

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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6 February 1964  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 6 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI

(Poland)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil: Mr. J. de CASTRO  
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria: Mr. K. LUKANOV  
Mr. G. GHELEV  
Mr. D. TEHOV  
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma: Mr. James BARRINGTON  
U SEIN BWA  
U HPOON SHEIN

Canada: Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. A.E. GOTTLIEB  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia: Mr. L. SIMOVIC  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. T. LAHODA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia: Ato Abate AGEDE  
Ato S. TEFERRA

India: Mr. R.K. NEHRU  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO  
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy: Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:  
Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO  
Mr. Manuel TELLO  
Miss Ofelia REYES RETANA

Nigeria:  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:  
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:  
Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:  
Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. C.G. EKLUND  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:  
Mr. H. ISMAIL  
Mr. AHMED OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER  
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and sixty-fourth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling upon the first speaker, I should like to make the following announcement to the Committee. In accordance with earlier decisions, the Committee begins today the examination of so-called collateral measures. I have just been informed by our Committee's co-Chairmen that they have started discussing a specific agenda. As they have not yet been able to reach a decision, today's meeting will be devoted to a discussion of partial measures of a general nature.

As there appear to be no objections, it is so decided.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Today I should like to begin consideration of one of the major areas outlined in President Johnson's message to the Conference (ENDC/120) where further steps can and should be taken in 1964. That is the area of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and of weapon material and information. All the participants in our Conference have expressed the need for consideration of that important subject.

My purposes today are: first, to emphasize the reasons why the United States delegation believes it imperative that action be taken now, before it is too late, to inhibit the multiplication of national nuclear capabilities; second, to review briefly the present United States policy with regard to nuclear non-dissemination; and, third, to present the important features of specific steps which we believe can be taken immediately to contain the nuclear threat. At subsequent meetings I shall explore in greater depth the series of separate measures in this field which the United States is proposing.

The spread of nuclear weapons and weapon technology to non-nuclear nations constitutes a grave threat to the security and peace of all nations, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. This is one of the postulates upon which all participants in this Conference agree. Every increase in the number of nations controlling nuclear weapons will multiply the possibilities of nuclear confrontations and the risks of accidental or intentional use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

A further spread of national nuclear forces would constitute a threat as critical to the security of non-nuclear as to that of nuclear nations. This was one of President Kennedy's major concerns. He brought the point home when on 26 July 1963 he said:

"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons ... in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered through the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security and no chance of effective disarmament." (ENDC/102, p.5)

Non-nuclear nations have frequently expressed the fear of being caught in the cross-fire of a nuclear exchange between the two nuclear sides. Certainly the deadly fall-out which would result from such an exchange would not be confined within any particular set of national boundaries. But I think it is equally true that the security of non-nuclear Powers among themselves will be decreased by the wider dissemination of national nuclear weapon capabilities.

Arms races, unfortunately, are not confined to large industrial nations. We are all aware that local arms races are being run today in various trouble-spots of the world. Nuclear weapons would add a new and dangerous ingredient to any of these potentially-explosive situations.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by smaller countries would increase the likelihood of the great Powers becoming involved in what otherwise might remain local conflicts. This danger was recognized by Chairman Khrushchev in his note regarding peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.

Finally, nuclear aspirations are costly to realize. Countries in need of economic development should not slow down or halt programmes designed to raise the standards of living of all their people in order to seek the dubious distinction of membership in the nuclear club.

It should be clear to us all, therefore, that steps to inhibit or prevent the proliferation of national nuclear weapon capabilities are a common interest of us all. This is the point I wish to stress. It is a conclusion to which both moral sense and national self-interest lead us. The interests of both nuclear sides overlap in this area. Here also the interests of the non-nuclear Powers overlap with one another and with those of the existing nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, United States policy has been firmly fixed against the spread of national nuclear weapon capabilities. As you all know, it was the United States which in 1946 presented to the United Nations a plan to bring atomic energy activities under international control and to eliminate all atomic weapons from national arsenals. Furthermore, existing domestic legislation in the United States prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to any nation that has not already developed such weapons, and atomic energy assistance of any kind to other countries is subjected to stringent control.

It is United States policy to further the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. President Eisenhower, in his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, charted our course in this regard. The United States subsequently gave its strong support to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

However, ever since the first controlled nuclear reaction the world has been plagued by a peculiar fact of nature. Almost any peaceful use of nuclear energy results in the creation of plutonium, an element which can be used to make the most destructive weapons mankind has ever known. Therefore, any nuclear power plant is a potential source of the raw material for atomic explosives. For this reason it has long been the policy of the United States Government to support the application of international controls to the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment or information between States for peaceful uses, as a safeguard against proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities. The United States has, in this regard, given strong support to the development of a system of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency. We are pleased to note that the Soviet Union has recently lent its support to the extension of this system of international safeguards to large reactor facilities.

Finally, in this review of United States policy with regard to non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, it should be noted that my Government voted in favour of the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665(XVI)) unanimously adopted by the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. You will recall that that resolution calls upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement under which nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons to States not possessing such weapons. The agreement

(Mr. Foster, United States)

called for by the Irish resolution would also contain provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons. The United States has long sought an agreement which would implement the terms of the Irish resolution.

We wish to make it clear that the creation of multilateral defence forces within the framework of existing collective security arrangements would not result in additional States obtaining national control of nuclear weapons. The creation of such forces would be fully consistent with the Irish resolution and would, in fact, reinforce common policies to prevent wider dissemination of national nuclear weapon capabilities.

What practical steps can be taken to contain the threat to the security of all nations which the potential spread of national nuclear weapon capabilities presents? Inability to reach agreement on a complete solution of international problems is no excuse for failure to take whatever steps are possible towards a partial solution. There are constructive steps which we believe the nuclear States can take towards the objective of preventing the dissemination of national nuclear weapon capabilities; and there are steps which non-nuclear States can take in the same field that will increase their own security in the nuclear age.

