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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 30th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BAGBENI ADELTO NZENGEYA (Zaire)

CONTENTS

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE, AS NECESSARY (continued)

Statements were made by:

Mr. Bayart (Mongolia)

Mr. Roche (Canada)

Mr. Adan (Somalia)

Mr. Meiszter (Hungary)

Mr. Rakotondramboa (Madagascar)

Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen (Denmark)

Mr. Ouedraogo (Burkina Paso)

Mr. Azikiwe (Nigeria)

Mr. Cappagli (Argentina)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF GENERAL DEBATE, AS NECESSARY

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (interpretation from French): I wish briefly to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.46 on agenda item 66 (i), "Disarmament Week". The draft resolution is sponsored by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam and my own country, Mongolia.

Everyone is familiar with the question of observing a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament; its growing importance has been recognized by the United Nations. The report of the Secretary-General (A/42/469) and the statements made at the First Committee's recent special meeting in observance of Disarmament Week by the President of the General Assembly, by the Secretary-General and by representatives of the various regional groups demonstrated once again that States Members of the United Nations continue to view Disarmament week as an excellent opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to strengthening peace and security, to general and complete disarmament and to making world public opinion more aware of this cause.

The draft resolution essentially reproduces texts of previous years, including the one adopted by the General Assembly without a vote at its thirty-seventh session.

In its preambular part, draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.46 stresses the vital importance of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, eliminating nuclear weapons and other types of

(E Sayart, Mongolia)

weapons of mass destruction and continuing to mobilize world public opinion in support of those objectives. In its operative part, the draft resolution invites all States, relevant specialized and other agencies and international non-governmental organizations to continue to observe Disarmament week, intensify their activities to promote disarmament, and inform the Secretary-General of those activities.

Lastly, the draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a report on the implementation of the provisions of the draft resolution.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Whole-heartedly supporting the general desire for the adoption of the draft resolution by consensus, in a spirit of compromise and co-operation and in the light of the positions of a number of delegations, the sponsors of the draft resolution have made serious efforts to present a new draft by deleting and modifying in substance certain passages of the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session. These modifications relate specifically to the first, second and ninth paragraphs of the preamble to last year's resolution, 41/86 D, while the sixth paragraph is deleted.

As to the operative part, paragraphs 3 and 4 are deleted and paragraph 6 is changed so that the reference to the International Atomic Energy Agency no longer appears.

If we compare the text of resolution 41/86 D, adopted last year, with that of this draft resolution it is easy to see the difference and the considerable softening of the text that has taken place. We have made all these changes in the hope that these will make it possible for those that in recent years have had some difficulty in supporting the resolution on the Disarmament Week to show a spirit of compromise and co-operation, and to support this new draft resolution.

Of course, we hope that all the other members of the Committee will, as they have in the past, give their valuable support to this draft resolution.

Mr. ROCHE (Canada): The prospect of significant reductions in nuclear arms has captured the imagination of the whole world. And the improved atmosphere in East-West relations has already made itself felt in the work of the First Committee this year. A major contribution to this new momentum has been the increased recognition of the importance of verification. In fact, as the United Nations Disarmament Commission declared by consensus at the conclusion of the 1987 ression, verification is a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and

implementation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Canada is convinced that only through a co-operative, realistic and pragmatic approach to verification issues will significant progress be achieved in the arms-control process.

This development is especially appreciated in Canada, for our country has worked very hard for several years to deepen understanding of the techniques and international recognition of verification. It is in that spirit that . introduce draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.44, entitled "Verification in all its aspects", which seeks to continue the progress made at the last session of the Disarmament Commission.

This draft resolution is introduced on behalf of Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and, of course, Canada.

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.44 is essentially of a procedural nature and builds on the two previous resolutions, 40/152 O, and 41/86 Q, each of which was adopted by consensus. The draft to be considered by the Committee this year retains the consensus language and notes with satisfaction the work accomplished by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1987 session. Its operative paragraphs are seven in number and I should like to highlight their main features.

Operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are retained from resolution 41/86 Q and call upon Member States to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on arms limitation and disarmament measures which are balanced, mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective.

In operative paragraph 2 time General Assembly encourages States which have not done so to send to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on verification.

