for this kind of continuous checking of what is happening in the field of military budgets.

I want to stress once more in this context that at present we should be interested not in details -- of military production, of upkeep of standing forces, or the like -- but in more global approximations of the changes in allocations to military and other categories of expenditure. It is the dynamics, the trends of change, which should legitimately interest us as outsiders, rather than any specification of accounts. We should have the possibility of following what is the direction of change, whether the real expenditures do move up or down. If there are cuts, we shall thus have a chance to see whether they should be considered as temporary or as being of a more lasting character, as modest or of a dramatic boldness.

It would no doubt be a step forward even if we could reach only the level of first approximation in regard to changes in military expenditures. Several of our colleagues have argued for a closer scrutiny of these matters. So did Mr. Obi, the representative of Nigeria, when on 24 January he said:

"We are not unaware of the arguments adduced by some about the differences in the accounting procedures and economic systems of the parties primarily involved. We grant that it may be difficult, but we refuse to believe that that obstacle, if indeed it be real, is insurmountable." (ENDC/PV.159, p.15)

Last Thursday the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, on the basis of a rather full description of the many problems connected with budgetary limitations, strongly favoured an expert examination in detail of how the military budgets of various States are in fact composed (ENDC/PV.172, p.11).

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What we need is some exploration of the methods and material at hand for studying budgetary implications of disarmament. The best lead available seems to my delegation to be the report (E/3593/Rev.1) by the United Nations expert group that studied the economic and social consequences of disarmament -- by the way, a group in which experts from countries belonging to different economic systems co-operated in a most productive way. Their assignment was:

"... to assess the transitional problems that may arise and to determine the peaceful uses to which the resources released may be put ..."

For carrying out that task it seemed to them "necessary to ascertain in some detail the volume and composition of resources so released" (ibid., p.3). The figures they reached would be of interest to us, although they should be followed up and analysed in the light of developments during later years, since their data generally referred to a period ending in 1959.

It is to be foreseen, of course, that one would soon encounter the difficulty inherent in the lack of international comparability, both in respect of military budgets as such and in respect of the systems for calculating the gross national product, with their different ways of accounting for the allocation of resources. Also in this domain there is international co-operative research under way from which we might receive elucidation. However, it will probably be beyond our capability for a long time to obtain a foolproof index and true comparability.

There are also other difficulties which should not be overlooked in this connexion. One of the problems is that the military forces of the countries are built up in quite different ways depending on their respective strategical conditions. It would be of importance also to know the expenditures for different kinds of verification systems.

There would be universal interest and approval if we could devise, gradually, some kind of method by which military expenditures could be gauged with an acceptable degree of accuracy -- just as there are almost universal misgivings about the mad sums spent on armaments today.

While reiterating that we could not and should not at this stage aim at any higher level of perfection than that of "first approximation", the Swedish delegation would urge the Committee to devote some time to discussion of the problems surrounding

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budgetary control and, preferably, to make these problems the subject of closer examination by some kind of informal working party. We are convinced that by limiting the scope of study in such a way as now suggested, fruitful co-operation in this field could be established. We have taken the initiative to begin to prepare a working paper -- or rather, a catalogue of questions which must arise when making an attempt at indirect control of limitation of armaments by analysing budget statistics. Were our suggestion -- as we firmly hope -- to meet with a favourable and interested response, we should be prepared to submit such a working paper.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): First may I take this opportunity to express my thanks for the kind welcome given to me by you, Mr. Chairman, and other representatives both inside and outside the Conference? It is indeed a great honour for me to be associated with the members of this Committee in the vital task facing the international community today, namely general and complete disarmament; and it will be my privilege, on behalf of the delegation of India, to offer whatever contribution I can towards a speedy achievement of that objective.

Before I come to the main topic of my statement today, which is collateral measures, and particularly non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, I should like to make a few comments of a general nature.

The delegation of India views the prospect before us with confidence. It is true that, although we witnessed some important developments last year, particularly the signing of the partial nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), we have since been unable to achieve substantial progress in other fields towards the building of mutual confidence, arms control and disarmament.

That is indeed a valid reason for some disappointment to the international community. As far as we in the Committee are concerned, however, this lack of substantial progress need not dishearten us. The General Assembly of the United Nations has asked us to continue our negotiations "with energy and determination ... and in a spirit of goodwill and mutual accommodation" (A/RES/1908 (XVIII); ENDC/116). This Committee has been regarded generally as the most promising body so far entrusted with this task, and, if I may say so, the presence of the non-aligned nations in the Committee has been widely welcomed. We have no reason to deprecate ourselves as long as we continue to negotiate with determination and good will.

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Disarmament is not a matter which can be achieved overnight, as it were. It requires careful, detailed, patient and realistic negotiations. We must remember, first, the unprecedented nature of the world that we are negotiating to build -- a world without arms, a world of justice, progress and security. That cannot be achieved by one stroke, as was in effect proposed, for example, by China when it refused to sign the nuclear test ban treaty.

Secondly, the world we live in today is still bedevilled by fear, suspicion and distrust. The "cold war" and the political partisanship which it engenders are still with us. In that atmosphere one is apt to see more the pitfalls of a proposal than its virtues.

I repeat, therefore, that we need not be unduly disheartened at the lack of any substantial progress so far. The important thing is that we should continue to make a serious and constructive effort to negotiate what we are entrusted with. In doing so, we must always bear in mind that our endeavour should be to achieve a mutual building of confidence and a reduction of tension in ever-increasing measure, so that we are able to bring the present nuclear nightmare to an end and achieve general and complete disarmament as speedily as possible.

It is in this context -- that of the unprecedented nature of our objective and the existence of suspicions and distrust -- that the collateral measures we are discussing assume the highest significance.

I should like to describe our Tuesday meetings and Thursday meetings as the "long-term objective" meetings and the "short-term objective" meetings. I should not like the phrase "long-term objective" to be misunderstood. By it I mean the full and complete objective. The Indian delegation believes that general and complete disarmament is the most vital and the most urgent problem facing mankind today, and if we are to survive, our institutions are to survive and our civilization, as we know it, is to survive, we must achieve that objective quickly. It is only in a strictly relative sense, therefore, that I use the words "long-term" and "short-term".

On the question of our short-term objective, namely agreements on collateral measures, I should like to pose certain guiding principles.

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First, we are a negotiating body. We are neither the Disarmament Commission nor the United Nations. Therefore it is not desirable for us to assume the functions of those bodies. Our task is to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and to report periodically to the United Nations on the work done by us. That does not mean, of course, that all negotiations must necessarily be conducted and all agreements reached within the confines of this Committee. Even if we could stimulate by our discussions, our proposals and our suggestions serious bilateral or multilateral discussions on measures of disarmament, particularly in the context of the United Nations, we should be happy at such developments. In fact we should encourage such collateral negotiations. The Moscow test ban treaty is an example of a welcome development of that nature. We in the Committee have abundant reason to congratulate ourselves on the part we played in that consummation; and, if I may say so in parenthesis in all humility, so also has the Government of India, which has kept on pressing for it at all international gatherings since our Prime Minister first proposed it formally ten years ago.

Second, we should negotiate measures which would hasten general and complete disarmament. That is our ultimate goal and our urgent goal. We must view each step according to that criterion. That is why, among other things, we welcomed the nuclear test ban treaty and the agreement not to orbit or station in outer space nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117), for those are positive steps towards the achievement of a disarmed world.

Third, we should negotiate measures calculated to prevent developments -- unhealthy developments -- which would make our ultimate task much more difficult if not impossible. The delegation of India places great emphasis on this principle, although it is couched in negative phraseology. I referred earlier to the justified disappointment expressed in many parts of the world at the lack of progress in our Committee. I said, however, that we should not lose heart. But, while we are discussing problems of disarmament, there are some people who are possessed by the mad urge to have their own bomb. They would call it the "Asian bomb". It is our duty and the duty of the international community to endeavour to prevent this proliferation of nuclear weapons; otherwise the world will never forgive us.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

Fourth, we should negotiate measures which build up mutual confidence and trust. Unhappily, it is the absence of this quality in international relations which has so far proved a serious handicap to our efforts and to the efforts of the world community to achieve disarmament and security. We should therefore acclaim every step that leads to reduction of tension and to the building of confidence, whether it is taken in this Committee or elsewhere.

Talking of developments elsewhere, the Legal Sub-Committee of the Outer Space Committee is at present meeting in this building. We in India and other non-aligned countries have been pressing for a total demilitarization of outer space. It has not been possible so far to devise an agreed formulation of this principle, as the problem is complex, and we appreciate its complexity. At the same time, we hope that the present session of the Legal Sub-Committee will be able to achieve progress in that direction. As far as our Committee is concerned, for the time being, however, the adoption of some of the measures included in the lists before us will make a vital contribution in our quest for mutual confidence and trust.

My fifth and last principle proceeds from the difficulties of the present. We are still in the very initial stages of consideration of disarmament problems. We should therefore, at least in this initial stage, try to negotiate measures which do not require an onerous or complicated system of inspection and control. I hasten to add that we are all in favour of inspection and control. The Indian delegation has at all times regarded control and disarmament as being inseparable. Resolution 1378 (XIV) adopted general and complete disarmament under effective international control as our goal, and that has been reiterated several times. At the same time, a difficulty has arisen in regard to the relationship between the degree of control and the degree of disarmament. It appears to me, therefore, that in this initial stage in which we find ourselves today we should particularly favour those collateral measures which require inspection and control to a minimum or, at least, to an agreed level. I am of course referring to collateral measures and not to general and complete disarmament as such.

