

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

(Romania)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. THOURDIN
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Mr. D. BENJAMIN

Secretary-General of the
United Nations:

U THANT

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and ninety-ninth plenary meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling upon the first speaker on the list, I should like to say that it is a great privilege for me to greet here, on behalf of the Conference and of myself, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant. I am sure that I echo the thoughts of all the members of the Committee in saying that we **should** have been particularly happy if we could have shown him, on his arrival, some concrete **results** of our efforts. Our task is certainly not an easy one, as we well know. But inspired, like the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the spirit of negotiation conducted with patience and perseverance, we cannot fail to achieve the desired results.

Unfortunately the Secretary-General can only stay a short time with us, for he has a very heavy work programme. I should like to thank him on behalf of us all for being so good as to give us some of his time.

The Secretary-General would like to say a few words to the Conference. I therefore call upon him to speak.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for your very gracious words of welcome to me. It is a real pleasure for me to be present with you today, if only for a few minutes, to express my best wishes for your success. I have, of course, followed your work with close attention and with great interest, as I view the achievement of disarmament and all that it means for international peace and security as the most important problem of our time.

More real progress in achieving measures of disarmament has taken place during this past year **than** in all the years since the end of the Second World War. The partial test ban treaty, the establishment of the direct communications link between Moscow and Washington, the Assembly resolution to exclude nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons from outer space, the unilateral reductions of military budgets, and the mutual cut-backs in production of fissionable material for military purposes, all bear witness to the intense efforts being exerted to bring about progress in the many areas of disarmament. All Members of the United Nations -- indeed, all humanity --

(The Secretary-General)

ferventally hope that your deliberations here will result in further concrete agreements which will maintain the forward momentum along the road to general and complete disarmament and the achievement of just and permanent international peace and security.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament provides a most effective forum for harmonizing the responsibilities of the nuclear Powers and the great Power groupings with the interests of the small and the non-aligned countries.

I was gratified to note that your two co-Chairmen have both stressed the specific instructions of their respective Governments to make every effort to reach agreement. An additional encouraging feature of the present session of the Conference has been the increasing signs of some flexibility in the positions of the major Powers as they search for avenues of agreement. The business-like atmosphere which has characterized your discussions and the persistence and patience with which you have pursued your work are additional reasons for believing that you will make further progress and thus continue the movement towards a lasting détente.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all I should like, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to associate myself with the warm words of welcome expressed by you, Mr. Chairman, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant. We have all been happy to see the Secretary-General of the United Nations in our midst. We are aware of the profound interest taken by U Thant in the disarmament negotiations. We have listened with great interest to his brief statement and agree with his appraisal of the efforts to make progress in the field of disarmament. We also share his hopes for further progress in this most important field of international relations.

The Soviet Union's proposal for the elimination of all bomber aircraft, as set forth in the memorandum of the Soviet Government dated 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123), is well known to the members of the Committee. It has already been the subject of preliminary discussion at the previous session of the Committee. We now propose to continue this discussion and, for our part, we intend to give certain clarifications and to spell out more precisely our proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In putting forward its proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft the Soviet Government starts from the position that such a measure would have great positive significance both from the point of view of reducing the arms race and from the point of view of generally improving the international situation.

First, we should bear in mind that the destruction of bomber aircraft by States would be the beginning of actual or, as it is called, physical disarmament -- a tangible, ponderable beginning. Although bomber aircraft are an obsolescent type of weapon, nevertheless they are still today a powerful means of carrying on a war of aggression, which can be used to deliver nuclear weapons to their targets in order to inflict massive blows in the territories of other States. Bombers can also be used as powerful conventional weapons. The elimination of this type of weapon at once as a separate measure would be a serious and real contribution aimed at ensuring the security of States.

Secondly, it has to be recognized that the elimination of bombers would, by itself, limit to some extent the possibilities of unleashing a world war. The elimination of bomber aircraft would create in fact a situation where anyone contemplating aggression would not risk unleashing a war with the use of only conventional ground and naval armaments. Large-scale military operations without bombers were impossible in the conditions of the Second World War: for all the more reason they are impossible now. It is obvious that a potential aggressor without bombers would be faced with the necessity of taking such an extreme decision as to use nuclear weapons from the very beginning; and that decision would inevitably entail a devastating retaliatory nuclear blow at the aggressor himself.

Thirdly, the elimination of bomber aircraft would also rule out one of the possibilities of the unleashing of a world war as a result of accident. This possibility is connected with the fact that at the present time, as is well known, the United States permanently keeps in the air a large number of its bombers with atomic and hydrogen bombs on board. Of course, this should be ended at once, without waiting until the question of the elimination of bomber aircraft is settled. But in any case, when there are no bombers the possibility of carrying out such flights will vanish altogether, and thus the accidental and dangerous consequences which they might have will be eliminated.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Fourthly, having sent all bombers to the scrap-heap, States will be able to reduce substantially their military expenditures. Bomber aircraft are an extremely costly type of weapon. It is well known, for instance, that in the United States it is planned to spend in the current fiscal year \$1,600 million on the modification of B-52 bombers alone, and the same item of expenditure is expected to be retained in the United States military budget for next year too. Considerable expenditures on bomber aircraft are also borne by all the other States which have this type of weapon. One of the aims of our proposal is to suppress this item of expenditure.

Fifthly, the elimination of bomber aircraft would be a serious measure contributing to the relaxation of international tension, to the strengthening of confidence between States, and thereby to the consolidation of their security. The significance of this measure will be all the greater as the elimination will affect that type of weapon which is regarded by the theoreticians and strategists of so-called "local wars" as the basic striking force to be used against militarily weak States and against the national liberation movements of peoples.

All these considerations, it seems to us, explain why at the previous session of the Committee the Soviet Union's proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft aroused a great response and profound interest among the participants in the negotiations and met with support on the part of many delegations.

In expressing a positive attitude to the idea of eliminating bomber aircraft, some delegations asked us at the previous session of the Committee to explain in greater detail in what way we consider it most appropriate to implement this measure: whether all the bombers should be destroyed at once or gradually, type by type; whether all States should simultaneously start to eliminate bomber aircraft. These are legitimate and understandable questions; they require an answer, and we are prepared to answer them.

As regards the order and sequence of the elimination of the various types of bombers, the Soviet Union keeps a flexible position on that question. We consider that it is important to arrive at an agreement in principle to eliminate all bomber aircraft within a definite short period. Within that period bombers could be eliminated in the sequence that will have to be agreed upon. On the instructions of the Soviet Government we are authorized to state at this stage of the negotiations

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

that, if our proposal for the elimination of all bomber aircraft within a definite period is accepted in principle, the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss and determine specifically the sequence of the elimination of bombers by types within that period.

In doing so we are, of course, prepared to ponder on and consider any proposals on this score which may be put forward by the participants in the negotiations. We do not think that any insuperable difficulties are likely to arise in the negotiations in connexion with the question of the sequence in which the various types of bombers should be eliminated or with which types it would be most suitable to begin the elimination. Which bombers will be the first to go on the bonfire, which will follow them and so forth are matters on which agreement can be reached.

