

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.195
2 July 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Miss L. de VINCENZI
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. G. YANKOV
Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. R.M. TAIT
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN
Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Mr. I. IACOB

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

Mr. V.M. BASKAKOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. A.M. PARRENT

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and ninety-fifth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today we begin discussion of the problem of preventing a further spread of nuclear weapons. The imperative necessity and urgency of solving this problem are so obvious that at the present time the overwhelming majority of States are in favour of an appropriate international agreement being concluded as quickly as possible.

The Soviet Government and the Governments of the other socialist countries have repeatedly expressed themselves quite clearly and definitely in favour of signing such an agreement. A clear and concrete proposal to this effect is contained in the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union of 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123). It can be said without exaggeration that, among the measures designed to curb nuclear weapons and thus prepare the conditions for their elimination, an agreement on the non-dissemination of these weapons occupies one of the most important places.

The demand of the peoples for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is fully shared, we understand, by the governments of the non-aligned States of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Their representatives have emphatically stated this here in the Committee. We well remember the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, who said:

"... the best way to ensure peace and security in our world is to prevent any accessibility to nuclear weapons and therefore avoid complicating further the already complex task of reaching any agreement on disarmament." (ENDC/PV.182, p.8)

Just as clear was the statement made by the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi:

"If things were allowed to slide during that period" -- ten years --
"without any check, the world would find itself in the position of having five, six or ten or 'n' countries possessing nuclear weapons. This is a prospect too frightening to contemplate. War by mechanical failure, accident or miscalculation, or even by design, would then be more difficult to prevent, apart from the political, psychological and even blackmail repercussions of such a development." (ENDC/PV.174, p.16).

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The statements made by leading statesmen of the United States and other Western Powers show that these Powers also appear to consider it necessary to agree on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. A year ago, on 26 July 1963, President John Kennedy said -- and allow me to observe that in Moscow due attention was paid to these words of the United States President:

"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons ... in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered through the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security and no chance of effective disarmament." (ENDC/102, p.5)

We highly appreciate also a statement by President Lyndon Johnson in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 17 December 1963, when he said:

"The United States wants to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them." (A/PV.1284, provisional, p.40)

The representatives of the United States, as well as the representatives of other States members of NATO have spoken in the Eighteen-Nation Committee of their desire to help towards solving the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Thus it can be stated that within the Committee there is a consensus of opinion on the need to agree, without any further delays, on effective measures to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons. This consensus of opinion is also reflected in the fact that the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons has been placed on the agenda of the Committee as the result of a joint recommendation by the two co-Chairmen -- that is, by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States -- and with the unanimous approval of all the other members of the Committee (ENDC/PV.191, pp.5, 6)

It may be said with some degree of assurance that there are some areas of common ground in the positions of the two sides also in regard to the provisions to be included in an international agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Thus both sides agree, apparently, that under such an agreement the nuclear Powers should bind themselves not to hand over nuclear weapons or control over them, or the necessary information for their fabrication, to States which do not now possess them. Both sides, as can be gathered from their statements, also adhere to the common

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

opinion that the non-nuclear Powers should give an undertaking not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as not to acquire information concerning their production. All this is excellent; all these areas of common ground in the positions of the sides can become important footholds in solving the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

It is with all the more regret that we have to note that, notwithstanding all this, at present the solution of the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons continues to come up against a serious obstacle which threatens to reduce to nought the positive results already achieved in this matter. You know what the obstacle is that we are referring to: the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

Common sense, elementary logic and the requirements of life itself show that only such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would close all the channels, all the floodgates through which the non-nuclear Powers could have access to such weapons is likely to be of any practical value. It is likewise quite obvious that it is particularly important from the point of view of strengthening peace and the security of the peoples to bring about such a situation as to ensure that no access to nuclear weapons would be obtained by those States whose declared policy is aimed at the absorption of other States, the alienation of territories belonging to them, and a revision of the boundaries established after the Second World War. It is no secret to anyone that precisely such a foreign policy programme is being put forward by the leading circles of one of the States members of the North Atlantic Alliance, namely the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is here that the divergences on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons begin --- divergencies that are fundamental and profound. The Soviet Union, the other socialist States and many non-aligned countries consider that an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons should in the first place prevent access to these weapons by the West German revenge-seekers or by any other enemies of peace. It is for this reason that the Soviet Government is convinced that the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force is incompatible with an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is within the framework of this multilateral force that it is proposed to allow the Federal Republic of Germany to have access to nuclear weapons and to participate in the possession, disposal and control of them.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The plan for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force is opposed by the governments of many countries, including even some countries members of NATO. In this connexion it is sufficient to quote the following statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Lange:

"We do not think that the contemplated multilateral force is necessary for maintaining the military and political balance. We ... emphasize that we do not consider the idea of creating a multilateral force a good one."

It is also significant that out of the four States members of NATO whose representatives are taking part in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee one State has refused altogether to participate in a multilateral nuclear force, while two others have not yet given a definite answer in this regard, although they are taking part in the relevant negotiations.

Wide circles of world public opinion are also opposing the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. A few days ago, representatives of world public opinion, the representatives of the World Council of Peace, who were received by Mr. Foster and myself in our capacity as co-Chairmen, declared their negative attitude towards the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

Nevertheless, the United States of America, being supported in this matter mainly by the Federal Republic of Germany, is stubbornly and persistently striving to have the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force put into practice, while here in the Committee it tries to make out that this plan is even no obstacle at all to the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and that it would not give the West German revenge-seekers access to these weapons nor open the nuclear floodgate which is the most dangerous in the present circumstances.

In support of this point of view -- and, we would say, in justification of its position which is preventing a solution of the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- the United States delegation has put forward here a good many reasons and arguments of various kinds. A study of the discussions shows, however, that all these arguments in the final analysis boil down to a single argument which

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

the representatives of the United States of America have formulated in a rather graphic way by asserting that within the framework of the NATO multilateral nuclear force the Federal Republic of Germany would be able to keep its finger only on the safety catch and by no means on the trigger that would set the multilateral nuclear force in action. In other words, control over the nuclear weapons in the multilateral force would remain in the hands of the United States of America and no one apart from the United States would be able to take a decision regarding the combat use of these weapons, while the role of all the other participants in the multilateral nuclear force would be reduced to one thing, namely that they would be able to restrict the possibility for the United States to take such a decision.

Since the formula of the safety catch and the trigger contains the very essence of the argumentation intended to prove that the NATO multilateral nuclear force would not lead to the dissemination of nuclear weapons, we must deal with that formula in greater detail.

Let us consider this question first of all from a purely logical point of view. It would be extremely odd to suppose that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany declares its readiness to defray 40 per cent of the expenditure involved in the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, and is displaying feverish activity in the diplomatic sphere for the purpose of the speediest possible creation of this force, not in order to gain access to nuclear weapons but solely for the sake of being able, by putting its finger on the safety catch, to prevent the United States from putting into action, whenever the United States of America so desires, the 200 Polaris missiles which are to form the armament of the multilateral nuclear fleet.

If that were really so, one could regard the whole venture of creating a multilateral nuclear force as a new chapter of "In Praise of Folly", the genial work of Erasmus of Rotterdam. But it is quite impossible to include the West German revenge-seekers among the characters of Erasmus of Rotterdam. People in Bonn are far from being simpletons; they know very well what they want. And they want something very definite: to be able to participate in the disposal of nuclear weapons, in pulling the trigger of the NATO multilateral nuclear force, and thus --

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

by the law of chain reaction -- in pulling the trigger of the United States strategic nuclear force. Can anyone who stays on the ground of realistic politics doubt this? Can anyone believe that such practical people as the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany will pay millions of dollars for a fiction?

As a matter of fact this is confirmed by the United States representatives themselves when they say that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force is the only way to prevent West Germany from producing its own nuclear weapons. If this is really said in all seriousness, it can mean only one thing: the United States Government itself regards the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force as at least just as effective a means of quenching the nuclear thirst of the West German revenge-seekers as the production by West Germany of its own nuclear weapons. Where then is the safety-catch?

