

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

DEPT. OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS
DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS DIVISION
10 March 1964
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

(Burma)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. D. TEKHOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Atto Abate AGEDE

Atto S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. G.R. SAPRA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. C.G. EKLUND

Union of SovietSocialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.S. MacDONALD
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the one hundred and seventy-third meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Today I wish to dwell briefly on differences of opinion concerning the so-called "Gromyko proposal" -- that is, the proposal to retain some sort of "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the disarmament process (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). Attempts have been made to convince us that the "Gromyko proposal" is tantamount to agreeing to maintain the danger of a world nuclear war until all the armaments and armed forces in the world have disappeared. The positions of "principle" listed by Sir Paul Mason in seven points on which the views expressed here allegedly coincide (ENDC/PV.171, pp.6-8, et seq.) are precisely an attempt to adapt the Soviet proposal regarding a "nuclear umbrella" to the position of the Western Powers. That position, which has been reaffirmed in the past few days by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy, boils down -- to tell the plain truth -- to the assertion that the best guarantee against the danger of nuclear war is the danger of nuclear war itself. Can anyone seriously maintain that the Soviet Union or any other socialist State will ever agree to this -- save the mark! -- "approach" to the decisive problem of retaining or totally destroying nuclear weapons, and to the possibility of their being used before they are finally abolished?

The Soviet delegation has once again and with the utmost clarity explained to us here Mr. Gromyko's proposal concerning the "nuclear umbrella" (ibid., pp.24 et seq.). The socialist States have vindicated and continue to vindicate the necessity of completely eliminating nuclear weapons, not at the end but at the beginning of the disarmament process. In any case it is necessary to eliminate the danger of nuclear war in the initial stage of the disarmament process. I would remind you that this view has been shared and is still shared by nearly all the States Members of the United Nations, except certain Western countries. I shall cite only two examples from the actual work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. At the meeting of the Committee on 21 May 1962, the leader of the delegation of Burma, referring to the first and second stages of disarmament, said:

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

"It would be my delegation's hope that between them these stages could contain all the major elements of disarmament such as the elimination of all nuclear weapons and their carriers, reduction of armed forces and armaments and liquidation of all potentially offensive military bases, and that stage III would be devoted mainly to providing for the smooth transition of States to a disarmed world". (ENDC/PV.40, p.35).

Somewhat later, on 12 July 1962, the representative of Nigeria, speaking in favour of the total elimination of the nuclear threat, stated:

"In the humble opinion of my delegation, the proposals in stage I of the two plans are unsatisfactory from the point of view of liberating mankind from the fear of a nuclear war". (ENDC/PV.54, p.33).

The representative of Nigeria had in mind the lack of measures for the elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves in the first stage.

As for the position of the States members of NATO represented here, it must be said that their most responsible leaders, like their delegations in our Committee, have described with sufficient eloquence the destructive power of modern nuclear weapons. However, in their opinion there is no need to be in a hurry to eliminate these weapons or the possibility of their being used, precisely because they are so terrifying. Certainly it is a very long way indeed from that position to the "nuclear umbrella". The "umbrella" is not the entire vault of heaven, but merely a guarantee added to other measures and, moreover, demanded by the Western States, a concession on the part of the Soviet Union, which has been evaluated by the overwhelming majority of the States of the world as a realistic proposal the adoption of which would open the way to agreements on disarmament, since it reduces to naught many of the objections of the West and to a great extent limits the danger of a world nuclear conflict.

Indeed, disarmament will not be disarmament if it leaves the nuclear danger hanging over the heads of mankind for a long time to come. Moreover, our Committee is the last place where disarmament, which is recognized by all as being the only means of eliminating war from the lives of mankind, should be represented as a sort of distant dream. That is why we appeal to the representatives of the West to withdraw their unfounded objections to proposals aimed at eliminating the nuclear danger as quickly as possible.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Let us briefly consider once again some of the objections advanced by the Western delegations in our debates during the past few days.

I do not wish to deal in detail with statements such as that there are still many contentious problems around the world, or that disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, affects important national interests of States. To connect the existence of international disputes with disarmament is to strike at the very idea of disarmament negotiations, and to strike at the basis on which the Committee on Disarmament was established. Important national interests have always existed, long before nuclear weapons were invented. Is it possible to convince anyone that there may be national interests which can be defended only by means of weapons of mass destruction? It is precisely the national interests of all peoples without exception that call for peace and, first and foremost, for nuclear disarmament.

We still hear talk of the military "balance" which would apparently be upset without nuclear weapons, although it has been proved that this is simply untrue. Evidently certain representatives of the West understand balance as meaning their desire to have nuclear supremacy in the world. How else, for example, can the statement of the United States side about the desire for balance be made to fit in with Mr. Foster's statement to us here in the Committee that next year the most terrible weapons of the United States of America will increase by 750 per cent as compared with those which existed when the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament began its work? (ENDC/FV.170, p.48).