We have been referring to the three agreements which we have witnessed during the last year: the direct communication link between Washington and Moscow (ENDC/97), the partial test ban treaty, and the agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space. Those were three measures in which international inspection

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did not come into consideration. I think we could profit by that experience, which gave us fruitful results. We could perhaps for the time being select from the proposals made in President Johnson's message to the Committee (ENDC/120) and those contained in the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union (ENDC/123) such items as require less complicated measures of inspection, or such measures of inspection as are acceptable to the two sides.

It is therefore those five principles which I should like to commend to the Committee for its consideration. When we are discussing a particular measure we should view it, I think, in the light of those five criteria. We in India have over the years placed great emphasis on a nuclear test ban. In the earlier stages we did not get much support from the great Powers. Eventually, however, international public opinion had its way, at least partially. We pressed for a cessation of tests because of the intrinsic value of that measure. At the same time, it appears to me that the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty was in large measure due to the fact that it fulfilled the criteria suggested by me. First, we in this Committee made it possible by the constructive manner in which we discussed it, and we stimulated the negotiations which led to the signing of the treaty. Secondly, it is a significant step towards general and complete disarmament. Thirdly, it is a measure which restricts the development of new weapons of mass destruction and prevents the situation from getting worse. Fourthly, we are all aware of the entente, howsoever limited, that it has created among the great Powers. Finally, it avoided the problem of what degree of international inspection was to be acceptable.

We realize, of course, that the Moscow test ban treaty is only a partial treaty. It does not cover underground tests, but we hope that it will soon be extended to cover those tests as well. We hope also -- and in a way this is even more important -- that the treaty will be subscribed to by all countries, particularly by all non-nuclear countries.

I refer to the nuclear test ban treaty only as an illustration of the validity of the five criteria advanced by me. I do not propose to deal with it today in a substantive manner. I have, however, given some emphasis to it, as it is relevant to the main topic that I wish to discuss.

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The Indian delegation has already given its initial comments on many of the proposals before us, and I do not intend to make a general statement on them. For the purpose of this meeting I propose to confine myself to one item. This is item 5 in the United States list and item 6 in the Soviet list: non-proliferation, or non-dissemination, of nuclear weapons. I am doing so not so much because it is one of the items common to the two lists as because it is one of the most important issues facing us today. The non-aligned nations have stressed this aspect of disarmament time and again in the United Nations, and the Swedish and the Irish resolutions have been adopted in the General Assembly (A/RES/1665 (XVI); 1664 (XVI)).

Secondly, it is the next logical step after the nuclear test ban treaty. By subscribing to that treaty over a hundred nations have, by implication, renounced the manufacture of these evil weapons. I say "by implication" because the treaty does not specifically prohibit manufacture, acquisition, receipt or transference of these weapons. Again, Article IV of the treaty provides for the withdrawal of a party from the treaty if

> "... in exercising its national sovereignty ... it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country" (ENDC/100/Rev.1, p.3).

Nevertheless, the fact remains that over a hundred non-nuclear nations have by implication renounced the doubtful and disastrous status of becoming nuclear Powers. Among the non-nuclear nations it is principally only one country which stands in solitary defiance -- not desiring, to quote the preamble to the Treaty, "to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances" (ibid.)

Thirdly, it appears to me that an agreement to achieve non-proliferation of nuclear weapons meets the principles I put forward at the beginning of my statement as being conducive to concrete results. In particular I should like to emphasize the third point I made: that we should negotiate measures which would prevent developments inhibiting the achievement of general and complete disarmament. We may or may not be able to take steps immediately on some concrete measures of disarmament; but if we do not take now, or in the near future, steps which would prevent the situation from getting worse or which would make eventual realization of general and complete disarmament difficult, if not impossible, then we shall have really and truly failed -- failed not only for ourselves but for our succeeding generations.

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The Pugwash scientists, who met in Udaipur in India in January and February this year, devoted considerable attention to this problem. They felt that the next ten years or so were crucial. If things were allowed to slide during that period, without any check, the world would find itself in the position of having five, six or ten or "n" countries possessing nuclear weapons. This is a prospect too frightening to contemplate. War by mechanical failure, accident or miscalculation, or even by design, would then be more difficult to prevent, apart from the political, psychological and even blackmail repercussions of such a development. As the Soviet memorandum points out --

> "A widening of the circle of States possessing nuclear weapons would increase many times over the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. At the same time a widening of the circle of nuclear States would also make it much more difficult to solve the problem of disarmament". (ENDC/123, p.4)

As Mr. Fisher pointed out at our meeting on 5 March:

> "At present only a few countries can produce nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all the world that their number be not increased". (ENDC/PV.172, p.14)

That is the crux of the matter.

If we are unable to make much headway at present on the other issues which we are considering, we shall try and try again, and sooner or later we shall succeed. But, if we fail in our endeavour to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we may not get many chances to try; and even if we do try we shall have a smaller chance of succeeding.

The Indian delegation would therefore suggest that we take up seriously and realistically the question of formulating an agreement on this question. We have the advantage of previous discussions on the subject, both in this Committee and in the United Nations General Assembly. Sweden and Ireland have successfully moved resolutions in the General Assembly. We have before us resolutions 1380 (XIV), 1576 (XV), 1664 (XVI) and 1665 (XVI). It is possible for us, therefore, to proceed constructively towards an agreement. Our objective is clear. It is not healthy that there are nuclear weapons in the world, but it would be suicidal if more countries possessed them. It is this that we have to prevent.

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I believe that the basis of an acceptable agreement might be as follows. The four nuclear Powers should commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons or weapon technology, and the non-nuclear nations should pledge not to manufacture, possess or receive these weapons. Perhaps we could have a treaty similar to the partial nuclear test ban treaty which could be signed in the capitals of the nuclear Powers and which could be subscribed to by all countries.

I should like to quote at this stage from the final communiqué issued by the Pugwash scientists last month:

"In view of the continuing dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, we believe the following additional measures to be necessary:

(1) all nations presently possessing nuclear weapons should jointly undertake not to transfer these weapons or technical information relating to them to any other State or group of States;

(2) all nations not possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to produce such weapons or to acquire them or the special technical information necessary for their production; and

(3) the government of each of the nuclear Powers should take whatever measures may be open to it to prevent its nationals with experience in the field of nuclear-weapons technology from contributing to the development of the nuclear-weapons capacity of any foreign Power."

I should like to take this opportunity to refer to the question of inspection and control of production of nuclear weapons, and particularly to the extremely interesting statement made by the leader of the United States delegation last week (ENDC/PV.172, pp.14 et seq.). Earlier, on 31 August 1962, the United Kingdom delegation had submitted an exhaustive document (ENDC/60). The views expressed by the United Kingdom and the United States merit particular attention, as they deal with the basic problem of diverting atomic energy from military purposes to the pursuits of peace. It is a much wider problem than the one which I have taken as my theme today, but, as references have been made to it during the current session in the context of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, I thought I would indicate to the Committee the views of the Indian delegation.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

We all agree that the use of nuclear energy for production of weapons should be prohibited under international control and supervision. At the same time, it is not intended that checks should be placed on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. The "Atoms for Peace" programme holds great promise for the world, particularly for the developing nations. There is no doubt that atomic energy will play an increasing role in electric power generation; it is already competitive in many high-cost fuel areas, including those in the under-developed countries. We in India, for example, are going ahead with a modest nuclear power-station programme. We have received valuable assistance from the United States and Canada in our plans for construction of two power stations, one at Tarapur near Bombay and the other at Rana Pratap Sagar in Rajasthan. Our third station will be in the state of Madras. These power stations will make a significant contribution to our plans of economic development.

The first consideration we should bear in mind, therefore, is, as stated by Mr. Fisher (ENDC/PV.172, p.14), that an increasingly large number of countries have peaceful nuclear programmes and that it is in the interest of all that their number continue to increase. It would be running counter to this interest if we sought to establish a control which would operate only against the developing nations.

The second consideration is that we should control what we wish to prevent. We want to eliminate military use of atomic energy; we should therefore control plants which produce fissile material. For example, as the United Kingdom paper has indicated, it is not really feasible to institute a control on uranium ore right from the mining stage. In any case the uranium mines, the plants for fabrication of fuel elements, and the reactors are not in themselves a military danger. They do not promote any military purpose unless they are coupled with plants and facilities for the fabrication of fissile material into weapons; and it is these facilities which have to be eliminated. It is the chemical-separation and gaseous-diffusion plants which have to be safeguarded in order to ensure that the materials produced in them are not used for military purposes. When, therefore, we come to the question of stopping production of nuclear weapons, what we shall need to do is to institute a system of international inspection of all plants for the extraction of plutonium, and all gaseous-diffusion plants. The Indian delegation believes that it is possible to devise a system dependent on the

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control and inspection of chemical separation plants and isotype separation plants for uranium-235, which will prevent any country from making weapons in any significant manner.

In his statement last Thursday (ibid.), Mr. Fisher referred to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have always been of the view that enriched uranium and plutonium should be supplied under adequate safeguards to ensure that they are used only for peaceful purposes. At the same time, we do not think that such safeguards should be attached to equipment and devices which in themselves serve no military purpose. Moreover, we believe that extension of the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as at present established, to equipment and devices which serve a peaceful purpose would widen the gap between the developed countries and the under-developed countries, as it would operate only in respect of the under-developed countries.