Besides, if the West German revenge-seekers did not reckon on gaining access to nuclear weapons in the multilateral nuclear force, why should the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany have rejected so resolutely and even rudely the proposal by the Government of the German Democratic Republic for the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States (ENDC/124,133)? The very fact of rejection by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany of this constructive proposal by the German Democratic Republic, which is steadfastly pursuing a policy of peace and relaxation of tension, is very significant.

Let us now approach from another angle the question of whether any dissemination of nuclear weapons would take place within the framework of the NATO multilateral nuclear force, and whether West Germany would thus gain access to these nuclear weapons. Let us look at these matters from, so to speak, a material point of view. If there would be no dissemination of nuclear weapons within the framework of the multilateral nuclear force, if control over these weapons would remain entirely in the hands of the United States of America, then why did the United States State Department find it necessary to inform the United States Congress in May 1964 that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force might require a change in the law which prohibits the transfer of United States nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

It is well known that this law - the McMahon Act (1946, Vol.60, No.755) - lays down the United States Government's right of ownership over all special nuclear materials (article 52), prohibits the transfer of secret data pertaining to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons (article 144), and also contains a number of other provisions of a similar type. Of course, we do not know precisely which articles of the McMahon Act it is intended to revise in connexion with the creation of a multilateral nuclear force; but there can hardly be any doubt that much more is concerned than simply giving the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO members an opportunity of keeping their fingers on the safety-catch of nuclear weapons. Otherwise it would not be necessary to revise anything.

In fact, the United States representatives themselves give us to understand that what is concerned is a change in principle of United States policy as now expressed in the McMahon Act. Thus on 7 May 1964 the United States Under Secretary of State, Mr. Ball, having said that control over the multilateral nuclear force should be exercised through an executive nuclear body representing the participating countries, added that "effective nuclear control meant the delegation to a central executive of the power of life and death involved in the use of nuclear weapons".^{1/} So that is what is concerned: the delegation of the power of life and death involved in the use of nuclear weapons. This is, of course, a very serious thing.

But that is not the only thing concerned. The plan to set up a NATO multilateral nuclear fleet provides for the joint ownership of the ships of this fleet, of Polaris missiles and their nuclear warheads. One hardly needs any specialized knowledge of the law of property to understand this simple thing: joint ownership is one of the forms of possession or ownership of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery which the NATO multilateral nuclear force would have at its disposal. So what does this joint ownership of nuclear weapons mean - the dissemination of nuclear weapons or not, the trigger or the safety-catch? The answer is apparently quite clear.

^{1/} U.S. Information Service, Daily Radio Bulletin, 8 May 1964, No.128, p.10.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The direction matters are taking is also shown by certain facts which have become known in connexion with the formation of the mixed-manned, or multilateral, crew of the destroyer "Biddle", which is to serve as a prototype for the ships of the future NATO multilateral nuclear force. The crew of the "Biddle", which is composed of a total of 336 ratings and officers, includes according to press reports 49 servicemen of the Bundesmarine, the navy of the Federal Republic of Germany. They include two West German lieutenants, one of whom is to occupy a command post in the engine-room and the other in a detachment for servicing the missiles with which the destroyer "Biddle" is equipped. You see to what the West German servicemen are given access: to the engines and missiles - that is, to what will form the holy of holies of the multilateral nuclear force.

Is it not true that the real situation differs perceptibly from the picture which has hitherto been drawn in the Committee by the representatives of the United States when they use the metaphor of the safety-catch?

In connexion with the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, there is yet another aspect of the question which cannot be omitted when considering the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force in connexion with the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We have in mind the future prospects of the development of events in the event of this plan being carried out. What the West German revenge-seeking circles want is well known. They want to have nuclear weapons at their own disposal. As long ago as December 1961 Mr. Strauss, who was then Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, stated that the possession of nuclear weapons and the right to dispose of them was "a symbol and even a characteristic feature of the criterion of sovereignty".

This frank thesis is developed in various ways by other leading figures of the Federal Republic of Germany in their statements. Nor do they conceal the fact that they regard the NATO multilateral nuclear force not as the end but as the beginning of the road leading to the possession of nuclear weapons. It is significant, for example, that a spokesman of the Bundestag military committee, Mr. Jäger, in his statement on 25 November 1963, called the NATO multilateral nuclear force a temporary solution of the question, because, as he said, "a real partnership within the framework of NATO for a longer period is possible only on condition that nonopolistic claims over nuclear weapons are abandoned".

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

There can be no doubt that, having obtained at first a somewhat restricted access to nuclear weapons within the framework of the NATO multilateral nuclear force, West Germany will then try to secure the abolition of these restrictions one by one, just as it has secured in recent years the abolition of most of the restrictions laid down for the Federal Republic of Germany by the Paris agreements of 1954 in the sphere of conventional armaments. And it is not difficult to foresee how matters will reach the point where nuclear weapons will, in one way or another, be fully at the disposal of the West German revenge-seekers; and if anyone opposes this development of events, the West German revenge-seekers are unsurpassed where experience in political blackmail is concerned. The whole world witnessed such blackmail in the years preceding the Second World War. Everybody is familiar with the statements made by the leaders of the Third Reich: either the Sudetenland or war; either Danzig or war; either the whole of Czechoslovakia or war.

In fact, blackmail is already being used by the West German revenge-seekers at the present time. It is they who have put the question in this way: either a NATO multilateral nuclear force, or West Germany with its own nuclear weapons. And they do this when, under the same Paris agreements, the Federal Republic of Germany has solemnly undertaken not to manufacture its own nuclear weapons. That shows what the solemn and any other promises of the West German revenge-seekers are worth. Yet we are told that we should rely on them and agree to such a solution of the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would not prevent the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force!

But what is the attitude of the United States itself towards the prospect of such a development of events in connexion with the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force? It is with a feeling of very serious disquiet that we must draw attention to the fact that the leaders of the United States seem to be prepared even now to be resigned, to some extent, to this prospect. How else can one understand the statement made by the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson, in November 1963, when, speaking about the multilateral nuclear force and pointing out that control over nuclear weapons would remain in the hands of the United States, he went on to say that "the evolution towards European control as Europe moves toward unity is in no way excluded".

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In his speech on 7 April 1964 the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, frankly declared that the multilateral fleet "is, of course, not the end of the process of bringing our allies closer together in the field of nuclear defence. From this first step, much could flow".^{1/} From an objective point of view it is clear that the United States is prepared to go even further along the path of concessions to the West German revenge-seekers in regard to their access to nuclear weapons.

Those are facts and nothing but facts. Those are the reasons which show that it is impossible to combine the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, that it is impossible to solve this problem unless the plan for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force is given up altogether. No matter how much the United States representatives may try to prove that one can feed the wolves and leave the sheep untouched, it is absolutely impossible to do so.

The time has now come for the Western Powers members of NATO to make a choice. If you really want a positive solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- and life imperiously demands that it be solved as quickly as possible --- you must renounce the plan to create a NATO multilateral force.

For our part, we made our choice in one of the important aspects of nuclear policy last year when we signed the treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1). That choice was not an easy one for us, nor was it a simple one. But we were guided by the interests of universal peace and security, by the interests of the peoples of the whole world. Now we are expecting the same of the Western Powers. We realize, of course, that it is not easy for you to make this choice, that it involves your relations with one of your main allies -- the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. But one ought not to base alliances on the dissemination of nuclear weapons; one ought not to transfer terrible destructive power into the hands of those who have already twice unleashed world wars and will not hesitate to unleash a third, a nuclear, war for the sake of their own selfish interests.

^{1/} U.S. Information Service, Daily Radio Bulletin, 8 April 1964, No.98, p.4

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The peoples and governments now face the very acute question of whether the Governments of the nuclear Powers are prepared to conclude an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, which really would mean closing all channels and ways for their dissemination. We, the Soviet Union, are prepared to do this. Are the United States and the other Western Powers also prepared to do so?