At the 165th, 167th and 171st meetings our Western colleagues again advanced the argument about the so-called "overloading" of the first stage which, in their opinion, would result from implementation of the measures envisaged by the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament. (ENDC/2/Rev.1). It has even been asserted that the Soviet plan provides for almost "total disarmament" in the first stage; whereas, as we know quite well, after implementation of the measures for the first stage under the Soviet plan, States would retain a substantial part of their military power. In the first place, the level of armed forces would remain very high. Furthermore, States would still retain a large percentage of "conventional" armaments. Lastly, no provision is made for the destruction of the nuclear weapons themselves. Consequently it is incorrect to speak of any "total" disarmament in the first stage, if, of course, one proceeds from the interests of the security of

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

States, and not from the interests and concepts of the general staffs of certain Powers. Furthermore, the new Soviet proposal regarding a "nuclear umbrella" gives States, as I have already said, additional guarantees, besides providing for really radical and effective measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

With regard to the "overloading" of the first stage by the Soviet plan and the "violation" of the Joint Statement (ENDC/5) concerning stage-by-stage disarmament, one may ask: where in the Joint Statement is it provided that all the stages should comprise the same quantitative and qualitative reductions of all types of armaments? Where in the Joint Statement is it required that the same treatment should apply to all types of armaments? Where in the Joint Statement do we find any exclusion of the possibility of beginning at any given stage the complete elimination of one type of armament and, at another stage, a percentage reduction of other types of weapons or their reduction to a certain level? In the Joint Statement there is no demand, nor could there be any, for mathematical equality at all three stages of disarmament. I would remind you that the United States plan (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3) also does not correspond at all stages with those requirements of equality which are applied by the Western delegations to the Soviet disarmament plan.

If we are to speak of a violation of stage-by-stage disarmament, and if we are to follow the logic of certain delegations which are afraid of an "overloading" of the first stage, then we must say that it is precisely the recommendations of the Western Powers which, if adopted, would lead to an "overloading" of the third and last stage of disarmament, which apparently the authors of those recommendations do not fear. Indeed, the United States plan for the first stage and, to a large extent, for the second as well envisages some very modest measures of disarmament which in the main should take place in the third stage. Obviously that is the reason why this stage looks so indefinite in the United States plan. Up till now we have heard nothing about the duration of the third stage of disarmament, which, according to the United States plan, should begin six years after the signature of the disarmament treaty. It is clear that an overloaded third stage would require, if not further subdivision into stages, at least an indefinitely longer period. It is obvious why we are being urged to be patient, and for a long time, whenever any mention is made of our main objective.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

For lack of serious arguments, the Western delegations return to the "difficulties" connected with control in general and to the proposal to set up international armed forces at the beginning of the disarmament process, in addition to the huge forces and arsenals existing in the world at the present time. Let us again take the question of control as an example. The delegations of the Western Powers put forward this question as a preliminary condition on which depends their attitude towards the Soviet proposal concerning the "nuclear umbrella" (and, incidentally, towards any other disarmament proposal). They are again calling for control in abstracto, when they want us to engage in the study of the concrete problems of verification of any particular measure in the field of disarmament without agreement on the measure itself which is to be subject to control.

The views of the socialist States on control are well known. I should like to quote the opinions of others on this question. Thus on 3 May 1962 the representative of India, speaking of control and, more particularly, of so-called "retained armaments", said:

"... I should have thought, particularly as regards those countries which have laid stress on the need for effective control, that their interest in a disarmament plan would be best assured if the plan moved fast, in a forthright manner, down the road of disarmament. Then the question of retained armaments becomes less difficult"...

Therefore let us approach this question of controls in a practical manner. Let us not approach it in a theoretical way." (ENDC/PV.30, pp.23,24,28).

It is time indeed to clear the question of control out of our way as an obstacle to agreement; let us agree on what we want to achieve, and then we shall pass on to discussing ways and means of verifying the implementation of the agreed measure. That should also be the approach to the study of technical details, in which the Western representatives are so greatly interested. It would not do any harm to recall the very interesting statement made by the representative of Brazil on 3 April 1962 in which he recounted how, over thirty years ago, the discussions on disarmament in the League of Nations were bogged down in technical details (ENDC/PV.14, pp.41,42). The experience of the past should be always kept in mind. It teaches us that we should not be dominated by technical details, but that our objective is to achieve general disarmament and to ensure peace thereby. That is

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

the objective which should above all dictate our decisions and help us to overcome obstacles, including technical ones. Man cannot be a slave to the technology he has created.

Therefore we consider that the Western delegations should not continue to reject concrete proposals such as the Soviet proposal regarding the "nuclear umbrella" without adducing valid arguments, if such arguments exist. We have not heard how the Western countries think to avoid nuclear war at the beginning of the disarmament process. On the other hand, we hear arguments here in favour of marking time patiently, whereas outside our conference room we observe dangerous events about which I shall take the liberty of saying a few words. In doing so, I do not know whether my words will be regarded as pleasant or unpleasant, since a suggestion was made here (ENDC/PV.171, p.12) that we should try to eliminate disagreeable expressions from our debates. But I am talking about actual facts of very recent date.

Fact number one: a well-known West German firm tested missiles which it had manufactured itself; having been caught in the act, in its initial fright it declared that it would cease this dangerous and forbidden production, in order not to create difficulties for the policy of its Government. But high-up Western patrons described the West German manufacture of missiles, including multi-stage missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, as an innocent pursuit of a "scientific" nature; the hint was taken immediately and the aforesaid firm revoked its decision not to produce missiles, adding that, on the contrary, it would increase its capital and would continue its "scientific" work in the future.

Fact number two: by the end of the current year a NATO "multinational" nuclear force, including men of the West German Bundeswehr, will be inaugurated on board a ship of the United States Navy.

Fact number three: a reorganization of the top organs of NATO is to take place; a "standing military committee" will have a "director", evidently a

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

West German general; the reorganization is based on a fairly logical reason -- the militarily strongest Western European State has no opportunity to command and direct the military policy of NATO, and that is not right.