The United States proposes the following actions:

First: the United States will, in private discussions, seek agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms of a declaration based on the Irish resolution. That would contain undertakings regarding non-dissemination and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. Such a declaration should, we believe, be subject to accession by both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. As an immediate step and to facilitate progress in these discussions, the United States, for its part, does not intend to take any actions inconsistent with the terms of the Irish resolution. That is the declared policy of the United States.

Second: The United States proposes an exploration of the possibilities of agreement on the application of effective safeguards to transfers of fissionable materials, equipment or information, for peaceful purposes. We believe that safeguards of this kind would minimize the possibilities of the development of additional nuclear weapon capabilities under national control as a result of such transfers. The kind of agreement we wish to consider would provide that transfers



(Mr. Foster, United States)

for peaceful purposes would take place only under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or similar arrangements.

Third: the United States reaffirms, as a contribution to the objective of restricting dissemination of nuclear weapons, its proposal for a verified halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons; and, in association with such a halt, the United States also reaffirms its proposal for the transfer by the United States and the Soviet Union of agreed quantities of weapon-grade U-235 to non-weapons uses.

If such a production cut-off can be agreed as a separate measure, prior to agreement on Stage I of general and complete disarmament and establishment of an international disarmament organization, the possibility of verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency should be explored. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency might verify the halt in production of fissionable materials for use in weapons at existing production facilities. That might be done on a temporary or permanent basis as agreed in consultation with that organization. Inspection to provide assurance that fissionable materials for weapon use were not produced at clandestine facilities could be conducted on a reciprocal basis pending establishment of the international disarmament organization.

Fourth: we have already stated that the United States intends to reduce its production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. President Johnson has announced that the United States is shutting down four plutonium reactors and cutting back production of U-235. This should provide a good opportunity for the Soviet Union to follow the principle of mutual example. We urge the Soviet Union to make a similar reduction of its production facilities. We are prepared to agree with the Soviet Union to the plant-by-plant shut-down of additional nuclear production facilities on a verified and reciprocal basis.

Fifth: the United States is prepared to permit international inspection of one of the weapon material production reactors scheduled to be shut down in our country. Possibly this could be done by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This offer by the United States is intended to provide an example and a precedent. We hope that the Soviet Union will reciprocate, but the offer stands whether or not it is reciprocated.

If the Soviet Union agrees to corresponding verified reactor shut-downs, the United States offer to accept international inspection will be extended as other reactors are shut down.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Containment of the nuclear threat is an interest shared by all nations, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, industrial and developing. The limited nuclear test ban treaty was a first step in that direction. As I have indicated, there is a variety of further practical and possible steps to contain the wider dissemination of national nuclear capabilities. Those steps would logically follow upon the nuclear test ban.

At subsequent meetings the United States will explore with the Committee in detail the nature of these and other United States proposals for nuclear containment.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today we are beginning the consideration of partial measures that is, measures aimed at slowing down the armaments race and further relaxing international tension. As can be seen from the statement made by the Chairman of today's meeting, the co-Chairmen have not yet been able to submit to the Committee an agreed recommendation on the procedure for the consideration of questions relating to the aforesaid field. Therefore, in regard to partial measures, today we shall obviously have to carry on a general debate, that is, express our views on any such questions as are under consideration by the Committee. Today I should like to dwell on the following.

Among the questions relating to partial measures, there are such matters as the establishment of nuclear-free zones and the problem of measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. We have before us document ENDC/124 of 3 February 1964, containing a statement by the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and also a draft treaty between the two German Governments on the total renunciation of nuclear weapons, submitted by the aforementioned Government. These documents show that the Government of the German Democratic Republic is fully aware of the deadly consequences to the German nation of a thermonuclear war, which could be brought about by the West German militarists and revanchists who are trying to gain access to nuclear weapons through the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force, and that it is firmly resolved to give our Committee every assistance and co-operation with a view to averting this threat. Here is what is stated in this regard in the statement addressed to the Committee by the Government of the German Democratic Republic:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"For the German nation the prevention of a nuclear war which would imperil its physical existence constitutes a vital question. On the borders of the two German States the two biggest military alliances of the world are facing each other on German soil. It is inadmissible that in this area the tinder of an atomic war should go on being accumulated. If peace is strengthened in Central Europe, a great service will have been rendered to the peace of the entire world.

"After two world wars started by German imperialism, national duty and international responsibility make it imperative for both of the German States to see to it that never again will the security of other peoples be threatened from German territory. In the question of disarmament the two German States should not wait for the example of other States, let alone conduct atomic armament of their own. A renunciation of nuclear weapons by both German States can never be discriminatory for the German people. Rather, it would mark the fulfilment of an honourable obligation towards their own people who want to prove their love of peace. It would be a contribution to the peaceful life of mankind, which the peoples have a right to expect from the German people." (ENDC/124, p.3).

Further, this statement says:

"In conformity with its draft Treaty on the comprehensive renunciation of nuclear weapons by both German States submitted to the West German Federal Republic, the Government of the German Democratic Republic requests the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to consider whether it could suggest to the General Assembly of the United Nations to recommend that the States possessing nuclear weapons should withdraw from German territory any nuclear weapons they have stationed there, and that they should undertake to respect the two German States as areas permanently free of nuclear weapons, against which nuclear weapons may on no account be used." (ibid., p.4).

This statement clearly reflects the high sense of State, common-national and international responsibility of the Government of the German Democratic Republic for the fate of the German people and for the fate of peace in Europe and throughout the world. We should all take note with gratitude of that particular aspect of the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

matter. Attempts to obscure this vitally important question by outcries about the question of the recognition of the German Democratic Republic, which has nothing to do with the matter, are bound to give rise to objection on our part. On this score the declaration of the Government of the German Democratic Republic states the following:

"The German Democratic Republic has the firm desire to reach an understanding on the renunciation of nuclear weapons with the other German State, the West German Federal Republic. This humanitarian concern is to receive expression without prejudice to any question of recognition, diplomatic relations or differences in political system pending between the two German States." (ibid).