We are prepared to take the same flexible position in regard to when and how other States are to be associated with the process of eliminating bomber aircraft. The Soviet Government has taken into account, in particular, the considerations put forward by the delegation of India to the effect that militarily less powerful States need bombers as a basic means for their military defence and therefore they would be unable to agree to the elimination of their bombers simultaneously with those of the militarily more powerful States. We consider that within an agreed over-all period the States possessing the greatest military potential should be the first to start eliminating bomber aircraft, and only at a later stage the other States, whose national security interests, of course, must not be infringed.

We have also been asked about control over the elimination of bombers. We shall answer this question. Of course, the elimination of bombers should be carried out under international control since it is a real disarmament measure. The Soviet Government is prepared to reach agreement on mutually-acceptable forms of such control.

Those are our clarifications and more precise details regarding the proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft. We are convinced that if the other side has the same desire to reach agreement on this question as we have, it will be possible to do so; all the necessary pre-conditions for such an agreement have already been created. It cannot be doubted that the peoples will regard an agreement on the elimination of bomber aircraft as a serious step in the field of disarmament, as a **great** contribution to the strengthening of universal peace.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It goes without saying that, under an agreement on the elimination of bomber aircraft, States will have to renounce their plans for the further improvement of this type of weapon as well as the further production of bombers. But this must be accepted; it is required by the interests of the strengthening of peace.

We should like to express the hope that the proposals for the elimination of bomber aircraft will meet with active support on the part of the whole Committee, and that the clarifications and more precise details which we have just given concerning this proposal will contribute to the success of the negotiations, particularly as they provide a possibility of finding, within the framework of a general agreement on the elimination of bomber aircraft, concrete solutions which take into consideration the interests of all States.

Let us set to work here in the Committee in order to arrive at an agreement on the first measure of physical disarmament - an agreement on the elimination of all bomber aircraft. The Soviet delegation is prepared for such constructive work.

In explaining our proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft, we must also touch upon the United States proposal, about which the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, spoke last Thursday (ENDC/PV.197, pp. 5 et seq.) - the proposal for a verified freeze of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. If we have to touch upon this question, it is not because Mr. Timberlake in his statement told us anything new, anything that would call for a new evaluation, on our part, of the proposal for a freeze of delivery vehicles. To be frank, we are bound to say that in Mr. Timberlake's statement we did not find anything which we did not know already from the message of President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States, dated 21 January 1964 (ENDC/120), and, of course, from those explanations of this message which were given by the United States delegation at the previous session of the Committee.

It is understandable, therefore, that we have nothing to add to the critical comments on the United States proposal for a freeze which we made at the previous session (ENDC/PV.175, pp.30 et seq.). Furthermore, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Pechota, has shown once again in his detailed statement (ENDC/PV.197, pp.11 et seq.) that the United States proposal for a verified freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, while it would not eliminate or even reduce the menace of a nuclear war, would at the same time lead to the establishment of control, not over disarmament, but over armaments, with all the resulting dangerous consequences

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

for the security of States. We fully agree with the considerations put forward by the representative of Czechoslovakia in his statement.

Now we should like to deal with the United States proposal in another connexion. We should like to draw attention to the fact that, if one compares the Soviet proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft with the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, it is easy to see the unquestionable advantages of the Soviet proposal.

In fact, the elimination of bombers is a real, physically-tangible disarmament measure. It would lead to a substantial reduction of the military potential of States, and consequently would substantially lessen the danger of war. Such a measure would justify also the establishment of appropriate international control over its implementation, provided, of course, that such control would not be a means of interfering in the internal affairs of States and an instrument of international espionage. At the same time, a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles would not be at all a disarmament measure but would be connected with extensive international control capable of uncovering the whole defensive system of peace-loving States, which could answer only to the interests of a potential aggressor.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to dwell on yet another question. The Soviet delegation deems it necessary today to draw the attention of all the participants in the disarmament negotiations to a question which is particularly acute and urgent; that is, the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is increasingly urgent that effective measures should be adopted in this connexion, because it is precisely now, when an exchange of views is taking place on disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on measures to ease international tension, when the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is under discussion and we are seeking ways to an agreement on this question, that at the same time outside the Committee preparations are going on at an accelerated rate to set up a NATO multi-lateral nuclear force, within the framework of which the West German revenge-seekers will gain access to weapons of mass destruction. According to press reports, an experiment has recently begun with the first ship of the multilateral force, a destroyer called "Biddle" or "Ricketts", the crew of which consists of sailors from seven NATO countries, including personnel from the West German navy. Thus we see

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

that the first step is being taken towards the dissemination of nuclear weapons; and this cannot fail to arouse the most serious misgivings among those who cherish peace.

On 11 July 1964 the Soviet Government addressed Notes to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Greece, as well as to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which it once again showed the incompatibility of the plans to establish a NATO multilateral force with a solution to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government emphasized that -

"...if the Western Powers take the path of disseminating nuclear weapons and giving the Bundeswehr access to them, this will greatly increase the risk of a thermonuclear conflict in which many countries - including the major States of the West - might find themselves involved even against their will."

The Soviet Government, being sincerely interested in maintaining conditions of lasting peaceful co-existence, which is vitally necessary for all countries and peoples, hopes that the Governments of the United States and other countries members of NATO, conscious of the great responsibility which rests upon them, will refrain from acts incompatible with the tasks of preserving and strengthening international peace.

We have requested the Secretariat to circulate these Notes from the Soviet Government as official Committee documents,^{1/} and we hope that all delegations will carefully study these important documents.

At the meeting of 2 July the Soviet delegation appealed to our Western colleagues to make a choice and, by putting an end to the very dangerous plan to establish a multilateral nuclear force, to take indeed the path of a positive solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.195, pp.40,42). So far no answer to this appeal has been received from the Western Powers.

At the same meeting on 2 July the Soviet delegation asked the delegations of the United States and other Western Powers (ibid. p.40) whether they were prepared to negotiate such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would close every loop-hole through which access to these weapons could be obtained by those who do not now possess them but are striving at all costs to gain direct, or at first at least indirect, access to them by establishing their own national control over nuclear

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/137.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

weapons or by participating, within military alliances, in the possession, disposition and control of nuclear weapons. So far there has been no answer from the Western Powers to this question either since it was put by the Soviet side.

But time is running out. As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, said when speaking on 30 June in the Norwegian capital, Oslo:

"Each day lost without benefit to the cause of peace is a voluntary or involuntary concession to the modern Moloch of war, which is ready to accept as a sacrifice many millions of human lives."

The co-Chairmen have agreed that the Committee meeting of 23 July shall be specially devoted to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. In view of the particular acuteness and urgency of this problem, the Soviet delegation expects that at that meeting the delegations of the Western Powers will give answers to the questions which have been put to them. Much will depend upon those answers. Those answers should show what direction the future development of events will take - whether it will be possible to begin businesslike negotiations on the preparation of a treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, or whether the States members of NATO will make such negotiations useless and impossible.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): First I wish to express my appreciation of the honour done this Conference by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his attendance here today, and also for the warm words of encouragement which he gave to us.