In operative paragraph 3 individual Member States and groups of Member States which possess verification expertise are urged to consider means by which they can contribute to adequate and effective verification measures in arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

In operative paragraph 4 the United Nations Disarmament Commission is requested to conclude its consideration of verification in all its aspects at its next substantive session, in 1988, and to report on its deliberations, conclusions and recommendations to the third special session devoted to disarmament and to the General Assembly at its forty-third session. To aid the Disarmament Commission to conclude its work, the Secretary-General is requested, in operative paragraph 5, to prepare for the Disarmament Commission's 1988 session a compilation of the views received from Member States on this issue.

Further, the Secretary-General is asked to bring this draft resolution to the attention of the third special session on disarmament.

My delegation believes that draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.44, building as it does on the two previous resolutions that were adopted by consensus, lays a firm base on which the United Nations, individual Member States, and groups of Member States can build.

Verification is not the only issue which arises in arms-control negotiations.

Other significant questions, including confidence-building and openness, must also be addressed. However, it is recognized that verification is one of the most critical and difficult components of the arms control and disarmament process.

Without a satisfactory meeting of minds on verification, the conclusion of an agreement is highly unlikely. Put another way, agreement on adequate and effective

verification is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for successful treaty-making.

It is increasingly evident and widely recognized that verification is an essential component of the arms-control and disarmament process. The historic agreement in principle by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics envisages a treaty to eliminate intermediate-range missiles that is expected to incorporate very extensive and intensive verification methods involving, among other things, on-site inspection. Both parties have concluded that such measures are necessary and appropriate to verify adequately the undertakings in their agreement. The verification provisions of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement, once finalized, are likely to constitute an important guide for future agreements in other arms-control contexts.

In the multilateral field, there has been substantial forward movement at the Conference on Disarmament towards a convention to ban chemical weapons. These negotiations, involving as they do one of the most comprehensive verification schemes ever envisaged, have reached the point where it is now possible to foresee the conclusion of an agreement on chemical weapons within the next few years.

Also in the multilateral field, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the USSR have now conducted inspections pursuant to the provisions of the Stockholm document of September 1986. These inspections have perhaps not received as much international public attention as their vanguard importance warrants. It is to be hoped that they presage a new ethos with regard to on-site inspections and that we may look forward to a time when such inspections are seen as part of a commonplace and normal process for demonstrating ongoing compliance with agreements and as in no way extraordinary.

In a further development in the multilateral field, the United Nations
Disarmament Commission's 1987 session, pursuant to resolution 41/86 Q, considered
the subject of verification in all its aspects. The deliherations of the
verification working group of the Disarmament Commission proved useful and
productive. Elaborating upon the basic principles outlined in the Final Document
of the first special session devoted to disarmament, the report of the working
group developed the following illustrative, although non-exhaustive, list of 10
principles on verification:

- "(1) Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements.
- "(2) Verification is not an aim in itself but an essential element in the process of achieving arms-limitation and disarmament agreements.

- "(3) Verification should promote the implementation of arms-limitation and disarmament measures, build confidence among States and ensure that agreements are being observed by all parties.
- *(4) Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and international procedures, including on site inspections.
- *(5) Verification in the arms-limitation and disarmament process will benefit from greater openness.
- *(6) Arms-limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to interfere with the agreed methods, procedures and techniques of verification, when these are operating in a manner consistent with the provisions of the agreement and generally recognised principles of international law.
- *(7) Arms-limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the agreement.
- *(8) To assess the continuing adequacy and effectiveness of the verification system, an arms-limitation and disarmament agreement should provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames for such reviews should be agreed in order to facilitate this assessment.
- "(9) Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage of negotiations on specific arms-limitation and disarmament agreements.

"(10) All States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties."

(A/42/42, para. 46)

Those are the 10 principles to which the Disarmament Commission agreed.

The report of the Disarmament Commission also reflected agreement in principle that a compilation of possible methods, procedures and techniques could be useful in facilitating future considerations of verification. In addition, the working group agreed that the United Nations has an important role to play in the context of the verification of compliance with arms-control and disarmament agreements. This role should include drawing upon the experience of the United Nations in providing assistance, advice and technical expertise to negotiators of arms-control agreements. The working group also agreed that the United Nations should examine the possibility of compacting and managing a verification data base. In this connection, Canada is pleased to have joined with Bulgaria and Sweden in sponsoring the Finnish draft decision contained in document A/C.1/42/L.36, which

"requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Commission at that session a preliminary report on existing capabilities and facilities within the United Na one Secretariat relevant to the establishment of a computerized data base for purposes of verification of compliance with international arms-limitation and disarmament agreements, thus enhancing the role of the United Nations in this field".