If the Western Powers are really anxious for a positive solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, we are prepared to negotiate on this problem without putting forward any preliminary conditions. However, from the very beginning there must be mutual understanding between us on the main thing: that our common aim is to conclude such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would preclude any possibility for their dissemination, and would close every loop-hole of access to these weapons to those who do not now possess them but are striving at all costs to gain direct or at least indirect access to them, either by establishing their own national control over nuclear weapons or by participating within the framework of military alliances in the possession, disposal and control of nuclear weapons.

We ask the delegations of States represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee: is this not a constructive statement of the question, and is this not a realistic approach to the solution of a major international problem -- the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons?

We ask particularly the representatives of the States members of NATO -- the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada: are you prepared to conduct negotiations on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons on this basis? Are you prepared to conclude an appropriate international agreement? Much depends upon your answer. Upon it depends perhaps the whole future development of events in the field of nuclear weapons. We await your answer; and so do the peoples of the world.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): As our Soviet colleague has reminded us this morning, it is by an agreement of the two co-Chairmen, endorsed by the Committee as a whole (ENDC/PV.191, pp. 5, 6), that we are devoting our discussion today to the question of the possibility of reaching an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. I was very glad to be able to agree with what our Soviet colleague said when he emphasized the extreme importance of this subject, and indeed when, as I

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

understood his closing sentences, he stressed the great importance of reaching an agreement on this subject as soon as possible. I need hardly say that on this aspect the United Kingdom Government feels exactly the same. We have always emphasized how essential it is that this matter should form the subject of an early agreement in this Conference.

There is already general concern at the terrifying power possessed by those countries which already control nuclear weapons. That concern is, indeed, one of the main reasons why we are all seated round this table in an effort to limit and eventually to eliminate those weapons from the arsenals of the nations, in the hope that the knowledge which has been put to their production may be diverted to peaceful ends for the good of mankind at large. But, if we see danger in the present position, how much more danger is there if the number of nuclear Powers increases?

At our meeting of 6 February our United States colleague quoted (ENDC/PV.164, p.6) some words used by President Kennedy on 26 July 1963; and I am very glad that Mr. Zorin again called attention to them and quoted them today. President Kennedy's words vividly sum up the cause for our alarm. It is almost superfluous to say that such a situation as he described would be completely contrary to the interests of us all, whether we belong to the nuclear or the non-nuclear Powers. It is in that context that we must consider the need for an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. As we all recall, the Irish resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in 1961, proposed --

"... the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons;" (A/RES/1665 (XVI)).

The importance of such an agreement was referred to on 16 June by my Foreign Secretary, Mr. Butler, in the debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons. In that debate the Minister of State, Mr. Peter Thomas, the leader of the United Kingdom delegation to this Conference, said further:

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"Such an agreement has been a major objective of Her Majesty's Government's policy. I can assure the House that this remains our objective." (Official Report, Vol. 696, No.122, col. 1243)

We are all, of course, aware that our Soviet colleague sees difficulty in proceeding to the conclusion of such an agreement because of what he alleges would be the consequences of setting up a multilateral force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mr. Zorin has rehearsed his position on that subject at some length again this morning. I confess I find the logic of his position difficult to follow. Even were his misgivings about the multilateral force well founded -- which, of course, they are not --, surely that is an argument for pressing on with the early conclusion of a non-dissemination agreement rather than for hanging back. Once we have reached agreement on the subject of non-dissemination, which, I repeat, is of such vital importance to us all, surely it is clear that any subsequent arrangements which we in NATO may arrive at for our mutual defence would have to be in conformity with the agreement on non-dissemination.

Perhaps I should remind the Committee that the United Kingdom has not yet decided to join the multilateral force. Both Mr. Butler and Mr. Thomas made that point quite clear in the foreign affairs debate to which I have just referred. Mr. Thomas said:

"We have agreed to take part in an objective examination of the American proposal for a mixed-manned nuclear force without commitment as to our eventual participation in such a force. That is still our position, and there is no mystery about it. Our eventual decision will depend on a number of factors, not least the shape of the proposal when the negotiations are completed." (ibid., col. 1236)

However, Mr. Thomas then went on to say:

"But one thing that one can say quite clearly is that, whatever these proposals are, it is clear that it is not intended that they should involve dissemination." (ibid.)

I can assure the Soviet representative that it is not our practice to sign an agreement which can be shown to be inconsistent with another agreement into which our Government has already entered. Indeed, I should doubt if any parliamentary government could get away with such a practice, even if it should want to do so. As Mr. Thomas said --and again I refer to the debate in Parliament on 16 June -- an agreement on non-dissemination --

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"... would substitute a precise international agreement for the present de facto coincidence of policies and allay their anxieties, whether well founded or not, about the possible evaluation of the M.L.F." (ibid., col. 1243)

Our Eastern European colleagues have frequently expressed misgivings -- and I use a mild term, "misgivings" -- concerning the motives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the creation of the multilateral force; and our Soviet colleague has again forcibly expressed those misgivings this morning. I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to a statement made by Chancellor Erhard on 1 May this year. Dr. Erhard said quite categorically:

"We have repeatedly and formally renounced the production of A.B.C. weapons, and we seek no national control over nuclear weapons."

That quotation is only the most recent of a whole series of similar assurances by German statesmen. For instance, Mr. von Hassel, the Federal German Minister of Defence, said in May last year:

"It is not a question of the Federal Republic of Germany revoking its solemn renunciation in 1954 -- which so far no other country has made -- of the manufacture of atomic weapons, or of coming into possession of these weapons by other means."

The maintenance of this renunciation, which was explicitly stated, as the Committee knows, in the Western European Union treaty, has also been confirmed by an official statement by the Federal German Defence Ministry in March 1963 and reiterated on many occasions by German statesmen.

I have given those quotations in order to show how unfounded are the suspicious allegations levelled against the Federal Republic of Germany. I make no apology to the Committee for doing so. It is only right and fitting that the record should be set straight, when we consider how often the Committee has had to listen -- as it has again this morning -- to statements from our Eastern European colleagues regarding what they hold to be the militarist aims of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I have only one more thing to say. Our Soviet colleague maintains, and maintained again with vigour in his statement this morning, that there is a clear distinction on this whole question between the position of the Eastern European countries and that of the West. As I understood his remarks, he invoked common sense

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

and elementary logic in support of his contention that the formation of a NATO multilateral force would render the conclusion of a non-dissemination agreement useless. I maintain, on the contrary, that common sense and elementary logic indicate that the best way for the Soviet Government to safeguard itself against that which it claims to fear would be to make rapid progress with us towards the conclusion of a non-dissemination agreement. The Committee will recall that my Foreign Secretary, Mr. Butler, said during his speech to this Conference on 25 February last:

"The existence of a formal agreement which we had all signed would itself constitute a safeguard against a multilateral force which involved the dissemination of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.169,p.11)

I hope that the logic, common sense and force of Mr. Butler's observation will be clear to us all.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): Let me at the very outset say how gratified my delegation is that our co-Chairmen have agreed on the agenda for the discussion of the so-called collateral measures (ENDC/PV.191, pp. 5, 6). This indeed is a good augury for our future work; for it has already enabled us to enter into the substance of the problems we face and waste no time on what are procedural issues. We hope that this agreement reached between our two co-Chairmen will exert a favourable influence upon the course of our further deliberations.

The problem of effective measures to ban further dissemination of nuclear arms has for some time been one of the crucial issues in the disarmament negotiations, and rightly so; for they can and should perform a dual function of the utmost importance: first, to become a decisive factor in reducing the danger of nuclear war, and second, to create conditions facilitating the realization of a much wider task -- that of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament. It is small wonder, therefore, that so many States and governments -- in fact the great majority -- are convinced that to arrest the dissemination of nuclear arms would constitute a safeguard of their vital interests against the evil consequences of an uncontrolled nuclear armament race.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

This, indeed, has found its expression in many discussions and debates both inside and outside the United Nations on many proposals and suggestions submitted on the subject. Some dealt with the issue in its global dimensions, and others did so on a regional scale -- to mention only the plans submitted by my Government in 1958 (ENDC/C.1/1) and a few months ago (ENDC/PV.189, pp. 6 to 8): that of a nuclear-free zone and that of a nuclear freeze in Central Europe, known as the Gomulka plan.