These facts are enough to enable at least one conclusion to be drawn: that those in the Federal Republic of Germany who do not hide their love of weapons in general and of nuclear weapons in particular are being given a part in the nuclear power of the West and are gradually getting into their hands the military potentials in Europe, to which they are adding their own. Yet the allies of these gentlemen wish to persuade the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that it is not political facts such as those I have listed, but some sort of "difficulties", some sort of technical details, some sort of insufficiently-clarified particulars, that prevent the Western side from accepting the Soviet proposal concerning the "nuclear umbrella". Naturally, the adoption of that proposal by all States would mean an end to the open or secret dissemination of nuclear weapons and a limitation of the possibility of using such weapons which exists today. On the other hand, it would mean the beginning of disarmament, and, moreover, a correct beginning, that would paralyse any possibility of a universal nuclear war, and in equal conditions for all.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): Before going on to the observations which I wish to make today, I should like to associate my delegation with those who have welcomed the new representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, and Mr. Fisher, who is leading the United States delegation.

In his speech at the last meeting in which he took part, the United States representative, Mr. Foster, said:

"... the most urgent task of this Committee is to maintain and to increase the momentum of agreement achieved in 1963". (ENDC/PV.170, p.46).

No one could disagree with him there, and every effort must therefore be made to promote an agreement in this extremely important field of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

When this question was broached the discussions turned, significantly enough, on the steps leading, if not to the final elimination, at least to the reduction of the danger of a nuclear war. I do not think I need dwell on the consequences of a nuclear war, even if we only take account of the destructive power of the present stocks of atomic weapons. It would therefore seem that we should unanimously recognize the need to adopt, from the very beginning of the disarmament process, measures to eliminate this grave menace. However, no progress has been made in this direction.

Recently we all had the opportunity of hearing Mr. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. Referring to a new era which, if I understood him correctly, began with the agreements achieved last year, Mr. Butler expressed the belief that --

"... today we are near to having absorbed the first lesson of the nuclear age: that nuclear war is too completely destructive to be contemplated; and that we are becoming acquainted with the second lesson: that any war between nuclear Powers can all too easily become a nuclear war". (ENDC/FV.169, p.5)

In our view the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) touches the very heart of the problem: that is, the elimination of the danger of nuclear war at the very first stage of disarmament. Although Mr. Butler adopted a position which, in our opinion, ran counter to the conclusion to be drawn from the lesson he mentioned, it seems that even the United Kingdom delegation, in its recent statements, has taken the view that the substance of the Gromyko proposal must be discussed.

During the debate on this proposal, certain problems were raised which I think we shall have to consider. But first let me make a general observation, equally applicable in our opinion to all the objections raised here by the Western Powers against the essence of the important amendment made by the Gromyko proposal in the Soviet draft for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1). This observation refers to the manner of approaching disarmament problems in general.

There are two ways of approaching disarmament problems, the first of which would appear to be based on the outmoded concept si vis pacem para bellum. If we adopt that attitude, which is a cold-war attitude and generates an obsession with war, we inevitably reach the conclusion that any disarmament measure implies a risk for the security of States. But does that hold good in this day and age? The development

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

of military nuclear techniques has destroyed the very basis of this concept. It is indisputable that, as an ever-increasing number of weapons accumulates, the security of States will be considerably reduced. Was not the late President Kennedy right when he said three years ago that the nuclear war which threatens mankind "could be started at any time by accident, miscalculation or madness"? (A/PV.1013, para. 50) Although the United States has devoted to armaments something like \$700,000 million in the years since the Second World War, that country, to quote its Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, enjoys less and less security. Those are facts which show that, as the stocks of armaments increase, international security becomes more and more precarious.

These facts also confirm a second concept, which sees international security as residing in disarmament, and first and foremost in the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. The difference between these two concepts is that the first considers the security of States to be safeguarded by the weapons that remain, while the second holds that true security is ensured by the weapons which are destroyed.

In the case of the Gromyko proposal, the first concept, that of the Western Powers, is based on the retention of an ever-increasing quantity of weapons, that being regarded as the sole guarantee of security. The second concept regards the "nuclear umbrella" as merely a supplementary guarantee of security, and considers that the main guarantee lies in the fact that, at the very first stage, the possibility of a nuclear war vanishes or is substantially reduced. As far as my own delegation is concerned, it adheres unreservedly to the second concept, a realistic one which opens up good prospects of progress.

It is on this basis that I should now like to approach certain concrete problems which arose in our discussions. For instance, our delegation notes in connexion with the discussions on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, that a relationship is established between the Gromyko proposal and that contained in President Johnson's message on freezing the number and types of nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/120), and even that these two proposals are regarded as being in opposition to each other. In referring to this same question -- which is thus

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

not regarded as a measure of disarmament proper -- the Western delegations even insist that it should be considered first, and as a collateral measure. There is certainly one point in common between the Gromyko proposal and the freeze proposal: they both deal with the same subject -- nuclear delivery vehicles.

The fact that the United States proposal on freezing the numbers and types of nuclear delivery vehicles is not really concerned with the disarmament process is particularly evident in the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3) submitted by the United States. This plan, as is well known, provides for the destruction of 30 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles during the first stage of disarmament. But if the freeze is regarded as a preliminary step to facilitate general and complete disarmament, then our negotiations on collateral measures are the appropriate framework for a discussion of this measure. The introduction into our negotiations of the freeze proposal -- which is linked with the development of the process of general and complete disarmament -- could only, in our view, introduce an element of obscurity which I hope that none of us wants.

The Romanian delegation feels justified in regarding the Western proposal for the freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles as lacking in clarity, since the Western Governments themselves do not seem to interpret this proposal in a uniform manner. Why do I say this? Let me give an example. As has been recalled here, during the debate on the military budget of the United Kingdom for 1964 in the House of Commons, the British Minister of Defence, Mr. Thorneycroft, stated very clearly, in reply to certain questions put to him, that the United States proposal concerning the freeze was not, in the view of the United Kingdom Government, in any way connected with its plans for developing the so-called United Kingdom nuclear deterrent. Mr. Thorneycroft said:

"There is no question and no proposal whatsoever that the United Kingdom should in any circumstances forego the five Polaris submarines".