Canada welcomes the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on the subject of verification and commends the Commission for its efforts. We endorse the recommendation in its report that the Disarmament Commission should continue to consider verification "as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament" (A/42/42, para. 46). Pursuant to the request of the General Assembly contained in resolution 41/86 Q, the

Disarmament Commission has made a constructive and businesslike start to the process of elaborating concrete recommendations and proposals regarding verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms-limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification. The draft resolution that I am submitting today incorporates the Disarmament Commission's recommendation.

The third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled to be held in 1988, will give broader and more in-depth consideration to disarmament questions than has been given in the past six years. It is Canada's view that verification, which has been identified by the Disarmament Commission as an essential element of all arms-limitation and disarmament agreements, should form part of the discussions of the third special session. The draft resolution submitted today recognizes this necessity.

As events seem to move favourably towards the conclusion of important arms-control agreements, the discussion of verification in all its aspects and the role of the United Nations therein becomes more and more critical for success in negotiations. With this consideration in mind, and on behalf of its sponsors, I urge the adoption by consensus of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/42/L.44.

Mr. ADAN (socialis): Sir, as this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor in this Committee, I wish first to congratulate you on assuming the responsible duties of Chairman. I am confident that under your able guidance the Committee will complete its work successfully. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to assure you of my country's complete support. My congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee.

(Mr. Adan, Somalia)

In supporting the statement made yesterday by the Ambassador of Gri Lanka on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, I should like to add the following brief comments, which are relevant to the need for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

(Mr. Adan, Somalia)

My Government continues to support the concept of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones as a significant factor in the promotion of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In this regard, Somalia, an Indian Goesh State, has always falieved that the goals of the General Assembly's Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace are admirable and could only be beneficial to the region and to the world.

Along with the other States of the Indian Ocean we have called for the convening of a Conference on the Indian Ocean as a necessary step towards achieving the goals of the Declaration. We therefore deeply regret the repeated postponements and the lack of political will which impede the convening of the Conference.

The Declaration specifically addresses major political problems of the region of the Indian Ocean; for example, the steady deterioration of the security of this formerly peaceful region could become a dangerous source of international tension, unless the escalation of great-Power presence, in the context of their global rivalry, can be ended and turned around.

Another dangerous situation which demands international attention and action is the development by South Africa of a nuclear-weapon capability, which could be used to blackmail African States over the question of South Africa's racist and hegemonic policies. South Africa's nuclear-weapon programme runs counter to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and to the hopes of African States for a continent free from nuclear weapons.

In addressing the need for increasing regional co-operation in political as well as in other fields, the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace also challenges the States of the region to settle any disputes peacefully and to contribute to the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean area either through the

(Mr. Adan, Somalia)

reduction of their own military forces or through their opposition to the placement of foreign forces on their territories.

In the Horn of Africa, a process of peaceful negotiation has been initiated - a process to which Somalia is fully committed and one which we hope will eventually contribute to the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean region.

Somalia fully supports the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean that the General Assembly should renew the Committee's mandate. Without question, the Committee should continue its efforts, in 1988, to complete the preparatory work for the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo. In agreeing that 1990 should be the latest date for the Conference, my delegation hopes that it will be possible to complete the harmonization of views on procedure and other questions well before that date. We reiterate our position that it is not necestary for all substantive questions to be resolved before the Conference is convened.

The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the great Powers and other maritime users of the Indian Ocean all have specific responsibilities with regard to the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The major responsibility, however, lies with the great Powers. Somalia hopes that they will lend their full co-operation and support to renewed efforts in 1988 for the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo at the earliest possible date.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Today I should like to set out the position of my delegation on the issue of a comprehensive test ban. This question has always been, and remains, one of the highest priority for my delegation. We have always regarded the comprehensive cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as the central issue of progressing towards nuclear disarmament. In our view, the aim of an eventual comprehensive test-ban treaty should be to prohibit all test explosions by all

States in all environments forever, and to work out measures to prevent the circumvention of such a ban under the pretext of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The reasons why we unceasingly persevere in fighting for the attainment of this goal are well known. Nuclear testing is the engine of the arms race in the so-called convention in nuclear field and in the development of new categories of exotic types of representation weapons. Nuclear testing is a must for the extension of the arms race to new spheres not so far covered, including outer space. With the continuation of nuclear testing, any effort in the field of nuclear disarmament may easily prove a futile exercise. It is therefore our firm conviction that there is no issue more urgent or more crucial today than that of putting an end to all nuclear tests.