The idea of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons has found wide support in our Committee from the very day on which we began our deliberations. Over two years ago, in March 1962, when we embarked upon our tasks, many delegations stressed the need for a rapid solution of this problem, for they assumed -- I believe rightly -- that it should not be difficult to reach an agreement on the subject, in view of the fact that proposals on general and complete disarmament submitted to this Committee provide for obligations precluding the further dissemination of nuclear arms. Yet to our great regret -- and, I should even say, sorrow -- no progress has been made during the months and years which followed. But time does not stand still. Things and events move; they do so at an ever-growing speed; and by the mere passage of time some factors improve while others deteriorate. Thus one may say that we have made no progress on the subject of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- in fact we have moved backwards, for the lack of progress has meant a step backwards.

Today we face a new situation which makes it imperative -- and I do not hesitate to use the word "imperative" -- to take some steps which would prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. I was glad to hear that Sir Paul Mason, who preceded me, shared that view. Why is it really so urgent? Here are the reasons which we think make it imperative, as I have said, to take decisive steps on the subject.

First, the growth in the number of States possessing nuclear armaments will create a situation in which it will become ever more difficult to prevent many other States from claiming and ultimately acquiring these weapons. By refusing to act we shall become guilty of assisting and condoning what might develop into a chain reaction of most dangerous dimensions. The disease will spread and may get beyond our control. In whose interest, one may ask, would it be?

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

Second, the dissemination of nuclear arms will make the solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament, and, further, of general and complete disarmament, much more difficult. New and ever more complicated issues of control will arise, and we shall be faced with the paradoxical situation of working for disarmament, for the destruction of nuclear weapons, while an ever-increasing number of States will be acquiring them.

Third, the dissemination of nuclear weapons will by necessity make States which at present are unwilling to have such weapons claim them once they see their neighbours getting them. Resources used hitherto for peaceful purposes will be diverted to military budgets; and this, as we all know from experience, will be done at the expense of peaceful production and the standard of living of millions of people. The international atmosphere will deteriorate. Mistrust will grow. And we may risk losing the great gains of the last years and the last months. The danger of a nuclear war, not only by accident but also by provocation, will undoubtedly increase.

In saying all that, I do not wish to appear to the Committee to be a prophet of gloom. But logic itself, that logic which has been invoked this morning -- and I think there is only one logic --, that logic which is unfortunately so frequently neglected in politics, dictates these conclusions. That is why the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear armaments should have the highest priority on our agenda. Such a solution could be effective only if it prevented the nuclear Powers from transferring nuclear weapons to others, and other States from gaining access to those very nuclear weapons.

With all that in mind, we welcome the Soviet memorandum of 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123) proposing a specific agreement on this very subject. Since the submission of that memorandum, new and important reasons have been added to those already existing. The solution of the problem has become even more urgent and even more important. The international situation, I think all of us could agree, has shown further signs of improvement. Further steps have been taken to arrest the armaments race. Mutual comprehension has grown. Indeed, this is reflected in the atmosphere in which we have begun our work round this table. Thus we can state without hesitation that there do exist both subjective and objective elements favourable to taking an important decision on the subject. Let us therefore have the courage to take that decision.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

There is another element which is worth mentioning and to which I should like to draw the Committee's attention. It is claimed that a certain balance in armaments exists at present, that this offers a special opportunity for taking agreed disarmament measures. If that claim is correct, then one should bear in mind that what is called "equilibrium" cannot by its very nature last too long, and that it can be easily upset. One must bear in mind that we face here static and dynamic phenomena confronting each other. In particular, one must bear in mind that events move very fast and today have a very dynamic character. Past experience has shown, and indeed has taught us, that equilibrium, or balance, has rarely lasted for long, and thus has rarely produced by itself conditions of durable peaceful co-operation. Human action is necessary in order to use whatever benefits the balance offers. Human action is necessary to avail oneself of the favourable situation that exists, lest it be missed.

In this particular case, the case of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, I would draw the Committee's attention to the fact that, should a shift occur in the non-dissemination, we shall face a new situation in which the question of balance will have to be looked at from a different point of view. We may once again face a lost opportunity. I would say even more: we may face a point of no return. Therefore, to use the words of a great poet, I would say: "This time is a very good one, if we but know what to do with it".

The decision we face is therefore clear. We should agree as soon as possible on barring the spread of nuclear weapons, in whatever form or way this may be done -- direct or indirect. We refer to the latter since the indirect access to nuclear weapons creates a loop-hole through which these weapons may be disseminated: from joint disposal to joint control, from joint control to joint possession, from joint possession to joint ownership. The frontiers become almost invisible, as they sometimes do in law. Any of these devices would easily break the ring -- and the ring should remain closed, and closed for all intents and purposes. This is, indeed, the essence of the problem we face: that the ring for non-dissemination of nuclear weapons must remain tight and firm.

The danger of opening the door even slightly to the dissemination of nuclear weapons was reflected in a wise statement by the representative of India on 28 April, when he referred to what he called --

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

"... some change in the existing deployment or disposition of nuclear weapons, or in regard to giving access to others so long as control of the weapons is not transferred" (ENDC/PV.187, p.59).

And to that wise question the representative of India himself gave a very wise reply. He said:

"Irrespective of the question of interpretation, however, it seems to us that at the present time, when there is a progressive improvement in the international situation, it would be most unwise -- and might even bring about a setback -- if any change were made in the existing arrangements for the control, use or deployment of nuclear weapons. In our view this is a matter in which the special concerns of one side should be respected by the other." (ibid.)

How true!

With all that in mind, should there, I ask, be any difficulty in reaching agreement on this very subject? We know that there is a difficulty. A device is being set into operation which, to our mind, would counteract the very objective we are pursuing. It is suggested that this would not imply proliferation of nuclear weapons, in view of the special arrangements which are envisaged. However, this is not so. It is to include a State whose activities and policy are a source of serious concern to us. It is suggested that that State's participation in this new venture is necessary in order to prevent it from acquiring an independent nuclear force. But is it not true that high-ranking members of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany are already stating now that after a certain time the existing limitations will be removed? They are already thinking of this arrangement as a stepping-stone to independent control of nuclear weapons. And this means, in the long run, a finger on the atomic trigger. Mr. Zorin referred to that at some length this morning; and we agree fully with what he said.

It is also claimed that questions of the security and defence of that particular State are involved. But can one seriously argue that anyone is threatening the Federal Republic of Germany? It already possesses a powerful military force, and its potential is constantly increasing. It has great forces on land, at sea and in the air. It enjoys the inherent right of self-defence, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. It has powerful allies. It has, therefore, the benefit of individual

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

and collective self-defence. Does it, indeed, face any genuine emergency or danger? Is it in need of repelling an imminent injury? I submit that it is enough to pose the question to have the reply. I submit that the contrary is the case. And yet we know that the Federal Republic of Germany has been refusing to accept proposal after proposal aimed at reducing tension, blocking the solution of problems in an area which is of great importance to the peace of Europe and to the peace of the world.

Besides that, we have to take into account the general development of international relations. We have to discern the very trend of that development. Is the trend towards deterioration or improvement? No one could claim that the world today is in a worse situation than five, or three, years ago. Why, then, one could ask, should we proceed to do something which would cloud the horizon and create difficulties and anxieties?

Finally, speaking for Poland, I would recall that we are frequently told that the Federal Republic of Germany claims part of our territory, questions our boundaries which are fixed and established for all time. But painful experience rests in our minds. We remember times in the past when we were assured of peaceful intentions. It was said of the statesmen of Germany in the twenties that they had no pen to recognize the western frontier of Poland in those days. The result of all that is well known. It fills the darkest pages of Europe's history.

