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Chairman: Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (Zaire)

later: Mr. NASHASHIBI (Jordan) (Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE, AS NECESSARY

Mr. RUKASHAZA (Rwanda) (interpretation from French): Since this is the first time at this session that I have spoken in the general debate on all agenda items relating to disarmament, allow me to extend to you, Sir, the warm and sincere congratulations of the Rwandese delegation on your unanimous election to perform the important functions entrusted to you by calling on you to guide the work of the First Committee at the forty-second session of the General Assembly. These heartfelt congratulations are all the more spontaneous and less a matter of duty in that they are addressed to a worthy representative to the United Nations of a friendly brother and neighbour country, Zaire. Your experience of international issues and in diplomacy and your personal qualities are our guarantee of the successful performance of the duties entrusted to you. I assure you of the help and support of the Rwandese delegation, within the limits of its modest possibilities, in your difficult task of ensuring progress towards disarmament.

My congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee, who fully deserve the confidence placed in them.

The problems connected with disarmament are multifaceted and very complex. Indeed, when human life first began on earth man immediately started to produce weapons to provide him with security but also, and above all, to spread his domination over all living things, over his neighbours, over all his fellows. That arms race has not ceased.

Today we are developing weapons of mass destruction that could in a few seconds destroy all human life on our planet and pollute it irreversibly. Therefore much patience is called for so that a mutual climate of confidence may be established among nations and peoples so that they accept a minimal level of

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armaments that will not be a danger to mankind but will nevertheless guarantee their security.

In my statement I shall not touch on all the disarmament agenda items, first, because many previous speakers have thoroughly developed certain questions and set forth views shared by my delegation; and also because, as work progresses in our Committee my delegation will, when necessary, speak on individual items. We assure the Committee that our position is inspired solely by the United Nations Charter, which commits Member States to work for peace and help to develop international relations with a view to furthering the prosperity and social and economic progress to which all peoples aspire.

Our debates are taking place in favourable conditions, in a climate of events that is indisputably of historic importance in the sphere of disarmament. We are on the eve of the convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is to be held next year and the preparations for which are at an advanced stage. Furthermore, our debates are taking place shortly after the agreement in principle between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a treaty aimed at the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not to mention the holding from 24 August to 11 September 1987 of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, the results of which are a source of encouragement for developing countries.

Rwanda is a small country in the heart of Africa, without a coastline or special resources. We are a peace-loving nation and my country therefore bases its daily actions on the principles of peace, unity and development. Rwanda has no desire for armaments, because they would absorb its already limited resources needed to guarantee the fundamental right of its people to better nutrition, better health and education.

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In our fourth five-year development plan, we have focused on economic and social development through food self-sufficiency to ensure peace and security even more completely for our people: peace and security within our borders, in our subregion, in our continent and throughout the world. This is the major concern of our country, because peace is the pre-condition of the success of our development efforts.

For my country peace and security are the result not of over-arming so as to be feared, respected by one's peers, considered a military power, but rather of confidence shared with our neighbours, our peers - in short with all partners within and outside of our country. The arms race in increasingly sophisticated nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological and conventional weapons, instead of ensuring peace and security, constitutes a serious threat to all mankind. Today it is as though mankind were sitting on a powder keg that could explode at any time, spreading destruction, desolation and annihilation. We believe that man, who has been able to invent all these sophisticated means of destruction, should be wise enough not to abuse them, and that fully justifies general and complete disarmament, especially since the funds thus released could be used for the peaceful purposes of development.

The Rwandese Republic, which is traditionally and resolutely dedicated to peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes, supports any initiative directed at the acceleration of the process of general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, we oppose any action that would make more difficult and delay the disarmament process on our planet and therefore increase recourse to the threat of use of force, the use of existing arsenals, and the occupation of territories by foreign armies.

Thus, with regard to nuclear disarmament, my delegation continues to have great hopes of the agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet

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Union on the conclusion of a treaty on the elimination of short- and medium-range missiles. We hope that the continuing negotiations between the two countries will lead before the end of the year to a specific agreement which will be applied immediately. Of course, only one category of weapons is involved, the nuclear weapon, and within that category only a minority of weapons, the important thing is that this step towards mutual trust is taken. It could create a precedent and lead to the conclusion of other agreements on this category of weapons.

While remaining hopeful about the negotiations under way between the United States and the Soviet Union, my delegation is worried about the trend towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other States, which contributes to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. My country unequivocally supports the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in South Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East, Central America and Africa. But we must start by eliminating from those regions the nuclear weapons already there, and the countries concerned must agree, in particular, to submit their nuclear facilities to international verification procedures, whether those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or those applicable under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United Nations and the international community must spare no effort to ensure that recalcitrant States abide by the relevant international resolutions and permit verification by challenge.