Discussions at recent Tuesday meetings of this Committee have highlighted anew the dangers of the nuclear arms race and the urgent necessity of doing something about it. Those discussions have also, I believe, highlighted the complexity of the problems involved. The reduction and elimination of existing arsenals of nuclear delivery vehicles, in a manner which will ensure military balance and the security of States throughout the disarmament process, cannot be accomplished easily or overnight.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

The difficulties of the problem we face should not blind us to its urgency. Nor should we despair of finding a permanent and effective solution; it must and will be achieved. But while we search for an effective over-all solution we should at the same time look for all possible steps we can take in the meantime to limit or reduce the dangers we face. Such steps should not be rejected merely because they do not solve all problems. In fact, the larger the attempted scale of those steps, the less may be their prospects of success. They should be accepted if they reduce, by whatever large or small degree, the threat of nuclear war, always provided that they are in consonance with the principles of disarmament upon which we are all agreed.

Those are some of the considerations which have led my Government to propose a series of collateral approaches to the problem of nuclear armaments. As Mr. Foster pointed out on 18 June (ENDC/PV.191, pp. 6, 7), these approaches have been of two kinds: first, those which deal with the carriers of nuclear weapons; and, second, those which deal with the stockpiles of nuclear explosives themselves. All these proposals have been advanced in the conviction that they offer practical, serious, worth-while and adequately-safeguarded means of bringing the world further back from the brink of nuclear holocaust.

Today I wish to deal with a United States proposal which would bring about the actual reduction in numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles. My Government proposes the physical destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bomber aircraft. We are prepared to carry out this destruction at the rate of twenty flyable aircraft per month on each side. We are further prepared to continue destruction of these bomber aircraft at this rate for a period of two years. We are also prepared to increase the total number of bomber aircraft to be destroyed by adding to the monthly quota an additional agreed number to be taken from bombers stored and preserved for emergency mobilization. The verification of this measure would be simplicity itself.

There are those who argue -- and my Soviet colleague is one of them -- that the physical destruction of these aircraft makes no real difference, because my Government plans to phase out the B-47. The United States does have plans to phase out such aircraft from its active forces, although not as fast as our proposal envisages. I expect that the Soviet Union has similar plans for its TU-16s. But -- and this is important -- the phasing-out of bomber aircraft does not necessarily mean destruction.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

Bomber aircraft in storage can fly again; bomber aircraft in storage can be transferred to another Power; bomber aircraft in storage also retain the capability of carrying nuclear weapons.

We are not proposing the physical destruction of a toy gun; we are proposing the physical destruction of an equal number of formidable weapons of war. For example, the B-47 is a six-engine jet bomber with a range of over 4,000 nautical miles without refuelling. It can carry a multi-megaton bomb load. As we have stated previously, the explosive yield from the bomb load of one B-47 is greater than that from all bombs dropped by all bombers in the Second World War. The TU-16 has roughly comparable capabilities.

My Soviet colleague need only say the word and our two Governments can begin the process of negotiation for the destruction of equal numbers of these aircraft. If the Soviet Union wishes to negotiate in terms of lesser numbers, we are prepared to consider any lesser numbers selected by them. If the Soviet Union is not prepared to undertake destruction of any TU-16 aircraft at this time, perhaps it might suggest other types of aircraft -- or other armaments -- with which it would prefer to begin.

The United States, in urging this measure, has kept in mind the matter of military balance. This proposal is squarely in line with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). The over-all force structures of both sides would be maintained after these bomber aircraft are destroyed; but they would be maintained at the reduced levels. No military advantage would accrue to either side and security would continue to be ensured equally for all.

In proposing such physical destruction, the United States also has in mind the matter of non-proliferation. Once destroyed, these aircraft could not contribute to arms races in the hands of other countries. Moreover, possession of such vehicles by other countries could increase concomitant pressures for development of a nuclear capability. Our measure would therefore make an important contribution towards stopping the spread of such capability.

There are those -- and again my Soviet colleague is one of them -- who believe that physical destruction of equal numbers of B-47s and TU-16s is too small a step. I would disagree with that. Considering the formidability of the delivery vehicles under discussion, and the fact that agreement on this issue would represent the first -- I repeat, the first -- agreement by this Conference on physical destruction, I see this measure as an important one in the disarmament process. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

The adoption of our proposal would place into operation the very simplest of verification procedures, would provide needed experience in the process of physical destruction, and would call to the attention of the world the serious intention of this Conference to make real progress. I put it to the Committee: would it not be an historic moment if this Conference could inform the peoples of the world that we had agreed to eliminate substantial numbers of bomber aircraft capable of carrying over a thousand times the explosive power of all bombs dropped by bombers during the Second World War?

Should this Conference endorse that measure, what are some of the essential elements in carrying it out?

First, as indicated previously, the United States and the Soviet Union would agree to destroy an equal and agreed number of TU-16 and B-47 jet bombers over a two-year period.

Second, destruction of the B-47s and TU-16s would take place in the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. One airfield in each country would be designated for such purposes.

Third, the agreed number of bomber aircraft would be flown by each party and landed at its designated airfield on the first day of each month.

Fourth, destruction would be carried out under the supervision and direction of the host country by its personnel and at its expense.

Fifth, destruction would be comprehensive enough to ensure that each bomber aircraft could no longer be restored to flyable condition and its engines no longer used for propulsion.

Sixth, the host country could, prior to destruction, remove from its bombers any equipment, instruments and the like which in its discretion it would wish to retain.

Seventh, such destruction would be verified by adversary inspection -- you inspect me and I inspect you -- a process which is elementary, uncomplicated and non-intrusive. That is a point I hope my Soviet colleague will not overlook.

Eighth, we think it would be desirable for observers designated by the non-aligned members of this Committee, and by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to participate in the verification process.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

The verification process we envisage, as I have already emphasized, is an extremely simple one, sufficient solely to ensure that the agreed destruction is actually carried out. We would propose the designation of perhaps six persons each by the United States and the Soviet Union; and those persons would verify the destruction of bomber aircraft at the designated airfield of the other party. Official personnel would be designated by the host country to accompany inspectors during the performance of their duties.

Inspectors would have the right to keep designated bombers under visual observation, witness their destruction, and make records of the destruction for their own governments.

Inspectors would not have the right to examine any bomber before it had been destroyed or any equipment, instruments or the like removed if desired by the host country.

Inspectors would enjoy the same privileges and immunities accorded by the host country to diplomatic envoys.

What would be the responsibilities of the host Government to facilitate the verification process? They would be as follows:

To co-operate promptly with both inspectors and observers at its designated airfield, refraining from interference with the verification operations and giving assistance and support as may be required;

To keep inspectors and observers informed in advance of the precise time and place of landing of bombers and their destruction;

To provide prompt transportation and suitable living quarters and other amenities for inspectors and observers, including supplies or support to carry out their functions;

To permit and assist diplomatic officials of the designating country to visit and communicate freely with inspectors at the airfield of the host country.