Sir Paul Mason has invoked words uttered recently by leading statesmen of the Federal Republic of Germany. Words and words -- we can quote words to the contrary. We are waiting for deeds. And here are the dangers. We see a genuine, a real danger in the Federal Republic of Germany becoming a party to what is to be the multilateral nuclear force. I regret to have to say all this; but if I did not do so I should be less than sincere, and I should fail to draw your attention to the realities of the situation.

The representative of the United Kingdom said that he wished to make no apology for questioning certain statements by representatives from Eastern Europe. I wish to say, with all due respect, that I do not wish to make an apology, for what I say is

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

the truth, and the real situation as we see it. The right of self-defence cannot justify armaments which constitute a genuinely-felt threat to other countries. As an English authority on the subject has warned us, "the free pursuit of what each State considers to be its vital interests" would indeed be extremely dangerous.

Disarmament and security are by no means mutually exclusive. We need no better evidence of this than the fact that we are sitting around this table. On the contrary, they can and should supplement each other, for under present conditions agreed and properly-implemented disarmament measures have become a most important factor which, more than anything else, can lead to security for all. As an American statesman once said:

"Excessive armies and armaments are as inimical to international peace as large private armies and armaments have always been to domestic peace."

To quote only a declaration of the Final Act of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, subscribed to after the Second World War by some of the Western States represented here:

"... no stipulation of the treaty nor any of the obligations created under it should be interpreted as justifying excessive armaments or may be invoked as a reason for the creation or maintenance of armaments or armed forces beyond those required for common defence in the interest of peace and security."

(U.N. Treaty Series 1948, Vol. 21, p. 169)

Having said all this, I will continue by stating that we feel that the proposed multilateral nuclear force would contribute to a serious deterioration of the situation and lead to consequences which are contrary to the hopes and desires expressed by many of us in this Committee. A new situation will arise. Indeed, we feel that our security would be in danger -- all the more so, as I indicated earlier, because it would include as one of the parties the Federal Republic of Germany, which already now attaches a different meaning to the instruments involved and to the arrangements to be made -- a meaning which leaves no room for doubt. It wants to use them as an instrument of its policy of revenge. There is a telling precedent on the subject.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

I would remind you that one of the Powers engaged in the First World War began to use gas in spite of the provisions of the Hague Declaration of 1899, to which it was a party. When other parties protested, they were given the reply that the Hague Declaration was not applicable, for it prohibited the use of gas from balloons; they were using gas from cylinders. The cylinder was decisive, not the gas. The Power in question was Germany. Thus it may be seen that misrepresentation, distortion and lawlessness have a tradition.

We are faced with an important problem and with it an important decision. When addressing this Committee some time ago Mr. Butler said:

"In human affairs there is much to be said for reaching agreement when the possibility and the will are there, instead of waiting to regret it later." (ENDC/PV.169, p.11).

It is the firm belief of my delegation that it is not too late to remove difficulties which exist now and those which loom on the horizon, in order to reach an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- an agreement which would safeguard the interests of all of us. A decisive step must be taken by the Western Powers so that what we consider to be a dangerous enterprise -- the multilateral force -- is not proceeded with. By doing so they will remove the danger of an increase in the number of countries with direct or indirect access to nuclear weapons, particularly serious as far as Western Germany is concerned, and of an increase in the number of fingers on the atomic trigger.

That is the firm conviction of my delegation. We believe that it can and should be done. We believe that the venture now envisaged would be dangerous and should be abandoned. The situation calls for all the courage we can command and the will and determination to reach an agreement. By doing so we shall lay a milestone on the road to disarmament. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of this Committee that Poland will be second to none in pursuing this objective.

Mr. PECHOTA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation, in its statement during the general debate after the resumption of the work of our Committee, expressed the view that the question of taking measures to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons had become

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

fully ripe for solution (ENDC/PV.188, p.35). We are convinced that a real possibility has been opened up for the Committee to lay down in a very short time the bases of an agreement, including the preparation of an appropriate draft agreement.

We should like to state once again that Czechoslovakia attaches great importance to the implementation of effective measures to prevent the terrible consequences of a further dissemination of nuclear weapons. We would point out that any development leading to the pullulation of nuclear weapons throughout the world could become extremely dangerous and make it impossible to find any way out of the nuclear impasse.

Today, when modern weapons have reduced to a few minutes the time required to cross thousands of miles, when outer space has been added to the spaces available for military purposes, the looming menace of nuclear war is like a tocsin urging mankind to take heed and to realize that nothing is more urgent than to avert this danger. This is the imperative of the moment, and it must become the Alpha and Omega of all our actions.

We realize, of course, that an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons would be merely one brick in the wall that is to protect mankind from the mounting threat of a thermonuclear war. Nevertheless it would help towards predetermining the way in which international relations will develop in the years to come. It would open up a realistic path towards freeing the nations from the menace of mutual extermination, and would lead to a further relaxation of the international situation and to a reduction of the arms race.

It should be pointed out that in this regard there has emerged a fairly broad basis for the achievement of agreement. At least that is the impression that is created if one takes into consideration the statements made by responsible spokesmen of many countries, including the Western Powers. As far as the socialist countries are concerned, they have repeatedly called for the earliest possible implementation of agreed measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, taking into account the importance of such measures and the legitimate demands of the peoples of the world. The best proof of the sincerity of these ~~endeavours~~ of the socialist States is provided by the concrete proposals put forward by the Soviet Union (ENDC/123) and by the consistent policy which it

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

is pursuing in this regard. The Czechoslovak delegation would like to state that its views fully coincide with the principles which have been laid down by the Soviet Union in its proposals.

If our Western colleagues now really recognize that any further dissemination of nuclear weapons would not be in accordance with the interests of peace and security, it would seem that there should be nothing to prevent them from concluding an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to other countries.

The Czechoslovak delegation considers -- and we think there is no need to explain at length why we are convinced of this -- that the conclusion of such an agreement is of vital interest to all the peoples of the world. For this reason all States must make an active contribution to the achievement of an agreement in this regard. As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, pointed out recently when speaking in Copenhagen:

"The peoples of the smaller or minor countries cannot and should not stand aloof from the solution of the most important problems of the present-day international situation. Moreover, only the activity of all States without exception, of great and small; only the activity of all peoples, of all men of good will, can lead to a real relaxation of international tension and to the establishment of lasting peace on earth." (Pravda, 20 June 1964)

These sensible words are completely applicable to the problem we are discussing.

In order to achieve the aim we are pursuing, it is necessary, however, to adopt genuine and not sham measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. In our opinion there must be no yielding to self-delusion by not taking into account certain facts the existence of which creates real obstacles in the way of the implementation of effective measures against the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Such obstacles, unfortunately, continue to exist. The main obstacle, and perhaps the most serious one, is the plan to create a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force.

The aim of that plan, as has already been pointed out on many occasions, is to give access, in one way or another, to the possession and control of nuclear weapons to a number of countries which do not now possess them, including Western

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

Germany, the ruling circles of which openly proclaim their territorial claims in regard to their neighbours and cherish the hope that they will succeed in changing the post-war structure of Europe.

That is the essence of the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. No matter how its proponents try to represent the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force as a sort of "evolutionary process" in the development of the nuclear forces now at the disposal of NATO, no verbal declarations or diplomatic phrases can cover up this ominous fact. Nor is there any way by which it can be left out of account.

It is no secret to anyone that Western Germany is trying to get hold of nuclear weapons through the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force and through its participation in this. Proof of that is provided by the activity which Bonn is carrying on to ensure the speediest implementation of this plan, at the same time rejecting all proposals for the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States. Everyone knows, for instance, what a provocative attitude was adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the most recent constructive proposal of the German Democratic Republic on this subject (ENDC/133). Desiring by all means to get their hands on nuclear weapons, the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed themselves in favour of implementing the plan for a NATO multilateral nuclear force in the most resolute manner, and before any of the other NATO States had done so. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed its readiness to defray 40 per cent of the total costs involved in the implementation of the plan.