With regard to South Africa, we note with dismay that, although the Heads of State or Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), during their first regular session, in 1964, adopted a Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the apartheid State of South Africa is becoming a nuclear State. This situation is all the more worrying since South Africa is a real threat to the peace and security not only of the front-line States and all Africa but of the entire world. My delegation joins others in requesting the General Assembly to adopt specific,

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immediate measures to bring about the denuclearization of Africa and to safeguard every region whose nationals seek to be free of nuclear weapons.

Turning now to outer space, everyone should bear in mind that this is the common heritage of all peoples and therefore must be used for fundamentally peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, technological, economic and social development of all nations, of all mankind. Therefore, we must refrain at all costs from transferring the headlong arms race on earth, on the oceans and in the atmosphere to outer space. My country believes that the exploration and use of space should be carried out in the interest and for the sake of peace, security and understanding among nations and international co-operation in improving the well-being of all peoples.

The history of mankind is in essence the history of armed conflicts between peoples striving to dominate another people or group of other peoples. The results of these conflicts, that is, the loss of human life and infrastructure and the ecological losses, are increasing at an alarming rate with the sophistication of weapons. The two world wars are still fresh in the memory of mankind. And yet there are bloody conflicts in many corners of the world with the use of expensive modern conventional weapons, which are a heavy burden on the slender budgets of many third world countries. While the major Powers spend enormous sums of money to develop military arsenals of all kinds, there is terrible poverty in the world: men dying of hunger, living without shelter, without the right to basic health care or education. That poverty in which nearly two thirds of the world's population is stagnating is a very serious threat to peace and security, a threat that we cannot combat with weapons, no matter how sophisticated they may be.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to assess at their true value the encouraging results of the International Conference on the Relationship

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between Disarmament and Development, because this relationship was highlighted by the countries participating in that Conference.

In his statement from this rostrum last September, the Minister for Co-operation and Foreign Affairs of Rwanda assessed and set out his expectations of that Conference in the following terms:

"The Rwanda delegation hopes that, in keeping with the conclusions reached at the end of that Conference, specific provisions will be adopted to remove the threat to mankind posed by the arms race and to carry out the transfers that would make possible spectacular scientific conquests and impose awareness of the correlation established between disarmament and development, between the needs of security and the expectations of peoples in search of progress and prosperity." (A/42/PV.9, p. 37)

(Mr. Rukashaza, Rwanda)

Our discussions on the eve of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be an opportunity for us to be as specific as possible in helping to improve preparations for that session and thus better ensure its success. My delegation is firmly convinced that the special session will contribute to the formulation of specific, practical and appropriate measures to speed up ongoing negotiations that will enable us to achieve results with far-reaching repercussions on disarmament, improve the climate of détente and confidence in the world, establish general conditions for peace and security and, finally, strengthen international co-operation for the improvement of the well-being of all peoples, while respecting the national independence of each State.

I would not wish to conclude my statement without paying special tribute to United Nations efforts in the disarmament field. As I said at the outset, disarmament issues are complex and multifaceted. The General Assembly has grappled with the problem of finding solutions acceptable to all parties; its efforts are continuing untiringly and its relevant bodies are working to find concrete solutions quickly in order to achieve the objectives of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): For a number of years now, the Byelorussian SSR has been paying particular attention to the problem of a ban on the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and has been undertaking efforts to achieve progress in this sphere. In our statement today, my delegation would like to dwell on this issue.

In 1948, the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments informed the Security Council that, in its view:



(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

"... Weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above." (S/C.3/27, para. 5)

Thus, the possible emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction was already considered realistic by the international community almost 40 years ago. The past decades have not led to the creation of such new types of weapons, and we can take satisfaction from that. On the other hand, the development of the world situation now compels mankind to look at the possibilities of scientific and technical progress not only with greater hope for its new and favourable fruits but also with growing alarm - alarm because new discoveries and achievements may turn out to be unprecedented dangers to the survival of mankind. The possible emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction is one of the serious aspects of such a danger. The trend towards increasing the material and intellectual resources allocated to military research and development attests to the fact that this is a real threat and we cannot simply close our eyes to it. At the same time, the world does not have sufficient resources for development and the basic needs of the population in many of the least developed countries.\*

According to data presented in the 1987 Annual Report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, expenditures for military research and development rose quickly in the 1980s, and the 1986 level exceeded expenditures for 1980 by 30 per cent. With regard to the consequences of such expenditures, the

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\*Mr. Nashashihi (Jordan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

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report reaches the important conclusion that it is not very likely that those efforts have strengthened security.