The Soviet Union has proposed the destruction of all bombers, beginning with those of the major Powers. Other suggestions have been made for destruction on a more ambitious scale than the United States proposal envisages.

The United States recognizes that bomber aircraft, as well as all other nuclear delivery vehicles, should be eliminated as the disarmament process proceeds. Our outline of a treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3) makes that quite clear. But any proposal for the elimination of bombers,

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

even on a phased or limited basis, in isolation from other armaments presents serious problems.

In the first place, the manned bomber is an important element in the United States deterrent forces and will remain so for the foreseeable future. It is true that the availability of missiles may make possible the reduction of strategic bombers more rapidly than other armaments while still maintaining military balance. But, while our proposal to destroy B-47s and TU-16s is balanced, the destruction of all bombers would eliminate completely many important elements in our military strength without imposing comparable reductions in the power of other States. Thus the intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles in the Western strategic force are supplemented primarily by heavy aircraft, of which the United States inventory is larger than that of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the corresponding missiles in the Soviet strategic force are supplemented in large measure by hundreds of medium-range and intermediate-range missiles, weapons in which the Soviet Union has superiority. The unbalancing effect which would result from the elimination of bombers alone is apparent.

In the second place, although such aircraft are nuclear delivery vehicles of enormous destructive capacity -- as I have already indicated for the B-47 --, they retain an important role in any non-nuclear conflict, since destructive loads can be either conventional or nuclear. Thus the elimination of all aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons would have a serious destabilizing effect on the world military environment unless it took place in the context of a balanced and safeguarded reduction of all armaments and forces by all nations.

Furthermore, we believe that, while it is reasonable to destroy aircraft such as the TU-16 and B-47 along the lines we have suggested, without production limitations, this approach should not be applied to entire types of armaments constituting a vital part of a nation's military capability. It would be unwise and unrealistic to attempt to eliminate large numbers of additional strategic delivery vehicles without the imposition of agreed production limitations.

I have presented to the Committee a proposal which, if implemented, would make a significant beginning in turning down the arms race. It is simple to execute and simple to verify. Its execution would not only symbolize our determination to begin the disarmament process; it would also provide valuable experience which could pave the way for further measures of disarmament in the future. Its completion would

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

forever eliminate a significant number of vehicles of destruction from the arsenals of States. Thus we have a great deal to gain, and nothing to lose, by undertaking the destruction of B-47 and TU-16 bombers. I urge that we begin now.

With regard to the comments of the representative of the Soviet Union on the multilateral force, I shall reserve the right to make a reply at a future time. For the moment I shall restate the position which we have already set forth and which, I believe, is familiar to most if not all delegations.

The multilateral force is being devised to provide a responsibly-controlled deterrent in the face of a Soviet nuclear threat which includes hundreds of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads and aimed at the densely-populated cities and industrial areas of Western Europe. The multilateral force will contribute to meeting this threat in a way which avoids the creation of new national centres of control over nuclear weapons. As we have made clear many times, it is fully consistent with the United States policy against the proliferation of independent national nuclear forces.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): This morning the United Nations Secretary-General honoured us by his presence and reminded us of the important tasks which confront this Committee. He thus demonstrated once more his great interest in the work we are doing. On this occasion it may be worth while recalling the words he addressed to the United Nations General Assembly on the day it adopted the wellknown resolution on excluding nuclear weapons from outer space (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117). He then called upon the United Nations -

"... to persevere with renewed determination in making progress towards the solution of the central problem of our time: that is, the achievement of general and complete disarmament." (A/PV.1244, provisional, p.47)

The present situation emphasizes the urgent need to take concrete measures in this respect. That was recalled at our last meeting by Mr. Hassan, when he addressed this Committee on the subject of nuclear weapons. Perhaps I may refresh your memory by quoting what he said:

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

"... world public opinion is in favour of the physical elimination, once and for all, of these destructive weapons; and that is one of the reasons why world public opinion supports the idea of general and complete disarmament, which is becoming increasingly imperative as man becomes more developed on the moral plane and more advanced technically and as his weapons become more frightful." (ENDC/PV.198, p.14)

He spoke of the urgent need to eliminate nuclear weapons and their means of delivery on a basis of priority. We fully subscribe to that view. Of course, we know that there are some who refuse to follow that path and who preach the wisdom of armaments and of the arms race, thus really making wisdom border on folly.

It has been said by one of the great scientists of our day that the glowing ember of uranium permitted mankind to light the nuclear fire. One might add to those words that mankind must beware lest it be burnt in this very fire. We face this danger in many aspects and in many fields. One of them is the danger of the proliferation, or dissemination, of nuclear weapons. We discussed the issue the other day in connexion with what is called the multilateral nuclear force now under preparation within the NATO alliance (ENDC/PV.195). This proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons may proceed at an ever-increasing rate, and disarmament will thus become more and more difficult.

Let me again stress the importance which my Government attaches to the necessity for taking adequate measures to ensure that these weapons are not placed within the reach of the Federal Republic of Germany. Our anxiety can be well understood if one considers our experiences, both past and recent. It suffices to look at the calendar of the last few years. The doors of the armoury of the Federal Republic of Germany have been repeatedly reopened, and more and more new weapons have been brought into it. In the spring of 1958, in the autumn of 1958, a year later in October 1959, then in May 1961, and even after the concluding of the Moscow test ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), and after other decisions which undoubtedly contributed to the lessening of tension -- when one would have believed that the way had been paved for further disarmament measures --, again new types of weapons to increase its military potential were received. It seems like a paradox, reminiscent of the sad experiences of the years between the wars. Therefore the issue calls -- and we stress this again -- for an urgent solution. My Government has on many occasions reiterated the warning of the consequences should Western Germany get access to nuclear weapons. I repeat it today.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

Another aspect of the problem we face is that which is on today's agenda. It is important - very important - and as such it occupies a due place in the catalogue of partial disarmament measures. Therefore it is essential that we approach it with all the seriousness it deserves. The problem of the elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons occupies a major place in our negotiations. It constitutes one of the most important issues within general and complete disarmament; but concurrently it is also what we call a collateral measure. Its importance lies in the function which means of delivery perform in the military machinery of today.

Of course, all means of delivery are not of equal importance. Bombers are no longer the only carriers of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, they still occupy an important place in the family of weapon carriers. Their wide range of operations, speed, precision of targeting, possibilities of repeated use and other factors mean that they constitute an important part of military operations and will continue to play such a part.

Thus, as I indicated earlier, the elimination of bomber aircraft is an important item on the agenda of the disarmament negotiations. Proposals to this effect have, as we know, been made by the Soviet Union (ENDC/123) and the United States. The delegations of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.182, pp.10-12), Nigeria (ENDC/PV.176, p.17) and India have put forward a number of interesting suggestions in this respect. We think that these proposals offer a possibility of achieving progress in an area in which basic differences of position have so far impeded agreement. We are convinced that the elimination of even one means of weapon delivery would in itself offer great possibilities. It would allow us to take one more important step forward towards disarmament.