This position was fully confirmed in the communiqué issued by the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States, during their meeting held at Prague on 28 and 29 October 1987, as well as in the special document of the same session entitled "Towards increasing the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva".

At the same time, we are fully aware that working out a comprehensive test-ban treaty is not a matter of months. We can take the example of the prohibition of chemical weapons with its history of decades of negotiations. Even it we admit that the comprehensive test ban is a far less complicated issue than the chemical weapons ban, the forging of a treaty will surely take quite some time. Awareness of this fact leads us to consider two aspects: first, work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty must be started immediately, without wasting any more precious time; and, secondly, partial steps towards a full-scale comprehensive test ban, such as reductions in the number and yield of nuclear explosions, might be deemed reasonable and timely. They might facilitate reaching the above goal, provided

such measures are not meant as a substitute. While we may agree that working out such practical steps is better suited to the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America that will start before December, we are concerned at pronouncements by one of the two parties, which appeared in the October issue of <u>Disarmament Times</u>, to the effect that the party in question does not at this time see any multilateral role in negotiating a comprehensive test ban. We respectfully disagree with such an opinion since we are convinced that the search for an agreement at the bilateral level, particularly as only a partial agreement is in view at the bilateral talks, and the elaboration of a comprehensive treaty at the Conference on Disarmament, may and should be undertaken concurrently.

My delegation is aware of the conflicting views regarding the substance and the appropriate procedure. Nevertheless, I cannot agree that such differences are cause for delaying the start of work. Accordingly, we feel that the General Assembly should recommend to the Conference on Disarmament the setting up of an ad hoc committee for that purpose at the very beginning of its session in 1988. Last autumn a group of socialist States, members of the Conference on Disarmament, offered a draft, which contains all the major elements of such a treaty and could, in our opinion, provide a basis for sensible work. We are ready to discuss those elements and any others proposed by any delegation. Furthermore, we could envision certain specialized working groups of scientific experts starting parallel practical work to formulate and submit to the Conference on Disarmament agreed recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of verification, including an international network for monitoring and verifying compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty, agreed proposals concerning the establishment of an international network for monitoring atmospheric radioactivity with the use of space communication links; and further proposals to advance the work on the establishment of a global seismic monitoring network.

I have set forth the position of my delegation concerning the comprehensive test han in a rather elaborate way. I have done so deliberately for two reasons: first, to put our views clearly on record and, secondly, to clear up any misunderstanding in connection with one of our moves.

As is known my delegation has for years submitted a separate draft resolution on this agenda item; it did so also on behalf of several other countries as well. It has not done so this year. I think the foregoing makes it also to all that our move does not imply that the issue is no longer of importance to us. On the contrary, I wish to stress once again that we continue to regard it as one of high priority. What has led us to stop short of taking that step?

We have followed with the greatest attention the debates in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in those of the First Committee, as well as the situation that has emerged inside and outside the United Nations with regard to disarmament. We have found that under the impact of well-known external developments there have evolved a favourable climate and circumstances which at last seem to afford the possibility for substantive progress towards effective multilateral disarmament and thereby for significantly enhancing the role of the United Nations in disarmament. The latter presupposes a more effective functioning of the entire United Nations disarmament mechanism. At the same time, we can also see that the proliferation of resolutions is continuing although almost all delegations come out for halting that process. Indeed, the proliferation of resolutions could be regarded as an inverse index of the effectiveness of the United Nations. Moreover, the rising number of resolutions tends to undermine the seriousness of the United Nations in the eyes of the world public, let alone the fact that world public opinion - being unable to follow with attention the subsequent course of the vast number of resolutions, their implemencation or the

almost ritual annual review of the status of their implementation - is likely to get "tired" of them all sooner or later.

The Hungarian delegation and the other sponsors of the earlier separate draft resolution on a comprehensive test ban, proceeding from the aforesaid considerations, are of the view that the moment is propitious for taking a step, one which, it is hoped, will be followed by our partners, and have decided not to submit this year a draft resolution of their own on this issue. We do not conceal our aim to see that our partners follow suit, thus ensuring that on this question of high priority world public opinion will be informed by a single United Nations resolution on the steps Member States of the world Organization plan to take in this field and that nothing will disturb world public opinion from concentrating attention on its implementation. We think that this would be a significant step in the direction of both solving the issue and enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations. How seriously we take the latter aspect is clearly shown by the fact that we have decided to take this step not on a fifth-rate issue: we have refrained from submitting, not a wobbling draft resolution, as it were, but one that has for years been carried successfully by the positive votes of the overwhelming majority of Member States.