Clearly, the building of reliable security must follow another path - that of eliminating rather than creating weapons. The direction of military technical decisions, including the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction, does not lead to the strengthening of peace and international security. In the labyrinth of modern strategic realities this is not merely a dead-end passage but the shortest way to disaster. The future and genuine security depend on political decisions. A programme to ensure security through disarmament - first and foremost the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction - is receiving ever broader support. Important advances have been made or work is being started on some types of weapons of mass destruction that fall under the 1948 definition; in these circumstances, the problem of a ban on the development and production of new systems of such weapons is taking on special relevance.

At a time when we are making intensive efforts to eliminate nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons, it would obviously be unreasonable to simultaneously leave the door open for the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction. That view is even more justified for a non-nuclear and non-violent world, and the objective of building such a world is shared by the widest circle of States.

In addition, a situation is possible in which even though there is progress towards ever lower levels, and finally a zero level, of existing types of weapons of mass destruction, nevertheless, as a result of scientific discoveries, there may be developed a dangerous plan for radically changing the military strategic balance through the acquisition of new types of weapons of mass destruction which will not be available, at least for some time, to other parties.

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Furthermore, the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction might seem "justified" from the militaristic point of view if those weapons turn out to be less expensive, if they can reach their targets more easily and if they can annihilate enemy forces with less severe and less lasting consequences than nuclear weapons. The last of those factors are capable of leading to a reduction of the threshold for the unleashing of war by means of weapons of mass destruction.

In a summary of the possible and foreseeable negative consequences of the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction, we should include a sharp destabilization of the military strategic situation, a lowering of the threshold of global military conflict, a new impetus to the arms race, difficulties in the verification of disarmament and an increase in the gap between the development of military technology, on the one hand, and international efforts to eliminate armaments, on the other.

The aforementioned considerations seem to provide an answer to the question one sometimes hears: how timely is the problem of a ban on new type of weapons of mass destruction?

Our delegation notes with satisfaction that many States are becoming increasingly aware of the necessity and urgency of a solution to this problem, which was first raised in the United Nations by the socialist States. Among others, the Doha Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World, adopted in late 1986 by India and the USSR, lists a ban on the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction as one of the concrete disarmament measures that are urgently needed.

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

The delegations of Argentina and Egypt have stated that the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament should carefully consider the military uses of advances in science and technology, in particular the development of new weapons of mass destruction.

The international community has already done much solid work in this area. In the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly notes the need to avert a qualitative arms race and to ensure that scientific and technological advances are used solely for peaceful purposes. The Final Document states that

"effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements". (resolution S-10/2, para. 77)

General Assembly resolutions, many of them adopted on the initiative of the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, propose possible approaches for resolving the problem raised in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. We take this opportunity to express our thanks to the many delegations that sponsored those resolutions and to all who supported them.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is convinced that prevention is the most effective and practical approach to a prohibition of the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction. The history of disarmament shows that it is far simpler to achieve a ban on a given weapon before that weapon becomes a part of active military arsenals. If we are to make progress, the work aimed at preventing the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction must be made serious and specific; to do this, the evolution of the situation in this sphere must be constantly monitored so that the question of initiating negotiations on banning the weapons concerned may be raised in good time. The Byelorussian SSR

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believes that the Conference on Disarmament, a multilateral body for disarmament negotiations, is the most effective forum for such work.

In our view, the Conference on Disarmament could carry out such monitoring with appropriate assistance from experts. When necessary, it could make recommendations for specific negotiations on the new types of weapons of mass destruction that have been identified. But this in itself would not be sufficient. To prevent the incorporation of such weapons into military arsenals, we believe, immediately upon the identification of a new type of weapon of mass destruction, all States must renounce the practical development of that weapon and begin negotiations on prohibiting it.

Lastly, it would be logical if all States, guided by a desire to strengthen security, would refrain from any actions that could lead to the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction or new systems of such weapons.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is currently engaged in consultations with many other delegations on a draft resolution it has proposed, together with a number of other sponsors, concerning a ban on the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction. That draft resolution takes into account the views expressed in past years by other delegations. We hope to achieve broad agreement among States on significant measures in this area. It is through unified efforts by all States that we shall be able to deal with this serious problem.

In conclusion, we express the hope that at its forty-second session the General Assembly will make a major contribution to preventing the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction and thereby facilitate progress towards a non-nuclear, non-violent world.

Mr. Mészter (Hungary): I wish today to address the issue of radiological weapons. Efforts to ban radiological weapons have a long history. As early as 1948 a United Nations forum, the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in its resolution of 12 August 1948, classified nuclear weapons, chemical (bacteriological) weapons and radiological weapons as weapons of mass destruction. Since then the disarmament community has been considering in one form or another the prohibition of radiological weapons, sometimes together with other types of arms.