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

At the end of the debate, during which it transpired that four years would pass before the United Kingdom would have those five submarines equipped with Polaris rockets, Mr. Thorneycroft added:

"The United States are now working out their plans and they have given the British Government an explicit assurance that nothing in their proposals would inhibit them from honouring their Nassau agreement to supply Polaris missiles [to the United Kingdom]". (The Times, 29 February 1964)

Does this mean that the freeze proposal applies only to the Soviet Union and the United States, while the other States Members of NATO --- with, of course, the assistance of the United States --- will quietly continue to develop their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in quantity and quality?

I should like to make another observation on the concept of percentage reduction. The United States representative, Mr. Foster, told us at the meeting of 27 February:

"We must not forget that the forces we are dealing with are dynamic. While we negotiate here, the arms race goes on".

Mr. Foster elaborated that idea and told us:

"... United States strategic missile inventories have increased more than 200 per cent since our Conference began here in March 1962. By 1965 these inventories will reach approximately 750 per cent of those in 1962". (ENDC/PV.170, pp. 46, 48)

According to official data, the United States now has available more than 500 long-range ballistic missiles, and plans to increase this number to around 1,200 in 1965 -- not to speak of tactical missiles and medium-range missiles, whose numbers we presume will also be increasing. Supposing that we succeed in concluding this year an agreement on general and complete disarmament, and that this agreement enters into force in 1965, the United States will, towards the end of the first stage -- which according to the United States plan, will be in 1968 -- possess a strategic striking force greater than in 1962, and greater even than now.

Since 1962 -- according to data published by the American Professor Melman -- the United States has had a striking force enabling it to destroy 80 times over any town with a population of 100,000 inhabitants or more. Despite the 30 per cent

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

reduction envisaged in the United States plan, this figure would increase; and, indeed, the capacity for destroying these towns would rise from 80 to 400 times. I should like to stress that we have considered the nuclear capacity of the United States alone. Is that the mathematical expression of the concept, in terms of percentage, that the Western Powers are proposing to us as representing "a fair, reasonable and realistic way to start"? (ENDC/PV.169, p.14)

If Professor Melman's figures are correct, it is even easier to understand why the reduction proposed by the Western Powers cannot satisfy the legitimate interests and wishes of the peoples of the world for an elimination of the threat of a nuclear war as soon as possible. That is the essential objective, and it is precisely in this respect that the Western proposals are unsatisfactory. To accept such a proposal would be, in our opinion, to perpetuate and even aggravate the present danger. This is because, as has been demonstrated, the adoption even in principle of percentage reduction might stimulate and intensify the nuclear arms race to the utmost degree.

That is why we consider that nothing new has happened to invalidate the conclusions reached a year ago by our own and other delegations: that disarmament of that type would hardly be real. On the contrary, the data supplied by Mr. Foster of the dynamics of the arms race further confirm and support these conclusions, which we are not alone in drawing.

A third objection, often invoked against the Gromyko proposal, is that the first stage is said to be overloaded. I think that today the representative of Bulgaria sufficiently demonstrated that this objection was unfounded (Supra, pp.7,8). It is true that the first stage will be the most important; but this, far from being a defect, is in our view a point in favour of the disarmament plan in question, particularly as the existing balance of forces will be in no way affected by it.

It has been said that the Parties came to a different agreement about it. But what the Parties did agree was that general and complete disarmament should be implemented "in an agreed sequence, by stages ..., with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits" (ENDC/5, page 2, paragraph 4). That does not mean in the least that the stages should be of equal proportions or of

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

identical content. Moreover, the United States draft plan itself belies the Western Powers' interpretation of this agreement. As we know, the Western proposals nowhere provide for a percentage reduction in three stages, either of nuclear weapons, or in the level of the armed forces, or in military budgets, or in the number of foreign military bases, and so forth. If the interpretation of disarmament by stages implied percentage reductions, why did the Western Powers not propose in their plan appropriate percentage reductions for nuclear weapons, military budgets, and so forth?

If our negotiations are to make any headway, we must now more than ever show a realistic awareness of the prospects for humanity entailed in the prolonged lack of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. The accomplishment of our task is a matter of indisputable urgency, among other things because we have not really very much time left before we shall have to submit to the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly a report on the results of the Committee's work, not to mention the great responsibility which we all bear to our peoples and to the whole world. This responsibility is all the greater since our Committee is at present the only international body whose task it is to prepare a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

If we show calmness, a sense of responsibility and perseverance, our efforts can and must be crowned with success. But, without adequate efforts by the Western Powers too, it is clear that our negotiations have not much chance of finding a way out of our present regrettable situation, despite the more favourable atmosphere which we all welcomed when resuming our labours.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): This morning I propose to examine in some detail the replies given by our Soviet colleague to two questions which I asked on 3 March, when we last discussed the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles during the disarmament process. The Committee will recall that my two questions were: first, why were sea-borne missiles excluded from Mr. Gromyko's latest proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1); and, second, why were anti-missile missiles included in those proposals (ENDC/PV.171, p.9)?

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I was grateful to our Soviet colleague for attempting to answer my questions so promptly (ibid., pp. 27, 28). I have now had a week in which to study his replies. Let me say at once that I am encouraged by his having given a little more information on those proposals. That shows the value of continuing our discussions in as constructive a manner as possible. On that point I just want to say, in passing, that I was rather disappointed by the approach adopted by our Czechoslovak colleague last Tuesday (ibid., pp. 16 et seq.). I think that I shall merely say to Mr. Zemla that nothing that he said then has changed my conviction that we should continue to search out areas of common ground between the two sides wherever there is any hope that those may exist. There are still so many areas of disagreement that I really do not think it helps our work to spend all our time simply reciting them.