We are convinced that our step is in full conformity with the letter and spirit of the Final Document adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly - the first special session devoted to disarmament - especially its paragraph 115 which urges Member States to make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures and to facilitate consistent implementation of United Nations resolutions. We have made the first step. The next steps are waiting to be taken by our partners. We hope that they have the political will and courage to do so.

Mr. RAKOTONDRAMBOA (Madagascar) (interpretation from French): My delegation has asked to speak today on behalf of the Group of African States in order to introduce two draft resolutions on agenda items 63 (c) and 58, respectively entitled "Review and implementation of the concluding document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa" and "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

The first draft resolution I have the honour of submitting to the First Committee for its consideration is contained in document A/C.1/42/L.62, dealing with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

Displaying an obvious dynamism ever since its first year of existence, the Centre has undertaken in particular to disseminate information and promote participation in conferences and seminars devoted to questions relating to peace, security, disarmament and development. It has in particular continued to expand contacts in Africa with various institutions and organizations, as well as with the reneral public.

The Heads of State or Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) especially appreciated the Centre's invaluable co-operation in finalizing the Lomé Declaration on security, disarmament and development in Africa and the Programme of Action for peace, security and co-operation in Africa and thus expressed their gratitude in resolution AHG/Res.164 (XXIII), adopted at their twenty-third regular session, held in Addis Ababa from 27 to 29 July 1987. At the same time, the African leaders requested all member States of the OAU to devote special attention to the question of disarmament and ensure that it be better known by the general public through school and educational programmes conducted under the World Disarmament Campaign.

(Mr. Rakotondramboa, Madagascar)

In addition, the draft resolution before the Committee contains the same elements contained in last year's resolution, and we hope that the First Committee will adopt it without a vote.

The second draft resolution I have the honour of introducing on behalf of the Group of African States refers to agenda item 58 entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" and is contained in document A/C.1/42/L.63.

Part A of this draft resolution, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration", contains seven preambular paragraphs and 10 operative paragraphs. The preamble recalls, in particular, resolution CM/Res.1101 (XLVI) on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-sixth regular session, held in Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 July 1987. While the preamble notes a certain degree of progress in the work of the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session in 1987, the seventh preambular paragraph expresses regret at the continued failure to achieve consensus in the formulation of an overall text of conclusions and recommendations on South Africa's nuclear capability.

(Mr. Rakotondramboa, Madagascar

The operative section of part A of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.63 contains the same elements that appeared in the resolution adopted at the forty-first session of the General Assembly on the same item. In operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly would call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and in operative paragraph 7 it would appeal to all States that have the means to do so to monitor South Africa's research and development, and production of nuclear weapons, and to publicize any information in that regard.

Part B of draft resolution L.63, entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa"; has 15 preambular paragraphs and 13 operative paragraphs. The efforts of the Heads of State or Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to preserve the status of their continent as a denuclearized zone are being seriously threatened by the military nuclear programme of the Pretoria régime. The acquisition of a nuclear-weapons capability by the <u>apartheid</u> régime constitutes a very serious threat, not only for all African States but for international peace and security as well.

In the seventh preambular paragraph the Assembly would note with regret the non-implementation by <u>apartheid</u> South Africa of resolution GC(XXX)RES/468 adopted on 3 October 1986 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during its thirtieth regular session. We should emphasize here that on 12 June 1987 the Governing Council of IAEA took note with regret and disappointment of South Africa's obstinate refusal to abide by the resolutions of the General Conference. This is referred to in document A/42/649, annex II.

In the eleventh and twelfth preambular paragraphs of part of the General

Assembly would express its grave concern that South Africa has continued its acts
of aggression and subversion against the peoples of the independent States of

(Mr. Rakotondramboa, Madagascar)

southern Africa and would condemn the continued military occupation by South African troops of parts of the territory of Angola.

In that connection the Group of African States wishes to draw the attention of the international community to a study soon to be published by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) on confidence-building measures in Africa, which concludes as follows:

"Any scheme of confidence-building measures in Africa at this stage does not include South Africa because, in the view of the .searchers, the policy of <u>apartheid</u>, colonialism and illegal occupation negates the principles upon which confidence and co-operation among States should be based."

(A/42/607, para. 15)

Proceeding from the consideration that peace and security must be preserved in Africa with a view to making the continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the Assembly would, in operative paragraph 4, reaffirm that the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In operative paragraph 8 the Assembly would call upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all forms of military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime.