Multilateral negotiations aimed at their total ban entered into a more intensive phase in 1979. It was in that year that the Conference on Disarmament, then known as the Committee on Disarmament, included as a separate item of its agenda the question of radiological weapons, in the larger context of new types of weapons of mass destruction. Since 1980 that question has been discussed in an ad hoc working group, while from 1984 on, an Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament has been set up annually to conduct negotiations on the issue. The year 1980 was relevant for another reason too: it was then that the idea of the prohibition of deliberate attacks on nuclear facilities was introduced and added to the original subject matter. Thus, the task of the Conference on Disarmament that of assuring negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty or treaties prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons - we call this "track A", or radiological weapons in the traditional sense - and prohibiting all attacks on nuclear facilities, which we call "track B".

I want to emphasize that it was generally recognized that the two questions - prohibition of traditional radiological weapons and a ban on attacks against nuclear facilities - were both important issues requiring solution and that the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum to deal with them.

(Mr. Meisster, Hungary)

The fact that we had before us two distinct, but in a certain way interrelated, questions gave the problem of approach a significant role from the very beginning. Theoretically there are two possibilities: either the so-called unitary approach, under which we try to formulate the elements of one treaty covering both issues, with working groups divided according to the main treaty elements, or the so-called dual approach, where special working groups are set up on the two questions with a view to formulating treaty elements separately. Understandably, the method of work took on special importance and has always been the subject of lengthy debate.

This phase, preliminary to the negotiations, could not be avoided this year either. Delegations in the Conference on Disarmament showed a significant degree of flexibility and opted for the second method. Accordingly, no objection was raised to a new structure of negotiations through an appropriate separation of "tracks" A and B.

(Mr. Meisster, Hungary)

As a result of this the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense of the word and the ban on attacks against nuclear facilities was considered separately in two contact groups under the guidance of a co-ordinator in each group. Two delegations, those of Japan and Indonesia, agreed to act as co-ordinators. At this point I should like to thank the two co-ordinators, Mr. Hadi Wayarabi of Indonesia and Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan for their devoted and very able work.

We are of course aware that by choosing this method of work the Ad Hoc Committee, after having tried the so-called unitary approach for three consecutive years, in fact went back to the position of the early 1980s, to the so-called double-track approach. I would hasten to add that at the same time we did our best to safeguard the intellectual and professional contribution to this cause during the so-called unitary approach as well.

This time we wanted to examine whether there is a better possibility of identifying and, as far as possible, formulating precisely the positions of different delegations when the process of formulation is not overburdened and over-complicated by the complexity of the relationship between the two distinct problem issues.

In this endeavour, the Ad Hoc Committee gave evidence of considerable realism. It was not on a wild-goose chase to formulate positions acceptable to all during this exercise. Instead it concentrated its work on clearly mapping out different positions so as to have as complete a register of the positions as possible. This was a successful try, even though we are aware that nobody can be satisfied with that much. So what were we able to accomplish at this year's session?

We succeeded in identifying the possible elements for the two conventions. We further succeeded in drafting treaty elements and alternatives to them, where



(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

differences in positions clearly exist. Delegations will find the result of this year's work in annexes I and II respectively of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons under the headings, "Possible elements for an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons" and "Possible elements relevant to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities". Members will find that the two attachments in the annexes are full of alternatives, and even so every second formulation is decorated with an asterisk or with special "numbers" indicating the existence of further dissenting opinions. Was it, consequently, a futile exercise? I do not think so.

In our sober assessment the two contact groups under the very intelligent guidance of their co-ordinators thus clearly exposed all existing views, all possible solution elements. They thereby laid a sound basis for intersessional reflection as well as for a good departure towards approaching the different views at next year's session of the Conference on Disarmament.

On this basis I have the honour to introduce on behalf of the Swedish, Japanese and Indonesian delegations, as well as my own delegation, draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.5 entitled, "General and complete disarmament: prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". The draft resolution takes note

"of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1987 session that deals with the question of radiological weapons," and especially

"of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1988 session".

Further it requests

"the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end and drawing upon the annexes to its report as a basis of its future work, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-third session".

Finally, it asks the General Assembly

"to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled 'Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons'".

We hope that the draft resolution will draw wide support from delegations in the First Committee and that it will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. IDULE-AMOKO (Uganda): We are speaking with a profound sense of honour and joy, not only because you, Mr. Chairman, have an impeccable record as a diplomat, but also because you hail from a fraternal country that has very close historic, geographic and cultural bonds with my own. Your presence as Chairman will undoubtedly enrich the deliberations of the Committee.

Exactly one week ago today, my President and Head of State, Mr. Yoweri Museveni, while addressing the General Assembly, challenged the international community in the following terms:

"How are we entering the twenty-first century? Do we enter it as a planet whose scientific discoveries and spiritual values have provided a common purpose for survival? Or do we enter the next century poised to use our space-age technology to prepare the annihilation of life on our planet?"