The ruling circles in West Germany expect that by taking advantage of the position of the Federal Republic of Germany in Western Europe and in NATO they will succeed in getting the upper hand in the joint nuclear forces and freedom to use them for their revenge-seeking purposes. At the Assembly of the Western European Union held in Paris from 4 to 7 June 1963, the West German Minister of Defence, Mr. von Hassel, openly demanded that Bonn should be given an appropriate share in nuclear planning and nuclear responsibility. Proof is also available that the ruling circles in Bonn have no intention of stopping at the achieved version of the plan for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force. That plan is for them merely a beginning, a first step towards the acquisition of the unrestricted right to use nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

It is not without interest to note that the former adviser on military matters to the President of the United States, Mr. Kissinger, developed his ideas in a similar vein in Wehrkunde, the West German military review for May 1963. I quote the following very interesting statement:

"If the Federal Republic of Germany is seriously thinking of acquiring strategic weapons, the multilateral nuclear force will soon appear to it to be only a transitional stage which, after all, might become the easiest way which would get Germany into the centre of serious nuclear business ... The NATO multilateral nuclear force ... will not stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons; it might even accelerate it. It not only will not prevent West Germany from gaining possession of nuclear weapons, but neither will it satisfy for a longer time any desire existing in Germany to gain a more significant voice in nuclear matters ..."

Of course, the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany to obtain through a multilateral nuclear force access to nuclear weapons -- of which one unit alone would exceed in power all the bombs and missiles hurled against Britain during the Second World War -- cannot have escaped the attention of the Western Governments. Why, then, despite the concern aroused in their own countries by the plan to create a multilateral nuclear force, and despite the negative attitude of several NATO countries to this plan, do they continue to insist on its implementation? Is it not obvious that the Federal Republic of Germany wants to play a more important role in NATO and to possess a nuclear potential in order to carry out its own plans, including some which do not necessarily correspond to the foreign policy concepts of its NATO allies?

As regards the statements made by official spokesmen of the Federal Republic of Germany, that they are not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons -- statements to which the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, referred this morning -- we are obliged to note that statements of that kind cannot lull the vigilance of the peoples of the world.

Such statements cannot change our position in regard to the multilateral nuclear force. Our position is based on indisputable facts. We could cite a great number of solemn statements made by political leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany in the post-war years, in which they swore that the Federal Republic of Germany would not

(Mr. Pochota, Czechoslovakia)

create its own army or manufacture certain types of weapons, and so on and so forth. All those statements were soon forgotten. We have no grounds for assuming that the statements cited by Sir Paul Mason will meet with a different fate. It is difficult to avoid the impression that even the representatives of the Western Powers themselves do not believe them. If that is not so, then why are our Western colleagues trying so hard all the time to convince us that the multilateral nuclear force is merely designed to prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from acquiring its own nuclear weapons?

It will soon be fifty years since the First World War broke out, and twenty-five years since the beginning of the Second World War. In this connexion it is appropriate to recall that it is precisely Germany that in the last fifty years has twice plunged humanity into catastrophes which cost millions of lives. What guarantee is there that, having obtained nuclear weapons, the militarist circles of the Federal Republic of Germany will not again lose the capacity to evaluate soberly and realistically the situation in the world and unleash a third world war?

There, in our opinion, lies the main danger of the plan to create a multilateral nuclear force. This danger is inherent in any plan to give the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons. After all, more than one hundred States in the world do not possess weapons, yet they do not regard this as a lacuna in their sovereign rights. Why, then, is the possession of nuclear weapons declared in Western Germany to be practically the criterion of its sovereignty?

Czechoslovakia, as a Central European State directly bordering on the Federal Republic of Germany and having had bitter experience of German imperialism, has not only the right but even the duty to draw attention to the alarming situation that still exists in that area. We watch with misgivings the dangerous revenge-seeking activity which not only meets with encouragement on the part of the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany but is even proclaimed as a national policy. As is well known, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only government which has so far not expressed its complete repudiation of the shameful Munich Agreement of 1938 and which has not drawn all the political and legal conclusions entailed. On the contrary, some of its spokesmen, such as the Minister Seebohm -- in his well-known statement on the Munich Agreement, which was an integral part of the preparations of Hitler's Germany for a war of aggression and, as such, an international crime -- have even referred to it as "an act of justice".

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

As is well known, that revenge-seeking statement of the Minister Seehofer gave rise throughout the world to a storm of indignation, and world public opinion demanded that he should resign immediately and be called to account. But what followed? The fact that the spirit of revenge is an important political force in the Federal Republic of Germany is shown by the refusal of Chancellor Erhard to comply with that demand and by his statement that the resignation of Mr. Seehofer would weaken the political basis on which the present Government of the Federal Republic of Germany rests.

That fact throws a vivid light on the conditions existing in the Federal Republic of Germany and reveals the true intentions and aims of its ruling circles. Therefore it is not surprising that Czechoslovakia, like a number of other States, considers the endeavours of the Federal Republic of Germany to obtain nuclear weapons to be a threat to peace in one of the most sensitive areas of the world. That is why we attach so much importance to this matter.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the implementation of the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force would mean a new and particularly dangerous stage in the nuclear arms race. It would impair relations between States, help to increase suspicion, and cause considerable harm to the interests of peace and security. Instead of limiting nuclear weapons, as the peoples insistently demand, it would give access to nuclear arms to a number of countries which do not now possess them.

For these reasons we cannot agree with the view so often expressed by the representatives of the Western countries that the plan to create a multilateral nuclear force would not at all mean the dissemination of nuclear weapons to other States. As we have shown, that assertion is not in accordance with the truth. Actually, the implementation of this plan would give the West German militarists access to nuclear weapons.

The abandonment of this plan would therefore be greeted by the peoples throughout the world with relief. We should like to believe that, among the responsible political leaders of the West, a realistic view of things will predominate and that they will give serious heed to the warnings coming not only from the socialist countries but also from the peoples of the whole world, including a large part of the public opinion of the West. If they decide to

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

subordinate their actions to the interests of the peoples of the world, including their own peoples, the last serious obstacle standing in the way of the signing of a world-wide treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons will have been eliminated.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): By agreement we are today discussing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the outset, I must confess that I share my United Kingdom colleague's impatience at having had to listen once again to the many baseless charges about the present Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, the discussion this morning has indicated that the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons is of fundamental concern to all of us. In spite of the apparent deep differences and misunderstandings on some points which this discussion has indicated lie between us, the interests of both nuclear sides overlap in this area. The interests of the non-nuclear Powers also overlap with one another and with those of the nuclear Powers.

All of us recognize that, as nuclear technology continues to develop in the world, it may become substantially easier and less costly for additional countries to engage in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Moreover, one should be aware of the fact that there will soon be a large number of power reactors throughout the world which could produce significant amounts of plutonium suitable for weapon use. If no international action is taken soon to prevent the diversion of plutonium thus produced to weapons use, it will become much more difficult to bring this problem under control in the future. Once additional nations begin to manufacture nuclear weapons, political and psychological barriers which now tend to restrain proliferation will have been broken, and still other nations will feel pressure to produce or acquire such weapons. This point was well made by our Polish colleague.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Thus, steps to prevent or at least inhibit the proliferation of national nuclear weapon capabilities are of common interest to all of us, and every delegation has, at one time or another, expressed its support for them. A number of such steps have already been made.

The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency came into force in 1957. Under the Statute, the Agency has two objectives: to assist in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and to ensure that this assistance does not "further any military purpose". The draftsmen of the Statute thus had the problem of proliferation very much in mind. This and many other of its provisions make that clear.

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 also helped us move towards our objective. It prohibited the spread of nuclear weapons to Antarctica. It also constituted the first test ban treaty, because it prohibited nuclear testing in that region.

The Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1), of course, made a significant contribution to non-dissemination. By preventing the form of testing which is simplest, least expensive and most useful, it makes it much more difficult for a nation to produce its initial operational nuclear bomb.

The 1963 United Nations resolution against placing nuclear weapons in orbit (A/RES/1884(XVIII)) prevents dissemination to the new reaches being conquered by man.