In operative paragraph 11, the General Assembly would commend the adoption by the Security Council in 1984 and 1986 of resolutions 558 (1984) and 591 (1986), with a view to blooking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field.

(Mr. Rakotondramboa, Madagascar)

In operative paragraph 1.2 the Assembly would demand once again that South

Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection

by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Group of African States, in preparing draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.63, has taken great care to take into account all the new elements that have emerged since the last session of the General Assembly. In our view, the result is a well-balanced text that reflects as objectively as possible our concerns on a question of crucial importance. We would express the wish that the international community will give favourable consideration to our hopes by adopting draft resolution A/C.1/42/...63 by a very large majority.

Mr. KORSGAARD-PEDERSEN (Denmark): On behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community I would like to speak on agenda item 64 concerning the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Twelve welcome the decision by the General Assembly to convene a third special session devoted to disarmament, and we support draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.68 submitted on that subject. We have participated actively in the work of the Preparatory Committee and look forward to the coming special session as a significant opportunity for balanced and constructive deliberation with a view to widening the understanding among Member States on all the main questions related to the disarmament process.

The third special session will take place within the framework of a constructive international dialogue and at a time when the intensive bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have given rise to expectations that real progress may be achieved in the reduction of nuclear arsenals. The third special session will be an opportunity for the General Assembly to evaluate, on behalf of the world community, the state of affairs in the

(Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

current arms-control and disarmament negotiations and to contribute in a constructive and positive manner to that process. Multilateral negotiations and deliberations are supplementary and complementary to the bilateral process. We hope that the special session will confirm the que and central role of the United Nations as a forum for debate, reflecting world opinion and stimulating new ideas related to disarmament.

We should be conscious that though the prospect of a real breakthrough in arms-control and disarmament negotiations seems within near reach, this will cover only part of the large spectrum of disarmament topics on the international agenda. The third special session will need careful and thorough preparations. The task before us is by no means an easy one. It will demand a realistic approach as well as flexibility and commitment to ensure the overall success of the session.

The Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament represents the most comprehensive document on disarmament ever adopted by consensus by the international community. The General Assembly at its third special session should reaffirm the validity of this document. Its recommendations and decisions should provide an important basis for the work of the special session.

While it would be natural to have a review of the implementation of the results of the previous special sessions, as well as an assessment of recent developments, the principal part of the considerations at the third special session should, in our view, be to explore ways and means of widening the area of consensus with the aim of drawing up a list of practical and realistic measures and actions designed to contribute to disarmament. The areas to which a special session on disarmament might devote its attention are many. The Twelve believe, however, that the best result will be achieved if consideration is concentrated upon carefully selected subjects. Our firm hope is that the deliberations at the third special session will be realistic and aim at adopting a final document to which all delegations can fully subscribe.

It will be of importance for the success of the third special session that the discussion should be guided by a forward-looking, result-oriented approach.

The Twelve will contribute in a positive and constructive manner to a successful outcome of the special session, which will be a significant contribution to the disarmament debate.

Mr. OUEDRAOGO (Burkina Faso) (interpretation from French): Burkina Faso and, indeed, the vast majority of the Members of the United Nations family have naturally welcomed the recent developments in the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the adoption of concerted and balanced disarmament measures. The imminent signing of the agreement at which the two

relations, which essentially determine the state of politics in the world. The hope of the world with respect to the achievement in the near fulure of new and substantial progress in the field of arms control and disarmament is based on the continuity of the dialogue between the two super-Powers, which now has undoubtedly proved its serious nature. World public opinion now interprets the announcement of the agreement aimed at eliminating medium— and shorter-range missiles from Europe as a major innovation reflecting a new dynamic of strengthened peace and security.

In saying this, my delegation is nevertheless quite keenly aware of the size of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons that will remain in the arsenals of the two countries even after the signing and implementing of the arms-reduction agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those stockpiles are now at an inordinately high level, a level well beyond their reasonable needs for defence and security, with their respective capacity for mutual destruction.

We should like to hope, however, on the basis of the good will manifested by the two great Powers in the field of strategic weapons, chemical weapons and nuclear tests, that the decision to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces will not be an isolated event but is rather a reflection of a true change in their attitude and approach towards questions of disarmament and, more generally, towards military affairs.

United States-Soviet talks will go beyond good intentions and declarations of principle and focus more firmly on working towards tangible disarmament agreements, with priority naturally being given to nuclear disarmament. The important thing, therefore, is to continue with determination towards the objective of a 50 per cent reduction in strategic missiles, as was agreed last year between the Soviet Union and the United States.