(A/42/PV.45, p. 6)

In reference to other international peace campaigns that refuse to take due account of the social conditions of peoples, my Head of State warned that "a more fundamental commitment to the improvement of our socio-economic conditions is the prime imperative of our times. A hungry man cannot be said

(Mr. Idule-Amoko, Uganda)

to enjoy a full life; a sick man is an incomplete human being. ... it is impossible to guarantee the human dignity of the people in a state of poverty, disease, ignorance and economic backwardness. In these circumstances, such efforts will be rendered peripheral to the real human rights problems which ... are based on the consequences of underdevelopment." (pp. 7-8)

To us, therefore, it seems outright moral perversion to perceive security in solely military terms. A new thinking has already emerged and is taking ground: that one is secure in so far as his social and economic environment is hospitable. The security of an individual, or of a nation for that matter, cannot be measured by the sheer possession of sophisticated instruments of death and destruction.

It is from this premise that we approach the question of security in its global dimensions. Security concepts that do not address themselves to the social and economic imperatives of our times are futile. That is why we must reject anachronistic military and strategic doctrines that inflame the arms race, sow seeds of international discord and endanger international peace and security. When the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development convened last August, it was our unrelenting hope that concrete plans would be mapped out to realize national and international security in universal terms. We are deeply dismayed that, though the link between disarmament and development was recognized, the establishment of a fund that would have been a tangible consequence of the disarmament process could not gain popular reception. We hope that this issue will constitute one of the preoccupations of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Idule-Amoko, Uganda)

Amongst the numerous reports to be considered at this session is one on the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy held at Geneva in March and April 1987. As you are no doubt aware, the Conference was not able to agree on universally acceptable principles for international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. That is yet another glaring example of a case in which efforts to promote international co-operation and harmony have been thwarted through the denial of the fruits of technological development to the many by the few.

It goes without saying that both developed and developing countries would benefit from advances in the nuclear field. Even though small countries like Uganda cannot afford nuclear power installations, we could utilize nuclear science in agricultural, veterinary, hydrological, medical and other fields. That is why Uganda has been urging the United Nations through its specialized agencies, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency, to assist the Organization of African Unity to host a seminar on nuclear science for peace and development in Africa. We do not believe that the benefits of technical development should be the domain of the chosen few. We are somewhat perplexed when dubious criteria are used to determine who does and who does not qualify to receive nuclear technology.

A tragic example of this is the nuclear co-operation rendered to the racist Pretoria régime by some Members of the Organization, a practice that must call for universal denunciation. We have said before, and we reiterate today, that apartheid is a crime against humanity and poses a serious threat to international peace and security.

We are deeply conscious of the many entreaties made here that realism should characterize disarmament negotiations and deliberations. One of the pertinent results of such entreaties is the agreement in principle reached between the Soviet

(Mr. Idule-Amoko, Uganda)

Union and the United States of America to dismantle their intermediate nuclear forces. It is our fervent hope that this marks the beginning of a stage of far-reaching significance in disarmament negotiations. It is hoped that an early agreement will be achieved, leading to the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on nuclear tests, a ban on chemical weapons and the demilitarization of outer space in order to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, having due regard to the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

Mr. JAEGER (Denmark): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the twelve States members of the European Community on item 62 (c) of our agenda, "Conventional disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission".

While nuclear arms reduction remains one of the highest priorities for the countries on whose behalf I speak, the Twelve have consistently stressed that conventional disarmament is an integral and essential part of the overall disarmament process. We therefore welcome the widespread and growing awareness in the international community of the pressing need to achieve concrete results in the field of conventional arms limitation and disarmament. This has also been clearly illustrated in the Committee by the number of statements made on this subject by a wide range of countries made and by the number of draft resolutions submitted.

The Twelve believe that the aim of the process of conventional disarmament should be to seek effectively verifiable arms control agreements leading to a more stable and secure balance of forces at the lowest possible level.

It is conventional weapons that have caused the loss of many millions of lives in countries throughout the world. Because of the global proliferation of conventional arms and technical developments in this area, the devastating power of

(Mr. Jaeger, Denmark)

these arms now exceeds anything the world has ever seen in the conventional field. Furthermore, the expenditure on conventional weapons is a serious economic strain on a large number of countries. As almost 90 per cent of all military spending is used for conventional armaments and forces, not only the major Powers, but all the States of the world must become involved in the process of conventional disarmament in order to release the financial resources needed to make a major impact on the world's social and economic problems.

Efforts to achieve conventional disarmament should be pursued on a global, as well as on a regional, level. The latter approach may well prove to be the most practicable for achieving progress in the foreseeable future. In that context we support the draft resolution on regional disarmament submitted by some members of the Twelve.

The document adopted by the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures at Stockholm in September 1986 was a major contribution to the building of trust between States. The concrete confidence- and security-building measures embodied in that document represent a significant contribution to European security as well as to international peace and security in general. We hope to see further progress in this field.