I notice that our Bulgarian colleague this morning also expressed his disbelief in the policy of trying to find areas of common agreement (supra, p.5). Of course, whenever one makes the effort to find such areas and one is told that in a specific matter such an area of agreement does not and cannot exist, one can only take note of the fact with regret. Nevertheless, I think it should not change our general attitude.

In the same way, Mr. Lukanov this morning expressed some apprehension that we in the West might be trying to lure him and his colleagues from eastern Europe into being immersed in a flood of detail and indeed submerged by that flood (supra, p.9). On the other hand, I noticed that our Romanian colleague who has just spoken did not seem to share that dislike of trying to find areas of common agreement, and showed a healthy robustness in his capacity to stand up to discussion in detail and to come away successfully from such a discussion. I listened with interest to what he said this morning, and there are points he mentioned which I shall probably want to take up in due course.

However, as I said, I want now to turn to our Soviet colleague's statement at our meeting of 3 March. He said, in reply to my first question, that whereas declared missiles to be retained, under Mr. Gromyko's proposal, on the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union could "easily be kept under permanent control" (ENDC/PV.171, p.27), sea-borne missiles, in his view, could not be.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

That argument seems to me to confuse two separate problems -- the problem of declared and legally-retained missiles, and the problem of undeclared and illegally-retained missiles. As I understand the position, the Soviet Government is now prepared to accept some form of control in respect of the first problem -- that is to say, declared and legally-retained missiles --; but it is not yet prepared to accept any control in respect of the second problem -- that is to say, undeclared and illegally-retained missiles. I shall return to the latter problem later in my statement this morning.

Regarding the first problem, the Soviet Government has expressed its willingness to accept some form of control over the number of land-based missiles which, under Mr. Gromyko's latest proposals, would first have to be agreed by both sides and which both sides would then be permitted to retain during stages II and III. Although Mr. Tsarapkin has not told us very much about the purpose and details of the sort of control which his Government has in mind, he did say on 4 February:

"This control would come into operation from the very beginning of the second stage ... and ... would be established directly at the launching pads ..." (ENDC/PV.163, p.24).

He indicated that the purpose of this control would be to check that the number of launching pads --

"... should not be greater than the number of missiles retained." (ibid.).

I suppose that the purpose of such control would also be to check that the number of land-based missiles legally retained corresponded to the number which had been originally agreed upon by both sides and the retention of which was therefore permitted.

So much, therefore, for the rather limited purpose of the Soviet Government's proposed control system in respect of declared and legally-retained land-based missiles under its own proposals. Of course, whether such control would effectively serve that purpose is still an open question, because we do not have enough details to determine precisely what would be involved.

However, I do not see why it should be any more difficult to apply measures with a similar purpose to sea-borne missiles and their platforms legally retained during the disarmament process. The ships come into port periodically. Would it really be any more difficult to devise a control system whereby the numbers of such missiles and their platforms could be checked at agreed times and locations?

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

That would ensure that they corresponded to the numbers originally agreed and permitted. The fact that land-based missiles would be permanently located at fixed sites, whereas sea-borne missiles and their platforms would be mobile, is irrelevant in this context, and I think that our Soviet colleague has very considerably exaggerated the difficulties here.

I ought perhaps to make it clear that I am not justifying the inclusion of legally-retained sea-borne-launched missiles in stages II and III to the exclusion of legally-retained land-based missiles. What I am doing is merely questioning the Soviet thesis that they themselves must be excluded from stages II and III because, in the view of the Soviet Government, they present difficulties of verification.

But if our Soviet colleague was thinking about the possibility that during the disarmament process one side or the other might retain, illegally and clandestinely, sea-borne missiles and their platforms over and above the number which they would be permitted to retain, then of course he has put his finger on the second problem to which I referred earlier. If that is what he has in mind, then it is perhaps encouraging that our Soviet colleague has now recognized the existence of a problem which would arise in an acute form under Mr. Gromyko's proposal though not under the proposals of the West, and one to which the Western delegations have often referred. Needless to say, it is a problem which is not confined to illegally-retained sea-borne missiles and their platforms. It is a problem which would arise also in respect of illegally-retained land-based missiles at secret sites. I hope, therefore, that our Soviet colleague is planning to carry the discussion of this problem further at future meetings; and, if so, we for our part shall be very glad to join him in that.

Before leaving the question of sea-borne missiles, I should like to point out that our Soviet colleague has apparently overlooked a number of very important advantages involved in allowing the nuclear Powers legally to retain sea-borne missiles during the disarmament process. One advantage is that the mobility of such missiles provides them with a far greater degree of invulnerability from surprise attack than land-based missiles at fixed sites. Our Soviet colleague himself pointed out on 3 March:

"Being located on board nuclear submarines cruising secretly in all seas and oceans, Polaris missiles ..." (ENDC/PV.171, p.27)

Certainly. That is what gives them their high degree of invulnerability from attack.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

We in the United Kingdom delegation have often pointed out in the past that the invulnerability of missiles is a vital element in the stability of any system of mutual nuclear deterrence and represents an important contribution to the maintenance of peace. Therefore the legal retention of sea-borne missiles during the disarmament process would provide one of the best safeguards that neither side would even be tempted to contemplate launching a surprise attack.

Our Soviet colleague did, of course, go on to say at our 171st meeting:

"... Polaris missiles are a means of aggression, a means of secret concealed surprise attack ..." (ibid.)

I was really rather surprised that he revived that argument. Nobody denies that in theory sea-borne missiles can be used in an offensive role just as much as they can be used in a defensive role. But, equally, nobody denies that in theory land-based missiles at fixed sites can also be used in either an offensive or a defensive role. Obviously the question whether any type of missile, be it land-based or sea-borne, is an offensive or a defensive weapon depends basically on the will of those who possess it and who decide how to use it.

