

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.182  
9 April 1964  
ENGLISH

---

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 9 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. D. TEKHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Atto A. AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Mrs. E. ADAMOWSKA

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. M. IONESCU

Mr. I. IACOB

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJÖLD

Mr. M. STAHL

Mr. C.G. EKLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. S. de PALMA

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and eighty-second meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): On 25 February my delegation expressed the wish that the Foreign Ministers of all Member States represented in this Committee could be present here for the purpose of speeding up our work (ENDC/PV.169, p.30). Therefore we welcome the fact that recently a number of distinguished statesmen have been able to attend our meetings and address the Conference. Their presence is another proof of the importance of our Committee as a useful forum for tackling and solving the vital problem of general and complete disarmament.

Owing to the lack of an agreed agenda on collateral measures -- a fact which we have regretted and still regret -- our debate has been characterized mainly by its general nature. Each of the major parties has indulged in a unilateral exposition and reiteration of its point of view. Such a state of affairs could not produce the fruitful and mutual exchange of views on specific issues which is indispensable for the progress of our work. Such an exchange of views could undoubtedly have created a more propitious opportunity for making efforts to smooth differences and remove obstacles.

We should like to believe that we are entering a new phase in our deliberations on collateral measures, a phase where both parties have terminated the exposition of all relevant aspects of their proposals, so that the Conference might concentrate on engaging in a thorough exchange of views on some of the collateral measures which offer large possibilities for agreement, so that we might be able to report positive and concrete agreement to the next session of the General Assembly.

Allow me now to deal with a question which, in our view, requires an urgent solution: the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We have listened with great attention to what has been stated in the Committee in connexion with that problem. We feel that it would be appropriate for the Committee to concentrate on that item in order to reach an early agreement in that respect.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

In 1962, when the Soviet Union and the United States submitted their draft treaties for general and complete disarmament, it was clear that there was a great deal of similarity in their desire to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Article 16 of the Soviet draft treaty stated in part as follows:

"The States parties to the Treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing such weapons". (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.13)

The United States outline of a treaty contained the following:

"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:

(1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a State which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;

(2) Not assist any such State in manufacturing any nuclear weapons."

(ENDC/30, p.9)

More recently, both President Johnson's message to the Conference (ENDC/120) and the Soviet Union memorandum (ENDC/123) have pointed out the importance of reaching an agreement on the prevention of proliferation of such weapons. The Soviet Union memorandum stated:

"A widening of the circle of States possessing nuclear weapons would increase many times over the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. At the same time a widening of the circle of nuclear States would also make it much more difficult to solve the problem of disarmament." (ibid., p.4)

The Soviet Union memorandum went on to say:

"In order to shut off all possibilities for the spread of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that an agreement on this question should contain, besides the prohibition to transfer such weapons or to give information on their manufacture to any particular government, also provisions to guarantee that such a transfer of nuclear weapons or access to them shall not take place indirectly, through military blocs, for example, through the so-called multilateral nuclear force of NATO." (ibid., pp.4,5)

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Our Western colleagues have expressed equal concern not only in the Committee but at the highest level as well. In the message of President Johnson to the Conference he said:

"... to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree:

(A) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of States which do not now control them ..."

(ENDC/120, p.2)

Mr. Fisher stated on 5 March:

"At present only a few countries can produce nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all the world that their number be not increased."

(ENDC/PV.172, p.14)

Our Indian colleague quoted on 12 March the final communiqué issued by the last Pugwash Conference, held in India recently, in which that distinguished group of scientists reminded us of the danger existing in the delaying of such an agreement (ENDC/PV.174, p.16).

In the meantime, most of the delegations around this table have made the point that a non-dissemination agreement would be the next logical step after the successful conclusion of the Moscow test ban treaty. Furthermore, as the Committee is aware, the problem of preventing a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons has been the centre of concern at previous sessions of the General Assembly. Several resolutions have been passed to that effect. We have before us resolutions 1380 (XIV), 1576 (XV), 1664 (XVI) and 1665 (XVI). We in the United Arab Republic delegation support wholeheartedly the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)), which was adopted unanimously at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. Moreover, we think that that resolution can stand as a starting-point for achieving an agreement on the prevention of a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Apart from the benefits which could result from reaching an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, which I have no intention of enumerating here, it would be a high tribute to our Committee if we could work out such an agreement. The problem of "agreement in principle", which retards our deliberations on certain problems in this Committee, has no existence here, as the Irish resolution in itself stands for such an agreement; moreover, in its

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

first operative paragraph it calls upon all States, and in particular upon States possessing at present nuclear weapons --

"... to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons".

(A/RES/1665 (XVI))

I am sorry to have had to quote such a long paragraph, but we think that it is appropriate to indicate the terms included in that resolution, which represents a useful starting-point for achieving such an agreement.

At our meeting on 10 June 1963 I stated:

"... it is self-evident that the freezing of the armaments race is closely tied up with and bears a direct relation to an agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as information relative to their manufacture or uses directly or indirectly, bilaterally or multilaterally, to other States which at present do not possess them". (ENDC/PV.142, p.15)

It is obvious, from reviewing both sides' arguments on this subject during the past three months, that the main stumbling-block which we are facing is the objection of our Eastern colleagues to the creation of the multilateral force within the NATO Alliance. Our colleagues from the socialist countries have continued to state on various occasions in this Committee their dissatisfaction with regard to this policy; while on the other hand our Western colleagues do not envisage such a policy as being one of dissemination of nuclear weapons. It would be a matter of polemics to go through such arguments and try to prove that the multilateral force is or is not a kind of dissemination of nuclear weapons; but whatever could be the reasons, whether political or strategic, we feel that the best way to ensure peace and security in our world is to prevent any accessibility to nuclear weapons and therefore avoid complicating further the already complex task of reaching any agreement on disarmament.



(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

The concept of non-dissemination in itself, as we understand it, is a kind of freeze of the deployment of nuclear weapons by other States. On the other hand, if we have correctly understood the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles (ENDC/120), as explained by Mr. Foster on 31 January, it includes a freeze of their deployment. (ENDC/PV.162, pp.16 et seq.)

We wonder whether it would be possible for the domain of such a proposed freeze to cover the creation of the multilateral force. In other words, would it be feasible for the United States plan for a verified freeze of strategic nuclear weapons to be applied to the creation of the multilateral force? On such an assumption, would it be acceptable, on the other hand, to our Eastern colleagues to embark on reaching independent agreements on both the non-dissemination issue and the question of freezing strategic weapons under control measures acceptable to both sides?

We bear in mind that our Eastern colleagues do not object to the idea of the freeze in itself. Mr. Zemla spoke to this effect at our meeting on 26 March:

"...I should like to emphasize that, as regards the freeze proposals in general, we do not oppose them a priori; we do not take a negative position on them per se in principle."

Mr. Zemla went on to say:

"The freeze would, no doubt, be of importance in a number of spheres. It might play a positive role in building a barrier, for example, against the undesirable dissemination of nuclear weapons to some new spheres where they have not penetrated so far." (ENDC/PV.178, p.26)

Therefore we are convinced that it would not be beyond the resourcefulness and realism of the nuclear Powers to find satisfactory solutions to those subjects in the near future, in any form or at any level acceptable to both sides.

The next item with which I should like to deal is the question of halting production of fissionable materials for weapon use, and the question of the inspection and control involved. We have welcomed the unilateral cut-back in production announced by President Johnson (ENDC/120), and have listened with great attention to what the United States delegation had to say on that question (ENDC/PV.166, pp.16 et seq.). We believe that the use of nuclear energy for the production of nuclear weapons should be halted at once, with the additional transfer of all stockpiles to peaceful uses. We also agree that appropriate and effective verification should be applied to prevent the use of fissionable materials in weapons.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

The representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, was quite right when he said on 12 March:

"... it is not intended that checks should be placed on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy." (ENDC/PV.174, p.18)

He went on to say at the same meeting:

"Moreover, we believe that extension of the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as at present established, to equipment and devices which serve a peaceful purpose would widen the gap between the developed countries and the under-developed countries ...". (ibid., p.19)

We agree with that conclusion drawn by Mr. Trivedi. In the meantime, we welcome the United States decision (ENDC/PV.172, pp.17,18) to open one of its reactors to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection as a first step towards an adequate system of safeguards.

I should now like to deal with a subject which has received renewed interest in our Committee: the physical destruction of some armaments, recently symbolized in the proposals concerning the destruction of bomber aircraft. The memorandum submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union (ENDC/123) contains a proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft. A counter-proposal was presented in detail to this Committee by the representative of the United States on 19 March, when he proposed the destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bomber aircraft (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.).

As a small non-aligned country, we are in favour of the destruction of the major means which the great Powers now have for delivering nuclear weapons to their targets; that is why we welcome the underlying idea of the two proposals. After studying the Soviet Union and the United States proposals for the destruction of bombers, it seems to us that, behind their apparent dissimilarity, they have a built-in logic which in the last analysis reveals a close correlation.

Nevertheless the Soviet proposal appears to be more attractive, as it tends to dispose of an important means of delivery of nuclear weapons on a larger scale than its United States counterpart. However, the implementation of the Soviet Union proposal for the destruction of all bombers would perforce take some time; so, in order to be meaningful, it must logically be accompanied by a cessation of the production of bombers to be agreed upon concurrently. It would be senseless to destroy all bombers while producing new ones.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

If we now turn to the United States proposal in this regard we find that, while it presents some tempting advantages on account of its practicability and feasibility, it nevertheless falls short of expectations as an effective measure in the field of disarmament, for two reasons. First, the two kinds of bombers proposed to be destroyed might be considered powerful weapons by small countries; but, as far as relations between the great Powers are concerned, it is safe to assume that they can be considered obsolete. Secondly, the proposal for the destruction of those two kinds, as it stands, will not prevent the production of new and powerful types of bombers. That is why the implementation of the United States proposal, in order to be really meaningful, must not be viewed as an isolated proposal but should be considered as an instalment in an agreed and phased programme for the destruction of all bombers.

Therefore a close analysis of both the United States and the Soviet Union proposals, in the light of the responsibility entrusted to us to facilitate general and complete disarmament and to achieve long-awaited tangible results in that field, seems to lead us to the three following interrelated conclusions, which could be discussed, co-ordinated and embodied in a single agreement with a carefully-phased programme for their implementation.

These conclusions are: (1) the cessation of production of all bombers; (2) the destruction of all bombers; and (3) the establishment of a carefully-phased programme for the destruction of all bombers, which would start with the United States proposal for the destruction of B-47, TU-16 and other bombers. Those are some thoughts I should like to put before the Committee for its consideration.

The preceding analysis reveals that the United States and Soviet Union proposals for the destruction of bombers are not quite ordinary collateral measures; they differ in their contents and scope from any collateral measures on which agreement has been reached so far. Indeed, those latter measures were more passive in character, requiring no control or verification, and did not involve physical disarmament.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Here we are faced with a kind of collateral measure proposed by both sides which includes more than one aspect familiar to general and complete disarmament. The two proposals include, indeed, some elements of cessation of production, physical destruction, and a kind of control and verification. It is a hopeful sign that the Conference is now turning its attention to more meaningful and vigorous collateral measures in the field of disarmament. We welcome such a development and should encourage it as long as it facilitates general and complete disarmament while safeguarding the security of States. The destruction of bombers, which constitute an important means of delivery of nuclear weapons, would relieve the burden of the first stage of disarmament and would be valuable experience for the disarmament process and eloquent proof that the great Powers were sincere in their desire to start on the road of general and complete disarmament.

There is another question which I should like to touch upon briefly, and that is the question of the establishment of observation posts to prevent war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack — a matter which has recently emerged again at the surface of our deliberations (ENDC/PV.178, pp.9 et seq.; ENDC/130). We think that the work done and the efforts exerted in the past, either in this Committee or before its establishment, in addition to the constructive working papers presented to this Committee, could serve a useful purpose in filling in the background which will help both sides to overcome the remaining difficulties in this respect. It would be another tribute to this Committee if we could in the near future reach further agreements in the field of the prevention of surprise attack, following the successful conclusion of an agreement on the direct communication link between Washington and Moscow (ENDC/97).

I should like to say a few words with regard to another subject which seems to my delegation to be of particular importance: the question of underground nuclear tests. It is a matter of regret to my delegation that this problem, even though mentioned in the list of collateral measures presented by both sides, has not received any attention whatsoever from the nuclear Powers during the past three months. Moreover, as the Committee is aware, we have been requested by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 1910 (XVIII) (ENDC/116) to consider this problem with a sense of urgency and to report to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date. On the other hand, we also regret that underground nuclear

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

tests have been carried out, We had hoped that, despite the absence of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the nuclear Powers would refrain from conducting such tests. In our view the fact that the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) left out underground tests does not in any way legalize the carrying out of such tests.

Meanwhile, as the question of verification continues to be the stumbling-block in the way of reaching agreement on the cessation of all tests -- a matter which does not appear to us to be an insoluble difficulty -- the United Arab Republic delegation at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, fully aware of the remaining differences, made the following statement:

"It is self-evident that the more improvements are brought about in the detection techniques of all concerned, the easier it will be to reach agreement on underground tests.

"As the chief issue on inspection is the adequacy and efficiency of the manner in which the desired results are assessed, my delegation is convinced that scientific progress will enable us to reduce the number of on-site inspections and that more future progress will eventually lead even to its becoming unnecessary." (A/C.1/PV.1310 p.28-30)

We went on to say that improvement in the --

"... techniques of detection and identification, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, by exchanging scientific information ..." (ibid.) -- would lead to that goal.

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was of the same opinion when he said on 12 December 1963 that he was "anxious" to get talks going among Soviet, United States and United Kingdom scientists in order to work out a method of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions which would make it possible to extend the Moscow Treaty to all fields.

Nearly five months have passed since that idea was proposed, during which we have heard no objection from either side. In view of recent scientific developments in the field of detection and identification, would it be possible for the nuclear Powers to consider a kind of co-operation in this scientific field, perhaps in conjunction with some advisory scientific organ, or within the sphere of our test ban Sub-Committee, or in any acceptable form? On 26 March Mr. Barrington suggested the idea of reactivating the Sub-Committee on Nuclear Weapon Tests. He said:

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

"Consequently my delegation wonders whether the time has not arrived for us to consider reactivating the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests which, as in the past, might report to the main Committee from time to time on the progress of its deliberations."

(ENDC/PV.178, p.36)

We believe that the consideration of these ideas would prove to be an effective means of obtaining speedier concrete results -- a matter that would put the comprehensive test ban treaty within our reach.

Meanwhile I should like to refer to the constructive proposal put forward on 24 March by Mr. de Araujo Castro of Brazil during his short stay with us, when he said that underground tests above a certain range which both sides agreed could be identified within their developing systems might be added to the interdiction area of the Moscow partial test-ban agreement (ENDC/PV.177, pp.9,10). In view of the fact that both sides in 1960 included in their negotiations the idea of banning all tests, including underground tests above seismic magnitude 4.75, we believe -- in view of the recent development in the detection and identification systems -- that the Committee should call upon the nuclear Powers to enlarge the partial test-ban treaty in order to cover the banning of underground tests, at least of the above-mentioned seismic magnitude.

In this connexion, we were very interested to read in The New York Times of 4 April that the underground Soviet test in Central Asia in February 1962, and the underground French test in Algeria in May 1962, were detected with unexpected clarity by seismic stations in the central United States up to 6,000 miles away. While the two underground tests were described as large ones, it was reported that the strength with which seismic signals were received was "surprising" and that promising new possibilities were being opened for monitoring a ban on underground tests. We think that scientific co-operation under the formula we suggested before could help to improve the capabilities of detecting and identifying smaller underground tests, and the threshold could be progressively lowered to match such improvements. This could be on the whole another step forward towards banning all tests for all time.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

I should like to touch upon another subject which has received close attention in our Committee. It concerns the proposal to curb the arms race and to pave the way to disarmament through reduction of the military budgets of the big Powers. A great deal has been said about the usefulness of such a measure; different approaches and various suggestions have been put forward as regards its implementation; many of its aspects have been dwelt upon, including the problem of verification.

While discussion on the reduction of military budgets continues in our Committee, and pending the conclusion of a formal agreement on this reduction, my delegation sincerely believes that there is a concrete measure which our Committee can call upon both parties to take right now. If one party finds it difficult to reduce its military budget through a binding agreement now, nothing prevents it from carrying on further reductions in accordance with a policy of mutual example. Both parties can use our Committee as a sort of clearing-house for proclaiming their intention to reduce their military budgets in the future, with a declaration of the amount they want to reduce each year. At the same time, it will be very useful if they inform the Committee of the items where the cuts have been made.

Such a course of action would keep the momentum gained by the early reductions made by both the Soviet Union and the United States; and it is of the utmost importance that such a momentum should be maintained and developed until a concrete and definite agreement on the reduction of military budgets can be reached. Moreover, whether they are able to reach such an agreement or not, the continuous reductions made under the policy of mutual example will make it easy, when the first stage of the disarmament process starts, for the parties concerned to adjust their military budgets smoothly and avoid sudden and drastic changes which might be detrimental to the economy.