Conventional disarmament is particularly important in Europe since our continent is the geographical area in which there is the heaviest concentration of armed forces in the world. The Twelve attach the greatest importance to achieving further progress in promoting stability through the establishment in Europe of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels. We support the draft resolution submitted by States members of the Twelve on confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament.

(Mr. Jaeger, Denmark)

At the request of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission considered the question of conventional disarmament at its session in 1987. We have noted with satisfaction the report by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission on the substantive consideration of the question of conventional disarmament. The Twelve participated actively in the deliberations in the Working Group on that item - presided over by a member of the Twelve, and although no conclusions were agreed upon, we think that the report of the Working Group constitutes a solid basis for further negotiations at the Commission's meeting next year. We support the draft resolution on this subject (A/C.1/42/L.12) introduced by a State member of the European Community.

In conventional disarmament, as in other areas of disarmament, increased information, openness and transparency are prerequisites for the achievement of agreement on reductions of armed forces. The Twelve have consistently advocated a more free and open flow of objective information on military matters. The need for transparency, openness and reliable data is reflected in the draft resolution submitted by some members of the Twelve (A/C.1/42/L.22). We of course support that resolution.

(Mr. Jaeger, Denmark)

The Twelve also note with interest the draft resolutions introduced by other States, including those submitted by China and Peru, which we are studying carefully and positively.

In looking ahead to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we believe that it should offer an opportunity to expand the area of consensus with regard to conventional disarmament in the light of developments in this field in recent years.

I am also speaking today on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community in order to make some comments on agenda item 60, entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

The Twelve have consistently and actively supported endeavours towards international agreements on effective disarmament measures that could contribute to reducing military budgets. Such agreements should lead to tangible measures of arms limitation and arms reduction and to increased security at the lowest possible level of military capability.

Global military spending is absorbing a substantial portion of the human, financial and technological resources of the world, and real and effective reductions in military expenditures could have far-reaching beneficial effects on domestic, social and economic conditions in all countries.

As the military budgets are a heavy burden on the economies of all countries, it is obvious that for Governments in industrialized, as well as in developing, countries, there should be a strong mutual interest in seeking to reduce the heavy military spending without diminishing security, thereby increasing the allocation of national and financial resources for a number of urgent humanitarian needs. The benefits that might be obtained by the reduction of military budgets were also considered at the recent United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.



(Mr. Jaeger, Denmark)

The Twelve have for many years emphasized the necessity of establishing agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures. Transparency and comparability are necessary prerequisites for starting negotiations of agreements on their reduction.

An important step in this direction was the recommendation in General Assembly resolution 35/142 B, which provides a universal framework whereby States can report to the Secretary-General about their military expenditures in a standardized form. The standardized international reporting instrument of the United Nations has proved to be a valuable first step making it possible for all Member States, which have different budgeting systems, to supply useful information on their military expenditures, thereby contributing to greater transparency in this field. We therefore urge other countries, and especially countries where information on military budgets is not fully available from public sources, to make use of the United Nations reporting system.

The United Nations should play a central role in stimulating negotiations on disarmament measures that could lead to the reduction of military expenditures. All Member States should therefore co-operate with the Organization with a view to discussing and solving the problems related to this process. By supplying the Secretary-General with information about their military expenditures, Member States would support the Organization in carrying out its role in this field.

Since 1980, the Disarmament Commission has considered the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets. To our regret, only very limited progress was made during this year's session of the Disarmament Commission. The momentum achieved at its preceding session was thus not maintained. The Twelve, however, hope that the Disarmament Commission, at its session in 1988, will be able to finalize the draft principles and solve the

(Mr. Jaeger, Denmark)

outstanding issues concerning the vital principles of transparency and comparability. The reduction of military budgets should furthermore be considered at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Twelve hope that the outcome of the Committee's consideration of this subject will reflect these points of view.

Mr. RAMOS BUSTOS (Honduras) (interpretation from Spanish): In this first statement by our delegation, it is my pleasure to associate myself with the many expressions of congratulations extended to you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this Committee on account of your well-known experience and qualifications, which will, I believe, assure the success of our meetings.

I should also like to express congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

Later I shall refer to other items on our agenda, but I should now like to express views on a topic to which my delegation attaches great importance, since it should guarantee peace and security to all regions in the world. We are concerned over the fear prevailing in the world because of the continuous development of conventional and other devastating weapons.

The delegation of Honduras has listened with special interest to the debate that has taken place in which we heard a description of the climate in which the world is evolving. We hope that the anguished voices of all nations, in particular of those not possessing nuclear weapons, will be clearly heard by those possessing such weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear Powers bear an enormous responsibility to the human race. The already well-known fatal consequences that would arise from the use of nuclear weapons is still valid. It is like a Damocles sword hanging over mankind that could tragically lead to the total annihilation of any sign of life on our planet.