However, the other nuclear Powers, and, indeed, the international community as a whole, should be associated with the pursuit of a more ambitious objective that could take the form of a multilateral treaty on general disarmament, embracing chemical and bacteriological weapons and making effective provision for mandatory verification.

With respect to this last category of weapons, which are weapons of mass destruction, my delegation notes with genuine concern the reports of their continuing use in various international conflicts, particularly in the Iran-Iraq war. We therefore appeal to all States concerned to halt the manufacture, stockpiling and use of such weapons. We hope that we are right in interpreting as an encouraging sign the good will manifested, in this area as well as in others, by the two great Powers with regard to the mutually verified destruction of existing stockpiles of armaments.

Over and above weapons of mass destruction, however, disarmament, which must be general and complete, cannot fail to take account of the problem of the continuing increase of the stockpiles of conventional armaments, which, as I need hardly point out, have been a i remain the most deadly in the conflicts which ravage our planet. While all nations, great and small, without exception, are directly concerned with this type of weapon, the fact remains that Europe is the continent that possesse the largest stockpiles of these weapons. It is natural, therefore, since Europe bears primary responsibility in this area, that we should expect exemplary conduct and initiatives from Europe. The Disarmament Conference, as the universal negotiating body for disarmament, will also have a major role to play. States with different economic and social systems, belonging to all the regions of the world, meet there and pool a wealth of ideas, knowledge and unique experience which is only waiting to be tapped.

Unfortunately, the record of disarmament efforts within the framework of multilateral institutions is, frankly, disappointing.

No doubt our Committee, and the General Assembly's special sessions devoted to disarmament - the third of which will be held next year - do constitute frameworks for multilateral consultation and co-operation and universal forums for expressing mankind's concern for peace and security. The fact remains that the resolutions and final acts which emerge from these sessions seem essentially to be regarded as begging the question rather than as leading to any serious consequences. On the other hand, it is remarkable that in the field of disarmament the only truly significant results have been achieved within the framework of bilateral talks, or at least talks involving only a limited number of participants, which exclude the vast majority of States.

July 1988 will mark the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which remains one of the most important arms-control instruments, although many of its objectives remain to be attained. For their part, the vast majority of African States have adhered to the NPT and have thus ratified the Declaration whereby they collectively decided in 1964 to make their continent a nuclear-weapons-free zone.

Unfortunately, that collective renunciation of any nuclear role is being challenged today because of the cunning efforts of the racist South African régime to master the technique of nuclear fission, for the sole purposes of destabilization and the waging of war.

The certainty that has now been established regarding South Africa's nuclear capacity has of course caused very strong feelings and legitimate concern in African public opinion. Apart from the fact that it represents an additional threat to international peace and security, South Africa's nuclear capacity is a dangerous lever of blackmail in the hands of a totally lawiess and pariah régime, which continues to flout fundamental human rights and persists in its illegal occupation and systematic plundering of Namibia's resources, and whose acts of provocation, aggression and destabilization against its neighbours are proliferating.

Africa expects the international community, particularly our world Organization, including its Security Council, to take the measures necessary to guarantee respect for the Declaration on the denuclearization of the African continent.

The pursuance of the arms race and the continued striving for military superiority are another ground for disquiet. My delegation is indeed concerned by the systematic, unbridged, unjustifiable quest for ever-more-sophisticated

armaments, the accumulation of which is obviously an extra factor in insecurity and instability. The military research and development sustained essentially in the nuclear domain by the results of the test explosions engaged in by all sides, without regard to the ecological consequences, represents in terms of human and financial resources fabulous extravagance that is in striking contrast to the paucity of the resources mobilized for development. That fact, illuminated in the Final Act of the recent United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, poses a true moral problem for mankind. The sums now being allocated by the international community for military uses, to defend security interests, are deemed to be 20 times larger than the total amount invested in public aid for development; they represent about 6 per cent of the gross domestic product of nations.

Such a use of talent and resources at a time when poverty, disease, hunger and illiteracy - all of them a disgrace to mankind - are endemic demonstrates the low level of international solidarity. What is worse, it teaches us that the absurd logic of the policies of force and the arms race is based on the theory that, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, man is worth less than the instruments of his death.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): I wish to make some brief remarks on the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament.

