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> Identical letters dated 12 April 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to forward herewith a letter dated 12 April 1999 from A. Abdullah, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan addressed to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 45, and of the Security Council.

(<u>Signed</u>) A. G. Ravan FARHADI Ambassador Permanent Representative

## Annex

## Letter dated 12 April 1999 from the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

Only weeks after the "Statement by the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan on behalf of the Afghan sides to the Ashgabat Peace Talks" and the "mutually agreed" points on the formation of "a shared Executive, a shared Legislature and a shared Judiciary", at the end of the three-day intra-Afghan dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations in Ashgabat on 14 March 1999, and while much optimism and efforts were under way to secure a date and venue for the second round of the peace talks between the parties - to which both sides gave their solemn consent - the Taliban have been intensely engaged in preparing for massive military operations to be launched soon against positions held by armed forces of the Islamic State of Afghanistan throughout the country.

Incontrovertible evidence collected by the intelligence services of the Islamic State of Afghanistan indicates that the Government of Pakistan, for nearly three weeks now, has been supplying large consignments of light and heavy armaments and ammunition shipments to the Taliban. Regular convoys - consisting of precisely 11 truckloads - continue to pour from Peshawar, Pakistan, to the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad, three days a week. Similarly, a steady flow of arms from the city of Quetta, Baluchistan, to the southern Afghan city of Kandahar, the headquarters of the Taliban "Supreme Leader", is being simultaneously maintained.

Crucially important among all, however, was the dispatch on 23 March 1999 by the Pakistani Government of a Pakistani regiment of paramilitary force to Afghanistan, which is at present stationed in the Rishkhor Garrison in the western suburbs of the capital, Kabul, poised to be deployed in the Taliban pre-planned incursions. Nonetheless, the frequency and consequently the quantity of the arms shipped from Pakistan reached its highest peak in the first week of the arms shipping operation, dating back to 21 March 1999, during the course of which the international news media widely reported a temporary sealing-off by the Pakistani Government of the Torkham border checkpoint, and a shortage of commodities such as wheat flour in the capital, Kabul, caused by it, evidently in an attempt to cover up the round-the-clock shipping operation carried out by the Pakistani army.

It is important to note that following the Ashgabat peace "Statement", the Taliban, in total contradiction to the terms stipulated in the "mutually agreed" text, despite the fact that the "Statement" made no reference to the official names of the negotiating parties, made scores of declarations full of premeditated evasions and in fact connoting their intention to pursue war, which finally surfaced in a statement by the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar on 10 April 1999, ruling out any further talks with the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

Thus stated, it was no surprise when Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz on 2 April 1999 renewed calls by his Government on the United Nations to impose an arms embargo on Afghanistan, a move which was calculatedly orchestrated by Pakistan to render itself rather innocent, while leaving the Taliban already armed to the teeth.

The information given above, in addition to recent deployment and shipments of widespread logistics and personnel by the Taliban, north of Kabul and in the provinces of Kunduz, Ghor and Faryab, plus many more corroborating factors - all herald heavy fighting soon to be sparked by the Taliban, already facing mounting civilian resistance, directly assisted and engineered by the Government of Pakistan, which inevitably would be a severe blow to the United Nations peace process in Afghanistan at large, and an acute setback to the Ashgabat peace accord in particular.

Mindful of the above, it must be put on record that the armed forces of the Islamic State of Afghanistan will remain vigilant and watchful with respect to these subversive activities of both Pakistan and the Taliban and will forcefully foil any attempt by warmongers aimed at subjugating Afghanistan.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, long seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict in the country, wishes to reiterate its sincere commitment to the "agreement" of "a shared Executive, a shared Legislature and a shared Judiciary" with the Taliban concluded in Ashgabat and its unwavering support to the United Nations peace process in Afghanistan, and earnestly requests appropriate measures to ensure the halt of the ceaseless Pakistani interventions in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, the resumption of renewed fighting by the Taliban war machine leading to further genocide in the country and the exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis followed by military onslaughts.

> (<u>Signed</u>) A. ABDULLAH Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Islamic State of Afghanistan

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