(Mr. Ramos Bustos, Honduras)

This spine-chilling situation has been given some initial justification because of the politico-military relationship of a bi-polar character. Nevertheless these relationships, instead of making the world more stable and secure, have intensified the degree of mistrust and only helped to bring us inexorably closer to disaster. We hope that we can discern a glimmer of hope with last September's agreement of principle, which is designed to eliminate the intermediate-range nuclear missile and we hope that this will also extend to other types of weapons of mass destruction. We hope that this will enable the voices of the international community asking for disarmament to be more clearly heard.

Talks to reduce present levels of weaponry is the responsibility of all nations not only to bring a halt to the insane arms race, but also to make progress along the path to disarmament in order to ensure stability for mankind. These first steps should be encouraged and my delegation welcomes them, hoping that the goodwill will encourage those States to create a general climate of confidence that will lead to an effective agreement on disarmament and the adoption of control and verification measures necessary to ensure compliance. It is important that the awareness of such great problems be translated into action, thus avoiding the dire words of warning becoming a reality. In November 1986, it was stated that in a nuclear war there can be no victors and that such a war must never be waged. We hope that the present climate will lead to détente and understanding.

My country, as one that does not possess nuclear weapons, endorses the terms submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Conference on Disarmament and to this Committee.

(Mr. Ramos Bustos, Honduras)

We understand the need to have an effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of this type of weapon by those States that possess them. Countries such as ours certainly hope that the super-Powers will agree on world disarmament. The fact that Honduras is in a denuclearized zone and does not possess such deadly weapons does not exempt it from the devastating effects of a possible world war. We are indeed defenceless and therefore must resolutely support any effort to find a common formula to overcome the differences that still exist. This general, basic approach must be set forth in a legally binding instrument that includes safeguards for its proper implementation.

It is crucial that nuclear-weapon States take account of the legitimate and pressing concerns of our States as a faithful expression of the necessity of creating a system of relations between States that are bound together by understanding and not interference. We must not dissipate the positive climate that has been created. The non-nuclear-weapon States should view positively anything that may lead to world peace.

In more specific terms, there is a real possibility that the climate of uncertainty and tension that has prevailed in Central America over the past eight years will become a thing of the past. The agreement reached at Guatemala by the five Central American Presidents is an edifying symbol of hope and understanding. A little progress has been made, and we hope that these first steps will lead to a stable and lasting peace in each country of Central America and to a harmonious system of co-operation among the five States of the region, all of which must contribute to the effort. Development in the region has been halted, and that situation must be overcome. We need the help of all countries in attaining those goals.

(Mr. Ramos Bustos, Honduras)

I should like to reaffirm that my Government will fulfil all the undertakings agreed upon in the Guatemala agreement as a contribution to peace in our continent.

The overall panorama in the field of disarmament is more promising than in the past. It is important that negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament receive renewed impetus to consolidate and strengthen that body so that it may serve the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter. Accusations and recriminations must give way to co-operation and understanding, especially among those who hold the fate of our planet in their hands. The achievement of agreement in this area is no easy task, but we should not continue to waste our time and resources in statements that reiterate the will to negotiate without putting that will into practice. We must now make genuine efforts to attain the objectives towards which the great majority of nations are striving.

At the threshold of the twenty-first century we must ensure that future generations live in a world free from nuclear weapons. We must eliminate the possibility of a nuclear holocaust and channel the world's natural and financial resources, which are now being wasted in the nuclear-arms race, in other and more beneficial directions, fulfilling the hope of the world's peoples that mankind may be freed from fear, disease and hunger.

The CHAIRMAN: Some representatives wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply. Before calling upon them, I draw the Committee's attention to the following decision of the General Assembly:

"Delegations should exercise their right of reply at the end of the day whenever two meetings have been scheduled for that day and whenever such meetings are devoted to the consideration of the same item.

"The number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two per item.

(The Chairman)

"The first intervention in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation on any item at a given meeting should be limited to 10 minutes and the second intervention should be limited to five minutes." (Decision 34/401, paras. 8-10)

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I have asked for the floor today in order to set the record straight regarding some remarks made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union. In his statement, Ambassador Nazarkin pointed to various initiatives the Soviet Union has taken in regard to chemical-weapons negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. Unfortunately, he also stated that the main obstacle which can delay the talks seems to be the desire of some States to gain time for developing binary weapons, and he questioned the sincerity of the intentions of those who are resuming chemical-weapon production.

If this were simply another case of the Soviet Union taking unwarranted credit for the achievements of others, our delegation would not intervene. Progress is progress, and it is not important who receives the accolades so long as there is a convergence of views and continuing progress towards a chemical-weapons convention. I cannot, however, sit by while the sincerity of the United States delegation is called into question.