The cut-backs in fissionable materials for weapon use announced in 1964 (ENDC/131,132) should help to limit further increases in stocks of such material -- stocks which might some day have spread to other nations if held in surplus by the nuclear Powers.

Each of these steps helps in some way to deal with the important problem of preventing the spread of independent nuclear capabilities to nations not now possessing them, an objective which all of us here do support. The United States has consistently and actively supported that objective and has offered a range of steps which would serve it.

First, we continue to pursue the goal set forth in the Irish resolution of 1961 (A/RES/1665(XVI)). As all representatives here know, that resolution recognized the danger of additional nations having nuclear weapon capabilities and called for agreement to prevent such proliferation. In keeping with that call, the United States has been seeking, and will continue to seek, an international agreement under which the nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons into

(Mr. Foster, United States)

national control of States not now possessing them, as well as not to assist such States in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would facilitate a parallel undertaking by non-nuclear Powers not to manufacture such weapons and to refrain from acquiring control over such weapons and from seeking or receiving assistance in manufacturing them. An international agreement of this kind would constitute a most important curb on the spread of nuclear weapons, which, if not checked now, may become a serious threat to international peace.

Second, we continue to support the idea that all transfers of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes should take place under effective international safeguards. This proposal is intended to fill a gap left by the IAEA Statute to which I referred earlier. Whenever that Agency participates in some way in assistance to nations in their peaceful nuclear programmes, the Agency system of international safeguards applies. However, this is not necessarily the case for transfers between States outside the IAEA framework. Our proposal is that international safeguards should apply to such transfers as well.

Third, the United States continues to believe in the utmost importance of its nuclear cut-off and transfer proposals. The working paper (ENDC/134) on the cut-off which my delegation submitted last week indicates the seriousness with which we view this measure. The cut-off would prevent the increase, and the transfer would begin the decrease, of stocks of fissionable materials for use in weapons. By restricting nuclear Powers to the existing or reduced levels of their stockpiles, this measure would further inhibit them from transferring such stocks to others.

Fourth, the United States continues to hold the view that the major nuclear Powers should accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection as they recommend for other States.

At our meeting of 5 March the United States delegation stated (ENDC/PV.172, pp.17, 18) that, as a first step in this direction, the United States had already placed under IAEA safeguards three of its smaller peaceful nuclear reactor facilities. At that time the United States also announced that it would, as a further step, invite the Agency to apply its safeguards to the Yankee power reactor, a large, privately-owned reactor with a power level of 600,000 thermal kilowatts.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The Committee will be interested to learn that the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 11 June 1964 approved the terms of an agreement between the Agency and the United States Government, which was then signed on 15 June. The new agreement, which is for a five-year term subject to extension by mutual consent, provides for the application of IAEA safeguards to the Yankee reactor, and also for continuing IAEA inspection of the three smaller United States reactor facilities already safeguarded. The United States has agreed that the four reactor facilities and any special fissionable material produced by those facilities will not be used to further any military purpose. The United States has obligated itself, in accordance with the Agency's system of safeguards, to grant access to IAEA inspectors in order to verify the exclusively peaceful uses of the facilities and of the nuclear materials involved. The Yankee facility will be the first to which the IAEA's recently-approved safeguards for large reactors will be applied.

In the case of two of the reactors, the Brookhaven graphite research reactor and the Yankee power reactor, the agreement requires the IAEA inspectors to have "access at all times". To facilitate this inspection, the United States has agreed that the Agency may designate one or more inspectors to be stationed in the United States. With respect to the facilities where access is to be permitted at all times, the agreement specifies either continuous inspection or that an indefinite number of separate inspection visits may be performed. This includes the right to inspect without advance notice.

We believe that the placing of these reactors under the International Atomic Energy Agency is an important step in furthering the development of an effective system of international safeguards. These safeguards will ensure against diversion of the peaceful nuclear activities involved to any military purpose. Once again we urge other States to join in this step and invite the application of these safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities and materials.

Now I turn to an aspect of non-dissemination which has been referred to in great detail by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. I shall reserve the right to reply in detail to certain charges made; but I must call attention to the fact that many of those charges are based on false reasoning.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Those allegations and others have been made both around our table here and elsewhere. They are that the proposed multilateral nuclear force is inconsistent with the objective of non-proliferation.

We strongly disagree. However, we can still hope that as the multilateral force takes shape the Soviet Government and the other socialist Governments will find that their fears about the acquisition of national control by members of the force will prove to be as groundless as we know them to be. As has been made clear on a number of occasions, the missiles in the multilateral force will be manned, owned and controlled multilaterally. No single participant will be able to fire the missiles, since firing of missiles in wartime would be by decision of the United States and an agreed number of other participants. Furthermore, no nation participating in the multilateral force could withdraw any element of the force and place it under its national control.

This force is being devised to enable members of NATO to cope with a range of threats which they might face. We believe that, so long as hundreds of Soviet nuclear-tipped rockets are arrayed against Europe, effective European participation in strategic deterrence should be provided. Soviet leaders have not hesitated to put their rockets to political use. They have from time to time reminded European countries how easily the Soviet Union could destroy the Acropolis, the orange-groves of Italy or, for that matter, all of England or France. Nuclear blackmail, addressed to Europe, lay at the heart of the pressures on Berlin during the period from 1958 to 1962. Therefore it is not surprising that Europeans living so near this Soviet nuclear power have been anxious to have a larger role in long-range strategic deterrence.

But the arrangements contemplated for the multilateral force would not increase the number of independent nuclear weapon capabilities and are thus consistent with our objective of preventing the spread of such capabilities. Indeed, by offering an alternative to national nuclear weapons programmes, the multilateral force should increase incentives and improve chances for the limitation of national weapon-producing centres.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Despite general agreement on the urgency of international action to curb proliferation of national nuclear weapon capabilities through transfer or acquisition, such action has been delayed by the Soviet Union, which has used groundless political arguments against the multilateral force in the pursuit of its long-standing aim to disrupt NATO defensive arrangements. Thus the Soviet Union is assuming a heavy responsibility in this matter. We strongly hope that it will see its way clear to join us in curbing the threat of proliferation.

In conclusion, let me remind you that for nearly two decades United States policy has been based on the precept that the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities to additional nations can pose a threat to world peace. In our own atomic energy legislation, in our support for the IAEA, in the test ban treaty, in the other steps which have already been achieved, in our many proposals here and at the United Nations -- from the Baruch plan to the cut-off -- we have adhered to two basic objectives: first, that the energy of the atom should be harnessed for peace, not war; second -- as a corollary --, that the independent capability to use this energy for war should not spread to additional nations.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to avail myself of the few remaining minutes to give a reply to certain questions which were touched upon in the statements of the previous speakers, and in particular to shed light on one question which was mentioned in the statement of the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, and in the statement of the United States representative, Mr. Foster. It is the question of the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665(XVI)), to which both those representatives referred.

As we know, that resolution was adopted before the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force saw the light of day. Obviously that resolution could not contain any provision that would specifically indicate the inadmissibility of such a form of the dissemination of nuclear weapons through this multilateral force.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

However, by its very meaning the Irish resolution cannot in any way be interpreted as permitting the creation of a multilateral nuclear force. Indeed, under that resolution -- which, incidentally, was quoted by the United Kingdom representative -- the non-nuclear States would bind themselves not to manufacture nuclear weapons or -- and here I quote from the resolution -- "otherwise acquire control of such weapons." It is obvious that the prohibition of acquisition in any way by the non-nuclear Powers of control of nuclear weapons shows unequivocally that any plan under which non-nuclear Powers would have access to any kind of control over nuclear weapons is contrary to the letter and the spirit of that resolution.

This becomes even more obvious if we take into account the interpretation given to that resolution by its author Mr. Aiken, the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In reply to a comment by the Indian representative, who pointed out that in his opinion the Irish resolution was not sufficiently broad and did not cover all possible cases of dissemination of nuclear weapons, and in particular did not prohibit the transfer of the weapons themselves but only control over them, Mr. Aiken said:

"The representative of India referred to one part of this draft resolution and observed that control was narrower than ownership.