I might just add, incidentally, that, if our Soviet colleague is worried that legally-retained sea-borne missiles could be used to launch a surprise attack, I find it somewhat difficult to understand how he can argue, as he did at our meeting of 26 April 1963 -- and here are his words:

"... that in the event of a crisis a devastating nuclear blow will be dealt not only at fixed missile installations and launching sites, but also at roving nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles on board, wherever they may be." (ENDC/PV.125, p.31)

There seems to be some contradiction there. In any event, what are we arguing about? We all know that in modern conditions an aggressive nuclear attack is unthinkable, because of the retaliation which it would bring.

For all those reasons, the answer which our Soviet colleague has provided to my first question -- why sea-borne missiles were excluded from Mr. Gromyko's latest proposal -- does not strike me as altogether convincing, and I hope that he will be ready to re-examine it in the light of what I have said.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I now turn to the second question which I asked on 3 March, which, you will remember, was: why do Mr. Gromyko's latest proposals include anti-missile missiles? (ENDC/PV.171, p. 9). Mr. Tsarapkin asserted that that question of mine was a strange one and that it seemed to involve a contradiction (ibid., p.28). His argument was that anti-missile missiles were included in Mr. Gromyko's proposals because they were purely a means of defence and provided an additional guarantee against surprise attack. If our Soviet colleague had studied my remarks at that same meeting and, indeed, the statements which I made on 22 March and 3 April last year, (ENDC/PV.112, p.10; PV.117, pp. 15,16), I think he would perhaps not have found my question so strange, and he might even have detected a contradiction, not in my question, but in his Government's own proposals.

I said on 3 March — and perhaps for once I may quote myself here:

"If one or other side were to possess a really effective anti-ballistic missile defence system, that — ironic though it may seem — would be extremely dangerous, because it would upset the stability of the nuclear balance. It would be extremely dangerous because it would make one side or other think that it was immune from potential nuclear retaliation. Any side which thought this would obviously not be deterred in its actions."

(ENDC/PV.171, p.9)

In this connexion the Committee will recall, I am sure, that when he was outlining President Johnson's "freeze" proposal (ENDC/120) on 31 January the United States representative, Mr. Foster, stated:

"... the United States believes that the freeze should also include anti-ballistic missile systems. A freeze on strategic delivery systems without a freeze on anti-missile systems would be destabilizing..." (ENDC/PV.162, p.19)

I think probably most of us accept the fact that dangerous consequences for the stability of the nuclear balance, and therefore for peace, could arise if one side or the other developed an effective anti-missile system. Perhaps I may explain in a little detail why that should be so.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

At our meeting of 4 February our Soviet colleague told us that the intercontinental ballistic missiles which his Government was now proposing that both sides should retain until the end of the third stage would be -- to use his own words -- a deterrent. As I understand it, the purpose of those intercontinental ballistic missiles would be to deter any State -- to use Mr. Tsarapkin's own words -- from venturing "to violate peace and embark on aggression". Such a State would be deterred because -- again to use Mr. Tsarapkin's words -- it "would have to pay a high price for such an act". We have not yet been told how high our Soviet colleague thinks that price would have to be, but he has suggested that it would involve a nuclear counter-blow. (ENDC/PV.163, pp.20,21).

Under Mr. Gromyko's proposal both sides would be allowed to retain agreed numbers of such anti-missile missiles as had been developed before the start of the disarmament process. However, given the nature of modern technological development, there could be no guarantee whatever that both sides would have developed by then equally effective anti-missile defence systems; and indeed that would obviously be highly unlikely. Therefore there is always a potential danger that one side but not the other would have developed such a system by the beginning of stage I -- and that of course is one of the reasons why President Johnson has proposed, among other things, a freeze of such systems as a collateral measure in advance of disarmament.

Perhaps we may assume that, in the absence of any agreement on a freeze, one side but not the other would in fact develop and deploy an effective anti-missile defence system before disarmament began. Some people may be inclined to think that that is a remote contingency; but it is a possibility which we cannot ignore. Clearly the side which possessed such a system might well be tempted during the disarmament process to believe that it could launch with impunity, or threaten to launch, an attack on the other side which did not possess such a system. The first side would be tempted in that way because it might calculate that it could ward off its potential victim's nuclear counter-blow with its anti-missile missiles. In other words, the aggressor would not have to pay Mr. Tsarapkin's "high price". Therefore it would not be deterred in its actions in the first place.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I am sure that none of us believes that such a situation would be either potentially stable or conducive to peace. On the contrary, I think we should all agree that it would be highly unstable and positively dangerous. I realize that Mr. Tsarapkin told us on 4 February that one of the reasons why anti-missile missiles were included in Mr. Gromyko's proposal was --

"In case ... anyone should attempt in violation of the treaty to conceal a certain number of missiles ..." (*ibid.*, p.23).

In other words, our Soviet colleague is maintaining that each side could guard itself against bad faith -- that is to say, against the danger that the other side might illegally retain missiles over and above the agreed and permitted number -- by being allowed to retain anti-missile missiles. But I must point out that anti-missile missiles -- remarkable inventions though they certainly must be -- are unlikely ever to have the capability of distinguishing between legally and illegally-retained missiles which have been launched in a nuclear attack or in nuclear retaliation.

Therefore, if a State should have an effective anti-missile defence system and consequently the ability to ward off intercontinental ballistic missiles -- whether they are legally or illegally retained --, clearly it need no longer be influenced in its behaviour by the knowledge that violation of the disarmament treaty and aggression launched against other States would bring "inescapable punishment" -- the phrase which Mr. Tsarapkin used last year -- or would involve the payment of a "high price", which is his phrase for this year.