As to the field where reductions should be made first, my delegation thinks that we should begin with the resources earmarked for the nuclear weapons which are the most destructive ones and of which both sides have more than they need. In any case, my delegation feels that our Committee could make a useful contribution to our work if it were to appeal to all the major Powers, whether represented in our Committee or not, and not merely to the United States and the Soviet Union, unilaterally to reduce or to continue to reduce their military budgets in the future on the basis of mutual example. We feel certain that such an appeal will not go unheeded.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

In conclusion, we hope that very soon we shall have exhausted the presentation and discussion of the various aspects of the collateral measures before our Committee. As I remarked at the beginning of this statement, there seems to have been a tendency during our recent meetings for the parties to engage in unilateral expositions and reiterations of their respective points of view. There also seems to have been a tendency for each of the major parties to engage more in debating the general merits of its own position than in exploring in depth the other side's position in order to ascertain and enlarge the points and areas of agreement. In these circumstances we are constrained to wonder whether a continuation of this method of work might not tend to harden the differences between the parties rather than to dissolve them.

In this connexion, we cannot help speculating whether progress might not be more quickly achieved if the negotiations could proceed on the basis of a detailed exploration of the problems involved in each specific measure, rather than making such negotiations subject to various conditions or to progress on other measures. The experience of the year 1963, which witnessed the first three agreements in the field of disarmament, would seem to indicate that progress and agreements are more easily and quickly attained if they are restricted to limited practical first-step measures that lead towards more comprehensive ones. In any case, we wonder whether the time for such reflections on the future course of our work has not already arrived, or will not very soon be reached.

In terminating, we should like to leave these thoughts with our co-Chairmen, who, I am sure, with their usual wisdom, will find the most practical way of putting them into effect.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened very carefully to the thought-provoking address just delivered by the representative of the United Arab Republic. I think we should be grateful to his delegation for the efforts it has made to suggest ways in which our discussions of collateral measures might be carried on more usefully, and to suggest various possibilities of agreement on such measures either by treating them separately or by perhaps combining them. Mr. Hassan had so much to give us that we shall necessarily have to read his address carefully to see which of his suggestions seem to offer the most promising ways of reaching the sort of agreement that I am sure all of us here wish we could reach.



(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I now turn to the question of the establishment of observation posts. In a statement made on 26 March Mr. Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, mentioned the subject of observation posts, (ENDC/PV.178, pp.20,21) the purpose of which, as we know, is to reduce the risk of war through surprise attack. Mr. Martin thought this was a promising collateral measure for our discussion at this time, and welcomed the submission of a paper by the United Kingdom representative (ENDC/130) as a positive contribution towards this discussion.

Today I should like to elaborate further the views of the Canadian delegation on observation posts. However, first, as a background to what I have to say on this particular subject, I think it is important to understand the nature of some of the proposals which have been put forward as measures to reduce tension and to halt the arms race. Each side claims that the measures it advocates would achieve those aims. Their unacceptability to one side or the other depends to a great extent on the context in which they are submitted and the degree of control which is to accompany them.

Soviet Union representatives in this Conference have often told us that there can be no control without disarmament. Yet I do not believe that anyone can dispute the fact that both sides, the United States and the Soviet Union, have put forward measures which do not entail the actual physical destruction of weapons or disbandment of forces -- which is the definition of disarmament -- but the implementation of which requires some degree of control if they are to have any meaning. Such measures are the following: the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries; the establishment of denuclearized zones; measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; the prohibition of underground tests; the freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles; halting the production of fissionable materials for weapon use; and measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack. I suggest that all these measures must have some control associated with them.

Let us take, for example, the Soviet Union's proposal to withdraw all foreign troops from the territories of other countries (ENDC/123). This is not a measure of disarmament in the true sense of the word; it is a redeployment of forces. The forces are not being disbanded, the armaments are not being destroyed; they are being moved to some other place. What Chairman Khrushchev said in this

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

connexion in his closing speech to the Plenum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in December 1963 is of interest, and I would quote an extract from that speech. He said:

"When we speak about reducing armed forces and armaments, including foreign troops in European States, we are not seeking to damage any country. We assume this can be carried out without violating the balance of the forces of States belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

"Obviously, as before, we are proposing the establishment of control over implementation of these steps. Apart from that, as is known, we are proposing the establishment of control posts on territories of States belonging to both groups to prevent a secret concentration of armed forces and avert a surprise attack". (Pravda, 13 December 1963)

It is clear from that statement that Mr. Khrushchev does not contend that the withdrawal of all or some foreign troops from the territories of other countries could be put into effect without some form of verification. Why, then, should Mr. Tsarapkin object to the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles (ENDC/120) on the ground that it would constitute control without disarmament?

It seems to us that the Soviet Union delegation is also inconsistent in regard to control of collateral measures, since it supports the Polish initiative concerning the freezing of nuclear weapons in central Europe. On 26 March Mr. Tsarapkin told us (ENDC/PV.178, p.52) that the Soviet Union regards the Polish proposal as a positive one. That proposal is for a freeze and does not entail the actual destruction of weapons -- that is, there is no disarmament --; but, if we understand it correctly, it would be subject to rather elaborate measures of control.

At the same meeting, when referring to the United Kingdom proposal concerning the establishment of a system of observation posts, Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"The first thing that strikes one about this proposal is the complete absence of any new ideas ... It essentially amounts to control without disarmament..." (ibid., p.53)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

When one examines the Soviet Union's position with regard to control over collateral measures, it becomes apparent that it does not adhere rigidly to its maxim "No control without disarmament", but will accept control over a measure which does not entail the reduction of arms if that measure is clearly to its advantage.

I am sure that all members of this Committee are looking for a collateral measure which will reduce tension, increase the security of States, will not upset the balance, and will be of advantage to all and of disadvantage to none. The establishment of a system of ground observation posts appears to the Canadian delegation to meet all those criteria. Observation posts can provide a means by which the host country -- that is, the country on whose territory the posts are located -- can reassure the nation or nations manning the post that its actions are peaceful and defensive and that it has no aggressive intentions. In that way tensions on both sides will surely be reduced.

It has been argued that attempts by posts to gain military information outside the scope of what was agreed could greatly increase suspicion and tension. If any nation manning the posts should allow this to occur, however, it would be a clear indication that it had no serious intention of making the system work. There will no doubt be fears on both sides in this regard; but safeguards can and should be built into the system which would eliminate the possibility of improper collection of intelligence -- or, as our Soviet colleagues prefer to call it, espionage.

A system of ground observation posts would, in the opinion of the Canadian delegation, clearly favour nations having only peaceful and defensive intentions, and would deter aggression. No country or group of countries would accept posts on its territory if it contemplated aggression to further its political aims. If one pursues this line of thought further, it becomes clear that the mere fact of accepting posts on its territory and facilitating the use of these posts for the purpose for which they are intended would indicate a nation's peaceful intent.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

If the system operates as it should, the nation whose posture is defensive would obtain information of an impending attack in time to bring its defensive forces into a state of readiness. The nation initiating or intending to initiate an attack would have either to interfere with a post to prevent it from passing legitimate information -- and that in itself would arouse suspicion of hostile intent -- or to deprive itself of the use of transportation facilities monitored by the post, thus limiting the possibilities for effecting a military concentration and bringing off a surprise.

The establishment of a system of observation posts, if put into effect as an isolated measure, could not possibly upset the balance now existing between the major Power blocs in Europe and thus could not work to the disadvantage of either. Apart from the purely military advantages I have mentioned, there are political aspects which, in our view, are also significant. A system of observation posts, however modest at the start, would contribute greatly to the growth of confidence in an area of existing tension, and such confidence is required for the solution of political issues which now make progress on disarmament difficult.

Those are only some of the considerations which my delegation thinks should commend this measure to the Committee. If the initiative of the United Kingdom in submitting the paper on this subject stimulates serious discussion -- which I hope it will -- we shall join the debate again in an attempt to promote agreement on a system of observation posts, which, I am sure, can be made to work to the advantage of us all.

Mr. LOBODYCZ (Poland): The Polish delegation proposes in its statement today to deal with a question which, though much discussed here last year, has been to our regret passed over in silence by the Western delegations during the current session of the Conference. I have in mind the proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is not my intention to inflict upon the Committee a detailed history of the proposal, but I shall take the liberty to remind my colleagues of a few pertinent facts of the recent past.

Fact number one: in his reply of 27 October 1962 to Premier Khrushchev's message, President Kennedy stated:

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

"If your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a détente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals."

Fact number two: on 20 February 1963, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted such a proposal -- a draft non-aggression pact between the two alliances (ENDC/77).

Fact number three: on 25 July 1963, at the conclusion of the negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, an agreed communiqué was issued in Moscow which read, in part:

"The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants." (ENDC/101, p.2)

Finally, fact number four: on 16 August 1963 the representative of the United States, referring to that communiqué, said:

"The United States, together with the United Kingdom, has informed its allies concerning the Moscow talks, but the consultations with our allies are just beginning." (ENDC/PV.152, p.38)

In a few days, eight months will have elapsed since that statement was made. It seems to us that the Committee is entitled to know what progress has been made in the consultations between the parties. The Committee is entitled to that information because the draft non-aggression pact was presented in this Committee and appears on its agenda. As a matter of fact, we expect information from the Western Powers; and may I note, incidentally, that some of the Western Powers, with certain reservations, did favour in principle the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact? Thus, for instance, on 20 February 1963 the representative of the United Kingdom clearly indicated that his Government was certainly not opposed to the conclusion of an agreement of non-aggression between the signatories of the two pacts if it would prove helpful (ENDC/PV.100, p.44); and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, also a member of NATO, stated at the last session

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

of the General Assembly of the United Nations that the concluding of such a pact would be a reaffirmation of principles already accepted in international relations (A/PV.1233, provisional, p. 59-60).

The position of the socialist States on the subject is well known. For years the socialist countries have been of the opinion that a non-aggression pact, which would rule out the threat of the use of force in relations between States and commit the States to resolving all international disputes by peaceful means only, could become a turning-point in the relations between East and West. We are sure that the concluding of a non-aggression pact would improve the international situation, creating an atmosphere of increased confidence among nations. We are also convinced that such a pact would create a favourable basis for the solution of other urgent international problems and would facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

The relations between the two major political and military groupings covering the territories of three continents -- Europe, North America and Asia -- and including all the nuclear Powers are decisive for the fate of peace in this world of ours. Awareness of that fact of contemporary life has been reflected in statements delivered here by the representatives of the non-aligned countries. I should like to refer to some of them.

The representative of Brazil, on 15 February 1963, in enumerating matters receiving immediate and explicit support from the Brazilian delegation, mentioned in the first place the non-aggression pact between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and those of NATO (ENDC/PV.98, p.19). On 29 August 1963 the representative of Burma expressed his belief that:

"... the formulation of the proposed non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw alliances should go a long ways towards facilitating a solution, and that the conclusion of such a pact would make a great psychological impact on the entire world." (ENDC/PV.156, p.56)

The representative of Ethiopia asked on 20 February 1963:

"... that members of the two alliances should give careful consideration to the advantages such a pact would yield in the search for a comprehensive, lasting and reliable programme of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.100, p.21)

The representative of India stressed on 29 August 1963:

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

"... non-aggression pacts are to be welcomed wherever they can be applied because they help to lessen the danger of war and promote a peaceful and tolerant atmosphere." (ENDC/PV.156, p.15)

The representative of Mexico said at the same meeting:

"A pact which committed the parties to refrain from resorting to aggression and to resolving their disputes solely by peaceful means, through negotiations or the application of the other procedures laid down in the Charter of the United Nations would be in essence a treaty on pacific settlement." (ibid., p.43)

The representative of Nigeria expressed the view on 15 February 1963 that the relief of humanity would be immense if, among other measures --

"... a non-aggression pact were concluded between the two giant military blocs..." (ENDC/PV.98, p.30)

The representative of the United Arab Republic, speaking about the non-aggression pact on 29 August 1963, drew our attention to the fact that --

"... members of this Committee are entitled to hope that both sides will find it possible to achieve a quick agreement satisfactory to all concerned." (ENDC/PV.156, p.40)

From that rather incomplete compendium of views it can easily be concluded that the majority of the Committee attaches great significance to a non-aggression pact and calls for its conclusion. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that this view prevails in world opinion. The question, then, arises why an undertaking of such paramount importance, and so easy to carry into effect, has not as yet materialized. Who stands in the way of its implementation? A non-aggression pact can be inconvenient only to those who are interested in preserving "cold war" relations among the Powers. It can be inconvenient only to those who want to perpetuate this state of affairs, for which some theoreticians have coined the rather peculiar term "state of intermediacy", meaning a state of relations in which there is neither peace nor war. Such an approach, which is nothing more than an approval of international tension, can be profitable only to those who intend to change the present political situation by every means. It is a public secret that such forces do exist in the North Atlantic Treaty alliance, namely in the German Federal Republic.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

We realize that the representatives of the Western Powers are sensitive to any criticism directed against their West German allies. Whenever we refer to facts proving the existence in the German Federal Republic of a trend towards revising the political situation which came about in Europe as a result of the Second World War, we receive as a rule stereotyped explanations to the effect that the phenomena we are concerned with are isolated and of marginal significance; that they do not jeopardize the security and integrity of European States; that we in Poland are over-sensitive on this subject and tend to exaggerate allegedly unimportant events. But are the Western Powers really not aware that political trends towards revision of the existing State frontiers in Europe not only enjoy the wholehearted support of, but are also being fostered by, the Bonn Government itself? We have recently had fresh evidence of this.

On 22 March 1964 -- that is, only three weeks ago -- the West German Chancellor, Professor Erhard, took an active part in a manifestation by the most rabid opponents of stabilization and normalization of the political situation in Europe, at a rally of the outright proponents of territorial claims with regard to the eastern neighbours of Germany. More than that, this high official of the Federal Republic of Germany did not hesitate to stir emotions of revenge by putting forward a demand for the restoration of the German borders of 1937. Is that not a demand to change the existing borders of Poland and those of other countries, borders which have been established by virtue of international agreements? Is there any doubt left, in the light of numerous political declarations by the West German Government, that a demand is also being put forward to absorb the German Democratic Republic? No juggling with words about so-called peaceful changes of borders can alter these facts -- for who would believe that foreign territories can be captured peacefully through negotiations?

In this connexion I should like to quote the leader of the Polish delegation at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Gomulka, who, in referring to the West German Chancellor's programme of territorial expansion to be carried out without the use of force, said:

"... it is easier ... to determine the sex of angels than to answer the question how ... to cut Poland's throat without using a knife."

(A/PV.874, para.82)



(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

The refusal to undertake a legal commitment not to use force against the countries included in its plans for territorial expansion, and the continued refusal to normalize the political situation in central Europe, determines the attitude of the West German Government towards the idea of a non-aggression pact. That attitude came as no surprise to us. However, we cannot but express our deep regret that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany still influences and in many respects bears upon the policy of the Western Powers.

The Soviet proposal consists of two essential obligations: first, to refrain from attack and from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter; second, to resolve by peaceful means all disputes that may arise between the parties to the alliances and to consult together with a view to taking such joint measures as may be considered appropriate. The two commitments are closely connected with each other and cannot be separated.

In evaluating any collateral measures proposed for discussion here, the Western Powers usually apply two criteria: the criterion of balance and that of control. A non-aggression pact, as we all know, prescribes identical obligations for both sides. It does not in any way affect the military potential of any of the alliances. In particular, it does not imply any shifts in the military mix, which has become a sort of fetish in all Western considerations.

Briefly, the concluding of a non-aggression pact could by no means place in jeopardy the security of any of the parties or upset the so-called balance. The requirement of control is simply not applicable to the subject under discussion, for political declarations related to intentions are naturally not subject to control. Consequently, from that point of view also there can be no difficulties in the signing of a non-aggression pact.

Doubts were expressed here some time ago about whether a non-aggression pact was needed in view of the existence of the United Nations Charter, which explicitly prohibits armed aggression. We have adduced a number of reasons why we deem it necessary to translate the general rules embodied in the United Nations Charter into concrete juridical norms adapted to the political realities of the world of today, divided as it is into two main opposing political and military groupings. What we have in mind is the concluding of a pact which could fulfil certain functions of an agreement of mutual security between the States forming the two groupings.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

Moreover, by extending the obligations to certain States which are members of one group or the other but which are not so far Members of the United Nations, and by banning the use of force not only in relations between the members of the two alliances but also in their international relations in general, a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries could bring us closer to the ideal of universal collective security which constitutes the core of the United Nations Charter.

Some doubts have been expressed also about the form in which a non-aggression pact should be concluded. Any apprehensions in that respect must have been dispelled by Prime Minister Khrushchev, who at a press interview on 27 July 1963 stated:

"As regards the question of how the non-aggression pact should be formulated, we are certain that on this score there will be no difficulty in reaching agreement; there are no insuperable obstacles, nor can there be any." (ENDC/103, p.3)

The question of the forum where a non-aggression pact should be negotiated is of secondary importance. It is irrelevant whether the final draft is adopted and signed here or elsewhere. The essential thing is to arrive at an agreement consecrating the principle of peaceful coexistence and the obligation to resolve by exclusively peaceful means all conflicts which might arise between States. The essential thing is to curb the proponents of aggressive policies.

It is essential to create a political, legal and moral instrument directed against any aggressive design. A military conflict can break out only when there are means to wage war and when there is an intention to start one. I refer, of course, to a premeditated conflict; for that is the subject of my statement today. I leave aside the problem of accidental wars. Of the two elements which enter into the equation in the case of premeditated war, the element of the material means for waging war is the more important. It is self-evident that, if we eliminate the physical possibility of starting a war, the war itself will become an impossibility. The awareness of that truth motivates our thoughts on general and complete disarmament.

However, in default of progress in the field of general and complete disarmament -- or even in the field of partial disarmament measures --, we should

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

at least erect a barrier against any intentions aimed at starting an armed conflict. Thus we could set up a favourable framework for effective disarmament negotiations.

We are deeply convinced that there are no objective obstacles to reaching an agreement on a non-aggression pact. The existing difficulties are purely subjective in nature. They should be overcome. The people of the world have the right to expect it from us.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): The United States has already noted the fact that the year 1964 has witnessed Soviet and United States announcements of reductions in military budgets. Those reductions were the result of independent assessments by each of the two Governments of its security needs. We hope that the disarmament agreements negotiated at this Conference will make additional reductions possible. The signing of agreements for the verified reduction of arms is the surest way to reduce expenditure for military purposes.

As President Johnson indicated in his State of the Union Message, the United States has taken new steps -- and has advanced new proposals at this Conference -- looking towards agreement on the control and the eventual abolition of arms. But President Johnson also stated:

"Even in the absence of agreement we must not stockpile arms beyond our needs or seek an excess of military power that could be provocative as well as wasteful."

We hope that other States will find it possible to reduce their military expenditures as far as their special security problems and their peace-keeping responsibilities to the United Nations will permit.

The representative of the Soviet Union has put forward on behalf of his Government a proposal dealing with military budgets, which I should like to discuss today. Point 3 of the Soviet memorandum of 28 January 1964 says:

"The Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached to reduce the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent." (ENDC/123, p.3)

This is the Soviet proposal; this is all of it. This appears to be a simple proposal. Indeed, on its surface the subject of budgetary limitations appears to be simple; but this is a deceptive simplicity. Actually the subject of budgetary limitations is one of the most complex matters with which this Conference could deal. By apparently overlooking the real complexity of the subject, the Soviet proposal raises a myriad of questions.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Since we have before us a Soviet proposal dealing with military budgets, it is natural to look at the Soviet military budget to see if there is anything in it which will throw light on the Soviet proposal. There is not very much. This year, for example, the Soviet military budget which was published and made available to the rest of the world consisted of sixteen words and one sum. Let me read to the Conference an unofficial English translation of that budget:

"To establish in the State budget of the Soviet Union for 1964 an allocation for national defence of 13,289,000,000 roubles." (Pravda, 20 December 1963)

What I have read is the published military budget of the Soviet Union -- all of it, or at least all that is available to us. And, so far as we can ascertain, what is now proposed is that other States, which make their budgetary decisions in front of all the world, should reduce their military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent. In return, so far as we can ascertain, they will be able to read more or less the same sixteen words in future Soviet budgets, and to make a simple mathematical calculation based on the one sum that is made public. Clearly that proposal raises many questions.

Now, some of those questions relate to the actual nature of the proposal itself. It is not clear, for example, whether the proposal is for one reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, or for a continuous process of reductions year after year. If the latter were the case, of course, then military budgets would ultimately be reduced to next to zero and the proposal would be one for general and complete disarmament, not for a collateral measure. But it would be general disarmament without control, without peace-keeping machinery, with no assurance of balance or verification -- indeed, without any compliance with the principles already jointly agreed to govern disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5).

One might ask the question: is this proposal intended to apply at once to all States? The armament efforts of most States are determined in relationship to those of others. What of the States which may not accede to this proposed agreement? Are we to suppose that some hold back while others race ahead?

It may be suggested that the proposal need not apply to new States which have not yet developed the military establishment necessary for their security. Yet we know of States with developed military institutions which feel that, in the face of

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

aggression or the threat of aggression, they must increase their military budgets however much they would prefer to reduce them. We have heard the suggestion today that the major Powers should agree and that others might follow later; but the issues posed by this proposal affect all countries.

The most serious questions -- to which we have been given no answers as yet -- deal with the relationship of military budgets to over-all arms efforts and total military capabilities. Let me give this Committee one illustration of why this is a serious issue.

We all know, and note with regret, that the arms race has involved ever-increasing costs in a dizzying upward spiral which became particularly steep by the mid-1950s with the onset of large-scale development and deployment of missiles and other nuclear weapons. The Warsaw Pact was signed in 1955. In 1957 the Soviet Union announced its first successful intercontinental ballistic missile. During the late 1950s the Soviet Union also produced and deployed hundreds of medium and intermediate range missiles against Europe. During the same period the Soviet Union developed, tested and produced nuclear warheads on a massive scale.

Did the published Soviet military budget reflect that accelerating arms race? It did not. On the contrary, it declined. In 1955 it was 10,700 million roubles; in 1960 it was 1,500 million roubles less; and in the intervening years it ranged from 1,000 million to almost 2,000 million roubles below the 1955 figure. It was not until 1961 that the published Soviet military budget surpassed its 1955 level.

Now, let us suppose that the reduction from 1955 to 1960 had been by agreement, on our innocent assumption that it would result in some comparable measure of disarmament, or that the threat from Soviet weapons would be reduced. How wrong we should have been proved five years later! This leads one to ask what relationship the Soviet military budget has to Soviet military capability. What assurances have we been given by the proponents of the proposal that what happened between 1955 and 1960 would not happen again; that, while the published Soviet military budget would decline, its arms level would skyrocket?

Indeed, we might ask what exactly would be reduced under the Soviet proposal. The terms "military budgets" and "military expenditures" have been used interchangeably by the advocates of the proposal; so we do not know which is meant. Yet from nation

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

to nation there are differences between military budgets and expenditures which may in some cases be so vast as to destroy any prospect of agreed balanced reductions, if one speaks of budgets alone, as does the text of the Soviet memorandum.

Just what is included in, and excluded from the sixteen words and one sum which make up the published Soviet military budget? Specifically, we are entitled to ask: are there other items in the Soviet nation budget, but not included in the military budget, which contribute to Soviet military strength? Let me mention a few possibilities.

Do we know whether military research and development -- the development, testing and evaluation of weapon systems -- is covered in the Soviet military budget? Or could all or part of it be covered under the budget for science?

Do we know whether all construction and maintenance expenditures for base facilities, missile sites and airfields are covered under the Soviet military budget? Or could some of them appear under communications or public works?

Do we know whether the cost of running military training establishments is covered in the Soviet military budget? Or could all or part of it be covered in the educational budget?

Do we know whether the stockpiling of strategic defence materials is covered under the Soviet military budget?

Finally, do we know whether the financing of industry for military purposes is included under the Soviet military budget? Or could all or part of it be financed under the item dealing with the national economy?

Moreover, there are important sources of funds for possible military use outside the Soviet national budget; this is true of other countries also. Soviet publications often explain that a significant source of funds within the economy is the profit of individual plants, factories and other enterprises. These funds are available outside the national budget. In an economy where prices, profits and industry itself are controlled by the government, we are entitled to ask: what contribution to military expenditures do these funds make? Could this contribution result in an increase in military activity not reflected in the military budget?

In addition to all those problems relating to the items which are inside -- and those which may be outside -- the military budgets, we have the question of prices. Prices necessarily affect the size of military budgets and their relationship

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

to total military strength. An increase in a military budget resulting from a price or a pay increase has quite a different significance from an increase resulting, say, from a rise in operational and maintenance costs or from a rise in procurement. By the same token, a decrease in a budget resulting from, or achieved through, a decline in prices is probably not what a disarmament conference expects to produce by a reduction of military budgets or expenditures. This problem is particularly critical when one deals with a controlled economy, where prices can be set at will.

And so we arrive at the question of verification. Here we are told by the representative of the Soviet Union that we should agree to the proposal now and concern ourselves with verification later. It has been suggested that we can look at the military budget of States, and that this is all that is required. We are told that this is so because we should not distrust the statements of responsible officials speaking on behalf of their governments on fiscal matters.

The Government of the Soviet Union, like all responsible governments, does not rely solely on trust of its officials to ensure compliance with regulations in fiscal matters. It has its own audit procedures to give it assurance that fiscal regulations are being complied with. Surely other States, to which the Soviet Union has proposed mutual reductions of military budgets, are entitled to similar assurance. Surely they are entitled to something more than merely reading the sixteen words and the one sum which are available in the published Soviet military budget.

In concluding, I should like to make one point clear. In raising the questions to which I have referred, the United States is not making any accusations. We are not questioning the internal fiscal policies or the economic system of the Soviet Union, or those of any other government. We do not ask the Soviet Union to justify its economic or budgetary system to us; that is its own affair. But we do submit that, if we are being asked to agree to a reduction of military budgets, we are entitled to know what is being proposed for reduction and what is not, what impact these reductions will have on military strength, and what assurances we shall have that they will be carried out.

In fairness, it must be said that many of these questions apply to the budgetary systems of all nations. The Soviet Union may well have similar questions about the military budget of the United States, for example, published in detail though it is.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

But the questions I have raised are not idle. They are designed to come to grips with the Soviet proposal, not to avoid it. Without the answer to these questions, the proposal to reduce military budgets is more show than substance.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): Before I turn to the main part of my statement this morning, I should like -- following what the representative of Canada said earlier -- to observe with what interest my delegation listened to the very thoughtful and far-reaching statement made earlier this morning by the representative of the United Arab Republic. Indeed, what Mr. Hassan had to say was so far-reaching that it is clearly impossible to try to take any kind of position towards it at once; his remarks will need very careful study. I shall only express the hope that that study will justify us in feeling that he has produced suggestions which will aid the Conference, and particularly our co-Chairmen, in drawing together the threads of our discussions on collateral measures -- something that we all very much want to see achieved.

I have, however, asked to speak this morning primarily in order to correct some observations made by the representative of the Soviet Union on 2 April with regard to the statement made by the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Thomas, on 26 March.

First, I wish to refer to what Mr. Tsarapkin said on the subject of military expenditure, and to the remarks which he purported to find in what Mr. Thomas had said the previous week.

Mr. Tsarapkin quoted (ENDC/PV.180, p. 24) Mr. Thomas's own statement that -- "At present the gross defence expenditure of the United Kingdom, according to the figures we publish, is going up, while the gross defence expenditure of the Soviet Union, according to the figures it publishes, is going down." (ENDC/PV.178, p. 7)

And Mr. Tsarapkin asserted that that was a fact which the United Kingdom representative wanted to hide. I find it, incidentally, an interesting theory that anyone should deliberately put a point in a speech in order to hide it. The representative of the Soviet Union then went on to say that Mr. Thomas --

"... does not talk about reducing military expenditure, but about studying a whole series of technical questions. He invites us to go with him into the laboratory, obviously in order to confuse matters and to turn black into white." (ENDC/PV.180, p. 24)



(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

That, I suppose, is what Mr. Tsarapkin meant in his allegations about concealment of the facts.

If I look at what Mr. Thomas said, what I find is a very simple and straightforward statement. It is that, if one is to ask who is and who is not urging on the arms race, one cannot find the answer -- and here I use Mr. Thomas's words --

"... without examining what is put into published figures for military expenditure and what is left out; without comparing this year's cuts or increases with last year's -- or the last several years' -- figures; without weighing changes in pay scales, unit costs and the like; without, in fact, making sure that what you are comparing is comparable."

Mr. Thomas went on to say:

"Nor is it, of course, very realistic... to examine the levels of defence expenditure without giving any consideration to what the country concerned feels obliged to defend itself against." (ENDC/PV.178. p.7)

I may say that these considerations seem reasonable enough to me. Perhaps that was why the Soviet representative thought it better not to quote them. It is doubtless easier to dismiss them as technical matters; but of course we all know -- and our Soviet colleague knows as well as any of us -- that they are vital to any reasoned and objective examination.

Perhaps our Soviet colleague had in mind trying to divert attention from the fact quoted by Mr. Butler in this Committee on 25 February that, while the Soviet Union is at present making such a point of having reduced its estimated military expenditure this year by 4.3 per cent, Soviet defence expenditure, as itemized in its budget, went up between 1960 and 1964 by 43 per cent (ENDC/PV.169, p. 15). A 43 per cent increase and a 4.3 per cent decrease! That seems to me to be an interesting comparison, but I hasten to say that I do not quote it in order to point a finger of blame. We are not inclined to believe that any responsible government -- Eastern or Western -- would increase the very heavy burden of defence expenditure weighing on its people unless in sober judgement it considered it unavoidable. All we ask of our colleagues from eastern Europe is that they will give us the benefit of a similar degree of understanding and that they will also agree to approach these matters by taking all the relevant factors into account. The United States representative has just given us a very clear idea of what some, at any rate, of those relevant factors are.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Now I should like to turn for one moment to the question of observation posts. On this subject -- again on 2 April -- the Soviet representative quoted a remark made by Mr. Thomas at the meeting of 26 March. At one point at that meeting Mr. Thomas said:

"It would, of course, be going altogether too far to suggest that even the most far-reaching system of observation posts could of itself prevent war if anyone were so mad as deliberately to embark upon it." (ENDC/PV.178, p.11)

The Soviet representative's comment on this was:

"By this remark of Mr. Thomas we see the admission of the fact that observation posts in themselves are not a panacea against war or against surprise attack." (ENDC/PV.180, provisional, p.56)<sup>1/</sup>

Perhaps I may respectfully ask Mr. Tsarapkin who is talking of a panacea? I should not have thought that even the Soviet Union would have maintained that any of their proposals on collateral measures provided such a panacea. If there were a collateral measure which provided a panacea against war, why should we be engaged in trying to negotiate general and complete disarmament?

In fact the Soviet representative has put up a straw man and tried -- and, I am bound to say, not very successfully -- to knock it down; but what he has not knocked down are Mr. Thomas's arguments, or the idea of a system of observation posts as a collateral measure which might -- and here I quote that part of Mr. Thomas's remarks which the Soviet representative omitted --

"... make a very important contribution to the reassurance, the relaxation and the building-up of mutual confidence, with which progress towards general and complete disarmament is so intimately allied." (ENDC/PV.178, p.11)

We realize, of course, that this idea is novel in its implications and that, if I may use Mr. Thomas's own words, it "would have been regarded by our grandfathers as beyond the realm of fantasy" (ibid., p.13). We do not insist that it should be accepted in principle right away; but we do suggest that it merits examination and that, if the Soviet representative will not insist on regarding it through nineteenth-century eyes, it might form the basis of a plan which, in its turn, might help to build a solid machine.

<sup>1/</sup> The translation of the Soviet representative's comment in the final record (ENDC/PV.180, p.29) employs different language.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

This morning the Canadian representative has indicated some of the points which do require study in this connexion, and some of the possibilities which a scheme of this kind might offer. It seems to us that we could well look into these possibilities and carry out the groundwork without anyone having to decide at this stage whether or not other ideas should be linked with this one before the machine is set in motion. We believe that such an examination would show the idea of observation posts to have merits of itself without such links; but we do not ask anyone to accept that until the examination has been made. What we find difficult to accept is the argument, which I fear we hear all too often from our Eastern European colleagues, that before embarking on an examination we should draw the conclusions from it.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Last Thursday, 2 April, Mr. Fisher, the representative of the United States concluded his speech by stating that "for its part the United States sees no grounds for pessimism". (ENDC/PV.180, p.22) But, as Mr. Fisher realizes that the lack of progress in the Committee's work and the lack of any agreement on the question of disarmament provide grounds for pessimism, he found it necessary to oppose this method of evaluating the Committee's work. He said:

"At this stage in our work this year, it is the direction in which we are moving, rather than the number of agreements reached, by which we should judge our progress". (ibid.)

We, of course, cannot agree with such an attitude towards the negotiations. This statement by Mr. Fisher is obviously most revealing and clearly explains why the Committee has so far failed to reach any agreement.

Yes, Mr. Fisher, on the eve of the twentieth century there were personalities like Bernstein of the German Social Democratic Party, who propagated the philosophy that movement is everything and the final goal nothing. This philosophy, which deprived the workers' movement of any prospect or aim, was completely rejected. I must point out, Mr. Fisher that the peoples will judge the work of the Committee, not by the number of its fruitless meetings but by its concrete results -- that is, by the understandings we achieve, by the practical measures on whose implementation we reach agreement in one form or other. To obtain such tangible results, the Committee's discussions must be steered out into a wide straight channel and must not be kept within a closed circle, as the Western Powers are attempting to do.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The facts show that there are at present objective possibilities of reaching agreement on the reduction of military budgets. All that is required is for the Western representatives to stop juggling with words and to show a readiness to reach agreement.

In his statement today, the representative of the United States dealt with matters bearing no relation to the problem of the reduction of military budgets. He brought these matters up none the less. He displayed an interest in and would like detailed information about such sections of the Soviet budget as education, science, industry, road-building, and the like. But by listing all these budget sections, Mr. Fisher in fact revealed the real aims of the Western Powers in raising these issues in connexion with the question of reducing military budgets.

They are plainly interested, not in the reduction of military expenditure, but in economic and financial intelligence, in obtaining information on the state of the economy of the Soviet Union in general and as a whole. As everyone knows, the budget is a mirror of a country's economy. In connexion with the reduction of military budgets, Mr. Fisher brought up such matters as price relationships and structure, the system of price-fixing in the Soviet Union, the hiring and dismissal of workers, training of cadres, road-building and many others. What bearing do such matters have on the question of military budgets?

The point is that there is a total figure for the military budget in the national budgets of all countries, in the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil and everywhere else. We have proposed that this total figure should be reduced by 10 - 15 per cent. In proposing this, we do not wish to raise complicated issues or to indicate to any country the type of troops which should be disbanded or reduced, or the area in which military expenditure should be cut, or the like. We leave specific decisions on these points to the discretion of governments themselves. But the very fact of a reduction in the total figure of military budgets will undoubtedly have an impact on expenditure, which will decrease. This is what we are aiming at and this is what we propose.

Passages have already been quoted in the Committee from statements by persons of authority in the United States -- for example by Mr. Gilpatric, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States about the practical feasibility of reducing the United States military budget by 25 per cent within the next few years (ENDC/PV.180, p.7); but you, Mr. Fisher, are ignoring these statements. But

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Gilpatric is obviously as well informed about military budgets as those who are opposing their reduction here. I will also quote the opinion of a well-known and respected United States expert on disarmament, Professor Seymour Millman, who wrote as follows in an article published in The Chicago Sun-Times on 26 January 1964:

"Generally speaking, the budget calculated merely for the maintenance of the existing level of armed forces amounts to 34,000 million dollars, which is 22,000 million dollars less than is required for the draft budget for 1964, submitted by the Government."<sup>1/</sup>

You see what a vast reserve is available to the United States for the reduction of military expenditure if, as we have been assured by the United States representative, that country genuinely wishes, if not to end, at least to slow down the arms race. All that is necessary is good will. We do not maintain that it is essential to conclude a formal agreement in order to implement this proposal. It would be possible to use the method already adopted: that is, the method of mutual example. If your present objections to the reduction of military budgets were valid, Mr. Fisher, they ought to have been taken into account earlier, a few months ago, when the United States Government announced its intention of reducing its military budget for the next financial year.

But these ideas of yours were not taken into account at that time; they did not merit attention. I think the same fate also awaits your views on future reductions of military budgets; in other words, they will be ignored by the parties when they reach agreement on the question of military budgets. Where verification is concerned we have no objection; and we have already told you several times that we are prepared, within the necessary limits, to agree on methods of controlling such an agreement on the reduction of military budgets. There is no difficulty there.

Let us take another question, that of measures to prevent surprise attack. It is obvious to everyone that surprise attack can be prevented only by measures which can exercise a real and effective influence in the direction, if not of complete elimination of the possibility of surprise attack, at least of substantially reducing such a possibility. These important measures should clearly be carried out in the most sensitive and threatened part of the world: the area where the two powerful military groupings of States face each other, the NATO countries on the one side and the Warsaw Treaty countries on the other.

---

<sup>1/</sup> Translated from Russian

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It may be asked what sort of measures can adequately and effectively prevent surprise attack. A passive measure such as the establishment of observation posts, by itself and unco-ordinated with genuinely effective measures that could in fact physically reduce the possibilities of a military clash, is clearly of no positive value. The establishment of observation posts in isolation from any concrete measures to ease international tension and to limit armaments cannot achieve the desired aim: namely, to increase confidence among States and thus to reduce the danger of war. On the contrary, as we have already said many times, it could even heighten mutual suspicion and exacerbate the international situation, because a network of observation posts could not in itself prevent surprise attack; but, in the event of anyone contemplating aggression, a network of such posts on the territory of the other side could provide the intending aggressor with extremely valuable information which could facilitate preparations for carrying out the attack.

That is why the Soviet Government has proposed that we should agree to the establishment of a network of observation posts in the territories of both opposed groupings of States in conjunction with specific measures to ease international tension, such as the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the European States, and the assumption of an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany. The establishment of a system of observation posts can prove useful only in conjunction with these specific measures to reduce the danger of war.

The memorandum of the Government of the USSR on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension contains the following statement:

"Practical steps for a real lessening of the possibility of an outbreak of military conflict in Europe and observation posts would in that case be two complementary aspects of a single process - the lessening of tension in the danger zones where the armed forces of the two opposing groups face each other."

(ENDC/123, p.5)

What is the attitude of the United States representatives to this problem? One can only express regret that the Western Powers are unjustifiably attempting to oversimplify a problem of such grave significance as the prevention of surprise attack. They divorce the establishment of a system of observation posts from such measures as the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the European States, or the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

assumption of an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany. For many years now the representatives of the Western Powers have stubbornly persisted in this attitude, which is absolutely unacceptable to the other side.

Being unwilling to discuss the substance of these most important aspects of the problem, Mr. Fisher asked us the following question: cannot the Soviet Union, which advocates the linking of this measure with other measures, "lay aside its conditions long enough to explore the question of posts on its merits?" (ENDC/PV.180, p.20) But we could ask you exactly the same question, Mr. Fisher: why cannot the United States lay aside its conditions for the study of observation posts? Why could that question not be studied in connexion with effective measures for disarmament, such as the reduction of foreign troops in Europe and an agreement not to station nuclear arms in the territories of the two German States?

According to the United States representative, the approach of the socialist countries to the question of the system of observation posts creates political difficulties. May I ask, Mr. Fisher, what are these political difficulties which prevent the United States from agreeing not to station nuclear weapons in the two German States and which prevent a reduction in the number of your troops and our troops in Europe? The Soviet Union is ready to agree to this. Why should the United States and its allies refuse to free Europe from the dangers and threats at present facing it and from its present burden, all these being directly due to the concentration of armed forces in the very heart of Europe on a scale unprecedented in time of peace?

The Western Powers wish to reduce the question of preventing surprise attack to the establishment of a system of observation posts and nothing else (ENDC/130). They are in effect proposing control without disarmament measures. To insist on such solutions is frivolous, to say the least. It is characteristic that the Western representatives do not themselves believe in the effectiveness of this proposal of theirs. Although Sir Paul Mason may not like it, I would again remind him that on 26 March Mr. Thomas admitted that even the most far-reaching system of observation posts could not of itself prevent war (ENDC/PV.178, p.11).

It may be asked why the Committee should waste its time in discussing such a weak and ineffective proposal. If the representatives of the Western Powers really wish to come to terms on measures which will help to prevent surprise attack,

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

why do they not accept an agreement based on a constructive combination of a system of observation posts with a reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the European States and the assumption of an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany? We see no obstacles to this course. The Soviet Union, for its part, is ready to agree to it at any time. The matter rests with the Western Powers.

It has become clear from the discussion of this problem in the Committee and especially from the statements by representatives of the Western Powers, in particular the United States, that there is a definite connexion between this problem and the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Analysis of the statements by the United States representative has made it possible to establish a definite chain of cause and effect. The United States objects to linking the question of observation posts with the question of States assuming an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the two German States because this proposal would deny West Germany access to nuclear weapons, whereas the United States is at present actively making formal arrangements to give West Germany access to nuclear weapons through the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force.

On the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons the Western Powers, in general and as a whole, are occupying an untenable position. The United States, while stating that it is in favour of putting an end to the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, is in fact speeding up negotiations on the establishment of the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force, which would include West German armed forces.

A report has already come in from Bonn to the effect that on 15 July -- that is, in three months' time -- a West German military contingent consisting of radar and missile specialists will start serving in Norfolk, U.S.A., on the United States destroyer "Biddle," which is equipped with nuclear missiles. The eagerness of the West German Bundeswehr to obtain access to nuclear missiles is shown by the haste with which it supplied this contingent and by the fact that, after the American, its contingent is the largest on the "Biddle".

In the discussion both of measures to prevent surprise attack and of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the United States is trying to adhere to its firm policy of giving West Germany access to nuclear weapons. In both cases the United States is advertising to the whole world its willingness to support West Germany's nuclear claims, even at the price of frustrating agreement on the prevention



(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

of a surprise attack and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The United States is thus showing that it prefers a nuclear military alliance with West Germany to disarmament. This is one of the most telling pointers to the true character of the position of the Western Powers, a position which is acting as a brake on the work of our Committee. It is harmful to this Committee, the peoples of the world and the Western Powers themselves.

In speaking in defence of West Germany's nuclear claims, the United States representative has shown a lack of discrimination in his choice of arguments. The United States and its NATO allies turn a blind eye to the fact that it is they who have surrounded the Soviet Union to the west, to the east, to the south and at the North Pole with their military bases, at which nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are stationed. From these bases their military aircraft carry out reconnaissance assignments and deliberately invade the air space of the socialist States, blatantly violating their frontiers and sovereignty. From these bases, bombers of the strategic air forces of the Western Powers, with nuclear weapons on board, regularly make provocative flights in the direction of the Soviet Union.

But when the Soviet Union stations its own missile equipment as required for defence purposes, representatives of the Western Powers take it upon themselves, as Mr. Fisher did at the meeting of 2 April (and again today), to talk about a Soviet nuclear threat which, to quote Mr. Fisher,

"... includes hundreds of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear warheads and aimed at the densely-populated cities and industrial areas of Western Europe". (ENDC/PV.180, p.19).