Actually, I think the word 'control' is wider, because under this draft resolution non-nuclear States would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control, by ownership or by any other means, of such weapons." (A/C.1/PV.1209, p.36)

Therefore any attempt to prove that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force would not be contrary to the Irish resolution is unfounded. The Irish resolution prohibiting the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the plan to create a multilateral nuclear force, which is one of the forms of dissemination, are mutually exclusive.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, has declared that nuclear and non-nuclear Powers would have, within the framework of the multilateral nuclear force, joint disposition and control of considerable nuclear forces.^{1/}

^{1/} U.S. Information Service, Daily Radio Bulletin, 8 April 1964 No. 98

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

But joint possession is only one of the forms of possession, and that is precisely what is prohibited by the Irish resolution -- for which, incidentally, all the States here present appear to have voted.

The Soviet Union supported and still supports the Irish resolution and understands it as a document which calls for the conclusion of an agreement which would preclude any possibility of transferring nuclear weapons or control over them either directly or indirectly.

That is what I wished to say regarding the Irish resolution, in view of the fact that this question was touched upon in the statements made by several delegations.

My second comment concerns what was said by the representative of the United Kingdom. He appealed to us to conclude an agreement, and pointed out that we are allegedly delaying the conclusion of such an agreement. But I am bound to say that in our statement today we have mentioned, on the contrary, that we are prepared to conclude an agreement and are prepared to negotiate on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons on the basis which we have set forth in detail. What is unacceptable in the basis which we set forth at the end of our statement? We said that it was necessary to conclude such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would preclude any possibility for its dissemination, and would close every loophole of access to these weapons to those who do not now possess them but are striving at all costs to gain direct or at least indirect access to them, either by establishing their own national control over nuclear weapons or by participating within the framework of military alliances in the possession, disposition and control of them.

If you believe that a multilateral nuclear force is not contrary to the basic provisions of such an agreement, let us conclude such an agreement straight away, even in spite of the fact that you are thinking of doing something or other over there. Let us conclude an agreement on this basis. We still have not had a reply to the question: are the Western Powers prepared to negotiate on this basis? I think that we shall be able to get this reply perhaps a little later, after the delegations have acquainted themselves more thoroughly with the text of our statement this morning and are in a position to express a definite opinion on this score.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Now for my third comment. The United Kingdom representative mentioned today that the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Erhard, and the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. von Hassel, had made a number of statements concerning their renunciation of the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons. The representative of Czechoslovakia has today spoken in some detail about the value of such statements, and the facts which he cited are, in our opinion, sufficiently convincing. But if you really believe those statements of Mr. Erhard and Mr. von Hassel that the Federal Republic of Germany has renounced the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons, then why do you talk about such a dilemma: either we create a multilateral nuclear force or Western Germany will have its own nuclear weapons. There would seem to be no such dilemma, if you are convinced that what Mr. Erhard and Mr. von Hassel say is what they really think and what actually constitutes the essence of their policy.

Then why do you put the question in that way? If a multilateral force is not created -- and Mr. Foster spoke about this today -- there would be, so to speak, a danger that Western Germany would seek in some way or other to manufacture its own nuclear weapons. Why, then, do you put the question in that way? If the statements of Mr. Erhard and Mr. von Hassel are to be trusted, no such question can arise. But for some reason or other it does arise with you. Why does it arise with you? Obviously I am not in a position to judge what goes into your own evaluation, but one gets the impression that the reason is that you yourselves do not put very much faith in what your allies tell you. That, of course, is your affair; but we have to base ourselves on the actual facts. The actual facts, which have been cited today by the Soviet delegation, have not yet been refuted by anyone, and I think that those facts compel us to be more cautious in settling this important, very important question in our work.

Those are the comments I wished to make in connexion with the statements made by certain representatives here in the Committee. I should like to express the hope that the consideration of this matter, which can hardly be regarded as having been completed today and calls for further examination, will nevertheless be carried on

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

to the practical stage where we shall be in a position to proceed to the consideration and discussion of a draft agreement on the effective non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. It seems to us that, if the Western representatives really wish to achieve such an agreement, they can do this by taking part in the discussion of such an agreement, the basis of which we have set forth in our statement today. In any case, the statements made today by the representatives of the Western Powers, in particular by the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of the United States, show that they, unfortunately, have not given satisfactory answers to the questions which we put to them.

I must say that the questions which have been put by us, and which have been supported by the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia, demand an answer. This is not our own individual demand but the demand of world public opinion and of the governments of the vast majority of countries. These questions must be given answers. If the answers are satisfactory, there will be opened up a prospect of concluding an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which would close all the channels and possibilities for such a dissemination.

I make an appeal that we should continue our work in this direction and get down to the task of preparing such an agreement, the significance of which -- as many speakers today have rightly pointed out -- goes far beyond the framework of our work here. Such an agreement would undoubtedly have great international significance.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I so seldom, if I may say so, ask to be allowed to exercise the right of reply that perhaps the Committee will allow me to make two very brief comments.

First of all, from what he has just said, I think our Soviet colleague has forgotten that at the outset of my speech I was able, and very glad to be able, to applaud his declared intention and the declared intention of his Government to proceed as early as possible with the conclusion of an agreement to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is true that later I felt some regret at the fact that -- to use an English phrase -- Mr. Zorin drew a very large red herring

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

across the path when he indicated the reasons why, unfortunately, he felt that he must qualify that declaration by saying that he was unable to proceed to such a step at present.

My second point is that I would simply ask Mr. Zorin if he would feel disposed to study carefully the record of the debate in the House of Commons on 16 June last, to which I made some brief allusion and in which he will find set out, more fully than I was able to in the time at my disposal, the reasons why leading members of the United Kingdom Government continue to believe in the overriding importance of the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665(XVI)) and in the fact that the plans for a NATO multilateral force are in no way in conflict with that resolution.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): One brief word in my capacity as Italian representative. I did not speak this morning on the substance of the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, because the Italian delegation has already spoken several times on this subject at previous meetings, so that all delegations cannot help being familiar with our views. For its part, Italy states yet again its firm intention of reaching as soon as possible a non-dissemination agreement in accordance with the terms of the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665(XVI)).

The Soviet delegation gave us this morning its own interpretation of the Irish resolution. For our part, we consider that the possible creation of a multilateral force would be perfectly in accordance with the terms of the Irish resolution. I would even go further and say that the multilateral force currently being studied will have to be in accordance with the Irish resolution. Italy voted for the latter with the sincere and firm intention of abiding by it. We should like this resolution to be transformed into a firm and formal undertaking as soon as possible. We regret that this agreement is still being delayed by the Eastern delegations through irrelevant arguments tending to distort the facts, and through the hasty expression of final opinions on matters still under study.

(The Chairman, Italy)

Like Sir Paul Mason and Mr. Foster this morning, I cannot pass over in silence certain judgments pronounced yet again by the Eastern delegations this morning about one of our allies. I should like to point out that the Federal Republic of Germany is closely linked with us and with other Western allies in an integrated defensive pact, and that it also collaborates with Italy and with other Western European countries in promoting peace, raising the social and economic levels of the peoples of the world, and granting assistance to all peoples.

Hence to accuse the Federal Republic of Germany of harbouring different and dangerous aims is indirectly to cast doubts on the sincerity of all the other Western countries associated with it. These associations together constitute the best guarantee and the best proof of the peaceful intentions of the West. They entail a collective responsibility which, as facts have proved, has one sole object: the maintenance of peace and the creation of a better world for all men.

Before reading the communiqué, I should like to read out the following message from our United States co-Chairman:

(continued in English)

"In accordance with the procedure of work announced at the 191st meeting, the United States wishes to suggest for discussion by the Conference on 9 July the verified freeze of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles as proposed by President Johnson in his message (ENDC/120) to this Conference of 21 January 1964."

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 195th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Francesco Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the United States and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 7 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.