I sum up by saying that the side which had both intercontinental ballistic missiles and effective anti-missile missiles would be free to do what it liked with its intercontinental ballistic missiles against the side which had only intercontinental ballistic missiles. In one word, the whole purpose of any system of mutual nuclear deterrence would be completely undermined in such a situation, with untold consequences for the maintenance of peace in the world. My reaction, therefore, to our Soviet colleague's answer to my second question is much the same as my reaction to his answer to my first question.

I am sure that the Committee realizes very well how extremely important these matters are and how essential it is that we should understand precisely what is involved -- and why. Therefore I make no apology for going on with my questioning and for saying that there are other aspects of Mr. Gromyko's proposal which I hope to examine at future meetings.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to make a few brief remarks on this morning's observations by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov, and by the representative of Romania, Mr. Dumitrescu. I listened to these observations with the greatest interest and, since of course I have not their texts before me at the moment, I intend to go through them more carefully when I have the record. I should like to make a few preliminary remarks now, and hope I shall not misrepresent the ideas of our two colleagues.

The representative of Bulgaria, followed by that of Romania, again sought to give the Committee the impression that the Western delegations were in favour of retaining nuclear weapons as long as possible. However, I am sure the Committee knows that these accusations do not correspond to the facts. The Western delegations are at least as desirous as all the others here to bring about as quickly as possible the total destruction of nuclear weapons. But we are looking at the situation in a realistic manner. We are aware of the enormous difficulties which are involved and which cannot be ignored. We are tackling these difficulties by concrete and prompt methods which are relatively easy to put into practice. Through our proposals we are seeking to put an immediate stop to the nuclear arms race. That is the very definite aim of the Western proposals for an immediate freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles and of the production of fissionable material for military purposes (ENDC/120).

The arguments advanced this morning by the Romanian representative in an attempt to prove that these freeze measures are of no great moment seemed to me quite unconvincing. The very fact that an increase in the number of nuclear delivery vehicles is to be anticipated confirms the importance and urgency of putting an end to this dangerous development as soon as possible. In my view, the Romanian representative's remarks only confirm the urgent need for an immediate agreement on freeze measures. Suitable proposals in this connexion have been submitted to the Committee; they are there for anyone to see. They must be put into shape without losing a minute. That is an essential task for the Committee.

The Western delegations have examined the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/R:ev.1/Add.1) in great detail, in a spirit of complete objectivity and perfect good will. The representatives of Bulgaria and Romania spoke here of the overloading of the first stage, a question to which my delegation has also referred in one of our recent

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

speeches (ENDC/PV.171, p.16). Mr. Lukanov said, I believe (supra, p. 8), that the Agreed Principles for disarmament (ENDC/5) do not indicate that there should be an equality of measures at each stage of disarmament. However, we have always spoken of progressive disarmament, a step-by-step approach. The idea was that we should begin by relatively simple steps which could be easily controlled, and then continually develop them afterwards.

Another factor is confidence. Confidence among us cannot be restored at the very outset of disarmament. We must therefore proceed with prudence. Confidence, which is an essential ingredient of disarmament, must be restored gradually through concrete agreements. As confidence returns, we can advance increasingly fast with more and more energetic measures of disarmament.

Mr. Lukanov also spoke of control and of our objections. My delegation has asked two specific questions to which no reply has yet been given (ENDC/PV.171, pp. 13, 14). The first was whether the Soviet delegation would be willing to accept inspection of any missile factories that have been declared. The second was how we can establish control of hidden missiles in the preliminary stage of disarmament -- I mean the first stage, when total control is not feasible.

This concept which I am setting forth in brief may not be very clear, but I would refer you to the very lengthy speech in which my delegation gave a detailed explanation of our difficulties.

The representative of Bulgaria also showed a certain lack of tolerance in regard to technical questions, what he calls "details". I must say that, in general, the Eastern delegations have shown some impatience when the Western delegations ask for explanations of the Gromyko proposal; they insinuate that this approach is not constructive. This impatience and intolerance do not seem to me to be justified. This attitude on the part of the Eastern delegations does not correspond to the spirit in which the Western delegations undertook a study of the Gromyko proposal.

It is of course quite natural that this proposal, through its very scope, should raise a whole series of grave and concrete problems. It would be a great mistake to consider the "nuclear umbrella" in too simplified a manner. It is quite normal for a conference to inquire into the problems which arise from a given proposal. That is a constructive approach, not sterile criticism. When problems

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

of this type arise, one just cannot say: "Accept our proposal in principle; we will go into the details later". As I see it, logic would indicate the opposite approach: to examine and, if possible, resolve the problems presented in several fields by the Gromyko proposal. After such a study, and our conclusions therefrom, we shall be able to tell you our final attitude to the Gromyko proposal.

We did not take that proposal lightly; on the contrary, we went into it very carefully, seeking out its implications, its consequences, its repercussions in various fields. We thus encountered several problems which must be solved first. I think it would be useful now to compile a list of these problems and examine them one by one, objectively and dispassionately. Otherwise I doubt whether it would be really constructive and useful to continue our discussions on the Gromyko proposal.