There is another essential reason why the Polish delegation supports this idea. It is a step which may not only arrest the present arms race but also turn the wheel backward and thus allow history to move forward.

Apart from the issue of non-dissemination, interests of general security require that measures calling for the physical destruction of dangerous weapon carriers should receive priority in our considerations.

The proposals for the elimination of bomber aircraft which have been submitted should be assessed in the light of all those requirements.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

But, while discussing this issue, I submit to the Committee that we must bear in mind that the idea of eliminating all bomber aircraft is in itself a very limited objective, in view of the fact that it leaves untouched not only other means of delivery but also other types of military aircraft. Any further restriction or limitation -- for instance, to a single type of aircraft -- would imply that the arms race could continue, not only in the sphere of other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, but also in the very same sphere and even with regard to other types of bombers. What will be destroyed can be easily compensated for by a build-up of more modern aircraft, more modern bombers. In those circumstances we cannot but feel that such a limited proposal as the one presented by the United States delegation with regard to B-47 and TU-16 aircraft could produce but very little practical effect, if any, when one considers that what are involved are bombers which are meant to be withdrawn -- Mr. Timberlake confirmed that this morning -- and which could and will be replaced by more modern carriers.

That is the qualitative aspect of the problem. But there is also another aspect, that of quantity. A minimum destruction has been suggested to us by the representative of the United States, whose statement this morning preceded mine. He mentioned the figure of twenty aircraft a month on each side. If we look at the situation realistically, what would be the result of the destruction of twenty bombers per month? If one may rely on certain published data, this would amount to less than 10 per cent of the monthly output of aircraft by the United States. Even a certain increase over that number of twenty would not seriously alter the situation.

Mr. Timberlake spoke of a journey of a thousand miles beginning with a single step. But how long will it take? And what about the dangers on the way, dangers which remain the same or increase? A slow-moving traveller may never reach his destination. We know of many travellers who have never reached much less remote destinations. Therefore I think that it is of the essence to move with more speed and more resolution.

In the light of those considerations, we feel that much more substantial and essential steps are necessary in this field. First, it is advisable and possible to proceed to the elimination of all types of bomber aircraft without effecting the security and defence of States. Second, by doing that we would not limit ourselves to the elimination of obsolete bombers but would also include modern aircraft of that type. Third, we believe that the

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

process should be carried out without undue delay. Indeed, this approach offers many advantages, immediate and long-range. The danger of an outbreak of nuclear war would be considerably reduced. Accidents and similar reasons for conflict would be diminished. Finally, it would facilitate the procedure with regard to further measures in this field. It would thus create a better perspective for the solution of the all-embracing problem of general and complete disarmament.

On 21 January the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Thomas, stated:

"Let us also consider whether we could not make at any rate some start with the physical destruction of weapons. This would be a real demonstration of our determination to turn the rising graph of armaments downwards". (ENDC/PV.157, p.23)

The destruction of bomber aircraft would fall in that category. It is a proposal to which we should devote our attention. It is a proposal worthy of being pursued urgently.

The Committee will recall that on 18 June we were assured by Mr. Zorin that the Soviet Union intended to adopt a flexible position on this problem (ENDC/PV.191, p.14). This morning Mr. Tsarapkin has offered some more details on the subject and has confirmed Mr. Zorin's statement. It is therefore our considered view that these expositions not only show flexibility but also offer a good basis for embarking on concrete negotiations. Time is pressing. We should really proceed with the elaboration of concrete disarmament measures; for, as I indicated earlier, the arms race is continuing, and the longer it continues the more difficult it will become to put an end to it.

We have stated repeatedly that the atmosphere has improved; but, in order to establish sound foundations for international peace and security, not only must we continue with our efforts, but our labours must bear fruit. Further and more important steps are and will remain necessary. There are some in Europe to whom the word "détente" seems to have a strange meaning; they would like to follow a different path. In refusing to adapt their line of action to the needs and realities of our times, they preach what I would call metaphysics in politics. There are those

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

who think that our efforts are futile; but we in Poland continue to hold that reason and foresight demand a constructive approach. Our mandate derives from a real and proper evaluation of the situation which exists today. We are under an obligation to carry it out.

My delegation is firmly convinced that the item on our agenda for today is one which opens up possibilities for an important and speedy agreement; but in order to achieve this objective real and genuine negotiations are necessary. What does the word "negotiation" mean? It means yielding to convincing arguments; it means accepting reasonable proposals; it means appreciating the justifiable preoccupations and substantiated claims of the other side. We firmly hope that -- within this meaning of the word -- the Western Powers will show readiness to enter into negotiations.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): First of all, the Canadian delegation would like, in common with others who have spoken before it, to have its thanks conveyed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for joining us here today and for the very encouraging words he addressed to us. The support of the United Nations and its Secretariat is indeed essential if we are to **make** progress in our task.

I should like to say also that I found the last sentences spoken by the representative of Poland to be very important: to the effect that what we have heard today from the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States would encourage us to believe that the way is open for serious negotiations on a disarmament measure which could have a very great effect, and indeed which could prove to be a break-through as regards many of the difficulties which have blocked progress in other directions.

I should now like to mention rather briefly a few of the considerations which occurred to me when listening to the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union. It was a very important statement, and the Canadian delegation will of course be studying it carefully, so that we may have more observations at a later time.

The Soviet proposal is that agreement in principle -- again we have those words "in principle" which have given us difficulty in the past -- should be reached for the destruction within a determined period of all bombers. We have heard the

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

viewpoint of the United States in regard to this question of whether we should make such a decision at this point in the negotiations -- before real negotiations such as the representative of Poland has suggested can begin. It would be difficult to decide in principle at this time that all bombers must be eliminated within some fixed period.

In this connexion, I should like to suggest to our colleagues of the Soviet Union -- with respect, and not with any desire to be contentious -- that in approaching this proposal for the destruction of bomber aircraft they are perhaps doing the same thing as was done in regard to the proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. All of us who have taken part in the negotiations here over a long period -- or at any rate since as far back as 1960 -- will recall that originally the proposal to control and to eliminate the power to wage nuclear war by first eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles was made by the then French representative, Mr. Jules Moch, at the preceding General Assembly in 1959 (A/C.1/SR.1030, para.18). At that time the proposal of the Soviet Union (A/4219) stood at eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles -- at any rate, intercontinental rockets -- in the last stage of disarmament. But on 7 June 1960, if I remember the date correctly, a new proposal was put forward (TNC/6/Rev.1), which was the well-known one that all means of delivery of nuclear weapons should be destroyed in the first stage. This, as we know, has proved unnegotiable up to the present time and is likely to remain so.

This fact has been recognized by the Soviet Union itself in the successive amendments it has made to its position in the so-called Gromyko proposals put forward at the General Assembly sessions of 1962 (A/PV.1127, paras. 75-77) and 1963 (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). As we know, the trouble is that it has not gone far enough back on the road towards the original French proposal to make the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles -- which is the crucial problem of disarmament -- a negotiable issue on which we can have a working group.

