

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 5 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

(Bulgaria)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. D. TEKHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato Abate AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. G.R. SAPRA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico: Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria: Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland: Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania: Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. M. IONESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden: Mr. R. EDBERG  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. C.G. EKLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics: Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV

United Arab Republic: Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.S. MacDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I declare open the one hundred and seventy-second meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before giving the floor to the first speaker, I shall call upon our co-Chairman, Mr. Fisher, who wishes to report to the Committee on the meeting of the co-Chairmen which took place yesterday.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I wish to thank the representative of Poland for yielding the floor to allow me to make a brief announcement as co-Chairman.

Before turning to the main point of my remarks, I should like to thank personally all delegations, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and his Deputy for the warm welcome I received on my arrival here. I am pleased also to greet once again, publicly, my fellow co-Chairman the representative of the Soviet Union, with whom I have had the pleasure of working before. As leader of the United States delegation and as co-Chairman, I assure the Committee and the Soviet co-Chairman that my delegation will continue to give its full co-operation in all future consultations to advance the work of this Conference.

I should like to report to the Conference that the Soviet co-Chairman and I met on Wednesday, 4 March. Among other topics, we discussed the question of a collateral measures agenda for the Committee. The two co-Chairmen have not yet been able to agree on an agenda at this time. Taking into account the views expressed by many delegations at the 170th meeting, the two co-Chairmen have agreed to recommend to the Committee that an informal meeting be held. The purpose of the meeting would be to give all delegations an opportunity for an informal exchange of views on the question of a collateral measures agenda.

On Wednesday I recommended to the Soviet co-Chairman that the informal meeting be held on Monday, 9 March, at 10.30 a.m. I did so in order to give myself the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the views of other delegations prior to the informal meeting. The Soviet co-Chairman has indicated that he has no objection. Therefore we recommend a meeting at that time.

I hope I have accurately stated the consensus that my co-Chairman and I arrived at on Wednesday.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): If there is no objection, I shall take it that the proposal made by the two co-Chairmen is adopted.

It was so decided.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): During the discussion we have had so far on the subject of collateral measures, it has become abundantly clear that the majority of the members of our Committee favour a detailed examination of the problem of the reduction of military budgets. The importance we attach to this problem in no way lessens the interest we take in other proposals which aim at reducing international tension and facilitating the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It seems to us, however, that the proposal (ENDC/123, p.3) on the reduction of military budgets offers the greatest chances of success for the following reasons:

First, we have already witnessed a certain reduction in the military expenditures of the Soviet Union and the United States. Those reductions, though modest, we hope indicate a trend. We must now take all the necessary steps for this trend to be maintained and strengthened.

Secondly, a measure of this nature, as experience has proved, can just as easily be carried out unilaterally as by international agreements. It goes without saying that the conclusion of a multilateral agreement on the reduction of military expenditures must not be subordinated to reductions in military budgets carried out unilaterally by all countries. But clearly unilateral measures can prepare the way for the conclusion of international agreements in this field. Hence we see many advantages in the proposal submitted at the meeting of our Committee on 20 February by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, to the effect that our Committee should appeal to all States -- or at least, to begin with, all States possessing considerable military power -- to follow the example of the Soviet Union, the United States, and some other countries which by way of "mutual example" have taken steps to reduce their military appropriations (ENDC/PV.168, p.19). At the same time our Committee would proceed to a detailed examination of a draft international treaty for reducing military budgets by 10-15 per cent. An appeal to all States to follow the example of the Soviet Union and the United States might be launched by our Committee in the near future. There can be no doubt that this would be a manifestation of our intentions of great moral import and real practical value.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

We hope that the United States delegation, in spite of Mr. Foster's somewhat negative reaction on 20 February (ibid., p.21), will not object to our Committee adopting a text which would merely invite other countries to follow the course taken by its own Government.

It also goes without saying that the amount of budgetary cuts which, in response to our Committee's appeal, the countries may think fit to propose to their parliaments cannot and must not be determined here. There is therefore no question of "a hortatory request for specific cuts in military budgets" (ENDC/PV.170, p.7), to use Mr. Foster's own words uttered on 27 February. All those measures will be taken unilaterally.

As to the conclusion of an international agreement, here also there can be no question of imposing a definite reduction, as Mr. Foster suggested, but of finding by negotiation a formula which can at the same time taken into account the situations of the different countries and the exigencies of disarmament.

During the discussions which have taken place in our Committee in the past fortnight, we have been faced by two theses, one advocating budgetary measures and the other extolling the merits of measures directly applying to armaments. It seems to me that these two theses, far from being contradictory, really supplement one another. It is true that a reduction in military establishments, like the destruction of certain types of armaments, would, other things being equal, have immediate repercussions on the level of military expenditure. But it is also obvious that a reduction in military budgets, if substantial, must of necessity entail a corresponding reduction in the efforts the countries are exerting to improve the structure of their armed forces.

I also believe that it would be vain to discuss whether a reduction in military budgets should precede or follow a relaxation in international tension. Of course we all agree that the budgetary reductions already carried out were a result of the better international atmosphere created by the signing of the Moscow agreements. But it is also true that possibilities in this sphere are far from exhausted, and there can be no doubt that the international climate would improve still further if the Great Powers were to proceed to still more substantial reductions in their military expenditure.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

As I have said, we are far from underestimating the importance of partial measures which would directly affect the armed forces. That we are asking the Committee to focus its attention now on budgetary measures is because we have the impression that we can thus reach tangible results in a relatively short time, while avoiding the obstacles we encountered when examining the different proposals on the reduction of armaments. We know only too well that fundamental differences of opinion separate us with regard to criteria and methods for the reduction of armaments. We are firmly convinced that we shall succeed in eliminating them by degrees in the course of our negotiations. For the present, it therefore seems to us desirable to adopt an indirect approach, that of disarmament by reduction of military expenses.

The method of reduction we envisage, which leaves States free to make their own choice, implies no changes in the structure of the military machine and does not affect the priorities they may wish to grant to various elements of their forces within a reduced budget. It can therefore in no way influence the strategic balance, nor give any military advantage to either side.

I do not think there is any need to dwell here on the effects that an international agreement on the reduction of military expenditure would have. Its consequences would clearly be felt as much in the social and economic as in the military and political field. It is on the former that I should like to make a few brief remarks before concluding my statement.

We all agree that the military effort plays an important part in the economic life of all countries and particularly in that of the Great Powers. We also all agree that the reconversion of the economy to a truly peacetime basis raises problems which should be considered now so as to avoid any subsequent disturbances. I think that a progressive reduction of military expenses can help this reconversion process.

Reduction of budgets, coupled with a judicious allocation for productive purposes of the resources thus released, can demonstrate the possibility of a smooth reconversion. Thus the political and military effects, by influencing the international atmosphere and increasing confidence between peoples, would join with the economic and social effects in creating a strong current of public opinion in favour of further agreements and further disarmament measures.



(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The application of the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union, by bringing us closer to our final goal, would enable us to envisage in a new light the realization of a project dear to the great majority of the Members of the United Nations: the establishment of a special fund for the economic development of the backward countries out of the savings effected in military appropriations. May I be allowed in this connexion to pay a tribute to the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, who has had the great merit of reminding us (ENDC/126) of the importance of that problem?

Poland has played an active part in the work undertaken within the United Nations on the economic and social consequences of disarmament; and it wholeheartedly supports the resolution entitled "Declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament" (A/RES/1837 (XVII)), adopted at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. The Soviet proposal opens the way to this objective. I hope that we shall not miss the opportunity that is being offered to us.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): During the last three meetings at which collateral measures have been discussed we have heard several statements about the reduction of military budgets. We have just heard a very thoughtful address on this subject by the representative of Poland, to which I may refer again in the course of my remarks this morning but which in any case the Canadian delegation will study with careful attention.

It has seemed to the Canadian delegation that when we are discussing budgetary reductions we must always be clear about what sort of action it is proposed to take. At recent meetings two different courses of action have been mentioned, and the representative of Poland has somewhat clarified the tying together of those courses in his remarks this morning.

The first course is that States should unilaterally decide to reduce their military expenditures. It has been pointed out that both the United States of America and the Soviet Union have reduced their defence budgets for the coming year. It is urged that this policy of mutual example should be continued, and it is hoped that it may be possible in the future to make larger reductions. Of course we all welcome the announcements by these great military Powers that they intend to restrict their military expenditures, and we agree that action of that sort helps

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

to create a good climate in which to negotiate disarmament. The Canadian delegation believes that, if the necessary degree of mutual confidence could be established, it might be possible for those two States to undertake further steps in this field and be joined by others.

The second course of action which has been proposed is that States should enter into a formal multilateral agreement to reduce their military spending by a specified percentage. That, as we understand it, is the proposal of the Soviet Union contained in its memorandum to the Conference of 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123). In the opinion of the Canadian delegation, it is important that we distinguish between those two approaches to budgetary reductions.