We welcome the stress placed by Mr. Fisher on the first two considerations mentioned in the fifth point of President Johnson's message to our Committee. We have also heard with great attention Mr. Fisher's account of the substantial assistance that the United States has given to many countries in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy; and we welcome the decision of the United States Government to place the Yankee reactor under the International Atomic Energy Agency system of safeguards. India has always supported the system of international safeguards, and believes that this system should be based on certain objective criteria which should apply to all countries and to all reactors. I am sure that most of us would deplore a situation in which the nuclear power projects in the developed countries would be exempted from being brought under the Agency's system of safeguards. For example, we would favour the International Atomic Energy Agency recognizing EURATOM, so that agreement could be reached whereby projects in which EURATOM participates could be brought under the international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

As the Committee is aware, the International Atomic Energy Agency is considering these issues, and, as I said earlier, they form a much broader aspect of disarmament. Therefore I do not wish to go here, at this stage, into greater detail, except to repeat that the key to the safeguards problem is the safeguarding

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

of gaseous-diffusion plants, centrifuge plants and chemical reprocessing plants, and not the imposition of control on mines, fuel fabrication facilities, or atomic power stations, particularly as at the moment we are discussing not the question of dismantling the nuclear weapon apparatus of the present nuclear Powers but that of preventing manufacture of weapons by non-nuclear nations.

Coming back to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we believe that a constructive step may be to formulate an international instrument like the nuclear test ban treaty in the light of ideas expressed in the Swedish and Irish resolutions in the United Nations. That would be a beginning, and a good beginning. Other steps towards perfecting the system can follow.

Mr. LOBODYCZ (Poland): At our last meeting devoted to the discussion of collateral measures my predecessor, Mr. Blusztajn, explained (ENDC/PV.172, pp.6 et seq.) the position of the Polish delegation with regard to the proposal for a reduction of military budgets (ENDC/123). I beg to state at the outset of my intervention that the arguments advanced by the Western delegations have not changed our sincere belief that this proposal offers, at the present stage of our deliberations, a chance of an early understanding -- be it in the form of an appeal to other countries for unilateral cuts in their military expenditures, or in the form of a binding international agreement on the reduction of military budgets by a determined percentage, or -- as we consider most advisable -- in both such forms.

If in my maiden speech in this Committee I venture to revert to the same subject, I do so only because the very interesting statement by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns (ENDC/PV.172, pp. 9 et seq.), has prompted my delegation to make a few additional comments. I do so all the more gladly since I see in that statement what could be considered a noteworthy attempt by one of the Western delegations to enter into a businesslike dialogue on the question of military budgets. Today the representative of Sweden brought up the same topic. We listened with interest to his remarks.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

We noted with particular satisfaction Mr. Burns's view that restriction of military expenditures is the sort of action which helps to create a good climate in which to negotiate disarmament. We also agree with the representative of Canada that the policy of mutual example has its limits and that international agreements carry more weight. That is precisely why we regard an appeal for unilateral budgetary cuts not as an end in itself but merely as an initial, preparatory step towards an international treaty.

In regard to the doubts expressed here about whether an international agreement entered into by States to reduce their military spending by an agreed percentage would give us confidence that the arms race had been permanently stopped, we do not challenge Mr. Burns's opinion (ibid., p.10) that any such agreement might not halt the armament race for ever. I should have thought there was a general consensus that such could be guaranteed only through general and complete disarmament. As far as collateral measures are concerned -- and the reduction of military budgets is one of them --, they pursue a more limited goal, that of slowing down the arms race.

I may be excused for reminding the members of this Committee that the partial nuclear test ban treaty has not permanently stopped the arms race either; yet none of us here has ever questioned its world-wide importance and its impact on the pattern of international relations.

Parial or collateral measures also create a good climate in which to negotiate disarmament. I think it is a fair assumption that this view is also shared by the United Nations, and I should consider it entirely superfluous to circulate a special questionnaire to this effect.

Another doubt has been expressed here: whether an international agreement under which all States would assume a formal obligation to reduce their military expenditures would be a significant or practicable collateral measure. We are deeply convinced that there should be no doubt in that respect. It is common knowledge that a military budget, roughly speaking, includes the following main categories of expenditure: military personnel, procurement, operation and maintenance of armaments, research and development. I humbly apologize to Mr. Burns and other experts present in this hall for stating the obvious; but it seems to us that a reduction of any military budget, if it is substantial enough, must affect one,

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

two or all of the aforementioned components. Thus the parties would be assured that the obligations to reduce budgets really meant fewer weapons coming off production lines, or fewer weapons deployed in the field, fewer men under arms, or even fewer of everything. As a result the military potential would have to be reduced.

It is not essential, I submit, in this particular case to know in concrete terms how many fewer soldiers, tanks, aircraft and missiles this might mean; for, if we had to consider this aspect of the issue, we should immediately and unavoidably face the same obstacles as we encounter whenever we embark on a discussion concerning the reduction of armed forces and armaments. We should be confronted with the very difficulties we are trying to avoid. That is why we suggest leaving to the States full freedom to reduce those elements of their military structure which they themselves consider appropriate. It goes without saying that in doing so the governments will take into account requirements of national security and, in particular, of military balance, to which the Western Powers attach an overriding importance.

The differences in the accounting procedures, pricing methods and currency values of the various countries could perhaps be of some consequence only in cases of budgetary reductions by specific amounts of money, in absolute figures, say in dollars or roubles. Those differences, however, could hardly be of any consequence when we consider a percentage reduction of military budgets.

In short, what we have in mind is cutting down further, and to a more substantial degree, those expenditures which already have been reduced by some Powers unilaterally, irrespective of differences in their economic structures. Indeed, it is hard to agree that what it was possible to carry out unilaterally presents suddenly a problem hard to solve once it is suggested that it should acquire the form of an international agreement.

I, for one, see no need for a detailed analysis of the structures of military budgets. The sad experience of the Expert Committee of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference (CONF.D. 158) provided, I believe, a convincing proof of how futile such studies can be. What is the use of working out a uniform budgetary scheme for all States, which in any case is hardly a feasible task? We are interested purely and simply in the reduction of budgets without interference with the sovereign rights of governments to establish the structure and internal proportions of their military expenditures.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

When we spoke on Thursday, 5 March (ENDC/PV.172, p.6), in favour of a thorough examination of the problem of the reduction of military budgets, we did not have in view sterile technical debates. What we really meant -- and I think there was no basis for a misunderstanding -- was the actual drafting of an agreement, including ways and means for implementation of budgetary cuts, as well as methods of control over the observance of the commitments undertaken. We do not have in mind a declaratory arrangement, as has been suggested by some Western delegations; we have in mind a mandatory and verifiable international obligation. We realize, however, that this may become possible only when the Western Powers are ready and willing to adopt the necessary political decision.

I hope that my explanations are relevant to the remarks of the representative of Sweden as well.

In conclusion, permit me to reiterate that the Polish delegation does not underestimate the importance of other collateral measures. We regard the present time as propitious for concentrating on the reduction of military budgets, because we feel that such a measure is ripe for agreement and relatively simple of implementation.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia): At the outset of my statement today I should like to express the regret of the Czechoslovak delegation that the informal meeting on Monday, which had been convened in an attempt to surmount the difficulties about the fixing of an agenda for the consideration of collateral measures, failed to achieve positive results. It has been proved again that our colleagues of the Western countries continue to be opposed to an agreement on determining the order of discussion of individual collateral measures, and that they demand that we should go on with the general debate. We believe that our talks here will not benefit if we evade the fact that, owing to the attitude taken by the delegations of the Western Powers, we have not been able to agree on the order of discussion of specific questions after two months of deliberations. Our partners of the delegations of the States members of NATO, for reasons unknown to us, do not even see the possibility of examining certain questions, although it has been stated here repeatedly that consent to discuss a specific problem naturally is not equivalent to agreeing to a solution which might be proposed for such a problem.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

We strongly believe that the general debate has been going on for sufficiently long. It is now necessary to embark upon actual consideration of individual proposals. After all, that has been stressed by the majority of the delegations in this Committee, and that is what the world public expects from us. That is even more true because, in our view, there exists already a suitable basis for agreement: parallel consideration of the proposal for the reduction of military budgets and of that for the adoption of measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the Soviet delegation (ENDC/123).

As far as the proposal for the reduction of military budgets is concerned, the course of our past discussions has confirmed that that question is in the foreground of interest and attention. That fact again proves that the majority of the delegations realize and recognize the importance and significance of such a measure, because the reduction of military budgets would lead to a slowing-down of the armament race and thus to strengthening confidence among States. It would be of considerable significance from the point of view of the economic interests and needs of all States and from the point of view of utilizing for the benefit of humanity those means which are allocated to armament at the present time. The two proposals submitted by the Soviet delegation represent a suitable basis for starting a business-like consideration of this item and reaching the objectives we have mentioned. Likewise valuable are the suggestions contained in the working paper submitted by the delegation of Brazil (ENDC/126).

The Western delegations have raised all kinds of objections to the consideration of the proposal for the reduction of military budgets. They refer, amongst other things, to difficulties of a constitutional nature. They raise objections concerning the efficacy of the reduction of military budgets in slackening the armament race. They question the possibilities of control of such a measure, and point to allegedly complicated technical details and implications which would be involved. However, the delegation of Czechoslovakia, like the delegations of the other socialist countries, does not regard their objections as being well-founded and convincing. Their baseless and artificially-constructed objections have been refuted in a number of statements by the socialist delegations at our past meetings, and again in the very apt statement today by the representative of Poland.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

The objections on the part of the Western delegations, in particular the objection that the reduction of military expenditures would not constitute an effective step for slowing down the armament race, have no justification. In order to understand the significance of such a reduction, we must look at the role that military expenditures play today in the preparations of States for potential war.

Under present conditions, military budgets and their upward trend are directly linked with military technology, which is being constantly perfected. Because of the well-known specific features of a potential global thermonuclear war, the weight of its preparation is being shifted, unlike in past wars, to the time preceding its start. The outcome of such a war would be decided by those material means which would have been accumulated in the time preceding its outbreak. The scope of military expenditures of States in time of peace predetermines in considerable measure the extent of the military potential and thus has a bearing on the result of a potential war. That is why the entire military machines of States are constantly maintained, at least as far as the great Powers are concerned, at tremendous financial cost, practically at the level necessary for war purposes.

The reduction of military expenditures would therefore necessarily lead to a certain slowing down of feverish armament, and might considerably affect the future development of military build-up and the perfecting of military technology in all countries. It would result in a restriction of the military potentials of States, would reduce the danger of an outbreak of war, and would create conditions favourable to general and complete disarmament. At the same time, in the present situation, such steps would not affect the balance of forces of States in any way and would not upset the present military balance, which has been evoked on many occasions by the delegations of member States of NATO represented in our Committee.

Therefore we believe that the question of reducing military budgets provides realistic possibilities for achieving positive results in our work, inasmuch as it is a problem holding promise of being solved relatively easily. Willingness to start solving it may rightly be regarded as a criterion of the attitude of an individual country towards disarmament.

Another question which we regard as being suitable for consideration, besides the question of military budgets, is the adoption of effective steps to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons. The socialist delegations have already

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

had the opportunity of expressing their views on this issue. Its importance was underlined this morning by the representative of India also. The socialist delegations have likewise drawn attention to the fact that plans to create a so-called multilateral force within NATO stand in the way of reaching an effective agreement in this matter. It is generally known that this is a means by which the West German military circles wish to gain access to control -- at the beginning, at least partial -- over nuclear weapons.

We are very much surprised at the attitude of the Western Powers, which have proclaimed on the one hand that they want to prevent a further dissemination of nuclear weapons, while on the other hand they speed up the creation of the multilateral nuclear force. That is attested to by, inter alia, reports that the nucleus of the NATO surface nuclear force is to be established in the form of a United States destroyer with a mixed crew by the end of this year. The West German Army will also supply men for the crew.

Recently we have been witnessing other dangerous facts which we cannot pass over in silence, try as we may. The representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, relying on their position as the most powerful West European military Power in NATO, demand ever more openly to have the decisive say in various commanding bodies of that military alignment. Here we have in mind in particular the proposal made by the former chief of the NATO Military Committee, General Heusinger, to be discussed very soon within NATO, calling for a reorganization of the NATO Standing Group, which is, to quote The New York Times of 2 March 1964, "responsible for the highest strategic guidance of the 15-nation alliance's forces". That body, thus far composed of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, should be "reorganized" -- that is, expanded and headed by a chief of staff and director in the person of a West German major-general.

A very serious question arises in this connexion: do the Western Powers realize that NATO is thus ever more rapidly and openly being subordinated to the interests of West German military circles? Is it not clear as well that those who have such influence, and who are being given an ever more decisive word in NATO today, will have it also in regard to the command of the multilateral force which is being established?

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

The correctness of this conclusion is confirmed by the well-known United States publicist and author Mr. Henry Kissinger, who wrote last year -- and I quote from Wehrkunde, May 1963:

"... the NATO multilateral nuclear force ... will not stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons; it might even accelerate it. It not only will not prevent West Germany from gaining possession of nuclear weapons, but neither will it satisfy for a longer time any desire existing in Germany to gain a more significant voice in nuclear matters ..."

Therefore, as Mr. Kissinger goes on to say, the multilateral force will be only a transitional stage for the Federal Republic of Germany and, --

"after all, might become the easiest way which would get Germany into the centre of serious nuclear business".

It is therefore hardly convincing to allege that the project for the NATO multilateral force does not contradict the demand for adopting really effective measures to prevent a further dissemination of nuclear weapons. How is it possible that the Western Powers assure us on the one hand of their readiness to halt further dissemination of nuclear weapons, and on the other hand pursue a policy which directly invites certain circles in West Germany to continue their efforts for a nuclear build-up, and even create for them the best possible conditions in this respect?

The interests of peace and security of nations call for determined steps to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons to other countries in any form, and especially to prevent their getting into the hands of the West German militarists. It is even more necessary because they again openly confirmed in 1963 that they were making efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. It was clearly stated in the "Study on Reorganization of the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Future Role of Armed Forces" which was made public by the spokesman of the Government of the German Democratic Republic at a press conference in Berlin on 27 February 1964. That study again called nuclear weapons "a symbol of the sovereignty of a State" and a means which would serve as a basis for implementing the designs of West German revenge-seekers.

The nuclear obsession of the military circles in the Federal Republic of Germany finds its reflection also in the fact that, apart from its continued co-operation with France in the fields of nuclear weapon research, the Federal Republic of Germany has recently been very active in its own research and production of rockets. Despite

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all denials by Government circles of the Federal Republic of Germany, it remains an unrefuted fact that there are about fifty scientific institutes in the Federal Republic of Germany, financed by the Government, which meet the demands of the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and proceed with their work connected with rocket research and manufacture. In connexion with the testing of rockets in the Federal Republic of Germany, a spokesman of the concern which produced the rockets said:

"the rockets, supposedly designed for weather research, were adaptable for military purposes and could be fitted with nuclear warheads!"

(New York Herald Tribune, 25 February 1964).

The position and the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which are supported by the position of the representatives of the Western Powers, today complicate the reaching of agreement not only on the question of measures to be taken to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons, but also on the question of concluding a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the establishment of denuclearized zones, withdrawal of foreign troops, reduction of military budgets, and other questions. They will give rise to ever greater difficulties in the future in nuclear disarmament in general.

If the representatives of the Western Powers really wish to facilitate the reaching of agreement on general and complete disarmament and prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons, they must realize that, as in the past, the policy of concessions to the demands of German militarism cannot but lead to quite opposite consequences. Such a policy cannot in the end lead to anything but an increased danger of a nuclear conflict and thus to a serious threat to the interests of peace and security in the entire world. The Western Powers should be aware of this in their own interest.

Those were the reasons for which the Czechoslovak delegation found it necessary to draw attention once again to the grave consequences inherent in the plan for establishing a multilateral nuclear force. That is why the Czechoslovak delegation calls upon the Western Powers finally to express themselves in favour of adopting measures in the field of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons that would be really effective and that would include a prohibition on handing over such weapons to other countries indirectly, through military groupings and pacts.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I listened with great interest to the speeches of all the representatives who have preceded me. I was particularly interested in the remarks of the representative of India, inasmuch as they dealt with a subject to which we from the United States have also referred quite recently in this Conference. I think it would be premature for me now to attempt to comment on those remarks, except to say that I will study them very carefully and hope to comment on them later, both privately and in the Conference. I found them very interesting.

I listened with great interest also to the remarks of the representative of Sweden.

Today I should like, for my own part, to discuss further some of the aspects of the second point of President Johnson's message to the Conference (ENDC/120). It will be recalled that the second point relates to a verified freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles, both offensive and defensive. That verified freeze, together with the third point, relating to a halt in the production of fissionable materials for weapon uses, would go far towards curbing the nuclear arms race. In setting forth the second point of his programme President Johnson said:

> "Second, while we continue our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, we must first endeavor to halt further increases in strategic armaments now. The United States, the Soviet Union and their respective Allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. For our part, we are convinced that the security of all nations can be safeguarded within the scope of such an agreement and that this initial measure preventing the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels." (ENDC/120)

My remarks today are intended to clarify further some of the points regarding the freeze in the light of the comments made by other delegations to this Conference.

My Soviet colleague and co-Chairman has characterized the verified freeze as not being disarmament. He has done so on the basis that it involves holding the number and characteristics of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear vehicles at

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a stated level. Now, it is true that the purpose of the freeze is to fix the numbers and characteristics at the level existing when the agreement goes into effect, in order that there be no significant increases. But the argument that such an effort does not represent disarmament, with the greatest respect to my colleague, I must say seems to me to be merely one of semantics: it seems to me to be merely playing with words.

When and if it is adopted, the freeze will have the result that the number of strategic nuclear vehicles on this earth five, ten or twenty-five years from now will be substantially less than would otherwise be the case. The fact that armaments will increase enormously in future years without a freeze is just as certain as the fact that an enormous destructive capacity exists now. The prevention of such an increase as well as the prevention of the increase in the amount of fissionable material for weapon use is therefore an integral part of the disarmament process.

Surely that would be disarmament in the most meaningful sense of the word; for one of our most important tasks is to see that in future years the number of armaments on this earth is less than might otherwise be the case. As President Johnson and my predecessor, Mr. Foster, have made clear, there could be no better way to begin this process than to stop now and then turn around.

Let us look also for a moment at the agreements we have already reached in our efforts here and elsewhere. First, of course, there was the Antarctic Treaty, then the partial test ban treaty, and then the resolution on refraining from orbiting nuclear weapons in outer space. The philosophy behind each one of these was to freeze the arms race at a point in time. In the Antarctic and outer space measures we were freezing armaments at the zero level, as no weapons existed there. But they are, none the less, significant steps.

Under the limited test ban which we worked out last year (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the philosophy of a freeze was carried into the area of the most destructive weapons. It is only logical now that we should try to build on that formula, which has shown an element of success in our past efforts. There is no contention, as I understand it, from my Soviet colleague that the freeze will not deal with important weapons. There is also no contention, as I understand it, that the Soviet Union itself, in the absence

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of an agreement, is not pursuing an on-going programme of constructing new and larger numbers of weapons in this field. On both sides, then, the freeze would represent a very major effort at curbing and controlloing the arms race with very significant results regarding the number of weapons we might otherwise expect to find on this planet in future years.

That brings me to my second point. The representative of the Soviet Union intimated at our meeting last Tuesday that my predecessor was trying to frighten the Commmittee by relating certain facts about the military plans of the United States in the absence of any agreement on the freeze or general disarmament (ENDC/PV.173, p.29) Now let me emphasize, first of all, that there was no intention to frighten anyone. We live in a real world, and in the absence of disarmament we must face the fact of increasing arms. It was not our intention to frighten the world or the participants in this Conference any more than it was Chairman Khrushchev's when he spoke -- perhaps in somewhat more picturesque language than Mr. Foster used -- of having seen missiles coming out of rocket factories like sausages out of a sausage machine (ENDC/PV.170, p.47; A/PV.900, para. 189). I do not think he intended to frighten us, and I say this in a most respectful spirit. I think he was merely stating a fact --- a fact that we all have to live with.

Secondly, the figures which Mr. Foster provided (ENDC/PV.170, p.48) were clearly designed to indicate the real importance that a freeze would have in respect of the future military plans of the United States. We believe that our plans are not unmatched on the Soviet side, and therefore undoubtedly the significance of the freeze proposal is even larger than the impression created by the figures used by Mr. Foster.

Thirdly, it seems to us that we must all be aware of the direction in which the world is going in the absence of any agreement here. These figures are important facts about that world, and we must learn to face those facts and recognize them in our work here. Our efforts here concern a real world of armaments; our efforts will be successful only when we begin to face that world and the realities which it imposes upon us.

Our Soviet colleague made several statements at our meeting of 3 March concerning anti-missile systems and Polaris-equipped submarines (ENDC/PV.171, pp.27,28). With

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

regard to the former, he indicated that in his view those weapon systems were intrinsically defensive, while with regard to the latter he indicated that in his view they were intrinsically offensive. On the basis of these claims he stated his view that each of these systems should, if I understood him correctly, receive separate treatment, in accordance with his characterizations, in a plan of general and complete disarmament. The systems which he called offensive he implied should be eliminated at a very early stage; the systems which he called defensive he indicated, in his view, should be retained until quite late in the process.

I should like to deal with that distinction insofar as it is germane to the problem of the freeze which we are now discussing. I should like to deal first with the question of anti-missile systems. In fact, I am afraid the day has passed when any country can rely solely on purely defensive weapons to defend itself against an attack. In the present situation the security of a nation depends to an increasingly large degree on its ability to deter an attack. This is not a happy situation, that we should have to depend on what Mr. Nehru described as "the threat of nuclear blows and counter-blows" (ENDC/PV.167, p.21) to maintain the peace in the world at present. But we must all face the facts as squarely as did Mr. Nehru when he said:

> "... we recognize that the situation today is such that the retention of some kind of deterrent has become more or less unavoidable." (ibid.)

I am afraid, therefore, that I cannot agree with Mr. Tsarapkin's characterization at our 171st meeting of anti-missile systems as being purely defensive. In this context anti-ballistic missile systems are no longer purely defensive; they become part of the balance on which our stability and peace now depend. Any freeze imposed on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles must be equally applicable also to anti-ballistic missile systems. If it were not, it would be destabilizing and would not be helpful to peace.

Many of the same considerations apply to the Polaris submarine or, for that matter, to any submarine capable of firing a nuclear missile. The fact that such a submarine can operate under water and hence is not visible or vulnerable does not make it any more an "offensive" weapon than any other delivery system which can deliver nuclear explosives to the heartland of another country. The Polaris missile system

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is one designed primarily as a second-strike weapon -- that is, one which could be used in retaliation. In the light of the present balance, I find it hard to accept a characterization that such a missile is more offensive than any other.

I have dealt with the comments of my Soviet colleague and co-Chairman not in a spirit of contention -- for I do not believe that would advance our work here -- but with the thought that only by discussing those areas where we appear to differ can we see whether or not we really differ and work towards an agreement. I think that is very important particularly in the area of the freeze, because a verified freeze could do a great deal to curb the continuing arms race in strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. As Mr. Foster pointed out on 31 January, a verified freeze would also --

> "... inhibit development of costly, new and more destructive weapon systems; it would be an accomplishment far beyond any 'confidence building' measure in significance, yet one that could be achieved in a reasonable period of time; it would lay a firm basis for the achievement of the balanced reductions contemplated in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5); ...
> it would permit significant reduction of military expenditures; it would help to reduce tensions and accelerate the forward movement towards general disarmament." (ENDC/PV.162, p.20)

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): First of all I, too, should like to express my delegation's regret that our two co-Chairmen have been unable to agree on the agenda. Regrettable though this may be, I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that our Thursday meetings are coming to be devoted to a large extent to the problem of the reduction of military budgets. While I am far from underestimating the importance and timeliness of the other collateral measures we are negotiating, I should be tempted to add that this problem of reducing military budgets has assumed prominence quite naturally because of its intrinsic importance. I should like today to expound our delegation's views on the reduction of military budgets, and particularly on certain concrete questions which have arisen during our Committee's negotiations.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

In regard to military budgets, I should like to remind you of a well-known anecdote. King Louis XII having one day asked one of his advisers what he needed to wage a war, the latter replied: "Your Majestry, to wage a war you need three things -- money, money, and more money". The technique of armaments has changed since then. Instead of arquebuses and cross-bows, military arsenals now contain nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles. But today, even more than in the time of Louis XII, money is needed to wage a war. Armaments and armed forces cost money, much more money than in the past. This means that a reduction in military expenditure is a way of combating the arms race, a step on the right road, the road to disarmament.

That is self-evident, and that is precisely why the idea of reducing military budgets is whole-heartedly supported by all the peoples of the world. That is also why most members of our Committee are in favour of this idea, as was rightly stressed at our 172nd meeting.

I do not intend today to go into the details of the problems involved in a reduction of military budgets. I only wish to examine certain objections raised with regard to the consequences of the adoption of this idea and its implementation.

At the last meeting it was stated, for example, that if the right degree of mutual confidence could be achieved it would be possible to take further steps in this field, and that this example would be followed by other States. As I see it, that means that, to reduce military budgets, there must first of all be a high degree of confidence between States; in other words, so long as distrust prevails, military budgets cannot be reduced. I think that this approach will lead us inevitably into a vicious circle: States will not reduce their military budgets because they do not trust each other; and they cannot trust one another because the arms race continues and military budgets have not been reduced.

However, it seems to me that we are all agreed that, until general and complete disarmament becomes a reality, and in order to prepare for it, we must nevertheless do something to combat the arms race, make progress along the road to disarmament, and enlarge the area of agreement initiated by the Moscow Treaty. It is precisely from that aspect that a reduction in military budgets has particular advantages. It raises no problems of maintenance of the balance of forces, it creates no unilateral advantages, it involves no risk to anyone, and it benefits all.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

What is more, once the idea of a reduction in military budgets has been accepted, it will greatly help to promote confidence between States, not to speak of its obvious economic advantages. According to Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States --

"The cost of a supersonic fighter squadron is of the order of magnitude that could build and maintain a university in a developing country". (Department of State Bulletin, 20 January 1964, p.86, from Mr. Rusk's press conference of 2 January 1964)

Moreover, the example of the military budget reductions unilaterally announced by the Soviet Union and the United States shows that we must and can break out of this vicious circle and enter on the path of a reduction in military budgets without waiting for mutual confidence to descend on governments like manna from heaven merely as a result of wishful thinking and verbal affirmations and regardless of the practical basis of mutual trust.

Secondly, certain Western delegations have said that an international agreement on reducing military budgets by an agreed percentage would not necessarily ensure that the arms race would come to a permanent halt. Only one thing can guarantee the end, once and for all, of the arms race, and that is general and complete disarmament. If that is an objection to a reduction in military budgets, it applies equally to all proposals for collateral measures, including all those proposed by the Western delegations here, from the freeze in delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons to the non-dissemination of those weapons. No collateral measure can of itself guarantee the end, once and for all, of the arms race; for its role -- as we know very well -- is to pave the way for disarmament, which of course is also true of a reduction in military budgets.

It is also alleged, as an objection against a reduction in military expenditure, that military budgets are an effect and not a cause of disarmament. Clearly, if general and complete disarmament takes place, the elimination of military budgets will follow. Conversely, without military budgets -- that is, if no more funds are allotted for military purposes -- general and complete disarmament is bound to take place.

But, of course, certain reductions can be made in military expenditure without necessarily leading to disarmament: for instance, if an expensive and obsolete

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weapon is replaced by one which is cheaper and more destructive. The United States itself provides us with an example of this: the older Atlas and Titan missiles are being replaced by the new Minuteman missile, the maintenance cost of which is said to be one-tenth of that of the other two. Similarly, certain steps could be represented as constituting disarmament but would nevertheless not prevent an increase in military expenditure, such as a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles accompanied by an increase in production of tactical nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

In reality, a reduction in military expenditure can be both an effect and a cause of disarmament. In both cases a reduction in military expenditure, whether by mutual example or by the conclusion of a multilateral agreement, would benefit international relationships, the cause of disarmament, and the peoples of the world.

Indeed here, as in the case of the relationship between mutual confidence and disarmament, or rather between the settlement of disputes and disarmament, no useful purpose is served by asking which is cause and which is effect. In certain circumstances, such measures could be the effect of disarmament; in others, they could be the cause. For instance, mutual confidence between States would facilitate disarmament and vice versa. I would remind you that a collateral measure is by its very nature designed to facilitate the cause of disarmament.

It has also been stated here that, before accepting the idea of a reduction in military budgets, we should follow the example of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference (CONF.D.158) and appoint a body of experts to

> "... examine in detail how the military budgets of various States are in fact composed -- what constitutes military expenditures, how those expenditures are carried in the national budgets of various States, and whether agreed budgetary limitations could be verified in practice".
> (ENDC/PV.172, p.11)

It will be remembered that that was suggested by Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada. I hope our colleague, whose competence and experience we fully appreciate, will not ask us at a time when we must follow a good example -- that is, the reduction of military budgets by the two great nuclear Powers -- to follow a bad example, that of the League of Nations, which, as has already been stated here, allowed the whole idea of disarmament, including a reduction in military budgets, to become bogged down in the sterile activities of numerous committees and sub-committees of experts.

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It has also been maintained that States, in order to reduce their military budgets, must know the exact terms of other States' budgetary reductions -- in other words, how many fewer soldiers, tanks, aircraft and missiles there would be as a result of a reduction in military budgets. That would of course entail among other drawbacks, that of having to control the reduction in military budgets.

In addition, I should like to point out that this would cause a certain confusion between the nature of a reduction in military budgets -- which is an indirect measure of disarmament -- and that of direct measures of disarmament. One of the merits of the proposal that States should reduce their military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent (ENDC/123) is that it would leave each government free to decide what degree of reduction to apply to its armed forces, nuclear weapons, and so forth, and to determine the proportion of each element of its defence system. This freedom of each government to decide how best to implement the reduction would ensure that this measure would in no case endanger the security of a State, or modify the relationship between the various forces to an extent other than that accepted by the State itself.

We listened today with great interest to the Swedish representative's ideas on this subject, and shall study them carefully.

It has also been said here that, before beginning to reduce military expenditure, we must settle outstanding international disputes. It has rightly been pointed out, however, that, as long as there are relations between States, differences are bound to arise between them, and that military budgets will never be reduced if the existence of international disputes constitutes an obstacle to such a measure.

We might add here, and all delegations are agreed on this, that the arms race is a disease of international life. From this point of view a reduction in military budgets is a medicine. It is certainly not a complete remedy or a panacea, but it is still a medicine. What should we say if patients were to lay down conditions before consenting to take their medicine?

Some delegations have raised objections of a constitutional nature. We have been told that the United States could never enter into an agreement on reducing military budgets, because only Congress can take such decisions. Here we can only associate ourselves with the views expressed by the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro:

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"I do not think that in this case there will be any difficulties which cannot be overcome again ..." (ENDC/PV.172, p.45)

As I have already said, our delegation regards it as an encouraging sign that, in the debate on collateral measures, attention should have been concentrated on the question of reducing military budgets. In our view we could reach an agreement on this subject without too much discussion. Clearly a reduction in military budgets -- and proposals have been made here about their quantum -- would, apart from its immediate and beneficial economic and social effects, exert a beneficial influence on the international situation as a whole. How else can we interpret these proposals than as a recognition that the arms race will not necessarily inevitably accelerate and that, in consequence, a reduction of military budgets can pave the way for general and complete disarmament?

If those are the prospects which would be opened up by an agreement in this field, let us give a little thought to the other hypothesis. What would be the practical repercussions of a failure of our negotiations on this subject? Need we dwell on the consequences of such a failure? Must we once more demonstrate the deplorable effects it would have on the international situation? I consider that our negotiations throw into prominence the importance and urgency of a reduction in military expenditure. In this connexion I should like to stress the great importance we attach to the proposal made here that an appeal should be issued to governments to reduce their military budgets.

In conclusion, I have only one thing to say: Let each of us endeavour to understand fully the implications of the alternative I have just mentioned, and to draw the appropriate conclusions.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I should like now to address the Committee in my capacity as representative of Canada.

The Canadian delegation has listened with particular attention to the remarks of the representatives of Sweden, Poland and Romania on the question of budgetary reductions. At this point I would merely say that the Canadian delegation will study those remarks and will probably at some later date have some further comments to make on that subject.

(The Chairman, Canada)

The Canadian delegation was particularly interested also in what the representative of India said about the control of atomic energy, in the context of the non-proliferation of weapons. The main part of my statement today -- which, I should like to reassure the Committee, is not going to be a very long one, in view of the lateness of the hour -- deals with that question of the control of atomic energy.

I should like to make a few observations about the decision of the United States Government, as announced by the United States delegation in this Committee on 5 March, to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguard system to a power reactor located at Rowe, Massachusetts (ENDC/PV.172, p.17). This offer has aroused keen international interest, not least on the part of my Government. If I correctly understand the motivation behind the proposal, it is that inspection of an operating power reactor will provide valuable experience for the IAEA in developing teams of inspectors, thereby contributing to that Agency's ability and competence in fulfilling the safeguard functions envisaged in its Statute. It may also demonstrate that inspection of an operating power reactor is feasible in practice and does not entail undue inconvenience for the operator.

One of the important aspects of the United States proposals, as we understand them, is that they would involve the progressive acceptance by the atomically most developed countries of a safeguard system which until now has been applied only to countries in receipt of assistence in this field.

We are gratified that the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has until recently been equipped to deal only with small reactors of up to 100 thermal megawatts, decided to few weeks ago to extend its safeguard system to large reactors of the kind now coming into increasing use all over the world for the generation of electric power. My Government took considerable satisfaction from the fact that the Agency's decision to do this was adopted unanimously by its Board of Governors. That is surely evidence of an increasing awareness on the part of the world community of the need to bring the peaceful nuclear activities of States under appropriate international inspection.

My Government believes that the International Atomic Energy Agency is making significant progress in this desirable direction. I suggest that this Committee may wish to consider more closely in future the ways in which the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency can contribute to the objectives we are seeking to reach in the broad field of disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The discussion which has taken place on the Soviet Union's proposal for a reduction in the military budgets of States (ENDC/123) has confirmed that the overwhelming majority in the Committee consider that the achievement of an agreement on this matter and the putting of this agreement into effect would be of great significance for the cause of peace.

Only the representatives of the Western Powers are restraining the Committee from drawing up a concrete agreement in this regard on the basis of the Soviet proposal. The battery of arguments to which the Western representatives have recourse is extremely poor. They boil down to general phrases without weight or substance. It is impossible, for instance, to take seriously the assertion which the representatives of the Western Powers keep repeating from one meeting to another that a decision by the Committee on reduction of military budgets would be "premature". If such an assertion means anything, it only means that the Western Powers consider it premature to put an end to the armaments race.

The statement of the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, at last Thursday's meeting (ENDC/PV.172, pp. 9 et seq.) also failed to make the negative position of the Western delegations in any way convincing. It is impossible, of course, to defend successfully a shaky and indefensible position; hence all the contradictions in which Mr. Burns found himself involved.

Members of the Committee will no doubt remember that at the very beginning of the resumption of the debate Mr. Burns took a positive attitude towards the reduction of military budgets and even informed the Committee of the steps taken in that direction by the Government of Canada (ENDC/PV.158, p.13). But last Thursday, when we were directly discussing the question of a positive decision by the Committee on the reduction of military budgets, Mr. Burns's views underwent a strange metamorphosis. He tried to cast doubt on the value of action by States in reducing military expenditures. In particular, he tried to minimize the significance of unilateral reductions through the policy of mutual example. Mr. Burns said that "mutual example can and does work both ways" (ENDC/PV.172, p.10).

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We agree with the appraisal, Mr. Burns, that an increase in military expenditures, such as is taking place in Western Germany and in the United Kingdom, is a bad example. But why then did the Canadian representative fail to mention this fact, and why did he find no words of censure for Canada's allies in NATO -- the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany? Would it be a bad thing if the Committee, in accordance with the wishes expressed here by many representatives, addressed an appeal to States to reduce their military budgets? Unfortunately it is becoming more and more evident that the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, is guided in his statements here, not by the interests of disarmament, but rather by purely military considerations on which the staffs and generals of the NATO military bloc insist.

The attempts of the representative of Canada to minimize the significance of an agreement to reduce military budgets are based on a very shaky foundation. Historical experience shows most convincingly that the reduction of military budgets is of great significance. I shall give just one example. According to the conclusion of investigators, one of the reasons why the German militarists were able to re-establish the Wehrmacht was that the Versailles Treaty, while imposing limitations on the numbers of armed forces and the quantities of certain types of armaments, did not place any restrictions on Germany's military budget. The results of this were not slow to appear. Whereas Germany's military budget amounted to 459 million marks in 1924-25, in three years, by 1928-29, it increased by more than half as much again, having risen to 758 million marks.

What is now going on in Western Germany in regard to military expenditures and the armaments race bears no comparison with and far outstrips the speed of the militarization of Germany in the thirties, when Hitler's Reich was preparing for war. Therefore it is most important to take measures to put a brake on the armaments race now, before it is too late. The Soviet proposal for the reduction of the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent is an excellent means to that end.

Mr. Burns reiterated statements that had been made earlier by the representatives of other Western Powers concerning the "difficulty" of verifying the reduction of military budgets and the need in this connexion for a preliminary study of the question of budgets by experts. In our last statement we pointed out the groundlessness of this argument and stressed that we were prepared to

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consider the question of control in the necessary context if we come to an agreement on a reduction of military budgets (ibid., p.30). Without such agreement, any talk about the form of control over the implementation of an agreement on the reduction of military budgets, and any talk about the scope of that control, would be pointless; it would be a sheer waste of time and would even be harmful.

In fact, Mr. Burns himself confirmed this by referring as an argument to the experience of the League of Nations, which spent several years "studying" technical problems connected with budgetary questions. What was the result of that "study"? Mr. Burns informed us that the result was the working out of methods for the submission of comparable data on military budgets. But what did the world gain from this? Nothing constructive, nothing positive; no agreement on the reduction of military expenditures was ever reached, the arms race continued, and finally the whole affair came to an end with the Second World War. Technical studies obscured the substance of the matter, and to those who perished or suffered in that war the "success" of the League of Nations to which Mr. Burns referred is hardly a consolation.

If the experience of the League of Nations teaches us anything, it teaches us what we must not do. It teaches us how vicious and dangerous to the cause of peace are any attempts to refer outstanding political questions "for study" to "technical" committees, commissions, sub-commissions, technical groups of experts, and so on and so forth.

Mr. Burns adduced yet another astounding argument against consideration in the Committee of the question of reducing military budgets. He literally said the following: Since this is a question which would affect the entire membership of the United Nations, the Committee should first acquaint itself with the views of all the Members of the United Nations by means of a "questionnaire" (ENDC/PV.172, pp.12,13). But in that case, Mr. Burns, any of us can say that all the questions under consideration by the Committee affect the entire membership of the United Nations, and that would be right. Consequently, if we were to follow the logic of Mr. Burns's argument, it would turn out that not a single proposal, not a single question, could be examined in the Committee without asking beforehand for the opinion of all the other Members of the United Nations. If the situation were as Mr. Burns imagines it to be, the Eighteen-Nation Committee itself would in point of fact be absolutely useless, since it would be incapable of doing any work.

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In our opinion, the Committee has been set up with the knowledge and approval of the United Nations in order to consider and reach agreement on the most important problems relating to disarmament, and one such problem is undoubtedly that of reducing military budgets.

In connexion with his arguments on the need for a "questionnaire" Mr. Burns did not mention the League of Nations. In our opinion, he might very well have done so. After all, the activities of the League of Nations in the field of disarmament boiled down in the end to various kinds of "questionnaires". It would be dangerous for the cause of peace and for the peoples if our Committee were likewise fated to meet the same inglorious end as the League of Nations, which got bogged down in all kinds of technical papers, questionnaires and year books. As we all know, the torrent of paper in the League of Nations did not halt the armaments race and did not prevent war. It merely served as a smoke-screen to conceal the ever-accelerating preparations for war from the eyes of the peoples.

The unconvincing nature of the arguments advanced by the representatives of the Western Powers against consideration of the question of reducing military budgets is becoming more obvious every day. More and more delegations are declaring themselves in favour of the speediest possible consideration and positive solution of this important question by the Committee. In their statements they show convincingly and clearly, as the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, did last Thursday (ENDC/PV.172, pp.44 et seq.), that the obstacles which, according to the representatives of the Western Powers, stand in the way of a solution to the problem of reducing military budgets can in fact be easily overcome, and that most of these obstacles are simply artificial and do not really exist.

In fact at present, except a few delegations representing the Western Powers, the whole Committee is unanimous in believing that it would be desirable to consider the question of reducing military budgets as a matter of priority and to reach agreement on this. We fully associate ourselves with the appeal made by the representative of Brazil at last Thursday's meeting that we should continue to work unremittingly in this direction, and we share the conviction he expressed that it would be possible to achieve progress in the question of reducing military budgets -- provided, of course, that there is good will and the desire to do so on the part of all members of the Committee, first and foremost the Western Powers.

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We have before us the proposal of the Soviet Government for a reduction of the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent. On the basis of this proposal it would be possible to reach agreement rapidly. Favourable conditions also exist for the implementation of this Soviet proposal: we have in mind the fact that a considerable number of States, including members of the Committee, have already carried out some reductions in their military budgets. A movement in the right direction has begun, a good example has been set, and we must not allow this process to be halted. As the head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, and the leading statesmen of an overwhelming majority of States have said, the Moscow Treaty has given an impetus to an improvement of the international situation, and we must not allow this vis inertiae, this impulse given to international relations by the Moscow Treaty, to die out. It is essential to help forward the further development of this process. The proposal to reduce military budgets is conducive to this end. Those who oppose this proposal reveal more clearly than by words their unwillingness to put an end to the armaments race.

We continue to believe that at the present time top priority should be given to the question of reducing military budgets, as being the simplest and easy to implement, and enjoying the support of the overwhelming majority of the Committee.

Permit me now to deal with the United States proposal for a freeze (ENDC/120). In submitting this proposal the United States representatives asserted that it symbolized a "new" approach of the United States to disarmament. Today I should like to make some comments of principle regarding this United States proposal.

In President Johnson's message it is stated:

> "... that the security of all nations can be safeguarded within the scope of such an agreement" -- that is, the 'freeze' -- "and that this initial measure preventing the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels". (ENDC/120, p.2)

If this proposal would really safeguard the security of all States, open up favourable prospects in the field of disarmament, and thus help towards eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, then of course we could only welcome it. But, in order to evaluate it in that way, one must analyse it carefully and see what consequences its adoption would actually lead to.

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First it is necessary to point out that, in proposing to freeze strategic means of delivery, the United States leaves aside that is, by no means covers all -- the nuclear weapons and strategic means of delivery, missiles, bombers and so forth, which at present exist in the armaments of States. Yet, as the United States representatives themselves have pointed out and as the late President Kennedy stressed on a number of occasions, the stockpiles of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers are so great that they could annihilate all the population, cities and industrial centres of our planet.

Here in the Committee we have heard many times about the over-kill capacity possessed by the nuclear Powers. References have been made to the extreme danger of this situation, and there has been talk about the need to take a resolute step forward in order to eliminate this danger, or at least to reduce it to a great extent. If the United States proposal to freeze the existing means of delivery of nuclear missiles were implemented, this over-kill capacity would be maintained in its entirety. This United States proposal is aimed at maintaining in its entirety the enormous power of destruction now at the disposal of the two military groups confronting each other. Thus, a freeze of the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons by itself, without the simultaneous implementation of disarmament measures, cannot lead to any lessening of the threat of nuclear war, since it would not reduce the military arsenals of States by a single missile or a single bomber.

Secondly, as far as we understand, the United States proposal for a "freeze" would not affect the production of Polaris missiles, nor would it prevent the creation of new armed forces based on these missiles. For instance, the United States proposal for a "freeze" does not cover the United States-West German plan for the creation of so-called NATO multilateral nuclear forces. The Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Rusk, speaking in New York on 22 January 1964, stated that the implementation of a freeze on strategic means of delivery should not prevent the creation of the multilateral nuclear

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forces of NATO -- that is, sharing by West German revanchists in the control of nuclear weapons. It is characteristic that the United States proposal for a "freeze" does not cover those types of weapon, including nuclear missiles, with which the West German Bundeswehr is equipped. Not a single aircraft, not a single missile, being the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and now forming part of the armament of the West German army, would come under those types of armaments whose production, under the United States "freeze" plan, would have to cease.

Thus, in accordance with this United States proposal, it would be possible to continue and increase the production of such missiles as the Davy Crockett, the Honest John (with a range of 25 km), the Sergeant (with a range of 100 km), the pilotless Matador and Mice bombers (with ranges of 1,000 and 1,500 km respectively), as well as such missiles as the Nike, Hawk, Tartar, the British Siket, the medium-range Pershing, the F-104 aircraft, and the Starfighter aircraft -- that is, all that now constitutes the main striking force of the West German army. Thus the entire arsenal of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons now at the disposal of the West German Bundeswehr would continue to grow and still further intensify the threat of a nuclear war.

Likewise, the United States proposal for a "freeze" would not cover the United Kingdom plan for the creation of a flotilla of nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles. In this connexion we might remind the Committee of a recent statement by the Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom, Mr. Thorneycroft. He pointed out with soldierly bluntness that the United States proposal for the freezing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons had no bearing on the United Kingdom plans for the construction of five nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles. In order that nobody should have any doubt in this regard, Mr. Thorneycroft stressed that the United Kingdom Government would in no circumstances abandon the execution of this plan (The Times, 29 February 1964).

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Thirdly, the United States proposal would not at all mean a cessation of the arms race. We are told that the level of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the level existing at the time of the agreement, would be "frozen" both quantitatively and qualitatively. That does not mean at all, as the United States delegation itself has made clear, that the production of powerful modern strategic missiles and strategic bombers would cease. On the contrary, it would continue in order to maintain the level reached at the time of the agreement of these weapons which make it possible even now to annihilate all the cities on the globe many times over. On 31 January, Mr. Foster said (ENDC/PV.162, p.19) that maintenance of "constant level" was the purpose of the "freeze" agreement.

On the other hand, this United States proposal proceeds from the premise that, in regard to all other types of weapons, complete freedom would be maintained to increase their production further and to intensify the arms race. In particular, under the "freeze" proposal the production of other means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be fully maintained and developed, and so would the production of such types of weapons of mass destruction as chemical and bacteriological weapons. The production of conventional weapons would go on at full speed.

As you see, within the scope of such an agreement on a "freeze" there cannot of course be any of that security of the nations to which reference is made in the message of President Johnson of the United States of 21 January (ENDC/120, p.2). On the contrary, the implementation of such a proposal would only intensify mutual suspicion and tension and increase the danger of war.

If we sum up the aforesaid aspects of the United States plan, the question naturally arises: what is the meaning of it; why has the United States needed to put forward such a plan at the present time? The United States representatives in the Committee assure us that its purpose is to halt or check the arms race. But, as we have just shown, no such halt in the arms race would occur. Therefore we have, of course, to look for the reason why the United States put forward this plan in some other calculations which have nothing to do with the tasks of strengthening peace or with the task of halting the arms race. These calculations

become clear if we consider the statements made by United States military and political leaders, and if we refer to the data showing the development of the production of armaments in the United States.

We know that in recent years the United States has been striving in every way to increase its arsenal of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, in particular of intercontinental missiles. As the United States Minister of Defense, Mr. McNamara, said on 18 November 1963, the United States has in the past few years concentrated its attention on strategic forces.

Here in the Committee, Mr. Foster has said that merely while our negotiations have been going on, namely since the spring of 1962, the United States has increased its arsenal of intercontinental missiles by 200 per cent (ENDC/PV.170,p.48). According to official United States data, by the end of 1963 the United States had 534 intercontinental missiles. At present, according to statements of United States military leaders, the United States has practically finished carrying out a programme for the construction of intercontinental missiles aimed at bringing their number up to 1,700. At the last meeting before his departure for Washington the United States representative, Mr. Foster, informed us (ibid.) with a menacing note in his voice that by 1965 the number of United States strategic missiles would have increased by 750 per cent as compared with 1962. On the other hand, Mr. McNamara stressed in his statement that any further increase in the budgetary allocations for the United States strategic forces could have only an insignificant result from the point of view of increasing the United States power.

Now, as Mr. McNamara stated, the time has come for the United States to review the cards. That review, as is clear from the statements of United States military leaders, is to consist in shifting the centre of gravity of the arms race from strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons to short-range means of delivery and conventional armaments. As the United States Presshas pointed out, the Pentagon now insists on increasing the production of low-yield weapons. In this connexion it is characteristic that the United States is now intensively drafting plans for creating new, and modernizing old, short-range means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Much is being said, in particular, about supplying heavy artillery with nuclear warheads and creating special mobile armed forces equipped with

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low-yield nuclear weapons, which could be sent immediately to any part of the world. New types of military aircraft are being introduced -- the A-11 in the United States, the TSR-2 in the United Kingdom, and so forth. Particular stress is being laid on the construction of new nuclear submarines equipped with new types of Polaris missiles -- which, as we have already said, are likewise not covered by the "freeze". Characteristic of the present military leaders of the United States are statements to the effect that it is precisely the development of this type of weapon that is to become in future the basis of United States military strategy.

Those are precisely the considerations -- which, of course, have nothing to do with safeguarding the security of States or with the task of really relaxing international tension and reducing the threat of war -- those are precisely the calculations to which the present United States proposal for a "freeze" of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons corresponds. Their point of departure is, first, the completion in the United States in the near future of an extensive programme for the construction of strategic missiles, and secondly, the demand of the Pentagon to lay the main stress in future on other types of weapons. Why, then, try to pass off this internal military reorganization in the United States as a peace initiative?

In reality this proposal for a "freeze" merely reflects the new military programme of the Pentagon. Let us now put the following question: if the United States "freeze" plan does not provide for a slowing-down of the arms race, perhaps it gives promise of some relaxation of international tension and might lead to increased confidence among States. To answer that question, let us take a look at the other aspect of the United States "freeze" plan, the proposal concerning the control to be established over implementation of the "freeze" on the production of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

But what does control over the "freezing" of strategic means of delivery really mean? In the first place, it would be control carried out without any disarmament measures whatsoever and in isolation from such measures, which would mean as a matter of fact opening up to foreign intelligence services the whole

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production of the most important types of weapons and their testing sites — that is to say, practically disclosing the most important secrets of the defence industry and the defence system of a country in the conditions of a continuing arms race and intensive military preparations. Furthermore, since under the United States plan the production of a certain number of missiles and aircraft to replace those that have become unserviceable would be permitted, there would also be a possibility of raising the question of control over the remaining armaments, in order to verify whether the quantity of these replaced armaments is not being increased and whether their quality is not being improved. In fact there would also be opened up a possibility of demanding the establishment of control over the activities of any scientific institution.

In essence, adoption of the United States proposal would involve the danger that it would open up to any party interested in carrying on espionage and intelligence work in the territory of other States legal opportunities under the guise of control to collect the most valuable and secret information on the armed forces, defence systems and defence industry of those States and, indeed, in any part of their territories, since it would always be possible to say that it was necessary to verify in any particular area whether there was any hidden production or secret testing of missiles, aircraft or any of their components.

The Soviet Union, as we are constantly stressing, is not at all against control. We stand for strict and effective control over disarmament measures. But the establishment of foreign control and the disclosure, in that way, of the most important elements of the defence system in conditions where not only has the problem of general and complete disarmament not been solved, but also no measures of actual disarmament are being implemented at all, could only serve the purposes of intelligence and espionage, the purposes of the preparation of aggression.

No State that is concerned about ensuring its defence can give its consent to the implementation of such control. No State that does not harbour any aggressive designs in regard to other States would press for control without disarmament, for control over the existing armaments of the other side. Adoption of the United States proposal would mean that a potential aggressor, having obtained a complete and thorough idea of the defence systems of the peace-loving States which he has marked

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down as his victims, and having obtained information regarding the targets which he intends to hit, could try to utilize the information thus obtained in order to launch a surprise attack and unleash a nuclear war.

Thus implementation of the United States proposal would not lead to halting the arms race; it would not decrease by a single nuclear bomb or a single missile the tremendous arsenal of destruction accumulated in the world today. This proposal would merely conduce to intensifying mistrust and suspicion in the relations between States. This United States proposal would result in reducing to nought the successes in the matter of relaxing international tension which were achieved as a result of the efforts of all the peace-loving States, and which were expressed in such universally-known acts as the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear tests, and the reaching of agreement to refrain from placing in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons.

It is impossible not to see that the United States proposal for a "freeze" on strategic means of delivery is a direct replacement of disarmament by measures of control over existing armaments, in the first place over those which form the basis of the defensive power of the Soviet Union. This proposal could merely open up a way for the widespread activities of foreign intelligence services in the territory of the Soviet Union, which would be solely to the advantage of the NATO military bloc. This fact reflects very clearly, among other things, the striving of the United States by means of its "freeze" proposal to secure for itself unilateral advantages, unilateral military advantages.

The United States representatives in the disarmament negotiations are fond of talking about the necessity, in implementing disarmament or any measure facilitating disarmament, of strictly respecting and maintaining the balance of forces now existing between States. Does the United States follow this principle in putting forward its new proposal for a "freeze"? Certainly not. In proposing to freeze and place under international control the most powerful means of defence which the Soviet Union possesses, namely strategic missiles, the United States leaves its hands free for the unlimited production and improvement of other nuclear weapon delivery vehicles not belonging to this category, including those which could be launched in the direction of the Soviet Union and other socialist

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

States from United States military bases located around the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The United States proposal for a "freeze" on strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons passes over this aspect of the matter in complete silence; it does not deal with it at all. How, then, is the balance of forces respected here? That is the question we may well ask the authors of this proposal.

If we really want to put an end to the arms race and to avert the danger of a thermonuclear war, we must exert the utmost efforts to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. This alone can put an end once and for all to the danger of devastating wars, and ensure lasting peace for the nations. In this connexion it should be recalled that the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1) provides for the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the very first stage of disarmament. In other words, the danger of a thermonuclear war would be eliminated in the shortest period possible. This is the main objective and the characteristic feature of the Soviet proposal, which radically distinguish it from the United States proposal for a "freeze" on strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet proposals contained in the Soviet Government's memorandum (ENDC/123) which has been submitted to the Committee for consideration are also aimed at lessening the danger of war and halting the arms race. We are already discussing here a proposal for the reduction of military budgets which, as has been stressed by a number of delegations in the Committee, is a reliable way towards turning back the arms race and helping to bring about the conditions for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government's memorandum also contains a proposal for reducing the numbers of the armed forces of States, the implementation of which would lead to a reduction of military potentials, and thereby to a lessening of the danger of war and to an improvement of the international atmosphere, as well as other well-known proposals directed towards the same objective.

The Soviet proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft even before the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament has a most direct bearing on the effective limitation of the arms race and the lessening of the danger of war.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

As the Soviet memorandum points out:

"Bomber aircraft, though obsolete, still remain one of the powerful means of carrying on a war of aggression, used to deliver nuclear weapons many thousands of kilometres from their bases in order to inflict massive blows in the territories of other States." (ibid., p.5)

The elimination of this type of weapon would be a serious contribution towards physical disarmament, in contrast to the essentially fictitious measures proposed by the United States. The elimination of bomber aircraft would to a considerable extent limit the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war and would lead to a relaxation of international tension and to bringing about more favourable conditions for the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government, a measure such as the elimination of bomber aircraft could easily be carried out in a short period of time -- for instance, in one year. If a decision to eliminate bomber aircraft were adopted, the Soviet Government would be willing to reach agreement on mutually-acceptable forms of control over their elimination. In this case it really would be control over a serious disarmament measure, unlike the control over armaments suggested by the United States and provided for in the United States proposal for a "freeze".

Thus, if we want to bring about a relaxation of international tension, a slowing-down of the arms race and the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, we must consider and adopt a decision on measures that would really lead to this goal. Such measures are contained in the Soviet Government's memorandum of 28 January, not to mention the measures which are provided for in the Soviet Union's draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. The United States proposal for a "freeze", however, would merely result in intensifying mistrust in relations between States and in increasing the danger of war.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): If no other representative wishes to speak, I should like to reply to Mr. Tsarapkin's references to what I said in regard to budgetary questions.

When I referred in favourable terms to budgetary reductions, my reference was to the example which had been set by the Soviet Union and the United States, one

(The Chairman, Canada)

to which Mr. Tsarapkin himself has referred in congratulatory terms more than once. Obviously there is nothing to be said against it.

When I asked for additional information on the further project of the Soviet Union for a reduction of 10 to 15 per cent (ENDC/123), how it would be controlled, and what it really meant, we heard the usual tirade to the effect that the Soviet Union is completely opposed to any discussion in detail and to any explanation which this Committee may want of any of its projects, including the famous project for budgetary control.

The Soviet Union has not even explained exactly how it proposes to issue the appeal to all the nations to reduce their military budgets. It seems to me that this Committee is not exactly in the position of a body which issues appeals to all the world to do this or that. It was set up for a different purpose, as Mr. Tsarapkin himself has said.

Although I shall reserve the right to reply further to some of the arguments which were advanced during the part of Mr. Tsarapkin's lengthy address that concerned what I had previously said, I do not desire to keep the Committee any longer, and will terminate my remarks as representative of Canada.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 174th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador E.L.M. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Romania, Canada and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 17 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.