The representative of Romania alluded to the favourable atmosphere of this Conference. I am glad that he did so, and I agree with him. This atmosphere of collaboration was mentioned yesterday at our private meeting, and was hailed with satisfaction by most of the delegations of the non-aligned countries. I do not think I am giving away a secret by repeating it today at a public meeting. I hope that this atmosphere will help us to study Mr. Gromyko's proposal ever more deeply and constructively.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today's statement by the representative of the United Kingdom clearly reveals the nature and character of the approach of the Western Powers and, in particular, of the United Kingdom to such a highly important problem of our times as the elimination of the danger of nuclear war. From Sir Paul Mason's statement it can be seen quite clearly what they would like to have in the process of disarmament. Briefly, they would like to organize disarmament in such a way that throughout the whole disarmament process there would be every possibility of unleashing a nuclear war.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Sir Paul Mason told us today (supra, p.24) that his delegation is against the proposal of the Soviet Union that anti-missile missiles should be included in the agreed and strictly limited quantity of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). Moreover, the reasons he gave for his objection were amazing. These objections are based on the view that these missiles are an effective means of defence and can effectively protect a country from a surprise nuclear blow. Sir Paul Mason does not like anti-missile missiles because they would inhibit the launching of a surprise nuclear attack. It is true that Sir Paul Mason covered this up with a verbal smoke-screen. He said that these missiles would ward off a nuclear counter-blow. But this logic of yours, this consideration, Sir Paul, is very clear to us.

In submitting its proposal the Soviet Union bases itself first and foremost on the premise that the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for in the Soviet disarmament plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1) -- precisely in the Soviet plan, and not in yours (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3) -- would lead, by the end of the first stage of disarmament, to a situation in which there could be no question whatsoever of unleashing a nuclear war. We agreed to the establishment of a "nuclear umbrella" only as a step towards meeting the position of the Western Powers, in order to do away with the unfounded and artificial objections which they had advanced against the Soviet proposal.

At the same time we were told by the Western Powers that allegedly they could not absolutely destroy all missiles. They reasoned as follows: "What if someone illegally retains or hides a number of missiles? We must have some sort of assurance", they said, "of being in a position to launch a nuclear counter-blow". The raising of this question itself is groundless, most unconvincing and purely speculative. Nevertheless, since this was an obstacle to agreement, the Soviet Union made a concession to the position, the point of view, of the Western Powers, even though, I repeat, it is groundless.

We then put forward our proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a specified, strictly agreed quantity of missiles. What missiles? Intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and ground-to-air missiles, which are to be retained in the territories of these two States until the end of the third stage of disarmament. Moreover, all this is in order to give States additional guarantees of their security; because -- I emphasize this once again -- the main guarantee of the security of States can be provided only by disarmament, and by nothing else.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

No stockpiles of nuclear weapons, however great they might be, can ensure security, even if they are increased by 200 per cent or by 750 per cent as compared with the 1962 level, about which Mr. Foster so "convincingly" tried to frighten us here on the day of his departure (ENDC/PV.170, p.48). On that day Mr. Foster uttered this threat to the whole Committee: "Look: if you do not accept our conditions, we shall increase our power still further". That is what Mr. Foster said, presumably by way of improving the atmosphere and cheering up our negotiations.

Well, then, I emphasize once again that in our era of nuclear weapons the only measure for the security of States, the only means of making States safe from the danger of war, is disarmament; we must start first of all with the most terrifying and menacing means of waging war, by destroying the missiles which are vehicles for nuclear weapons. Without missiles, without means of delivery, modern nuclear weapons will lie motionless in the arsenals of the United States and other nuclear Powers.

It was in order to go towards meeting the claims of the Western Powers that they needed to have something in case of a supposedly possible surprise attack by means of supposedly possible concealed missiles, that we proposed the "nuclear umbrella". Now we are told that this Soviet proposal is not a good one because it includes anti-missile missiles in this "umbrella". But, for goodness' sake, anti-missile missiles are purely defensive weapons. Anti-missile missiles are used to destroy missiles which appear over your own territory, and not over the territory of others. What is the point of your objection, Sir Paul Mason? It is obvious that you would like, even in the event of anyone daring to unleash a war, to do everything possible in advance to deprive a country possessing anti-missile missiles of the possibility of defending itself. That is the gist of your logic, Sir Paul Mason. If a country possesses anti-missile missiles, it can defend itself against attack. But you consider that to be wrong, and you demand: "Destroy and exclude this means of defence from your 'umbrella'". This demand of yours reveals the aggressive nature of your position in the disarmament negotiations, Sir Paul. That is one aspect of the matter.

Now let us turn to the second aspect, concerning Polaris missiles. These missiles, carried by nuclear submarines, which can rove about all seas and oceans secretly and beyond control and which can creep up unnoticed and fire all their sixteen missiles at the targets which they have set themselves -- these purely aggressive weapons should be retained, according to Sir Paul Mason's proposal, and should be included in the "nuclear umbrella".

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

But where is your logic, Western representatives? After all, if we were to submit this proposal of yours to the judgement of the whole world, you would be unanimously condemned for the aggressive nature of your position. It comes to this: on the one hand, the means which would protect a country from surprise attack and would be located in the territory of the country defending itself must be excluded from the "umbrella"; while those which could be used to subject a country to surprise attack, such as Polaris-type missiles, for example, must be included in the "umbrella". There you have the characteristic approach, which eloquently shows the frame of mind and tendency of the Western Powers in the disarmament negotiations.

I must emphasize, Sir Paul Mason, that declared missiles must be kept under permanent control. We are in favour of control, and we have proposed that these missiles should be kept under permanent control at their launching pads. Precisely such control will really provide a full guarantee that the retained missiles will not be used for attack. Any preparations for an attack would be exposed immediately.

Those are our preliminary comments on the statement made today by Sir Paul Mason. We shall, of course, study his arguments carefully and give him an appropriate and full reply at a later meeting.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I have noted the reference which my co-Chairman, the representative of the Soviet Union, made to some observations by my predecessor in the Chair, Mr. Foster, in a speech before his departure. I might say, with the greatest respect, that I think my colleague's characterization of those remarks is not really accurate. There are also certain other points in his observations to which I should like to reply. I think, however, it would be unwise for me to do so extemporaneously today, and I will do so at the next meeting at which we discuss general and complete disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 173rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador James Barrington, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Romania, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 12 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO