

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.183
14 April 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. LIND

(Sweden)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. G. CHELEV

Mr. D. TEKHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato A. AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. C.G. EKLUND
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.S. MacDONALD
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the one hundred and eighty-third meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I should like at this meeting to refer to a problem frequently stressed by some delegations, that of making the disarmament process contingent on the establishment of so-called peace-keeping machinery. I should, however, first like to comment on certain observations made by my colleague, Mr. Burns of Canada, on my statement of 31 March (ENDC/PV.179, pp. 16 et seq.). I hope he will forgive me, if, to avoid repeating myself, I do not follow the exact order in which he made his observations.

Referring to the two disarmament proposals before us, Mr. Burns said: "There is nothing different in principle here" (ENDC/PV.181, p. 35). I hope I have made my delegation's position in this matter sufficiently clear. But if Mr. Burns does indeed think that there is nothing different in principle between the two positions, we would ask why his delegation finds it difficult to accept in principle the first of these proposals, as is suggested by so many of the delegations present.

Referring to my statement that the United States plan for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3) "would not only not eliminate that possibility"--that of a nuclear war--"but would preserve or even increase it" (ENDC/PV.179, p. 19), the Canadian representative said: "We do not see how that could happen" (ENDC/PV.181, p. 35).

Yet there is a very simple explanation: what guarantee would there be that new and more refined nuclear weapons would not be produced, thus nullifying the effects of the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles? Under the United States plan the 30 per cent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles is linked with the implementation of 100 per cent control. In these circumstances, what guarantee would there be that a potential aggressor, retaining 70 per cent of his nuclear delivery vehicles, would not be tempted to commit nuclear aggression?

Similarly, referring to my delegation's observation that a percentage reduction in --

"the number of nuclear delivery vehicles would result in preserving ... the strategic military advantage which the authors of the proposal think they possess" (ENDC/PV.179, p. 18) --

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

Mr. Burns maintains that --

"... if there should be such an advantage in existence, favouring one side or the other, a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles would not increase that advantage." (ENDC/PV.181, p. 35)

My reply is that, if there were such an advantage, favouring one side or the other, the United States draft would be even less likely to serve the purposes of a disarmament plan. Mr. Burns does indeed recognize that any such advantage would be preserved, which--as I have already shown--would stimulate the arms race. But, in fact such an advantage would be increased, for the same reasons as I mentioned just now.

I should like to define my delegation's position regarding the relationship which the Western delegations see between, on the one hand, the process of general and complete disarmament as a whole and the contents of the first stage in particular, and, on the other, the so-called peace-keeping machinery.

As my delegation has already stated, it agrees in principle that a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament should include special provisions regarding the maintenance of international peace and security during the disarmament process and after its completion. This idea finds detailed expression in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2/Rev.1).

By Article 3 of this treaty, entitled "Obligations to Maintain International Peace and Security",

"The States ... solemnly confirm their resolve ...

"(a) to base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly co-existence and cooperation;

"(b) not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use to these ends the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;

"(c) to strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

"The States undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia), remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament, in any manner other than for the safeguarding of the internal security of States or for the discharge of their obligations to maintain international peace and security, under the United Nations Charter."

Article 18 ("Measures to Strengthen the Capacity of the United Nations to Maintain International Peace and Security"), which refers to the first stage of the disarmament process, stipulates that all States parties to the Treaty shall, before the entry into force of the Treaty, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces as provided in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. Those armed forces are to form part of the national armed forces of the States concerned and be stationed within their territories. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, serving under the command of the military authorities of the States concerned, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

In regard to the second and third stages of the disarmament process, articles 27, 37 and 42 of the Soviet draft contain, as you know, provisions relating to the problem of maintaining international peace.

As these provisions indicate, the problem of peace-keeping machinery has by no means been overlooked. The arguments of those who make this problem an obstacle to or a preliminary condition for acceptance in principle of the disarmament measures envisaged for the first stage seem all the more unfounded.

The Western delegations appear to argue as if general and complete disarmament will not produce the slightest change in the world, in international relations, or in the behaviour of States. Indeed, the Western delegations seem to think of armed forces and armaments in terms of intercommunicating vessels, the one containing national forces and the other an international peace-keeping force. Basically, the Western delegations maintain that as national armed forces are reduced, the international peace-keeping force must be enlarged, so that at the end of the disarmament process the security of States is to be assured by an international force so powerful "that no State could challenge it" (ENDC/30, chapter H, para. 3, p. 32).

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

But, if such a force is to be established, States must obviously make available armed contingents, weapons and means of production. If so, the logical conclusion is that States will constantly have to seek to modernize these weapons, which is tantamount to saying that they will have to retain their military apparatus, although this should be eliminated at the end of the disarmament process.

Ours, however, is a totally different approach to the problem of maintaining peace in a disarming and disarmed world. We believe that the very fact of disarmament will bring about profound changes in international relationships, in the prospects for maintaining international peace and security and for removing the possibilities of starting a war. It is not merely a question of mutual trust between States and between peoples -- this will of course be fostered by disarmament. The point is that, in conditions of disarmament, the principal guarantee of international peace and security will lie in the absence of weapons and armed forces, not in the presence of an international police force.

In this context, the Western delegations present disarmament as if it were a danger to world peace and security, a factor making for disorder and chaos. This accounts for their insistence on the elaboration of a new international legal code governing relations between States in a disarming or disarmed world, in order to place all States under the compulsory jurisdiction of an international body. In reality, it is not disarmament which threatens international peace and security; quite the contrary, it is the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race. If these weapons, on which some people wish to base world security, were to be eliminated, the prospects for preserving international peace and security would be very greatly strengthened. There is good reason to believe that disarmament would not multiply or aggravate disputes between States; rather, we foresee that the number and gravity of international disputes would appreciably diminish.

The peace and security of the world cannot be based on the ruins of the sovereignty of States, on the sacrifice of their sovereign equality. They must be based on respect for the basic principles of the United Nations. In this

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

connexion, it is relevant to recall that all States represented in this Committee signed the Moscow Treaty of 5 August 1963, banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, the preamble of which proclaims, as the principal aim of the original parties signatory,

"the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations ..." (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

These objectives are organically linked with the basic principles of the United Nations, the implementation of which constitutes its raison d'être. The first of these principles is specifically the sovereign equality of all its Members. That is precisely why we wish to point out that the Western proposals for the establishment of a peace-keeping force do not take account of the functions, prerogatives and powers of the Security Council as defined in the Charter. The Western Powers want to eliminate the Security Council from the machinery for maintaining peace in a disarming and disarmed world.

In a recent statement made on 25 March, Senator Fulbright of the United States referred to those defects of the human mind which inevitably give rise to discrepancies between the world as it is and the world as people see it. Among other things, he said:

"We refuse to believe something because it displeases or frightens us or because it is simply startlingly unfamiliar."

(U.S. Congressional Record, p. 6028)

What Senator Fulbright said is quite true; it is all the more applicable to the differences between the world of the future -- a disarming world, than a disarmed world -- and the picture of this future world in the minds of some people, a picture which displeases or frightens them, or is startlingly unfamiliar.

When we realize how far such factors determine the position of the Western delegations on the question of peace-keeping machinery, we cannot fail to see that these ideas are so many obstacles on the path to general and complete disarmament. These obstacles can and must be eliminated, and the sooner the better. In any case, we must neither exaggerate nor distort the problem of peace-keeping

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

machinery in such a way that we create an obstacle to disarmament, just as the problems of controls and of guarantees for the security of all States are being exaggerated and distorted.

Although, generally speaking, this cannot be regarded as a major problem of disarmament, we cannot, a fortiori and objectively, let it stand in the way of acceptance in principle of a proposal which would eliminate the threat of nuclear war at the very first stage of the disarmament process. At this stage we have to decide whether we agree that the nuclear threat must disappear as quickly as possible or whether we are prepared to agree to its maintenance for an indefinite period, as is implicit in the United States plan. For our part, we believe that only proposals favouring the first alternative would enable us to make progress in our work.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): This morning I propose to examine some aspects of a question which, as we all know, lies at the root of some of the problems which the Committee is trying to solve. I refer to the question of verification of the reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles under a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In the view of the United Kingdom delegation, there are at least two major aspects of that question. First, there is the need for verification of the actual destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles. Arrangements will be required for checking that the nuclear delivery vehicles which we agree to destroy in all three stages of disarmament are in fact destroyed -- or, as we say, are "thrown on to the bonfire". Secondly, there is the need for some verification of "remainders", or remaining war potential. There must obviously be verification of what is destroyed; there must also be the right to check that no State has retained, or is building up illegally and clandestinely, stocks of nuclear delivery vehicles over and above the number permitted at any given stage of the disarmament process. Any such excess could, of course, be a strategically destabilizing force, which could be used for aggression.

I do not propose to dwell this morning on the first major aspect of verification to which I have just referred. We all seem generally agreed that the actual physical destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles must be verified,

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

although we have not yet discussed the modalities of such verification. I must interpolate that these will be extremely important. They need not, I think, present insuperable obstacles; provided of course that we do not try to make stage I of the disarmament process a very short period of time, or to overload it to the unrealistic extent envisaged in the present Soviet plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1).

The leader of the United Kingdom delegation dealt with the latter questions at our meeting last Tuesday, and I shall not repeat what Mr. Thomas then said (ENDC/PV.181, pp. 14 et seq.). I wish only to say that our Soviet colleague's reply (ibid., pp. 38 et seq.) to the various points made by Mr. Thomas was, I thought, unconvincing -- so much so that I could not help thinking at the time that almost everything Mr. Tsarapkin had said merely confirmed the validity of our objections to the Soviet attempt to overload stage I and thus to make agreement between us very difficult to achieve.

With regard to the second major aspect of the verification problem to which I have just referred: I believe there has been some narrowing of the wide gap between the positions of East and West as regards verification of declared and permitted nuclear delivery vehicles under a general disarmament treaty. It is with this point that my statement this morning is mainly concerned.

As we all know, the Soviet Government has expressed its willingness to accept some form of verification of legally-retained armaments: namely, the land-based missiles which, under the Soviet Government's own proposals, the United States and the Soviet Union would be allowed to retain until the end of stage III. Although, as I hope to explain in a moment, there are some aspects of this verification which are still not clear to us, we have in the past welcomed this slightly more flexible Soviet approach, and I do so again today. In view of the fact that the Soviet Government has now recognized that some form of verification of what, under its own proposals, would be the most powerful weapons left in its hands during the disarmament process would not constitute espionage, we hope that in due course the Soviet Government will also recognize that, even with the Soviet criteria for control, there is no reason why verification should not be extended to cover all retained armaments, whether they be legally or illegally retained and produced. We hope, therefore, that the Soviet delegation will consider how best to give both sides adequate assurance that the stability of the mutual nuclear deterrents to be retained during the disarmament process under either plan could not be upset by the clandestine and illegal retention and production of weapons.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Now, I said earlier that certain aspects of the verification system apparently contemplated by the Soviet Government for the missiles to be declared and legally retained during the disarmament process under its proposals were not clear to us. Perhaps I may explain what I have in mind.

The Committee will recall that on 4 February our Soviet colleague said that control "would be established directly at the launching pads" and that one of its purposes would be to verify that the number of launching pads "should not be greater than the number of missiles retained" (ENDC/PV.163, p.24). On 10 March I myself suggested that another purpose of such control would presumably be to check that the number of land-based missiles to be retained under the Soviet plan corresponded to the number agreed by both sides and the retention of which was therefore permitted (ENDC/PV.173, p.19). I made that suggestion because it had seemed implicit in our Soviet colleague's own remarks. He has not, I think, disputed my interpretation, and I shall therefore assume that it is correct.

If so, I still do not understand why sea-borne missiles legally retained during the disarmament process could not be subject to verification with a similar purpose. As I pointed out on 10 March, ships on which sea-borne missiles are mounted come into port periodically (*ibid.*). It would not, therefore, I believe be too difficult to devise a verification system whereby the number of such missiles and their platforms could be checked at agreed times and places to ensure that they corresponded to the numbers agreed and permitted. Therefore, on this score alone our Soviet colleague has not convinced me that the legal retention of land-based missiles offers any particular advantage over the legal retention of sea-borne missiles.

However, at our 173rd and 175th meetings our Soviet colleague somewhat shifted his ground. He tried, as I understood it, to adduce other verification arguments in favour of the legal retention of land-based as opposed to sea-borne missiles; and I myself thought that in doing so he was confusing certain important issues. For one thing, it seemed to me that he tended to equate the term "verification" and the term "control" in a somewhat misleading manner. Therefore it is perhaps worth looking fairly carefully at the arguments which our Soviet colleague used.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

On 10 March Mr. Tsarapkin said that the land-based missiles to be legally retained under his Government's proposals must be "kept under permanent control at their launching pads"; that, he claimed, would provide "a full guarantee that the retained missiles will not be used for attack" (ENDC/PV.173, p.30). Mr. Tsarapkin claimed further that with such a control system "Any preparations for an attack would be exposed immediately" (*ibid.*). Two meetings later -- that is, on 17 March, -- our Soviet colleague repeated that the legally-retained land-based missiles "would be under permanent control" (ENDC/PV.175, p.25). On that occasion he dropped his first argument -- namely, that such control would provide a full guarantee, as he put it, that the retained missiles would not be used for attack --, and concentrated instead on his second argument by claiming that the Soviet control system --

"...would enable each interested party to have complete assurance that no suspicious preparations for launching these missiles are being carried on by either side." (*ibid.*)

Our Soviet colleague went on to argue that, whereas such control could in his view be applied to land-based missiles, it could not be applied to sea-borne missiles.

Now, what are we to make of these arguments? Before we are in any position, it seems to me, to judge whether the control system apparently contemplated by the Soviet Government for legally-retained land-based missiles could or could not be applied to legally-retained sea-borne missiles, we must obviously know what that control system would involve and how it would serve the purposes which our Soviet colleague claimed for it at the 173rd and 175th meetings.

First of all, it is not clear, at any rate to me, what permanent control at the launching pads of legally-retained land-based missiles would in fact entail. The Soviet representative implied that the duties of the inspectors permanently located at those launching pads would involve something more than just checking that the number of launching pads was not greater than the number of missiles retained, and that the number of such missiles corresponded to the agreed and permitted number.

In the second place, it is not clear how these extra duties, whatever they might be, would offer a full guarantee, to use Mr. Tsarapkin's words, "that the retained missiles will not be used for attack" and that "any preparations for an attack would be exposed immediately" (ENDC/PV.173, p.30).

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

On the basis of the information so far available to the Committee, it seems to me that we simply do not know enough at present about this control system to judge the validity of that claim. Of course, if our Soviet colleague had merely said that the legally-retained land-based missiles would not be prepared and used for attack by one side, because it would be deterred by the knowledge that it would suffer unacceptable damage as a result of a retaliatory nuclear blow by the other side, then I could have followed such an argument. But are we to understand that our Soviet colleague is now implying that under his Government's proposal one or the other side might not in fact be deterred in this way; that the deterrent mechanism envisaged by the Soviet Government could break down; and that the only way, in his view, to prevent preparation for and launching of a nuclear attack with legally-retained land-based missiles would be to have inspectors permanently at the launching pads?

If that is so, I should be glad at any rate to know what additional guarantees would be provided by having permanent inspectors at the launching pads. What could these inspectors do to prevent a potential aggressor from continuing his preparations and from launching a nuclear attack? As things stand, I think that the Committee may well conclude that the main importance of having inspectors at declared and permitted launching sites would be to check that the number of missiles allowed by the disarmament treaty was legally retained by both sides. That would at least help to ensure that the numerical balance legally retained was strategically a stable one. That brings me back to the point which I made at our 173rd meeting and earlier in my statement this morning: that inspection with that purpose in mind could be applied as easily to legally-retained sea-borne missiles as to legally-retained land-based missiles.

I should like to make two final points. First, I have asked some questions -- of course, there are many others that could be asked -- about the control system apparently contemplated by the Soviet Government, in order to elicit some further information about another aspect of the Soviet Government's proposals the detailed and essential aspects of which are still unclear to us.

In the second place, although my remarks this morning have been largely confined to the question of verification of declared and legally-retained nuclear delivery vehicles, I am sure that the Committee will not wish to overlook the even more important problem of undeclared and illegally-retained or produced nuclear

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

delivery vehicles during the disarmament process. I am sure that the Committee will agree that, before any general disarmament agreement can be concluded, both sides will have to be assured that any agreed and strategically-stable nuclear balance would not be in danger of being upset by the illegal and clandestine retention or production of undeclared nuclear delivery vehicles by one side or the other.

These are critical issues for which the Soviet Government's plan does not, in our view, provide any adequate solution. As I say, I have referred to these issues only in passing; but I look forward to early and detailed discussion of them in the Committee.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I listened with great attention to the statement made just now by the representative of Romania, Mr. Dumitrescu. He dealt with a very important question: that of peace-keeping machinery. He referred to it as "so-called machinery" (Supra, p.5), which is not very complimentary to the machinery; and he stated that there was a contradiction of some sort between our proposals regarding the peace-keeping machinery and disarmament as such. I should like to assure him straight away, while reserving my right to study his text more closely, that there is really no such contradiction, in our opinion, because disarmament and the peace-keeping machinery must develop in parallel, step by step, and must be integrated so as to ensure real peace to the world.

Our basic conception of the peace-keeping machinery is to be found in paragraph 1 of Chapter H of the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, where one can read:

"The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type ... contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/30, p.17)

I believe that those are two principles to which the delegation of Romania, all the delegations of the East and, in fact, all delegations would subscribe and adhere. There is nothing there really contrary to the sovereignty of States and to their equality. Provision is made solely for better security for everyone by appropriate means within the framework of the United Nations. Now, security is

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

not only, in our opinion, the absence of arms, but also the existence of valid guarantees, in order that the rights of each and everyone may be respected without the possibility of aggression or subversion.

The question of the peace-keeping machinery, as I have just said, is very important. I am glad that Mr. Dumitrescu raised it this morning, although I do not share his point of view. I believe, in any case, that this question deserves thorough study and, on our part, well-prepared and carefully-considered statements. That is what we are going to do as soon as possible.

I should now like to make a few remarks on the statements made by the Eastern representatives at our meeting on 7 April. I have already commented briefly on those statements, but I should like to revert to them today after carefully reading the verbatim record. In the statements of the Eastern delegations last Tuesday I have unfortunately again found some remarks so little in conformity with the truth that I cannot avoid drawing the Committee's attention to them. For example, Mr. Lukanov, the representative of Bulgaria, stated:

"...the West proposes, not the elimination of the nuclear threat, not general and complete disarmament under strict international control, but the preservation of the 'military structures' of States ..."

(ENDC/PV.181, p.9)

The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, said for his part:

"... the Western Powers wish to 'guard' the world, not from war, but from disarmament." (ibid., p.42)

Those are judgments which ought not to find any place at this stage of our work and in the atmosphere of this Conference. I regret them, and would exhort the representatives of the East to refrain from making such remarks, which, by giving a false interpretation to our wishes, make no contribution to the good progress of our work. I would therefore request them to use the kind of language we use towards them, in order to maintain a serene atmosphere, an atmosphere of collaboration.

In continuing the examination of the statements of the Eastern delegations, I have also noticed some statements on the principle of control which I cannot pass over in silence. For example, Mr. Lukanov said, in English --

"... all considerations such as the balance of forces ... must be set aside." (ibid., p.7)

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Zemla, after remarking that the Western Powers wished to preserve the balance of power throughout the process of general and complete disarmament, said: "Such a position is quite untenable." (ibid., p.25) Further on he said:

"... the attempts to preserve the 'rough balance of forces' in the disarmament process ... are by their substance in direct contradiction of the implementation of general and complete disarmament." (ibid.)

In fact, those statements and many others contained in the declarations of the Eastern representatives seem to me to be rather surprising and altogether contrary to what was solemnly agreed among us all within the United Nations. I have to note with some misgiving that, for the first time, the Eastern delegations seem to want to bring again into question what appeared to be beyond all discussion: that the balance must be maintained throughout the process of disarmament. I understand that those delegations, having realized that their proposals are not in conformity with the principle of balance as this has been dictated by logic and decreed by the United Nations (ENDC/5), are now trying to modify that principle itself. But, in fact, it is their own proposals that the Eastern delegations should endeavour to amend. They should not try to denature the principle of balance, which, together with the principle of control, lies at the very basis of our work and without which disarmament is altogether impossible.

The question of control, too, was re-examined by the Eastern delegations during our meeting on 7 April. But, despite lengthy explanations, I have sought in vain in those statements for a satisfactory reply to the fundamental question which we had put to them several times. It is true that Mr. Zemla did not at all wish to ignore the problem of hidden weapons. He admitted this indirectly when he said:

"The problem of the so-called hidden weapons would be practically non-existent under the Soviet proposal." (ENDC/PV.181, p.27)

But Mr. Zemla did not tell us why.

As for Mr. Tsarapkin, he gave us a long and interesting list of the control measures which the Soviet delegation would be prepared to accept. But that list contains a great gap; an essential measure is missing: the freedom for the international inspectors to make sure that undeclared missiles are not hidden

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

somewhere. Mr. Tsarapkin stated:

"... control would take the form of observing, of verifying the physical action to be taken." (ibid., p.40)

But that is not enough. Inspection, to give real guarantees, should not only have for its object what has been done, but should be in a position also to discover what has possibly not been done. We do not ask -- contrary to what has been erroneously stated -- that all the territory of a country should be open to international inspection from the beginning of disarmament. According to our proposals, that freedom should even be quite limited at the beginning. Naturally, it should later be expanded gradually in order to be complete and total at the end of disarmament. This gradual and realistic method of ours would not be feasible if the Soviet proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) were accepted. The application of the latter would, in our opinion, require very vast control measures, which the Soviet delegation is not prepared to allow and which, moreover, would be very difficult to work out right from the beginning of disarmament.

But let us come back once more to the substance of the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) and let us see again -- taking also into consideration the remarks made by Mr. Burns at our last meeting but one (ENDC/PV.181, pp.31 et seq.) -- what would be the consequences of its application where conventional disarmament is concerned. If I understand aright the thinking of the Soviet delegation, the strictly limited number of missiles to be retained would ensure, with a minimum of danger and expense, what is called the nuclear stalemate (ibid., p.32). The two "nuclear umbrellas", which would be, if I am not mistaken, of equal size, would mutually exert a deterrent effect, so that they would never be used, since the mutual fear of reprisals, which would always be disastrous however limited they might be, would deter any aggression.

It seems to me that in such a situation conventional weapons would keep their full value and would even acquire an increased importance. The use of atomic weapons being practically excluded, the quality, quantity and distribution of conventional weapons would again become determining factors. An imbalance in this field would compromise the security of one of the parties and might thus encourage aggression.

In connexion with these considerations, I should like to return briefly to the problem of European security, especially as during his statement of 9 April the representative of the Soviet Union brought it up again and took me somewhat to task. Mr. Tsarapkin showed considerable solicitude for the security of Western Europe, and

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

expressed his surprise that as the representative of a European country I did not share his concern (ENDC/PV.182, p.43). He added that Western Europe was under a grave threat from the East. Several passages in his statement emphasized the existence of this threat, which is only too well known.

But what does the Soviet delegation suggest to us in order to remove this threat which weighs upon us and to protect better the security of Western Europe? Here are some of the measures which the Soviet delegation proposes and which would have to be applied either at the end of the first stage, or even before, as collateral measures:

(1) According to the Gromyko proposal, all nuclear weapons would have to be eliminated in Western Europe, whereas the Soviet Union would keep a certain number -- however restricted -- of missiles. Only a few of these missiles would be enough to cause untold devastation in Western Europe and thus open the way for an invasion by conventional forces.

(2) According to the Soviet proposals for collateral measures, all nuclear devices of all kinds would have to be eliminated in Central Europe. These devices would remain intact in Russia and their numbers might even be increased. They would evidently have sufficient range to strike at Europe.

(3) Again as another collateral measure, all the forces of our overseas allies stationed in Europe would have to be withdrawn, while our neighbour, the Soviet Union, would keep an army of about two million men. A part of that army could be used in Europe in an exceedingly short time.

(4) The so-called "foreign" bases and a part of the infrastructure in Western Europe would have to be destroyed. All similar installations in Soviet territory having the same military value would remain intact and could be increased.

(5) Within the framework of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, provision is made for an equal percentage reduction in conventional weapons. This reduction, which is also proposed for us, alters its value when associated, as it is in the Soviet scheme, with the withdrawal of the allied troops and the destruction of the integrated bases. The conventional armaments of the East, which are decisively favoured by geographical factors, would have an obvious advantage.

Those are the Soviet proposals. Do they really guarantee the security of Western Europe? Does Mr. Tsarapkin believe that, if we accepted these proposals, we could really feel reassured? Of course, we are assured that the Eastern countries have no aggressive intentions. We quite wish to believe it. We wish to believe the statements of the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries, particularly of Mr. Khrushchev, who have abandoned their former threatening tone and insist on the necessity of peaceful co-existence.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In Europe we have followed and continue to follow the evolution of this policy with relief and hope. However, we cannot forget that the process of disarmament is bound to be long, that policy can be subject to fluctuations, that it is a human matter--as experience shows--and that it can change when people change. We cannot forget either that peace can be troubled not only by overt and direct aggression but also by indirect, insidious aggression and by acts of subversion.

Words and declarations, however important and soothing they may be, are not enough. Without concrete guarantees the countries of Western Europe cannot destroy the defensive organization which they have built up in order to preserve, beyond contingent circumstances, their security and freedom. Those guarantees, in our opinion, must and can be found in balanced and controlled disarmament. To that end we have submitted proposals which we consider to be honest, realistic and fair. They do not aim at weakening the security of either side. We are here to discuss them and, if need be, to amend them, provided that the essential elements -- balance and control-- are maintained.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The discussion of the proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union for the destruction, during the first stage of disarmament, of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, except for a strictly limited and agreed quantity of missiles of specified types to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the disarmament process, (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) has gone far beyond the bounds of this proposal as such. In fact, this discussion has taken the form of an analysis of the basis of the positions of the two sides and of their approaches to the problem of disarmament. The Western countries have been compelled to show openly before the whole world their unwillingness to tackle the main problem -- the problem which is the kernel, the core of disarmament: namely, the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war.

I do not think that the members of the Committee have failed to note the remarkable fact that the more the number of meetings mounts up, the more we hear in the statements of the Western representatives an extolling of the concept of nuclear balance, and with all the more insistence they put forward the demand for the retention of as large as possible a number of nuclear bombs and their means.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

of delivery. In this they see all their hope for peace. We do not intend to quote statements of such a kind here. All the interventions of the Western representatives are filled with them, and they are, of course, obvious to everyone.

Nobody, however, can believe that the Western representatives are really convinced of the deterrent capacity of the concept of nuclear balance, or that they really believe in the peace-making purpose of nuclear bombs and their means of delivery. If the Western representatives prefer to turn a deaf ear to what is being said in the Committee, they should at least act here in accordance with the statements made by the leaders of their own Governments to the effect that the nuclear arms race will lead to a nuclear war and that nuclear balance is a balancing act over an abyss of war.

In the Committee, however, we hear speeches which in substance are a direct negation of the aim assigned to the negotiations. Listening to these speeches here, one cannot help asking the question whether the United Nations and the peoples of the world have rescinded the terms of reference they gave to the Committee, and whether, instead of the aim of general and complete disarmament, they have now entrusted the Committee with another aim -- the aim of preserving the so-called nuclear balance. Of course they have not. The proposals of the Western Powers and their approach are aimed, not at eliminating the danger of a nuclear war, but at maintaining it.

It is evident that here, precisely on this point, there is a profound difference between our approach and the approach of the Western Powers to the matter. The Soviet Union and, we are convinced, the majority of the members of the Committee, as well as the overwhelming majority of people in the world, in demanding the speediest possible solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, believe that it is essential to put an end at once to the danger of a nuclear war. It is towards the achievement of this aim that our proposals are directed. The Soviet Government's proposal for a so-called "nuclear umbrella" is likewise directed towards the achievement of this aim. But when certain representatives of the Western Powers try to make out that this Soviet proposal means that the Soviet Union is at one with the Western Powers in regard to their policy aimed at maintaining the threat of a nuclear war up to the end of the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

disarmament process, this is simply a striving to pass off something wished for as real--wishful thinking on their part--and nothing else.

The fact that the Soviet proposal is aimed at the speediest possible elimination of the danger of a nuclear war is understood perfectly well by all the members of the Committee. The point of view of the representatives of the socialist countries has been repeatedly expounded here with the utmost clarity. Representatives of the non-aligned countries have also on many occasions referred to this aspect of the Soviet proposal. On 24 March the representative of India emphasized:

"I believe all of us accept that disarmament will lead to international security and that, in consonance with that proposition, the menace of nuclear arms has to be eliminated on a priority basis. The Gromyko plan is postulated on that premise." (ENDC/PV.177, p.28)

We shall now quote the conclusion reached by one of the Western representatives. On 7 April the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, speaking about the Soviet proposal, pointed out that

"... it might reduce the possibility of nuclear war in the early stages ..."
(ENDC/PV.181, p.34).

Thus the discussion in the Committee has led to a definite conclusion which, as can be clearly seen, is now recognized by delegates representing States of all three trends: that the Soviet Union's proposal for the first stage does eliminate the menace of a nuclear war.

As to the proposals of the West, they do not answer this purpose at all. It is quite obvious to everyone that the representatives of the Western Powers--the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy--are losing, not only day by day but literally hour by hour, any desire to deal with the main problem which is solved by the Soviet proposal: that of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war. They keep turning aside from it, trying to find in other matters pretexts for rejecting this Soviet proposal. Particularly significant in this respect is the statement made by Mr. Thomas on 7 April, in which the whole arsenal of Western objections is concentrated as in a focus (ibid., pp.12 et seq.).

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

One of the objections to which the Western representatives have recourse most frequently is their argument to the effect that the Soviet proposal would allegedly upset the balance. That is an arbitrary assertion which cannot be supported by any facts whatsoever. On the contrary, it is clear to any reasonable-minded person that the Soviet proposal providing for the destruction of all means of delivery, except for a small agreed quantity of missiles to be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union, would place both sides in an equal position from the point of view of safeguarding security. The Western representatives, feeling their position to be vulnerable, are now trying to get away from this shifting ground and are seeking support for their negative position in a different field--in the field of conventional armaments.

Thus on 7 April the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, while agreeing that the Soviet proposals would abolish the danger of nuclear war, tried to prove that these Soviet proposals would place the West in a disadvantageous position in relation to the socialist countries in the field of conventional armaments (ibid., pp. 31 et seq.). In that connexion Mr. Burns referred to a statement made by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, in a speech to the Economic Club of New York--and here I quote the words of Mr. Burns:

"... he said there was no difference in the conventional strength of the two sides" (ibid., p. 32) --

and he himself confirmed that that was the situation at the present time. But further on, the Western representative tried to convince us that, in the implementation of the first stage of disarmament under the Soviet proposal, this equality will be upset and the socialist side will gain a preponderance.

Why will it gain a preponderance? How? Is it because we have accepted the Western proposal for a percentage reduction in conventional armaments? If you think so, Mr. Burns, then why do you describe the percentage approach of the United States as harmonious and balanced? It is not quite clear.

Or is it perhaps that the balance between the two sides in respect of conventional armaments will be upset because we have accepted the Western proposal to fix, at each stage, definite numerical levels of the armed forces? Perhaps these levels are so high that they allow the possibility of aggression.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

On our side, Mr. Burns, there will be no objection to lowering these levels; on the contrary, that is just what we are calling for. But the Western Powers keep pushing these levels upwards and raising the ceiling. Thus in 1952, for instance, the Western Powers proposed a ceiling of one million men for the Soviet Union and the United States of America respectively; then they raised the ceiling of the armed forces for both sides to 1,500,000 men respectively. Later on they proposed a level of 1,700,000 men; and now the Western Powers talk of 2,100,000 men for each side-- that is for the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

No, Mr. Burns; the Soviet proposals do not give any unilateral advantages to the Soviet Union, and they do not aim at doing so. The Soviet proposals have only one aim in view: to put an end as soon as possible to the menace of a nuclear war, to strengthen as much as possible general security, and to free the peoples from the menace of war and from the burden of armaments. In the light of this fact any talk to the effect that the Soviet proposal allegedly upsets the balance is trivial and far-fetched.

The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Thomas, developed also the theme of "confidence". He said:

"Let me again remind the Committee that confidence is one of the main keys to disarmament." (ENDC/PV.181, p.20)

Since the Western Powers raise the question of confidence, they have also to draw the appropriate conclusions. See if you can answer the following question: what is at present the breeding-ground for the growth of mistrust between States? Such a breeding-ground is undoubtedly the fear of the possibility of a nuclear war breaking out, the anxiety of States and peoples lest tomorrow they may become the target of a nuclear strike. In fact it is that, more than anything else, that poisons the international atmosphere to the limit and blights the buds of confidence just as they have appeared. Only in the elimination of the danger of nuclear war is to be found the main key to the restoration of lasting confidence, the key to the achievement of disarmament. It rather looks as though the question of confidence is being raised by the Western Powers merely as a pretext which could provide them with a basis for obstructing any agreement.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The socialist States propose (ENDC/77), for instance, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. The West is evading even that simple and easily practicable step towards the creation of confidence. Ethiopia and other African countries have proposed the conclusion of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons. That, too, is a simple and easily practicable step; and what an easing of international tension it would bring about in the world! The socialist countries are in agreement with it, but the West is shirking it.

On the whole, the interest of the United Kingdom representative where confidence is concerned does not appear to be genuine. Are we to understand that the increase in the military budget of the United Kingdom is a contribution to international confidence? Or perhaps the bombing of inhabited centres in the Yemen by British aircraft is a help in strengthening confidence. It seems that, according to the conception of the United Kingdom representatives here, the dispatch of British troops to Cyprus should also be understood as a manifestation of confidence. Apparently the creation of a NATO multilateral force, on which the United States and Western Germany are at present working intensively, is also to be included among the measures aimed at establishing confidence. No, representatives of the Western Powers: the raising of the question of confidence is merely a red herring and in no way helps your untenable position.

Besides making an excursion into the moral field of confidence, Mr. Thomas went deep into the more prosaic field of practical matters. He claimed that the Soviet proposals did not suit the West, because they "overloaded" the first stage of disarmament. Speaking frankly, the arguments of the Western representatives about overloading reflect, above all, an unwillingness to do any work on the destruction of weapons. Let us even admit that to do so we shall have to redouble our efforts. Well, why not? Are the Western Powers not prepared to undertake this good work for the sake of the interests of their own peoples and of all the peoples of the world?

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

As a matter of fact, the representatives of the Western Powers recognize the practical feasibility of the measures for the first stage of disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union. On 7 April Mr. Thomas admitted that --

"... it might just conceivably be possible to accomplish the actual physical destruction involved ..." (ENDC/PV.181,p.19).

Then he makes a reservation about control to which I wish to return later. But at present the important point for us is the recognition by Mr. Thomas of the possibility of the physical destruction of weapons in the first stage, as proposed by us. This has long been understood by everyone who takes his stand on real facts. The fact that this has now been understood by the Western representatives and admitted by them in their statements is an undoubted achievement. And in the light of this admission, their arguments about "overburdening" the first stage have no foundation.

Now I shall deal with the references of the United Kingdom representative to questions of control. Sir Paul Mason has also spoken about this today. At our last meeting I had occasion to point out the fact that the task of control-- that is, the supervision of the physical destruction of armaments-- is incomparably easier than the physical destruction itself. After all, it would not be such a great burden for the control personnel to watch a worker cutting away with a blow-lamp, say, the engines of bombers, or using a mechanical press to destroy certain essential parts of a missile. Without any particular trouble to themselves, a single group of inspectors could, within a day, supervise the destruction not of one but, say, of many dozens of specimens of any particular type of military equipment. It would be possible, for instance, to load the missiles on barges, take them to a deep part of the ocean and sink them. After all, the whole German fleet was sunk at Scapa Flow at the end of the First World War.

In trying to prove that the Soviet proposals were not practicable from the point of view of control, the United Kingdom representative actually dealt a blow at the Western proposals. The fact that our proposals are realistic and feasible has already been proved by us quite fully. But if the United Kingdom representative has any doubts about the physical possibility of control over the implementation of our proposals, how can he honestly talk about the physical possibility of control over the implementation of the Western proposals?

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

On 17 March we explained (ENDC/PV.175, pp. 28, 29) the meaning of control according to the recipe of the Western Powers, which demand the verification of available or remaining weapons, and to what it would inevitably lead. I should like to repeat our comments once more.

In order to begin the 30 per cent reduction of means of delivery, as proposed in the United States outline of disarmament (ENDC/30, p.4), you must, of course, know the entire 100 per cent of the available quantity, and you must not only know but be certain that the entire 100 per cent has been revealed to you.

Well then, let us suppose that all States have reported their official data. Can one proceed after that to reduce or destroy the armaments? Apparently not, since it is precisely at that time-- namely, at the time of the submission of official data by States-- that the concealment of delivery vehicles is most likely; because who would start concealing these delivery vehicles in the process of disarmament, when control would already have come into operation and when, consequently, there would be a serious risk of being caught red-handed? But once it is assumed that nuclear weapon delivery vehicles may be concealed at the time of submitting information on existing stocks of these vehicles, there immediately arises in the minds of the United States leaders the question of comprehensive control for the purpose of discovering any "hidden" delivery vehicles. In practice this would mean that before the first missile had been scrapped it would be necessary to investigate all industrial plants, all warehouses, all arsenals, all military units, any inhabited area, any patch of land--in a word, the whole country and all remaining armaments, in case a missile should have been hidden somewhere.

Thus, under the Soviet proposal, control is established over disarmament measures, that is, over the means of delivery of nuclear weapons to be destroyed, and over the missiles to be retained within the framework of the "nuclear umbrella"--that is to say, control in the process of disarmament and control over disarmament measures. But the implementation of the United States proposals requires the establishment of control over the whole country actually in the period when official data on the entire 100 per cent of their delivery vehicles are declared by the parties to the agreement. It is already in this period, as follows from the United States proposals and is completely misunderstood by

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Cavalletti, who has apparently been insufficiently briefed by his Western allies, that comprehensive inspection, general verification, a search throughout the country from end to end are to be carried out.

Today Mr. Cavalletti tried to refute this. He tried to maintain that in the beginning it would not be necessary to open the entire country for the purpose of searching for missiles or nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. But in what other way, Mr. Cavalletti, apart from a comprehensive search of the whole country, would you be able to dispel your own suspicions that someone, in declaring 100 per cent of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, might have concealed a certain quantity of these weapons somewhere, in some corner of his territory? If you insist on such a verification, Mr. Cavalletti, then there is no other way, apart from a comprehensive search of the whole country.

From what has been said it is clear that the Western proposals on control are unrealistic politically, since they would boil down to intelligence work, to a search of the whole country without real disarmament measures; and, moreover, they are physically unfeasible.

The United Kingdom representative said that in order to implement such far-reaching disarmament measures as those mentioned in the Soviet proposals, it was first necessary to build up confidence. But with such an approach, the Western Powers' proposals on control, which require the whole country to be searched before the implementation of any disarmament measures, seem for all the more reason to be unfeasible. If we are to approach disarmament in such a way, it is obvious that we shall not succeed in solving this problem along those lines. It is obvious that this problem must be solved in a different way, if we really want disarmament and not endless talk on the subject.

The most recent objection of the Western side to our proposals, the one that turns up most often in the verbatim records, is the reference to peace-keeping machinery. I think that the members of the Committee have already noticed that the Western representatives -- as the representative of Romania, Mr. Dumitrescu, has rightly pointed out --, in fighting against the Soviet proposals, are actually

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

fighting against the United Nations and against its Charter. The Soviet Union's proposals are based on the need to strengthen the United Nations as an instrument of peace. We shall not at present quote the relevant articles of the Soviet draft treaty. The representatives can themselves refresh their memories in that regard.

What is the direction that is being taken by the Western Powers? On 17 March Mr. Fisher, in explaining the United States' negative attitude to the Soviet proposals, stated that this negative attitude was due to the fact that the Soviet Government was --

"... opposing the creation of international peace-keeping forces outside the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament ..."

(ENDC/PV.175, p.8)

I draw your attention, gentlemen, to the words "outside the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament". What amazing logic! The objection of the Western representatives to the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament could be understood, if there were no provision in the Soviet plan for the creation of international armed forces. But that in fact is not so. All that is provided for in the Soviet draft treaty.

The Western Powers, apparently, object to the Soviet draft treaty for two reasons: first, they blame us because the Soviet draft treaty provides for peace-keeping armed forces in exact conformity with what is laid down on this subject in the Charter of the United Nations. The Western Powers place the question of armed forces in an altogether different context. Their idea of these armed forces is at variance with the Charter of the United Nations and does not fit in with it. The second objection of the Western Powers to the Soviet proposals is that these do not provide for the creation of peace-keeping armed forces at the stage in question: namely, before the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Here again, in speaking about this, the Western Powers have in mind the creation of armed forces, not in the way provided for by the Charter of the United Nations, but in their own manner.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Forgive me, Mr. Fisher, but your pretensions have no bearing whatsoever on our negotiations; and if you put them forward, it is apparently because you have no serious and well-founded arguments against the Soviet proposals. But you definitely have a desire to shatter the Charter of the United Nations.

This was very eloquently confirmed by the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, at the meeting on 7 April. He frankly stated that, in his opinion. - -

"... better peace-keeping arrangements than those of Chapter VII of the Charter will be needed ..." (ENDC/PV.181, p.36).

What, then, is the peace-keeping device that the Western Powers have in mind? Here, on this point, the Western Powers show sufficiently their real position. At the meeting on 17 March Mr. Fisher attacked the principle of unanimity in the Security Council; he attacked the principle of agreeing on measures for using international armed forces (ENDC/PV.175, pp. 8,9). What that means is known to everybody. I shall not go into details. But it is obvious that the Western Powers would like to bring about new conditions, which would be more suitable for the purpose of turning the international armed forces into an instrument of their policy. Is there any need to say that the approach of the Western Powers to peace-keeping questions runs counter to the provisions of the United Nations Charter? Consequently their objections to the Soviet proposals, which are based on the Charter, are untenable.

In order to leave no ambiguity, we have deemed it necessary to analyze the basic motives of the Western Powers and to compare our own and their approach as regards the main lines. From what has been said it follows quite obviously that the Western proposals do not solve the problem of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war, and are unrealistic both from the political and the practical points of view. On the other hand, it is just as obvious that the Soviet proposals meet all possible criteria; and it is precisely these qualities of our proposal for the elimination in the first stage of disarmament of all the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, except for a strictly limited and agreed quantity of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States of America until the end of disarmament, that explain the wide support which it received at the session of the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

United Nations General Assembly, as well as from international public opinion and scientific circles. The Western representatives are fond of referring to science. But if they take scientific opinion into account, they should take into consideration the conclusions of the Pugwash Conference of scientists, which have been cited in our Committee (ENDC/PV.177, pp.28, 29).

Concern about the fate of the negotiations and the desire to get them moving prompted the Indian representative to put forward a proposal concerning the proper basis for our future work (ibid., p.28). He suggested that we should approve in principle the Soviet proposals and then go on to a detailed examination of them. In this regard we understand the Indian delegation and make common cause with it.

We show good will, and we see the manifestation of good will also on the part of our colleagues -- the representatives of other socialist countries and of non-aligned States. Only one thing is missing in the work of the Committee, and this is now quite evident. There is no sign of good will on the part of the Western Powers. Moreover, the representatives of those countries are developing an amazing philosophy. Stagnation and a refusal to make headway are being raised by them to a virtue, and they consider such an approach realistic, practical, gradual, well-balanced and so on and so forth, while they declare the search for agreement to be a defect or even a lack of realism.

The Western representatives take the liberty -- as Mr. Thomas has done -- of reproaching the Soviet Union for not having changed its proposals since the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. Let us see what this "reproach" means. In what respect has the Soviet Union not changed its proposals? In the respect that it is not abandoning its positions of principle; nor is it abandoning the measures aimed at eliminating the menace of a nuclear war. That, indeed, is where we differ with you. Agreement can be achieved only when the Western Powers abandon their present position aimed at maintaining the menace of a nuclear attack up to the very end of the last stage of disarmament. This position of the Western Powers will not lead to disarmament, and no agreement is possible on such a basis.

The petrified position of the West, and the unwillingness of the Western delegations to pay heed to the reasonable appeals reaching their ears from all quarters to take the Soviet proposals as the basis for a decision, are now the stumbling-block on the path to agreement. The Western Powers must remove this obstruction from our path.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I listened with interest to the remarks made by the representative of Romania this morning in which he referred to some previous statements of his which I had mentioned at our last meeting. I will not carry this discussion any further at the moment; but I should like to say that I will study what he has said in the verbatim record and may exercise my right to reply to it at a later date.

Today my remarks will relate chiefly to what the representative of the Soviet Union said on 7 April in regard to control over, or verification of, the proposals which the Soviet Union is advancing for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage of disarmament, which are combined with the so-called Gromyko "umbrella" proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). Of course, I shall probably have something to say in regard to the further remarks which he made this morning, particularly those addressed to me.

Now, to go back to the meeting of 7 April, the Soviet representative said: "He claimed"—referring to me—"that the Soviet proposal did not guarantee adequate verification of the proposed measures. This opinion of the Soviet proposal expressed by Mr. Burns is an unsubstantiated assertion ..."

(ENDC/PV.181, p.38)

He then went on to show — or try to show — how baseless it was by rehearsing the measures for control which are set down in the first stage of the Soviet draft treaty for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1). He gave them to us rather in the manner of a schoolmaster repeating the multiplication table to a somewhat dull pupil. But everything that Mr. Tsarapkir said (ENDC/PV.181, pp.38-40) was already known to us because it was all in the Soviet draft treaty which had been presented to this Conference in March 1962. Indeed, I said on 17 March:

"All that our Soviet colleagues have told us in regard to the control measures they envisage for a general destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles is exemplified by article 5, paragraph 3, of their draft treaty for general and complete disarmament, which says:

"Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above." (ENDC/PV.175, p.20).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We knew what was written about those proposals, and it is precisely because they are inadequate and unsatisfactory that we have been asking questions about verification, asking questions in an endeavour to get the representative of the Soviet Union to make clearer what exactly it is that is being put to us, and how the Soviet Union will demonstrate that all nuclear weapon vehicles are actually eliminated with the exceptions provided for in the Gromyko proposal for a minimum deterrent, and those rockets which are to be kept for purposes of peaceful space research.

This morning we have heard Mr. Tsarapkin say (supra, p.27) a good deal about what he calls the disadvantages, or the physical unfeasibility or the unrealistic quality, of the Western proposals, which, he said, will involve searching every nook and cranny, every military establishment and every factory of the Soviet Union. No doubt by inadvertence, he erred concerning what would be necessary under the actual Western proposals, which are for a reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles by 30 per cent in the first stage and 35 per cent in the two ensuing stages. It has been pointed out (ENDC/PV.35, p.15) that the control in respect of these measures would be proportional to the extent of the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles carried out in each stage. In other words, it would not all be done in one stage or all done at first, because certain quantities of these vehicles would be left for later stages. Therefore the control problem becomes more manageable.

But this morning the representative of the Soviet Union—addressing his remarks mainly, I think, to what Mr. Cavalletti had said—was recalling that the verification measures which the West said would be needed if the Soviet plan for the reduction and elimination of all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, were carried out, were very extensive; and he alleged that those were actually the proposals for verification which applied to the plan as set out in the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1,2,3).

As I said before, the Western delegations have on a number of occasions asked for an explanation of how the Soviet Union would propose to have its proposal to abolish all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage carried out in such a manner as would solve the problem of verifying that no weapons other than those which had been declared were left anywhere in any country. I myself have asked questions

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

at a number of meetings, as follows. On 4 February I asked how the destruction or dismantling of nuclear weapon vehicles was to be phased and timed, and how it was to be verified to the satisfaction of all parties (ENDC/PV.163, pp 12 et seq.)

Again on 18 February I asked:

"How would a proposal on the lines suggested by Mr. Gromyko be verified? What has just been stated points to the necessity of a complete disclosure of the numbers and locations of existing intercontinental ballistic missiles, and unrestricted opportunity for inspection of all territories of missile-owning countries before reduction to a minimum balanced deterrent could be effected — that is, effected in the one-stage operation which is the present Soviet Union proposal." (ENDC/PV.167, p.8)

Then:

"Looking at the Soviet Union proposal in this way, one sees that it runs into what are essentially the same objections, with regard to verification and the possibility of the gaining of advantage by one State or group of States, as were advanced against the original Soviet proposal — that is, before the Gromyko amendments — to destroy all nuclear weapon vehicles without exception in the first stage ..." (ibid)

On 17 March, from the verbatim record which I have already quoted, I pointed out the unsatisfactory and meagre character of the information about verification which we had so far obtained from the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.175, p.20). I also said:

"If the West is to take the Soviet proposals as a serious basis for negotiation, it is necessary for the Soviet Union to put forward a tentative, or at least an illustrative, programme of how the territory of the Soviet Union and its allies and, at the same time, the territory of the United States and its allies would be opened up for inspection to prove that there are no rockets other than those declared at the launching pads. That programme would have to relate the areas opened, and the time they would be opened after the commencement of disarmament, and the percentage or proportion of rockets as well as all the other categories of nuclear weapons that would be supposed to be destroyed by that time." (ibid., p.21)

None of those questions has been satisfactorily answered by the Soviet delegation in any of its statements, up to and including the statement made today. Mr. Tsarapkin and other representatives of the Eastern

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

European countries have stated that all the necessary explanations have already been given about the verification of the Soviet Union proposals for eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles, as amended by the Gromyko proposals. We are sorry to have to say that, on the contrary, no explanation satisfactory to the Western group of nations represented here has been given. I need hardly say that in negotiation it is essential that those who put forward a proposal in the hope of having it accepted by the other side should give a full explanation of it to that other side and answer all relevant questions which the other side may put. If that is not done, then the other side must conclude that the proposals are not serious, or have not been worked out in sufficient detail to make certain that they are really practicable and feasible-- which amounts to the same thing.

The purpose of the Canadian delegation in putting these questions and offering these criticisms is to forward our negotiations in respect of the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. Our negotiation has bogged down because of the continued refusal of the Soviet Union to give the required explanations, coupled with a demand for acceptance in principle of its proposals before explanations are given.

In the hope of getting things moving, I am going to offer to the Committee some ideas of what possibly might be methods of carrying out and verifying the proposals of the Soviet Union for the first stage, relating to nuclear weapon vehicles. These suggestions which I offer can be considered as "models". "Model" is an expression which has come into use, I believe, in connexion with strategic studies in the United States and elsewhere. The "model" is a simplified picture of certain key factors in a problem, which is set out for the purpose of analysis, eliminating complex and complicating circumstances met with in real situations in the world. This method, which is based, I believe, on the methods of study used in the physical sciences, has certain advantages in clarifying complex problems such as those of the first stage of disarmament.

The first point concerns the timing of the release of information necessary for control. The Soviet Union has set down in article 2, paragraph 5, of its draft Treaty that all parties --

"... shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time such information..." (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.4) --

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

as is required for control purposes. Does this mean that for the first stage the Soviet Union would give complete information about numbers and locations of all nuclear weapon vehicles which it has listed for destruction --that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles, rockets of lesser range, aircraft and artillery capable of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets? And would this be done before the destruction commenced? If not, how would it be done and when would it be done? Or would the information be released in parts --part before the start of disarmament, another part six months later, a further part after another six months, and so on? This is something we should like to know in order to assess the practicability of what the Soviet Union is proposing, or alternatively to convince the Soviet Union representative here of its impracticability.

The next point we have to consider is when the inspectors who are to oversee all this destruction, and who are to supervise the removal of nuclear weapon vehicles, are to be brought to all --I repeat, all-- the locations where the military units operating nuclear weapon vehicles are in the Soviet Union and, of course, in all other countries. Is that to be done before destruction starts? This is an extremely important point. If not before destruction starts --when? It would appear that if the inspectors are to do all the things enumerated by Mr. Tsarapkin on 7 April (ENDC/PV.181, pp.38-40) they must be present at all the important military units of the Soviet Union and, of course, of other countries. It would not be sufficient, for example, if inspectors were allowed to see aviation squadron "A", which had been declared as being equipped with aircraft for delivering nuclear weapons, and were not allowed to see aviation squadron "B" which was declared not to have them --a declaration which it would be necessary indeed to verify.

The same consideration would apply to units of artillery and so forth. It would be clear that, if such an extensive inspection of all military units of the Soviet Union were to be agreed to, there would be very little military secrecy left in that country or, of course, in the other countries concerned. However, there is nothing whatever in the past statements of our Soviet colleagues here

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

that would lead one to expect them to allow the inspectors of the international disarmament organization to visit all the military units and see all nuclear weapon vehicles before destruction began.

It would be interesting to learn whether the representative of the Soviet Union will state his country's position on that point. If the reaction to the first model which I have just given is negative, then presumably the Soviet Union has another plan or idea for phasing destruction and its necessary verification. One such other plan might be to arrange for the destruction of equivalent quantities of nuclear weapon vehicles by the Soviet Union on the one side and the United States, the United Kingdom and any other nations possessing nuclear weapon vehicles on the other. That, indeed, would be a kind of extension of what has been proposed to us in this Conference -- what is referred to as the "bomber bonfire".

This might be practicable in the early stages of disarmament; but it is not likely that either side would feel able to go on with this method until nuclear weapon vehicles had been reduced to the numbers contemplated under the proposal for a minimum continuing nuclear deterrent, or the so-called Gromyko "umbrella". For one thing, if the two sides have differing numbers of certain kinds of weapons **after** even numbers on each side have been destroyed, there would be an undestroyed residue. For another thing, before the final batches of nuclear weapon vehicles had been destroyed, the parties would want assurance that none had been hidden. This would involve the problem of opening national territories to the international disarmament organization inspectors. So, although this plan or method of destruction of equal numbers might be simple at the start, it would run into great difficulties after the early stages.

However, if neither of the two proposals, or models, which I have outlined are what the Soviet Union has in mind for the timing and verification of the destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles, perhaps it contemplates reducing the vehicles by phases, taking a proportion of each kind of vehicle on each side and at each phase, and allowing inspectors to visit the military units from which they are being withdrawn and to supervise their destruction. This would also involve opening up progressively areas in the territories of the contracting States to the activities of the inspecting teams.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

This, however, as the Committee will see, would be a plan of percentage reductions; although the Soviet Union -- if indeed they contemplate this method of proceeding -- would doubtless argue that the reductions could be carried out more quickly than the percentage reductions envisaged in the United States proposals for basic provisions of disarmament. However, the principle would be the same -- percentage reduction over a certain period --; and therefore it should be possible to negotiate on the question of timing the periods required to effect the reductions and the way in which verification would be progressively carried out and extended.

I hope that these speculations on the solution of the problem of reducing the number of nuclear weapon vehicles, and the necessary accompanying verification, may result in our receiving a clearer exposition of Soviet Union thinking on this matter than we have had up to the present.

A good deal was said by the representative of Romania and the representative of the Soviet Union in regard to the views expressed by the Western delegations about the necessity of having improved machinery for peace-keeping within the framework of the United Nations; and we are reproached for wishing to have something which would perhaps work a little better than the present arrangements. My delegation will, probably at some later meeting, wish to come back to this subject. However, I could hardly help commenting at this time that, of the eight neutral nations represented here, six have taken part in peace-keeping operations; and I am sure that they are in an excellent position to know what at the present time are the deficiencies in the way in which the Charter provisions are allowed to operate.

Other subjects have been mentioned and other points raised, particularly in the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, which I should like to study further and on which I reserve my right to reply.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 183rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador P. Lind, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Soviet Union and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 16 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.