As you see, this declaration clearly states that the Government of the German Democratic Republic does not at all connect an agreement by the two German States to renounce nuclear weapons with, or make it dependent upon, diplomatic recognition or non-recognition of each other. Therefore the representatives of the Western Powers both inside and outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee have no grounds for evading agreement on the aforesaid question under this pretext. Then a legitimate question arises: Why do the Western Powers still continue to evade an agreement aimed at saving Europe from the terrible threat of a nuclear war? The answer to this is well known to everyone: it is the determination of the West German Bundeswehr and revanchists, encouraged by NATO, to lay their hands on nuclear weapons and to have their own means of delivery of such weapons.

In this connexion I should like to acquaint members of the Committee with the representations which the Soviet Government made a few days ago to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and also to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The text reads as follows:

"Reports have recently been published in the foreign press to the effect that work is being carried out in the Federal Republic of Germany on the designing and production of guided missiles and rockets, including missiles that could be used for delivering nuclear warheads to their targets. In particular, it is reported that the 'Waffen-und-Luftrüstung A.G.' Company which has undertaken the testing and production of such missiles, is prepared to take orders for the manufacture of 'any system of tactical missiles'

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and that it is proposed in future to test anti-missile missiles, 'close combat missiles', Zenith missiles and other types of rocket weapons. It has also been noted that the 'Waffen-und-Luftrüstung A.G.' Company intends to export the missiles produced by it and has already received from certain countries orders amounting to 'millions of marks'.

"Thus, despite the assurances of the Federal Government that it 'does not intend to permit the manufacture or export of military missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany', the West German industry has begun to produce guided missiles and, according to the statements of specialists, these are military missiles of the most varied types and purposes. The attempt of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in its declaration of 6 December 1963 to represent the missiles which are being tested by West German firms as being for research and meteorological purposes is clearly at variance with the explanations of those who are designing and producing these missiles, and can serve only one purpose -- to cover up and encourage the activities of the military concerns of the country.

"Of course, the organization of the production of military missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be regarded as an isolated phenomenon. It is taking place against the background of the measures which are persistently being carried out by the Federal Republic of Germany to increase the West German war potential, to inflate the military budget of the Federal Republic of Germany, which has already jumped up to 20 milliard marks, to 'modernize' the armaments of the Bundeswehr and, above all, to further the campaign in favour of enabling the army and navy to possess and dispose of nuclear weapons. Of course, it is far from being accidental that the stirring up of the activities of the revanchist military-industrial circles in the Federal Republic of Germany is taking place at a time when plans are being worked out in NATO for the creation of a so-called multi-lateral nuclear force, in which the Bundeswehr will participate. In fact, this is one of the consequences of the policy of expanding the nuclear armaments race which has been adopted by members of NATO and, above all, by the leading Powers of that bloc. It is not hard to imagine how the danger to the peoples would grow if the plans for the creation of a so-called NATO multilateral force were carried out in practice, and if the Bundeswehr were to be given access to nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"One would have thought that in the new atmosphere that has been brought about since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the Federal Republic would at least refrain in its policy from steps that are contrary to the efforts of other States which are striving for the settlement of controversial problems in the interests of consolidating peace. Recent events, however, show that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is still striving to carry on a policy aimed at intensifying the divergences in the world and frustrating co-operation and agreement between States.

"It must be again pointed out that until a German peace treaty is concluded, no one can release the Federal Republic of Germany, as one of the legal successors of Hitler's Germany, from the obligations binding upon it which arise from the unconditional surrender of Germany, from the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the decisions taken jointly by the Allies. The militarization of Western Germany and, especially, the actions aimed in fact at preparing for the arming of the country with nuclear weapons, are a flagrant violation of the aforementioned international legal instruments and cannot fail to meet with counteraction by peace-loving States.

"The information which has become common knowledge regarding the organization in the Federal Republic of Germany of the production of missile weapons shows what dangers the countries and peoples of Europe are being exposed to as a result of the absence of a German peace treaty. The Soviet Union Government, as a Power which received the unconditional surrender of Hitler's Germany and which in accordance with international decisions has definite rights and obligations in regard to preventing a threat to neighbouring countries on the part of German militarism and in regard to maintaining peace throughout the world, deems it necessary to draw the Federal Government's attention to the extremely dangerous character of the inadmissible military measures being carried out in the Federal Republic of Germany.

"Taking into account the importance of the aforementioned problems for the safeguarding of world peace and security, the Soviet Government would like to stress once again that on the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will lie the entire responsibility for the consequences entailed by attempts on the part of the Federal Republic to carry out measures of such a kind, which increase the tension in Europe." (ENDC/125)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

That is the real reason for the difficulties with which we are confronted whenever we come to the consideration of specific measures aimed at lessening the danger of a nuclear war and preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Of course, one can hardly expect the West German Government, which has set out to manufacture missiles for the delivery of nuclear weapons, to admit this openly. That Government and its NATO allies will, of course, try to deny the obvious facts. But in this matter, which represents such a danger to peace, mere denials cannot satisfy anyone. The inadmissible military measures which are being carried out by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to the manufacture of missiles for the delivery of nuclear weapons must be stopped; otherwise the entire responsibility for the consequences of increasing tension in Europe will fall upon the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. I would ask the representatives of the Western Powers to think about these consequences. In this regard, I should like to use the same quotation as the one cited to us by Mr. Foster at today's meeting. He read out to us the following passage from the statement made by the late President Kennedy on 26 July 1963:

"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons ... in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security and no chance for effective disarmament. There would only be increased chances of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great Powers to involve themselves in otherwise local conflicts." (EMDC/102, p.5)

If the Committee wishes to achieve positive results from consideration of the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, it should make sure that the West German Bundeswehr and revanchists, and also the NATO strategists who are intensively engaged in working out a way of giving West Germany access to nuclear weapons through the creation of a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force, that is to say, the opponents of a positive solution to this problem, would not be able to prevent agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In this regard, wide opportunities are opened up to the Committee by the proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic for the conclusion of a treaty between the two German States on the total renunciation of nuclear weapons, and also its appeal to the Committee to consider whether it could suggest to the General Assembly of the United Nations to recommend that the States possessing nuclear weapons should withdraw from German territory any nuclear weapons they have stationed there, and that they should undertake to respect the two German States as areas permanently free of nuclear weapons, against which nuclear weapons may on no account be used (ENDC/124). The Committee should not lose this opportunity. It should support that proposal with the utmost good will. The Soviet delegation, on its part, will willingly do everything possible in order to solve this problem.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I should now like to speak in my capacity as representative of Poland.