In present circumstances, when a State unilaterally decides to reduce its defence budget, its decision is governed only by its own assessment of its defence requirements. If subsequently the same State believes that there has been an increase in the threat to its national interests, it will most probably respond quickly by increasing its military spending. This in turn could stimulate steps by other States. In other words, mutual example can and does work both ways. The arms race itself is an example of nations following the policy of mutual example in the wrong direction. Thus, while we warmly welcome any evidence of self-imposed restraint by the major Powers in the field of military spending, only international agreements to undertake verified measures to limit or reduce armaments can give us confidence that the arms race has been permanently stopped.

We can now ask ourselves: would an international agreement entered into by States to reduce their military spending by an agreed percentage give us confidence that the arms race had been permanently stopped? Because a number of States are able this year to take unilateral action to reduce their budgets, it does not necessarily follow that an international agreement under which all States would assume a formal obligation to reduce their military expenditures, which would really be only a declaratory arrangement, would be a significant or practicable collateral measure. An agreement of this sort would create confidence that the arms race had been checked only if the parties to it were assured that the obligations to reduce budgets really meant fewer weapons coming off production lines, fewer weapons deployed in the field, and fewer men under arms.

However, we run into serious difficulties as soon as we ask whether, under an agreement to cut budgets by a definite percentage, States could be confident that military establishments were actually being reduced.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We all know that national accounting procedures vary enormously. We also know that the economic structures and pricing methods of different countries are vastly different and that these differences are particularly marked between nations with capitalist and those with socialist economies. Furthermore, we know that expenditures on certain types of activities which appear in the military budgets of some countries are normally included under quite different items in the budgets of other States. Fluctuations in currency values would present yet another difficulty in determining the real meaning of an announced reduction in military expenditures.

Members of this Committee will doubtless recall that an expert committee of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference studied exhaustively the problems involved in the limitation of military expenditures in the years 1932 and 1933 (Conf. D 158). Considerable progress was made at that time in working out methods whereby States could report their expenditures in a uniform manner which would permit comparison of the actual levels of spending. Although no agreement was reached at that time on whether it would be feasible to institute a system of agreed budgetary restrictions, it was unanimously agreed that it would be useful if States published their military expenditures on a uniform basis.

Bearing in mind that earlier attempt to solve the many problems connected with budgetary limitations, the Canadian delegation believes that it would be useful for experts to examine in detail how the military budgets of various States are in fact composed -- what constitutes military expenditures, how those expenditures are carried in the national budgets of various States, and whether agreed budgetary limitations could be verified in practice. We noted that at the beginning of his statement the representative of Poland suggested that we should study in depth the proposals for budgetary limitations; and this, it seems to the Canadian delegation, is one of the ways -- and an important way -- in which we could conduct such a study in depth if we are going to make progress with these proposals.

One result of the study which I have suggested might be the adoption of more uniform practices for reporting military expenditures. That could be valuable in two respects. In the first place, it would be useful under a general disarmament agreement for States to report military expenditures according to agreed practices to the international disarmament organization. In addition to that long-term advantage, a better understanding of other nations' accounting practices might assist States to follow a policy of mutual example in reducing military expenditures.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

It seems to the Canadian delegation that, before a State reduces its expenditures in response to the reductions announced by another State, it needs to have some idea of the significance of the example which the other State has set. Moreover, in order to preserve the military balance, States intending to reduce their military budgets need to know what the meaning is in concrete terms of the budgetary reductions of other States -- in plain words, how many fewer soldiers, tanks, aircraft, missiles and so on.

After a study of the sort I have mentioned, this Committee would be in a position to decide what are the possibilities for international action in this field in advance of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. My delegation believes it would be premature for this Committee to try to work out an agreement under which all States would undertake to reduce their military budgets by an agreed percentage -- or on any other basis -- before the necessary preliminary work of the kind I have mentioned has been done.

In addition to the complex problems which I have suggested might be appropriately studied by experts, there is another aspect of the Soviet proposals regarding military budgets which would require further clarification before we could judge the merits of those proposals. The Soviet Union has suggested that this Committee address an appeal to all States to follow the example of the Soviet Union and the United States in reducing their military budgets. The representative of the Soviet Union indicated on 20 February that certain paragraphs from the working paper (ENDC/126) submitted by the representative of Brazil could form the basis of such an appeal (ENDC/PV.168, p.19). The Soviet Union has also proposed that this Committee draw up an agreement which would impose obligations on all States to reduce their military spending by a specified percentage. The Soviet Union suggests that action be taken by all nations.

However, as the representative of India has already pointed out, States which at the present time are faced with the threat of aggression would find it difficult, if not impossible, to undertake significant reductions in their military spending in the near future (ENDC/PV.170, p.29). Other States may be confronted by other special problems which would affect their ability or willingness to become parties to an agreement such as has been proposed. Since this is a question which would affect the entire membership of the United Nations, it seems to me that it would be logical for us to have the benefit of the views of the United Nations membership

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

as a whole. We wonder whether the Soviet Union delegation has thought of any way of obtaining the necessary preliminary information on this point. Does it propose working out a questionnaire asking all Member States of the United Nations to state their willingness or ability to subscribe to an undertaking to reduce their military budgets as the Soviet Union has proposed?

At the meeting of 20 February Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"We are deeply convinced that no State has, or can have, any serious reasons for not reducing its military budget at the present time."

(ENDC/PV.168, p.19)

Frankly, after listening to certain comments in this Committee at previous meetings, my delegation cannot share Mr. Tsarapkin's conviction. We understand that the Soviet Union's proposal envisages mainly reductions by States which are making large expenditures. But military expenditure is often assessed relative to national income. If one considers this aspect, it might be argued that some States -- other than members of the two alliances represented here -- spend relatively large portions of their total budget for armaments and armed forces although at the same time they have an urgent need for funds for economic and social development. It seems to the Canadian delegation that this condition ought to be taken into consideration when one looks at the problem of reducing spending on arms.

It must be borne in mind that, according to the representative of the Soviet Union, the basic purpose of the proposal to reduce military spending is to put an end to the arms race. Mr. Tsarapkin at our meeting of 27 February said:

"... the reduction of military budgets... directly cuts away the basis of the armaments race ..." (ENDC/PV.170, p.44).

The purpose of my intervention this morning has been to point out the difficulties and complexities which require study and clarification before it will be possible to decide in this Committee whether an agreed reduction in military budgets would indeed be a quick and effective way to cut off the arms race. Several other proposals for collateral measures have been made in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference which could contribute effectively and directly to halting the arms race. We noted that the representative of Poland this morning said that some of the measures proposed could be complemented by military budget reductions and that the various measures are not necessarily opposed to one another (Supra, p. 7).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation believes that we should not delay reaching agreement on certain of these other positive measures which would limit the immediate objects of military spending.

The proposal of President Johnson to freeze the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapons (ENDC/120) would put a stop to the development of new weapons of mass destruction. As the representative of Burma pointed out on 20 February, the implementation of this proposal would stop further increases in the capacity which the major Powers already possess to destroy each other and the world (ENDC/PV.168, pp.7,8). If implemented, this proposal would result immediately in a significant decrease in the resources which are now devoted to the manufacture of major armaments. It is a measure which we have been told would not involve onerous verification procedures. For all these reasons, the Canadian delegation regards this proposal as one which deserves early and serious negotiation.

The same considerations apply to the proposal to stop or progressively reduce the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes. If the United States proposals in this area were adopted, there would be an immediate decrease in military expenditures and an all-important first step would have been taken towards nuclear disarmament. Incidentally, I would remind representatives that Mr. Foster quoted on 13 February precise figures regarding the value of the weapon-grade fissionable material which the United States is prepared to transfer now to peaceful uses. Mr. Foster told us that 60,000 kilograms of this material is worth approximately \$720 million (ENDC/PV.166, p.18). The Canadian delegation hopes that the Soviet Union will soon respond favourably to both those proposals in President Johnson's message to this Conference.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): At present only a few countries can produce nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all the world that their number be not increased.

An increasingly large number of countries have peaceful nuclear programmes. It is in the interest of all that their number continue to increase.

However, without effective safeguards, the materials and technology which are acquired for peaceful uses of nuclear energy may be diverted to produce nuclear weapons. Unless effective safeguards are applied, what started out as a use of the atom for peace may turn into the development of the atom for war. Should this

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

happen, the benefits to mankind which we hope to obtain by the wide uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be far overshadowed by the dangers resulting from the increase in the number of nations having the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. It is therefore of great importance that we create effective safeguards against this. To do so is not easy, but it is possible.

It is in that light that I should like to discuss today two of the proposals contained in the fifth point of President Johnson's message to this Conference (ENDC/120). The fifth point of the President's message calls for an agreement --

"... that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards;"

It also calls upon the major nuclear Powers to --

"accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other States" (ibid., p.2).

I should like, first, to review the major international activities and policies of the United States in the field of atomic energy. Against that background, I shall then develop further those two proposals in the President's message for international safeguards.

A series of agreements for co-operation provides the basic framework within which the United States participates in peaceful nuclear activities with other countries and international organizations. These include agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and with various regional organizations active in the field. They also include bilateral agreements for co-operation with some thirty-five countries.