Another point which was made by the representative of the Soviet Union -- and I should like to say in parenthesis here that we agree very much with many of the things he said in his statement -- was that, besides destroying bombers, the parties must renounce plans for further development or production of bombers. This would seem to the Canadian delegation to be a very obviously necessary provision if the destruction of bombers is to be a real measure of disarmament. We wonder whether

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

the Soviet Union has in mind a measure of control over the establishments which might produce bombers -- such a measure of control as is mentioned in articles 5 to 8 of its draft treaty on disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1). For the convenience of the Committee, I would point out that the Soviet draft states that undertakings and workshops engaged in the production of rockets and military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses, and that inspectors of the international disarmament organization shall verify the implementation of these measures.

If there are to be no more bombers built, is there to be any such measure of control? Does the Soviet Union have this in mind? If that is so, it seems to me that the Soviet Union would be adopting the principle of a freeze of production, together with the principle of bomber destruction, and this is necessary. In the view of the Canadian delegation, to destroy bombers and replace them by other bombers -- or by missiles -- would not advance us very much towards disarmament; it would not advance us at all. We have heard that argument from others who have spoken today. Therefore the Canadian delegation would like to suggest that the measure for bomber destruction and the measure suggested by the United States for the freeze are really twin measures and must be considered together if we are really going to move forward.

This introduces complications; and it can be seen that the complications would be greatly increased the more one extended the scope of what is to be destroyed. I do not wish to expand on that at the present time, but I think the point will be grasped by all of us here. Therefore I should like to suggest that we are more likely to arrive at an agreement on this matter -- on which we all hope for agreement --- through a measure to some degree limited, which would have to be negotiated primarily between the two greatest Powers.

I should also like to comment on one or two of the points made by the representative of Czechoslovakia in his statement at our meeting of 9 July, when he criticized the United States proposal for a freeze. His first criticism is that the proposal arose from the desire of the United States to obtain a unilateral advantage (ENDC/PV.197, p.12). It seems to me that that criticism is answered very well by what the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, said at the same meeting, as follows:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"The Soviet leaders in their statements have not only never shown any concern about the existing situation, but have also frequently asserted that the Soviet Union is capable of repelling any nuclear attack and retaliating in kind. Such is the present situation according to the Soviet leaders. There is therefore no reason to suppose that, if a freeze of strategic vehicles were now decided on, the existing balance would be upset to the detriment of the Soviet Union. The present situation, if we are to believe the statements of the Soviet leaders, affords complete and absolute safeguards for the security of the Soviet Union and its allies." (ENDC/PV.197, p.10)

Another criticism made by the representative of Czechoslovakia was that "no control measure can be adopted without a corresponding disarmament measure." (ibid., p.13). He then went on to explain that the freeze would not be a disarmament measure. If I may, I should like to remind him that the plan put forward by Poland for a freeze in a certain area of Europe -- generally known as the Gomulka plan for a nuclear freeze (ENDC/PV.189, pp.6-8) -- is not a disarmament proposal, and yet there is control involved in it. That plan is, if I understand correctly, supported not only by Czechoslovakia but also by the Soviet Union and other parties to the Warsaw Pact. Therefore it would appear that the principle that there can be no control measure without a corresponding disarmament measure is not always adhered to. Those are the points that I wished to make on the statements we have heard this morning.

There is one final observation I should like to make. The representative of the Soviet Union called attention to the challenge his Government had offered to the members of NATO that are represented here to state their position on a non-dissemination agreement. As he reminded us, we shall be having a meeting devoted to the subject of non-dissemination on 23 July, and he said that he would like to have definite answers at that time. The Canadian delegation hopes that we shall be able to put forward an answer at that meeting.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I had not originally intended to intervene in the discussion this morning, and I promise that what I have to say will be very brief.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

The representative of the Soviet Union opened the discussion this morning with a far-ranging statement on all aspects of which, I think, it would not be proper for me to try to comment this morning. Since, as Mr. Tsarapkin himself reminded us, the question of non-dissemination -- to which he alluded at some length -- is already set for our discussion on Thursday next, I think that any observations my delegation wishes to make should properly be made on that occasion.

However, I do wish to say a few words on the subject with which our Soviet colleague began his statement this morning: the question of the physical destruction of weapons and in particular of bombers. I am sure that it is well known to all my colleagues -- and I shall illustrate this as I proceed--- that the United Kingdom delegation has always been strongly in favour of adopting a measure which would make it possible to begin the physical destruction of at least some armaments. It was with this aim in mind that we welcomed the United States initiative in putting forward a proposal for the destruction of certain types of bombers and in discussing this with representatives of the Soviet Union, in the first place, on a bilateral basis. That initiative was, of course, subsequently reported to this Conference, and the United States representative has enlarged upon that in his remarks today.

The Soviet proposal of 28 January (ENDC/123), which was the basis upon which our Soviet colleague again spoke this morning, is, as we all realize, a far more ambitious proposal. But our United States colleague has explained this morning -- convincingly, I think -- that it is one which also raises far more difficult problems, as is so often the case with far-reaching proposals. In the course of his remarks this morning Mr. Tsarapkin gave an important exposition and clarification of his Government's views, which certainly needs to be studied very carefully. While that is so, I believe that it would be a very great mistake -- and I repeat the words "a very great mistake" -- to lose sight of the more modest but, to my mind, more realistic United States ideas which Mr. Timberlake has brought to our attention again this morning.

I do not think that it will surprise anyone in this Committee if I say that we in the United Kingdom often tend to see merit in what I may call the step-by-step approach to problems of this kind. Perhaps it is because history has taught us the lesson that that approach is the one which normally produces

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

more substantial and more lasting results. However, I do hope that the Conference will not consider that attitude as one which belittles the importance of the issues involved. The exact contrary is the case.

From what I heard this morning I do not think that I shall altogether carry our Polish colleague with me on that point. If I may strip Mr. Lachs's comments upon the United States proposal of his customary eloquence, they seem to me to boil down to the suggestion that the United States proposals would have very little practical effect and that the pace of the operation would be far too slow, perhaps even dangerously slow. Perhaps it would be fair to reply that if one starts on an operation slowly it is always possible to increase speed as the operation progresses, whereas if one attempts to begin at too fast a pace there is always the serious danger that one may have to slow down. I myself know which of the two situations I should find the more discouraging.

In his comments this morning our Polish colleague referred to some observations made by the leader of my delegation, Mr. Thomas, on the question of the destruction of bombers. Therefore I may perhaps take a minute or two to illustrate what I have been saying by some of the statements already made from this chair. The Committee will perhaps remember that during his visit to us on 25 February last the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. Butler, said:

"... [a] measure which would most effectively pave the way for a comprehensive disarmament agreement would be one which provided for the physical destruction of some weapons ...