The Polish delegation has followed with attention the general debate, the greater part of which has been devoted to partial disarmament measures. We note with satisfaction that the significance of those measures has been fully realized in this Committee. In fact nearly all the representatives have emphasized the importance of partial measures in easing international tension and creating a climate in the Conference favourable to the progress of our negotiations on general and complete disarmament, which remains our Committee's principal task.

The experience of the past few months has shown that even a relatively limited agreement such as that on the partial cessation of nuclear weapon tests has stimulated our desire to find more far-reaching solutions which might, if we do not miss the opportunity, lead to a radical improvement in international relations as a whole.

Independently of the proposals which have been made at earlier stages of the Conference, we have now before us a number of proposals advanced by the delegations of the Soviet Union (ENDC/123) and the United States (ENDC/120). The measures proposed for our examination differ in their character, their scope and the possible effect of their implementation. If we compare the substance of those proposals, we shall find that considerable differences exist between them, but my intention is not to make a detailed comparative analysis at the present stage.



(The Chairman, Poland)

On the other hand I should like to emphasize that, in spite of those differences, we find common points on quite a number of problems, and this is an element which should facilitate agreement. I should like to refer here to that part of the statement made by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, on 4 February in which he expressed the hope that we should be able to select from those two lists certain common proposals leading towards new agreements (ENDC/PV.163, p.17).

I should also like to recall the statement made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, on 28 January in which she recommended us to adopt a pragmatic attitude towards the selection of partial measures, and expressed the view that priority should be given to those measures which were ripe for discussion by our Conference and on which -- as Mrs. Myrdal said later in the same statement -- it was easiest to reach an agreement (ENDC/PV.160, pp. 20, 21). It seems to us that in this category of ripe problems several proposals could be classed on which it would be relatively easy to reach an agreement, of course assuming good will on the part of all the parties concerned.

Here we should mention, first of all, the question of reducing military budgets, and that of reducing armed forces. I have given first place to those two problems -- both of which are mentioned in the Soviet proposals -- because the present situation is favourable to their solution. In this connexion I have in mind the reduction in its military budget carried out by the Soviet Union and the reduction in military expenditure announced by President Johnson for the United States budget, since a reduction in armed forces is logically connected with a decrease in military budgets. Moreover, the Soviet Union has already undertaken certain measures to this end and is ready, as stated in the Soviet Union's memorandum of 28 January, to extend their scope if the Western Powers display willingness to take similar measures.

In this connexion I should like to emphasize that Poland has always ascribed great importance to concrete measures which, though of a limited nature at the outset, might change, if implemented, the political climate of international relations, ease tension and facilitate agreement on a much wider scale. This is of particular importance in the areas where the armed forces of the opposing sides directly face each other, and where the danger of the unleashing of an armed conflict

(The Chairman, Poland)

and its possible consequence -- that is to say, the outbreak of a global nuclear war -- is greatest. The most important focus of such tension exists in Central Europe, where within a relatively small area large forces of the NATO member States and of States signatories of the Warsaw Treaty are concentrated. What is more, the state of tension thus created is a source of suspicion and mistrust, a fact which impedes political settlement as well as normalization and stabilization in that part of the world.

For many years past the socialist States have been demanding the adoption of measures capable of reducing military and political tension in Central Europe. That has always been and still remains the object of the Soviet Union's proposals concerning the withdrawal, or at least the reduction, of foreign armies stationed in the territories of European countries, and of its proposal concerning the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO (ENDC/77) -- an idea which, incidentally, finds considerable support within our Committee.

In the Soviet Union's memorandum submitted to this Committee (ENDC/123) we find a very important proposal. It concerns the elimination of all bomber aircraft. In the statement of the United States Government (ENDC/120) we find some ideas concerning the destruction of a certain quantity of obsolete types of bombers. Of course the difference in the approach to this issue by each of the two sides is obvious. The Soviet proposal aims at a substantial reduction of the war potential, while the United States proposal aims at its modernization. President Johnson and the Defense Secretary, Mr. McNamara, have spoken in some of their recent statements of an intensive perfecting of armaments, and not in the field of aviation alone. Nevertheless one cannot help noting some progress, taking the form of a certain common tendency to destroy certain categories of arms independently of the programme of general and complete disarmament.

I should also like to mention in passing that we have noticed a certain rapprochement of the United States position to the view upheld for years by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, that recognition should be given to the particular role played by nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The Western countries thus seem to have given up to a certain extent their theory that nuclear armaments should be treated on the same footing as conventional weapons. This may help to eliminate the obstacles we have encountered during the discussion on the realization of the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

(The Chairman, Poland)

The desire to diminish the danger of an outbreak of war in the most sensitive area also led Poland more than six years ago to propose the creation of a denuclearized zone in Europe with limited armaments. That proposal has lost none of its urgency, but, on the contrary, in the light of the events of the last few years, has proved how realistic and convincing it is. It is still on our Committee's agenda (ENDC/C.1/1).

In its constant search for points of closer contact between the positions of the two sides, Poland lately put forward the suggestion to "freeze" nuclear arms in Central Europe. This proposal is to be found in the statement made by Mr. Wladyslaw Gomulka on 28 December 1963, and is at present being elaborated in detail. There is growing appreciation among those who think clearly in Western circles of the imperative necessity and importance of easing tension in Europe and of thus creating stable foundations for universal peace. We therefore venture to express the hope that the proposals of the socialist States will be examined with attention and understanding.

As I have already emphasized, the starting-point for our discussion could be the measures on which it is relatively easy to reach agreement, such as the reduction of military budgets and forces. The application now, even before the conclusion of an overall disarmament agreement, of those measures which would tangibly reduce the military potentials on both sides would be evidence of the willingness of States to achieve general and complete disarmament.