As representatives will recall, the programme of fellowships on disarmament was established during the first special session on disarmament to meet the needs of Member States, particularly the developing countries, in the sphere of disarmament. In my delegation's statement at the plenary meeting of that session on 26 May 1978, the then Nigerian Foreign Minister and now Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Major-General Joseph N. Garba, stated, inter alia:

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

"The United Nations must now launch a programme designed to give in-depth knowledge on disarmament issues to public officials so as to create a cadre of such officials in countries, mostly developing countries, which are currently short of such expertise". (A/S-10/PV.6, p. 46)

To enhance his argument in favour of implementation of the programme from the regular budget of the United Nations, he observed that the cost would "represent n more annually than the cost of one military vehicle" (ibid.).

I am pleased to say that the general opinion of members of this Committee is that the programme has been a success. As envisaged, it has turned out an appreciable number of public officials in the field of disarmament, particularly from the developing countries. The Secretary-General and his staff in the Department for Disarmament Affairs deserve commendation for their endeavours in that direction.

The wide support of Member States that the programme enjoys is exemplified in the number of requests for places in the fellowship programme and the number of countries that invite fellows annually to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the achievement of the overall objectives of the programme. In my statement in the Committee on 19 October 1987, I expressed our appreciation to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Japan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for inviting this year's fellows to study selected activities. The Governments of some other countries have in previous years invited fellows for similar visits. I wish to place on record our appreciation of the kindness shown by all those Governments that have contributed to the success of the programme. It is hoped that more Governments will extend invitations to future fellows in subsequent years.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

The First Committee, at this session, has before it draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.58/Rev.1, on the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament. The draft resolution is identical to the text proposed last year on the same subject, except that some changes have been made in order to enlist consensus for the programme, which we have all found very valuable.

The draft resolution recalls annex IV to the Concluding Document of the second special session on disarmament and notes with satisfaction the achievements of the programme, particularly the fact that several former fellows are now in positions of responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, serving their various Governments.

The draft resolution expresses the belief that the programme will enhance the capabilities of the fellows in understanding ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral, and calls on the Secretary-General to continue implementation of the programme within existing resources.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

It is pertinent to say, therefore, that the implementation of the programme will not entail additional expenditures or financial implications.

Finally, the draft resolution expresses appreciation to those Governments that extended invitations to the 1987 fellows and commends the Secretary-General for his diligence in the operation of the programme. We have made efforts, both in consultations and in drafting, to accommodate the views of Member States in the hope that the draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.58/Rev.1 has been introduced on behalf of the delegations of Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and on behalf of my own delegation.

Mr. CAPPAGLI (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Argentina wishes to introduce two draft resolutions on aspects of a priority item in disarmament negotiations.

Nuclear weapons, as mentioned in the Programme of Action of the 1978 Final Document, pose the greatest danger for mankind and the survival of our civilization. The final objective in this context is the total elimination of such weapons.

My delegation - together with those of Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, the Congo, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, the Sudan, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia - has sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.26, on the prevention of nuclear war, which is, in substance, is similar to its immediate antecedent, resolution 41/86 G.

(Mr. Cappagli, Argentina)

As in previous years, it was not possible in 1986 to establish in the Conference on Disarmament a subsidiary organ to study measures aimed at preventing nuclear war. Bearing in mind the urgency of the matter, and the fact that existing measures are inadequate, the draft resolution we are introducing:

"Again requests the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures which could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1988 session;" (A/C.1/42/L.26, para. 3)

The delegation of Argentina wishes also to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.25, which, in addition to my delegation, is sponsored by the delegations of Bangladesh, Cameroon, the German Democratic Republic, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Romania, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The need to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race, so as to avert the danger of nuclear war, is a matter of concern for the international community which is threatened by it. Thus the vital interest of the international community in nuclear disarmament negotiations.

This year the Conference on Disarmament held several informal meetings at which there was an interesting exchange of views on the question. In no way, however, should these meetings replace the establishment of an <u>ai hoc</u> committee with an appropriate negotiating mandate. Regrettably, it was also not possible in this field to make progress in 1986 at the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Cappagli, Argentina)

Similarly, as in the previous case, it was not possible to reach agreement on the establishment of a subsidiary organ to this end. Thus, the draft resolution requests that the General Assembly once again call on the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1988 session, to elaborate on paragraph 5 of the Final Document and to submit recommendations to the Conference on Disarmament as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages, for the cessation of the qualitative and quantitat a improvement and development of nuclear weapons, and the reduction and elimination of such weapons.

The delegation of Argentina trusts that both draft resolutions - A/C.1/42/L.25 and A/C.1/42/L.26 - will be adopted with the broadest support of the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.