The nuclear materials which we have distributed abroad under agreements for co-operation are valued at approximately \$82.5 million. Reactors and critical assemblies supplied by the United States are located in twenty-four countries. Each is subject to safeguards to ensure against diversion of the materials or equipment to military uses. The system of safeguards applied bilaterally by the United States Government is administered by the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

The United States has also given its strong support to the development of an effective system of international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States bilateral system is fully consistent with that IAEA system.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

In recent years the IAEA has made significant progress towards the development of a comprehensive system of international safeguards. Agency safeguards for small reactors of less than 100,000 thermal kilowatts were adopted on 31 January 1961. Final action extending the system to large reactors of 100,000 thermal kilowatts or more was taken on 26 February 1964. That final decision of the Board of Governors of the IAEA was unanimous. In particular we welcome the co-operation of the Soviet Union in extending the Agency safeguards system. We hope that in the future the IAEA will extend further its system of safeguards to cover fuel fabrication and chemical re-processing facilities.

It is the policy of the United States to transfer the administration of safeguards under its existing bilateral agreements to the IAEA as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this policy the United States and Japan, for instance, have recently transferred to the IAEA responsibility for administering safeguards under their existing agreement for co-operation. The United States is currently negotiating additional transfers with a number of its other bilateral partners.

Some two years ago the IAEA was also invited by the United States to apply Agency safeguards to several of its own smaller research and power reactors. Three reactors in the United States are at present being inspected by the IAEA. Two are research reactors located at Brookhaven, New York; the third is a 45,500 thermal kilowatt power reactor located in Ohio. The opening of these facilities to IAEA inspection has, we believe, been a step in developing the principle of safeguarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It has also assisted the IAEA in gaining practical experience in field-testing inspection techniques.

The United States does not believe that the opening of these reactors to international inspection is a derogation from its national sovereignty. Nor is the safeguard system onerous. It involves record keeping, reporting and inspection -- the same kind of controls as prudent management would naturally set up internally. For the purposes of a safeguard system, such controls must be checked and inspected by an external agency.

For the necessary external check, we prefer international to bilateral safeguards. There is little reason for any country to doubt the objectivity of inspections conducted by an international inspectorate in which nationals of a variety of countries participate.

I should now like to develop further the United States proposals regarding international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.



(Mr. Fisher, United States)

First, the United States proposes that all future transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards. We believe that this proposal could be implemented by appropriate agreements, which would grow out of this Conference, covering all such future transfers. Fissionable materials, or raw materials or equipment essential to the production of fissionable materials, would be covered.

Suppliers would agree to transfer materials and equipment only under IAEA safeguards or similar arrangements.

Recipients would agree to receive materials or equipment only under such safeguarded arrangements.

Provisions relating to open technology and authorized visits by scientists for study and observation might also be included.

We believe that the agreement regarding transfers should, in addition, provide for the extension of IAEA or similar safeguards to an increasing number of the peaceful use facilities of all States receiving assistance.

Second, the United States proposes that the major nuclear Powers accept in an increasing number of their own peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection as recommended for other States.

As a first step in that direction, the United States has already accepted IAEA safeguards on certain of its peaceful use facilities, as I have described previously.

As a second step, the United States will invite the IAEA to apply safeguards to a large power reactor in the United States. The Yankee power reactor at Rowe, Massachusetts, has been selected for this purpose. This privately-owned reactor, which is rated at a power level of 600,000 thermal kilowatts, is one of the largest nuclear power reactors in operation in the United States. In 1963 it produced over one billion electrical kilowatt hours.

We are offering the Yankee reactor for IAEA inspection for two reasons. First, it will assist the IAEA further in developing and demonstrating the effectiveness of its inspection techniques for large reactor facilities. Second, we intend it as an example to other nuclear Powers. We hope that other States will join us in this step and invite the application of IAEA safeguards on some of their large civil reactors; indeed, we urge them, and in particular we urge the Soviet Union, to do so.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Progress towards development of an effective system of international safeguards for peaceful nuclear activities is an important objective in itself. Therefore the United States will invite IAEA inspection of the Yankee reactor whether or not other States reciprocate. But, as I have said, we urge the Soviet Union in particular to reciprocate. If it should do so, we could then discuss the possibility that we might both place additional peaceful atomic energy installations under IAEA safeguards.

Some members of the Committee may wonder about the significance of these proposals as regards a slowing-down of the arms race. Today I have talked about IAEA safeguards, not general and complete disarmament. I have talked of inspection of peaceful nuclear reactors instead of the destruction of armaments. Yet I believe that the proposals which the United States has put forward this morning could, if acted upon, produce one of the most significant developments of this Conference.

In the future, atomic energy will become an increasingly important resource for fulfilling man's daily needs. As that happens, transfers of nuclear materials between States for peaceful purposes will increase both in frequency and in size. Participation in atomic energy research and civil power programmes will become more and more widespread.

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to take the steps which will ensure that these peaceful atomic energy activities are not diverted to military purposes. It is essential to build up the international safeguards which will keep that from happening. If we do not, we shall find that in extending the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes we have not sown a field with choice seed which will ripen into a field of grain for the benefit of all mankind. We may find instead that we have sown the field with dragons' teeth and that, when harvest comes, it will bristle with nuclear weapons. What the United States proposes are practical steps to keep that from happening.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I have listened with the greatest interest to what our United States colleague has just said, and I am sure we shall all want to study very carefully the proposals he has put before us. We are all aware of the great importance which the peaceful development of atomic energy has

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

for the future of mankind, and I am sure we all share Mr. Fisher's view that it is essential that that peaceful development cannot be in any way side-tracked or diverted to military purposes.

I have asked for the floor this morning for a rather different purpose. I have done so in order to make a brief intervention on the subject of the interview given by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko, to Izvestia on 2 March (ENDC/127\*), in the course of which Mr. Gromyko took up some of the points dealt with in this Conference at its 169th meeting by my leader, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Butler. I am not going to try to deal this morning with Mr. Gromyko's answers to all the points which were put to him by Izvestia; nor do I want to over-emphasize the fact that Mr. Butler came here to put forward the ideas of the United Kingdom Government and to discuss them in this forum, whereas Mr. Gromyko apparently prefers to "admonish" the Conference -- and I could think of a much stronger phrase -- from his vantage point in Moscow upon its failure to make more rapid progress.

What I do want to do is to take up two direct comments made by Mr. Gromyko on Mr. Butler's speech made at our 169th meeting.

The first point relates to Mr. Gromyko's allegation that Mr. Butler -- and I am here about to quote from the report of the Tass international service in English on 2 March -- virtually evaded a discussion of the proposal on the retention of a restricted quantity of rocket weapons until the end of the process of disarmament. Tass reports Mr. Gromyko as saying:

"Instead of discussing the disarmament problem on its merits, Britain's Foreign Secretary urged passing it over to a laboratory; that is, to engage in an examination of technical problems."

What, in fact, did Mr. Butler say? At our meeting of 25 February Mr. Butler, after setting out what he considered to be the three essential elements or principles of disarmament, said:

"... I must say that the time for generalities and general speeches seems to me to be over. There is now a crying need for constructive work on practical problems. We must, so to speak, leave the platform for the laboratory." (ENDC/PV.169, p.9)

That, as will be clear, was a general statement which Mr. Butler developed later in his speech and upon which I shall touch again in a moment.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

However, when it came to dealing with Mr. Gromyko's proposals put forward at the last session of the General Assembly (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), Mr. Butler's comments were not what Mr. Gromyko suggests they were. If we look at the verbatim record of the 169th meeting, we shall see that Mr. Butler said that the Soviet suggestion -- meaning the proposals contained in the Soviet draft treaty outline (ENDC/2/Rev.1) --

"...that almost all the defensive nuclear armoury of our allies and of their own should be destroyed in the first stage of a disarmament treaty, which they put at only eighteen months..., seems to us to be unrealistic."

(ENDC/FV.169, p.13)

But Mr. Butler went on to say:

"However, the United Kingdom approach has always been to seek areas of agreement rather than to stress our disagreements. That is why at the United Nations General Assembly my Prime Minister, when he was Foreign Secretary, welcomed Mr. Gromyko's new proposals as an advance on his earlier ones and a step in the right direction."

(ibid., p.14)

Mr. Butler went on:

"We think, therefore, that it would be well worth while to explore the form that this 'umbrella' would take and the means by which we should reach it -- and I am sure that we should have the continued advice of the representative of the Soviet Union in this connexion. That is why the United Kingdom representatives at this Conference have asked for more particulars, in the hope that we can bring our two positions nearer together. This still seems to us to be the right way in which to proceed." (ibid.)

That is what Mr. Butler in fact said on this point; and I think it is as well to set the record straight in this respect, because it does seem that Soviet representatives at a very high level are still unable to understand why we continue to ask them, as I did myself at our last meeting, to make their proposals on this subject clearer to us.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

The second point on which Mr. Gromyko took exception to Mr. Butler's views, as indeed our Soviet colleague did on 25 February (ibid., p.28), was concerning Mr. Butler's proposals -- and I am going to quote from the question posed by Izvestia on this point --

"... for the setting up of special groups for the discussion of technical problems within the framework of the Eighteen-Nation Committee."