Another partial measure with which we could deal now is the proposal on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. This item is to be found in both the Soviet and the United States plans. Yet we should be rendering poor service to the cause of peace if we did not indicate the divergence of their attitudes in this field.

The importance of these partial measures lies in the fact that they might open up increasingly far-reaching prospects for agreement on disarmament, particularly in the sphere of nuclear armaments. Nevertheless, their significance would become illusory if at the same time projects aiming at intensive nuclear arming were being carried out with the participation of an increasing number of States. Of course I have here in mind the plan aiming at the creation of a multilateral nuclear NATO force.

(The Chairman, Poland)

The application of this plan would not only be in contradiction with the intention proclaimed by the United States of reducing the risk of war, but might on the contrary contribute to an aggravation of the international situation and destroy all the positive effects of the agreements so far reached among the various Powers.

The creation of new forms of possession of nuclear weapons -- collective possession -- could hamper nuclear disarmament and even render it impossible through the opposition of merely one of the co-possessors. We have on a number of occasions heard in this Committee and outside it assurances from the United States that nuclear weapons would not be placed under the control of other States and that the present position with regard to the possession of those weapons would not be changed. We have today heard a declaration by Mr. Foster to the same effect. (supra, p.7 ). But is not co-participation in a multilateral nuclear NATO force, joint availability, and joint decision on their utilization equivalent to co-participation in their control?

It is evident to anyone knowing the ever-growing military ambitions of the Federal Republic of Germany that that country's Government is anxious to acquire this control at the present stage in order to achieve its political aims in Europe. In this connexion a general of the United States Air Force, Thomas D. White, wrote in the periodical Newsweek for 11 November 1963:

"... probably only Germany" -- he meant, of course, the Federal Republic of Germany -- "sincerely supports the projected multilateral nuclear force. That is obviously because the Federal Republic of Germany certainly considers that half a loaf is better than no bread at all. When it has digested half a loaf, it will always be able to ask for more"<sup>1/</sup>

I think that representatives of the Western Powers will not accuse this United States general, as they usually accuse us, of being unduly sensitive in appreciating the tendencies of political circles in the Federal Republic of Germany.

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<sup>1/</sup> Retranslated from French.

(The Chairman, Poland)

Moreover, it would be naive to think that the Federal Republic of Germany would be prepared to bear expenses in respect of the multilateral nuclear force amounting to thousands of millions, equalling those of the United States and considerably exceeding those of other NATO countries, if there were to be no change in the present situation with regard to the possession of nuclear weapons, and if the Federal Republic of Germany were not to obtain access to those weapons.

In this connexion it should be emphasized that the Government of the second German State, the Democratic Republic of Germany, has adopted on this question the very opposite attitude. This attitude stems from the overall policy of peace pursued by the Democratic Republic of Germany, and also answers both to the general exigencies of European security and to the vital interests of the German people. The Government of the German Democratic Republic has on a number of occasions addressed proposals to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that both German States should renounce access to nuclear weapons in any form. This attitude has been expressed in the draft treaty submitted, together with a declaration addressed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic at present staying in Geneva (ENDC/124).

Poland, which attaches great importance to the existence of a peaceful and democratic German State on its borders, fully supports the German Democratic Republic's initiative in this field, which shows that Government's concern for security in Europe; it also supports the proposal mentioned earlier.

Returning to the question of the non-dissémination of nuclear weapons and to the concept of a multilateral nuclear force associated with it, I should like to emphasize the following. In our opinion there can be no doubt -- and this has been confirmed by Western military experts -- that this United States project is based not only on military considerations, but also perhaps to a still greater extent on political considerations. It is a measure aiming in the first place at satisfying the aspirations of one of the partners of the United States in exchange for the support it gives to United States policy in Europe. This, however, does not mean that West German politicians see that question in the same light, and that the creation of a multilateral force would not have an influence on the military situation in Europe.

(The Chairman, Poland)

The creation of such a force would seriously increase the threat of a nuclear conflict, while the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons should be aiming at exactly the opposite, namely at decreasing that danger. Consequently, we are ready to examine in this Committee the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. However, an agreement on this matter should exclude any kind of transfer of nuclear weapons, whether direct or indirect. If the conclusion of such an agreement really signified, as the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Thomas, assured us on 30 January, "that all secret byways<sup>1/</sup> to dissemination would be closed" (ENDC/PV.161, p.19); that is to say, if it also led to the abandonment of that form of dissemination which would be constituted by the creation of a NATO nuclear force, the obstacles to the conclusion of such an agreement would disappear.

To sum up, I should like to emphasize that we are witnessing at present a more favourable atmosphere for a fruitful discussion on the adoption of what are known as partial measures. If all the delegations display goodwill and consistency in the search for a true detente, we believe that it will be possible to find a common basis for a number of problems, especially those I have enumerated here, and also for other problems. Thus we shall be able to satisfy the desire universally expressed by the peoples of the world that the year 1964 may see a widening of the first break-through which occurred in 1963 towards reduced tension, peace and disarmament.

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): In my statement today I should like to explain the position of my delegation on certain problems of the so-called collateral or partial measures on which the Committee is beginning discussion today.

The general debate has confirmed that all the delegations are giving considerable attention to these measures. They have quite rightly stressed their significance as an important factor in creating favourable conditions for the solution of further problems, and in the first place general and complete disarmament.

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<sup>1/</sup>The simultaneous interpretation of the original Soviet statement used the expression "secret byways". In the final revision this phrase was translated from the Russian to read "indirect channels".

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Most delegations agree that it is in this field that relatively good pre-conditions exist for reaching agreement. Therefore it is essential to conduct the negotiations in such a way as not to let these favourable conditions go by. The Czechoslovak delegation considers that the proposals contained in the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union of 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123) provide a suitable basis for the achievement by the Committee of positive results in a short time in the negotiations on collateral measures. The measures proposed by the Government of the Soviet Union are based on the negotiations which have hitherto taken place both in our Committee and at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and take into consideration the views expressed in the course of these.

There is no doubt that the implementation of any of the proposed measures would play a positive role -- whether it be the measure aimed at slowing down and reducing the rate of the armaments race, or the measure aimed at further reducing international tension and strengthening confidence in relations between States, thus creating favourable conditions which would facilitate the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Czechoslovak delegation expresses its full support for the proposals contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Government, regarding them as a new and momentous contribution to the task of achieving progress in our work. We hope that in the near future the memorandum will be thoroughly discussed in the Committee -- as a number of delegations have already promised to do -- and that this discussion will open the way to the achievement of agreement in a short time at least on some of the measures proposed in the memorandum.

The Czechoslovak delegation attaches particular importance to the proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, or a gradual reduction of their numbers. We base our view on the fact that such a measure has now been given a positive appraisal by a number of States, including some States that are members of the Committee. I should like, for instance, to point out that in his statement at the meeting of 30 January the representative of the United Arab Republic mentioned "immediate or gradual withdrawal of forces from foreign territories" (ENDC/PV.161, p.13) among the measures which should and could be carried out in order to prevent surprise attack.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

At the present time ever clearer and more insistent reasons are becoming evident and favourable conditions are being created for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. The presence of foreign troops in Europe, for example, can hardly be justified by referring to the so-called disadvantageous strategic situation of the NATO countries, or to the numerical superiority of the armed forces of the socialist countries, an argument we have heard put forward quite recently in our Committee. The development of modern military techniques and an objective appraisal of the situation have long since refuted these already out-of-date arguments which were even doubtful before, and this, moreover, has been admitted by military leaders in the West. Besides others, the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, speaking to the Economic Club of New York on 18 November 1963, criticized the views concerning the alleged massive armed forces of the socialist countries and their superiority as erroneous and out-of-date.

Thus the presence of these foreign troops in the territories of other countries cannot be explained by military necessity, since they are not essential for the defence needs of either of the military groups from a military point of view. Their continued presence and, all the more, the despatch of further units to foreign countries in various parts of the world must therefore be regarded as nothing else than a factor that aggravates international tension and creates a dangerous military atmosphere, and as an instrument for interfering in the internal affairs of States and for suppressing national liberation movements.

The situation in regard to the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries (ENDC/77) is similar. The realistic value and usefulness of concluding such a pact for the reduction of tension and the establishment of normal relations between States, particularly in Europe, is being recognized by an ever-widening circle of States, both by States members of the Committee and by many other countries, including some countries forming part of NATO. It is regrettable that our partners from the NATO countries are still evading a businesslike discussion of this proposal, despite the fact that they cannot adduce any reasonable arguments against the conclusion of such a pact, and despite the fact that, in accordance with the Moscow communiqué of 25 July 1963, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to consult with their allies "about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants". (ENDC/101, p.2).



(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

From the point of view of lessening the danger of a thermonuclear war it would also be important to implement proposals aimed at preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and at establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. These measures would be particularly appropriate in such a sensitive area as Central Europe. Naturally Czechoslovakia, on account of its geographical position, is extremely interested in the implementation of such measures. For this reason we support the proposal of the People's Republic of Poland for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), as well as the idea of "freezing" nuclear weapons in this area as proposed by Mr. Gomulka on 28 December 1963.

In this connexion we also welcome the new initiative of the Government of the German Democratic Republic concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States (ENDC/124), about which the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, has just spoken in detail and so convincingly. The implementation of this proposal would result in the two German States being completely free of nuclear weapons. The two German States would assume an obligation not to produce nuclear weapons in the future and not to obtain them from third States in any way, whether directly or indirectly. At the same time the Governments of both German States would undertake not to allow the nuclear weapons of third States or military groups to be stationed in their territories, and never to use nuclear weapons themselves. All these measures would be carried out under strict international control.

The draft treaty contained in document ENDC/124 testifies to the untiring efforts of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to bring about normal peaceful conditions in the relations between the two German States and thereby to strengthen peace and security in Central Europe. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, being anxious to help towards reducing the threat of war and at the same time to make it easier for the Federal Republic of Germany to accept this draft treaty, emphasizes in the preamble to the treaty that its conclusion would not prejudice the inter-State relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

The draft treaty shows that it fully meets the demands for the prevention of any further spread of nuclear weapons and their use, particularly in such a sensitive area as Central Europe. The implementation of the draft treaty proposed by the Government of the German Democratic Republic would lead to the creation, in the territory of the two German States, of a peaceful zone free of nuclear weapons; this in its turn would help considerably to improve the situation not only in Europe but throughout the world. We are convinced that all who are sincerely striving to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and thereby to lessen the danger of a nuclear war should wholeheartedly welcome and support this important proposal by the German Democratic Republic, since it is fully in keeping with the tasks the accomplishment of which has been entrusted to the Committee.

In this connexion one cannot help noticing the contrast between the peace-loving policy of the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic, which so far has not only done nothing that would help towards normalizing the situation in Central Europe, but on the contrary is carrying on a policy leading to quite the opposite results. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is feverishly intensifying its efforts to re-arm. Whereas some countries have begun to reduce their military expenditures, the military budget of the Federal Republic of Germany is constantly increasing, and in 1964 will exceed DM.20,000 million, which represents more than 34 per cent of all the budgetary expenditure of the Federal Republic of Germany. As is well known, militaristic circles in the Federal Republic of Germany are making extraordinary efforts to acquire access to nuclear weapons at the present time through the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force. Moreover, they are also beginning their own production of missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads at considerable distances.

This development in the Federal Republic of Germany is distinctly contrary to all the restrictions imposed on Germany by the agreements between the Great Powers of the anti-fascist coalition as a result of the defeat of Hitler's Germany. These are alarming facts which should compel us to consider with the utmost seriousness the momentous draft treaty submitted by the German Democratic Republic.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak delegation, like the delegations of other socialist countries, is prepared to discuss other proposals submitted in this field, particularly after we have received the clarifications promised by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, concerning the proposals contained in President Johnson's message (ENDC/120). We shall, of course, evaluate them according to the extent to which they may help to relax international tension, reduce the threat of a nuclear war, and create the conditions for an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

As negotiations concerning collateral measures have begun, the Committee is now faced with the important problem of establishing a procedure for the consideration of the various proposals. That is a question in the solution of which all of us here are interested. On it depends to a large extent further fruitful work by the Committee.

First and foremost it is important not to lose too much time in discussing priorities, as happened last year. In this regard we fully share the opinions expressed by a number of delegations. It suffices, for instance, to quote what was said by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, at our meeting on 28 January:

"... whichever one of the collateral measures seems ripe for early implementation should be given a high priority in our deliberations."

(ENDC/PV.160, p.20)

If, as a result of the attitude of certain delegations, the Committee finds itself unable to begin very soon a businesslike discussion of some of the proposed questions, there will be a real danger of that happening against which the representative of India, Mr. Nehru, so earnestly warned us on 31 January when he said:

"The next few months are of crucial importance, for if there is a lack of progress in our work the earlier gains may be lost".

(ENDC/PV.162, p.10).

We also agree with the representative of India that that might easily create a setback in the international situation (ibid.).

Bearing in mind the aforesaid circumstances, the Czechoslovak delegation believes that, in view of everything that has been said here, the proposals for the limitation of military expenditures and for the reduction of armed forces of States offer the best prospects for reaching agreement. Certain results have

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

already been achieved in this field by the method of mutual example. As is well known, the Governments of the Soviet Union and of the People's Republic of Romania have announced unilateral reductions in their military expenditures. The United States Government has also announced that it is preparing to take similar measures. The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, also declared in his statement at our meeting of 23 January that Canada had reduced its military spending in some areas (ENDC/PV.158, p.13).

In this connexion I should like to inform the Committee that on 31 January 1964 the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, when discussing the budget for this year, also decided to reduce defence expenditures by 384 million Czechoslovak crowns, that is, by 3.4 per cent in comparison with the expenditures in 1963. The Czechoslovak delegation believes it would be useful if similar steps were taken by the governments of other countries. Our Committee also could make, in its own way, a contribution in this direction, if it expressed in a suitable form its position in regard to such measures and appealed to all States to take similar steps.

Of course we fully realize that the path of unilateral measures in the field of budgets has its limitations. A decision in principle could be secured by a formal agreement, for which all the prerequisites exist. This fact has already been pointed out in the general debate by the representatives of some delegations. For example, the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, said at our meeting of 24 January:

"We believe the time is now opportune for a formal agreement on the 'freezing' and reduction of military budgets". (ENDC/PV.159, p.15)

Later Mr. Obi declared, quite rightly:

"There would be no better demonstration of seriousness of purpose than formally to agree to freeze the military budgets and to make substantial reductions in them". (*ibid.*).

At our meeting of 30 January a statement in favour of a further reduction in military budgets was also made by the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, who welcomed the Soviet Government's proposal for a 10 to 15 per cent cut in military budgets and expressed the hope that "it will be possible to reach agreement on the Soviet proposal in the near future". (ENDC/PV.161, p.6). We may presume that such an agreed reduction might be very much more radical than

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

the unilateral measures which have been announced, and that its positive effect on the further development of the international situation would be much greater. A significant reduction in military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, as proposed in the Soviet Government's memorandum (ENDC/123), would restrict the possibilities of any further rearmament and at the same time would release considerable material resources for the economic development of the countries concerned, as well as for increasing economic aid to developing countries.

A favourable situation and a practicable path towards agreement exist at the present time also in regard to reducing the armed forces of States. Here again there is an opportunity which should not be lost. The Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States have already announced that they are considering the possibility of unilateral reductions in the numbers of their armed forces. These facts show that both Great Powers consider it possible and desirable in the present circumstances to carry out specific measures in this important field.

The Soviet Government has also indicated in its memorandum that, besides the contemplated unilateral reduction, it would be willing to agree to a further reduction if the Governments of the Western Powers showed willingness to carry out similar measures. A reduction in the numbers of the armed forces of States would in no way alter the existing military balance between the largest States, and would have a very favourable effect on the further development of the world situation, including the speeding up of the actual disarmament process.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope of the Czechoslovak delegation that in the course of further talks the two co-Chairmen will soon succeed in reaching agreement in regard to the future programme of our negotiations on collateral measures. We consider that the measures to which I have just referred could become an acceptable basis for such an agreement.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): The representatives of the United States and Italy have asked to exercise their right of reply.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I have asked for the right of reply to certain statements which have been made here this morning.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Step by step, by determined efforts, it appeared that the atmosphere of our discussions had been substantially improved. The moderate and reasonable tone exhibited until today had laid, in our opinion, the foundation for fruitful work by this Committee. It was therefore with regret and sadness that I listened to the Soviet representative today. His remarks and those of some of his colleagues tend to bring back the cold war into this conference hall. The attack by the Soviet delegation upon the Federal Republic of Germany is wholly unwarranted. The Federal Republic has denied the Soviet allegations, as this Committee and the Soviet Union are fully aware. We will not honour the unwarranted allegations of the Soviet delegation with a detailed reply. Nor do I think the Committee should digress from its important work to discuss proposals from non-governmental organizations or individuals. The United States delegation will not participate in any such discussions.

The Soviet representative appears to have forgotten his admonition at our last meeting not to belabour the problems which divide us. I hope that his statement of today has been a temporary digression and that he will return to objective discussion of the important tasks which confront us.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Instead of exercising my right of reply, I should like to make a few very brief remarks on today's meeting.