The Soviet statement accused the United States of sowing mistrust and lacking sincerity with regard to the chemical-weapons negotiations.

The United States delegation rejects those charges.

Ambassador Nazarkin linked both of those allegations to the scheduled United States binary modernization programme. This modest binary programme, approved with deliberation and all due consideration by the Administration and the Congress, is necessary to correct in some small measure the huge Soviet build-up in chemical

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

weapons, which continued unabated until early this year, when the Soviets first admitted possession of chemical weapons and later announced they had ceased production.

The United States welcomed this admission and announcement of cessation, particularly since the United States unilaterally ceased production of chemical weapons in 1969 and has not produced any of these munitions for 18 years. During the 18 years of the United States moratorium the immense Soviet arsenal has become a threat to the security of the United States and our allies in Western Europe. This imbalance is both threatening and destabilizing.

During the long United States moratorium and the continuing Soviet build-up we continued to negotiate in good faith on a chemical-weapons convention in Geneva.

As will be recalled, Vice-President Bush submitted a convention on behalf of the United States at Geneva in 1983, which contained many of the inspection and verification features ignored and opposed by the Soviets until this year.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

The Soviet statement also referenced a new proposal of the Soviet Union on bilateral exchange of data. In fact, what the Soviet Union did was to accept lock, stock and barrel the 1984 proposal of the United States - a proposal that, despite the persistent importunings of the United States delegation, the Soviet Union had hitherto refused to address substantively.

Ambassador Nazarkin also alluded to a proposal which the Soviet Union put on the negotiating table for mandatory challenge inspection without the right of refusal. If this so-called proposal sounds familiar it is because it was first presented in CD/500, the United States draft conventional weapons convention introduced in the Conference on Disarmament several years ago. Mandatory challenge inspection is a concept only recently accepted by the Soviet Union.

In other remarks which do not appear in his distributed text, Ambassador Nazarkin seemed to state that the Shikhany visit was the first of its kind. He may be forgiven for failing to mention the workshop for Conference on Disarmament representatives hosted by the United States at Tooele, Utah, in 1983, since his Government chose not to attend. We are pleased that the Soviets have now agreed to pay such a visit to Tooele.

In each of these instances it is perhaps inaccurate to describe Soviet conduct as new initiatives. They have simply quit saying no. This is not to disparage such movement of the Soviet delegation, because it has enabled the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to make unprecedented headway.

The United States believes that progress on chemical weapons was made at Geneva this year. We anticipate even more progress at the intersessional and bilateral meetings later this year in Geneva. Certainly we are hopeful about prospects for progress in 1988. But we are not negotiating a chemical weapons



(Mr. Friederadorf, United States)

convention in Geneva for the sake of a convention, or measuring our progress against artificial deadlines, pseudo-urgency or generated pressure applied by negotiating States possessing a preponderance of stocks. Our purpose in being in Geneva working on a chemical-weapons ban is to attain a convention that enhances the security not only of the United States of America and its allies, but of all States throughout the world. Characterizing the role of the United States of America in this process as mistrustful and insincere does not contribute positively to the efforts of all of us to ban chemical weapons.

Mr. MOREL (France) (interpretation from French): I am speaking in exercise of France's right of reply following the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union on the question of chemical weapons. He alluded to two countries and, because of the way he described their positions, a very serious substantive comment by France is necessary. We cannot allow that description, although general and apparently indirect, to confuse the point of view which France has expressed regarding chemical weapons, in particular, during the last few months, and which I went into in great detail in my statement, to be presented as it has been presented this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union.

The position stated is ours. It has been and remains our position. There is no question of two countries having made a joint choice. The problem is quite different; I speak of what concerns the French Government, and France is making this proposal from its own point of view. We are in no way trying to defend a particular right with regard to one or other type of production. We are trying to remind all parties to the convention of a real problem, that of security, which jeopardizes the credibility and proper functioning of the convention during the

(Mr. Morel, France)

first 10 years after its entry into force - that is, during the phase of the destruction of stocks, of which we stress the necessity, which is disputed by none. Equal security is essential for all parties at all times during the implementation of the convention, but particularly during the first 10 years.

I shall not go back over the substance of the question, but I believe that rather than engage in an exaggerated or polemical presentation of our position, it would be better to undertake a thorough study of this problem of security that faces all countries. This is a real problem. The debates in Geneva seem to demonstrate that this question is appreciated. We do not claim to propose a final solution. We have submitted a certain number of ideas to the negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament. If we stress this point it is because for a long time now this problem has been deferred; it has been said that it should be discussed later. Our argument at a time when negotiations are being stepped up, when the real stakes are on the table, is that later will be too late. This is a serious, urgent problem which deserves something better than a caricature of the position of my country.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.