The representatives of the Western Powers, who are determined to reject the Soviet "nuclear umbrella" proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) at all costs, even go so far as to make outrageously stupid statements to the effect that this Soviet proposal threatens the security of the non-nuclear remainder of the world and that the "nuclear umbrella" might become an instrument of blackmail against the non-nuclear countries.

Mr. Fisher, if you are genuinely concerned about the fate of the West European peoples, if the United States really wishes to free the European States from the threat of a retaliatory nuclear strike, there is an excellent way of doing this. Dismantle the bases which you have brought up close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; keep your nuclear weapons in your own territory,

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

and the problem will be solved. But this is just what the United States strategists do not want. They prefer to subject the peoples of Western Europe to this threat, hoping by this means to reduce the resources available for a retaliatory strike against United States territory. Prominent Americans frequently have expressed their views on this subject openly and cynically, a fact to which I have already drawn attention in some of my earlier statements.

In this connexion, I must say that Mr. Fisher's remark at the 180th meeting about the Soviet nuclear threat was surprising, to say the least. The Soviet Union is proposing the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the very first stage of disarmament. Accept this proposal of ours, and all those hundreds of ballistic missiles aimed at the "densely populated cities and industrial areas of Western Europe", to which you, Mr. Fisher, referred last Thursday, will be destroyed under strict international control.

The position of the representatives of the Western Powers in this Committee is astonishing: on the one hand, they do not accept the Soviet Union's proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, a proposal that would remove the threat of a nuclear missile war; while on the other hand they raise a clamour about a "nuclear threat" and "nuclear blackmail". In refusing to accept the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles except for those to be left as part of the "nuclear umbrella", the United States and its allies, and they alone, are responsible for the fact that the centres of Western Europe are nuclear targets. This disagreeable state of affairs is the logical and inevitable consequence of the belligerent attitude of the United States and some of its allies. What has the Soviet Union got to do with this? As the Russian proverb says, "he is doing both the beating and the howling".

In displaying this affected concern for the safety of the States of Western Europe, the United States representative seems unintentionally to have given away the real purpose of the United States proposal for freezing strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (ENDC/120). As you know, these vehicles could cover the distance, say, between American and Europe or America and Asia in a few minutes. This is obviously most unpalatable to the United States, which has up till now enjoyed invulnerability, separated as it is from the rest of the world by the vast expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is precisely these vehicles for which the United States is proposing an immediate freeze.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

So far as shorter-range and tactical delivery vehicles are concerned, the United States tells us that it intends to continue the arms race unabated. As you know, the United States stations these delivery vehicles, not in its own territory, but in military bases in the territories of other States in Europe, Asia and Africa, so as to be closer to the frontiers of the socialist countries. In making its freeze proposal the United States is simply seeking to shift the emphasis in the arms race from one type of nuclear weapon delivery vehicle to another; as I have just shown, this shift would not only not strengthen the security of the States of Western Europe but would actually increase their danger.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this military consideration is the true explanation for the unwillingness of the United States delegation to accept the establishment of a system of observation posts simultaneously with the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of European States and the assumption of an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The United States wants to do just the opposite: to station greater numbers of such weapons in Europe, to saturate Western Europe with nuclear warheads and vehicles for their delivery to targets. It is easy to understand the motives actuating United States military men in this connexion and the reason why such a programme is defended by the United States representatives here. On the other hand, the attitude of Mr. Cavalletti, the Italian representative, can only be regarded as extremely surprising.

Mr. Fisher referred on 2 April to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons based on the Irish resolution, adopted by the General Assembly as resolution A/RES/1665 (XVI). Mr. Fisher stressed that "the United States does not intend to take any action inconsistent with the Irish resolution." (ENDC/PV.180, p.18) This statement by Mr. Fisher would satisfy everybody if United States deeds corresponded to these words. The facts are, however, quite different. Neither the text of the Irish resolution nor the interpretation given to it at the General Assembly by various delegations, including its sponsors, gives any ground for asserting that it prohibits only direct national ownership of nuclear weapons and not the granting of indirect access to such weapons -- that is, the dissemination through military alliances of nuclear weapons to countries not yet possessing them.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In brief, the United States considers that the granting to West Germany of access to nuclear weapons through the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force is fully compatible with an agreement on non-dissemination. We are absolutely amazed at this frivolous and, I would even say, farcical attitude of the United States to such an extremely important question. This attitude clearly shows that the United States does not want to engage in serious talks and is not disposed to seek agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, preferring military nuclear co-operation with the West German armed forces to an agreement on this matter.

This idea was expressed very clearly by Mr. Fisher on 2 April when he stressed that the multilateral force is being devised to enable Western European members of the Alliance -- that is, including West Germany -- jointly with the United States (ibid., p.19) to use this nuclear force in their military planning.

The representatives of the non-aligned countries represented in this Committee have repeatedly referred in their statements to the necessity of banning underground tests of nuclear weapons. The Soviet position in this matter is well known and was set out in the memorandum of the Government of the USSR, dated 28 January 1964, from which I quote:

"The Soviet Government declares its readiness, as before, to reach agreement on extending the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, to underground testing."

(ENDC/123, p.6)

We are highly gratified by the positive results achieved by the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1). Clear and convincing evidence of these results is provided by the scientific data and calculations concerning the improvement in the radioactivity situation in the world, given in a communication from the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, which was distributed by the Soviet delegation on 20 March as an official Committee document. This communication contains the following passage:

"The conclusion of the Moscow Treaty ... put an end to any further ejection of radioactive substances into the external environment and created the prerequisites for a rapid improvement in the general situation with regard to radiation." (ENDC/129, p.2)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

There is no doubt that an agreement prohibiting all underground tests without exception would be a very valuable and important step, which would be welcomed by the whole world. The conclusion of such an agreement is, however, impeded by the position of the Western Powers, especially the United States, which are unjustifiably continuing to insist on international control of a ban on underground tests. It has already been fully demonstrated in practice that special international control is no more needed for detecting underground nuclear tests than it is for tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

In this connexion it is interesting to note an article in The New York Times by Mr. John Finney, the well-known writer on nuclear questions, to which the representative of the United Arab Republic referred today. In his dispatch from Washington published in The New York Times on 4 April, Mr. Finney states that on 2 February 1962 the United States system for observing underground nuclear tests detected with unexpected clarity a small underground nuclear explosion set off the same day in the Soviet Union 6,000 miles away. The same was true of an underground nuclear explosion set off by France in the Sahara on 1 May 1962, which was also registered with unexpected clarity by the United States seismic observation service in United States territory, in other words, several thousand kilometres from the site of the explosion.

Another point Mr. Finney revealed in his article was that, at that time, United States Government agencies tried to conceal these facts so that the United States delegation in Geneva could go on asserting that national observation systems could not effectively detect underground nuclear explosions and so that it was not prevented from pressing its demand for the establishment of international control in the territory of the Soviet Union. Mr. Finney's article clearly shows that as early as 1962 the United States had no grounds for demanding the institution of international control. It is all the more strange, two years later, to see the United States still maintaining its old and unjustified attitude in this matter.

These baseless demands by the United States are the sole obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on prohibiting underground tests. If the United States, the United Kingdom and the other Western Powers were to give up their baseless demands for international control, a comprehensive agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests in all media, including underground, would be concluded.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

A review of the state of our Committee's negotiations on these and other measures shows a total lack of progress. The deadlock in the disarmament talks and the total lack of progress cannot, of course, fail to arouse concern and anxiety among all those who favour disarmament and are seeking to eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war. It is now clear to all that the United States, the United Kingdom and their NATO allies oppose disarmament.

In general the position is such that the Western Powers should seriously ponder what their next step should be. Once you rightly recognize that in this nuclear age, in this era of missiles, war is unthinkable, then, having said "A", you must also say "B". You must firmly, resolutely and unhesitatingly enter on the path of disarmament; progress in our talks will then be assured.

In conclusion, I should like to say that we listened with great interest to today's statement by Ambassador Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic. His statement contained a number of valuable ideas concerning solutions to a number of problems before our Committee; these ideas should certainly help us to find a positive solution. The Soviet delegation will, of course, study Mr. Hassan's ideas closely; but we should here and now like to pay tribute to the constructive approach and the desire to advance our talks which were the keynote of his statement today.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I call on the representative of the United States in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): The representative of the Soviet Union had some rather harsh things to say today about the policies and motives of the United States, and he covered a broad range of subjects. I think that it will be no surprise to the members of this Committee that I find myself in rather thorough disagreement with most of what he said.

However, I do not think that it would be consistent with the objective that we all have -- that is, to get on with forward-looking, practical disarmament measures -- for me to make a detailed reply at this stage. I propose to do that at the proper time.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 182nd meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador V. Dumitrescu, representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Canada, Poland, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 14 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