In the first place I should like to express the hope that the two co-Chairmen will soon be able to come to an agreement on an agenda for discussing collateral measures, in order that the discussion on this subject may proceed in a clear and orderly manner conducive to our reaching tangible results. I am convinced that the mutual goodwill which has so far marked the work of this session, and which, I believe, has particularly characterized the meetings between our two co-Chairmen, will finally prevail over the quite understandable and natural difficulties the co-Chairmen may encounter when working out an agreed agenda on collateral measures.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Moreover, the Committee heard today a very constructive, very concrete statement by the United States representative, Mr. Foster. This statement contains proposals both far-reaching and practical, and at the same time relatively easy to carry out. I think that the great majority of the delegations listened to Mr. Foster's statement with the deepest interest and, I hope, satisfaction, because, in my opinion, it was an important contribution to this Conference's work in so far as it dealt with the serious problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

It is therefore regrettable that Mr. Foster's statement should not have been followed by as constructive and positive a statement on the part of the Soviet delegation, and that the latter should not have replied with equally concrete and practical proposals to those made by the United States on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I might even say that the Soviet delegation has advanced no concrete proposal whatsoever concerning agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet representative, whose statement was followed by those of the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia, reiterated arguments of a nature which cannot be conducive to our Conference's progress, nor to the reaching of tangible and positive results. Nevertheless, I hope that after studying the United States proposals — as Mr. Tsarapkin and our Eastern colleagues will certainly not fail to do — the delegations of Eastern Europe will adopt a more constructive attitude, and one in conformity with the sentiments they have so far expressed during this session.

As to the statement made by you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as Polish representative, it contains in my opinion many interesting points which deserve study. For the present I should simply like to endorse the hope you expressed at the end of your speech that the year 1964 may prove to be a year of success for our work and for peace.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I wish to say only two things. First of all, I should like to associate the United Kingdom delegation fully with what has just been said by the representatives of the United States and Italy in deploring the tone which the discussion has taken this morning; though I was glad to note that, as Mr. Cavalletti has just said, there were many points in your own statement, Mr. Chairman, as representative of Poland, which seem to be well worth careful study and further discussion at the due moment.

Secondly, I should like to take up one reference which you yourself made, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Poland, to a statement made by the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Thomas, on 30 January. When speaking on the subject of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons (Supra, p.22), you quoted him as having said:

"We also believe that all secret byways<sup>1/</sup> to dissemination should be closed ..." (ENDC/PV.161, p.19)

In quoting it so, Mr. Chairman -- and that is a correct quotation so far as it goes -- you were, I fear, leaving the Committee under the impression that Mr. Thomas was referring at that stage to the possibility of the creation of a multilateral force.

Therefore I wish to put the record straight on this point. Mr. Thomas had just referred to two statements made by our Soviet colleague, who had himself used the phrase "secret byways"<sup>1/</sup>. Mr. Thomas went on to say:

"That last remark carried an innuendo -- in our view" [that is, in the view of the United Kingdom delegation] "a quite baseless innuendo..." (ibid.)

He then continued as follows:

"We also believe that all secret byways<sup>1/</sup> to dissemination should be closed, and closed quickly ..."

So far you are correct, Mr. Chairman. He went on to say:

"... so that we are never faced with the hydra-headed monster to which the representative of Nigeria so graphically referred." (ibid.)

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<sup>1/</sup> The simultaneous interpretation of the original Soviet statement used the expression "secret byways". In the final revision this phrase was translated from the Russian to read "indirect channels".



(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Then he added the following words -- and this is the point of my intervention:

"In our view, the best and indeed the only way to do so is to conclude an effective non-dissemination agreement without delay. We cannot see the logic of anyone's saying that because he fears dissemination we had better have no non-dissemination agreement at all." (ibid.)

That was what Mr. Thomas said. In quoting it I may perhaps indulge in the hope that you yourself, Mr. Chairman, and your Eastern European colleagues will, as the Italian representative has said, come to realize the practical wisdom and constructive imagination of the proposals made by the United States representative this morning, so that we may be able to get away from the atmosphere which has prevailed this morning and hold serious discussions on them without further delay.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I, too, should like to exercise the right of reply in connexion with the answers that have been given here by the representatives of the Western Powers.

It should be pointed out that, as usual, the Western delegations -- I refer to the representatives of the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom -- hastened to come to the rescue of Western Germany. That is just what we expected. In doing so, they had recourse to the unfounded assertions which are customary on these occasions concerning the peace-loving disposition of the West German militarists and revanchists. This does not surprise us at all, just as we are not surprised by the attempts of the West German Government to deny the fact that the production of missiles for the delivery of nuclear weapons is being developed in the Federal Republic of Germany. But all these denials, and the protestations of the peace-loving disposition of Western Germany, cannot mislead anyone and still less satisfy anyone. In this connexion it might be well to remind you, including Mr. Foster, how many times reference has been made to the Paris Agreement, of the many attempts to reassure the world by saying that Western Germany has undertaken not to manufacture some particular weapon, and how many times these assertions have been refuted by actual experience.

Everyone knows that the West German Bundeswehr is already the most powerful striking force in the NATO system of armed forces in Europe, and is the core of these forces. It is a fact that the West German Bundeswehr already has at its

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

disposal various types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, including missiles supplied from overseas, from the United States. It is also a fact that Western Germany is striving with incredible determination for the creation of a NATO multilateral force and for access to nuclear weapons through this force. Yet we are discussing here the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Responsible persons in Bonn make no secret of the fact that they expect to lay hands on nuclear weapons in this way. It is only in the light of these facts that we can appraise the real state of affairs, to which attention is drawn in the representations made by the Soviet Government to the Governments of Western Germany, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, which I read out today (Supra, p.11 ). Any assertions concerning the peace-loving disposition of the West German militarists and revanchists and any attempts to deny the development of inadmissible military activities in West Germany are at variance with the actual facts.

In conclusion, I should like to say that we can only express our regret at what Mr. Foster has just told us: namely, that his delegation does not intend to participate in a discussion of the proposal contained in the statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the draft treaty submitted by that Government (ENDC/124). But one cannot help asking why is it that you do not wish to discuss these proposals. After all, they relate to measures aimed at forestalling and preventing the further dissemination of nuclear weapons -- they relate to that, and to nothing else. It is incomprehensible to me. Why do you, on the one hand, put forward proposals on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, declare that you will not participate in discussing proposals submitted in connexion with this item of the agenda? We hope that the United States delegation will reconsider its negative approach, which as a matter of fact kills in the bud any possibility of reaching agreement on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 164th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Naszkowski, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 11 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