As I said just now, Mr. Butler had this in mind when he referred, at the beginning of his speech, to the need to "leave the platform for the laboratory". (ibid., p.9). He went on to say at a later stage of his speech:

"We should not look for a further proliferation of disarmament plans, which can too easily become a substitute for hard constructive work. ... what I believe to be urgently needed is the hard factual examination of the measures involved in disarmament, ... So I hope that as a result of these discussions it may be possible to set up working groups to study factually certain problems which are agreed upon as being the most important for the immediate future." (ibid., pp.16,17)

Mr. Gromyko's comment on this was fairly lengthy. I shall not quote it at length, but merely summarize it. He said that it was not a new proposal; that it had been made in the days of the League of Nations, when it had produced no useful results and had, indeed, been conceived for the special purpose of frustrating any proposals aimed at effective disarmament. Mr. Gromyko went on -- and here I shall quote from the Tass report:

"To refer the question of disarmament, including the question of control over disarmament, to technical groups means to hide the discussion of the problems of disarmament still further away from public opinion, to help the enemies of disarmament, those who regard the discussion of one of the cardinal problems of mankind as some kind of fencing at the conference table."

Mr. Gromyko added:

"The Soviet Government is against such an approach to the disarmament talks. It stands for honest discussions and for an agreement on effective disarmament."

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

It is perfectly correct that Mr. Butler's proposal was not a new one; but neither is the Soviet Government's reaction to it. Indeed, we heard this from our Soviet colleague (ENDC/PV.169, p.28) immediately after Mr. Butler had spoken here. Perhaps I may just give one practical example of why it seems to us in the United Kingdom that the time has come -- and I quote Mr. Butler again --

"... to set up working groups to study factually certain problems which are agreed upon as being the most important for the immediate future." (ibid., p.17)

We have had a good deal of discussion here already on the reduction of military expenditure; and the Committee will probably remember that at our meeting of 25 February there was an episode when our Soviet colleague challenged figures which Mr. Butler had used when comparing Soviet, United States and United Kingdom defence expenditures. Mr. Tsarapkin said that the figure which Mr. Butler had used as a percentage of the Soviet yearly national income -- or, as we say in the West, of gross national product -- was incorrect: that it referred to the percentage of the annual budget spent on military needs. On that basis Mr. Tsarapkin quoted a new ratio of figures between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom (ibid., pp. 28,29).

I have to say that we in the United Kingdom do not challenge the figures Mr. Tsarapkin has given for defence spending as percentages of national budgets; but we do not consider that the right basis for comparison, because the Soviet budget represents a much greater proportion of the gross national product than does either our own or the United States budget. In our system, free enterprise accounts for a very substantial segment of the national economy.

The best basis for comparison seems to us to be to work out defence spending as a percentage of gross national product. No figure of Soviet gross national product is available to us, and consequently we have to make certain calculations. The figure of 13 per cent of gross national product that we have given represents a calculation based on the best assessment we can make of the Soviet gross national product, relating this to Soviet defence expenditure as a whole, and taking account of the uncertainties involved in the pricing of capital goods in the Soviet Union,

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

which we consider are underpriced in comparison with the West. Further, in estimating the real total of Soviet expenditure on defence, we think it may well be necessary to add to the published figure other items that we think should be included, such as part of the expenditure on science.

So I suggest that there could hardly be better proof than that of the need for technical examination of the problems before us -- in this case a technical examination of the problems involved in military expenditure, and particularly how to compare national budgetary practices. I listened with particular interest to what our Canadian colleague had to say on that subject this morning. He has great experience in these matters, and I felt that his view on this point was very close to my own. Indeed, I was not altogether discouraged when I heard our Polish colleague indicate earlier that he thought these questions of military expenditure did deserve careful study in depth (Supra, p. 6). There are, of course, a number of other matters of at least equal importance before the Committee, all or most of which would benefit from the same kind of expert examination.

In conclusion, I must say again that, unless we are prepared to get down to work of this kind, our progress in this Committee is unlikely to be sufficiently speedy to allow Mr. Gromyko to change his mind about it. We shall, almost literally, not know exactly what it is that we are talking about. I remember that our Canadian colleague not so long ago reminded us that it was bad diplomacy to make agreements if afterwards it was found that those agreements were based on an inadequate understanding of the situation, which made it impossible to carry them out. (ENDC/PV.163, pp.13,14). That applies no less if we add the blessed term "in principle". I earnestly hope that it will not be long before we shall be able to pick out the subjects on which we think progress seems likely to be possible and that, having done so, we shall devote our attention to using all the technical skill which we can muster to satisfy ourselves that such agreements are not only desirable but also, in fact, realizable and workable. That is how we shall best ensure, to use Mr. Gromyko's own words, "honest discussions" and "an agreement on effective disarmament".

Mr. de SANTIAGO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I should like to join previous speakers in congratulating the Committee on the presence here of Mr. Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States, now his country's representative on our Committee, and of Mr. Trivedi, Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, and now leader of the Indian delegation. On behalf of the Mexican delegation I extend a cordial welcome to them both.

We have followed with close attention the debate on the study of measures for general and complete disarmament and of the so-called collateral measures. For our country, as President López Mateos stated in the United Nations General Assembly on 14 October 1959 -

"Disarmament is a problem of such overriding importance that nobody could refuse to consider it in any of its aspects or in whatever terms it is stated. The responsible leaders of all countries should persevere in their efforts to resolve it, examining all suggestions and probing all methods. Faced with so serious a problem, none of them should give way to disillusionment, inertia or apathy". (A/PV.828, para.19)

I think that those words are relevant today because, after six weeks of discussion, murmurs of disillusionment and pessimism are beginning to be heard. Those of us who come from the non-aligned countries are here to wield the weapons of persuasion, because we have faith in positive solutions.

As today's meeting is devoted to the consideration of collateral measures, I propose to make a few comments on some of the proposals that have been submitted to us.

Proposals have been advanced in this Committee for halting the arms race. Among them I may mention those relating to the freezing of nuclear delivery vehicles proposed by the United States (ENDC/120), the reduction of military budgets suggested by the Soviet Union (ENDC/123), the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the reduction in the production of fissionable material for war purposes, and other proposals the Committee should study in an attempt to reach an agreement which, in addition to leading to general and complete disarmament, would reduce international tension and release resources for the economic improvement of the so-called under-developed countries, thus promoting the realization of the idea suggested by the Brazilian representative (ENDC/126).



(Mr. de Santiago, Mexico)

Throughout its history, Mexico has always emphasized the virtue of friendship and its unshakable belief in the peaceful co-existence of peoples, and we are sincerely determined to achieve peace. We have given practical proof that peace is a possibility. Together with other Latin-American countries, we have contributed - at least to a large extent - to the establishment of harmonious relations between the nations of our continent. We have never constituted a threat in America; we are developing in an atmosphere of respect and mutual understanding, and we are inspired by a strong desire for collaboration.

As a people, we are hostile to armaments and war, and our military budget, framed within extremely narrow limits, has the sole and exclusive purpose of meeting the requirements of internal security. It may be said that, for many years past, Mexico has solved this problem within its national framework. Some countries might perhaps lighten the overwhelming burden represented by expenditure on war material at a time when the economic development of Latin America calls for the greatest concentration of resources. But we are convinced that in order to overcome the handicap of their inadequate development, some of our countries also need to help themselves by hard work and creative imagination. We are putting forward these considerations with due respect for the sovereignty of each nation and with no desire to interfere in the domestic or external affairs of others.

Among other things, my country attached importance to the motion put forward by President Alessandri of Chile in November 1959 in which, although he made no reference to Mexico, he said:

"Latin America must not become a consumer market for armaments in excess of reasonable requirements for defence against aggression. Still less should that occur at the cost of the prosperity of its peoples, because such expenditure retards the economic development of the countries of which it is composed."

There are joint declarations on the same problem by the Governments of Chile and Mexico, signed at Santiago in January 1960; by Brazil and Mexico, signed at Mexico City on 10 April 1962; and again recently by Chile and Mexico, signed at Mexico City on 17 December 1962. I think that all these facts have contributed to reduce tension and that our efforts have not been useless in eliminating the threat of war. Those agreements rest upon the common interest of all concerned, to employ

(Mr. de Santiago, Mexico)

an expression used by Mr. Foster on 27 February, (ENDC/PV.170 p.49), and the intentions of our States with regard to the problem of disarmament have been plainly stated, as Mr. Tsarapkin asked on 13 February (ENDC/PV.166, p.38). We are glad to repeat the remark made by the United States representative Mr. Foster:

"Let us keep firmly in mind the benefits which will accrue to mankind through the savings which actual disarmament will make possible."

(ENDC/PV.168, p.21)

It is our impression that those remarks substantially coincide with the Brazilian proposal and other declarations of Heads of State of some of the countries of our continent. There can be no doubt that -

"... it is most important that the example of the Soviet Union and the United States in this field should be followed by other States,"

(ibid., p.19)

as the Soviet Union representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, said on 20 February. We are ready to collaborate within the compass of Latin America, of our continent, and of the world as a whole to ensure that men, despite the threat of arms, should reach mutual understanding.

I do not propose to deal in detail with the Brazilian representative's proposal, for I think it might be prudent to await the report mentioned in General Assembly resolution 1931 (XVIII) which is quoted in the Brazilian Working Paper. This will be submitted at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, which is the right place for discussion of the establishment and operation of the proposed fund.

Mexico and Brazil share the same ideals, the same feelings and the same realizable hopes, and we are therefore confident that the ideas of Brazilians and Mexicans will substantially coincide with regard to the proposals of the representatives of the States forming part of our Committee.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Before taking up the questions with which I intend to deal in my statement today, I should like to reply briefly to the representative of the United Kingdom.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The statement made by Sir Paul Mason today in defence of the views and proposals expressed by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Butler, in his statement in the Committee on 25 February (ENDC/PV.169) failed to produce anything new on the substance of the matter. We consider that the evaluation given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. A.A. Gromyko (ENDC/127\*), to these views and proposals of Mr. Butler has in no way been refuted by Sir Paul Mason. That evaluation remains fully valid.

Today Sir Paul Mason indulged in the same unfounded evaluations, practically out of the blue, concerning the military expenditures of the Soviet Union which also figured in the statement of the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom in the Committee when he said that 13 per cent of the gross national product of the Soviet Union went on military expenditures (ENDC/PV.169, p.15). This evaluation of Soviet military expenditures is essentially incorrect and is a product of the free fantasy of the authors of these unscientific and unfounded statements.

As the discussions on collateral disarmament measures in the Eighteen-Nation Committee have shown, the majority of the representatives who have made statements have shown great interest in the question of reducing military budgets. We note with satisfaction that nearly all the representatives in the Committee have spoken in favour of reducing military budgets, and that the majority of the members of the Committee have a positive attitude towards the proposal of the Soviet Union for the reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent (ENDC/123).

At the same time we cannot but express our concern that the representatives of the Western Powers have so far shown no desire to reach agreement on the question of reducing military budgets. In their endeavour to prove the impossibility of carrying out this measure at the present time, they have put forward a number of objections to the reduction of military budgets. All their arguments and proofs are unfounded and unconvincing. Let us consider them one by one.

1. The first objection boils down to the following: they state that at present there are a number of unsolved territorial and other problems and that, until these outstanding international problems are settled, States cannot agree to reduce their military budgets. The conclusion is that the relaxation of international tension and the settlement of contentious international problems are a prerequisite for the solution of the problem of reducing military expenditures.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It seems to us that such an approach to the matter is wrong and unjustified. In fact, in international life there have always constantly been and there will always arise international problems calling for settlement. There is no justification whatsoever for the demand that contentious territorial and other international problems should be solved as a condition for reducing armaments or cutting down expenditures for military purposes. The task is precisely to bring about some relaxation of international tension by carrying out such a measure as a partial solution of the disarmament problem - if, of course, it is not possible to solve this problem in a more radical way, through general and complete disarmament.

The very fact of agreement to reduce military expenditures would undoubtedly have a positive influence on the development of the international situation. All the members of the Committee emphasized that the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests, and the reaching of agreement on renunciation of the use of outer space for placing nuclear weapons in orbit, have substantially improved the international situation. Therefore there can be no doubt whatsoever that the reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, proposed by the Soviet Union, would also be a substantial contribution towards improving the international situation, and would help towards slowing down the armaments race and achieving agreement on other disarmament problems. We consider the argument advanced by the Western Powers that outstanding international problems must be settled before a start is made to reduce military expenditures to be completely unjustified and merely aimed at evading agreement on one of the urgent collateral measures in the field of disarmament.

2. The second objection is as follows: the representatives of the Western Powers state that agreement must first be reached on the material destruction of some specific type of weapon - or even not destruction, but "freezing" - and that then the problem of reducing military budgets will solve itself - that is, automatically.

In this connexion we should like to emphasize that the Soviet Union considers it necessary to reach agreement on the reduction or elimination of specific types of armaments. The memorandum which the Soviet Government submitted for the consideration of our Conference (ENDC/123) contains proposals for the reduction of the numbers of armed forces and the elimination of bomber aircraft, while the

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Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1) proposes even more far-reaching measures for the progressive elimination of specific types of weapons. As the negotiations show, however, the representatives of the Western Powers put forward objections against the elimination of any specific types of armaments under the pretext that such elimination would change in an unfavourable direction the balance of forces between the countries of the West and of the East.

It was precisely in order to obviate these arguments of the Western Powers, and to avoid all the complications and difficulties which arise through the fault of the Western Powers whenever we start considering proposals for the elimination of specific types of armaments, that the Soviet Government put forward the reduction of military budgets as a separate collateral measure. The implementation of this measure would not affect the existing balances of forces, since all States, and in the first place the most powerful ones militarily, would reduce their military undertakings by an agreed proportion.

3. As their third objection, the representatives of the Western Powers assert that the implementation of the proposal for the reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent would not have the same importance for different States. Thus States having large military budgets would have to reduce their expenditures to a greater extent than States with smaller military budgets. It is self-evident that in this matter we cannot ask all States to reduce their budgets by an equivalent amount. The whole process of disarmament envisages that the militarily most powerful States will have to reduce and destroy a larger quantity of weapons and disband more military units than small and medium-sized States. But the percentage reduction of military budgets would not change the existing balance of forces, since all States would have to reduce their military expenditures in equal proportions.

4. As their fourth objection, the representatives of the Western Powers point out that there are obstacles of a constitutional nature to a further reduction of military budgets at the present time. We should like to stress that this aspect of the question is outside the competence of our Committee. Constitutional and similar problems relate exclusively to the internal competence of States. It would be absolutely unjustified and inappropriate to consider these questions here in the Committee. If States are advocates

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and not opponents of disarmament, they will naturally find ways and means of bringing their internal constitutional procedures into line with an agreement on any particular disarmament problem.

5. The fifth objection is as follows: as an "argument" against an agreement to reduce military budgets, the representatives of the Western Powers put forward the difficulty of solving the problem of verification of the fulfilment by States of their obligations to reduce military appropriations. This was mentioned today by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns (supra., pp.10 et seq.)

Such an "argument" can in no way be considered valid. Verification of the fulfilment by States of their obligations to reduce military expenditures is not more complicated but simpler than verification of the fulfilment of the obligations of States to reduce some specific types of armaments or numbers of armed forces. As we pointed out on 13 February, we do not see any obstacles to considering and reaching agreement on the necessary control over the reduction of military expenditures, when we are concerned with an agreement on the reduction of the military budgets of States (ENDC/PV.166, pp.37, 38). We are prepared to discuss the specific aspects of this question if we come to an agreement on the reduction of military expenditures. We are convinced that the problem of control over the reduction of military budgets could be solved positively, and in our opinion it can in no way be an obstacle to the conclusion of such an agreement.

Thus we cannot admit as valid any of the objections to the reduction of military budgets which the representatives of the Western Powers have put forward here in the Committee, as well as in informal talks. All these objections show that the Western Powers are not yet prepared to consider specific aspects of the problem of reducing military budgets - this most effective and most easily implemented collateral measure, which has met with the greatest support from the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

We cannot, of course, disregard the fact that at the present time the United States and its Western partners are not yet prepared to reach agreement in the Committee on the reduction of military budgets. At the same time we do not consider that the representatives of the Western Powers have said their last word - or at least we hope they have not. Our hope in this connexion is strengthened by the circumstance that the Soviet proposal for the reduction of

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military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent has been made with due regard to the fact that a similar proposal was put forward by the United States Government itself in 1957. As is well known, at that time the United States delegation in the United Nations Sub-Committee on Disarmament proposed, among other measures which States should carry out in the first place, the reduction of military budgets by 10 per cent. It is characteristic that at that time the United States delegation did not in any way consider the proposal to be difficult to carry out because of any "peculiarities" of United States legislation or because of any constitutional procedures. Bearing this in mind, we hope that now, after a more careful study of the proposal for the reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, which essentially coincides with the aforementioned United States proposal, the Governments of the Western Powers and, in particular, the Government of the United States will deem it possible to go forward to meet the countries supporting this proposal and that we shall be able to solve this important problem in the interests of peace.

Therefore we consider it necessary to continue to keep the question of reducing the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent constantly within the field of vision of the Committee. We shall continue to exert all our efforts to persuade the Western Powers to change their negative attitude towards this problem. Meanwhile, in order to avoid a complete standstill or deadlock in the work of the Committee, we propose once again, as a first step towards the implementation of a reduction in military budgets, the drafting and adoption of a declaration or appeal to all other States to set about reducing their military budgets, on the basis of the policy of "mutual example" as shown by the Soviet Union and the United States, which have taken certain steps to reduce their military expenditures.

We should now like to give some full explanations of another Soviet proposal - the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. This proposal is contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Government of 28 January 1964 on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension (ENDC/123).

In one of our previous statements (ENDC/PV.160, pp.11, 12) we have already stressed the great significance that the Soviet Union attaches to the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. We have pointed out the widely-known recent events which confirm the urgency of this Soviet proposal. Every day we see more and more clearly the tremendous harm which

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the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries is causing to all peoples. The presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries causes much harm not only to the peoples of the countries where the troops are stationed, but also to the peoples of the States whose governments have sent these troops to foreign countries, to territories which are not infrequently many thousand miles away from their national boundaries.

If we were to shade on a political map of the modern world the countries and territories in which foreign troops are stationed, the shading would cover more than half of all the countries of the world. Here are some facts which are astounding in these days. At present United States troops are scattered throughout the world and are stationed in the territories of forty-one countries. Over a million United States troops, or about 40 per cent of all the United States armed forces, are serving beyond the national boundaries of the United States. British and French troops are stationed in the territories of dozens of countries.

We are now witnessing an unprecedented situation, in which many countries are actually living under conditions of systematic foreign military occupation. This means that the world is living, as it were, in war-time conditions, although nearly two decades have passed since the Second World War. In our last statement on this question we pointed out that if the presence of troops in the territories of foreign countries leads to a worsening of the international situation, the enormous concentration of foreign troops in the territories of European States has a particularly pernicious effect on the development of international relations.

Taking into account the importance of this question, the Soviet Government has on a number of occasions put forward proposals aimed at withdrawing, or at least reducing, the foreign troops in Europe. Unfortunately our proposals have fallen on deaf ears where the Western Powers are concerned. They have not met the response they deserve from the representatives of the Western Powers. In objecting to this proposal they invariably assert that the withdrawal of foreign troops, and in particular the troops of the United States, from the territories of Western Europe would upset the "balance of forces" and would bring about some sort of military advantage for the Warsaw Treaty countries.



(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Let us examine these arguments more carefully. In the first place, what strikes us is that those who put forward such arguments are thinking in the out-of-date terms of the first half of the twentieth century. They absolutely ignore the fact that at the present time strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons and, primarily, intercontinental missiles are the basis on which the balance of forces is determined. But precisely this decisive type of weapon is not affected by the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. Neither the quantity of these delivery vehicles nor their distribution - that is, the location of the intercontinental missiles held by the two sides - is altered by this proposal.

Secondly, no considerations of security can justify the continued maintenance of foreign troops in the territories of European States. On the contrary, it is fraught with serious dangers both for those States and for peace throughout the world, since it creates in that area an atmosphere saturated to the limit with explosives, where a small spark could be enough to set a world nuclear war ablaze. It is characteristic that the most zealous defenders of the maintenance of foreign troops in Europe are the militarist circles of the Federal Republic of Germany, who are hatching plans for revenge, since for them, for those circles in Western Germany, any prospect of peace would mean the failure of their aggressive revanchist plans. That is why the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany reacts so nervously to any reports about a possible withdrawal or even reduction of foreign troops.

Thirdly and lastly, let us consider what the situation in Europe would be from the military point of view after a reciprocal withdrawal of Soviet and United States troops. According to official Western data, NATO has 56 divisions in all the European areas. Six of these divisions belong to the United States and one brigade belongs to Canada. Thus, after withdrawal of the six United States divisions to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, NATO would have 50 divisions at its disposal in Europe. Moreover, practically the entire army of Western Germany, which now constitutes the basis of the NATO forces in Europe, is stationed in Central Europe, directly on the borders dividing the countries adhering to NATO and to the Warsaw Treaty.

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Furthermore, one should also bear in mind the fact that at a distance of 200 to 300 kilometres from the army of Western Germany there will be the French, Belgian, Netherlands and Danish armies, numbering roughly 650,000 men according to official data. In fact, given modern transport facilities, these troops constitute a kind of operational reserve, which can be utilized immediately.

At the same time, all the Soviet armed forces stationed in Central Europe would have to withdraw from the line dividing the two groups in Europe to a distance of 1,000 or more kilometres away. In the light of these facts, how can one say with a straight face that the implementation of the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of troops from Europe would result in some sort of threat to the security of the NATO countries and, in particular, to Italy, as Mr. Cavalletti says? When the representatives of the United States object to the withdrawal of troops from Europe, they have mainly Western Germany in mind. But everyone knows that the portraying of Germany as a defenceless lamb threatened with danger from the East was one of the favourite devices of the German militarists in the days between the First and Second World Wars. This argument played a not inconsiderable part when Germany was trying to get rid of the limitations of the Versailles Treaty and to obtain further American milliards for its rearmament.

The implementation of the Soviet proposals could cause neither military nor political harm to any European State; at the same time it would considerably strengthen the security of all the countries of Europe, both Eastern and Western.

The sooner all these troops are withdrawn from the territory of European countries, the more stable will peace be on this continent and throughout the world and the less will be the danger of the outbreak of war. We hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will duly consider this Soviet proposal, which is prompted by the desire to strengthen universal peace.

On a political map of the modern world one can clearly see that the centres of possible conflicts appear precisely where there are foreign military bases and foreign troops. The facts show that the presence of foreign troops is one of the main causes of conflicts, of which the populations of the countries in whose territories foreign troops are stationed and foreign military bases are located become the victims. The presence of foreign troops leads to such a situation that in these countries any incident, even if it is insignificant at first,

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may lead to serious international crises fraught with far-reaching consequences. Foreign troops actively hinder the peoples and governments of the countries where they are stationed from settling their internal affairs and solving their own problems without outside interference.

The facts of recent times show a trend towards a further aggravation of an already dangerous situation. Reinforcements - battalions, regiments and divisions - are hastily being sent out from the mother country, and plans are being hatched to send other troops to countries and areas where there are as yet none. In discussing this question we are compelled to point out the extreme danger to peace in the Mediterranean area inherent in the despatching of further contingents of British troops to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, the people and Government of which have unequivocally declared themselves in favour of annulling the shackling agreements under which military bases of the United Kingdom have been maintained in the territory of the Republic. Instead of yielding to the legitimate demand of the people of Cyprus, the NATO States urgently tried to make plans for the further occupation of Cyprus by foreign troops of the NATO countries. They arranged matters so that the territory of the Republic of Cyprus would be occupied not only by British but also by United States troops, and even by troops of the West German Bundeswehr. What causes profound concern is the fact that the politicians and statesmen of the Western Powers, in making these adventurist plans, close their eyes to the extremely dangerous consequences which they entail for the peace of the world.

Serious concern is aroused also by the activities of foreign troops in Asia and Africa, in countries whose populations up till recently were in the grip of the colonial yoke but have now taken the path of national independence and do not wish to put up with the presence of foreign troops in their territories. The NATO Powers, who are concerned solely with this matter, do not wish to leave these countries in peace and are hindering their independent development in every way. States members of NATO which have stationed their troops in these countries are seeking every possible opportunity to consolidate their hold there as thoroughly as possible and for a longer time, and for that purpose they are striving above all to prolong the presence of their troops, the number of which is constantly increasing under various pretexts.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In recent weeks the attention of world public opinion has been drawn to East Africa. After military demonstrations by the United Kingdom and other Western Powers against a young State, the People's Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba, United Kingdom troops have been sent to other East African countries: Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. They have disarmed the soldiers of the national military forces of those countries. The United Kingdom command has established military control over the main strategic points of those East African countries, which are independent, by stationing several thousand British soldiers there. Considerable naval forces of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America are concentrated off the shores of East Africa. The United Kingdom command has ordered its military units stationed in Great Britain, in Northern Ireland, on the Island of Malta and in Western Germany to be in full combat readiness for dispatch to East Africa at any moment if necessary.

The present scope of the military operations of its troops in East Africa shows that the United Kingdom command is taking advantage of the existing situation to develop extensive military action against the peoples of the recently-liberated East African countries, thus making their independence illusory and ephemeral. This military action pursues the aim of maintaining and strengthening the military strategic positions of the United Kingdom, trampling on the sovereignty and national interests of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, and threatening the freedom and independence of other African countries.

Foreign garrisons are being increased in Malaya and Borneo, where an attempt is being made to prop up that very unstable formation the Federation of Malaysia, with British bayonets. This fact is seriously aggravating the situation in South East Asia. Foreign troops become a force in support of a coup d'état, as, for instance, in South Viet-nam, or a coup de force as in Gabon, in order to maintain in power puppet dictators who lack any support by the people.

United States intervention in South Viet-nam is continuing and is being intensified. United States troops have occupied that country and are behaving in it if it were their own: they liquidate one dictator, put another in his place, bring about palace revolutions, and literally perform gendarme and police functions. United States occupation of South Viet-nam, in view of the heroic resistance of its people, is now accompanied by a destructive war of aggression against the Viet-namese. It is well known that plans are now being prepared in

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the United States to extend United States military intervention northwards against an independent sovereign State - the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam. This armed interference by the United States in the lives of the peoples of South East Asia is an extremely dangerous playing with fire, which will lead to serious consequences unless it is stopped.

To justify the armed interference of the Western Powers in the affairs of other peoples, specially-invented theories have made their appearance which bear the obvious stamp of colonial imperialistic policy. These theories set out to prove that the presence of foreign troops in various countries and areas of the world is even indispensable. The question arises: indispensable for whom? One of the varieties of these theories is that of the so-called concept of a "vacuum", according to which, without the presence of foreign troops - that is, without the armed forces of NATO - countries allegedly cannot develop normally along the path of national independence. Without asking the peoples for their opinion, the NATO countries arrogate to themselves the role of "guardians" - or rather, gendarmes - in the States of Africa and Asia.

It is this concept of a "vacuum" that is used to justify the sending of United States armed forces to the area of the Indian Ocean, although hitherto, precisely because no foreign troops, or hardly any, were there, no international disputes have arisen in that area. Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense of the United States, based himself on this erroneous concept when, in his recent statement to the United States Congress on the question of the military budget, he called for an intensification of military intervention by the United States in the political life of other countries of the world, and very clearly made it understood that the wishes of the populations of those countries could be disregarded. In this connexion we cannot fail to recall the bloody events in Panama, where foreign troops opened fire on the unarmed population - events which aroused indignation throughout the world.

The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Butler, referred at a recent meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to certain "peace-keeping commitments all over the world" (ENDC/PV.169, p.14) which are allegedly incumbent upon the Government of the United Kingdom. At the same time he even tried to justify an increase in the military budget of the United Kingdom by such

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"commitments", and also dragged in the concept of setting up forces which "could be speedily deployed and sent to any trouble-spot in the world" (ibid., p.8). In essence, all these statements are based on recognition of a "right" (I put the word "right" in inverted commas) to send foreign troops to any particular country and to ride roughshod over the will of the peoples of such countries. But who, in fact, has granted such a right, and who has empowered foreign troops to become the rulers of the political destinies of other States against the will of their peoples? To support his statement Mr. Butler referred to the events in Cyprus as an example. But precisely that example convincingly testifies to the contrary, to the fact that, if there were no foreign troops or military bases, the people of Cyprus could have solved their internal problems long ago.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, replying to the questions of a correspondent of Izvestiya, said on 2 March 1964 that no State has any grounds for assuming the right to perpetuate the maintenance of its forces and military bases on the territories of other States. The attempt to assume the right to fulfil some kind of police functions in relation to other States by the use of a State's own forces and bases outside its own national frontiers expresses an aggressive trend in foreign policy. The world has recently witnessed new evidence confirming that foreign troops and foreign military bases are a serious source of international complications. The nations resolutely condemn this policy (ENDC/127\*, pp.7, 8).

Mr. Gromyko stated that one of the principal problems calling for solution is that of withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States, or at least, as an urgent measure, reducing their number (ibid., p.7). The Soviet Government has always insisted and will continue to insist on a solution to this problem. Recent events clearly confirm that the struggle for the withdrawal of foreign troops is one of the most important historical trends of our time. The development of this trend has already led to the evacuation of foreign bases in Morocco and the liquidation of the French base at Bizertia in Tunisia, and there are reports of the forthcoming liquidation of foreign bases in Libya. Another manifestation of this trend is the recent statement of the Government of Ceylon that in future it will not allow ships to enter its ports,

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or aircraft to land at its air-fields, if they are carrying nuclear weapons. The trend is also shown by the resolution adopted by the Conference of Heads of African States and Governments at Addis Ababa in May 1963, which contains a demand for the liquidation of the military occupation of the African continent. Incidentally, I would remind you that this resolution of the Addis Ababa Conference has been issued as a document of our Committee under symbol number ENDC/93/Rev.1 of 18 June 1963, and is before the Committee.

Our task is to support in every way this undoubtedly progressive trend, which leads to the strengthening of the independence of States and to a really stable peace, and not to go in for quibbles in order to retain by all means the right to maintain troops in the territories of other countries and thereby to retain the possibility of pressure or direct armed intervention by foreign troops in the internal affairs of other States. In essence, that is what Mr. Butler suggested to us in his statement to the Committee.

We are firmly opposed to such views, which are contrary both to the United Nations Charter and to the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, adopted at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, which unequivocally prohibits the use of armed force against peoples which have taken the path of national independence (A/RES/1514 (XV)). Foreign troops which are the instrument of foreign domination and oppression must be withdrawn from the territories of other countries. The implementation of this measure would greatly reduce tension in international relations and improve the international situation.

Mr. de CASTRO (Brazil) (translation from French): Allow me to add a few brief remarks to the very interesting discussion we have had today in the Committee.

First, I should like to stress that we listened with the greatest interest to the remarks made on two very important collateral measures: the reduction of military budgets, and the peaceful use of atomic energy. I consider these two measures very interesting, because they can enable us to reach our desired objective: disarmament as part of our work for peace.

I should like to devote especial attention today to the reduction of military budgets, because my delegation considers that this measure would be the most

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practical, effective, reasonable, sure and easy method of progressively achieving disarmament. We all realize that it would be futile to expect sudden disarmament. However, while we cannot halt the arms race all at once, we must at least endeavour to slow it down. As we see it, an indirect but effective way of doing this would be to reduce gradually the resources fed into the "armaments mill" - that is to say, financial resources.

We therefore believe that it is proper, desirable and reasonable to give priority in our Committee to a discussion of this problem of reducing military budgets. That does not mean in the least that we think we should concentrate on this problem to the exclusion of all others; for there are other very important problems. Moreover, the reduction of military budgets is closely linked with other collateral measures. We consider that, in order to disarm, a certain number of pertinent measures must be envisaged. But we are compelled, for procedural reasons and practical purposes, to concentrate on a certain number of measures and to go into them thoroughly. We cannot work without a method, speaking today on one subject, tomorrow on another, and then, the day after that, broaching a third subject without in the end achieving any results. That would be a sterile approach.

In my view - and, I believe, in that of everyone else - we are here to achieve results. Our task is to achieve general and complete disarmament, overcoming all difficulties, all procedural and political obstacles which may arise. To overcome them, we must study each problem before us in a serious manner.

The problem of military budgets is a serious one, and lies at the root of all the others; for, in peace as in war, everything depends on economics. Consequently, if we are to study the problems before our Committee seriously, in order to find a solution for them, we must study the economic basis of armaments and of the arms race.

We are therefore very pleased to see that the proposal submitted by my delegation to this Committee in the form of a working document (ENDC/126), aimed at persuading the Committee to study the problem of reducing military budgets, retains its full importance in relation to two other problems: the economic reconversion of the world from a war to a peace economy; and international assistance - or rather, co-operation, a term better suited to the susceptibilities of those peoples who have developed a new political consciousness - to promote a fresh economic balance in the world.



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Our proposal, presented as a working document, met with a favourable response, and there was support for a discussion of this problem. I think this working document served a useful purpose, and I am glad of it, for the matter has now been under serious study for two weeks. A step has been made in the right direction, and I wish to take this opportunity of expressing our most sincere thanks to all the delegations - from the Italian delegation which was the first to speak, to those who have spoken today on this matter, those of Poland and Mexico. I thank all those who have expressed an opinion, either to show their interest in the subject or to support our proposal as a whole or in some of its aspects; for that encourages us to continue to do all in our power to make a modest contribution to this gigantic task we have undertaken.

I represent here a country whose strength lies solely in its weakness in war. Since we are weak in war, perhaps we may presume that we shall be strong in peace. We are, indeed, strong in one respect. We are strong because we are convinced that we must do everything possible to achieve a genuine peace, a peace founded on justice and not on the force which we do not possess and which, in our view, is not the ideal way of solving the problems of the present-day world.

In expressing these thanks I must in certain cases go somewhat further. I must tender especial thanks to the delegation of India for Mr. Nehru's comments on the day of his departure (ENDC/FV.170, pp.24 et seq). He made a speech in which he not only expressed his views on our proposal, but also made a profound analysis of its merit and substance. In addition, he asked whether we could provide certain supplementary explanations which would place his delegation - and the Government of India - in a better position to evaluate our proposal.

Whilst expressing our thanks to the Indian delegation for its interest in our project, I should like to give some brief explanations in reply to the questions put here by its leader. He mentioned three aspects. He asked first of all (ibid., p.29) whether it was necessary to create a new fund to use the savings which would be achieved as a result of reductions in military budgets. We must explain ourselves clearly on this point.

It is neither our intention nor in our interest to create new agencies. There are quite enough already; for, in our opinion, one of the weak points of the United Nations is the proliferation of agencies between which there is perhaps

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some collaboration, but not always an adequate degree of constructive co-operation. A desire to collaborate and co-operate is one thing, but co-ordination is another. And it is proper co-ordination which is lacking; without that, one sometimes gets lost.

We do not wish to insist on the creation of new agencies, which might perhaps arouse certain apprehensions in the Indian and other delegations. What we do want is, with the savings achieved through a reduction in military budgets, to establish a fund - it would perhaps be more appropriate to say adequate funds - to be used for economic reconversion and for development; in other words, to devote the savings from the war budget to a peace economy.

That is our idea, which in essence is fully in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations, and indeed with the most recent trends of thought in the United Nations. If we consult the United Nations documents of February, we see that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, has just proposed the creation of what he calls a United Nations development programme to carry on the development decade which started two years ago. To implement this programme he advocates in a special report the merging of the United Nations Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance into one big development fund. It is in this spirit that we wish to establish a fund and that in the last part of our working document we recommend the establishment within our Committee of a working group composed of a certain number of representatives, whose task would be to make studies and submit recommendations to our Committee. If our Committee recommended the establishment of the fund, the Secretary-General of the United Nations could, for example, transmit that opinion to the Economic and Social Council, as he did when advocating the adoption of his United Nations Development Programme, on which occasion an ad hoc committee - to which the delegation of Brazil has the honour to belong - was set up to prepare a report. It was with that intention that our working paper was prepared.

The second question raised by Mr. Nehru is as follows. If the developing countries manage to achieve savings in their military budgets, should they, who have so many needs and are terribly short of capital, contribute to this fund and renounce these savings? I say Yes, on the lines indicated in our working paper. What in fact do we recommend in that document? We suggest that 80 per cent of the savings be used by the same countries which achieved them, and that only 20 per cent be made over to the fund.

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What do I intend to do with that 20 per cent? To give the needy and developing countries the right to say that they are giving as well as receiving. As I see it, we must do away with the idea that there are giver and receiver countries, since all countries both give and receive. We know that, with such an attitude and with the new political consciousness which now prevails, we can obtain throughout the world what I refuse to call assistance but call co-operation and economic and social solidarity. Thus countries like India and Brazil can both give and receive.

There is nothing new about this idea. When I was President of the FAO Council, I advocated the setting-up of an international food fund, and the World Food Programme was created. All countries participate in it and contribute their food surpluses, for every country in the world, even the neediest, the most impoverished, is likely to have a surplus of certain products; some, even, have nothing but surpluses - coffee, sugar and so forth. It is in this spirit that I wish to devote such parts of the military budgets as are superfluous - for after all we are trying to disarm at this Conference - to the establishment of a fund for the economic development of the world, which is a very important matter, as I shall try to demonstrate in reply to another question raised by the representative of India.

The third question raised by the representative of India is the following. Is the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the right forum for a discussion of this problem? Yes it is; and I think I can easily show why. The first reason is that we should not have the money we need without the savings obtained from the military budgets. Where should this matter be debated if not in the Disarmament Conference? That is why we must, from the outset, discuss this problem here. The second reason is that we advocate the establishment of this fund because we consider that the economic imbalance of the world is a major factor of social tension, perhaps just as serious as the factors denounced here today by Mr. Tsarapkin as a menace to peace. The gulf between the needy, poor and underdeveloped countries and the rich, industrialized and developed countries is as great as the ideological gulf between the socialist and capitalist worlds, if not greater. Our aim is to diminish social tensions in the world so as to avoid those explosions which could lead to the ultimate catastrophe.

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For these two reasons, I consider that the problem should be discussed in our Committee. That is not to say that the subject will be exhausted in the Committee. No. As we see it, the Committee, after making a serious study of the Subject, as it has indeed already done, can prepare a report in the sense of a formal recommendation to the Secretary-General. If we achieve this agreement which I have so much at heart, it will be for the Secretary-General, and therefore for the United Nations, to make a detailed study of the most effective, realistic and reasonable method of establishing an effective fund. That was the idea underlying our working paper.

Such were the comments and facts which I wanted to submit to the delegation of India, as a token of Brazil's gratitude for the interest shown by the Indian delegation in the question we have had the honour to raise in the Committee.

In addition to those especial thanks, I should also like to thank the Polish representative, Mr. Blusztajn, very sincerely for his reference to our proposal (supra., p.9). In his very interesting speech, which I followed with great attention for its great clarity and remarkable depth, he stressed two points with which we entirely agree. Indeed, both the speech in which I introduced our working paper (ENDC/PV.166, pp.5 et seq) and the text of that document itself contain the same ideas though perhaps less well expressed, as the Polish representative's speech today, and those ideas were put forward in the same spirit and with the same desire to find a solution to this problem. He said this morning that the point to be emphasized was that the trend manifested in the spontaneous statements made by the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the subject of budget reductions must be maintained and strengthened, and that we must not hesitate to follow up such a promising beginning. In the introduction to our working paper we too said that all Governments should be urged to show their desire for peace by practical measures and by making similar reductions in their military budgets. The representative of Poland reaffirmed that today.

Our Conference should launch a universal appeal. If I understood the representative of Poland correctly, he does not want to lay down a fixed percentage but would like each country to determine a reasonable percentage for itself. We entirely agree with him on this point, particularly since it would thus be possible to overcome certain difficulties on which I should now like to dwell.

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One of these difficulties was stressed by certain nations, such as the United States of America, whose delegate, Mr. Foster, was very sympathetic to our proposal (ibid., pp.15, 16); he was, however, reticent about the possibility of adopting a definite position, mainly because in his country budgetary problems are the concern of Congress (ENDC/FV.170, p.7). A constitutional difficulty is involved here. However, I do not consider personally that this difficulty is insurmountable, for I know that the United States has surmounted it in certain specific cases. During the budget debate in various international organizations the United States delegation is obliged to make the following statement: "We can only adopt a limited budget. For us that is a ceiling, because Congress has fixed that limit for us." But whenever international organizations have adopted budgets above that ceiling - as has often happened, particularly at the last debate on the FAO budget, which I attended - the United States has found a way to overcome its constitutional difficulties and fulfil its international commitments.

I do not think that in this case there will be any difficulties which cannot be overcome again, so I am optimistic that in time we shall also obtain the support of the United States of America for our project. Moreover, I have already noticed two very pertinent facts which permit us to hope for a favourable attitude. Allow me to quote an article published by that influential newspaper The New York Times in its international edition. On 26 February, under the heading "Poverty and Disarmament", which touches us closely since it links the problems of development with those of disarmament, we read these lines, which are relevant to this attitude which I should like to see increasingly affirmed by the United States delegation: (continued in English)

"The conquest of poverty will be neither swift nor cheap. For the first year President Johnson says he hopes to make nearly a billion dollars in new money available for Federal antipoverty programs. However, the indications are that the amount actually to be spent for the 1964-65 fiscal year will not exceed one-third that amount. This is perhaps as much as can be usefully applied at the start; but vastly larger appropriations will be necessary later if the assault is to attain the massive dimensions essential to chop away the root causes of dependency.

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"The nations's awareness of this need comes just as it has been found possible to make the first modest cuts in the billion-dollar-a-week military budget. What could be more appropriate than to establish now, as a matter of conscious national policy, a clear link between cutbacks in defence spending and increased investment in human welfare and community services?"

The article ended with these words:

"By a decision now that a large part of the funds released from defense will be earmarked for schools, housing, health and public works, the movement away from military war could be coupled with a movement forward in the war against poverty. By this example, a powerful spur would simultaneously be applied to other governments to make similar commitments for reallocation of their resources to peaceful programs. The campaign against poverty could eventually be turned into the worldwide undertaking it must be for true security and the abolition of want."

(continued in French)

That is why I feel that there are certain latent possibilities of our reaching a sort of consensus, an agreement, on this problem.

Mr. Tsarapkin said today (supra., p.30) that no other subject had met with such a large measure of approval. That is to say, more members of this Committee had declared themselves willing to study this problem of reducing military budgets than any other problem. I agree with him, and therefore consider that we should persist in our desire to analyse this problem. The representative of Canada pointed out very rightly that the matter is complex and complicated (supra., p.13) I am in agreement with him, too. That is why the question must be gone into thoroughly. We cannot launch into problems of this type without knowing them well. But that is no reason for not studying them. On the contrary, if a problem is complex and complicated from the start, we must analyse it and increase our knowledge of its various aspects, so as to master it and be able to find a solution. I repeat, we must continue to lay stress on this problem.

I should also like to thank the representative of Mexico, Mr. de Santiago, for his observations on our proposal, and particularly his statement that his country wishes to be always in agreement with mine (supra., p.26). Mexico

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and Brazil are united in defence of the ideals of peace; they have always worked together to achieve the denuclearization of Latin America. In fact it is thanks to the efforts of our two Presidents, Lopez Mateos of Mexico and João Goulart of Brazil, that that movement has been launched. I therefore wish to extend my warmest thanks to the representative of Mexico for his interest in and support of our proposal.

In conclusion, I hope some progress can be made on this point. I do not say that we can solve the problem overnight, or that we can achieve substantial results in the twinkling of an eye; but I am sure that we shall succeed; indeed, we must succeed, because some progress has to be made.

I do not believe that anyone can reasonably imagine that, in order to combat the armaments race, we must plunge into a disarmament race - that, too, would be dangerous -; but at least we must not stand still. If we realize that the arms race is leading us towards a terrible danger, a great peril, an abyss, it is better to advance slowly than at the terrifying speed which is habitual in our epoch. That is why we must slow down; and, to slow down, we must disarm, but slowly. For in the face of danger it is always more risky to act precipitately than slowly. The ideal would be to advance slowly but surely towards disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 172nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador C. Lukanov, representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, Poland, Canada, the United Kingdom, Mexico, the Soviet Union and Brazil.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 10 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.