"It is for that reason that we have warmly welcomed as a preliminary measure the United States proposal for a 'bomber bonfire' ..." (ENDC/PV.169, p.12)

Mr. Butler went on to say:

"Once the first step in destruction of weapons has been taken, we hope that other more substantial ones will follow." (ibid., p.13)

That last remark by Mr. Butler has since been echoed by Mr. Thomas. At the penultimate meeting of our last session he suggested to the Committee:

"... that there are many and real advantages in proceeding step by step." (ENDC/PV.186, p.37)

He went on to argue that it was well worth while considering the "bomber bonfire" — and here I quote his words again:

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"... as a practical beginning, which may well lead on to other similar measures". (ibid., p.38)

His succeeding remark to that last one was:

"Even to make a start is useful." (ibid.)

Then, again, Mr. Thomas spoke of that proposal in the statement he made at the first meeting of our present session. He said:

"Let us not neglect measures which, while comparatively limited in scope, could be of real benefit." (ENDC/PV.188, p.23)

That is a plea which I should like to reiterate today, particularly in the light of the United States representative's further explanations of his proposals.

I join the representative of Canada in thinking that what we have heard this morning from both sides of the Conference -- if I may put it so -- is important and gives us, at any rate, grounds for hoping that there may be the making of a real negotiation on the subject. As so often happens in matters of this kind, it may essentially prove to be a question of how to begin. In his most welcome intervention this morning the Secretary-General of the United Nations spoke of what seemed to him to be signs of a growing desire on the part of the Committee to concentrate its work, to try to engage in practical solutions and to work on a more concrete basis than hitherto. It seems to me that this is surely a field in which we ought to be able to give effect to the wishes expressed by the Secretary-General.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to make a few brief comments in connexion with the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, and the statement made by the representative of Poland, Mr. Lachs.

The Polish representative, Mr. Lachs, has spoken today about the historical experience of Poland, which compels it to be particularly on its guard against the danger of the West German spirit of revenge and the striving of the West German revenge-seekers for rearmament. To us this viewpoint expressed by the representative of Poland is fully understandable. Our historical experience in this respect fully coincides with the historical experience of Poland, and Mr. Timberlake is hardly in a position to convince us that we ought not to have

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

any grounds for disquiet in connexion with the plans to give the West German revenge-seekers access to nuclear weapons through the NATO multilateral nuclear force.

Anyway, it should be noted that the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, tried today to resort to such methods as distorting the true picture of the existing situation. He gave a definitely distorted evaluation of events and phenomena. Thus Mr. Timberlake said that the NATO multilateral nuclear force is regarded by the United States as a deterrent in the face of the threat of Soviet medium-range missiles aimed at the densely-populated centres of Western Europe. In saying that, Mr. Timberlake tried to give a distorted evaluation of the gist of the matter. He resorted to such a method in order to give grounds for and justify the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force and the admission of Western Germany to it.

But whom are these arguments of yours likely to convince, Mr. Timberlake? You say that the Western countries need the multilateral nuclear force for their defence. But, Mr. Timberlake, everyone knows that the majority of Western European countries are not at all interested in the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Either they do not participate at all in the negotiations for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force or, even though they take part in the negotiations, they openly express great doubts about the advisability of creating it. So your argument about the need for this force to defend Western Europe is unfounded. This version is not supported by your Western allies.

In reality there is a different reason for the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force. A few days ago, Reuter's news agency reported that one of the members of the Government of Federal Germany had confirmed in a conversation with Mr. Denis Healey, Minister of Defence in the Labour Party shadow cabinet, that in less than five years his country, Western Germany, would have its own atomic weapons. Obviously it is on board the "Biddle" or the "Ricketts"-- the newspapers mention both names and we do not know exactly the name of the destroyer on board which West German servicemen and officers are to be trained in handling nuclear weapons -- obviously, I repeat, it is on board the "Biddle" or the "Ricketts" that the training of military cadres of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

the West German Bundeswehr is to take place. On board that ship or ships West German military specialists will be instructed how to handle, apply and use nuclear weapons.

That is the crux of the matter, and that is the real reason for the creation of this force. This force and the participation in it of West German military personnel are a form of actual access to nuclear weapons by Germany. All these measures for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force are being taken solely at the demand and in the interests of the West German revenge-seekers, whose aggressive aims and plans are known to everyone. The creation of this force is an undoubted threat to the cause of peace.

The Note addressed by the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States on 11 July states, in regard to the creation of the multilateral nuclear force, the following:

"It goes without saying that, with such a development of events, the Soviet Union and the other peace-loving countries would be obliged to take the appropriate measures which would be dictated by the new situation and would effectively safeguard their security."

(ENDC/137, p.3)

It is obvious that measures must be urgently taken to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, to prevent the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, and thus to avert the development of one of the most dangerous aspects of the present international situation.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): This morning we heard some very important and very interesting speeches, among which pride of place must of course be given to the speech by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I should therefore like to associate myself with the thanks tendered to the Secretary-General for his presence here and for his speech.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

This morning I shall confine myself to commenting on the speech by the Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin though later, I shall have to make a closer study of his speech in the verbatim record. I must say that, at first sight, Mr. Tsarapkin's speech on the elimination of bomber aircraft does not contain any fresh explanations. Nor does it contain supplementary material on the proposals previously submitted by the Soviet delegation, which are already known to us.

Moreover, I feel that the Soviet delegation, in presenting yet again its proposal on the total elimination of bomber aircraft, has followed its usual method, for it once again invites us to accept its proposal in principle as a condition of learning more about the proposal. Thus Mr. Tsarapkin told us today to accept total elimination of bomber aircraft, after which he would tell us how it could be carried out and controlled. The Soviet proposal once more contains obscure points on which we should like information; in other words, there are some very serious gaps in it.

The Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, very rightly raised the problem of the freeze this morning. In my view that is one of the obscure points which should be explained by the Soviet delegation. I should very much like to know whether the Soviet proposal for total elimination of bomber aircraft entails a freeze of their production, and, if so, when and under what kind of control this freeze would take place. The assertion, repeated this morning by Mr. Tsarapkin, that the freeze is not a measure of disarmament leads us to doubt that the total elimination of bomber aircraft, as proposed by the Soviet delegation, would in fact be accompanied by a strict freeze of the bomber aircraft themselves.

To be sure, the affirmation that a freeze does not constitute a disarmament measure was made by the Soviet delegation in connexion with the United States proposal for freezing all strategic delivery vehicles (ENDC/120). But it seems to me that there is reason to believe that the elimination of bomber aircraft as proposed by the Soviet delegation would be dissociated from a duly-controlled and guaranteed freeze. If that is the case, one may well ask what would be the point of the proposed total elimination of bomber aircraft; if that is not the case -- that is, if a duly-controlled and guaranteed freeze would accompany the total elimination of bomber aircraft -- the Soviet delegation should say so clearly. If a freeze is really to accompany the proposed elimination of bomber aircraft, we are justified in seeing some prospects for an agreement in the field of the freeze itself and, in general, in that of delivery vehicles and bomber aircraft.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In this vast field three proposals have been submitted either by the East or the West. These proposals, which are before us, differ in certain respects, but coincide in others. That is very important. We must therefore seek to discover whether an agreement is feasible on those parts which coincide, in pursuance of the method used in reaching other agreements on disarmament such as the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I shall make a statement in my capacity as head of the delegation of Romania.

First, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the previous speakers in expressing its appreciation of the words of wisdom uttered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the beginning of this meeting. I think we are all aware that, if we follow the path of genuine negotiation in a spirit of patience, perseverance and comprehension of the interests of each and all, we can and shall make a successful contribution to the progress of disarmament.

Secondly, on behalf of the delegation of Romania, I wish to welcome back the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, who, we are sure, will again make a valuable contribution to the work of the Committee.

I should now like to make some comments on the problems listed on today's agenda.

The delegation of Romania listened carefully to the important statements made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, on the proposals for eliminating bombers and on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and by the United States representatives on the elimination of certain types of bombers at present in the arsenals of the major nuclear Powers. The above-mentioned statements, as well as those made by the representatives of Poland, Canada, the United Kingdom and Italy, will of course require profound study; this we shall undertake as soon as we obtain the verbatim record of this meeting.

One conclusion which seems inescapable, however, is that there are still serious obstacles to a solution of these problems which will really constitute a step towards disarmament. When evaluating current proposals relating to the material destruction of bombers -- or, for that matter, any other disarmament measure -- we must take into account their significance within the wider context of the elimination of the nuclear threat.

(The Chairman, Romania)

Viewed from that angle, the destruction of bombers -- which can serve as nuclear delivery vehicles -- would be of indisputable importance. As has already been said in this Committee, the bombers at present in the possession of the major nuclear Powers, although no longer the most powerful and most effective nuclear delivery vehicles, are still a powerful weapon whose use could cause heavy loss of life and considerable destruction of property. The great majority of present types of bombers can carry nuclear loads whose explosive power is equal to or greater than that of all the bombs dropped during the Second World War.

Hence bombers are a special case, as compared with other weapons, when they are in the arsenals of nuclear Powers and can thus be used to carry nuclear weapons to the target. That imparts especial importance to this measure, since, as has been repeatedly stated by the Soviet delegation, it should be implemented first of all by the great Powers, for the latter possess the most powerful weapons.

Naturally, no one maintains that the threat of a nuclear war would be completely eliminated by this measure. The threat will continue to exist as long as present stocks of nuclear weapons are retained, together with the other nuclear delivery vehicles: missiles, artillery, naval devices, etc. However, we consider that the implementation of this proposal would open up prospects of taking effective action in regard to the other nuclear delivery vehicles at present in the possession of the great Powers. But we cannot agree to the destruction of certain types of bombers if they are merely going to be replaced by more up-to-date weapons. A measure resulting in improvement of military equipment cannot be regarded as a disarmament measure; indeed, since it involves the modernization of armaments, it constitutes a method of rearmament.

Hence, as was suggested on 9 April by Mr. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic, the destruction of bombers must, as an essential condition, "be accompanied by a cessation of the production of bombers..." (ENDC/PV.182, p.10). Any agreement on these lines would be highly beneficial. Mr. Hassan then added: "It would be senseless to destroy all bombers while producing new ones." (ibid.).

Besides the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all bombers on the basis of an agreement in principle (ENDC/123), we also have before us the United States proposal for limiting this action solely to certain types of bombers (ENDC/PV.176, p.5 et.seq.). Is that latter proposal not an implied admission that the deterrents in the possession of the United States exceed what we are told that country requires for its security?

(The Chairman, Romania)

Moreover, while we recognize the value of destroying certain obsolete types of bomber, should we not logically admit a fortiori the importance, for the elimination of the nuclear threat, of the destruction of the other types of bombers as well? So far as we are concerned, a solution leading to the destruction of all bombers would be an important step in the direction of reducing the nuclear threat, which is our most important task and to which we must continue to devote all our efforts.

We noted with interest the statement made on 13 June by the Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, in which he said that "in this regard the Soviet Union intends to adopt a flexible position". (ENDC/PV.191, p.14) In his statement today Mr. Tsarapkin likewise gave evidence of flexibility and of a desire to reach agreement.

As was stressed by those representatives who spoke before me, the fact that the controls entailed in the destruction of bombers would be very simple is yet another argument in favour of the adoption of this measure as quickly as possible. It should in my opinion be stressed that in this highly sensitive field of control the positions of the two great Powers seem to be identical, for both propose on-the-spot control of the material destruction of the bombers declared. This endorses the view constantly put forward by the Romanian delegation and by the delegations of the other socialist countries that we must have, not disarmament without control, or control without disarmament, but effective disarmament measures under strict international control.

Our discussions on that subject have shown that there would be an undoubted advantage in taking definite steps towards the destruction of bombers. In our opinion, there are definite prospects of promoting the cause of disarmament in that direction.

The measures envisaged by us could, of course, be accompanied by collateral measures of incontestable importance. I refer to the need to liquidate military bases in foreign territories where bombers belonging to other States are stationed. As we all know, these bases -- both in Europe, in the vicinity of the socialist States, and in other regions -- are a source of tension and endanger international security, including the security of those States in which the bases are situated.

My delegation is convinced that our Committee has ample possibilities of taking advantage of the favourable conditions which can even now be discerned.

That is all I wanted to say as the representative of Romania.

(The Chairman, Romania)

I should now like to read out to the Committee the agreed recommendations of the co-Chairmen concerning the further discussion within the Committee of measures to halt the arms race and reduce international tension. These recommendations are as follows:

"The co-Chairmen recommend to the Committee that, in considering measures aimed at reducing the armaments race and at lessening international tension, it establish the following schedule of meetings for the five weeks following 16 July:

- 23 July Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons
 (suggested for discussion jointly by the United States
 and Soviet delegations);
- 30 July Topic to be suggested by the Soviet delegation;
- 6 August Topic to be suggested by the United States delegation;
- 13 August Topic to be suggested by the Soviet delegation;
- 20 August Topic to be suggested by the United States delegation.

"At meetings during which USSR topics will be discussed, the Soviet delegation will introduce the following topics:

1. Reduction of military budgets.
2. Elimination of bomber aircraft.

"At meetings during which United States topics will be discussed, the United States delegation will introduce the following topics:

1. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for
 weapon purposes.
2. Freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

"Specific topics for discussion at the Committee's meetings on 30 July, 6, 13 and 20 August will be communicated to the Committee by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively not later than one week before each of these meetings.

"As with prior procedural arrangements, this schedule will not preclude any delegation from raising and discussing any topic at any session of the Committee. In particular, any delegation may reply at any meeting to statements made at earlier meetings.

(The Chairman, Romania)

"At a later date, the co-Chairmen will develop recommendations concerning the further work of the Committee on measures aimed at reducing the armaments race and at lessening international tension."

If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with the co-Chairmen's recommendations.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 199th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador V. Dumitrescu, representative of Romania,

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed the Conference. Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Poland, Canada, the United Kingdom, Italy and Romania.

"The delegation of the Soviet Union tabled two notes addressed by the Soviet Government on 11 July 1964 to the Governments of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, respectively, concerning the 'multilateral' nuclear forces of NATO.^{1/}

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 21 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/137